JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

IMPROVING THE AGILITY OF THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF)

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: _________________________________

01 April 2010

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Robert Antis, JFSC
**Title**: Improving the Agility of the NATO Response Force

**Abstract**: Significant challenges impede North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Response Force (NRF) agility. NATO has not sufficiently advanced policy, doctrine, planning, task organization, unity of effort, funding, or strategic lift in order for the NRF to be operationally successful. Without significant advancements in these areas, the NRF will be limited in its ability to deploy combat formations within timelines of five to thirty days to theaters of operations located strategic distances from Europe. This paper provides a review of NATO’s Cold War origins to its transition to expeditionary operations with the NRF; a review of relevant NATO policy, funding, doctrine, and the planning process that shapes NRF operations; and case analyses of NATO’s past military operations both prior to and following the formation of the NRF.
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I would like to thank three people for contributing to this thesis. My wonderful wife, Dr. Gwendolyn Eungard, provided tremendous support and encouragement throughout this endeavour. Special thanks to Dr. Robert Antis, my advisor at the Joint Forces Staff College for his outstanding advice and coaching. His expertise in European affairs proved invaluable during the writing of this paper. Finally, I want to thank Major John Skutch, USMC, at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk. His perspective from within NATO provided great insight to the challenges facing daily NATO operations.
ABSTRACT

Significant challenges impede North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Response Force (NRF) agility. NATO has not sufficiently advanced policy, doctrine, planning, task organization, unity of effort, funding, or strategic lift in order for the NRF to be operationally successful. Without significant advancements in these areas, the NRF will be limited in its ability to deploy combat formations within timelines of five to thirty days to theaters of operations located strategic distances from Europe.

This paper provides a review of NATO’s Cold War origins to its transition to expeditionary operations with the NRF; a review of relevant NATO policy, funding, doctrine, and the planning process that shapes NRF operations; and case analyses of NATO’s past military operations both prior to and following the formation of the NRF. The goal of this paper is to provide recommendations for NATO leaders to improve the NRF’s agility by improving its ability to deploy and sustain its forces while it successfully executes its missions. The author’s recommendations for improving agility include increasing NRF funding; promoting continued investments in airlift and sealift assets; diversifying the NRF’s task organization by adding constabulary forces; emphasizing greater unity of effort during deployment and execution; and finally, providing greater fidelity to the force with definitive policy, doctrine, and adaptive planning.
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

“...21st century realities are calling for a NATO that is more agile, more flexible, and more expeditionary.”

General James L. Jones

Following the 2002 NATO Prague Summit, NATO committed to the formation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) that could be utilized not only in support of Article V collective defense operations but also in non-Article V operations. This NRF may include forces from countries that are not part of the twenty-eight-nation NATO Alliance but are partners under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. The creation of the NRF signaled a dramatic shift from the “standing in place” territorial defensive force posture and logistics processes geared toward crisis response solely in the western Europe to an agile, expeditionary force capable of rapid deployment outside the footprint of Europe. Additionally, NATO’s logistics concepts, originally designed to maximize support to the standing forces in Europe, are now transforming to provide rapid support to the response forces. This shift to expeditionary forces prompts NATO nations to procure strategic lift capabilities and pool resources in order to enable many of its member nations to deploy and execute NATO’s expanding mission set.

Significant challenges impede NRF agility as the transition from territorial defense forces to agile expeditionary forces has not been quickly embraced by all nations nor has progress been made quickly. The thesis of this paper is that only through NATO changes specific to policy, doctrine, planning, unity of effort, task organization, funding, and strategic lift will the NRF achieve the agility required to be operationally effective.

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Without greater advancements in these areas, the NRF will be severely limited in its ability to deploy combat formations within timelines of five to thirty days to theaters of operations located at strategic distances from Europe.

The main thrust of this paper is to suggest ways to improve the *agility* of the NRF. In order to discuss agility, it must first be defined. Agility, used four times in the Joint Operations manual⁴ and thirteen times in the Army’s current operations manual,⁵ is not officially defined by the DOD in Joint Publication 1-02. The exclusion of the word from the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms implies that the Merriam-Webster definition is adequate for its use in DOD.⁶ The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions also does not include agile or agility in its contents and cites the Concise Oxford Dictionary (Ninth Edition) as the official reference for English words not included in the glossary.⁷ The default official definitions of agility are shown in Table 1 below.

### Table 1. Definitions of Agility

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<th>Source Dictionary</th>
<th>Official Source of:</th>
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<td>Merriam-Webster</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
<td>(1) marked by ready ability to move with quick easy grace &lt;an agile dancer&gt;, and (2) having a quick resourceful and adaptable character &lt;an agile mind&gt;.²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concise Oxford Dictionary</td>
<td>NATO English-speaking Forces</td>
<td>(1) able to move quickly and easily, and (2) quick-witted or shrewd.¹</td>
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⁵ Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2008), 1-11, 1-16 – 1-17, 1-19 - 1-21, 3-4, 4-9, 6-13, C-1, and D-6. Note: D-6 removed Army specific definition of agility and aligns definition with Joint Staff and common English use.
⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington D.C., 2009), ii.
⁷ NATO Military Agency for Standardization, *Allied Administrative Publication - 6 (AAP-6 (V)), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions for Military Use* (Brussels: 2000), VIII.
Both definitions when applied to a military force suggest the ability of the force to move quickly, easily and gracefully while being resourceful and adaptable. Therefore, in order for the NRF to be agile, it must possess the ability to plan, task organize, and move or deploy quickly either by air or surface.

The goal of this thesis is to make recommendations to NATO leaders for improving the NRF’s agility. In order to achieve this goal, this paper begins by providing a review of the relevant background of NATO’s Cold War origins to its transition following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. In light of the relevant history, Chapter II reviews relevant NATO policy that directed the creation of an agile NATO Response Force (NRF). Chapter II also reviews NRF funding and doctrine and the NATO planning process that continue to shape the limited agility in NATO planning and operations. Chapter III includes case analyses of NATO’s past military operations both prior to and following the formation of the NRF, which identify capability gaps that limit NATO expeditionary operations and in particular the agility of the NRF. Chapter IV provides recommendations on improving the agility of the NRF by addressing the shortfalls in policy, doctrine, funding, strategic lift, task organization and unity of effort identified in Chapters II and III. Finally, Chapter V summarizes the key points discussed in the thesis.

Periodically, the European Union is mentioned in order to highlight the potential overlap of EU Rapid Reaction Forces with the NATO Response Force. The NRF likely will also deploy in support of EU-sponsored operations in the future, so its inclusion in the discussion, though minor, is intended to emphasize the overlap and the mutual benefit provided by the NRF.
The Context of NATO's Origin

In order to set the context for dramatic change in posture from a nuclear based territorially defensive response force that characterized NATO forces for fifty years to a force with expeditionary aspirations, a historical review follows. What started as a strong political action with nuclear-capable forces to stop the Communist advancement across the European States has now grown into an Alliance, complete with operational headquarters and dedicated forces standing by to respond rapidly in response to world crisis or political aims.

Following the atomic bombings and subsequent surrender of Japan in WWII on 15 August 1945, the United State’s 33rd President, Harry S. Truman, welcomed home nearly 4.5 million\(^8\) soldiers and began reconverting the U.S. from a wartime to a peacetime economy. Facing projections of up to 8 million people unemployed,\(^9\) unprecedented inflation, and a towering budget deficit of $279 billion,\(^10\) the President and the American people focused inward. They engaged in external commitments only through occupation forces, the international leadership of General of the Army George Marshall and the economic stimulus plan bearing his name, the Marshall Plan.

The U.S. committed significant numbers of occupation forces for demilitarization and nation-building in Japan and Germany, though France and England's occupation forces greatly lowered the U.S. force requirement. The significant use of occupation forces marked a change in policies from post WWI as America did not quickly retreat

\(\text{\footnotesize\(^8\) John C. Sparrow, }\textit{DA Pamphlet 20-21, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army},\ (Washington, D.C., 1952), 85.\)


behind the oceans as it had it 1919-1920.\(^\text{11}\) President Truman set out to reduce the national debt by rapidly reducing the size of the military budget and advocated the Universal Military Training Corps to train all draft-aged males on military basics, thereby increasing the national militia without having to pay the Regular Army wages.\(^\text{12}\)

By contrast, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) kept many of its forces in place at the end of WWII and in 1946, began to prepare its military “against all kinds of eventualities,” as directed by Joseph Stalin.\(^\text{13}\) Greece, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Italy struggled against growing internal support to Communist parties.\(^\text{14}\) Winston Churchill was the first to characterize this Soviet presence as an “Iron Curtain descending across the Continent” in his *Sinews of Peace* on 5 March 1946. He further stated that, "If the Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If however they become divided or falter in their duty and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all."\(^\text{15}\)

President Truman later spoke to a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, intending to gain support for $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey to support their internal wars against Communist insurgents. He gained both congressional support and international support for his doctrine of supporting “free peoples who are resisting


\(^{12}\) Donovan, 136-137.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 187.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 276 - 291, 357-366.

attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”\textsuperscript{*6} During and immediately after the election year of 1948, however, President Truman encountered three significant challenges: Soviet blockade of Berlin requiring continuous airlift support to West Berlin; internal Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia by way of its newly elected Communist leadership in June, 1948; and the Mao Tse-Tung’s Communist People’s Liberation Army defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Army of China in 1949 despite U.S. financial assistance and General Marshall’s political assistance to Chiang Kai-shek.\textsuperscript{17}

Seeing the spread of Communism throughout the world and struggling to find resources to limit its advance, Britain, France, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg signed an agreement in March 1948, creating the Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO) intent on providing a common defense in Europe.\textsuperscript{18} The WUDO countries approached the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to strengthen the collective defense of the alliance. On 4 April 1949, the Washington Treaty of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed.\textsuperscript{19} The North Atlantic Treaty’s Article V defiantly stated, “All Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be an attack against all.”\textsuperscript{20}

NATO’s birth, therefore, must be viewed through the paradigm of desperation and fear that immediately followed WWII. The U.S. and Western European nations

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 371
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 372.
sought a non-military based political solution to the Soviet threat, although Western European nations greatly desired the U.S.'s nuclear capability and protection now provided by the Treaty. In 1949, there was no initial intent to have an agile, multinational military force to defending against Soviet attack. These nations wanted to avoid war, and no nation outside of the USSR wanted to fund a large standing army. As the next section will convey, the deterrence policy would give way to flexible response guidance over the next fifty years.

Evolution of NATO's Force Structure from 1950 - 1989

The first U.S. use of force following NATO's inception occurred during 1950-53, when President Truman employed U.S. military forces against North Korea following their invasion of South Korea. In doing so, he implemented his policy of helping free peoples to stand against attempted subjugation. As a crisis outside the North Atlantic area, President Truman did not have the ability to enact Article V and gain NATO support in the war, although the war had UN Security Council approval under UN Security Council Resolutions 82 - 85.21 This began a pattern of the U.S. and major European nations deploying forces and fighting around the world in support of struggling democracies without the ability to claim NATO support. NATO did not support collective military action outside the European footprint to counter a perceived threat until the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent regional instabilities and extremist terrorist attacks pushed the Alliance into expeditionary operations.

Just prior to the U.S. entrance into the Korean War, NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC), created by the Washington’s Treaty’s Article 9, directed the formation of

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the Defence Committee, on September 17th, 1949. The committee agreed to create an integrated military command structure for Europe and the Atlantic Ocean – the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR, operational on 2 April 1951) and the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT, operational on 10 April 1952). The NAC approved General Dwight Eisenhower as the new Commander of SACEUR in December, 1950. General Eisenhower and his deputy, Field Marshal Montgomery, together with their staff created the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) largely from the previous plans and later the personnel of the WUDO. During the creation of SHAPE, General Eisenhower commented that the task of “devising an organization that satisfies the national aspirations of twelve different countries or the personal ambitions of affected individuals is a very laborious and irksome business.”

In 1951, the Supreme Allied Command Europe was divided into three geographical regions shown in the bottom of Table 2 below. The names of the current joint commands under SACEUR are also listed to convey the shift from regional headquarters to standing joint headquarters with component headquarters able to lead expeditionary forces. SACEUR would temporarily lose the British Channel to Allied Command Channel to appease the UK’s objections for the U.S. having both Allied Commands under American leadership. Throughout the 1950s, the Military Committee (MC), the new name for the Defence Committee, focused these two commands on organizing and planning for the defense of Europe.

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23 Ibid., 5.
24 Ibid., 6.
25 Ibid., 3-6
26 Ibid., 4-5.
Table 2. NATO's Initial and Current Strategic and Operational Headquarters

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<td>Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>South</td>
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<tr>
<td>Countries/Bodies of Water</td>
<td>Norway and Denmark / The Baltic and North Seas</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Italy, Greece*, and Turkey* / The Mediterranean Sea (* - joined NATO in 195227)</td>
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<th>Current Subordinate Commands:</th>
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While NATO focused on European reconstruction and continental defense, French operations in Indochina strained relations between France, the U.S., and NATO. France requested NATO military assistance to support them as they found communist elements in Indochina while maintaining occupation forces in West Germany, but NATO declined military support to France while the U.S. provided the French only monetary aid and military advisors.28 Following the French withdrawal of South Vietnam in 1954, the U.S. committed support to the South Vietnamese government and continued the Vietnam War against the communist North.29 During the same year, the U.S. with seven other nations formed a new regional treaty organization to replicate the collective defense of

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27 *NATO Handbook*, 17.


the NATO charter, but the regional alliance lacked adequate intelligence and power projection to remain valid.30 Further turmoil among NATO nations followed during the 1960s when the French withdrew from NATO’s Allied commands following President de Gaulle’s announcement on 10 March 1966.31

In 1967 while the U.S. continued the fight against communist takeover of South Vietnam, NATO developed and approved the Flexible Response Strategy of nuclear and conventional forces. Flexible Response aimed to deter aggression, defend the NATO member states, and if required, permit escalation of force under political control. Knowing the ramifications of the strategy, the Military Committee pushed NATO to advance munitions standardization, refine personnel requirements, establish basing and infrastructure priorities, develop multinational logistics and integrate communications in an effort to improve overall military preparedness among member nations. Further shaping the Flexible Response strategy, the U.S. and the USSR agreed to limit nuclear weapons in 1972. The weapons agreement provided the needed impetus to integrate the Allied Commands with broad NATO representation.32

As the Cold War continued through the 1980s, the U.S. forces continued to train for possible deployment to Europe by conducting annual Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises. NATO focused on the Soviet nuclear threat and air defense through establishment of an airborne warning radar system. Later to be named Airborne

32 NATO International Military Staff and NATO Public Diplomacy Division, "The Beginnings of NATO’s Military Structure: Birth of the Alliance to the Fall of the Berlin Wall," 8.

NATO celebrated its 40\textsuperscript{th} birthday in 1989 just seven months before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. At this time NATO’s military strength stood at 8.5 million soldiers while Warsaw Pact forces numbered 7.5 million, though the Soviet forces had more than twice the number of battle tanks and artillery and a less complex organizational structure.\footnote{NATO International Military Staff and NATO Public Diplomacy Division., 10.} When the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November 1989, NATO became the undisputed victor of the Cold War.\footnote{National Archives and Records Administration, "Tear Down This Wall," National Archives and Records Administration, http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2007/summer/berlin.html (accessed 25 September 2009).} The victory against the Bear quickly led to the member nations collecting the “peace dividend” by moving quickly to disassemble much of their forces and decrease their discretionary spending, though many NATO nations would later respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.\footnote{Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Public Affairs Office, "SHAPE - NATO History," Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, http://www.nato.int/shape/about/background2.htm#5 (accessed 25 September 2009).}

**Chapter Summary**

NATO’s strength, developed out of necessity in the midst of wide-spread desolation in Europe provided the political (and nuclear) deterrence to hold off further Communist expansion into Western Europe. The Alliance focused on its clear enemy and tailored its force posture toward territorial defense. The Allied joint force headquarters in Norfolk (SACLANT) and Mons (SACEUR) focused on executing...
flexible response operations in the advent of Soviet invasion. When the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO member nations moved quickly to downsize their forces in response to the fall of the major regional threat.
CHAPTER II POLICY, DOCTRINE & PLANNING GUIDING NRF AGILITY

"If NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile, which can deploy in days or weeks, instead of months or years, then it will not have much to offer the world in the 21st century."³⁷

U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, September 24th, 2002

Former U.S. DoD Secretary Rumsfeld’s comment shown above illustrates the state of the NATO systems which continued through the end of the Cold War until the formation of the NRF. NATO’s policies, funding guidance, doctrine and planning process were created to fight the Soviets with little thought or intent to deploying anywhere. The primary goal was to defend Europe from Soviet aggression onto NATO member territory.

This chapter first examines current NATO Policy as it applies to the execution and sustainment of military operations. Secondly, the chapter provides a doctrinal review to highlight the disparity between published Allied Joint Publications and the lack of published guidance to the NRF. Finally, this chapter will provide an overview to the NATO planning system and contrast this system with the agile requirements of the NRF.

NATO Policy Guiding Military Operations

Currently, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Military Committee (MC) approve all strategic policy documents affecting NATO military operations. NATO Committees, such as the Senior NATO Logisticians Committee (SNLC) or the NATO Pipeline Committee working in conjunction with Allied Command Transformation,

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submit recommendations for approval to the MC followed by notation or approval by the NAC, as appropriate.

The NAC published a Strategic Concept (SC) in 1991. The SC, made public one month prior to the signing of the Belavezha Agreement which effectively dissolved the USSR, signalled a transformation strategy to meet the post-Cold War regional instabilities. It acknowledged force reductions but also directed the defense to prepare for a role “…in managing crises [with available forces that will include] in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseen.”

The NATO 1991 SC led to the development of the combined joint task force (CJTF) concept that gained full NAC support in June 1996. This capstone concept capturing the strategic vision of NATO member nations led to the creation of three CJTF "parent" headquarters (the three joint force commands shown in Table 1 on page 9) and their subsequent assessment of capability of full spectrum operations over land or sea. Intended to increase NATO members’ options to promote security in Eastern Europe, the CJTFs provided flexible military structures from “coalitions of the willing” to address tasks such as peace operations. Prior to the creation and approval of the CJTFs, NATO operations required complete NAC approval and were disapproved if only one member

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nation did not politically support the action. CJTFs provided NATO members the option to build coalitions in order to conduct operations desired by participating nations. The CJTF could utilize NATO assets such as deployable command and control nodes while executing operations and would return the equipment to NATO’s joint force headquarters when complete. CJTFs utilized NATO standing operating procedures to guide combined operations and provide interoperability solutions to the coalitions. Ultimately, CJTFs provided NATO members with the political flexibility to build coalitions in order to execute operations.\(^{41}\)

An overview of CJTF operations Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan follows in Chapter III.

Despite NATO’s CJTF concept advancement during the mid-1990s, NATO forces continued to demonstrate a lack of interoperability during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999. Citing lack of multinational cohesion and effectiveness and the widening capabilities gap between the U.S. and its allies, NATO initiated a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Washington Summit in April 1999.\(^{43}\) The DCI’s aim

| Table 3. Defense Capabilities Initiative Focus Areas\(^{42}\) |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Aim             | Description                                                                 |
| mobility and deployability | rapid movement of forces to areas that may be outside Alliance territory |
| sustainability  | maintenance of deployed forces’ equipment and personnel while distant from home nations; including capable and sufficient reserves |
| effective engagement | forces capable of full spectrum operations |
| survivability    | force protection with capable infrastructure against current and future threats |
| interoperable communications | command and control systems which facilitate combined operations |


was to improve the areas identified in Table 3.

NATO’s member nations made limited progress toward these aims prior to 11 September 2001, resulting in another example of the huge capabilities gap between the U.S. and its Western European allies. The lack of success in DCI can be linked to the twenty-five per cent reduction in defense spending by the NATO members since the end of the Cold War as well as the Western European members’ comparably limited defense budgets which account for only one-third of NATO’s total equipment spending.

NATO enacted Article V for its first time on 12 September 2001; one day after the terror attacks against America. NATO European member nations struggled to provide forces in support of the U.S.-led war on terrorism, straining the U.S. and NATO relationship. In response to these capability shortfalls, discussed further in Chapter III, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld submitted a NATO rapid response proposal to the NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in September, 2002. On 24 October 2002, the Secretary General lent his support to this concept by preceding the 2002 Prague Summit by stating, “Our transatlantic toolbox must have the full spectrum of tools we might need to preserve our security and safety in this new age of uncertainty.” The NAC then provided full support to the concept at the NATO Summit in Prague one month later.

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44 Joseph P. Kugel, 15.
At the Prague Summit the NAC approved a threefold Prague Capability Commitment. It placed renewed focus on the capability shortfalls, announced a NATO Response Force (NRF) concept with capability of force deployment with five to thirty days of notification and able to sustain itself for thirty days, and changed the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) into the Allied Command Transformation. The ACT would oversee NATO transformation. The simultaneous re-designation of the Supreme Allied Command Europe to the Allied Command Operations (ACO) placed all NATO military operations under the responsibility of ACO.48

The NATO Ministers of Defence gave final approval for the NRF concept 18 June 2003 by signing Military Committee (MC) Policy 0477 in Brussels; General James Jones, SAC Europe, further endorsed the NRF by stating, "… NATO will no longer have the large, massed units that were necessary for the Cold War, but will have agile and capable forces at Graduated Readiness levels that will better prepare the Alliance to meet any threat that it is likely to face in this 21st century".49 (Emphasis added) MC Policy 477 contained seven missions for the NRF in order to guide training and readiness. These missions can be grouped into three categories (see Table 4 below). Despite the aggressive mission set and high political aspirations for the NRF, NATO did not publish an accompanying NRF funding or support concept, leaving NATO members to use existing policy and doctrine for the next two years.


49 NATO Public Information Office, “NATO - Topic: NATO Response Force".
Table 4. NRF Mission Set\(^{50}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category:</th>
<th>NRF Deployed as a Stand-alone force for crisis response</th>
<th>NRF deployed as an Initial Entry Force</th>
<th>Deployed as a demonstrative force package</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions:</td>
<td>(1) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)</td>
<td>(6) Facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces in a JOA from a benign up to a hostile environment</td>
<td>(7) Show the resolve of member nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Support Consequence Management (CBRN or humanitarian crisis)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Crisis Response Operations (CRO) including Peacekeeping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Support Counter Terror (CT) Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) Embargo Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Depicted below in Chart 1 below is the hierarchy of strategic policies guiding NATO’s logistical practices. The chart conveys that the highest levels of policy are the Council-Memorandum (C-M) and Military Committee publications. Specifically to

Chart 1. NATO Structure of Logistic Policy and Guidance\(^{51}\)

the NRF, the NAC’s approval of MC 477 and subsequent approval in 2005 of MC 526 discussed below provided limited strategic guidance on mission execution as well as NRF logistics support concepts. The black line and arrow in the chart indicate the point at which the breakdown in guidance occurs. NATO has not followed up their strategic


guidance with required doctrine to provide clarity to the policies while synchronizing the
doctrine across the operational commands.

Two years after the signing of MC 0477, the Military Committee signed MC 0526
in June 2005 which defined the Logistics Support Concept for NRF Operations. The
committee’s vision for NRF support included support forces which are ready and
available as well as multi-functional, modular in size, and as agile as the NRF combat
forces. Further, support forces must execute missions under NATO unity of effort and
command by decreasing nation internal support structures and increasing multinational
logistics cooperation.52

The NRF Concept of Support from MC 0526 is distinct from the NATO
Combined Joint Task Force concept of support. Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine 4.6
applies to CJTF support operations. In order to convey the significant conceptual
difference between MC 0526 and AJP-4.0(A), Table 5 below lists both support concepts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept of Support Elements</th>
<th>NRF Concept of Support based on a Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) (Source: NATO Logistics Handbook)</th>
<th>CJTF Concept of Support using Multinational Joint Logistics Centers (MJLC) (Source: AJP-4.0(A))53</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-sustained capability</td>
<td>Capable of up to 30 Days of support and beyond if resupplied</td>
<td>Not able to sustain itself for any length; reliant upon parent HQ for life support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Force Size</td>
<td>JLSG focused on minimizing logistics footprint through joint and multinational effort</td>
<td>Modular functionality – dependent upon the operational requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Authority</td>
<td>NRF Commander has C2 over logistical units up to and including a JLSG as well as organic combat forces</td>
<td>MJLC is responsible for the coordination of logistic support between participating nations, component commands, host nations and non-military organizations at the operational level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Information Management</td>
<td>Improved visibility over theatre level logistic assets.</td>
<td>MJLC will use organic computer information system (CIS) equipment as provided through deployable CIS capability packages for the CJTF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52 NATO Logistics Handbook, 94-97.
53 NATO Standardization Agency, AJP-4.0(A), Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine (Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, 2003), 1-5 – 1-22.
The NRF, therefore, trains and executes rapid response missions supported by a dedicated Joint Logistics Support Group which exists as a cadre in peacetime. The JLSG seeks to minimize or eliminate NSEs to minimize the logistics footprint. The JLSG remains at the same readiness levels as the combat forces of the NRF since the NRF cannot deploy and sustain itself without the support of the JLSG. The CJTF’s MJLC is not intended to be a rapid deployment organization, but a cadre from the MJLC provides the nucleus of the JLSG headquarters. For a CJTF operation, the cadre from the MJLC are augmented by forces, which requires forty-days after units are identified and approved for the mission. Further, whereas the JLSG can deploy and support its forces for 30-days, the MJLC as part of a CJTF is not designed to sustain itself let alone its component forces.

**NATO Doctrine Guiding NRF Support**

NATO political policies drive subsequent development of doctrine for its military forces. The next discussion will briefly highlight the authorities for producing NATO doctrine prior to a review of its current support doctrine guiding expeditionary multinational operations. The review will focus on procedures remaining prior to the formation of the NRF as NATO has yet to produce approved doctrine specific to NRF operations.
The SNLC is the tasking authority for NATO joint logistics doctrine. The committee delegates authority to ACT to lead NATO in developing and subsequent revising of its joint logistics doctrine. SHAPE and its subordinate elements support doctrinal formation by participating in doctrine working groups and the drafting of assigned doctrine.

The NATO Standardization Agency distributes Allied joint logistics doctrine packaged as Allied Joint Publications (AJPs). The AJPs are the foundation for all support and provide greater detail to logistics procedures than the policy documents described earlier in this chapter. NATO has published only the support-based AJPs shown in Table 6. Since the NRF is by design a joint force, this doctrinal review will limit its focus to available Allied Joint Publications and not review Allied Logistic Publications (ALPs) which are created to support the land, air, and maritime components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication Date</th>
<th>Publication Number</th>
<th>Publication Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003 (December)</td>
<td>AJP-4.0(A)</td>
<td>Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 (December)</td>
<td>AJP-4.4(A)</td>
<td>Allied Joint Movement &amp; Transportation Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005(May)</td>
<td>AJP-4.5(A)</td>
<td>Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine &amp; Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 (December)</td>
<td>AJP-4.6</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Logistic Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 (October)</td>
<td>AJP-4.7</td>
<td>Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL) Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005(November)</td>
<td>AJP-4.9</td>
<td>Modes of Multinational Logistic Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 (March)</td>
<td>AJP-4.10(A)</td>
<td>Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a doctrinal rule, NATO member nations bear the responsibility of support for their forces allocated to NATO during peace, crisis and conflict and must ensure, either individually or by co-operative arrangements, the provision of logistics resources to support their forces. This may be discharged in a number of ways, including agreements
with other nations or with NATO. Nations retain control over their own resources, until such time as they are released to NATO.

NATO’s Allied Joint Publications do not force nations to participate in multinational logistics or provide transportation for other member nations that may have limited lift assets. NATO’s capstone logistics doctrine, AJP-4.0(A) *Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine* clearly emphasizes the importance of multinational logistics by espousing the logistics principles of coordination and economy. It further creates a concept of support for operations with a multinational perspective,\(^54\) but the publication places ultimate responsibility on individual nations for their forces in the Roles and Responsibilities portion:

Nations may contribute to the support of a NATO operation via a variety of means as described throughout this publication. However, the ultimate responsibility for the planning and controlling of the deployment and redeployment and the provision of support, including medical support, of participating forces remains with the participating nation. If nations elect to support forces through a national support system, it remains vital, just as in multinational logistic operations that they interface with the NATO multinational logistic coordination entity.\(^55\)

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 1-5 – 1-6.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., 1-9.

AJP-4.4(A) *Allied Joint Movement & Transportation Doctrine* further defines collective responsibility:

Collective Responsibility. NATO and nations have a collective responsibility for movement and transportation (M&T) support. This responsibility extends from initial M&T planning through the strategic deployment, Reception, Staging & Onward Movement (RSOM), sustainment and redeployment phases of an operation. NATO Commanders at the appropriate level are responsible for establishing the M&T requirements and for initiating, prioritising, co-ordinating, and deconflicting movements. *Nations are responsible for obtaining transportation resources to deploy, sustain and redeploy their forces.*
NATO is responsible for the movement of NATO owned equipment and assets including Headquarters elements for NATO-led operations.\(^{56}\) (emphasis added)

This publication, however, does recognize the hurdles to such policy. It states that, “The execution of a nation’s responsibility to obtain sufficient M&T resources could be hampered by shortages of required lift assets. Consequently, nations should, where possible, make surplus lift capacity available for co-operative and shared use.”\(^{57}\) Additionally, the AJP-4.4(A) provides detailed guidance on how to create a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in annex B to assist nations in developing bi-lateral or multilateral arrangements for reciprocal use of air and sealift within NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations. If an NRF troop contributing nation did not have sufficient lift to move its force a strategic distance by air or sea, that nation must pursue an MOU with a nation that can. Although AJP-4.4(A) provides a template to draft an MOU, achieving it is not expedient as these documents are signed at Chief of Defense (CHOD) level or above. Further, the MOU is the primary document required to secure support, but a Technical Arrangement (TA) is also likely required. It addresses general procedures and provides an umbrella document to administrative and functional annexes and implementing arrangements for transportation support. The TA is also signed by national representatives though generally at lower levels than the CHOD.\(^{58}\)

AJP-4.5(A) Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine & Procedures similarly emphasizes the importance and potential costs savings of multinational logistics


\(^{57}\) Ibid.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., B-2.
operations focusing on the Joint Force Command J4 led Host Nation Support agreement (HNSA) and contracting planning for any sized element deployed from a NATO JFC which technically includes the NRF though no mention of the NRF is included in the publication. The publication, however, provides lengthy bureaucratic guidance on how to achieve a coordinated multinational plan.

In developing HNSA, it is essential that the logistic staff work closely with the legal, financial (J-8), CIMIC (J-9) and other relevant staffs internally, within HN and SN(s) and the relevant NATO Commander’s HQ. The designated NATO Commander should establish a Joint HNS Steering Committee (JHNSSC) in conjunction with the HN wherever possible, to oversee the development of the Technical Arrangement (TA) and Joint Implementation Arrangements (JIAs). The HN and known and potential SN(s) should provide representatives to this JHNSSC. Logistic planners should remain abreast of the evolving operational plan, to ensure the HNS concept continues to fully support it. … This, in turn, will lead to the production of the Joint Implementation Arrangements. Finally, once the operation commences, staffs must continue to monitor HNS to ensure arrangements are adhered to and to ensure that changing priorities are serviced.59

Though likely a worthwhile process designed to promote fairness, any process involving steering groups does not promote agility.

The publication provides explicit funding details to the Nations to convey NATO’s “costs lie where they fall” policy. The lack of collective funding further inhibits the agility of the NRF as will be discussed in the funding section of this chapter:

…nations remain ultimately responsible for sustaining both their forces assigned to the NATO Force Structure, and personnel assigned to NATO Command Structure elements in the Joint Operational Area (JOA). As such, NATO does not normally pre-finance national costs nor relieve nations of their responsibilities. Where centralized support managed by the NATO Commander will be used, the prior approval of any consequent

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exceptional NATO pre-financing must first be obtained by the SC from the appropriate funding committee.\textsuperscript{60}

The NATO force commander has the responsibility of defining logistic requirements needed to support and sustain the NATO force. The commander and his staff must coordinate logistic planning and support within the defined area of responsibility. The commander implements an appropriate mix of the different methods of multinational logistics. Such options include, as defined in AJP-4.9 *Modes of Multinational Logistic Support*, Lead Nation (LN), Role Specialist Nation (RSN), National Logistics, National Support Elements (NSE), Multinational Integrated Logistics Unit (MILU), Multinational Integrated Medical Unit (MIMU), Host Nation Support (HNS), Mutual Support Arrangements (MSA), contracting and Third Party Logistics Support Services (TPLSS). The publication affirms the collective responsibility of NATO member nations and its Joint Force Commanders and affirms the principles of cooperation and coordination as defined in NATO policy document MC 319/1.\textsuperscript{61}

NATO follows the responsibilities section of AJP-4.9 by empowering authorities to execute or perform these responsibilities. NATO commanders have the authority to redistribute specified logistics assets committed by nations for the support of the forces under their command and situated within NATO Commanders’ operational boundary. Redistribution is not a routine procedure but only a temporary solution to overcome unanticipated deficiencies during an operational mission. Terms and conditions for the transfer of authority over logistics resources are set out in Annex A of MC 319/1 and are subject to concurrence of the nations contributing to the forces concerned. The Joint

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 1-6.

\textsuperscript{61} NATO Standardization Agency, *AJP 4.9, Modes of Multinational Logistics Support* (Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, 2005), 1-1 - 1-4.
Force Commander also assumes control of common-funded resources as directed, and of multinational assets upon Transfer of Authority (TOA). The commander has the authority to establish requirements for HNS and the use of local resources, to initiate and participate in bilateral and multilateral negotiations and, where appropriate, to execute HNS arrangements on behalf of sending nations subject to their prior concurrence.

AJP-4.9 provides critical details to the support concepts of lead nation, role specialist nation, and third party logistical support services and provides a detailed template for a memorandum of understanding among multiple nations. The support concepts in the publication are the key support concepts of the NRF, but the publication never addresses the NRF nor any of its unique requirements. The document provides critical details to guide support arrangements, but the document does not address the rotational basis of the NRF nor does it provide an agile means to coordinate among nations.

The doctrine excerpts above point out the difficulty of multinational logistics in an intergovernmental organization. The Secretary General or the NAC cannot force nations to abide by an Alliance order to consolidate logistical support nor direct use of member owned strategic lift assets. The Nations must develop their own support arrangements for their formations or be willing to engage other troop contributing nations to achieve logistics economies of scale in areas such as transport assets for deployment and redeployment, contracting or other HNSA.

Despite the NRF achieving initial operational capability in 2005 and full operational capability in 2006 and deploying twice in support of the NAC (discussed in Chapter III), Allied Command Transformation has not produced an Allied Joint
Publication that includes the NRF, its operations, nor its support concept. Given the relatively recent formation of the force and NATO’s continued involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the delay in NRF doctrine is understandable. The lack of doctrine to guide an agile force, however, fails to lead the expanding Alliance away from existing non-agile defense-based support doctrine. Without revised support doctrine, the NRF will not achieve the agility the Commanders of ACT and ACO envision.

Further, the NATO Logistics Handbook states that agility remains one of the goals of the NRF. "The NRF logistic concept offers the nations a real potential for resource savings. However, the key operational driver must be to make the NRF a truly agile, lean and deployable force. This is the operational driver for a more integrated and multinational logistic construct."62 (emphasis added) The Handbook is not accompanied by directive doctrine to move this logistic concept toward reality.

The U.S. joint operations publication, JP 3.0, provides much of the missing NATO guidance in its directive to U.S. forces.

JFCs need to coordinate for the effective and efficient use of all logistic support to include lift, distribution, and sustainment assets as well as the use of infrastructure such as highways, rail lines, seaports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment. *The notion that logistics is primarily a national responsibility cannot supplant detailed logistic planning in seeking multinational solutions.* Multinational force commanders (MNFCs) typically form multinational logistic staff sections early to facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations. Careful consideration should be given to the broad range of multinational logistic support options; from lead nation and role specialization nations, to the formation of multinational integrated logistic units to deliver effective support while achieving greater efficiency. Standardization of logistic systems and procedures is an ongoing, iterative process and MNFCs should ensure that the latest techniques, procedures, and arrangements are understood for the current operation. Interoperability of equipment, especially in adjacent or subordinate multinational units, is desirable and should be considered during concept development. The acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) is a

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tool for mutual exchange of logistic support and services. ACSA is a reimbursable, bilateral support program that allows reimbursable logistics-exchanges between U.S. and foreign military forces. An ACSA provides the necessary legal authority to allow mutual logistic support between the U.S. and multinational partners. This agreement increases flexibility for operational commanders by allowing fast response when logistic support or services are requested. (emphasis added)

Without NATO leaders pushing for similar doctrinal procedures for the NRF and its JLSG, NATO response forces will not achieve high levels of agility in the execution of their missions.

**NATO Funding Guidance**

Besides initial policies directing NRF missions and sketching its concept of support, NATO's lack of detailed policies and doctrine for the NRF creates a major funding limitation on NRF agility. The default funding policy for NATO operations has been “costs lie where they fall." NATO is an intergovernmental organization minimally funded through appropriations from its member nations. NATO member nations contribute funding through burdensharing arrangements agreed upon by the nations. For example, the 2009 NATO member contributions are shown in Table 7. As NATO enlarges membership, the members renegotiate their burdensharing percentages based on the requirements and nations included. In 2005, for example, NATO renegotiated the percentages following the addition of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to NATO in 2004.

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63 *JP 3-0*, II-8.

Since Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance in 2009, the burdensharing percentages are likely to be renegotiated in 2010. The categories in Table 7 are discussed below.

Member funding is dedicated towards three NATO budgets: the NATO Military Budget, the NATO Civil Budget, and the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). Each budget provides essential resources for NATO political and military headquarters. The budgets, as shown below, are not intended to cover the operational expenses on NATO military operations.

The NATO Civil budget provides funding for operating expenses of the NATO political headquarters in Brussels. It resources NATO political activities, consultation and cooperative activities with partners to strengthen security. The Secretary General, the NAC and their International Staff (IS) are resourced by the Civil budget in order to execute their NATO international initiatives and to secure its headquarters.

The NATO Military budget provides the majority of its funding to resource operational and maintenance costs of the NATO Military Committee, the International Military Staff (IMS), SHAPE (headquarters), its three joint functional headquarters;

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65 Ibid., 1-8. Note: Table 7 does not include Albania and Croatia as these nations joined NATO during 2009.
NATO AWACS fleet operations, and NATO support agencies, and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). During NATO execution of a crisis response operation, the military budget funds the NATO command structure.66

The NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) budget funds prioritized construction and command and control (C2) system investments to support the potential missions of the NATO strategic commands. NATO member countries benefit from this fund as it provides resources for military installations and required capabilities including satellite communication, air command and control systems, permanent military headquarters, aerial ports, fuel storage and distribution, seaport improvement and maritime navigational aids.67

None of the preceding NATO budgets have funding for NATO Response Force operations. This lack of dedicated multinational funding limits the agility of the NRF. It prevents the force and its JLSG from executing the tasks required to deploy and sustain itself without additional national funding from the NRF contributing nations; national funding likely requiring legislative resource allocation and appropriation approval.

The lack of funding also limits NRF agility during deployment and establishment of life support. MC 477 and 526 promoted minimum forces while maximizing available host nation support. Without dedicated funding to initiate support contracts and open ports, the NRF will not achieve rapid deployment timelines.

Further, the NRF’s ability to train with its multinational forces is not funded by the military committee and therefore, is limited by member nations' abilities and willingness to appropriate funding for NRF readiness training. The significant burden on

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67 Ibid., 60.
member nations to fund their own units training during NRF rotation cycles and potential
deployment/redeployment and sustainment costs during NRF operations deters national
participation in the NRF. If nations hesitate in participating in the NRF, they will not
participate in NATO led force and doctrine transformation. In fairness to NATO,
doctrine provides formats for nations to use to partner together to achieve deployment
and support, but national defense must first approve detailed memorandums of
agreement. Since the NRF may consist of twenty nations, overcoming the complexity in
creating and staffing multilateral agreements rapidly for a rotation cycle or deployment is
unlikely.

**NATO Planning Process**

The final NATO concept to review that applies to NRF operations is the NATO
planning process. Over its history, NATO's planning process evolved from a single Cold
War Soviet Invasion defense plan that was periodically updated to a well-defined
planning system (shown in Table 8 below) designed to support a wide menu of
contingency response operations. To maintain the agility focus of this thesis, the only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO Operational Planning Process</th>
<th>Joint Operational Planning Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage I</td>
<td>Initiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage II</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage III</td>
<td>Concept Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage IV</td>
<td>Plan Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stage V</td>
<td>Plan Review</td>
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</tbody>
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operational planning processes (U.S. Military Joint Planning Process shown for comparison above) is the requirement for approval from the consensus of nations prior to the initiation of operational planning toward a specific military action and associated area of operations.

Initiation is not a new concept as it is the first step in the U.S. and NATO planning processes shown below. In both cases, planning begins only after an appropriate authority recognizes a potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or actual crisis though the U.S. Combatant Command does not need external authority to initiate planning.70 Further, both processes align with the famous post-Napoleonic military theorist General Carl Von Clausewitz’s writing that military operations are instruments of policy and support the nation's, or in this case, the Alliance's political agenda.71

The primary difference in the initiation of planning for U.S. and NATO is that though the President, Secretary of Defense of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can initiate planning by deciding to develop military options and can provide further guidance through the Guidance for the Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the U.S. Combatant Commanders and other commanders also have the authority to initiate planning following identification of a planning requirement not directed by higher authority where as NATO Strategic and Joint Force Commanders do not. The North Atlantic Council has sole authority to approve initiation of military planning which is given only after consensus is achieved from all NATO twenty-eight-member nations.

70 Ibid., I-9.
Joint Force Commanders and the rotational NRF likely have general plans to execute missions assigned, but the Supreme Allied Commander Europe lacks the authority to direct specific operational planning at the early stages of a natural disaster. The three NATO Joint Force Commands cannot utilize their staff to anticipate requirements or analyze a specific region or its potential host nation capabilities, ports of debarkation capabilities, and strategic lift assets until the NAC has initiated military planning.

In short, NATO's current planning doctrine restricts the ability of the NRF to be agile by preventing not only its lean Joint Logistics Support Group staff as well as its higher headquarters from anticipating mission requirements and initiating coordination efforts across the NRF's troop contributing nations. Following a natural disaster at strategic distances from Western Europe, the NAC would have to not only learn facts of the disaster and build consensus to support it, but also formally approve planning initiation to pursue military action within twenty-four to forty-eight hours in order to give the NRF any chance at all to deploy following five to thirty days of notification.

Chapter Summary

Having explored NATO guidance to the NRF by reviewing policies, doctrine, funding practices and planning processes, one notes the significant hurdles to NRF agility. NATO NRF policies provide limited political guidance to both the Allied Command Operations and the Allied Command Transformation, but the doctrine to add necessary details to NRF operations and their support is not available yet and hampers the
forces' ability to coordinate and maximize logistics support. The funding to carry out NRF operations remains unclear as well. Another key constraint lies in the planning process requiring NAC approval prior to planning initiation. The NRF planners at the Joint Force Command headquarters cannot anticipate requirements and plan for operations in potentially austere locations at strategic distances. Since the end of the Cold War, these hurdles have hindered NATO operations as the following chapter illustrates.
CHAPTER III EVOLUTION OF NATO OPERATIONS

"Agility is the ability to rapidly deploy, employ, sustain and redeploy capabilities in geographically separated and environmentally diverse regions."72

U.S. National Military Strategy 2004

At the end of the 1980s, NATO standing forces needed to operate differently to accomplish missions in a new era. The unrest in the Balkans in the early 1990s would be the first chance to test NATO’s ability to adjust in a non-Cold War environment. Unfortunately, NATO agility shortfalls became evident during its involvement in Bosnia. This lack of agility continued to characterize NATO operations through the 1990s. Only after the events of 11 September, 2001, did NATO members begin to transform from a territorial to an expeditionary mindset as the Alliance deployed first to Afghanistan and then to Iraq. Recognizing the need for a global rapid response capability, NATO formed its NRF. Although it has achieved limited success during subsequent humanitarian assistance operations in New Orleans and Pakistan, this chapter documents these missions and the problems caused by the lack of agility.

Table 9. NATO Operations and Missions73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Completed Operations and Missions</th>
<th>Current Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995-2004 Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1999-TBD: Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2003 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>2001-TBD: Monitoring the Mediterranean Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Hurricane Katrina Relief</td>
<td>2003-TBD: Afghanistan (ISAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006 Pakistan Earthquake Relief</td>
<td>2004-TBD: NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NATO Operations in the Balkans

NATO’s 60,000 member Implementation Force augmented by 13 PfP nations (8 of which aspired to join NATO)\(^74\) executed its first deployment to the Balkans in December 1995 in the largest movement of troops in Western Europe since WWII. With authority from the UN to enforce peace, Operation Joint Endeavor provided a chance for NATO to redefine itself and defy inertia since the fall of the former Soviet Union. Many Alliance member nations contested the deployment outside the Alliance’s borders. Nations feared that the mission represented a tendency to take on more tasks that could be better performed by civilians or constabulary units.\(^75\)

NATO again deployed to the Balkans in June 1999 following an air campaign (Operation Allied Force) against Serbia that began three months earlier to prevent further acts of ethnic cleansing. Operation Joint Guard featured an international security force of nearly 50,000 aimed at implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1244. This second mission to the Balkans mission overlapped with the approximately 20,000 members of NATO Stabilization Force still in Bosnia.\(^76\)

Despite opposition, the Alliance deployed forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina to conduct a successful operation. NATO operations in Bosnia concluded in 2004 after providing stable peace in the region for ten years. The operation also produced critical

\(^74\) The eight PfP nations were Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Albania; all are now NATO members. Five additional PfP nations that supported OJE: Austria, Finland, Sweden, Russia, and Ukraine. During Operation Joint Guard, Bulgaria, Ireland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in as part of the Stabilization Force.

\(^75\) NATO Public Information Office, NATO in the Balkans Briefing: Bringing Peace and Stability to the Balkans (Brussels: NATO Public Information Office, February 2005), 12.

lessons to guide NATO’s multinational force and doctrine changes. Among the lessons observed were: (1) NATO members and PfP nations with conscript-based forces such as Hungary are limited in their ability to deploy these forces. The conscript-force is well-suited for territorial defense, but it does not suit expeditionary operations. (2) Central and East European governments recognized their need for robust logistics capabilities as well as a need to communicate better in English in order to participate in the NATO-led operation. The Polish and Czech Republic forces, for example, struggled with the English language, logistics, and multinational interoperability. (3) NATO operations require constabulary forces or sufficiently trained military personnel agile enough to operate as a constabulary force. They must be capable of suppressing civil unrest during stability operations and providing greater civil affairs functions to assist in the rule of law and corrections.77

NATO Kosovo lessons learned further emphasized the difficulty of shifting from the Cold War based territorial defensive operations to expeditionary operations. The inability to project national supplies and unit equipment to Kosovo plus an unbalanced force composition greatly limited the European response to the Kosovo crisis and alarmed NATO members. Like Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Joint Guard pointed out the Alliance’s need for police paramilitary units to provide the best response to civil unrest. The challenges of working in a multinational environment were significant as well. Nations did not abide by the same escalation of force procedures nor was their signal equipment interoperable across the Implementation Force creating great challenges in communications and command and control. Member funding challenges in

77 Ibid., 1-2.
peacekeeping operations were evident in Kosovo operations as new members found it
difficult to finance their military participation (as well as in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and
Iraq). In contrast to UN peacekeeping activities (for which participants are
reimbursed), most new members have had to finance expeditionary operations by
increasing defense budgets, postponing modernization, increasing debt, and/or borrowing
funds by floating government bonds.

U.S. ground forces under Task Force Hawk also struggled with rapid deployment
to Kosovo primarily due to the limited airfield capacity in Albania. Restricted airfields
and non-modular forces identified the U.S. Army’s need for smaller, more agile force
options to in order to execute operations in austere locations. NATO operations in
Kosovo highlighted the complexity of the multinational environment and accentuated the
need for greater mobility assets and smaller, more modular task organizations.

NATO Operations in the Afghanistan

The Balkans provided major regional tests for NATO, but Afghanistan provided
the graduate-level test in executing expeditionary operations at strategic distances
(distances outside tactical movements in the European theatre). The 11 September 2001
terror attacks provoked deep anger in the U.S. and required rapid retaliation through
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The attack on the U.S. prompted NATO’s first
invocation of Article V. Despite having NATO support and its open check book of
support, the U.S. asked for little initial assistance in the form of aerial refuelling and
AWACS support during the early stages of the war. Some analysts contend that the

78 Ibid., 33.
79 Bruce R. Nardulli, Walter L. Perry, Bruce Pirnie, John IV Gordon, and John G. McGinn,
U.S.’s “go-it-alone” mentality flowed from the perception that its Allies lacked many of the military capabilities to make it a viable part of the mission. NATO lacked sufficient airborne refueling, air transport, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and night vision equipment necessary to conduct a technology-centric Shock and Awe style campaign designed to achieve a swift victory with minimum civilian and U.S. casualties.”

As the U.S. executed OEF, NATO formed and deployed the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003. ISAF’s troop strength is currently ten times ISAF’s initial troop levels as shown in Table 10 below. Nations participating in ISAF in Afghanistan continue to grapple with the enormous financial and force stresses while preparing for and then executing combat deployments in a theater that is a strategic distance from Western Europe.

The variation in political will of ISAF partners deeply constrained military rules of engagement (ROE) for national contingents. Canada and Britain did not suffer from ROE restrictions. Canadian military forces executed Operation Medusa in 2006 by fighting conventionally against Taliban forces armed with crew-served weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. Other ISAF nations, such as Norway had stringent national caveats that severely restricted their ability to fight.

<p>| Table 10. International Security Assistance Force Troop Levels |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aug-03</th>
<th>Aug-04</th>
<th>Jul-05</th>
<th>Sep-06</th>
<th>Nov-07</th>
<th>Mar-08</th>
<th>Feb-09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,581</td>
<td>8,065</td>
<td>9,685</td>
<td>19,597</td>
<td>31,267</td>
<td>47,332</td>
<td>56,420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

81 Ibid., 7.
The NATO experience in Afghanistan highlights another challenge in multilateral operations: significant variation in capabilities. Several nations lacked sufficient combat support and combat service support forces to leverage effectively and sustain their ground combat forces. This shortage included lift helicopters, sustainment stocks including sufficient ordnance, intelligence assets, engineer forces, medical forces and supplies, and digital command and control systems.83

**NATO Operations in Iraq**

Following Saddam Hussein’s refusal to vacate Iraq following repeated failures to comply with Iraqi disarmament provisions of UN Resolution 1441, the U.S.-led coalition massed over 250,000 American, 45,000 British, 2,000 Australian, and 200 Polish troops in Kuwait.84 The “coalition of the willing” began Operation Iraqi Freedom on 21 March 2003, and removed Hussein’s regime from power by 9 April and transferred to stability operations. NATO did not formally sign onto OIF until after cessation of combat operations, but ambiguity on the size and severity of the insurgent threat posed in Iraq kept many nations from participating. By February 2005, the Allies had set aside all differences over Iraq, and all 26 Allies were contributing to NATO’s training of Iraqi security forces (discussed below), either in Iraq, outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment.

In 2004 NATO founded the NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I) to assist the Iraqis in establishing an effective and enduring security. NTM-I’s utilizes a three pillar model of (1) Training, Advising and Mentoring in-country, (2) Organising out-of-country

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83 Barry R. McCaffrey, “Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Memorandum from General McCaffrey to COL Mike Meese and COL Cindy Jebb, (United States Military Academy, 2006), 4.
84 Ibid., 21.
training at NATO establishments in various countries, and (3) Coordinating equipment donations. The NATO Training Mission – Iraq is supported and funded by all 28 NATO nations; 13 member nations have staff in theatre as of June 2009 although NTM-I is now transitioning towards a lean mentoring force supporting an Iraqi-led institutional training program.

NATO forces were once again ill-prepared for an engagement at a strategic distance. First of all, NATO nations acknowledged their need for increased strategic airlift, such as Poland with its limited CASA and C–130 aircraft. Though Poland entered NATO in 1999, it still has limited interoperability and standardization experience. Secondly, NATO members must clearly and accurately communicate a detailed risk assessment and mission road map including phases of an operation to guide consensus. The lack of credible intelligence and incomplete Phase IV planning inhibited consensus building among the Allied nations. Further, the U.S. independent formation of a “coalition of the willing” further eroded Alliance support rather than build it. Thirdly, the lack of Phase IV planning prevented Allies from identifying the significant resources required to maintain their presence in Iraq in the protracted counterinsurgency (COIN) war. Many NATO nations faced multiple challenges due to their internal limitations on conscription forces, as shown below. Although many European nations have eliminated conscription, several NATO members such as Germany, Norway, Denmark, and Estonia continue to use it to provide their base force.

87 Simon, 21-31.
The conscript-force is well-suited for territorial defense, but it does not suit expeditionary operations. Based on 1995 total force strength statistics, the combined endstrength of these nations dropped 25% by 1999, 50% by 2004 and nearly 60% by 2009. As the nations dropped endstrength, they also moved away from conscription-based systems as the conscription endstrength dropped from 63% in 1999, to 34% in 2004, to .4% as of 2009 (only Estonia of the sample below continues to conscript 1,500 personnel for 8 - 11 month terms; 40% of their forces).

Table 11. Sample of NATO Nations Transitioning from Conscription to Professional Militaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Strength of Military Forces</th>
<th>Conscription terms (in months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>68,261</td>
<td>52,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>278,600</td>
<td>205,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>73,591</td>
<td>56,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>52,015</td>
<td>45,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>217,400</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>12,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>4,615</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>3,270</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force</td>
<td>823,752</td>
<td>620,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Conscript</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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88 Ibid., 23, 31. Note: except where another source is cited.
Finally, NATO participating members were ill-equipped due to shortages in protective armor required in COIN operations and accompanying escalation of force measures. The lack of COIN training coupled with national mandates restricting appropriate response in unexpected combat conditions put the Allied soldiers at great personal risk.\(^{94}\)

The U.S. did not succeed in gaining NATO consensus early on in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The U.S. formation of a coalition of the willing heightened political tension from 2003 until 2005. Once NATO gained consensus on the NTM-I mission in 2005, it has provided solid support to Iraq and will continue to mentor Iraqi security forces until they are prepared to train their own forces.\(^{95}\)

**NATO Operations Utilizing the NRF**

Limited by the operations shortfalls of early NATO operations, in 2002 the U.S. suggested the NRF concept to NATO as a means to drive a more productive transformation among the European forces citing the unrealized intentions of the Defense Capability Initiative. Chapter II contained the origin of the NRF from the Prague Capability Summit through the signing of the Military Committee documents defining the NRF’s roles and concept of support. While NATO grappled with the policy and doctrine from 2003 to 2006, NATO's Supreme Allied Commands for Operations and Transformation worked together to create a Combined Joint Statement of Requirements to identify unit capabilities required in the NRF. The commands laid out a timeline to

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\(^{94}\) Simon, 27.

take the NRF to an initial operational capability in 2005 and to full operational capability in 2006.

Allied Command Operations’ three joint force commanders located in Brunssum, Naples and Lisbon, rotate command of the NRF. These commanders lead their NRF forces through cycles (typically 12-months in length) that include a training and validation phase (6 months) followed by a stand-by phase (6 months). During the stand-by phase, the NRF headquarters and its air, maritime, and land forces maintain readiness throughout the phase until relieved by the follow-on NRF rotation’s headquarters. By rotating the NRF responsibility through the Joint Force Command headquarters, NATO maintains a balance between force efficiency (interoperability and readiness) and experience across the commands.96

Since reaching initial operational capability in 2005, the NRF deployed twice in support of the NAC. The NRF supported the United States following the devastating aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in September, 2005, and the NRF deployed to Pakistan following a severe earthquake in October 2006. The remaining sections of Chapter III provide an overview of these NRF missions to review the impact of transformation on NATO operations as well as to assess the agility of the NRF.

**NRF Operations during Katrina Relief**

Hurricane Katrina made landfall on 29 August 2005, and damaged 90,000 sq miles of the U.S. Gulf Coast, flooding 90 percent of New Orleans and displacing 800,000

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On 4 September the U.S. requested NATO relief support in the form of medical and logistical supplies including food supplements. On 9 September the NAC approved a NATO transport operation involving the third NRF rotation cycle, specifically “NRF 5” under the leadership of Joint Command (JC) Lisbon. The NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) coordinated with both NATO and Partnership for Peace nations to identify donations for the U.S.

The NRF 5’s Air Component Command (ACC) accumulated over 90 flight hours utilizing tactical transport aircraft (C-130s and C-160s) to move donations from nations such as the Czech Republic, Greece, Norway and Romania to Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Other European nations including Austria, Finland, Denmark and Slovak Republic utilized national assets to move their materials on Ramstein. After consolidating relief supplies on Ramstein, the ACC planned and executed twelve airlift missions utilizing B 707 aircraft from NATO’s Airborne Early Warning fleet from Geilenkirchen, Germany; an Airbus A310 from Canada; a C-130 from Turkey, and, most significantly, an Antonov 124 donated by the Ukraine providing nearly 50 percent of the strategic lift by moving (86 tons) on 20 September. In total, the NRF’s ACC delivered nearly 190 tons of disaster relief items to the U.S. from 12 September to 2 October 2005. In short, the NRF provided the first supplies to the U.S.’s Gulf Coast only eight days following the U.S. request for assistance and only three days after the NAC approved the

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mission. This was a major accomplishment for the NRF, which consolidated all donations and completed delivery of all supplies within 30 days of request.¹⁰⁰

NATO has not published a public lessons learned document regarding Katrina, but The U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Center for Operational Analysis’ Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned publication provided a thorough review of the U.S. response. The publication found no fault or favor in NATO’s NRF support, but it did recommend improving the national immediate response capability through interoperable communications with all support elements.¹⁰¹

Despite the lack of published NATO lessons learned documents, it is apparent in reviewing the operation that there is a significant lack of strategic aircraft available to NATO and the NRF. Arguably, the NRF’s tactical airlift (fifteen C-130s and C-160s from France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom) proved sufficient to move cargo from European nations to the air hub at Ramstein during the consolidation phase.¹⁰² The ACC in conjunction with the SHAPE Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC) planned and coordinated the strategic air missions to the U.S. The ACC utilized eleven missions with B707 NATO AWACS Trainer and Cargo Aircraft (TCA), C-130s, and an Airbus A310 to move cargo nearly 100 tons of cargo. With thanks to the Ukrainian donation of an AN 124, they then moved the remaining 86 tons in one flight.¹⁰³ Two items are worth noting: (1) During a non-relief mission, the 17 NATO AWACS aircraft would likely not be available for cargo movements as they would be

¹⁰² NATO EADRCC Final Report (Nº 15) Katrina-USA, 2.
¹⁰³ Ibid.
utilized in missions ranging from air surveillance to air support and reconnaissance.\textsuperscript{104}

(2) The NRF could significantly increase agility through rapid access to a limited fleet of strategic cargo aircraft, such as C-17/C-5/AN 124 aircraft. Following the Katrina support mission and in the midst of NATO relief support to Pakistan following an earthquake, NATO gained support for a needed Strategic Airlift Initiative to be further examined in Chapter IV.

Amidst a successful 1\textsuperscript{st} NRF relief mission with timely delivery of goods, shortfalls in NRF strategic airlift availability were apparent. NATO observed this lesson again during its second operation described in the next section.

\textbf{NRF Operations during Pakistan Earthquake Relief}

Six days after NATO ended its relief support mission to the U.S., a magnitude 7.6 earthquake struck Pakistan on 8 October 2005, killing nearly 74,000 Pakistanis, injuring another 130,000, and leaving more than 5 million homeless.\textsuperscript{105} On 10 October Pakistan requested NATO assistance for humanitarian relief. Within 24 hours the NAC approved Operation Plan 10305 which laid out a two-phased support mission.

Phase one provided NATO aircraft to perform an air bridge for relief supplies from 19 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and 2 non-EAPC nations (Malta and Bosnia-Herzegovina), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs


Similar to NATO’s Katrina Relief support, the NATO EADRCC served as the lead coordinator for humanitarian aid from the nations. SHAPE’s AMCC directed the movement of donations using the NRF’s ACC tactical airlift assets to consolidate supplies within Europe and also to execute the strategic delivery of materials to Pakistan. The UN provided the majority of donated items, and the NRF flew these donations from Turkey to Pakistan. Due to significant financial donations and donations in kind, NATO chartered AN-124 and IL-76 commercial aircraft to augment its strategic lift capability previously limited to the fleet of NRF-assigned tactical airlifters and the three NATO AWACS TCA. The ACC completed its last airlift mission to Pakistan on 9 February 2006. In total, the ACC flew 3,500 tons of aid (nearly 18,000 tents and heaters as well as over 500,000 blankets and 30,000 mattresses and 50,000 sleeping bags) to Pakistan.

The second phase of the operation included the deployment of NRF land forces made up of medical, engineer, aviation, and support units. The NAC approved the use of the land forces on October 21st, and the NRF’s Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) Headquarters (shown in Table 12 below) deployed on 24 October to prepare for the arrival of an expected 1,200 troops.

On 31 October 2005, the German helicopter detachment arrived in Pakistan followed by the Dutch Field Hospital on 1 November. The Italian Heavy Engineer personnel arrived on 2 December followed by their 136 trucks including 20 dump trucks.
16 trailers, 4 excavators, and 4 bulldozers. Italy moved these assets to Pakistan using surface lift, as many of the vehicles would not be able to fit inside the largest of aircraft. The NRF LCC redeployed on 29 January 2006, exactly 100 days after the NAC approved Operation Plan mission 10305. The LCC’s forces provided the following support to Pakistan:

- Dutch-led field hospital and mobile medical units cared for nearly 8,300 patients and performed 160 major surgeries.
- Italian Heavy ENG units repaired nearly 60 kilometers of critical infrastructure while removing nearly 15,000 tons of earthquake debris.
- German Medium Transport Helicopters delivered nearly 1,800 tons of relief goods to mountainous villages. These helicopters also evacuated nearly 7,700 earthquake victims.

### Table 12. NATO Pakistan Relief Mission Task Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Forces Command Lisbon; Commander: Air Commodore Andrew Walton (UK RAF)</th>
<th>Joint Force Air Component Command - France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land Component Command (LCC) – NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Spain; Commander: Lieutenant General Jose Javier Arregui Asta</strong></td>
<td>NRF 5 Deployable Joint Task Force HQ; Commander: Vice Admiral John Stufflebeam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Elements</td>
<td>Support / Water Purification Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Heavy Engineers (TF Elephant), Polish light ENG unit (1st ENG BDE), Spain light ENG, and UK ENG (high altitude relief work)</td>
<td>Dutch Marines Field Hospital with UK, Czech Republic, Germany, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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111 NATO Public Information Office, “NATO - Topic: Pakistan earthquake relief operation.”
• French and German fuel handlers performed approximately 1,000 aviation refueling missions for military and civilian aircraft in support of relief operations.

The NRF clearly succeeded in its mission to provide rapid support to Pakistan and provided credible proof that NATO can deliver forces to an area outside of European boundaries. Additionally, the NRF’s DJTF Headquarters deployed within five days of notification and the majority of forces reached Pakistan within thirty days. One apparent shortfall during the operation, however, was the deployment of the Italian Heavy Engineer unit. Its deployment required 55 days before the unit could be fully operational. The slow surface deployment of the large equipment to landlocked Pakistan shortened the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th># of flights</th>
<th>Planning Allowable Cabin Load (in Short Tons)</th>
<th>Maximum Total Lift per aircraft (flights x ACL in tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed C-130</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing B-747</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDonnell Douglas DC-10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing B-707 (AWACS TCA)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonov AN-12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonov AN-124</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDonnell Douglas C-17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDonnell Douglas DC-8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed Tristar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Maximum Payload</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4,741</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft Utilization (Maximum Lift/Total Moved (3,500)) Percentage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>74%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


113 Air Mobility Command, *Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403l, Air Mobility Planning Factor (Scott AFB: Air Mobility Command, 2003), 12.


engineer’s effectiveness by nearly 50 percent in light of the NRF operation only lasting 96 days. The second observed inefficiency was the continued shortage of strategic airlift assets available to move the relief items and forces. Table 13 above captures aircraft utilization and reveals that NATO could have moved 4,741 short tons (STONS) as compared to the 3,500 STONS actually transported. Since aircraft cargo dimensions frequently fill the aircraft before the maximum allowable cabin weight is reached, the 74% aircraft utilization percentage points to a high level of efficiency achieved by the NRF’s Air Component Command during movement of the relief supplies.

Notable in comparison to the Katrina Relief mission, the ACC’s air bridge to Pakistan delivered nearly 18 times the volume of materials as was sent to the Gulf Coast. Table 14 below depicts the average aircraft payload for the NRF missions. The increase in payload during the Pakistan operations is directly related to the increased use in strategic airlift. Of the 164 NATO airlifts missions to Pakistan, 36 missions used wide body (40 STONS or greater payload) aircraft, or 22 percent of all missions. During Hurricane Katrina relief operations, NATO used 2 wide body airlift missions of the 12 total flights (17 percent of all flights).

Evident in the comparison above is the continued need for wide body aircraft to support NATO operations. Contracting an AN-124 to support an operation is likely to cost three to four times the cost of operating a C-130, but the AN-124 can haul nearly nine times the payload of a C-130. Tactical airlift will likely remain critical for the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>NRF ACC Airlift Missions</th>
<th>Tons of Relief Items</th>
<th>Average Tons Per Airlift (Average Payload)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katrina Relief</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Relief</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NATO NRF for intra-theater movements, but increased investment in strategic airlift will provide a more rapidly deployable and more capable NATO force.

Another challenge facing the NRF during Pakistan Relief Operations was the unavailability of common funding to support the airlift mission. During an interview on Pakistan Earthquake Operations lessons learned, NATO Assistant Secretary General Maurits Jochems, who is responsible for Civil Emergency Planning, commented:

There are lessons learned in the sense that we have a funding problem I discovered. That both the strategic airlift, both the helicopters, to limit myself to these two examples, the operational costs are gigantic, are enormous, to run these kind of units. And ministers of defence who eventually in the NATO organization make things available, were at one point saying, but listen my defense budget is not to run humanitarian relief operations. That's more for ministers of development cooperation, perhaps, if you look at it in a national basis, or for the UN to pay for. I mean, I venture this at my own responsibility, but if the UN asks us to help why should they not pay a little bit for the running cost…. It's indeed either that, to put it a bit simply, either the main clients like the United Nations or some of the bigger non-governmental organizations pay for it, or we have to think of a new social contract within NATO nations, between defense ministries and ministries for development cooperation.\textsuperscript{117}

Currently there is no NATO, EU, or UN proposal to fund airlift operations during emergency relief missions, although NATO is currently reviewing funding requirements for NRF deployments.

\textit{Chapter Summary}

NATO operations since the end of the Cold War continue to undergo a slow evolution. Beginning with a defense-based force, NATO was forced to adapt to expeditionary missions with the occurrence of unrest first in the Balkans and then in

Afghanistan and Iraq. Recognizing the need for an even more agile force, NATO created the NRF to a rapid response capability and a catalyst to drive change.

The NAC put the NRF to the test after Hurricane Katrina and an Earthquake in Pakistan. Although the NRF executed both mission successfully, the lack of strategic airlift and dedicated funding limited the agility of force in both operations. To improve the agility of the NRF missions of the future, NATO must address these problem areas. The following chapter provides recommendations to mitigate these operational shortfalls.
CHAPTER IV  RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE NRF AGILITY

“The NATO Response Force is a ready, agile and flexible force which I believe is crucial to the health and success of our alliance in the coming years... as a key element of our NATO military culture, the NRF can enable the alliance to better meet threats to security and stability in the 21st century.”\textsuperscript{118}

GEN John Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 4 May 2007

The preceding chapters provided a review of relevant NATO policy and doctrinal guidance and the post-Cold War operational history of Alliance forces that include the formation of the NRF. Based on shortfalls that emerged during the preceding review, this chapter will provide recommendations to improve the agility of the NRF. In order to provide a framework for these recommendations, the author submits that the minimum agility requirements model forms the acronym FAST UP (defined in Table 15 below) to connote national forces that, once alerted, are up and on their feet quickly ready to deploy.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Agile Force Requirements</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Agile forces require dedicated funds to execute their missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>Agile forces require sufficient strategic airlift to reach their destination quickly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Sealift</td>
<td>Agile forces require sufficient sealift to move equipment and sustainment from port to port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Tailorable Task Organization</td>
<td>Agile forces require the ability to change task organization to achieve the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Unity of Effort</td>
<td>Agile forces require unity across the command and member nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Policy, Doctrine, and Planning</td>
<td>Agile forces require clear policy and doctrine and the ability to lean forward in future planning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agile forces are Funded, have sufficient Airlift and Sealift available, are Tailorable task organizations, execute with a Unity of effort, and have effective Policy, doctrine, and adaptive planning systems in place to enable mission success (i.e. FAST UP).
and execute their mission. Recommendations to improve each FAST UP requirements will be provided with intentional emphasis given to Funding, Airlift, and Sealift requirements as these elements are the priority areas of improvement for agility.

In order to provide road signs throughout the chapter, the reader can refer to the footer of each page of this chapter to remember the components of FAST UP. Additionally, as each topic is discussed, the corresponding component(s) of FAST UP will be underlined following the chapter sub-titles. For example, "NRF Funding Guidance (FAST UP)" signals that the passage will discuss the funding aspect of FAST UP. Note that the FAST UP model is not intended to convey priority of the recommendations; FAST UP is simply a model to convey the critical elements required to improve the agility of the NRF to enable the force to deploy strategic distances and sustain itself for up to 30-days.

**NRF Agility Funding Recommendations (FAST UP)**

Chapter II pointed out the lack of common funding available to the NRF that would enable the stand-by forces to effectively and efficiently plan for its deployment and sustainment. Chapter III’s discussion on NRF deployments following Hurricane Katrina and the Pakistan earthquake highlighted the lack of funded, dedicated airlift to expedite NATO response to the crisis. NRF afforded a 17 percent strategic cargo aircraft utilization to deliver relief materials to the U.S. and 22 percent for the airlift missions to Pakistan.

To improve the NRF agility, NATO must provide common funding for its rotational forces. Sufficient operational funding ensures that it can train, deploy and execute its missions derived from the political aims of the NAC and NATO member
nations. Several recommendations are presented to ensure member participation in NRF rotations as well as to maximize effectiveness of the Response Force.

First, an enlarged NATO should dedicate funds in the common military budget to fund all NRF rotation cycle validation training as well as all rapid deployment (airlift and sealift of cargo and passengers) and sustainment contracts (basic field sanitation and messing services) of the NRF’s first responders as the Response Force executes NAC directed missions. To fund this increase in the military budget, NATO would reexamine its burdensharing program and levy an “NRF tax” on member nations in order to solidify its commitment to a credible, agile response force. Waivers for the NRF tax would be available to nations which contribute either national strategic transportation or military forces to the NRF rotations.

Contracted wide-body cargo aircraft or fast sealift ships move the NRF to areas of operations rapidly following receipt of Notice to Move from the NAC. Nations pledging transportation support for the NRF deployments would absorb the cost of maintaining the strategic airlift or sealift assets as well as the cost of executing the deployment support. NATO would not tax all Alliance members to cover these costs and would award nations pledging strategic transportation assets by exempting them from much if not all of the NRF tax designated to cover operational costs.

The NRF Tax could also be significantly reduced or fully waived by nations committing their nationally trained forces for the NRF rotations. The benefit for this is twofold for NATO. The Alliance improves its ability to fill NRF unit requirements in the NRF Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), and NATO is able to include more nations in the NRF as a means to improve interoperability across the expanding

Agile forces are Funded, have sufficient Airlift and Sealift available, are Tailorable task organizations, execute with a Unity of effort, and have effective Policy, doctrine, and adaptive planning systems in place to enable mission success (i.e. FAST UP).
Alliance. Nations participating in the Alliance would have a financial incentive to commit forces to the NRF for training and stand-by status, though the nations would have to provide sustainment funding and accept risk of their national treasure as their men and women are deployed in support of Alliance missions.

A second funding recommendation lies in procuring military funding for NATO missions that directly support the EU and its European Security and Defence Policy. For example, if there were a natural disaster in Italy, then the EU is the likely source to organize economic aid from the EU nations while NATO is the likely source of military assistance able to execute the delivery of relief materials. Aligning the EU’s collective funding provisions with NATO’s deployment and sustainment costs to support the relief would benefit both the supranational EU which can provide quicker and more capable assistance and the intergovernmental Alliance which can deploy (following consensus) in support of EU without funding all operational costs. Funding for humanitarian assistance operations likely will come from either the U.S. or the EU as they collectively represent 60 percent of the world GDP and 40 percent of the world trade.119

Furthermore, NATO forces will likely include U.S. forces in the event of an NRF deployment in Europe or in an area of European interest. EU funding is thus a reasonable solution to facilitate NRF agility. Clearly, the transfer of funds from the EU to NATO to support crisis operations is not likely prior to the crisis event, but the protocols and legalities must be developed and approved by both organizations now.

Third, using funds from the NRF tax and shared funding from the EU, NATO should fully fund the NRF deployment costs (not provided through nations pledging support in return for tax relief) and the costs of initial sustainment contracts for these forces. This funding provides the NRF and supporting agencies such as the Movement Co-ordination Centre Europe and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency the ability to maximize strategic transportation and minimize the number of contracts let to support multinational forces.

The NRF Joint Logistics Support Group's ability to execute contracts for multinational formations prior to a deployment would significantly decrease national support element requirements from sending nations. Dedicated initial NRF contract funding empowers the JLSG to do the following prior to deployment:

- refine their concept of support prior to deploying in order to decrease the costs associated with NATO Response force deployment
- identify support arrangements for follow-on forces to minimize troop levels and strategic lift requirements
- execute RSOM of NRF elements after successfully contracting life support, Host Nation transportation and minimal field services
- expedite assignment of Logistics Lead Nation /Role Specialist Nation (LLN/LSRN) for functional areas and classes of supply for follow on forces

Funding the NRF deployments and initial contract requirements will enable NATO to achieve tremendous efficiencies which in turn equate to cost avoidance for the 28-nation Alliance.

SHAPE also must play a greater role in funding the NRF. As the headquarters for all operational forces, it must tie the political aims desired by the NAC to the projected NRF funding levels and force composition as reflected in the NRF CJSOR. If the NAC cannot gain consensus to approve a funding increase for the NRF, then the NAC

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should scale back its Response Force to enable the deployment of fewer forces under the NRF banner while building a larger second tier of forces. This second tier would not rapidly deploy, but these units would deploy following approval and funding from their sending nations. NATO is currently reviewing this option calling the initial entry force the Immediate Response Force (IRF) and subsequent forces will be created out of a Response Force Pool (RFP).  

In summary, adequate NRF funding will advance change in NATO’s military operations faster than any other means and offers great benefit to the Alliance – though there is no doubt that funding is also the most politically divisive. As the NATO Secretary General leads the Alliance through the intellectual review and renewal of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, he must either gain support for the NRF if it is going to continue to meet the demands of future crisis operations or he must stand down the Alliance’s initiative to have an agile Response Force. The funding challenge continues to surround the NATO Response Force, but SHAPE is visiting its default policy of “costs lie where they fall” to alleviate financial burdens on nations providing forces to the rotational NRF. The NRF, as the catalyst for change, has shown the Alliance that agility requires funding – NATO must now change.

**NRF Agility Strategic Air and Sealift Recommendations (FAST UP)**

The review of NRF deployments in chapter III demonstrated a lack of strategic aircraft to move the NRF and relief supplies quickly to its final location. NATO achieved

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an average aircraft load of less than 16 short tons (STONs) for its support to the U.S. during Katrina Relief and 21.3 STONs tons per aircraft during the Pakistan earthquake relief mission. These two small deployments, the only two NRF deployments on record, illustrate the need for additional wide-body aircraft. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan further exemplifies this shortage. The lack of creditable strategic lift dissuaded US senior leaders from requesting significant numbers of NATO forces following the 9/11 attacks and subsequent NATO Article V declaration. As European nations struggled to send limited numbers of forces to Afghanistan, NATO leaders began to confront the strategic lift shortfall identified by some to be the “Alliance’s Achilles heel of capabilities.”

NATO focused on addressing this need in the Riga Summit Declaration of November 2006. Through the declaration, the NAC endorsed initiatives to increase its ability to project forces including:

- improving NATO’s ability to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support and to sustain them for extended periods. (This will require forces that are fully deployable, sustainable and interoperable and the means to deploy them.)

- increasing strategic airlift, crucial to the rapid deployment of forces, to address identified persistent shortages. Multinational initiatives by NATO members and Partners include the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution; the intent of a consortium to pool C-17 airlift assets; and nationally, Allies plan to acquire a large number of C-17 and A-400M aircraft. There have also been significant developments in the collective provision of sealift since the Prague Summit.

General Ray Henault, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee at the time of the Riga Summit, further emphasized this need following the Riga Declaration by stating further:

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122 Ek, “CRS Report for Congress NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment,” CRS-6.
Agile forces are Funded, have sufficient Airlift and Sealift available, are Tailorable task organizations, execute with a Unity of effort, and have effective Policy, doctrine, and adaptive planning systems in place to enable mission success (i.e. FAST UP).

...strategic lift, airlift and sealift - primarily airlift for the short notice deployments and those with a very short timeline - is very crucial. There is a trial ongoing for strategic airlift under a common funding formula for deployment of the NRF or components of the NRF. You still need sealift because the NRF may be deployed for a period of time and we may need to move some of our heavy equipment by sea.\(^\text{124}\)

NATO members have followed through on the preceding strategic guidance to improve strategic airlift in a three-pronged approach including the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative, and promotion of national investment into additional strategic airlift assets. The following paragraphs summarize these strategic airlift initiatives in order to convey their value to the Alliance to encourage their sustainment.

**Airlift Initiatives**

NATO’s first initiative, the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), was the result of the NATO Ministers of Defense Meetings in Brussels in June 2003 where nations signed a letter of intent to pursue collective access to strategic airlift. In Istanbul in June 2004, the nations refined their intentions in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to contract collectively for capability to move outsized cargo utilizing up to six Antonov AN-124 wide-body aircraft. On 23 January 2006, 15 countries (listed in footnote below) formally signed a multinational contract with Ruslan SALIS GmbH, a subsidiary of the Russian company Volga Dnepr, an aircraft service provider based in Russia.\(^\text{125}\) As the I (interim) in SALIS implies, the contract, though renewable, is


\(^{125}\) NATO Public Information Office, "NATO Topics: Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) - How did it evolve?" NATO, http://www.nato.int/issues/strategic-lift-air/evolution.html (accessed 2 November 2009). The 15 Nations included: Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United Kingdom - joined by Sweden on 23 March 2006.
intended to serve as an interim solution toward a more capable, permanent solution for NATO. This contract provides the now 18-nation (17 NATO nations plus one Partnership for Peace nation - Sweden) consortium with two full-time charter 120-ton AN-124 aircraft plus two additional aircraft six days after request and up to two additional aircraft (six total) following after nine days of notification. Effectively, the nations have purchased a minimum of 2000 flying hours per year.\textsuperscript{126} The Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE), an organization discussed later in the Unity of Effort portion of this chapter, executes the airlift transport and air-to-air refueling coordination between the SALIS consortium member nations. The nations, however, did not contribute equitably to the contract, and therefore all have a different entitlement toward contract aircraft utilization. The original MOU has over 50% of the contribution coming from Germany and France as well as 1,100 of the 1,859 dedicated flying hours going to these nations.\textsuperscript{127}

The SALIS initiative served as a positive first step forward for NATO, though the SALIS initiative and is open to any EU nation that invests in the airlift capability provided by the Antonov contract. The non-NATO based SALIS contract, however, does not attempt to address the airlift of the NRF, as NRF troop-contributing nations may not be part of the consortium, which may further discriminate against smaller nations. Additionally, SALIS offers only limited capability of up to six AN-124s and falls short of providing sufficient strategic airlift for NATO’s NRF. Two AN-124 flights could have

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Agile forces are Funded, have sufficient Airlift and Sealift available, are Tailorable task organizations, execute with a Unity of effort, and have effective Policy, doctrine, and adaptive planning systems in place to enable mission success (i.e. FAST UP).

delivered all the cargo included in the 12 airlift missions NATO utilized during Katrina Relief, but even using six AN-124s over this time frame required the first two aircraft to make five runs to deliver the relief materials to Pakistan. This may be an acceptable number of turns for NATO, but the aircraft contract does not provide the 3rd and 4th aircraft until 6 days following request and the 5th and 6th until 9 days after request. Therefore, the Pakistan Relief, if executed solely by SALIS aircraft (capable of moving 120 STONS per mission\textsuperscript{128}) would have looked like Table 16 below:

Table 16. Notional maximized SALIS performance* for Pakistan Relief with two aircraft available until day 6, four available until day 9 then all 6 are available

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day 0</th>
<th>Aircraft Available</th>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Day 2</th>
<th>Day 3</th>
<th>Day 4</th>
<th>Day 5</th>
<th>Day 6</th>
<th>Day 7</th>
<th>Day 8</th>
<th>Day 9</th>
<th>Day 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Notification to contractor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,500 tons required</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running total (tons)</td>
<td></td>
<td>240</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>2160</td>
<td>2640</td>
<td>3360</td>
<td>3500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - Optimized Delivery Capability Assuming 1 Turn Possible in 24 Hours

If all six aircraft were immediately available, the same 3,500 tons could have been delivered in five days instead of the ten days shown above.

To mitigate the shortfall and achieve a more permanent solution to its airlift deficiency, NATO pursued its second airlift initiative. The NATO Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) became formal nine months after the SALIS initiative on 12 September 2006, following a letter of intent (LOI) signed by 13 NATO nations (listed in footnote below). The LOI authorized the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) to begin negotiations with Boeing on the procurement of C-17 Globemaster III aircraft for

\textsuperscript{128} USSR Report Engineering and Equipment, 1.
the Alliance. The initiative provides for two C-17 aircraft procured by NAMSA with U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and one additional C-17 given to NATO by the U.S. A multinational command with multinational crews, the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW), would fly and maintain the aircraft based at Pápa Air Base in Hungary. On 27 July 2009, the first SAC C-17 arrived at Papa Air Base; the second C-17 arrived on 21 September 2009; and the third aircraft arrived on 12 October 2009. To oversee the acquisition and sustainment of the aircraft, the NAC approved the charter of a NATO Production and Logistics Organisation (NPLO) on 20 June 2007 which authorized the establishment of the NATO Airlift Management Organisation (NAMO). It is noteworthy that the C-17s technically belong to 10-NATO member nations plus two PfP nations (Finland and Sweden). The NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer addressed this arrangement in a note on the NAMO:

Ministers welcome and endorse the legal and political commitment of member States of the NATO Airlift Management Organisation (NAMO) that member States of NATO that do not participate in NAMO shall bear no responsibility vis-à-vis NATO and third parties for the costs, expenses, and liabilities of any kind arising from the implementation of the Airlift Management Programme or the use and the maintenance of the SAC aircraft.


NAMO, therefore, is a charter organization comprised of NATO and PfP nations in which all members are responsible for the three C-17 aircraft and only the charter members are entitled to their use. Further, NAMO executes acquisition, aircraft management and support for the C-17s on behalf of the SAC nations and will support missions on behalf of NATO, the European Union and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{133}

On 28 September 2009, the HAW conducted its first C-17 mission in support of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan delivering sustainment to Swedish troops in Mazar-e Sharif. Mr. Peter Flory, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, commented positively on the mission: “The first mission to Afghanistan is a big step forward for the efforts of the SAC nations, including both NATO and EU members, to address a critical shortfall in strategic lift.”\textsuperscript{134} The HAW has since executed missions to support NATO troops in Kosovo.

Looking again at the Pakistan Relief mission with the HAW and C-17s (capable of moving 85 STONS per mission\textsuperscript{135}) in place, NATO’s combined airlift capability utilizing the airlift potential of SALIS and SAC (shown in the Table 17 below) would significantly improve the agility by which the Alliance could deliver 3,500 STONS. The existing SALIS contract required ten days to execute the lift but only 7 days would now be needed to execute the same mission requirement with the combined fleet of AN-124s and the C-17s. In this example, the SALIS contract’s ability to add the fifth and sixth aircraft was not needed as the delivery was completed prior to the 9\textsuperscript{th} day. If, however,

\textsuperscript{133} NATO Public Information Office, "NATO - News: First strategic flight in support of ISAF, 28-Sep.-2009."
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
Agile forces are Funded, have sufficient Airlift and Sealift available, are Tailorable task organizations, execute with a Unity of effort, and have effective Policy, doctrine, and adaptive planning systems in place to enable mission success (i.e. FAST UP).

Table 17. Notional maximized SAC + SALIS Performance* for Pakistan Relief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Available</th>
<th>Day 0</th>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Day 2</th>
<th>Day 3</th>
<th>Day 4</th>
<th>Day 5</th>
<th>Day 6</th>
<th>Day 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SALIS</td>
<td>AN 124 #1</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AN 124 #2</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AN 124 #3</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AN 124 #4</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AN 124 #5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AN 124 #6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>C-17 #1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-17 #2</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-17 #3</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running total (tons) :</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1485</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2475</td>
<td>3210</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - Optimized Delivery Capability Assuming 1 Turn Possible in 24 Hours

Table 18. Notional maximized SAC performance for Pakistan Relief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Available</th>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Day 2</th>
<th>Day 3</th>
<th>Day 4</th>
<th>Day 5</th>
<th>Day 6</th>
<th>Day 7</th>
<th>Day 8</th>
<th>Day 9</th>
<th>Day 10</th>
<th>Day 11</th>
<th>Day 12</th>
<th>Day 13</th>
<th>Day 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-17 #1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-17 #2</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-17 #3</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running total (tons) :</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>1785</td>
<td>2040</td>
<td>2295</td>
<td>2550</td>
<td>2805</td>
<td>3060</td>
<td>3315</td>
<td>3500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - Optimized Delivery Capability Assuming 1 Turn Possible in 24 Hours

the SALIS interim bridging contract is not renewed and NATO can only rely on the SAC to achieve the 3,500 STON delivery, then Table 18 below reflects the result. The decreased payload of the three C-17s increased the required delivery days to 14. Not shown on the chart, however, is the C-17s ability to stretch the C-17s delivery distance with its air refueling capability and to take off and land on runways as short as 3,500 feet (1,064 meters) and only 90 feet wide (27.4 meters).\(^{136}\)

The SAC therefore provides NAMO with three very capable strategic aircraft that are designed for use in austere areas with less than commercial wide body length airports. The SAC augments NATO’s agility, but the aircraft are not directly available to NRF

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\(^{136}\) Ibid.
contributing nations which are not in NAMO. The SAC then, like the SALIS, improves the agility of select member nations, but it does little to support smaller non-charter member nations that lack strategic airlift. NATO must promote charter membership to new NATO members in order to mitigate this apparent gap.

In addition to the two airlift expansion initiatives detailed above, NATO’s agility is also improving through existing national airlift procurement programs. Seven NATO nations\(^\text{137}\) began purchasing 180 A-400 Airbus aircraft in 2009.\(^\text{138}\) The A-400’s maximum payload of 37 tons\(^\text{139}\) is over twice the capability of the tactical airlift capability of the E, H, and J-models of the C-130,\(^\text{140}\) but when deployed a strategic distance of 3,450 nautical miles, the A-400 payload is limited to 20 tons.\(^\text{141}\) The A-400 also provides a larger cabin area for outsized equipment. The A-400 cargo area is 3.85 meters tall and 4 meters wide (15.40 square meters) where as the C-130’s cabin is only 2.74 meters tall and 3.12 meters wide (8.55 square meters). The A-400 investment is a definite boost to agility; in conjunction with the two strategic initiatives, it provides increased capability to NATO. Additionally, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada are procuring C-17 aircraft. The U.S. has a robust C-17 on hand inventory of 174


\(^{141}\) Airbus Military Technical Specifications.
with orders to increase the fleet to 205\textsuperscript{142} plus congressional authorization and appropriation for an additional eight.\textsuperscript{143} The UK procured six C-17s,\textsuperscript{144} and Canada purchased and received 4 C-17s from Boeing.\textsuperscript{145}

Through SALIS, SAC, and nation procurements, NATO is moving forward in achieving agility for its forces. The following chart reveals which NATO nations are investing in airlift. Albania and Croatia, new NATO member nations in 2009, currently do not have investments in strategic lift; Iceland is also not shown below, but Iceland does not have a national military force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALIS Nations</th>
<th>SAC NAMO Nations</th>
<th>National Procurements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contract AN-124s (2 to 6 aircraft)</td>
<td>3 C-17s in NATO HAW</td>
<td>180 A400s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland (PfP)</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Finland (PfP)</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Roman</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden (PfP)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NATO Nations involved in two initiatives (shown in \textbf{bold text}) include: Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, the United Kingdom and the United States. (PfP nations: Finland and Sweden)

\textsuperscript{142} USAF C-17 Globemaster III Factsheet.
Airlift Recommendations

In light of these initiatives that have significantly improved NATO's airlift capability, two recommendations to NATO leaders follow. NATO must build upon the airlift initiatives by (1) increasing aircraft inventories and (2) expanding member participation in order to provide sufficient lift to the NRF’s immediate response and follow-on forces. NATO's aircraft inventory is currently limited to AWACS and C-17s. NATO may choose to pursue tanker aircraft to provide immediate access to air refueling assets to stretch delivery length of their C-17s or to increase station time of servicing AWACS aircraft. Secondly, based on data in Table 19, NATO should continue to promote Alliance and PfP participation in one of its three initiatives and facilitate the participation of aspiring NATO members through the NATO membership process. Ensuring applicants have access to strategic airlift prior to membership provides immediate value to the Alliance and facilitates national participation in the NRF.

As NATO's airlift capability grows, the NRF clearly benefits from the additional airlift and increases its agility. Together with the sealift initiatives discussed below, NATO is following through on the political guidance received at the Riga Summit.

Sealift Initiatives

Parallel to the strategic airlift initiatives, NATO nations have partnered to improve the collective sealift available to the Alliance. Following the Prague Capabilities Summit, NATO established a High Level Group on Strategic Sealift to reduce the sealift shortfalls for NATO’s deployable forces including the NRF. The Group pursued a combination of fulltime charter and multinational assured access
contracts to solidify sealift capability. Following the NATO Defence Ministers meetings in June and December 2003, nine Defence Ministers signed a letter of intent authorizing formation of a consortium led by Norway to execute contracts through NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) for the provision of the sealift capability.\textsuperscript{146} The MCCE’s Sealift Coordination Centre (SCC) coordinates sealift for the consortium. NATO member countries have pooled their resources to charter special ships, giving the Alliance the capability to transport rapidly forces and equipment by sea. The sealift consortium (less Denmark and the United Kingdom – as these nations are providing vessels to the consortium) is financing the charter of up to 10 special roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships from the following sources:

- 3 commercial RO/RO ships on assured access contract executed by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization
- 1 - 2 Danish RO/RO ships chartered on a fulltime contract basis for several years
- 4 United Kingdom RO/RO ships: residual capacity of four of the six RO/RO vessels under the UK’s 25-year Private Finance Initiative contract with AWSR Shipping Ltd. (lasting until December 2024)
- 1 Norwegian RO/RO ship on ad hoc basis through a dormant contract.

As an example of the capacity of the ships, the Danish and UK ships can each lift nearly 54,000 square feet of vehicles and equipment, which would stretch two and a half kilometers if they were in a single file.\textsuperscript{147} By comparison using the chart below, a U.S.


\textsuperscript{147} Joris Janssen Lok, "NATO's strategic sealift capabilities gather pace - Jane's Defence News,"
Large Medium Speed Roll On/Roll Off (LMSR) can lift ammunition, food, water, fuel, equipment and other supplies to sustain up to 20,000 troops with two combat brigades for up to 15 days. The U.S. ships carry vehicles and equipment to support humanitarian missions, as well as combat missions. Each of these vessels has a cargo carrying capacity of more than 300,000 square feet, equivalent to almost eight football fields. Therefore, based on the information above, the following chart shows the capability available to the NRF for sealift operations compared against the sealift available to U.S. forces.

Therefore, the entire fleet of NATO's RO/RO vessels could collectively move only half of a U.S. combat brigade plus its sustainment for 15 days. NATO does not currently have an upper limit on the size of the NRF as emerging guidance from NATO includes an Immediate Response Force and an open ended Response Force Pool. Without having a stated NRF sealift requirement, NATO's sealift allocation currently provides only the required lift to move a half of a brigade. If the NAC directed a mission of approximately 15,000 ground troops similar to four U.S. or U.K. brigades, NATO would only be able to move one-eighth of the force without the support of troop contributing nations.


Ibid.


NRF actual sealift requirements are defined by the troop listing contained in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) for the rotational NRF force. Since this is a classified document, gross estimation is the only means to evaluate sealift capability based on unclassified information.

Table 20. NATO RO/RO and U.S. LMSR Sealift Capability Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel Type</th>
<th>Seafort Capability per vessel</th>
<th>Units per Vessel (Uses 1.2M Sq Ft per Brigade)</th>
<th>Total Force Available for Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 RO/RO (NATO)</td>
<td>54,000 sq ft (Danish and UK)</td>
<td>.045 Brigades per vessel</td>
<td>.45 Brigades for 15 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 LMSRs (U.S.)</td>
<td>300,000 sq ft</td>
<td>.25 Brigades per vessel</td>
<td>2 Brigades for 15 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The NRF’s agility to deploy quickly using sealift is not only limited by the availability of the 10 RO/RO vessels, but also the suitability of these ships. U.S. Joint Publication 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations, summarized in the chart below highlights relevant advantages and disadvantages for the NRF’s sole use of these vessels. RO/RO vessels are designed for rapid loading and unloading of rolling stock and are suitable for the NRF’s mission. The limited numbers of containers used by deploying units would likely fit on the top deck of the RO/RO vessels, but this analysis must be further conducted among NATO planners using the lift requirements identified by the units listed on the classified CJSOR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RO/RO advantages</th>
<th>RO/RO disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specifically designed to carry wheeled and tracked vehicles for all or most of its cargo</td>
<td>Below-deck space and volume utilization generally less efficient than on a containership because it is designed to accommodate cargo which cannot be stacked but which vary in height</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability for rapid loading and discharge of military vehicles and non-self-deployable aircraft as vehicles are driven or towed on and off the ship by means of ramps</td>
<td>Relatively unsuited for carrying containerized sustainment and ammunition (only top deck available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open deck areas well suited to the carriage of outsized military cargo</td>
<td>Limited availability due to saturated market sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sealift Recommendations**

NATO's limited sealift capability to move one half of a brigade plus with its sustainment for fifteen days is not sufficient to meet full NRF deployments of the NRF’s publications.

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151 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 4-01.2 Sealift Support to Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 August 2005), IV-3.

Immediate Response Forces nor follow-on forces in the Response Forces Pool. Further, the loose nature of assured access and ad hoc contracts works against the urgent requirements of the NRF degrading its agility. Based on asset availability times shown in the following chart, chartered sealift requires between four and thirty days to get the vessel to port for outload. There are no published guidelines for assured access or ad hoc vessel arrangements. Therefore, NATO leaders should consider expanding the available sealift fleet through investment in additional assured access contracts with specified availability lead times in its contract arrangements. An alternative source for vessels to mitigate the fleet shortfall is through gaining NATO member commitments to use national assets to move other nations. Both of these recommendations are tied to the funding credit (NRF Tax relief) recommendation discussed in the funding portion of this chapter.

Secondly, NATO should expand its vessel portfolio to include assured access contracts for container ships. The lack of a container ship on contract hinders the sustainment throughput as RO/ROs are not designed to take containers to their lower decks. Unit deployments by sea are faster using a combination of RO/RO and container ships. NRF deployments may not require a dedicated container vessel; therefore, assured access contracts may be in the form of partial ship or by container contracts set up by the MCCE.

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153 Ibid., III-12.
NRF Agility Tailorable Force Mix Recommendations (FAST UP)

“As strange as it may seem, the military victory is the easiest part of the struggle. After this has been attained, the real challenge begins: the re-establishment of a secure environment opens a new opportunity for nation building.”\textsuperscript{154}

George K. Tanham

NATO has made no progress in expanding its relationship with European constabulary organizations despite the U.S. urging the Alliance to develop this force requirement.\textsuperscript{155} A sufficient menu of tailorable force options for the NRF must include constabulary forces. Although NATO's Allied Commands routinely update the NRF task organization for future NRF rotation cycles, the actual task organization, called a Combined Joint Statements of Requirements (CJSOR), is classified. Therefore, this thesis can only make recommendations as to the nature of the forces included in the NRF CJSOR and their ability to deploy in support of NATO operations.

Chapter III’s review of NATO operations highlighted the need for large constabulary forces during stability operations. Further, these unconventional forces continue to play a key role in Iraq and Afghanistan as they focus on training the national police forces of these struggling democracies. The U.S. continues to fulfill this unconventional mission of foreign security force assistance with military forces as the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice are not currently structured or funded to “build nations” or train foreign national or local police forces. The NRF likely will continue to encounter such missions while training for and executing conventional missions.


warfighting. Therefore, the NRF must build into its CJSOR modular constabulary units that can perform these policing actions.

The credibility and value of these European constabulary forces is not in question. If NATO can gain member support to militarize and deploy these forces as part of a NATO Response Force or Combined Joint Task Force, the capabilities of these forces increase significantly. The European policing forces fit well into military operations as they are trained in military skills, can fill the gap to enforce peace and train local and national law enforcement institutions following major combat operations. Further, these forces are already equipped with national police uniforms, weapons (if lethal force is required), and force protection equipment suited for crown control. NATO previously integrated the Italian Carabinieri police force successfully in Kosovo, but NATO must incorporate these forces into the planning and early stages of crisis repose as missions likely will maintain their relevance in the future years.

Assignment of constabulary forces to the NRF is useless, however, if the police forces are unable to deploy outside state boundaries and execute policing actions under a clearly defined rule of law. NATO must define specific constabulary force capabilities and training and readiness levels to member nations in order to lay the ground for constabulary force involvement in the NRF. Only with qualified and adequately empowered police units can the NRF execute elements of their mission set including support to consequence management (a humanitarian crisis, for example) and crisis response operations (peacekeeping in the next "Kosovo").

157 Ibid., 1-3.
158 Ibid.
NATO must choose among two options to improve its tailorable force mixture in the NRF enlist nations that have military forces trained to execute policing actions or gain the support of member or PfP nations to deploy elements of their standing constabulary forces during a crisis. Both of these options require force monitored high training and readiness levels and the ability to deploy outside national boundaries. The agility of the NRF is linked to its ability to put the right forces on the ground as quickly as possible; dedicated military police units or constabulary forces will provide the critical capability to stop looting, suppress rioting and control crowds. The NRF’s mission success may depend on its ability to put these forces on the ground.

**NRF Agility Unity of Effort Recommendations (FAST UP)**

As addressed in Chapters II and III, the post-Cold War NATO forces are increasingly professional yet steadily shrinking in size because NATO members have largely moved away from conscription. Germany is a notable exception with its six month conscription program although this is a decrease in length to its former policy of nine month terms. Germany also does not deploy their conscripted forces into battle without the troop first volunteering for the mission. Although increased professional forces adds to deployable capability to the European based forces, their decreasing size continues to widen the existing “capabilities gap” between the U.S. and the Europeans. In 2005, for example, only ten to fifteen percent of NATO’s forces were deployable outside national boundaries. Further degrading the European military capability is the lack of investment in defense, specifically in research and development. The U.S. Defense Budget continues to tower over the combined European totals. The U.S. 2006 DOD Budget was $440 Billion, which was over half of the combined European defense
budget. The U.S. also spent nearly six times the European amount on military research and development.

On top of the capability challenges presented by the smaller forces and defense budgets, NATO’s European members are split between improving NATO capability and participating in the European Union (EU) Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Chapter II specifically detailed the events around the Prague Capability Commitment that NATO members agreed to improve European national force’ capabilities in strategic air and sealift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units.\(^{159}\) In addition to this commitment, NATO members have made European Union (EU) Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) commitments and provide force structure commitments to this organization.

**Recommendations**

In order for NATO to maintain, train, and execute operations with an agile force, there must be increased unity of effort among its members as well as with the EU. The U.S. 2010 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes importance of the NATO-EU relationship and its importance in “projecting the full force of transatlantic power.”\(^{160}\) Similarly, NATO must continue to promote an Allied unity of effort in operations to execute its missions because NATO’s newest members do not have robust military forces or the capability to project their forces without assistance from other nations. Only through unified action can NATO successfully achieve agility with its NRF.


Guiding the increased unity of effort should be consensus on the future threat facing NATO members. Allied Command Transformation’s recent Multiple Futures Project (MFP)\textsuperscript{161} informed by U.S. JFCOM Joint Operating Environment (JOE)\textsuperscript{162} focused on identifying near and distant threats for the Alliance in hopes of anticipating its next challenge. The MFP provided a transatlantic dialogue to identify national and NATO understanding about common risks and obligations under NATO’s Article 5. The MFP should facilitate consensus building before a situation requires military action. Facilitation is needed as a rift continues due to divergent threat interpretations between European nations and the U.S. have only widen since 11 September 2001.\textsuperscript{163} NATO summits in Prague (November 2002) and Istanbul (June 2004) did not decrease the “threat gap” and unify effort. NATO must use the MFP to unify NATO forces and promote agreed upon risks and Article V obligations in light on this effort and stop further corrosion within the Alliance.

As political unity of effort is gained based on a common perceived threat, NATO forces must continue to champion emerging initiatives that enables greater NATO agility. The following discussion highlights recent NATO Unity of Effort initiatives that provide tangible evidence as to the benefits of unity as well as requirements for unity.

The first initiative is the HIP Helicopter Task Force. Created in February 2009, under the leadership of Czech military forces, the HIP Helicopter Task Force provides NATO with a multinational transport helicopter program. The Task Force helps countries that do not have the ability to deploy and execute transport helicopter

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{161} NATO Allied Command Transformation, \textit{NATO Multiple Futures Project Final Report} (Norfolk: Allied Command Transformation, 2009).

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{162} U.S. Joint Forces Command Center for Joint Futures, \textit{The Joint Operating Environment}. (Suffolk: Center for Joint Futures, 2008).

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{163} Simon, 1-2, 20.
operations with their HIP helicopters such as the MI 8, MI 17 and MI 171.\textsuperscript{164} It supports training ranges for pre-deployment training validation, tests unit command and control systems and base support procedures, and facilitates the deployment of transport helicopters by NATO and PfP nations through the collective support or funding of other Allies.

Most recently, the task force, comprised of Czech Republic, Albania, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey and the UK, provided a strategy for mitigating critical utility helicopter shortfalls in ISAF operations in Afghanistan. The poor road system of Afghanistan drives ISAF’s heavy reliance on rotary aircraft to transport troops and equipment. The Task Force sought out required assistance for the nations with HIP aircraft in order to set up a multinational deployment operation. Any nation could participate in the task force if they wanted to deploy HIP helicopters or support the nations deploying helicopters. These nations pooled deployment experience, trainers, funding and onload assistance, all of which are critical components of accomplishing the mission though unity of effort.

Another successful initiative geared toward easing the movement of European troops and their equipment is the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE). Formed on 1 July 2007, the MCCE was a merger of the European Airlift Centre (EAC) and the Sealift Coordination Centre which were both formed as a result of NATO’s Defence Capability Initiative agreement in 1999. By unifying transportation operations among the European nations, the Centre proved its value saving millions of euro though

better coordination of lift allocation, maximizing payloads, and avoiding empty flight or sailing backhauls.

The Centre is staffed by thirty military and civilians personnel from participating NATO and EU nations and serves as a model for cooperation among its members. Though a great example of unity of effort in Europe, NATO should promote constabulary force augmentation to the center if it can solidify national police force participation in the NRF. Police force representation in the MCCE will then improve interagency coordination prior to and during the movement of forces. The MCCE serves a great model for the unity of effort required by the NRF, but its ability to support the EU and NATO efficiently is uncommon as these organizations, as shown below, have a limited history of cooperation.

The “Berlin Plus” arrangement between EU and NATO Foreign Ministers in March 2003, gave the EU unprecedented access to NATO’s planning assets and military equipment. The arrangement followed a multi-year debate over how EU and NATO forces should cooperate. Immediately after the Berlin Plus arrangement became official, the NATO Operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia transferred authority to forces under the EU’s Operation Concordia.

Following the arrangement and successful mission transfer, the European Council drafted and approved a document entitled the “European Defence: NATO/EU Consultations, Planning and Operations.” This document now provides the basis for EU’s effective relationship with NATO although both multinational organizations

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166 Hauser and Kernic eds., 33.
continued to struggle with defining a non-redundant relationship between the NRF and the EU Rapid Response Force. Both response forces gain forces from the limited national forces in Europe; competition between the forces, therefore, is likely unless NATO and EU agree on the operational differences between the two or even dissolve one in favor of the other. The U.S.’s position on the current and future European Security and Defense policies remain as Stated by Secretary Albright: (1) no duplication by the EU of what was done effectively under NATO, (2) no decoupling between the U.S. and NATO, and (3) no security policy discrimination against non-EU members such as Turkey.167 Both forces are likely to remain effective political instruments in the future of these organizations; therefore, the EU and NATO must better articulate their requirements in order to gain a better unity of effort among its member nations without overburdening them. Currently the existing force requirements do exactly that.

An example of such overburdening is addressed by Hauser and Kernic’s European Security in Transition, which attempts to define the heavy requirements already on the European nations. Approximately 1,000 to 2,000 troops are reserved for United Nations Standby Arrangements Systems and for national evacuation purposes. The NRF and RRF require a combined 35,000 troops earmarked for high-intensity, combined joint network centric operations. During current stabilization force operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, another 70,000 personnel are required plus support troops for these forces. In total, approximately 147,000 troops, including troops conducting initial

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entry and advanced training, are required.\textsuperscript{168} With such large force requirements not likely to subside in the near future, NATO and the EU must minimize the overlap in order to survive and endure the current force tempo.

NATO’s recent restructuring of the NRF into the two forces – the Immediate Response Force (IRF) and the Response Forces Pool (RFP) – decreases the redundancy of force requirements and overlap with EU requirements by reducing the immediate response capability by nearly 50\% while removing the upper limit on forces in the Response Forces Pool. Further, forces pledged by nations to the RFP are not tied to the same readiness standards as the IRF and may deploy in support of national commitments without violating the stand-by status that now only applies to the IRF. If emerging NRF construct fails to satisfy a capability requirement, ACO will seek the requirement directly from member nations with more depth in force structure.\textsuperscript{169}

A second recent change will also benefit the NRF’s unity of effort: NATO members doubled the NRF Immediate Response Force stand-by status to 12-months. This decision slows the training tempo of the IRF troop contributing nations as previous training requirements committed nations to up to 18-months of training and validation in order to serve 6-months on stand-by. The extended stand-by period also provides additional time for NRF forces to integrate forces and support while standardizing operations across the various national forces.

In summary, NATO and its NRF have attempted to increase agility despite smaller forces and decreasing budgets through continued unified efforts amongst its members through initiatives such as the MCCE and the MIH helicopter task force. As

\textsuperscript{168} Hauser and Kernic eds., 140-141.
NATO's commanders continue to facilitate transformation across their multinational commands, these initiatives must be championed as NATO's "Attack on One is an attack on All" mentality becomes a "deployment for one is a deployment for all." NATO will achieve better agility through the teamwork of its member nations. EU and NATO cooperation is also increasing as seen in the combined MCCE operations, but more political leadership is required between the Alliance and the European Union in order to clarify NRF and RRF roles. Only then can the force pools required for crisis response operations by both forces be preserved.  

**NRF Agility Policy, Doctrine and Planning Recommendations (FAST UP)**

The final letter in the FAST UP acronym addresses policy, doctrine, and planning process recommendations to improve NRF agility. NATO policy and doctrine must further define deployment and support practices for its expeditionary forces and empower the Supreme Allied Commander with the authority to direct contingency planning without the approval of the NAC. The following paragraphs further detail these recommendations based on the policy, doctrine, and planning process shortfalls identified in Chapter II.

Though NATO policy documents MC 477 and MC 526 define the NRF’s mission set and support concept, they clearly lack budgetary guidance for the force. This funding shortfall has been addressed previously in this chapter, but the funding solution must include revision of these capstone policies, which could include guidance to decrease the size of the NRF to the extent NATO is able to fund its deployment and sustainment or decrease the range of operations prescribed to focus training and equipment requirements.

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170 Ibid.

*Agile forces are Funded, have sufficient Airlift and Sealift available, are Tailorable task organizations, execute with a Unity of effort, and have effective Policy, doctrine, and adaptive planning systems in place to enable mission success (i.e. FAST UP).*
Further, MC 526 includes broad support concepts for the force, but the policy avoids clear directive guidance by providing nebulous multinational support options for the NRF. Due to the expeditionary nature of the force, NATO should designate lead nation for operations and support during planning and validation in order to maximize efficiencies and assist lesser capable national forces in deploying and sustaining their forces.

Another significant guidance shortfall limiting NRF agility is the lack of expeditionary doctrine. As Chapter II noted, there are no Allied Joint Publications which even mention the NRF despite the NRF reaching full operational capability in 2006. As NATO’s Allied Command Transformation continues to promote the NRF as a catalyst for change, it must develop critical doctrine to define clearly unique operational procedures for NATO’s expeditionary forces. Without greater detail in operational concepts, the NRF’s agility is largely dependent on its ability to create procedures quickly during an operation without the benefit of previously published doctrine to guide its operations.

As doctrine emerges to guide the force, interoperable command and control systems can incorporate the doctrine into program tools that facilitate operations and expedite movements, supplies, and personnel replacements. Without common doctrine, computer solutions will not be created. The NRF is forced to use commercial off the shelf software and computing equipment to accomplish a limited degree of interoperability.

Doctrine has also not been updated to include recent transformational concepts. NATO’s shift away from its static pipeline infrastructure highlights NATO’s progress in advancing its operational procedures. NATO’s modular concept seeks to satisfy all fuel
requirements through a combination of thirteen discrete but compatible modules which can receive, store, and transport fuel in any theatre of operation. The modular concept enables NATO and PfP nations to combine their capabilities to provide a multinational solution to meet all fuel requirements. The pipeline to modular fueling transition, however, remains limited by concept development and evaluation and is not included in NATO doctrine. Despite the challenges of an enlarging Alliance, NATO must expedite doctrine in order to keep better pace with the evolution of its operational practices and missions and enable the procurement of interoperable systems that enforce up-to-date document to enforce chance in procedures.

Not only has policy and doctrine not been updated to meet operational requirements, planning procedures have fallen short as well. Chapter II highlighted the NATO self-imposed planning process limitations on the NRF – (1) neither the NRF nor its Joint Forces Headquarters including both SHAPE and any of its three subordinate joint commands can begin planning for a contingency operation without NAC approval and (2) the NRF will not deploy without NAC approval. Both of these internal governing mechanisms point to the inherent political nature of the Alliance and seek to restrain aggressiveness of the military force that is utilized along the time-tested guidance of Clausewitz that military operations are extreme forms of political action. Despite a call for NATO members contributing military forces to delegate NRF deployment authority to the Secretary General or SACEUR and eliminate the second limitation shown above, the Alliance is not likely to overturn the consensus rule for troop deployments that

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could cost a nation one of its sons or daughters.\textsuperscript{173} Therefore, if progress in agility is to be made at the strategic levels in NATO, then it is likely to come in the form of delegation of planning authority by the NAC.

Chapter III highlighted examples of planning and approval after national requests for NATO assistance were made. Five days after the U.S. requested relief assistance following Hurricane Katrina, the NAC approved the NATO mission. Only one day after Pakistan requested relief assistance following its earthquake, the NAC approved an operation involving the NRF. In both cases, there was not significant delay between request and approval; however, both of the NRF missions involved humanitarian assistance following unpredictable natural disasters. NATO will most likely utilize the NRF in the future for one of its other directed missions. More specifically, the NRF would execute a non-combatant evacuation operation, a crisis response operation, a support counter terror operation, an embargo operation, or a deployment simply as a display of force to show member nation resolve. Unlike humanitarian operations, these operations will require maximum planning effort by the multinational force. In such cases, NATO members must gain consensus quickly to provide Joint Force Commanders including the NRF commander the authority to initiate planning.

In light of implications of this planning limitation, NATO should consider delegation of planning authority below the NAC in order to enable NATO military preparedness and improve the agility of the NRF. Two plausible recommendations this delegation are (1) The NATO Secretary General should have the ability to authorize the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to begin planning for specific

contingency operations involving an emerging threat or pending disaster or (2) SACEUR should have independent planning authority, with directed updates provided to the Secretary General. These consensus alternatives seek to expedite planning without committing NATO funds or forces and remain viable options for NAC to consider. In order to achieve this change in planning procedures, the NAC would ultimately have reach consensus for the delegation of planning initiation authority.174

The benefits of streamlined planning initiation are many. NATO force planners can refine generic NRF planning scenarios and tie it to an area of operations more quickly. Logistics planners could better anticipate support requirements by identifying ports and their capabilities, host nation assets, available strategic and tactical lift, and true force readiness postures based on current equipment, training, and personnel reports. Increased time for logistical planning results in greater collaboration for multinational operations and provide greater efficiencies resulting in greater saving to the sending NATO nations or possibly to NATO’s Common Funds.

The last letter of FAST UP recommendations, P, calls for progress in NATO’s policy, doctrine and planning process. NATO policy must first be updated to reflect the required funding for the NRF and its broad mission set. Doctrine must then be developed to direct rapid expeditionary force operations. Roadblocks further exist in planning procedures as NATO forces cannot even begin to plan without explicit approval from the NAC. Simply enabling planning to occur prior to any operation would greatly shorten military force response in the event of a NAC directed mission. Such changes would improve agility in future NRF operations.

CHAPTER V  CONCLUSION

NATO’s primary task over the past decade has been to provide relevance to Allied nations by transforming its force from the Cold War territorial defense force that lingered until the 21st Century to an agile expeditionary force. This expeditionary force must be capable of performing combat operations following Article V enactment as well as executing a menu of missions falling under crisis response. Calling it the catalyst for change, NATO ultimately created the NATO Response Force (NRF) to accomplish this ambitious goal.

During the Cold War, the Alliance focused all planning on a potential Soviet invasion, setting three regional joint headquarters and a logistics pipeline to defend Western Europe. The subsequent fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, however, placed NATO in an identity crisis that included a brief call for its dissolution. In response to a regional crisis in the Balkans, NATO re-invented itself by becoming expeditionary and taking on crisis management operations. With a new identity and mission, it sought to restore regional stability in the post-Cold War era. NATO forces deployed to the Bosnia-Herzegovina and remained there through the 1990s while adding Kosovo’s stability to its mission. In the midst of successful, though slow and disjointed, operations in the Balkans, NATO also supported the U.S. on 12 September 2001, by enacting Article V, and provided limited forces to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom.

The change in threat and requirement for expeditionary operations prompted the European members to move toward smaller professional armies, although they had limited strategic lift capabilities. The rise of professional armies provided greater capability to the Alliance as NATO operations had faced deployment limitations due to
large percentages of conscription forces among its members. Many Alliance nations are still unable to provide depth and diversity in its force menu though and require other nations to partner with them in support of NATO operations.

Based on NATO member nations’ limited ability to respond rapidly in support of the U.S. after the 9/11 terror attacks, the 2002 Prague Capability Summit captured the consensus of the member nations by directing the creation of an agile, expeditionary NATO Response Force. NATO also realigned its strategic command giving all operational authority to the Commander, Allied Command Operations and all transformational and doctrinal authorities to the Commander, Allied Command Transformation.

Chapter II pointed out critical policy and doctrinal shortfalls that directly hinder the agility of the NRF such as the lack of detailed doctrine and funding to enable the volunteer response force to execute its menu of options. The NATO Military Committee’s policies that authorized, defined, and directed the sustainment of the NRF provided a solid start, but the lack of published guidance in doctrine greatly limits the force.

The evolution of NATO operations was detailed in Chapter III both prior to and after creation of the NRF. NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq plus the two NRF partial deployments supporting Hurricane Katrina relief in the U.S. and an earthquake in Pakistan put the expeditionary nature of NATO to the test. A case analysis of these operations revealed interoperability shortfalls, national deployment limitations due to conscription-based forces, and an inadequate force mix to accomplish
the mission. Further, the NRF’s funding and strategic airlift limitations restricted NATO ability to respond rapidly during both relief operations.

Chapter IV suggested recommendations to improve these policy, doctrine, and operational shortfalls and utilized the acronym FAST UP to structure these recommendations. Agile forces then, are adequately Funded, have sufficient Airlift and Sealift available, have Tailorable task organizations complete with constabulary forces, execute with a Unity of effort, and have effective Policy, doctrine, and adaptive planning systems in place to enable mission success. Each facet of the acronym is summarized below:

**Funding**

NATO must provide dedicated funding for NRF deployment and initial sustainment. Only then can it facilitate rapid deployment and provide sufficient support through its Joint Logistics Support Group, maximizing effectiveness and achieving efficiencies in contracting for support. Possible funding sources include a NATO member NRF Tax or direct support from the EU as NATO's operations are likely to achieve political aims of both organizations. If consensus cannot be achieved, NATO should appropriately resize the NRF to make it affordable for rapid deployment while developing a lower readiness tier of forces that will deploy and sustain themselves in accordance with the means of their sending nations.

**Airlift and Sealift**

NATO initiatives to improve strategic airlift and sealift have yielded strong improvements in these areas. The airlift initiatives to date include the Strategic Airlift
Interim Solution, the Strategic Airlift Capability initiative, and the promotion of national investment into additional strategic airlift assets. Each of these three initiatives give participating nations increased power projection capabilities for their forces, but new NATO members are not involved in these initiatives and do not have the means to deploy their forces. NATO must include participation in these initiatives as part of its membership action plan in order to provide added value to the Alliance force when membership is increased.

In the sealift arena, NATO can currently only move one half of a brigade equipped with fifteen days of sustainment. NATO must increase its RO/RO vessel fleet and develop procedures for increased use of containerships to facilitate rapid deployments for the NRF’s Immediate Response Forces. Further, the loose nature of assured access and ad hoc contracts that comprise NATO's current sealift posture work against the urgent requirements of the NRF, further degrading its agility. NATO must refine these contract arrangements to provide higher degrees of availability to its response force.

**Tailorable Force Mix**

NATO must improve its tailororable force mixture by adding police forces to the NRF's Combined Joint Statement of Requirement. The police forces would come from either member nation military police forces or national police forces such as the Italian Carabinieri or French Gendarmerie. Both of these options require forces which are trained and ready to deploy outside national boundaries. The agility of the NRF is linked to its ability to put the right forces on the ground as quickly as possible; dedicated
military police units or constabulary forces will provide the critical capability to stop
looting, suppress rioting and control crowds in stability operations following major
combat operations.

Unity of Effort

Despite smaller though more professional forces and decreasing defense budgets,
NATO continues to improve force agility through unified efforts. Initiatives such as the
MIH helicopter task force and the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) are
positive first steps. NATO must continue to champion these initiatives and transform the
previous mentality of “an attack on one is an attack on all" to the new paradigm of a
"deployment for one is a deployment for all." European Union (EU) and NATO
cooperation must further increase beyond the success of the combined MCCE operations
as more political leadership is required between the two entities in order to clarify RRF
(EU) and NRF (NATO) roles. Only then can the force pools required for crisis response
operations by both forces be preserved.

Policy, Doctrine, and Planning

Lastly, NATO policy must be updated to reflect the required funding for the NRF
and its broad mission set. Doctrine must then be developed to direct lead nation support
for rapid expeditionary force operations. Finally, planning authorization roadblocks must
be eliminated to empower the NATO forces commander with the authority to plan for
contingency operations. Simply enabling planning to occur prior to any operation will
yield faster military force response times and more efficient support operations when the NAC directs the NRF to execute a mission.

Much progress has occurred in NATO’s evolution from a Cold War territorial force to the expeditionary force of the 21st Century. Much work remains, however, to eliminate shortfalls and improve agility. Multiple options exist for the current NATO leaders to make such improvements. Whether through advancements in funding allocation, airlift, sealift, force mix, unity of effort, policy, doctrine or planning, NATO must continue to transform its military forces into a legitimate force for the challenges of tomorrow.
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VITA

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His civilian education includes a Bachelor of Science degree in Mathematics from John Carroll University and a Master of Science degree in Air Mobility from the Air Force Institute of Technology. His military schooling includes the basic and advanced logistics courses, CAS3, and the USAF’s Advanced Study of Air Mobility. This thesis is part of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School’s Masters of Science degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

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