The Long War: Building the Balance Between Today’s Necessities and Tomorrow’s Needs

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This thesis proposes changes within the military to achieve a more balanced portfolio of capabilities in the array of tools the U.S. military has for executing the Long War. Through comparative analysis of the ongoing Long War to the nearly fifty year struggle of the Cold War, this paper identifies significant similarities and differences that form the basis for proposed changes in the military. The proposed changes call for an increase in human intelligence capability, a reexamination of established force protection practices, and a program that attempts to more closely align the military with the society they protect and serve. All proposed changes, minus one, are actions that may be made within the purview of the defense establishment using the resources the Department of Defense has at its disposal. The one exception follows an example already used by the United States and Congressional action of the past. This paper proposes concrete changes within the military that if enacted will directly affect the efficiency and effectiveness of forces waging the current conflict and increase the likelihood of achieving the national goal of winning the Long War.

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The Long War;
Building the Balance Between Today’s Necessities and Tomorrow’s Needs

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature: ____________________________

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Thesis Advisor: Dr. Bryon E. Greenwald
This thesis proposes changes within the military to achieve a more balanced portfolio of capabilities in the array of tools the U.S. military has for executing the Long War. Through comparative analysis of the ongoing Long War to the nearly fifty year struggle of the Cold War, this paper identifies significant similarities and differences that form the basis for proposed changes in the military. The proposed changes call for an increase in human intelligence capability, a reexamination of established force protection practices, and a program that attempts to more closely align the military with the society they protect and serve. All proposed changes, minus one, are actions that may be made within the purview of the defense establishment using the resources the Department of Defense has at its disposal. The one exception follows an example already used by the United States and Congressional action of the past. This paper proposes concrete changes within the military that if enacted will directly affect the efficiency and effectiveness of forces waging the current conflict and increase the likelihood of achieving the national goal of winning the Long War.
Contents

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................1
THE COLD WAR – LONG WAR COMPARISON ..............................................................................15
  COLD WAR – LONG WAR SIMILARITIES..................................................................................21
  COLD WAR – LONG WAR DIFFERENCES..................................................................................27
CHANGES REQUIRED TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE LONG WAR...38
  INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS .........................................................................................39
  FORCE PROTECTION MIND SET ..........................................................................................45
  CONNECTING THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE WITH THE SOCIETY THEY SUPPORT ......53
CHANGING THE MILITARY CULTURE ....................................................................................62
  THE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE APPROACH TO CHANGE .........................................................63
  TWO PRONGED PINCER APPROACH TO CHANGE.................................................................65
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................68
  RECOMMENDATIONS ..........................................................................................................70
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................72
Introduction

The defining principle driving our strategy is balance. The United States cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything. The Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs.

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, January/February 2009

The United States military today stands at a crossroads of two well traveled, yet traditionally divergent trails. To the left, the trail leads to the counterinsurgency fight that the military is in today in multiple locations around the world. To the right, the path leads to the robust training required to maintain our dominant conventional capability to confront a peer competitor whenever and wherever one should arise. But on the heals of better than seven years of military action around the globe, the U.S. Secretary of Defense of what is arguably the greatest fighting force ever assembled, foresees and desires a convergence of the two roads ahead. He envisions a convergence on the path where both the skills required for today’s counterinsurgency fight are balanced with a trained conventional capability that is unmatched by anyone in the world today or tomorrow. He wants both capabilities maintained at peak levels and readily accessible to confront any opponent no matter their orientation or capability level. The Secretary of Defense has articulated the destination, now is the time to develop the roadmap and actions required to merge the two divergent military capabilities and reach that convergent, balanced point on the road ahead.

Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Robert Gates has recognized a need for balance between the counterinsurgency skills required today, and a trained and ready conventional capability prepared to confront any potential regional or peer competitor of the future.

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date, this desire for balance has come primarily as rhetoric and conceptual articulation with few follow on directives or changes. He stands between two diverse entities, which advocate particular capabilities based on firmly held beliefs. Complicating the process even further are the numerous biases, advocates for and against, and institutional resistance to change that resides in the behemoth bureaucratic organization known as the U.S. military. The Department of Defense must enact policies and changes to move the organization towards achieving the goal of maintaining the skills necessary to win the fights that U.S. forces are engaged in today and confront the enemy of tomorrow no matter the capability that enemy should employ. Articulating the destination is only the first step. Determining how to reach that destination is the greater burden. Inextricably linked to how individuals envision routes to the future are how those proponents viewed the past.

There exist many respected advocates that claim counterinsurgency conflicts of extended duration are not an anomaly, but the norm of the future. Former Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker believes that the counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan offer a “peek into the future.”2 Current Army Chief of Staff General George Casey told the House Armed Services Committee that “persistent conflict is the new normal.”3 Even disparate voices outside the military admit that the Long War scenario is more likely than not. As Andrew Bacevich states:

According to the first lesson, the armed services – and above all the army – need to recognize that the challenges posed by Iraq and Afghanistan define not only the military’s present but also its future, the “next war,” as enthusiasts like to say. Rooting out insurgents, nation-building, training and advising “host nation” forces, population security and control, winning


hearts and minds – these promise to be ongoing priorities, preoccupying U.S. troops for decades to come, all across the Islamic world.\(^4\)

But despite the authoritative confidence of what the future holds for the military, there exist counterarguments concerning which capabilities the nation requires.

The contrarian viewpoint of what the future holds in store for the U.S. military lies with those that predict the need for a conventional force capability. Emerging international powers and declining peer competitors such as China and Russia prompt numerous futurists to promote a dominant modern conventional force able to meet the potential challenges posed by these countries. These potential competitors, combined with a bureaucracy which inherently migrates towards conventional force on force comparisons, provide these advocates a ready set of examples to argue their respective points. Yet whether the inclination is to fight today’s conflict or hedge against tomorrow’s opponent, grounding both positions are historical examples and the advocates for each. Both commentaries mine the past for nuggets of history on which to stake their claims of preeminence.

The senior leadership of the Army today began their collective careers in a similar debate that centered around defeating a communist insurgency in Southeast Asia and confronting a conventional threat on the plains of Europe. The debate for balance harkens back to the 1970s as American forces limped home from Vietnam with the reality of Soviet expansion seeming a very likely possibility. Individuals like Robert Komer, Harry Summers, and Andrew Krepinevich became the advocates and tangential vocal leadership in the struggle to retain or develop particular capabilities that could meet the demands of the future. Robert Komer, as the architect of numerous successful counterinsurgency

programs in Vietnam, became the outspoken advocate for the retention of a hard earned and battle-tested counterinsurgency capability. ⁵ Komer orchestrated numerous imaginative programs in Southeast Asia. From securing the Vietnamese population to the development of the controversial Phoenix program, which aimed to undermine the North Vietnamese security apparatus and morale, each program met with acknowledged success. According to numerous accounts, including his own post-mortem, his efforts came too late in the conflict to make a lasting difference before the U.S. left Vietnam in 1972. Mr. Komer’s fresh perspectives and substantial results provided a legitimate perspective for the retention of America’s counterinsurgency capability for future application. His unique perspective and forceful nature inspired others to advocate for the capabilities developed by the Vietnam experience.

Individuals like Andrew Krepinevich carried forward Komer’s work and became a willing disciple of the counterinsurgency position. In his book *The Army in Vietnam*, ⁶ Krepinevich claims the U.S. failed to adapt appropriately to the insurgent opponent it faced. The premise of his argument is that the U.S. continued to try to address an irregular opponent in a very conventional manner. Krepinevich justifiably points out numerous examples of employing conventional capabilities in the unconventional nature of the conflict in Southeast Asia. He further contends that the Army “…expunged the (Vietnam) experience from the services’ consciousness.”⁷ His opinions and writings have extended beyond the Vietnam era as he has predictably been critical of the pace of employment of

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⁷ Ibid., 260.
the counterinsurgency skills necessary in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He continues to be an influential figure in defense policy arena.

If Komer and Krepinevich are the poster children for the U.S. military’s unconventional capability, then retired Colonel Harry G. Summers provided the vocal counterpoint. Colonel Summers, in his trenchant study *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, contended that the limits placed on the U.S. military made the outcome of the Vietnam conflict inevitable. His contention is that the U.S. failed to fight in an effective conventional manner and to affect the North Vietnam center of gravity for fear of escalating the conflict. According to Summers, these limitations and others inhibited the successful execution of the war in Vietnam. Besides his critical analysis of the conduct of the Vietnam War, Colonel Summers remained an advocate for the conventional Army until his death in 1999. His prolific writings throughout the 1980s and 1990s provided enormous influence to numerous junior officers during that time period. Many of those same junior officers are today, the mid and senior-level leadership of the military.

This debate between the unconventionally minded Komer and Krepinevich and the Neo Clausewitzean Summers is not simply a rehash of history. Today, as Secretary Gates has discussed the need for balance, new spokesmen have emerged as vocal advocates for each distinct capability. John Nagl, a recently retired Lieutenant Colonel, but former armor battalion commander in east Bagdad in 2006, epitomizes the Komer intellectual bloodline and is the most well-known advocate for counterinsurgency capabilities. Colonel Gian Gentile, of the Military History Program at the United States Military Academy, has

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9 Andrew F. Krepinevich is the Founder and Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent policy research institute. For more information see www.csbaonline.org.

replaced Harry Summers as the champion of conventional forces. Each has provided an argument and counterargument to the retention of a particular military skill based on their perceived analysis of the current state of the U.S. military’s capabilities.

Outlined in his book *Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya to Vietnam*, Nagl’s analysis of organizational learning provides evidence in the methods of conducting a counterinsurgency campaign. This book along with numerous other writings have made him the outspoken advocate for retaining the hard earned counterinsurgency skills the Army now possesses. He is also very vocal about institutionalizing these skills for future use and to prevent atrophy. Nagl’s advocacy and conclusions suggest the retention of the Army’s counterinsurgency skills even at the expense of its conventional capabilities. His approach to retaining these skills thus far has been limited to suggestions of changes to programs of instruction in the Army’s training institutions to emphasize the scenarios found in current conflicts around the globe. He is an outspoken champion for the development of skills required to win today’s fight, if necessary, at the expense of tomorrow’s capabilities.

Colonel Gian Gentile, who in numerous editorial pieces claims Nagl’s analysis is lacking, has emerged as one of the outspoken champions for the retention of U.S. conventional capabilities. He recognizes the need for counterinsurgency capabilities, but also claims that every situation does not fit the counterinsurgency model that has emerged in Iraq and endeared itself to the entire defense community. Gentile is a proponent for the rudimentary concept of analyzing each scenario that involves U.S. forces and creating and

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employing the appropriate capability to confront the given problem. His concerns are based on an agreed upon acknowledgement that the U.S. ability to confront a conventional foe has deteriorated from lack of training. He often reminds the public of the cost associated with failing against a conventional opponent and the conservative approach to wholesale changes to proven military capabilities. It is ironic that both Gentile and Nagl are, or were, Armor officers with similar backgrounds. Their shared pedigree illustrates the point that even two individuals so alike can become enamored with capabilities and conclusions that are diametrically opposed.

Perpetuated over better than twenty years, this argument has failed to reach conclusion or consensus among any of the parties involved. Each has viable points, but as many debates go, to accept any acknowledgement by the counter argument is akin to accepting defeat. For the Secretary, rectifying these two diverse and distinct viewpoints with supportable solutions for both parties is his greatest burden. And despite the passionate cries on either side of the debate, few have produced concrete suggestions to solidify their position within their own argument. Nagl argues for an “Army Advisory Command that, among other functions, would be the advocate for all aspects of the advisor mission within the institutional Army.” It is problematic to suggest that any solution to this problem is the creation of another bureaucratic organization. Gentile provides even less concrete formulas for the retention of the conventional skills that he claims are necessary, but lacking in today’s Army. The most that he has put forth is the suggestion that “Good strategy and sound military policy are premised on making choices and

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15 John A. Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” 25.
establishing priorities.” Yet, as the priority has shifted to a capability that he does not agree with his arguments have become more and more vocal. The nation deserves more than the establishment of another bureaucratic organization to advocate a certain cause or the esoteric bumper sticker on what good strategy should seemingly consist. Now is the time to admit that all members of this debate have valid points and ask the question, “what now?” The military must move past this argument, leave the emotional fortune telling to the circus acts, and develop changes and correct deficiencies that both sides can support to make the military of today even better for the future.

A reoccurring failure of all those who offer an opinion is the inability to take into account the natural migration of the Department to either side of the argument. There exist advocates and biases within the defense bureaucracy that will drive the organization, like an unattended vehicle, in a particular direction based on numerous factors that are all together unrelated to its most logical or necessary path. The Defense industry that seeks to sway the government to make large weapon system purchases, provides a motivation based closer to a profit margin than a national objective. A Congress unwilling to advocate for increased military manning spread across every Congressmen’s district yet seemingly in nobodies’ district provides the impetus to emphasize a technical vice manpower intense solution. And the U.S. military that prefers to consider a force on force battle scenario, which considers few nonmilitary factors for success, than an insurgency campaign in which the very outcome likely depends directly on nonmilitary tasks, are just some of the reasons why the U.S. military tends to migrate towards the conventional fight regardless of the veracity of the argument. American military tradition draws on our Western European

16 Colonel Gian P Gentile “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” 33.
heritage and favors the conventional fight. The U.S. military can and has adapted to emerging circumstances and on occasion performed competently in counterinsurgency campaigns like the Indian Wars in the late 1800s, the Philippine insurrection at the turn of the century, parts of Vietnam, and Iraq after 2006. However adaptable, the military has also shown a penchant to snap back to its preferred emphasis on conventional campaigns and the great force on force battle as experienced in World War II and Operation Desert Storm. The emphasis on retaining and developing the skills and capabilities for an unconventional fight must take primacy due not to there relative importance to a conventional capability, but based on the organizations tendencies to migrate naturally towards the conventional fight.

Regardless of one’s position, nearly every current defense policymaker participated in a conflict known as the Cold War which many have compared to today’s struggle. General Ray Odierno, the current commander of forces in Iraq, contends “…the situation is analogous to the situation confronting servicemembers who fought the Cold War.” Or as an unidentified White House official stated “This is a generational war, and we are going to be in it a long time.” The projected length of the current conflict alone has forced many less enlightened individuals to make the easy comparison to the Cold War. But a more formative study should analyze the characteristics of the Cold War and compare them to those of the Long War to understand where the similarities end and the differences begin.

The Cold War was not only a confrontation that lasted over forty years, but also more

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importantly, it is the one conflict that most of the senior leadership of today’s military participated in. Opinions were formulated, reasoned actions became habits, and organizations and capabilities were built to confront the monolithic enemy that was the Soviet Union. At a minimum, any analysis of the Cold War will reveal much of the foundation of how the leadership of today’s conflict viewed the world growing up and how that view may influence the way they see tomorrow’s fight. Yet even the Cold War provided confrontation that did not fit the preconceived notions of the capabilities required.

Despite the obvious importance of conventional capabilities in the Cold War, the one glaring anomaly in that long struggle was the conflict in Vietnam. This conflict in Southeast Asia was essentially a counterinsurgency fight executed unsuccessfully with conventional tools. A point not lost on the adversaries this country faces today. As the leadership of Al-Qaeda, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, penned to his former lieutenant Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi in Iraq: “The aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam – and how they ran and left their agents – is noteworthy.” These comments provide some evidence of the notion held by many throughout the world that America may be vulnerable in conflicts of extended duration. This notion held by some individuals within the U.S. military and beyond may stem from the idea that the U.S. does not possess the national will for a long fight, or that our political system does not allow for the consistency that is

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21 Brigadier General Robert L. Caslen, General “Global War on Terrorism,” Woodrow Wilson Center’s Division of International Security Studies, the RAND Corporation, and the U.S. Army’s Eisenhower National Security Series, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event (Accessed September 9 2008). 1. This statement and theory provided by Brigadier General Robert L. Caslen Jr., the Joint Staff’s Director of Strategy in 2006. He contends that there exists a gap in the normal support for military actions that Americans have historically had (three years) and the average time it takes to put down an insurrection (9 years). This six year gap is based on examples from the Civil War, Korea, and the Vietnam conflicts and is an attempt to put some sort of time factor to the amount of patience that the American society has for military actions.
required for an extended duration battle. One need only to examine America’s short history to conclude where the country’s acumen lies and based on this, how an enemy may choose to confront the U.S.

The example of Vietnam is held as proof that America does not have the will and staying power to participate in a conflict of long duration. This perception resides not only with our enemies, but also among elements of American society. The perceptions that American society does not possess the national will or the political consistency to sustain a conflict of greater than about four years is proven false by the current length of the Long War. With respect to the support for our military actions, 2008 does not resemble 1968 at all. There are few indications of distaste for the conflicts that American servicemembers are involved in today. Does this demonstrate increased support or a lack of dissent? Is apathy a negative attribute if it continues to resource the actions the military is tasked to accomplish?

Although the Cold War to Long War comparison provides some insight, as James Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig point out:

> We have divisions. They have box cutters….This is a different problem from the national security concerns we faced in the past. It reminds us, again, that the Cold War can teach us the principles of fighting the long war, but it cannot give us a “how to” manual. We are on our own.  

Despite the initial and superficial comparisons of the Cold War and the Long War, a more thorough analysis will reveal what those principles for the Long War are and if Cold War policies and capabilities are hindering our execution of the current campaign. A defense organization designed to fight a conventional adversary on the plains of Europe has produced perspectives that handicap our ability to combat a transnational terrorist

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organization in the streets of Baghdad. What are the legacy perspectives that are hindering our ability to wage a successful campaign today? Is the military-industrial high tech / high cost legacy conventional force of the Cold War the tail that is waging the irregular, hybrid, Long War dog? What can we learn from the Cold War that will inform our efforts in the Long War and help attain the balance in conventional and unconventional capabilities desired by Secretary Gates?

This paper will not constitute a national strategy nor a holistic examination of the whole of government approach required to wage a successful Long War campaign. Again as authors James Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig state:

National strategies involve more than just the use of the armed forces. They consider all of the economic, political, diplomatic, military, and informational instruments that might be used to promote a nation’s interest or secure a state from its enemies.23

Any complete U.S. strategy to counter an adversary must take into account all elements of national power to be successful. Blindly using historical analogies without complete examination may leave one lacking the insight necessary to make informed decisions. While many historians and senior military officers cite the British experience in Malaya (1946-1960) as an example of a successful counterinsurgency operation, without the sudden outbreak of the Korean conflict and the high demand of both tin and rubber, the British may not have been able to afford the cost of their strategy in Malaya.24 A complete examination of all elements of national power is beyond the scope of this discussion. This document will contend with the military aspects of conducting an effective and efficient Long War campaign. A caveat exists, however. Any significant change to any element of

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national power could suddenly and overwhelming nullify a perfectly designed military campaign plan. Also, this paper assumes the smooth and effective orchestration of all elements of national power and endeavors to examine the current military strategy to suggest policies to solidify and reach the balance the Secretary is striving to obtain.

This thesis will compare the ongoing Long War with the Cold War to identify similarities and differences between the two conflicts. This comparison and analysis will lead to identifying those weaknesses that currently exist within the military system that hinder our ability to execute an efficient and more effective Long War campaign. Identifying the shortfalls that exist will lead to recommendations to mitigate those weaknesses. Recommendations will include the reorientation of numerous training priorities and procedures to develop a more robust human intelligence capability, a reexamination of force protection measures that prevent mission accomplishment, and the development of a program to reconnect the military with society. As the former Joint Staff J-5, Brigadier General Robert L. Caslen stated: “… the United States is in the midst of a “long war” and the decisions taken today [2006] will determine how long and how intense this war will be.”25 Making changes to military training and military policy is necessary to ensure the positive outcome of the current Long War campaign. Not altering or changing our approach and expecting the systems and procedures developed during the Cold War to apply to the current conflict at a minimum will lead to an inefficient use of the nations’ military forces. The goal is to offer concrete recommendations to find the middle ground between the late Robert Komer and the late Harry Summers and achieve the balance Secretary Gates seeks. Addressing the concerns of both camps requires a better

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understanding of their positions as well as a better understanding of the strategic environment. Much is made of the Cold War in discussion of strategy in the Long War. However, like the analogy of the conventional and unconventional argument, this comparison is clouded at best and requires a better understanding.
The Cold War – Long War Comparison

There was a guiding vision behind Ike’s approach to the Cold War, a worldview far more powerful than the crude notion of simply containing the Soviet Union. Eisenhower, like Kennan, believed that this was war of a different kind. It would have a military dimension, perhaps even battles and campaigns, but it would not end in an inexorable march to Moscow and a victory parade. Nuclear standoff made a direct confrontation unthinkable. Lacking the capacity to come to grips with the enemy, the war would inevitably be a drawn-out contest, a long war. Ike, the general, knew that winning long wars required strategies of a different character.26

The Cold War stands as the longest political-military struggle in this country’s history. From February 1946 and the scribing of the long telegram by George Kennan27 until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Cold War dominated our nation’s thinking on our country’s security concerns. This enduring conflict had times of immense tension and times of relative calm. The Cold War provided periods of heated conventional combat juxtaposed with low intensity wars of liberation. Each of the superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, achieved military successes and failures, but each in its own way affected the duration and intensity of the Cold War. The Cold War or *The Fifty Year Wound*28 as historian Derek Leebaert refers to it, left an indelible thumbprint on both the American society and its governmental institutions.

The Soviet threat and the Cold War resulted from conditions set from the aftermath of World War II and provided an enemy for the American government to focus their

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27 Ibid. The entire “Long Telegram” appears as Appendix 1 starting on page 204.

efforts. Unlike the Long War and the catastrophe that occurred on September 11 2001, there was no equivalent for to the start of the Cold War. As Derek Leebaert put it:

Absolutely no one was thinking of the forty more years of struggle in every corner of the globe and through so many facets of human behavior. Each side believed that the other would fall by its own hand: Moscow saw the inevitability of a capitalist crash; the West, less certain that inexorable social forces guaranteed victory, nonetheless hoped that the Soviet system was too irrational to endure, although the isolation and ruthlessness of its leaders might make this end violent.29

American society, after nearly four years of the total war of World War II, along with the Truman Administration “did not make significant budgetary investments in national security until after the outbreak of the Korean War.”30 “Military budgets hit their Cold War low in fiscal year 1948 at $9.5 billion, or 3.5 percent of GDP.”31 Although numerous policy directives (NSC-68) and other rhetoric generated considerable thought as to how to “contain” the Soviet threat, the U.S. failed to develop any coherent plan for five full years following the conclusion of World War II.32

Throughout the Cold War, direct military to military conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union never occurred. This lack of direct confrontation, however, did not prevent the use of military force by either nation in locations around the globe. The U.S. found itself in multiple shooting wars in Korea (1950-1953), Vietnam (1964-1973), and El Salvador (1980-1994) as well as multiple contingency operations throughout the Cold War

29 Leebaert, The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America’s Cold War Victory, 81.
32 James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom, 5-6. For a more complete explanation of the slow start to the American realization of the Soviet threat and the influence of both George Kennan and General Dwight Eisenhower in the development of the numerous Cold War policies see the Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom pages 2-10.
period. All the before mentioned conflicts were designed to prevent the influence and proliferation of communist governments throughout the world.

The primary and overriding threat throughout this time period remained the Soviet conventional capability and the fear that the communist ideals (backed by overwhelming Soviet military strength) would spread west across Europe. The overwhelming conventional and nuclear threat provided the basis for the development of the U.S. conventional capabilities to counter this threat. This overriding threat led America to see each conflict it participated in as a conventional campaign regardless of the actual character of a particular fight. Only when limited by Congressional oversight as in the El Salvador\textsuperscript{33} conflict or being regulated as a economy of force operation like the Philippines\textsuperscript{34} did American tend to apply an other than conventional capability to address a problem. The Soviet threat formed the basis on how the U.S. government operated and with whom the United States developed alliances.

In the bipolar world of the Cold War, every nation was seen as an enemy or an ally with few countries falling in the middle. The communist scare that gripped the United States, combined with the country’s collective ignorance of foreign cultures, led the political leadership of the country to see every communist as the enemy and all communism as emanating from Moscow. Despite there being significant differences between the communist governments of the world, the United States saw every communist and the countries that backed them as the enemy. Conversely, those countries that opposed


the Soviet Union, despite their legitimacy or ruthless form of governing became American allies.

During the Cold War, the relative significance of the military with regards to the overall national power varied widely. As the military strength of America ebbed and flowed over the forty year time period, so did its significance to countering the Soviet Union. At times the U.S. military and its capabilities put tremendous pressure on the Soviets and at other times the military played a less significant part of the equation. The military strength of the United States played some importance to the outcome of the Cold War, but like most ideological struggles, its relative importance compared to the other elements of national power has yet to be determined. Programs and policies like the Marshall Plan, the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and numerous informational programs, all can claim a proportional share of the credit for the successful outcome of the Cold War.\(^{35}\)

The Long War is the term coined to characterize the current conflict that began with the terrorist attacks on the world trade centers on September 11, 2001. General John P. Abizaid coined the Long War phrase before he retired as head of the United States Central Command. “It was intended to signal to the American public that the country was involved in a lengthy struggle that went well beyond the war in Iraq and was political as well as military.”\(^{36}\) Although the term ‘Long War’ may have fallen out of favor within some elements of government and the military, it represents the overall conflict in which the U.S. is currently involved. The terms, War on Terrorism (WOT), the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the Long War, are all synonyms for the current protracted struggle. This


\(^{36}\) Gordon, “U.S. Command Shortens Life of Long War as a Reference,” 1.
conflict is irregular or unconventional in nature. An irregular campaign, according to Mao Tse-tung, has “qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.”37 No one expects opponents of the United States in the Long War to fight in conventional formations and in a conventional manner unless those techniques benefit them.

The Long War is the moniker attached to the ideological struggle for the influence over Islamic dominated areas of the world.38 It is a struggle that to date has consumed better than seven years and resulted in the deployment of hundreds of thousands of U.S. service members at the cost of billions of dollars. Well into its seventh year, it has already breached the three year threshold which to some bodes poorly for the prospects of the U.S. retaining public support for its cause.39 The Long War has led to major campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and lesser deployments to the Horn of Africa and other remote corners of the world where our enemies have found sanctuary and respite. This conflict gives every indication of being as lengthy and as all consuming of national economic, military, political, and psychological resources as its predecessor Cold War. As Major James Wright, a recent student of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, characterizes the current conflict:


39 See Footnote 20 for a further explanation. The contention that the American society only possesses a limited amount of “support” for a cause seems based solely on a time factor and not on other factors. Conversely references like Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1996) contend there are other factors such as a sensible weighing of benefits and costs that is influenced heavily by consensus among political leaders.
The character of the Long War is distinguished by three important facets: its duration, its mode of conflict, and by the motivation of the combatants. First, the war is a protracted struggle. The conflict will be measured in decades, not years and will require the consistent application of national resources....Second, the Long War is marked almost exclusively by irregular warfare......Third, there is radical ideological motivation that drives the enemy.  

Derek Leebaert boiled the Cold War down this way:

Immense promise juxtaposed with fear of immense destruction. Hope lay in handling the dangers as cheaply and indirectly as possible, so that the country would be able to explore the wonders ahead. There seemed to be three ways of doing this: (1) trying all the harder to get friends and allies to do more; (2) ensuring that technology could substitute as much as possible for GIs; (3) using the CIA as a means of accomplishing goals quietly and cheaply. These anticipated efficiencies would be emphasized for the rest of the Cold War, although the purpose they served often remained unclear.  

This chapter will analyze the Cold War as an example of a U.S. generational, ideological, political, and military struggle for the influence of populations. The Cold War stands as the most clear cut U.S. example of a sustained conflict to analyze against the current conflict. The analysis will identify the similarities between the Cold War and the Long War as: An ideological struggle - war of ideas; Long duration nature of the conflicts; Necessity of using all elements of national power; Influence through proxy; and the continued significance of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The comparative analysis will also look at the major differences. The differences identified are: Irregular Enemy and Type of Conflict; Intelligence Required for Success; Force Protection Requirements; Prosecution with an All Volunteer Force; and Transnational Organization as Main Opponent. The differences between the two conflicts are then used to determine if there are changes in the approach or the development of capabilities for the struggle ahead.

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41 Leebaert, The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America’s Cold War Victory, 121-122.
The intent of this analysis will be to provide the convergence and differences between the two conflicts to provide directions and/or areas to strengthen our capabilities and eventually our success in the Long War.

**Cold War – Long War Similarities**

The similarities between the Cold War and Long War are numerous and provide an initial easy comparative analysis. Many of these simple similarities have been the impetus behind the comparisons of the two conflicts. The first similarity is the motivation of the belligerents in the two conflicts being ideological struggles between two entities. In the case of the Cold War it was the Democratic system of the West versus the Communist system of the East. This ideological difference between the two was the type of government system each embraced as its own. The Democratic West and the Communist East became the two camps in which many nations lined up behind. On the one side, the democratic and freedom of expression capitalistic free market countries of the West, which were led by the United States. On the other side, the centrally planned economy, dictatorship, and restricted freedom of the East created and led by the Soviet Union. Communist governments in Beijing, Havana, Pyongyang, and Berlin provided a manifestation of the Soviet expansion goals during the Cold War.

The Long War of today continues to present the free market economy, democratic and freedom of expression systems of the West versus the “radically ideologically motivated” Islamic theologies of the East. The goals of our adversaries are to create a significant caliphate in the Middle East that cleanses the Islamic constituents of western

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42 Wright, “Military Effectiveness in the Long War” 20.
influences. For the democratic oriented West, the outcomes and goals are about defeating “violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society and fostering an environment inhospitable to violent extremist and all those who support them.” The struggle is for legitimacy and influence over the population.

Another similarity between the two campaigns is the expected duration of each struggle. Although only one of the conflicts has concluded, few argue that the current campaign will conclude in a rapid manner. In the case of the Cold War, the conflict lasted better than forty five years (February 1946 to December 1991). From the scribing of the long telegram and the identification of the threat by George Kennan to the fall of the Communist government in the Soviet Union, the Cold War provided both the United States and Soviet Union with an agreed upon adversary for at least 40 years.

In the case of the current Long War, the duration of the conflict is yet to be determined. The duration, however, has extended past at least the seven year mark if using September 11 of 2001 as the start date. The current conflict is even longer if one includes the bombings of embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (August 7, 1998) or using the bombing of the USS Cole (October 12, 2000) as the precursors to the “hot” portion of the Long War. General Odierno, the current commander in Iraq, states “Our estimate is that for at least the next 20 years, part of our focus will be on how we deal with the extremist networks that will continue to threaten the United States and its allies.” The current conflict has transcended Presidential administrations and now two consecutive Secretaries of Defenses

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who both believe they are in a war that will likely last decades. The intensity may vary but by most estimates this conflict will last a significant time period. The lengthy duration of the Cold War and anticipated length of the Long War is the second similarity between the Cold War and the Long War.

The third similarity between the two struggles is the relative importance of all elements of national power in determining the outcome. During the Cold War, numerous other elements of national power besides the military played a significant role in the eventual outcome. The Marshall Plan provided an economic stimulus in Europe after the overwhelming destruction of World War II. The development of NATO provided a diplomatic incentive for all countries friendly to the United States to work towards a common goal and provided a more formidable opponent to the Soviets. The synergistic effect of all elements of national power played an important role in the outcome of the Cold War. Direct military confrontation with the Soviet military never actually occurred due to the fear of nuclear escalation and possible annihilation. This fear of nuclear exchange in many respects provided the motivation for non-military elements of national power to play a more significant role in the outcome. When an opponent has the ability to destroy not only your nation, but the world as a whole, the motivation exists to use other than military power to affect an opponent.

In the Long War, the relative importance of all elements of national power will play a significant role to determining the outcome of the current struggle. The Long War has


\[48\] For a more thorough analysis of all elements of national power to the outcome of the Cold War see Derek Leebaert, The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America’s Cold War Victory.
produced calls for a restructuring of government and a whole of government approach to conflicts. However, even these reforms if anything like the Goldwater- Nichols Act of 1986, will take years until the government fully incorporates and institutionalizes the changes. The *National Defense Strategy* states:

The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur developments, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies.

Whether it is reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan or the ability to identify and track potential enemies within the continental United States, the scope of government action and contributions by all elements is growing. This whole of government approach provides a windfall of potential growth of bureaucratic processes and individual initiative that if successful, can produce a synergistic affect on future foes.

The fourth similarity between the Cold and Long War is the use of proxies to confront the primary adversary. The Cold War produced numerous armed conflicts, but rarely a direct confrontation between Soviet and U.S. forces. Numerous occasions provided a confrontation between U.S. forces and Soviet sponsored forces as in the case of Korea. Likewise the U.S. used surrogate forces (the mujahidin) to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s and governmental forces to confront a Soviet threat in El Salvador. Only once during the Cuban Missile Crisis did the U.S. and U.S.S.R. come close to a direct confrontation. All of these examples showed a propensity to use whatever

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49 For more information on actions and attempts to change the government to be more effective in achieving national goals see: Project on National Security Reform. “Forging a New Shield: Executive Summary,” Center for the Study of the Presidency. (Arlington, Virginia, November 2008).


forces are available to confront the Soviets wherever they were positioned. This use of
proxy forces is another example of a similarity that carries over to today’s struggle.

Each opponent in the Long War uses proxy forces in an attempt to confront their
respective adversaries. The United States used the Northern Alliance forces gathered and
in opposition to the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001 and 2002 to overthrow the
government and disrupt Al-Qaida.\textsuperscript{52} The U.S. has used (or at least provided motivation for
the use of) government forces in Pakistan, Niger, and throughout the Horn of Africa to
police ungoverned spaces in locations our adversaries can use for training and/or sanctuary.
Islamic fundamentalists have sponsored multiple insurgent organizations to confront the
U.S. military around the globe or attack Middle Eastern governments that oppose
fundamentalist calls for Islamic states. The very nature of being an insurgency provides
incentives for the use of indirect or proxy forces in attempts to affect the United States. Al-
Qaida has used friendly governments for protection (the former Taliban led government of
Afghanistan) and provided sponsorship to forces already fighting U.S. friendly
governments to confront American strength around the globe.\textsuperscript{53}

Although the motivation for using proxies differs by conflict, the fact that indirect
forces are used to the extent they are is significant. In the case of the Cold War, the
motivation to use proxies stemmed from the fear on both sides of the massive destruction
that a nuclear exchange would produce if direct confrontation did occur and escalated out
of control. In the case of the Long War, the motivation to avoid a direct confrontation
resides with America’s opponent due to their inability to confront U.S. forces directly in a
conventional campaign. America has used proxy forces in attempts to confront its

\textsuperscript{52} For further discussion and the use of Northern Alliance soldiers see: Sean Naylor, \textit{Not a Good Day To Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda}. (New York, Berkley Books, 2005).

\textsuperscript{53} For more information on Al Qaeda support for insurgencies around the world see Rohan Gunaratna, \textit{Inside Al Qaeda}. (New York, Berkley Books, 2003).
opponents in attempts simply to affect its opponents since direct confrontation is not in our opponents’ best interest.

The last similarity between the Cold War and the Long War is the reoccurring threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). During the Cold War, the motivation not to use thermal nuclear weapons stemmed from the fear of mutually assured destruction by both sides. Each entity realized that the use of WMD may well have meant the end of civilization. This WMD capability by each side provided protection as well as assurance that each country’s opponents would think twice before they considered their use.\textsuperscript{54}

In the Long War, the use of WMD weapons remains a reoccurring threat though not to the scale found under the Cold War. The use of WMD by our adversaries remains a goal and aspiration.\textsuperscript{55} Although the scale of their use would be significantly less than if the Soviets were to have used them against the U.S. during the Cold War, they remain attention grabbing. The prospect of a nuclear explosion or chemical attack in a U.S. population center by a terrorist organization demands a significant share of government resources to prevent. As Victor Hanson stated, “They must assume that a single terrorist strike could kill thousands of Americans without our ability to strike back at their capitals.”\textsuperscript{56} The motivation of massive retaliation is useless if we cannot find an entity at which to strike back. So despite the scale being smaller than during the Cold War, the Long War provides

\textsuperscript{54} Leebaert, \textit{The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America’s Cold War Victory}, 362-373.

\textsuperscript{55} For a further perspective on the use of WMD by our opponents see: John Arquilla, “In the fight against terrorism, the long war is the wrong war: Sooner or later, terrorists will get, and use, WMD,” http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/07/16/INGT9JTA0H1.DTL (Accessed September 9, 2008)

\textsuperscript{56} Victor Davis Hanson, “Is the War on Terror Over?” Real Clear Politics.com, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/is_the_war_on_terror_over.html (Accessed September 5, 2008)
scenarios in which the use of WMD remains a prevalent and important consideration by the U.S. and our opponents.

All of these similarities are the primary reason so many have compared the Cold War to the Long War. These similarities become the basis for a comparison of the two conflicts, but only identify half the story. The differences between the Cold War and the Long War will determine whether their significance warrants change or adjustment to how the U.S. conducts military operations in the future.

**Cold War – Long War Differences**

The major differences between the Cold War and Long War are: Irregular Enemy and Type of Conflict; Intelligence Required for Success; Force Protection Requirements; Prosecution with an All Volunteer Force; and Transnational Organization as Main Opponent. These differences in the characteristics of the Cold War and the Long War warrant a close examination to determine if they hamper our ability to confront the nations’ opponents. Understanding the differences is more important than appreciating the similarities. States and militaries change slowly. To the extent that the U.S. adequately identifies what is similar, one can be confident the government and military will have a doctrine, technology, or method available to use. It is the understanding and exploiting of the differences in a rapid and effective way which will bring victory. As Carl von Clausewitz stated in *On War*:

> The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.\(^{57}\)

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The initial difference between the Cold War and the Long War is the type of conflict and the type of enemy the U.S. faces. During the Cold War, the primary adversary was the conventional Soviet Army poised on the borders of Germany. In fact, General Maxwell Taylor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs early in the Cold War (1956), “focused on modernizing land forces to defend Europe, making the Army’s readiness for the use of atomic weapons and our readiness for atomic warfare his first priority.”

Despite hot wars in Korea and Vietnam, the Soviet threat in Europe remained the focus of U.S. policy and strategy throughout the Cold War. As Brian McAllister Linn, a Professor of History at Texas A&M points out:

Less than 1 percent of the army’s post-World War II manual on operational doctrine was devoted to counter-guerrilla activities, and in the mid-1950s students at the CGSC received not a single hour of instruction on the unique political-military strategy of communist revolutionary warfare.

As noted earlier Andrew Krepinevich claims the U.S. military “…expunged the (Vietnam) experience from the services’ consciousness.” Numerous conflicts occurred during the Cold War that were not conventionally oriented (e.g. Vietnam), but the primary threat to the security of the U.S. remained the conventional Soviet threat throughout the conflict.

The threat that America faces in the Long War is by nature irregular. Terrorism at its core is irregular and although there are moments of conventional force on force battles, these have been the exception and not the rule and have fallen under the construct of an irregular campaign by our opponents. The primary enemy the U.S. faces today, Al-Qaida

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59 Ibid., 182.

and its associated organizations, is unconventional by design and by choice. The transnational organizations that make up the enemy networks have to date worked outside the international state system. The enemy chooses to confront the U.S. through irregular means using tools like terrorism and unconventional warfare to affect our influence. Our opponents seek “victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy [in this case the U.S.] instead of engaging him.”61 Any attempts to work within the recognized international political system, like seeking sanctuary within Afghanistan before the U.S. invasion, failed to work for our opponents. The prospect of the current enemy moving to a conventional campaign in any way is remote at best. That is not to say that a near peer conventional adversary will not develop before this conflict terminates. For now and the foreseeable future, U.S. opponents in the Long War will remain irregular and “will require long-term, innovative approaches.”62

The next major difference this conflict presents compared to the Cold War is the type of military intelligence necessary to conduct this campaign successfully. During the Cold War, the concern over eastern bloc advances led to the military intelligence community relying on indications of large troop movements and order of battle doctrine to predict Soviet intentions. As James Lewis and Mary DeRosa stated in Five Years After 9/11: An Assessment of America’s War on Terror:

The United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars since the 1950s to build massive technical collection systems – chiefly for “sigint” (signals intelligence) and for imagery collection from space. The United States designed this collection architecture for large, static, conventional military opponents, and it worked reasonably well against them. These collection


systems are less effective against nimble opponents who blend easily into civilian populations, but that is only one problem. 63

The intelligence requirements during the Cold War gave rise to satellite imagery and other technical means to provide the U.S. and its allies the indicators of major unit movements by Soviet and GRU forces. Predicting the preponderance of enemy actions through Soviet order of battle doctrinal study meant little analysis was conducted of the personalities of the opponents. Weapon counts and equipment capabilities were of greater concern to the intelligence community than the location or background of key leaders. Satellite photos could identify the designs of the Soviets in Cuba in the early 1960s. Cultural intelligence was an un-emphasized, if not non-existent, capability within the military intelligence community during the Cold War. Intelligence field craft remained under budgeted, under utilized, and under prioritized compared to the technical capability developments arena over the last sixty years.

The intelligence requirements of the Long War present a significantly different set of requirements for the intelligence community. If counting the weapons was necessary during the Cold War, finding a particular weapon is necessary during the Long War. Identifying potential enemies coupled with understanding and predicting those individuals’ intent has become the primary intelligence requirements during the Long War. A photo taken from thousands of feet can rarely identify a single person and deciphering his or her intent is nearly impossible. Understanding the norms of a local foreign population was not necessary during the Cold War, yet has become essential in the Long War. In this conflict, a degree of cultural intelligence is a tool that every servicemember should carry.

Personalities matter as much or more in an irregular campaign and the attempted mapping

of individual thought processes has replaced the counting of tanks and bombers as essential elements of the military intelligence community.

Based on the primary conduct of the conflict, the Cold War and the Long War diverge and provide a third difference. The use of large formations and concept of mass in the Cold War defined much of the basic concepts of procedural warfare. The need to confront large formations gave rise to the development of intricate Corps level operational procedures. A clear and distinct forward edge of the battle would develop and result in a definitive battle space and rear area. Security remained dependent on the space within this construct that soldiers and their units occupied. Forward units worried more about security and rear areas less so. The battle plans even resulted in the garrisoning of numerous U.S. forces as close to their likely initial battle positions as possible. This fifty year preparation led to a “concrete” mentality and force protection mindset that limited initial maneuver and initiative by junior leaders.\(^{64}\) Senior leaders cared more about an officer’s ability to follow than his ability to innovate or find solutions on the fly. This rote memorized battle drill mentality combined with an overwhelming fear and aversion to the loss of soldiers’ lives resulted in a force protection attitude bordering on the extreme, and in some cases and for some commanders, the primary mission essential task. This is demonstrated by comments from a soldier that participated in operations just after the end of the Cold War.

The Somalia intervention of 1993-1994, a particularly harsh experience, revealed significant flaws in the army’s preparation for a post-Cold War world. Major Tim W. Quillin criticized senior commanders for emphasizing “force protection” over the accomplishment of the mission. Their lack of leadership had contributed to a “siege mentality” that yielded

\(^{64}\) These conclusions are drawn from discussions by the author with numerous junior leaders stationed in Germany and Italy at the tail end of the Cold War time period (1988-1991). Their negative comments centered on the fact that many Noncommissioned Officers and Junior Officers were evaluated on their ability to follow a prescribed checklist of actions and any variance from that checklist often times resulted in reprimands from their chain of command.
the initiative to Somali warlords and nullified American military superiority.65

These comments coincide with the author’s own experience of receiving verbal reprimands from an Assistant Division Commander during operations in Haiti for talking to Haitians on a security perimeter at Porte Au Prince airport during the initial stages of Operation Uphold Democracy.66

If the Cold War was marked by massed formations and an overbearing force protection mentality, the Long War is more about relative combat power and force protection requirements that may vary widely from location to location. Any relatively successful insurgent will only come in contact with opponents in situations where the insurgent holds a relative combat power advantage. As Mao claimed “when guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.”67 Small unit tactics by elements of the deployed forces will have to contend with and face insurgents more than likely at a time and place of the insurgent’s choosing. The more closely gathered the forces, the larger and more lucrative the target for the insurgent. Securing populations, a major task within any counterinsurgency campaign, is an inherently risky procedure. Accomplishing this task prevents the safe haven effects of a population supportive of an

65 Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, 222.

66 The incident referenced is from the author’s own experience of receiving a verbal reprimand from the Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver of the 10th Mountain Division for talking to Haitian children at the fence line at the Port Au Prince Airport. The intent of talking to the children was to determine a sense of how they viewed the presence of U.S. forces in the city, to gain a sense of their living conditions and determine if there were any known threats to American forces in Haiti. The Brigadier General observed our interaction with the children and stated “that there was no reason to talk to the Haitian people.” This incident occurred just prior to the author’s unit being employed throughout the country to work with the local Haitian government and social infrastructure for the restoration of the Aristide government. For more information on this operation see Bob Shacochis, The Immaculate Invasion (Penguin Books, USA, May 2000).

67 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 48.
insurgent. Successfully completing this task can eliminate the resources that populations provide to insurgents. Military forces must go to where the population is and spend as much time as possible to ensure their continued security. The bureaucratic pull to consolidate forces and provide quality amenities should balance against the overriding concern of securing the population in their native location. The U.S. military has gone to great lengths to flatten command and control procedures through the advent of technological advances in communications equipment and decentralized execution procedures. These advances, however, have not been able to loosen the force protection requirements developed and institutionalized during the Cold War. As a 2006 Defense Science Board Task Force stated in *Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional Environments*:

> Force protection is not an end in itself. Furthermore, protecting the force is not only, or even mainly, about defensive measures. To the extent that “force protection” connotes bunkers and barbed wire, it is not a helpful term.  

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The fourth difference between the Cold War and the Long War is the manner in which the U.S. now mans its ranks with an all volunteer force (AVF). This system came about towards the end of the Cold War and continues to be the system used by the Department of Defense. Throughout the vast majority of the Cold War, the U.S. Government drafted members of society to fill the ranks of the military. This legislation, with minor modifications to the parameters, continued to provide the needed manpower through conflicts like Korea and Vietnam. The U.S. Congress allowed the draft legislation to expire in 1973, and with it the military embarked on the system of using volunteers to fill the ranks of the U.S. military. The AVF is still in use today and has by most accounts

been a successful program. The AVF is less costly and has produced a better educated and more motivated force than its draft predecessor.\textsuperscript{69} For all its good, however, a gap has emerged in the understanding of military actions by the general American public.

This change occurred in roughly the last 15 years of the Cold War, and has been one of the major changes in the characteristics of the military fighting the Long War. As the military historian Adrian Lewis observed,

\begin{quote}
The most significant transformation in the American conduct of war since World War II and the invention of the atomic bomb was not technological, but cultural, social, and political – removal of the American people from the conduct of war.\textsuperscript{70}
\end{quote}

The Long War is the first conflict of extended duration waged using the all volunteer force structure. Since the 1970s, the members of Congress that possess military experience has declined by 51 percent (from 74\% to 23\%) according Colonel Matthew Bogdanos an experienced district attorney from New York city as well as a Colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves. He further claims:

\begin{quote}
These figures reflect a disturbing national trend, with the military and civilian worlds warily eyeing each other across a cultural no man’s land. As tightening budgets shrink future forces, veterans will be fewer and the chasm wider.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}

For all the good the AVF has produced, it has produced a gap in the understanding of the military capabilities this country possesses and provides a difference between the Long War and the Cold War.

The last major difference between the Cold War and the Long War has come about much to the chagrin of the U.S. and by the preference of our enemies. During the Cold


\textsuperscript{71} Matthew Bogdanos, “Duties Best Shared,” The Virginia Pilot, (March 15, 2009), 9.
War, the major adversary was the Soviet Union and its recognized Warsaw Pact countries. All of these entities were states and recognized in the international state system. Individual governments recognized diplomatically by the U.S., with all the privileges and restrictions associated with the declaration of being an international state. During the Cold War, distinct states, both enemy and friendly, participated in the United Nations and generally speaking played by a recognized set of well defined rules. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States competed for influence and power in an internationally recognized system. Many of the tools that the United States used to try to affect the Soviets or their allies were those developed, recognized, and brought about during the Cold War. The United Nations and its Security Council subset provided an internationally recognized forum to air grievances or build legitimacy for military actions. The U.S. and its allies gained legitimacy for military actions in Korea when the U.S.S.R. failed to be present at the United Nations Security Council vote talks.\textsuperscript{72} The Soviets used internationally recognized elections to gain power throughout Europe early in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{73} Economic sanctions (U.S. with Cuba), weapons treaties and weapons inspections (Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties), and the use of third party states during negotiations (Paris Peace Talks) are just a few of the examples of tools used during the Cold War to affect state actions and international relations.\textsuperscript{74} These methods worked due to the recognition on both sides that these techniques established legitimacy for their respective actions within the international community.

\textsuperscript{72} Leebaert, \textit{The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America’s Cold War Victory}, 92-93.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. 38-46.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. 418-420.
The U.S. finds itself combating an entity that has elected not to compete within the international state system developed and matured during the Cold War. Understandably, Al Qaida and like organizations have elected to prosecute their desires outside the realm of the state system due to the fact that this system provides few instances which are advantageous for these organizations. They hold no seats and no influence on the Security Council in the United Nations. Transnational organizations are not bound to the borders or rules established by internationally recognized states. They in many ways act as parasites to the state system, “hiding behind international norms and national laws when it suits them, and attempting to subvert them when it does not.”

This situation has made for a much more complex and less defined route to combating our adversaries. Many methods to effect states during the Cold War are no longer viable or pertinent in the Long War. The superpower have had a major source of internationally recognized power turned against them by an adaptive and flexible organization that seeks influence and power without the trappings (social problems, border security, and infrastructure maintenance) that come from becoming an internationally recognized state.

The comparisons and analysis between the Cold War and the Long War has produced the following similarities and differences:

Similarities: 1. Ideological Struggle: a War of Ideas
2. Long Duration
3. The Necessary for Using All Elements of National Power
4. Influence through Proxy
5. Continued Significance of WMD

Differences: 1. Irregular Enemy and Type of Conflict

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2. Intelligence Required for Success

3. Force Protection Requirements

4. Prosecution with an All Volunteer Force

5. Transnational Organization as Main Opponent

This analysis has shown that there are numerous easily recognized similarities between the Cold War and the Long War. These similarities are the examples most brought forward by proponents of examining the Cold War to determine the route the Long War should travel. But the similarities only tell half the story. The differences indentify numerous substantial and divergent paths from the Cold War scenario. These differences will provide the major considerations for changes and adjustments to the capabilities that the U.S. has at its disposal to successfully execute the Long War in the future. Adapting to the differences will affect the duration and the final outcome of the Long War.
Changes Required to Meet the Challenges of the Long War

This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

John F. Kennedy in Speech to West Point Graduating Class on 6 June 1962

Comparing the Cold War to the Long War has highlighted numerous similarities as well as differences between the two campaigns. These similarities and differences form the basis for determining where adjustments and changes need to be made. Furthermore, the study of the differences has highlighted areas in which the legacy thinking of the Cold War hinders our successful performance in the Long War. These changes, grounded in the analysis of the Cold War and Long War comparisons, are necessary to succeed in the current campaign against terrorist networks and Islamic fundamentalism.

Analysis of the Cold War and Long War offer several suggestions for changes to current U.S. military capabilities. Three suggestions are recommended, the development of a more robust human intelligence capability, a reexamination of force protection requirements, and plan to reconnect the military with the society they defend. Changes in these three separate areas will enhance the current U.S. military suite of capabilities. They each attempt to correct an ongoing problem or create a needed capability that is hampering the U.S. ability to conduct the type of operations necessary to succeed in the Long War.

76 Kennedy, “Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy,”
By and large, all the recommended changes can be accomplished within the purview of DoD and can be initiated with internal policy directives or changes in priorities within the services. Implemented quickly, these recommendations will change the results achieved on the battlefield and produce more efficient outcomes for the resources expended. With the whole of government approach to solving ongoing problems moves at a glacial pace, these recommendations can begin to change a culture grounded in sixty years of habitually learned behavior. The faster DoD implements, and institutionalizes these changes, the more efficient it will apply resources and the more effective the military will be in winning the Long War.

**Intelligence Requirements**

To achieve outcomes that enhance America’s overall abilities, the human intelligence capability that has failed in the counterinsurgency battles of today needs corrections at numerous levels. The conditioning of new recruits to be the eyes and ears in a foreign culture and detect anomalies of everyday life is the first step to this solution. They must report to a military intelligence community more attuned with handling greater amounts of low grade source information to develop a more comprehensive picture of the operational area. To address the need for cultural understanding and intelligence in unforeseen locations, Congress should enact a law similar to the Lodge – Philbin Act to provide a relatively rapid source of soldiers that bring a depth and understanding of a culture needed in future contingency operations. Taking these three steps will develop a HUMINT capability that has been lacking within the military for decades and create a capability that will serve the military well today and in the future.

A major difference between the Cold War and the Long War is the type of intelligence required by the U.S. to be successful. During the fifty year Cold War, the
ability to identify and detect the massing of large units was the primary task of the military intelligence community. This requirement led to a reliance on high technology photo imagery and signal intelligence to detect the movement of, and the massing of Soviet forces in Europe. Although the U.S. achieved some success in human intelligence (HUMINT) in clandestine operations during the Cold War in Guatemala and Iran in the 1950s, DoD turned away from HUMINT and towards technological intelligence following the failure of HUMINT to predict the Cuban Missile Crisis.77 These historical examples were not the only reasons for the technology oriented intelligence segments of the U.S. inventory ascending to dominance during Cold War. A military industrial complex predicated on the ability to create and receive funding for the implementation of a program has created ingrained proponents for technological solutions to military intelligence problems.78

The preference for technological solutions is not unique to the intelligence community, but one that has gained momentum in recent years. The transformation of DoD under SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld emphasized smaller force structures and an ever increasing reliance on technology. Couple these actions with a Congress that rarely advocates for increase force structure unless prompted by the Services and the results are a HUMINT community that has atrophied since its apex in the 1950s. The Services must advocate for increase manning and funding for a HUMINT capability. A larger, better trained and forward deployed HUMINT force will create more actionable intelligence in a

77 For discussion and more in-depth analysis of Human Intelligence successes and failures during the Cold War see Derek Leebaert, *The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America’s Cold War Victory*.

78 Ibid. For a more thorough understanding of government and industrial programs that permeated throughout the American society and supported intelligence problems during the Cold War and remain present today see *The Fifty-Year Wound*. 
counterinsurgency struggle. DoD, however, must not wait for added funding to create a more robust and effective intelligence tool built around an increased HUMINT capability.

There are steps DoD can take now to improve HUMINT at the tactical level, while growing the organization to institutionalize the capability for the future. At the tactical level, changing programs of instruction can instill a sense of observation within every soldier going through basic training. The development of low grade intelligence sources will provide tens of thousands of eyes and ears on the battlefield in places like Baghdad and Kabul. As Brian Jackson relates based on the British experience in Northern Ireland:

The primary sources are direct security force observation and interaction with members of the public. Every soldier a collector. Direct collection of low-grade intelligence by security forces relies on the eyes and ears of the entire force, not just the efforts of intelligence specialists. Because insurgents and terrorists blend in with the general population, familiarity with what is normal in an area provides the basis for detecting anomalous behavior that might indicate insurgent activity. Like the community patrolling police officers do, this strategy leverages an individual’s ability to learn what the baseline activity is in his area of responsibility and then apply his own human processing power to identify activities of concern.79 These advances will go a long way to increasing the reliability and accuracy of what amounted to “approximately 95 percent of our useful intelligence” for one Brigade in Iraq in 2003.80 These low grade sources were a particular favorite of General Frank Kitson of the British Army in both the Northern Ireland campaign and the Kenyan insurgency in which he participated. His contention is that an effective intelligence apparatus includes both a high-grade and equally important low-grade sources of information.81 These low grade intelligence sources will begin to change the way in which U.S. soldiers observe and


81 Jackson, “Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a “Long War,”: The British Experience in Northern Ireland.” 77.
relate to the populations on an insurgent based battlefield. The development of low grade sources of intelligence is only the beginning of the changes to correct the intelligence shortfalls in the U.S. HUMINT capability.

If everyone in a deployed unit is a collector and not just the intelligence and civil affairs portions of a force then the amount of information gathered will increase exponentially.⁸² This potential increase in information does not ensure success unless the information can be processed and synthesized into actionable intelligence. Colonel Peter Mansoor, a Brigade Commander in Bagdad and later the Executive Officer to General David Petraeus, explains a second element lacking in the HUMINT capability he experienced with his Brigade in Iraq.

Few of our military intelligence officers had the background or skills to execute this work [the development of enemy organizational templates], which left a lamentable void in our capabilities. The U.S. Army military intelligence community during the Cold War had focused heavily on use of technical intelligence systems, along with knowledge of Soviet doctrine, to create a predictive template of enemy actions on the battlefield. The system worked well if the battlefield was the Fulda Gap in 1989; less so if the battlefield was Baghdad in 2003. Human intelligence was a badly neglected discipline. The Ready Combat Team and other military organizations in Iraq struggled to create an enemy organizational template. Some would say that one did not exist, but our later experience confirmed that the insurgency was organizing itself at this time. We could and should have done a better job in disrupting it at the outset.⁸³

The military intelligence community must train its analysts to create organizational understanding from low grade intelligence sources with a keen sense of cultural awareness as a foundation. Replace the knowledge of weapon capabilities and doctrinal templating with human terrain mapping and an emphasis on adaptive learning. The ability to make sense of the reams of readily available low grade intelligence and immense amounts of

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⁸³ Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq, 48. Italics added.
open source data and string cause and effect analysis together to paint an accurate picture of the insurgent battlefield will make all the difference in the outcome of future campaigns.

These suggestions to shore up and help build an internal human intelligence apparatus will make a significant difference on an insurgent battlefield and can be executed with no more funding then is available today. These steps, however, are just one approach to the development of a more holistic HUMINT capability. Taking steps to improve U.S. military and interagency understanding of foreign cultures and peoples in potential conflict areas, is critical to the holistic development of the human intelligence system.

On June 20, 1950, with the Lodge-Philbin Act, Congress provided DoD authority to hire no more than 2,500 “skilled military specialists and technicians,” unmarried and between the ages of 18 and 35 years of age to fill the ranks of the U.S. forces in exchange for their American citizenship. 84 These immigrants from the expanding Soviet satellite states (minus Germany) provided a depth of understanding and cultural awareness to many possible Cold War battlegrounds. These men were used throughout the Army in a variety of occupations requiring a wide variance of skills. 85 The U.S. government provided a place of employment within the Armed Forces and provided the Lodge Act soldiers with acceleration to gaining their U.S. citizenship upon completion of three years of satisfactory service. But this arrangement did more than just fill the ranks and provide a fast track citizenship to Eastern European immigrants. These new recruits brought a vast amount of cultural astuteness, language capability, and a deep understanding and hatred of the communist system. These second and third order effects provided a significant boost in


85 Ibid.
capabilities to a military facing a threat from the Warsaw Pact countries.\textsuperscript{86} Using this same basic design can help mine the human capital from the American society needed to develop a robust human intelligence capability.

Congress should pass a modern-day version of the Lodge – Philbin Act to provide the military the ability to recruit and train approximately 2,000 foreign born and raised individuals into the Armed Forces as one way to improve cultural awareness in the military. These 2,000 individuals (both male and female) should be from varying locations. The locations should be determined through a comprehensive analysis of likely future U.S. military contingency locations. Recruiting immigrants, for instance from China, Venezuela, Cuba, Pakistan or any other locations in which the likelihood of U.S. involvement may be imminent will provide the military an immeasurable source of knowledge. These recruits should be trained and retained in the military intelligence field and be used as basic interpreters and providers of the cultural awareness piece lacking in so many of the plans and actions of U.S. forces.

A standing yearly Lodge – Philbin act would also provide a flexible response to unforeseen or unanticipated contingency locations. In the case of armed action in a country that was unforeseen by military officials like Afghanistan in 2002, this would give the U.S. military an accessible tool to build a core of individuals that possess a cultural awareness and language prowess rapidly. This tool would provide much more depth and breadth and significantly augment the ongoing attempts to train American born and bred soldiers a

\textsuperscript{86} These conclusions are drawn from discussions by the author with numerous Lodge Act soldiers that served primarily in 10\textsuperscript{th} Special Forces Group in the 1950s. These soldiers tended to migrate towards the Special Forces (SF) community due to the SF mission to act as a stay behind force after the initial invasion of Warsaw Pact countries in Europe in War Plans of the 1950s. Another reason for these soldiers inclination to serve with SF units is the appreciation the SF community had for the language skills and cultural awareness of European countries that Lodge Act soldiers provided to a newly established, and relatively unproven military capability. These soldiers provided a modicum of instant creditability in the beginning days of the development of the Army’s unconventional warfare capability.
language over a six to twelve month course of instruction. Depending upon the value of
the individuals’ personal connections in his / her native country, it may provide a vast
amount of intelligence to an organization caught flat-footed by emerging world events.
The U.S. military should leverage the desire of a large portion of the world’s population to
gain the freedom and job opportunities that America has to offer and hire individuals with
the cultural skills the military is lacking.

The human intelligence capability that has failed in the counterinsurgency battles of
today, and will likely to fail in the future, needs corrections at numerous levels to achieve
the results the U.S. military desires and deserves. Developing and enforcing the “everyone
a sensor” mentality with new recruits to be the eyes and ears in a foreign culture is the first
step to developing a more robust HUMINT capability. They must report to a military
intelligence community more attuned with handling greater amounts of low grade source
information and better trained in the development of human terrain mapping with an
emphasis on adaptive learning. This approach will produce a more detailed picture and
more comprehensive understanding of the contingency battlefield, no matter the location.
To address the need for cultural understanding and intelligence in unforeseen locations,
Congress should enact a law similar to the Lodge – Philbin Act to provide a relatively rapid
source of soldiers that bring a depth and breadth of cultural understanding, no matter the
contingency location. Taking these three steps will develop a HUMINT capability that has
been lacking within the military for decades and create a capability that will serve the
military well into the future of the Long War.

**Force Protection Mind Set**

Weary of the mines along the path, the U.S. military has chosen in some respects
not to walk the path at all. The protective measures and policies DoD and some
commanders have placed on deployed soldiers have established a mentality more heavily weighed towards force protection than mission accomplishment. The bunker mentality developed from force protection measures has yielded the initiative to our adversaries and provided them the freedom of maneuver and action that is critical in military operations. This migration towards over force protection, if not corrected, will at a minimum impede the mission, and at the extreme, cause operational paralysis.

The migration and expansion of force protection measures within the military has resulted from conclusions drawn from history, bureaucratic pressures to save limited resources, and out of the desire by leaders to provide soldiers some of the comforts they have become used to when not deployed. Historical examples of force protection failures of U.S. forces provide advocates for protective measures incomplete evidence of the relative importance of force protection requirements. The exit from Lebanon after the bombing of the Marine barracks, and from Somalia essentially after the death of eighteen Rangers, has led to an aversion and fear of some that any loss of soldier life will lead to the U.S. summarily exiting ongoing operations before completion. These historical examples have caused some to go as far as to claim that casualties are an operational imperative.

Casualties are a center of gravity. American values are based on the sanctity of human life, and public opinion is easily swayed by fatalities televised on CNN. That was demonstrated after the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut and the death of Army rangers in Somalia. Enemies are willing to capitalize on American sensitivities and are not restricted by political or ethical rules. Casualties at Khobar Towers confirmed this phenomenon and led us to quickly refocus our efforts to protect U.S. forces in the region.

87 Tim W. Quillin, “Force Protection In Support and Stability Operations (SASO),” Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth Kansas School of Advanced Military Studies, First Term AY 99-00, 3.

88 Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, 222.

During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, the primary concern for U.S. commanders and their personnel was force protection. These historical examples and the natural distaste on the part of all commanders for losing any of their assigned forces lead, in some cases, to an overprotective mentality and an emphasis of force protection to the detriment of mission accomplishment. The old adage “mission first, people always” has influenced some commanders to believe that the loss of life, despite mission success, falls into the category of failure. In some respects the military has become hyper-sensitive to the loss of soldiers, while the general public, secure in the belief that soldiers volunteered for military service, have grown increasingly insensitive to, if not completely unaware of mounting casualties. The thousands of deaths in Iraq has not resulted in a significant call for the closure of that mission yet the military continues in some cases to place undue importance on the protection of soldiers. History is only one force compelling the military along this path.

The second aspect that has led U.S. forces to be overly protective of forces is the tendency and desire of the bureaucracy to pull units together and consolidate at fewer, but larger, locations. Consolidating more forces at fewer locations achieves savings of numerous resources. It takes a smaller percentage of a unit’s overall force to guard a larger unit location, saving personnel to achieve other assigned tasks. It is certainly less expensive in terms of dollars to build and equip a few large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) vice numerous smaller diversely located bases. Larger FOBs also provide a commander an ability to mass combat power to ensure that if and when a fight does arise they will have the force gathered to overwhelm the enemy. The larger the location, the

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greater the sense of security regardless of the actual security measures emplaced. This psychological reaction to being one of many as opposed to out on your own is a natural draw to pull more forces to fewer locations. Bureaucratic efficiencies and the human desire for companionship in a stressful environment are all reasons why American forces have shown a preference of protective measures over the successful execution of a mission.

Max Booth, the well known lecturer and military historian recently commented:

> But the strategy of concentrating U.S. troops in giant bases, though superficially alluring, carries its own heavy risks. The biggest risk of all is that the troops won’t be able to accomplish the job they were sent to do. You can’t wage counterinsurgency from a long distance. You have to live among the people you’re defending. When U.S. soldiers commute to work in Humvees, not only do they find themselves unable to control their AOR’s (Areas of Responsibility), they also find themselves vulnerable to roadside bombs. By getting to know their neighborhoods – which, in most cases, requires foot patrols – troops can gather the intelligence necessary to round up insurgents and establish security for the population.91

This force protection mentality also exacerbates the problem with the lack of HUMINT when soldiers confined to large FOBs are not amongst the people that possess valuable information that can relate directly to their protection.

The third reason that leaders within a deployed area tend to migrate towards larger base camps as opposed to the smaller dispersed locations is the desire by commanders to make the most of an undesirable environment. Larger FOBs allow for an increase in quality of life areas that soldiers and their commander’s desire. The larger the location, the more the military can provide amenities and services that are representative of the surroundings they find in a peacetime location. Large base camps can provide Post Exchange facilities, morale welfare and recreation services, and other items that deployed soldiers’ desire. These services grow out of a desire by commanders and the Armed

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Services to provide the best environment possible for all deployed soldiers to offset the long and grueling deployment. The consolidation of forces does, however, come at a negative force protection price:

America’s forces were cooped up in heavily guarded Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) waiting for actionable intelligence that seldom arrived. When it did, they would drive their vehicles to battle down roads their enemies had lined with bombs.  

All three aspects are at play in Colonel Mansoor’s account of operations in Baghdad in 2003:

One of Brigadier General Dempsey’s (now General Martin E. Dempsey, Commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) first orders was to consolidate our troops into battalion-size bases, which reduced the number of soldiers routinely needed for guard duty and allowed for improved quality of life in larger and more secure facilities. By reducing the personnel needed for framework operations, we would be able to surge when necessary to conduct other types of missions. Although I supported this decision, it turned out to be a double-edged sword, and in retrospect probably the wrong call. Although larger forward operating bases enabled the combat team to mass combat power for surge operations, we lost continuous contact with Iraqi citizens in those parts of the zone where companies used to live and work in smaller outposts. A robust Iraqi police presence could have compensated for this drawback, but the Iraqi police force in 2003 was woefully insufficient to the task of protecting the citizens of Baghdad against petty crime, much less a budding insurgency.

In defiance of the operational principle of protecting the population, decision makers justified the consolidating of forces on larger FOBs based on force protection criteria and a desire to provide better living conditions for their soldiers. Living with and protecting the local population is a risky proposition in a counterinsurgency environment, yet is necessary to achieve success in any campaign aimed at the destruction of an insurgency force.

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92 Clifford D. May, “The Long War: Yes, we’ve been in Iraq five years and counting: and yes, the outcome counts,” National Review Online, http://article.nationalreview (accessed September 8, 2008) 1.

93 Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq, 50.
An insurgency is only as strong as the support it garners from the population. Yet a population in which an insurgency festers and grows will present an environment of immense danger to contingency forces. Locating with the population, in these cases becomes a very dangerous place, but one which will get worse if not addressed by U.S. forces. “Conservation of one’s own strength; destruction of enemy strength”\textsuperscript{94} as Mao tse-Tung stated about guerrilla warfare is very poignant quote if one considers that the strength of any insurgency comes directly from the people. The design in any insurgency campaign by both forces is to gain support from the population and is more important than gaining superiority over the opponents military.\textsuperscript{95}

By placing forces within the population the U.S. military can at least begin to compete for the support of the population. Removing oneself from the location will only ensure that the U.S. will not be competing. Again as Colonel Mansoor states:

Power, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and the insurgents and various militias and criminal organizations were eager to fill the resulting void when we left the interior of Baghdad for facilities on the outside. In fact, we should have been moving in the opposite direction – establishing combat outposts and patrol bases inside Baghdad manned by U.S. and Iraqi companies and platoons. We needed more – not less – contact with the Iraqi populace.\textsuperscript{96}

If the U.S. armed forces have become risk adverse and overly sensitive to force protection concerns, then moving individuals and organizations back to a more balanced position of equilibrium is a requirement for future success. The first step towards this end should be the thorough examination of all force protection procedures to determine which are routine and show signs of habit and apathetic application vice true protective measures.

\textsuperscript{94}Mao, \textit{On Guerrilla Warfare}, 95.


\textsuperscript{96}Mansoor, \textit{Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq}, 298.
A one size fits all perspective limits leaders in their ability to develop creatively the best solution to a given problem. Like the donning of chemical protective gear to a level that is commensurate to the threat conditions, so too should the force protection equipment and posture of protective measures a unit and its leaders prescribe be based on the threat. Analyze those procedures that have become routine to determine their true value to the organization and overall safety of individuals and units. Every unit must determine whether a force protection measure implemented in a half-hearted manner is somehow undermining both the time and energy of those essential tasks necessary for mission accomplishment.

A second step towards moving the force protection measures near a reasonable equilibrium is developing training tools and scenarios that assist in determining levels of force protection necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. In today’s training environment, the military expends very little intellectual energy in determining which measures are necessary given a particular scenario. The habitual filling out of a risk assessment has led many to simple plagiarism without exerting the mental energy to actually mitigate the actual risk. The cut and paste actions and attitudes by soldiers in many training scenarios has resulted in a preference to over-protect than to apply the appropriate measures necessary to meet the mission’s requirements. Each and every force protection measure produces a countering effect to some aspect of a mission and must be examined to determine the cost-benefit best for success. Consolidation of units in large FOBs has the effect of removing soldiers from the populations they are responsible for.

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97 This conclusion is based on the author’s observations over a seven year period (2000-2007) involving more than five hundred separate risk assessments completed by both company grade officers during the Special Forces Qualification Course and multiple Joint units using training facilities at For Story, Virginia. Greater than 80 percent of first time submitters of risk assessments copied verbatim a previously completed and approved risk assessment failing in many cases to even match the actual training dates with the dates indicated on the risk assessment.
protecting. Even the donning of body armor and other force protection equipment results in a less mobile and individually agile soldier. Wearing a helmet may protect the soldier at the determent of hearing and seeing what is transpiring around him. The force protection of soldiers is just one side of this equation with mission accomplishment occupying the other more important half. Besides what message does the armored soldier in full force protection equipment send to the population about the security of his or her environment? Emphasizing creativity in risk mitigation will have the secondary effects of developing adaptive leaders that are more creative in their development of solutions to problems and more attune to their surroundings in a counterinsurgency environment.

Leaders at all levels must be willing to underwrite lesser force protection measures if they provide an operational and tactical advantage to an assigned mission. Instead of signing high risk assessments, commanders at the appropriate levels must insist on a discussion of training that involves increased risk. Originators of the high risk training should have to justify their mitigation measures and receive the authorization from face to face meetings with their superiors and not just the rubber stamp approval or disapproval through correspondence. This interaction will start the process of building the two way trust, both up and down the chain of command, which is necessary to finding the equilibrium in the force protection measures taken in both training and in actual combat.

Examining force protection measures that have migrated to a point that hinders mission accomplishment is the first step to bringing back into equilibrium the balance needed between force protection and mission accomplishment. The second step is the development of training tools and scenarios that emphasize the creative application of mitigation measures to a variety of risk factors. Designing scenarios with numerous correct solutions, and not just one approved answer, will stimulate leaders to develop creative
solutions to complex problems in training situations that will create contingencies instead of leaders that apply more vigorous intellectual energy to producing creative and adaptive outcomes. And finally, leaders at all levels must be open and available to the discussion of all elements of risk and push their subordinates to develop creative solutions that emphasize mission accomplishment. This last step will begin to build the trust required to underwrite much of the risk found on a counterinsurgency battlefield in favor of accomplishing the mission. No amount of force protection measures can eliminate the inherently dangerous environments in which soldiers in the Long War will find themselves. Embracing the risk associated with each and every mission will promote mission accomplishment while protecting the soldiers that execute them.

**Connecting the All-Volunteer Force with the Society They Support**

Commenting on the Long War, one author stated pointedly, “It’s this generation’s turn to accept the challenge or face the hell of destructive consequences.”98 Today, the Long War is being fought by individuals uniquely different than those that stood watch during the Cold War. Today’s military is manned by what has become known as the All Volunteer Force (AVF) which began in 1973. This change in the way in which the U.S. manned its ranks has had effects not yet realized or analyzed. As the military historian Adrian Lewis observed, the AVF has essentially removed the American people from the conduct of war.99 The AVF, has by most accounts, been an overwhelming success.100 Yet the second and third order effects of having an AVF is beginning to stress the very

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100 Asch, “Should Uncle Sam Want You?” 1.
relationship with society that the military is organized to defend. The use of volunteers has created a detachment between the society and military\textsuperscript{101} that may create tension on the road ahead. This proposed change addresses an unintended effect of the AVF that if not rectified in the near term will lead to further widening of the gap that currently exists between the military and society.

During the Cold War, and for the significant portion of the industrial age, America manned its formations with members of society through draft legislation. The U.S. traditionally relied on our ocean barriers to have time to mobilize, train, and equip the forces necessary to meet the nation’s security needs. America generally used legislative action after a crisis occurred to allocate the resources to build an adequate force. This process provided direct congressional input and by default, a direct connection with the American public. The draft created not only the forces required to execute the military’s missions, but also a better understanding of what military service entailed by the general public. Nearly every male citizen was eligible for military duty and as such an underlying basic understanding of military service existed in the country writ large. The AVF changed that equation significantly and despite its successes has left a growing gap in the basic understanding of military service by the population. This basic lack of understanding is exacerbated in that only 25\% of America’s young people today ages 17 to 24 are qualified for military service. Obesity and other health problems, physical fitness deficiencies and lack of a high school diploma or equivalent are just a few of the considered disqualifiers for service.\textsuperscript{102} As a former Vietnam and Persian Gulf veteran turned Professor noted recently,

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… a reliance on professional soldiers eviscerates the concept of civic duty, relieving citizens at large of any obligation to contribute to the nation’s defense. Ending the draft during the waning days of the Vietnam War did nothing to heal the divisions created by that conflict; instead, it ratified the separation of the army from society. Like mowing lawns and bussing tables, fighting and perhaps dying to sustain the American way of life became something that Americans pay others to do.103

The AVF built a professional force and eventually a recruiting system to compete for the workforce of America. Based on the criteria of likelihood of continued service and high school equivalency education, the AVF has provided a more stable and better educated force than would be acquired through a draft.104 The truest test and ratification of this ideal of the AVF prior to the Long War was during Operation Desert Storm, which exercised the entire force with the mobilization of reserves. This operation did not last long enough to determine the true impact of a sustained operation on the reserve component.

Yet despite the successes of the AVF, it has created an unhealthy side effect. It creates a situation that makes military service almost foreign to large segments of the American population. “Seven years into its confrontation with radical Islam, the United States finds itself with too much war for too few warriors – and with no prospect of producing the additional soldiers needed to close the gap.”105 The military and the Army in particular continues to reach its recruiting goals, but at an ever increasing cost. The recruiting cost per recruits has more than doubled over the last twenty years and has reached $18,000 per recruit. Compounding the issue, these numbers do not include any supplemental military budget money which has provided a significant share of the Army


budget since 2003. This phenomenon exacerbates an already tenuous relationship that some scholars believe the military has with society. According to Professor Brian Linn,

The army’s vision of war has seldom involved public participation, except on the services’ own terms. Instead, military intellectuals have either dismissed the citizenry altogether or ascribed to them a largely negative influence. Army intellectuals have portrayed themselves as enlightened and informed professionals struggling against venal, ignorant politicians and an apathetic, selfish public. The army’s lack of empathy for the nation’s own citizens, its distrust of the political system, and its insistence that defense be the nation’s overriding priority have greatly influenced its way of war. With few exceptions, peacetime officers have underestimated the latent power of patriotic civilians and democratic institutions. As a result, they have tended to envision future conflicts in which the public is little more than a frightened mob, the political system is ineffectual, and the regular army has been granted carte blanche to fight the war it imagines. And in assessing the lessons of past conflicts, it has tended to focus on its own contributions and to ignore those of industry, the home front, political leaders, and citizen-soldiers. At its most insidious, this bias has contributed to an institutional fable that the regular army’s success on the battlefield has often been undermined by a lack of sufficient “will” on the home front.

The AVF, for all the good that it has produced, risks “cultivating doers less tolerant of different lifestyles or ways of thinking.” This relationship, strained during the Vietnam conflict, has not recovered due the mercenary nature of the armed forces. The trinity, as proposed by Clausewitz, contends that three entities and their interrelation are a timeless feature of war.

….These three tendencies are…deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.


107 Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, 236.

108 Bogdanos, “Duties Best Shared,” 9

109 Clausewitz, On War, 89.
Maintaining the hatred, enmity, and passion of the people that Clausewitz claims essential in this relationship is essential to garner the support necessary to sustain the conflict. That support will manifest itself either financially or with manpower, or both, through the support of the people. Taking steps to re-establish the relationship between the military and society will maintain the support needed and form a stronger and healthier relationship for the betterment of each entity. The armed forces must reconnect with society for the health, and welfare of both entities.

The Armed Force of the United States must develop a program so that soldiers of numerous ranks can engage with the society they defend. Provided with some training, these soldiers must get out of their insulated cocoons, much like getting off their FOBs when deployed, and get out among the population and interact with the American public. They must interact beyond the communities in which they live and move into communities little affected by the military. They must interact in communities like Portland, Oregon; Lincoln, Nebraska; and Columbus, Ohio and not be confined to neighborhoods like Fayetteville, North Carolina that already feel and appreciate the services the military provides. They must talk to school age children and high school students and get out amongst the college campuses of the country to engage with individuals that are starting to formulate their sense of activism or sense of civic responsibility. They should resist the tendency to go to Lions Clubs and Veterans Groups as part of this program as those entities are by and large supportive of the Armed Services and the return on investment would be minimal. Viewing these events as training events for all involved, concentrating on the enlightenment of each entity and not on the publicity that may result, should be the goal. The development of a grassroots level program initiated by the military would benefit both
parties and produce a greater understanding of what each entity offers in terms of commitment to a national will.

*Time* magazine in 2003 declared of the American Soldier:

For Uncommon skills and service, for the choices each one of them has made and the ones still ahead, for the challenge of defending not only our freedom but those barely stirring half a world away, the American soldier in Time’s Person of the Year.110

The military and military duty has always produced a level of respect and admiration within this country that has been exceptional and now is the time to use that admiration to reconnect the members of the military with local communities. The military should select a corps group of individuals at all ranks that have demonstrated the leadership within the Armed Forces and put it on display to the country. These personnel must educate without alienating and must provide an example and exposure to the military that for many will be the first and only interaction with the armed services. They must be the types of individuals that will express their opinions in an open and honest way, but also be savvy enough to restrain from confrontation should it arise. They must be those soldiers that present themselves in a manner in which people want to follow them. At the beginning of the Cold War, General Eisenhower stated that “to meet the demands of armed conflict every material resource and every individual in the state must be called upon to bear a proportionate share of the burden.”111 With the military engaged in a sustained fight, now is the time to let the state share a proportion of the burden, even if it is just listening to the viewpoints of one soldier fighting in the Long War on its behalf.

This two way education between the society and the soldier will benefit both entities in a manner that will outweigh the small amount of temporary duty dollars assigned


to this problem. The society will begin to gain an understanding of the commitment and attributes that go into making a good soldier and the sacrifices that each military family goes through for successful service. The nation can begin again the process of putting a face to the undertaking the military is assigned. The soldier will be the personal linkage to an American foreign policy often only translated to the general public by the media. The future soldiers and taxpayers of America can begin to understand the complexity of military actions and the intellectual depth required to succeed. The soldier’s international perspective can serve to educate an American public so long isolated by two vast ocean borders and naivety to the international world, narrowing the cultural gap that exists between the U.S. and the rest of the world. But for all the benefits a program of this magnitude offers, the military would gain even more.

The soldiers that participate in this program, as well as the individuals they lead, will gain a greater appreciation of the country they have raised their collective right hands to defend. A greater understanding of the diverse viewpoints and attitudes of the society will be proliferated throughout the military. This greater understanding will benefit the soldiers with the ability to address diverse viewpoints and distinct attitudes that they will encounter on the irregular warfare battlefield. It will give soldiers the opportunity to solidify their own viewpoints and train them in the ability to reach consensus as well as an ability to articulate professionally the missions and tasks that they are assigned. The greater exposure of the military to society will also aid in the recruitment process to ensure the manning of the military well into the future. This last reason will alleviate a potential hazard in the future manning of the military.

Another potential indicator of the military’s political effectiveness lies in its access to a sufficient quality and quantity of manpower. The US military, the Army in particular, has faced some alarming personnel problems in the last few years. The all-volunteer US military, the
centerpiece of the national defense since 1973, may be facing a significant threat to its existence. Four years of combat in an unpopular war, an extremely high operating tempo, and strong competition from the private sector have placed a strain on service members and posed challenges to recruiting and retention efforts.112

After seven years of sustained combat actions with seemingly only apathetic support from the public, the military must reengage with society to force the relationship in a positive direction. The military must take the step to engage the society in a systematic and sustained way that will start the education process for both the armed forces and the society on the viewpoints of each entity. As Colonel Bagdanos offers:

> Without greater understanding between the military and civilian worlds or, better, a return to a synthesis of the two, we risk a future without all of us working toward the same ends – whatever society decides those ends should be. And we risk misusing military force because of misunderstanding about what it can and can’t do or, once used, its being prematurely withdrawn because of unrealistic expectations.113

This program would serve both the military and the public, creating a better understanding between the two, while providing the manpower the military will need for the long fight ahead.

After more than thirty five years of manning the military with the AVF and with the military engaged in combat for the last seven years, now is the time to take a reflective look at the state of affairs of the AVF. Actions taken today will serve the military well into the future and ensure the viability and professionalism of the U.S. military. The military must attempt to connect with the society it serves. If not, the military will drift further from the society, which will impact recruiting and essentially dispel the notion of public service. The military must engage the people of this country for the betterment of both entities.

112 Wright, “Military Effectiveness in the Long War” 47.

Doing nothing is not an option if the military expects to understand and garner the support that is necessary to sustain the national will required for the Long War.
Changing the Military Culture

*We are all, at heart, gradualists, our expectations set by the steady passage of time. But the world of the Tipping Point is a place where the unexpected becomes expected, where radical change is more than a possibility. It is – contrary to all our expectations – a certainty.*

Malcolm Gladwell from the Tipping Point

“The military, for reasons of organizational structure and professional culture, is largely resistant to change.”

Changing the culture of any organization is not simple, especially when that organization is large, successful, and in the midst of a protracted fight. Yet change within the military must occur if it is to prevail in the current Long War. The military can collectively choose to do nothing and the soldiers engaged in the day to day fight will be forced to make their own adaptations. Attempting to stay alive is an excellent motivation to change yet there are many within DoD who are not in a struggle to the death. The conservative nature of the Armed Forces and the bureaucratic inertia that exists must be set aside and organized to change for the better. Change alone will not come from the writing of papers or the making of speeches, but from action. Directive and direct actions by the military to move the organization in a positive and common direction will begin the change process.

The adaptations and adjustments that soldiers and leaders have taken over the last seven years to defeat their enemies on the field of battle have been necessary for the survival of individuals and units in the fight. Applying the same effort, vigor, and necessity to the organizational changes required for the future in the Long War will

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enhance likely outcomes. The following will provide some discussion on two avenues of approach towards making the changes within DoD. The first example demonstrates a natural bureaucratic reaction to facing an uncertain future for a particular segment of the Army. The second example demonstrates a positive approach which is taking place today. Emulating and propagating this second example into the future will ensure the continued success of the entire organization. Both examples demonstrate the impact of individuals within the bureaucracy, one negative and one positive, but all important in aligning the organization with the goals of the Long War campaign and the nation.

**The Counter-Productive Approach to Change**

Fighting an unconventional campaign with a structure organized to fight conventionally has demonstrated numerous shortfalls. Numerous military specialties have never been in higher demand. Skill sets such as military policemen, engineers, civil affairs specialists and others have been in high demand over the past seven years.\(^{116}\) Unfortunately, juxtaposed to those high demand specialties there are some that have found themselves as mostly spectators in the ongoing fight. Numerous career fields have found themselves in the unenviable position of questioning the viability and relativity of their respective career choices. The demand that arose out of the conditions set by the Cold War has changed and with it the need for increasing numbers of different career fields and specialties. These conditions are not set by an arbitrary bureaucratic position or nostalgia for the good old days of a particular career field. They are set by the approaches that a hard core enemy takes in attempt to destroy the U.S. military in engagements around the world.

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In the Army, the Field Artillery (FA) is one branch that is struggling to define its future roles and missions. Redefinition combined with the inevitable decline in the size and prestige of the King of Battle has created an example how organizations confronting significant change often revert to a more familiar and perceived prestigious time. This tendency by organizations results in a bifurcating of overall effects and creates organizations and individuals attempting to recreate the past based on a nonexistent requirement vice becoming the active participants in redefining the future.

The Field Artillery branch has gone as far as publishing a Field Artillery campaign plan which is “a comprehensive document that addresses every aspect of Field Artillery fires and fire support.”\textsuperscript{117} This definition is found in the same document that states “The FA is relevant.”\textsuperscript{118} Declaring a branch is relevant does not simply make it so. These statements stand opposed to previous documents sent to the Chief of Staff of the Army that state “The once mighty “King of Battle” has been described by one of its own as a “dead branch walking.”\textsuperscript{119} In each article and every visible example of the actions taken by the branch, the collective intent of its leaders is to retain the past vice being an active and relevant participant in defining the future of the branch. The branch would be better served seeking to fill any of the numerous gaps in military capabilities that currently exist. A better start may be in examining the “outside their MOS” jobs that 90% of fire supporters are serving in today”\textsuperscript{120} to determine which jobs will be required well into the future.


\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 1.


\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 1
There is more than enough work for everyone involved in the Long War without holding onto the past glory days of a particular branch or skill. The Long War requires adaptive and flexible people and organizations to meet the demands that this campaign places upon it. Declaring one’s relevancy and attempting to retain an organizational structure designed for another fight and another enemy is counterproductive to the entire defense organization as a whole. This campaign demands adaptive organizations that look to the unknown opportunities of the future and not the known comfort of the past.

**Two Pronged Pincer Approach to Change**

Today, the military, from a personnel standpoint stands well suited to make the changes required in the current Long War campaign. After more than seven years of fighting, large portions of the service has experienced the struggles of engaging an adaptive and flexible enemy on a counterinsurgency battlefield and understand what is necessary to be successful. Junior officers and junior NCOs came into the service knowing full well that decision likely meant duty in a combat zone. These junior leaders have experienced more in seven years then most soldiers that joined the military after 1975 experienced in decades of service. These soldiers must demand that their experiences be accounted for and institutionalized in professional military education courses and training regimens for the betterment of the entire organization. Doctrine should incorporate their best practices and they should reject training scenarios that depict a way of fighting that existed in 1989. Preparing for conflict in the struggles of the Long War is difficult enough without wasting valuable training time fighting battles that never did and never will occur. These junior leaders must demand their hard learned lessons inform the entire military from the brand new privates to the most senior officers in the chain of command.
The senior leadership within the military must enact and enforce the changes necessary to win the Long War. They must back the changes or act as the change agent themselves and protect those that best demonstrate the change they believe the organization needs. Senior leaders must protect those junior leaders that demonstrate the attributes that are necessary to facilitate change in the organization and more importantly protect those leaders from the bureaucratic tendency to resist change. The junior leaders and senior commanders act as two forces that should converge upon the middle management of the military to change the biggest obstacle within the military ranks.

Both the senior leadership and the junior leaders will apply pressure to the middle managers that continue to embrace past, irrelevant practices. Morris Janowitz, the late preeminent military sociologist, “contends that the tendency to resist organizational change rests in the middle officer ranks.”\textsuperscript{121} If this in fact is true, then both the junior and the senior leaders must be diligent in their persistence against middle managers propensity to protect past practices and resist change. The middle managers will draw on their years of experience in the Cold War and nostalgically look to those times since those are the times that solidified their collective careers. These middle managers will present a formidable opponent by insisting on practices not relevant in the current struggle or by interpreting guidance in a manner that fits their vision of the future and not the vision of senior leaders.

The junior leaders and senior commanders must work in concert to articulate and implement the changes required to win the Long War. They must both engage the middle managers to ensure their direction is not side tracked by leaders unwilling to move the organization forward. Armed with the experience gained on the counterinsurgency battlefields of the recent past, leaders at all levels must remain diligent in institutionalizing

\textsuperscript{121} Greenwald, The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at \textit{Transformation},” 11.
the changes needed to be successful for all those that will fight in the future battles of the Long War.
Conclusion

Once cured of our current thinking deficiency, the opportunity to reengage intelligently in the Long War with a refined, comprehensive approach will be open to us. 122

Secretary Gates has called for a balance between retaining the skills necessary to win the fights the country is in today and the conventional capabilities to confront a peer conventional power of the future. There are numerous individuals and organizations that have articulated the merits of each capability, but the intellectual capital required to develop the tools and capabilities that achieve the balance has been left wanting. This analysis has attempted to move beyond the parochial study of each diverse viewpoint and study the requirements that the current struggle demands and develop numerous concrete changes the U.S. military can make today to begin to achieve the balance the Secretary desires and the country demands.

The Long War presents a scenario that many have claimed is analogous to the Cold War waged by the United States and the Soviet Union for nearly fifty years. A more detailed analysis revealed numerous similarities but more importantly, numerous differences in the fundamental characteristics of the two conflicts that naturally call for change. These changes are designed to be accomplished within the authorities and with resources which the Department of Defense already has at its disposal. A complete reengineering of the entire organization is not necessary to achieve the effects that the Long War requires. The changes suggested in this study can be accomplished through the emphasis of some basic concepts in the military training base, the examination of past

practices for consideration of relevancy, and the realignment of minimal resources to support a program for soldiers to engage with the society they defend.

As proponents articulate their respective arguments as to which counterinsurgency or conventional capability should be emphasized, each can embrace the recommendations for their own distinct purposes. As the intellectual offspring of Robert Komer cry for a continued emphasis in counterinsurgency capabilities, they can collectively embrace the recommendations to build a more robust HUMINT tool to provide the necessary intelligence so critical in a counterinsurgency campaign. Counterinsurgency disciples can embrace the recommendations in the force protection arena as fuel to support taking more risk in a campaign where living within the population is a necessity to gain success. Disciples of Harry Summers can embrace the recommendations for better HUMINT as a proposal to develop a capability to analyze an emerging peer competitor wherever and whenever that should occur. Conventional futurists can embrace the recommendations in the force protection field by emphasizing the development of a military capacity to move away from a one size fits all application of all military tools to the intellectual agility and ability to apply the right capability to the right problem of the future. Each side can embrace a program to more closely connect the military with society either for the likely increased recruiting pool that this program would produce or for the stimulation of the debate on how to apply the military power of the U.S. in the future. Both sides in this great debate will not be completely satisfied but complete satisfaction is not necessary to reach the balance that the SECDEF desires and the nation deserves.

The military must take action to correct deficiencies and remove negative tendencies to be successful in the future battles of the Long War. A thorough analysis has revealed numerous fundamental differences between the ongoing Long War and Cold War,
which is responsible for many of the practices and capabilities that the military abides by today. The analysis and subsequent suggestions recommend the development of a more robust human intelligence capability to provide the amount and type of intelligence required by military practitioners of today and for tomorrow. The reexamination of numerous force protection procedures will bring the military back into the balance of realistically analyzing and mitigating risk to enhance mission accomplishment instead of hindering it. And the final recommendation involves an attempt to reconnect the military with the society that they support for the educational development and the health of each entity. These three recommendations, whether taken complete or in part, will ensure the success of U.S. forces in the fights of today and the unforeseen fights in the future of the Long War.

**Recommendations**

Build a more robust and capable human intelligence ability to meet the increased demands of the Long War through the training of each individual soldier to be more attuned and observant to changes that occur on the counterinsurgency battle ground. Reorient the training of the military intelligence community by developing training scenarios that emphasis the ability to decipher and depict a flexible and adapting enemy organization through the culling of vast amounts of information and low grade intelligence sources. And finally the reinstitution of a Lodge – Philbin Act that develops a capability to rapidly infuse specific cultural awareness and astuteness into the military through the use of U.S. immigrants.

Move the military away from the bureaucratic rubber stamping of risk assessments and one size fits all force protection measures to individuals and organizations that address risk
mitigation in creative and innovative ways and examine force protection measures for each and every instance as it relates to the possibility of mission success. Underwrite leaders that realistically examine risk and apply force protection measures applicable to the risk assigned and not those that over apply force protection measures based on standardized practices or an over reaction to chain of command concerns. Apply the force protection measures applicable to the mission assigned and not dependant on the bureaucratic wishes to save resources.

Develop and begin a program to infuse the example the soldiers set in their commitment and service to this nation into the society to begin to educate and reconnect the society to the military. The program should include soldiers of all ranks that would engage the generally unexposed communities of the country to the military culture through formal and informal gatherings. These soldiers must not only be examples of quality service but must be educators as well as students to learn from the viewpoints and opinions of the general population and proliferate the societal perspectives throughout the military.
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