This paper asserts the importance of public diplomacy, an element of soft power, in achieving U.S. national security goals. Following an analysis of the U.S. government’s process to formulate and deploy soft power and public diplomacy, this paper presents and assesses historical and contemporary application of public diplomacy as an element of national power. In addition to reform and modernization of the Department of State’s public diplomacy capacity, it is recommended that more attention, resources, and personnel be appropriated by the U.S. government towards public diplomacy initiatives. The paper concludes that national policymakers should integrate public diplomacy, as a complement to hard power, more fully into foreign policy planning and execution in order to achieve national security goals.
Improving Public Diplomacy, the Frontline of Soft Power

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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Abstract

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Three women, all brilliant and strong, in my life who made this thesis possible: my mother Berta Llera who always inspired me to learn more about the world, my beautiful wife and editor Susie who I love more each day, and my wonderful daughter Eva who is the joy in our lives.

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I. Introduction

During the past decade, the United States’ capacity to influence global events has eroded due to overreliance on military operations at the expense of diplomatic, informational and economic elements of national power. Of course, U.S. foreign policy during the last eight years – since September 11, 2001, has been dominated by military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and against militant extremists worldwide. It reasonably follows, therefore, that military matters would become the vanguard of U.S. foreign policy during this time. Nevertheless, the United States’ ability to lead a global coalition against the roots of terrorism and other factors which compelled the use of military force stands in contrast with previous eras in which U.S. leadership marshaled greater international support and garnered more success in achieving its goals.

diplomatic ultimatums are examples of hard power, while academic exchanges, media outreach and cultural and artistic programs represent soft power.

In particular, the United States must dedicate resources, attention and personnel to one especially untended portion of soft power: public diplomacy (PD). The definition of PD, like the concept of its use, needs to be updated. While the Department of State defines PD as “government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries,” the realities of today’s world require a broader definition and approach. Unlike traditional diplomacy, which occurs between and among official governments, PD occurs between official and non-official representatives of governments directly with foreign publics. The capacity of PD to reach past competing or adversarial entities such as foreign governments, corporate interests, international organizations, or militant extremist groups to deliver messages directly to foreign publics is unique. It is also critical in order for the United States to prevail in ongoing struggles against instability, nationalism, terrorism and economic turmoil. According to the U.S. Public Diplomacy Council, effective PD is “essential to the nation’s long-term national security interests.” Similarly, the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that PD is “critical” to achieve U.S. national interests.

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Put simply, PD is *diplomacy intended to influence foreign publics* and its “overarching goal is to build a web of human relationships that provides… outcomes commensurate with long-term U.S. interests.”⁶ PD, in its applied form, results in programs and activities deployed to influence public perception of policies or issues. A veteran diplomat described a PD program as one “carried out by the government aimed at understanding and engaging with foreign publics, in order to serve American interests.”⁷

It should be noted that PD programming always runs the risk of being perceived as “propaganda…if broadcasting misreads cultural clues and appears to be inauthentic.”⁸ Propaganda, unlike PD, is *false* information mixed with facts.⁹ The U.S. government has wrestled over concern about conducting propaganda under the guise of PD. In the 1970s, Congressional transcripts reveal a debate about how to link, and delink, policy information from “general” information so as to prevent news from becoming, or being perceived to be, official propaganda.¹⁰ The report noted that “the two kinds of information are often mutually reinforcing and difficult in practice to separate.”¹¹

PD activities are broad and getting broader. PD naturally includes many hallmarks of soft power such as cultural and artistic outreach programs, academic exchanges, and media like

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¹¹ Ibid.
the Voice of America. But PD is also people-to-people ties, non-official sources of messaging such as the private sector and entertainment industry, and any of a host of other activities which broadcast American culture or values throughout the world.

PD must adapt to innovations in technology and media to be effective. The application of PD has changed with the new global information age: messages, both intended and unintended, which used to take weeks and days to prepare and disseminate around the world now appear instantly everywhere. And just as the U.S. government focuses PD efforts on foreign publics, foreign entities – both allied and hostile – target the American public with competing messages. The United States needs to meet the challenge of public messaging in the information age head-on, with a revitalized and broad-reaching PD capacity.

This paper will argue for the critical need to improve U.S. PD to achieve national security objectives. Through assessment of current PD practices and illustrative examples from historical periods in which PD was a factor, this paper will demonstrate that an effective PD capacity is as important to national security as overwhelming military power. The historical study will glean key lessons to help craft a modern PD strategy for contemporary challenges. Finally, this paper will recommend several discrete and salient steps which the U.S. government can undertake to formulate PD strategy which reinforces national policy. To accomplish this goal, organizational and personnel system reforms are needed in parts of the federal bureaucracy responsible for U.S. foreign policy and especially in Department of State.
“Public diplomacy remains a critical part of U.S. smart power.”\textsuperscript{12}

- CSIS Commission on Smart Power

II. Public Diplomacy & U.S. Foreign Policy

In Monty Python’s satirical film \textit{The Life of Brian}, the character Reg debates with fellow revolutionaries the evil nature of the superpower of the time, the Roman Empire. “Apart from the sanitation, medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system and public health,” Reg demands, “what have the Romans ever done for us?”\textsuperscript{13} For Reg, social welfare, development and security from the Romans was not enough – because of the lack of effective public diplomacy.

This light-hearted fictional account is actually an effective allegory for the United States. Although the U.S. government vastly outpaces the world in the amount of global development and defense assistance, the international image of the United States has deteriorated over the last decade. Many studies, such as global assessments by the Pew Charitable Trusts, the German Marshall Fund and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, have found that the United States’ image abroad has “declined precipitously” over the last decade, particularly in Europe and in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A smarter, more secure America.” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2007, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{The Life of Brian}, excerpt, 1979, \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IaE3EaQte78}.
Senior leaders in the U.S. government have taken note. Improving the country’s image abroad was listed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) as one of the most pressing national policy issues facing the new Obama Administration.\textsuperscript{15} In the wide-ranging assessment of foreign perception of the United States, the GAO noted that negative perceptions of the United States could directly lead to a weakened ability to garner support for U.S. foreign policy. Foreign leaders “may seek to leverage anti-American sentiment in pursuit of their own political goals” possibly leading to reduced support in general for U.S. policies.\textsuperscript{16} Even leaders in countries we consider friendly to U.S. policies have found it “convenient and politically advantageous” to publicly attack America.\textsuperscript{17}

The purpose of PD and soft power in general goes substantively beyond simply ameliorating the United States’ image abroad. PD is critical to national security because it enables the U.S. government to achieve its goals. U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Susan Rice indicated that the Obama Administration shares this view – as well as appreciates the importance – of public diplomacy, noting it is not an “end to itself…but a means to an end.”\textsuperscript{18} Put more bluntly, former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy James

Glassman advised that PD “is a national security job, it’s not a PR job.”19 Glassman added that an ideal PD policy leader “has an orientation towards national security, not an orientation towards public relations.”20

Therefore, rather than to eliminate criticism of U.S. policies, the purpose of PD is to “mitigate objections by explaining the U.S. government’s decisions…and reminding foreign audiences of the aspects of America they still admire.”21 The application of PD, which will be explored throughout this paper, results in both short-term and long-term benefits to the United States – from simple cultural exchanges to shaping future world leaders’ perspective during a fellowship in America. As foreign publics are the target of U.S. PD, effective PD makes a compelling case for U.S. policy as just, reasonable, and mutually beneficial. Thus PD is strategic since “publics matter to governments as tools of national foreign policy.”22 PD is the core of soft power and an invaluable national asset.

“To win the peace…the U.S. will have to show as much skill in exercising soft power as it has in using hard power to win the war.”

*Financial Times* (London)23


20 Ibid.


III. Public Diplomacy in Action

As a component of foreign policy, the United States employs PD programming and activities throughout the world. PD is formulated in both Washington and at Embassies and other presences overseas. The following paragraphs will outline how PD is developed at home and abroad.

Public Diplomacy At Home

The U.S. system of governance is inherently decentralized including the formulation of foreign policy. Unlike many parliamentary systems, the Secretary of State, the U.S. equivalent of a Foreign Minister, oversees only part of the country’s foreign policy and foreign aid. The Defense Department (both the civilian leadership and geographical combatant commanders) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in particular have their own foreign aid funding streams and their own roles to play in foreign relations. Additionally, the U.S. Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Justice, as well as independent agencies such as the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the intelligence community, have programs and policy effects which resonate in the intertwined world of international politics. The U.S. Congress and, in particular, its leadership and foreign affairs committee chairs wield great power either from Washington or on congressional delegations abroad with statements and activities. Foreign leaders realize that Congress makes foreign policy “real” with its constitutional authority over Ambassadors appointments, treaty ratification (in the case of the Senate) or disbursement of public funds. The State Department manages, rather than commands, U.S. foreign policy.
In 2003, the Bush Administration attempted to centralize PD. President Bush issued Executive Order 13283, creating the Office of Global Communications (OGC) within the White House. A longtime adviser to Bush, Karen Hughes, was appointed to lead this new office. The OGC was to “coordinate strategic communications overseas that integrate the President’s themes while truthfully depicting America and Administration policies.” The OGC did not survive the change of Administration for reasons explored in Section V and today, there is still no formal, authoritative procedure for PD planning or execution. The State Department, according to former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Margaret Tutwiler, lacks a “formalized system” to integrate “public diplomacy into policy making” and instead relies on ad hoc coordination, even as the lead PD agency in government. Even the most professionally crafted message can become garbled or contradictory if another part of government makes a non-choreographed public comment. One recent example was when the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) released the 2009 Joint Operating Environment (JOE) and named Mexico alongside Pakistan as a potential “failed state” in the coming years. While JFCOM’s analysts found this assessment to be reasonable, the singling out of Mexico for the first time in a public U.S. government document caused a diplomatic stir and did not mesh with the State Department’s and other constituent parts of the U.S. government’s posture on Mexico. As Hughes noted in 2005 (two years after she was named Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy), it is a challenge for Washington to speak with “one voice”—a critique still valid today.

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Public Diplomacy in the Field

The Public Affairs Section (PAS) of a U.S. Embassy or consulate is responsible for coordinating PD in their host nation. PD professionals become experts in the local culture by virtue of their experience in the field, and “understand the nuances that are necessary” for effective PD. In the words of a veteran PD officer, “different emphases do not mean that…traditional and public diplomats cannot work together.” In fact, he adds, “at any well-run mission, the two strands interweave together all the time; attending meetings together, drafting policy papers together and organizing events together.”

The primary programs and activities of the PAS are cultural and informational programs which should be linked to Mission Strategic Plans established by the ambassador and approved by the Secretary of State. (A diagram representing a typical U.S. Embassy appears in the Appendix.) PD officers at embassies, however, must coordinate with PD managers in Washington “scattered” throughout the State Department’s various bureaus. As a GAO report noted, PD efforts at post can suffer as a result of poor coordination or linkage with specific national goals and become “an ad hoc collection of activities designed to support such broad goals as promoting mutual understanding.”

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PD facilities overseas are struggling with new challenges. In addition to programming throughout the host nation, a PAS tries to draw in visitors with PD buildings such as American Centers, American Corners and American Windows. These are usually partnerships with host nation leaders and either create or enhance existing civic facilities with literature, periodicals, and information technology provided by the U.S. government. These structures also serve as venues for PAS programming, such as visiting artists and speakers. Unfortunately, there are few standalone American Centers remaining from previous eras of PD history (more in Section IV), and today, a PAS is reliant on Information Resource Centers (IRC), which are libraries, multimedia facilities, and presentation venues of varying sizes. An IRC is often housed within an embassy, limiting access by foreigners. A State Department study found that IRCs that are on the diplomatic compound received one-sixth as many visitors as those located off-compound in the Middle East.31

Cultural diplomacy is a major part of PD work overseas. Rather than reaching out to students, professionals or military officers, cultural diplomacy initiatives bring international artistic, sports and cultural luminaries from throughout the globe together with their U.S. counterparts.32 These ventures are widely and positively received and have immediate and


lasting impacts on the United States’ image. In short, these events demonstrate to foreign audiences that “despite differences…we share a common humanity.”  

A positive trend in U.S. international outreach is found among the number of foreign students coming to the United States to complete academic study. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the number of students coming to the United States dropped sharply. Many observers worried that this trend would continue for years. Because of a major, whole of government PD effort led by the State Department, the number of foreign students coming to the United States is at a record high, with over a half-million student visas issued in 2007 alone. Educating foreign students is an important part of U.S. foreign policy and PD for several reasons. First, the students interact directly with Americans and gain an appreciation for American values and the diversity of the nation. Second, many students return to their home countries armed with a U.S. education, which puts them in good standing to make an impact with meaningful employment. Some of these students emerge years later in positions of influence in politics, economics, journalism or entertainment. Having a background of study in the U.S. helps inform the former students’ world views and builds a basis for mutual understanding over a lifetime. In sum, a robust foreign student community is an investment in future global relations and capabilities which benefit the United States and help achieve national security objectives.

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
An often overlooked, but significant, element of PD is the visa application process at embassies and consulates around the world. Each year, millions of foreign citizens apply for visas to travel to the United States. For many of these applicants it is the first and perhaps only interaction they will have with an American citizen – and in many more cases their only interaction with an official representative of the U.S. government. Whether the interview is a positive or negative experience for the applicant, therefore, is of PD importance. There is a substantial difference between a foreign citizen leaving the interview feeling like it was a rude, opaque and biased ordeal rather than a fair, transparent and respectful process.

**Soft Power & the Interagency**

Although the State Department leads the interagency PD planning process, many other agencies have a role in the process. Notably by virtue of its size and international presence, the Defense Department plays a large role in PD affairs. The Defense Department supports U.S. government PD through official travel, combined exercises and humanitarian relief operations. Additionally, information operations (IO) support military operations and public affairs with a more deliberate intent to influence decision-makers and opinion. Through these activities, the Defense Department can be even more visible than the State Department in some areas of the world, such as in places like Korea and Europe, where the United States still maintains large bases.
The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has been designated the department lead to interagency PD coordination efforts.\textsuperscript{35} Nevertheless, just as military doctrine recommends clear chains of command and unity of effort, it is important that the State Department continue to be the lead agency on U.S. PD. As former Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte told Congress, “when conditions require,” the Pentagon “will support civilian agencies.”\textsuperscript{36} PD formulation and execution meet this condition.

**Challenges**

Along with the difficulties mentioned above, there are several institutional and systemic challenges yet to overcome. The U.S. Foreign Service is small. As of July 2008, there were only 6,636 Foreign Service Officers worldwide and only a portion of them work primarily on PD. There are fewer than 58,000 Department of State employees (including civil servants in Washington and about 37,000 locally employed host nation nationals).\textsuperscript{37} By comparison, the United States employed more than 12,500 diplomats who focused exclusively on PD during the Cold War (more in Section IV).

While technological advancements have changed the nature of war and warfare, the conduct of diplomacy – both public and otherwise – remains tied to human interaction.


\textsuperscript{36} U.S. Senate. *Committee on Foreign Relations.* Testimony for Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte, July 31, 2008.

Respected journalist and former director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) Edward R. Murrow framed the ongoing challenge of PD in 1964: “the real art in this business is not so much moving information or guidance or policy five or 10,000 miles…The real art is to move it the last three feet in face-to-face conversation.” This assertion holds truer than ever today. The global information age powered by international media, broadband and satellite communications, and increasing access for the world’s population to data brings more people into the business of international politics. The most salient challenge of PD is to navigate the information infrastructure of the current paradigm and reach past competing messages to global publics – something that will require a “totally different mindset” from the past. In the 1990s, PD was dominated by the “CNN effect” of global media, but developments have turned this century into a “post-CNN” world with an “unprecedented degree of global transparency in public affairs, enabling individuals and groups to acquire information directly.”

U.S. Targeted by Soft Power

An important point to consider is that PD, like any other element of national power, can be employed against the United States. As a democracy, the U.S. electorate is the ultimate decision maker. As a result, official and unofficial foreign entities constantly seek to sway U.S. public opinion. The Canadian Ambassador to the United States talked plainly about this

employment of PD on the U.S. public. According to Ambassador Allan Gotlieb, the Canadian government views the U.S. government as “primary interlocutors” for the U.S.-Canada relationship but adds that “Canadians realize that a great deal of work has to be done ourselves.”41 Since Canada cannot rely on the U.S. government to convey Canadian policy to the American public, Ambassador Gotlieb called PD “the only possible antidote…meant to impress the constituents of legislators of the wisdom in not taking action against Canadian interests. Not because such action is nice, but because it hurts specific American interests.”42

Many other countries target the U.S. public with PD and commit significant resources to that effort. There are countless opinion pieces written by foreign officials, often heads of state themselves or representatives, published in U.S. newspapers seeking to influence American perceptions on issues where U.S. foreign policy counts. More and more countries are lobbying the U.S. Congress directly. Kuwait, Japan and Israel have all been “top spenders” in this endeavor, hiring lobbyists and public relations firms to influence U.S. government decisions.43 In 1991, for example, the Kuwaiti government-in-exile spent over $10 million lobbying U.S. legislators to “mobilize American support” for the liberation of their country from Saddam Hussein.44 Mexico’s public messaging in support of the North American Free Trade Agreement

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42 Ibid., p. 76.
43 Nicholas Cull, David Culbert, and David Welch, *Propaganda and mass persuasion: a historical encyclopedia, 1500 to the present* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), p. 327.
in the early 1990s in the U.S. has been credited by experts as effective PD, as has Pakistan’s “success story” to portray itself as a “partner in democracy” in the United States.45

These are only a few examples of PD being employed as a national policy – even from Canada, a close ally – and targeting the U.S. public. An in-depth review of PD from a strategic competitor, China, is explored in Section IV.

45 Nicholas Cull, David Culbert, and David Welch, Propaganda and mass persuasion: a historical encyclopedia, 1500 to the present (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), p. 327.
“I need to be in on the take-offs as well as the crash landings.”

Edward R. Murrow, on becoming USIA Director

IV. Illustrative Examples of Historical PD Efforts

These examples and analyses explore eras in which PD played a major role. Both effective and ineffective PD strategies and outcomes are represented here, with the goal of linking past successes and failures with recommendations in Section V. Examples from the last half-century show the evolution of U.S. PD structures and operations. Finally a deeper analysis follows of China’s rapidly developing strategy to shape its image in the United States and throughout the world.

Occupying the Axis: 1944 – 1950

Dressed in his U.S. Army uniform, a young Elvis Presley arrived in post-war Germany on a USO tour and told a reporter, “what we do here will reflect on America and our way of life.” Elvis embodied the citizen-diplomat as the face of the United States to the rest of the world and through his fame became a powerful force of public diplomacy in post-World War II soft power projection. The U.S. military and government, by contrast, struggled to find success in public diplomacy efforts in the aftermath of the war and during the occupation of Germany and Japan.

In the turmoil that saw it transition from a defeated empire at the end of the First World War, a belligerent seeking to dominate Europe in the Second World War and ultimately a defeated power rebuilt by foreign powers, Germany and its neighbors were buffeted by countervailing (and effective) PD efforts for decades. As an example, the Anschluss, or coordinated annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany in 1938, was a “spectacularly successful example of public diplomacy operating at all levels of a society and employing a mix of official, semi-official and unofficial agents to convince a people and their government” that absorption into another country was their “political destiny.”

Rebuilding the Axis powers was a tremendous undertaking that forced disparate elements of the U.S. government to coordinate efforts like never before. For the first time, the United States had to manage major political-military issues on foreign shores and lacked any systems in place to do so. One of the first breakthroughs in post-WWII administration was the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), which was formed in late 1944 to resolve political-military issues in the occupation of Axis powers. The SWNCC, a precursor to the National Security Council, was “successful because it provided a forum for the formation of interagency relationships.” It also provided a clearinghouse for soft power such as media and civil affairs in the occupied areas.

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The U.S. and Allied occupying forces recognized the need to employ soft power along with military force. Two U.S. organizations in particular demonstrated the soft power efforts: the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) and Psychological War Division (PWD).\textsuperscript{51} Even though a military government would be in place in Germany for years, the CAD enabled civilians, from the State Department, to oversee civil affairs.\textsuperscript{52} The PWD was an early U.S. attempt at PD in post-war Germany by publishing newspapers and running radio stations, efforts which proved feeble.\textsuperscript{53} U.S.-sponsored media was “dour and grim” in comparison to the practiced Soviet propagandists running the Russian-language Radio Berlin.\textsuperscript{54} Still, the CAD and PWD illustrated the primordial origins of U.S. PD efforts and demonstrated even then the important distinctions between soft PD (by the CAD) and the military oriented operations by the PWD. This distinction remains between the State and Defense Departments’ respective mandates in global influence operations.

The U.S. military occupation of Japan presented similar challenges to those faced in Germany, but with some key differences in situation. Most notably, the United States was the sole occupier of an undivided country without a hostile force on its border. The return of Okinawa from U.S. military occupation back to Japanese sovereignty presents useful insights into the U.S. applications of soft power and PD.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 17.  
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 281.  
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 281.
The United States and Japan agreed on a “reversion plan” to transfer Okinawa back to Japanese control. In that process, “public opinion…was the chief actor” leading to an ultimately peaceful transition.\textsuperscript{55} The United States employed PD, especially cultural diplomacy, alongside economic aid for the same purpose: to improve the acceptance of U.S. assistance in post-war Japan and also to speed the integration of U.S. holdings such as Okinawa back into the Japanese economy and society.\textsuperscript{56} Specifically in Okinawa, a PD effort was to complement media outreach efforts with cultural affairs programming at public sites such as libraries and training centers. In a characteristic true to modern PD efforts, some officials involved personally in PD in Okinawa noted that outreach was mostly driven by short-term goals or “fire-fighting” rather than implementing longer-term plans.\textsuperscript{57} U.S. PD in post-war Japan was hindered by some of the same limitations the United States faces today: the disruption caused by short (two-year) rotations of key staff, the need for more civilian and military officials with adequate language skills, and the need for better cross-cultural understanding.\textsuperscript{58} Hampered as such, in the words of an Okinawan journalist, the U.S. PD effort was “at best very poor.”\textsuperscript{59}

In both Germany and Japan, the U.S. government struggled to find its footing in the application of soft power and PD. Coordination cells such as the SWNCC and CAD were born out of necessity and led to institutional and systemic improvements. Though not optimally

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 70.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 71.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
effective, PD played an important role in the post-WWII era by all accounts. Resistance to Allied occupation eventually “subsided after the benefits of freedom and the effects of public diplomacy hit home.”

**The Cold War: 1945 – 1991**

With the end of WWII, the United States and USSR immediately plunged into an ideological struggle rooted in deep mutual distrust. In the early days of the Cold War, United States policy towards the Soviet Union was predicated on fear of the spread of Communist ideology to the West. In fact, in 1947, the U.S Ambassador in Moscow wrote that Russia had “declared a psychological war on the United States...a war of ideology and a fight unto the death.” The Soviet leadership held equal enmity, perceiving the U.S.-led rebuilding efforts in Western Europe as an overly aggressive extension of American influence. Moscow responded to the Marshall Plan with propaganda with the aim of “blotting out” public awareness that the United States was responsible for the flood of foreign aid into post-WWII Europe. The United States’ first major war of ideas and soft power was underway. The lessons of WWII mentioned above were not lost on the United States. As noted by former Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte to Congress, “in any conflict or post-conflict time, our civilian and military agencies have worked together to address unique needs.”

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62 Ibid.
It was during this new struggle that the United States established – out of necessity – an official entity to conduct PD: the United States Information Agency (USIA). It was created in August 1953 with the purpose “to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in promotion of the national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and U.S. institutions and their counterparts abroad.”64 The Voice of America, the U.S. government’s official radio (and later television) station, was created during WWII as part of the Office of War Information and merged with the new USIA.65

The USIA’s star was ascendant for several decades as the U.S. and USSR fought their pitched war of ideas. Its resources and manpower reflected the importance of this struggle and the desire for the U.S. government – particularly through Congressional funding – to prevail. In 1967, USIA personnel peaked with about 12,500 American and foreign national employees around the world (and notably in large numbers throughout the Vietnam War).66 Demonstrating the importance legislators attached to PD, a 1977 Congressional transcript shows that the GAO reported that both PD and cultural outreach programs “serve the national interest…and support our foreign policy objectives.”67

65 Ibid.
The USIA’s founding was based on the Smith-Mundt Act of 1958 which effectively marked the beginning of official, government-sponsored PD in the United States. Smith-Mundt, which passed with bipartisan support and was signed by President Truman, empowered parts of the U.S. government to conduct PD and also legally barred U.S. government-funded media from domestic distribution, a prohibition that exists today. Ironically, much of the impetus behind Smith-Mundt’s restrictions was due to Congress and the FBI being suspicious of the loyalties of the State Department (and later the USIA) during an era ridden with paranoia about Communism.

The ideological battle went beyond news and information. The United States used “artistic and intellectual freedom as a weapon against Communism” in both the Eastern and Western blocs. Through the USIA, the U.S. government funded large-scale media and entertainment products to “export American culture and the American way of life” as a defense against Soviet “campaigns…to discredit the United States.” The USIA essentially subsidized publications, films, art, and other media as a matter of national security, since these products “would not have been circulated based on commercial demand.”

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72 Nicholas Cull, David Culbert, and David Welch, Propaganda and mass persuasion: a historical encyclopedia, 1500 to the present (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), p. 101.

73 Ibid., p. 414.
These efforts clearly succeeded in many cases. The United States became adept at PD, building an “arsenal of persuasion” which included the USIA, Radio Free Europe, Voice of America and other efforts.⁷⁴ In 2004, the Hungarian Ambassador to the United States provided some insights into this era during a briefing in Washington called, “How Rock and Roll Helped Lift the Iron Curtain,” crediting in part the influence of American music in countering Soviet authority in Eastern Europe.⁷⁵ The Ambassador showed that PD can have unintended effects as well: even Marvin Gay’s ballad “What’s Going On” was seen as a “protest song” due to lyrics like “escalation is not the answer.”⁷⁶

The Fulbright Program, one of the most significant and effective PD programs in U.S. history, emerged from the early days of the Cold War. In 1946, Congress passed legislation put forth by Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright to sponsor foreign students, scholars and teachers to come to the United States, and for their American counterparts to go abroad.⁷⁷ Today, the Fulbright program awards over 7,000 annual grants and boasts over 286,500 alumni from 155 countries.⁷⁸ It is a “permanent part of U.S. relations with the rest of the world.”⁷⁹

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⁷⁶ Ibid.
⁷⁸ Ibid.
Applying some of the key lessons from WWII, occupation of the Axis powers and the resultant early struggles with the USSR, the United States triumphed in the Cold War. While soft power and PD alone would not have allowed the United States to prevail, the skillful balance between hard and soft power was critical to success. It is important to note that PD during the Cold War was clearly a major national priority with concomitant funding, personnel and bureaucratic clout. The USIA was the incarnation of the U.S. government’s commitment to winning the ideological war.


The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the central impetus for U.S. PD as a national priority. From both inside and outside government, budget analysts saw easy prey in PD programming for cutting resources. In 1994, the Cato Institute wrote in their *Handbook for Congress* that PD was “largely irrelevant” in the post-Cold War framework.\(^\text{80}\) USIA funding and personnel reflected the U.S. government’s waning interest in PD. After a historic peak in the late 1960s, the number of USIA personnel plummeted by 60% to approximately 2,800 officers and foreign nationals worldwide in 1999. That year, on October 1, the USIA ceased to exist and its employees and mandate were transferred to the Department of State.\(^\text{81}\)

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Starting in the early 1990s, the United States dismantled its “ arsenal” of influence in what Under Secretary Glassman called “unilateral disarmament in the weapons of advocacy.”82 The flagships of PD outreach, the previously USIA-run American Centers, shut down around the world and both figuratively and literally ceded space to other first world nations’ cultural outposts. France’s Alliance Française, Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, Germany’s Goethe-Institut, and the United Kingdom’s British Council replaced U.S. American Centers in capitals and cities around the world.83 This competition was not limited to national governments. Even the European Union (EU) has developed a comprehensive communications strategy in search of a unified “European message” to bolster its soft power projection.84

In recent years, Iran has joined the ranks of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in deploying about 60 cultural centers in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe.85 In addition to educational programs teaching Farsi and providing library resources, these centers serve as a natural platform from which to launch Iranian anti-American propaganda.86

PD outreach abroad suffered another major setback in 1998, this time at the hands of terrorism. After the Al-Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, new regulations

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86 Ibid.
on U.S. facilities required more security – and by extension less accessibility – in the face of heightened threat. As a result, more embassies, consulates, and the few remaining cultural centers were either moved far away from city centers or became surrounded by walls, barbed wire and armed guards and consequently are less welcoming to visitors.87

Beset by budget cuts, erosion of national attention and restrictions due to security threats, U.S. PD withered during the two decades following the end of the Cold War. These factors directly contributed to the United States’ lack of readiness to compete in the next ideological struggle already underway.

The New Ideological War

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 categorically thrust the United States into the current struggle against militant extremism. The new challenge for the United States was to balance the necessity of military power, often unpopular in Europe and the Middle East, with the necessary PD to explain U.S. policy and build a common cause. Due in large part to the new threat and need for international coalitions, Under Secretary Hughes said that PD was back and “a high priority at the highest levels of government.”88 Still reflecting the ongoing global PD priorities of the U.S. government, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad currently has the highest number of PD officers of any post worldwide.89 New PD strategies shifted resources from

87 Ibid.
cultural programs towards a “non-military way for the U.S. to combat violent extremism” which meshed well with the Defense Department’s counterterrorism efforts.90

Just as the United States and USSR had fought an ideological war over their respective spheres of influence, now the United States engaged with extremist groups such as Al Qaeda.91 One of the early responses by the U.S. government to the new threat was to replicate the Cold War model that created the Voice of America. The Administration, with Congressional backing, established Radio Sawa and the Al-Hurra television channel to reach Arab audiences and Radio Farda for Farsi speakers in Iran and Afghanistan.92 (These stations are overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, an independent agency previously a part of USIA.)

Interagency coordination of PD, which had been a challenge ever since the days of the SWNCC, was again a source of friction. While PD had historically been the sole purview of civilian agencies like the State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors, the Defense Department increased its direct communication to foreign populations through media as the wars progressed in Afghanistan and Iraq. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Defense Department established a television station and newspaper to disseminate American views to the Iraqi people.93 In 2005, U.S. media revealed that the Pentagon had hired a contractor to pay Iraqi

news editors to publish “positive stories about the U.S. occupation.”94 This was decidedly detrimental to the United States’ PD objectives and should not be repeated. Veteran diplomat Bill Rugh is correct that “primary responsibility for public diplomacy media operations should be restored to the State Department.”95 The Pentagon should return to its traditional role of “wartime psyops and information for American audiences.”96

It is becoming increasingly clear that PD is as effective and relevant as military operations in the struggle against violent extremism and militant ideologies like Al Qaeda’s. The “core task” in the new war, Glassman said, was to discredit the vision and violent methods of the extremists.97 The role of PD was to offer “an alternative vision” to that of the enemy.98 As Glassman described, “the threats that America faces today and the goals that we want to achieve are profoundly dependent on influencing foreign publics – not with arms…but with the softer power of ideas.”99 Glassman outlined the general objective in the struggle against extremists: “Our desired end state: a world in which the use of violence to achieve political, religious or social objectives is no longer considered acceptable. Efforts to radicalize and recruit new members are no longer successful, and the perpetrators of violent extremism are condemned and isolated.”100 Because of its capacity to reach foreign publics and reach past gatekeepers such as

94 Ibid., p. 6.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p. 9.
100 Ibid.
violent extremist groups and political or religious leaders, PD is a critical and potentially
determinant factor in the current ideological struggle.

The view that soft power and PD are needed in greater quantities, even in war zones, is
gaining support. Returning from a tour in Iraq, U.S. Army Lieutenant General James Dubik said,
“the war we are fighting is not only a military problem. It’s not even primarily a military
problem – military action alone is insufficient and must be subordinate to diplomatic, political
and economic action.”

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, wrote “if we are truly to cut oxygen from the fire of violent extremism, we must leverage every single aspect of national power – hard and soft.”

Country Focus: China’s Public Diplomacy

China has developed a national strategy for PD which includes employment on U.S. and other key global audiences. China is particularly interesting because of its historical concern with foreign perception and its broad, dynamic relationship with the United States. In 2003, the Chinese Minister for State Council Information Zhao Qizheng attacked “Western media” for “damaging” coverage of China and accused them of “stressing the negatives in China without pointing out recent positive developments.” Certainly, the photos and footage from the

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104 Ibid., p. 91.
Chinese military’s crackdown on student protestors in Tiananmen Square in 1989 left a lasting, largely negative, image of China throughout the world.\textsuperscript{105}

Chinese leaders have decided to shape and improve their country’s global image. The Chinese leadership wants to depict China as “a trustworthy, cooperative, peace-loving, developing country that takes good care of its enormous population.”\textsuperscript{106} Certainly, a national objective for hosting successful Olympic Games in 2008 was to convey an image of a beneficent China to Asian neighbors and the world.\textsuperscript{107}

China is expanding PD efforts into global media. In another sign of active PD efforts directed towards foreign audiences, China launched in September 2000 a global, English-language version of its state-run television called CCTV-9.\textsuperscript{108} The channel claims to reach over 45 million viewers worldwide and is available via cable or satellite in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{109} China disseminates state-produced programming on China Radio International (a radio station similar to Voice of America), an English-language version of Xinhua News Agency. In addition, the Beijing government funds a myriad of high-quality websites and even free booklets, in English, explaining Chinese culture and society, available in


\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 88.


\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
cultural centers around the world. These complex and resource-demanding initiatives represent a pillar of China’s PD drive to influence foreign publics on Beijing’s terms.

Chinese leaders realize that their country’s controversial record on human rights is the largest vulnerability to the image they wish to portray – especially in the United States. China sees a useful PD target in the more than 2.5 million Chinese living in the United States. China vividly demonstrated PD within the United States during the ostensibly spontaneous but clearly coordinated events surrounding the Olympic torch procession through San Francisco. On April 9, 2008, the torch relay progressed through the city and was, as expected, targeted by demonstrators protesting the Chinese government over Tibet. Less anticipated was a large number of Chinese participants who arrived in about 50 busses from throughout California, “many of them paid to come out for the day in support of Beijing.” Chinese businesses and organizations were also involved, providing food and water for pro-China demonstrators and banners of Chinese universities and student unions were visible in the crowd. Unlike the pro-Tibet demonstrators, who sought to disrupt the torch route, pro-China groups were “self-policing” and appeared “more controlled, more peaceful and less confrontational;” all apparently

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113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
part of China’s “broader PR strategy.” Similar organized pro-China demonstrations took place shortly thereafter during the Dalai Lama’s April 14 visit to Seattle.

Beijing views overseas Chinese as a useful Chinese culture promoting group as well as a lobbying effort for political interests. In order to combat negative perceptions tied to human rights, the Chinese Ambassador to Washington toured the United States in 2001 offering a “National Conversation” with him. The Chinese government leveraged its strong business and industrial concerns in the United States, as the tour was sponsored in part by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Finally, addressing the human rights issues, but on Chinese terms, the government of China built a “Splendid China” pavilion in the United States which included references to the “great value” of Tibetan and Uyghur cultures within China. China has recognized the value of PD and is adapting its foreign policy to maximize its benefit. Events such as the Olympic Torch relay in San Francisco and their ambassador’s listening tour demonstrate that the Chinese government can and will “organize and deploy its overseas population” as part of “centralized and coordinated” PD activities.

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115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
118 Ibid., p. 98.
“America does have to be committed to values and to making life better for people around the world. It’s not just the sword; it’s the olive branch that speaks to those intentions.”

- Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

V. Recommendations

The U.S. government has not yet taken the necessary steps to revitalize soft power and PD as an instrument of national power. The following recommendations draw from lessons learned throughout historical eras of PD strategy and initiatives.

Improve Training

A German report concluded that “the most critical function of the diplomat…is that of public diplomacy.”¹²¹ PD professionals need “sustenance and recognition – more staff, more training in tradecraft, foreign area studies and language proficiency, better career tracks, and more involvement in public diplomacy activities from the entire foreign affairs community.”¹²² The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ “Embassy of the Future” commission recommended “building a bigger and better-trained State Department” which can leverage new technology to improve “diplomatic reach.”¹²³ Reviews by the GAO and other groups have noted the shortfall in number of U.S. diplomats and military officers with language fluencies – particularly in Arabic and Chinese.¹²⁴ The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) in Arlington, Virginia,

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trains most FSOs in language before deployment. FSI should be expanded to teach more personnel for longer, and set higher goals for the number of FSOs who will be language-proficient in postings abroad. As stated in Section III, the visa process is another excellent opportunity – or dangerous pitfall – for PD efforts. Consular officers should receive specialized PD training beyond normal visa interview training to instill the importance of soft power at the visa counter. Consular officers should be assessed by superiors specifically on their comportment while interviewing foreign nationals.

PD training efforts should be extended further in harnessing new technologies. In the YouTube era of instant and user-driven media, official PD from the United States is naturally at risk of being overwhelmed by the onslaught of competing, or at least distracting, messages. The global information age does make PD harder, but it also makes it and other elements of soft power more critical to achieve national objectives.\textsuperscript{125} To be effective, today’s practitioners of PD must acknowledge that the information age brought with it the end of national governments’ “monopoly on the processing and diffusion of information.”\textsuperscript{126}

It is clear that terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda have used information technology to great effect for spreading ideology, impacting foreign publics through fear, and recruiting members for their ranks. The U.S. government needs a corps of representatives matched to this

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task. FSI already includes courses for PD and non-PD diplomats on the capabilities and potential of new information technology, but training should go further. Diplomats should be able to tour and even serve short assignments with media and news organizations built on new media such as cutting-edge IT companies specializing in web design, streaming media, graphic arts and programming. This kind of capacity would help mitigate some of the limitations of current security threats which result in U.S. PD officials worldwide being “penned in by Embassy walls” due to security concerns.127 PD training for the 21st century would produce diplomats better able to confront competing ideologies and propaganda at home and in the field.

Evolve Career Tracks

State and Defense Department officials share the burden of executing successful public diplomacy. To that end, the appropriate officers should have more opportunities to serve in each others’ organizations for several key reasons. First, no training can equal first-hand experience working in another organization or culture. Second, personnel will return to their home agencies with a better appreciation for how to coordinate activities as well as having equity in the other organizations’ success.

While some PD advocacy groups have argued for reserving PD assignments for PD officers, it is more advantageous for the United States for diplomats to cycle through PD tours, even if it is outside their career track.128 PD is a specialty, but it is also critical in all diplomatic

postings, regardless of actual tasks. It is therefore important and beneficial for the diplomatic corps and the U.S. government to have many officers exposed to PD work rather than a smaller number of PD specialists.

The recruitment element is already underway. The State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) plans to expand a civilian corps which includes professionals inside and outside government who can serve as subject-matter experts in non-military fields. S/CRS will require months (perhaps years) to be an effective institution. Former Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte told Congress that expanding State and USAID will subsequently “increase our foreign language, diplomatic, and border security capabilities; augment our public diplomacy, cultural affairs capacity, and POLAD program; increase USAID’s presence overseas and development contributions; and implement the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, including the Civilian Response Corps, to provide additional civilian expertise for rapid crisis response.”

The civilian initiative will ensure a “proper balance among our nation’s diplomatic, development, and defense capabilities.”

President Obama has indicated his support for a continuation of this policy and has announced his intention to deploy a boost in civilian experts to Afghanistan. The civilian surge in Afghanistan is a good, ad hoc start to improving PD activities. The Obama Administration


130 Ibid.
has extended a plan formulated by the Bush Administration to enact a civilian “surge” in Afghanistan in 2009 through a “steep increase in civilian experts” to combat the insurgents.\(^{131}\) A direct result of these experts’ deployment would be an improvement in PD efforts by demonstrating civilian-led rebuilding efforts alongside the military’s stabilization operations. The President’s Principals Committee has approved a plan to send “several hundred civilians from various U.S. government agencies – from agronomists to economists and legal experts – …to Afghanistan to reinforce the nonmilitary component in Kabul and the existing provincial reconstruction teams in the countryside.”\(^{132}\) As British Defense Minister John Hutton noted, “the campaign in Afghanistan is not going to be won by military means alone.”\(^{133}\) In sum, the experiment which charged the U.S. military with a supermajority of post-conflict soft power and PD efforts has fallen short of mission objectives. Instead it has confirmed that there is “no replacement for the real thing – civilian involvement and expertise.”\(^{134}\)

**Engage the Marketplace**

The U.S. government PD messaging, or public advocacy for national interests, should harness shared interests with the private sector. The GAO suggested that State develop a strategic plan to engage the private sector.\(^ {135}\) Historically, the United States and U.S. businesses

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\(^{132}\) Ibid.

\(^{133}\) Ibid.


have been able to distance themselves from each others’ policies due to the decentralized U.S. economic system. This does not mean, though, that U.S. business interests are entirely divorced from U.S. government policy. At times, both the U.S. government and U.S. businesses find common cause – it is in these situations that PD officials should look for opportunities to amplify messages alongside voices from within the private sector. A good example of common interest followed the global anti-American sentiment triggered by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Various businesses, fearing such sentiment would affect negatively affect their operations, formed a non-profit organization called the Business for Diplomatic Action (BDA).\(^\text{136}\) The stated purpose of BDA is to “enlist the U.S. business community in actions to improve the standing and reputation of America in the world.”\(^\text{137}\) This private sector advocacy group is a natural, though informal, ally in U.S. government PD efforts.

A useful medium to integrate the strengths of the private sector with the needs of PD efforts by the U.S. government would be the proposed “Corporation for Public Diplomacy (CPD),” a model similar to the 1967 Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB).\(^\text{138}\) The CPB, which is tax-exempt, receives substantial private donations, and has seeded support for acclaimed programming such as *Sesame Street* and *American Playhouse*. Similarly, the CPD could “leverage” private media, entertainment and others.\(^\text{139}\) One of the biggest inherent

\(^\text{139}\) Ibid.
limitations of U.S. PD initiatives is the perception by foreign audiences that any news or
information disseminated from Washington is propaganda – an autonomous CPD would allow
genuine “public-private messages” to reach globally and even support “indigenous”
programming in countries worldwide.\textsuperscript{140} There clearly already exists a solid basis for private
sector support for U.S. PD outreach efforts; in 2007 alone the State Department raised over $800
million for philanthropy in support of PD programs. “Private sector summits” have been hosted
by the U.S. government to explore methods in which the private and public sectors can work
together on mutual PD goals.\textsuperscript{141}

PD professionals should be afforded furloughs from official duty to serve in private
sector fields relevant to PD work, such as marketing, journalism or the entertainment industry. A
2004 study by the RAND Corporation on PD warned “it should not be assumed…that skills,
techniques, and tactics that have been effective in marketing private goods will be…effective in
promoting public goods.”\textsuperscript{142} However, the same study noted that “concentrations of creative
people and innovative ideas” do exist outside the government, which should “solicit ideas from
the private sector.”\textsuperscript{143} Former Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke in the language of Madison
Avenue when he said that the United States’ core mission in the Middle East is “selling a
product…that product we are selling is democracy.”\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} Karen Hughes, “Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination.” (speech, Department
\textsuperscript{142} Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen, “Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It.” The RAND
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Peter Van Ham, \textit{The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations}, ed. Jan Melissan, (New York:
Proven, effective tools used in the private sector could be adopted by PD planners to solve current challenges. Regional idiosyncrasies often frustrate PD efforts as one message does not fit all in the global environment and “monolithic methodology fails to account for specific regional, cultural and ethnic nuances.” Targeting messages to specific regions would be the natural equivalent of “narrowcasting” or “niche marketing” from the advertising world.

**Adapt Organizations**

As former Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte told Congress, the U.S. is “safer and stronger when our lead national security agencies are united in purpose.” This certainly applies to PD policy coordination, formulation and execution. The challenge of interagency coordination on PD issues was a common theme in the case studies and in other historical eras. The GAO rightly reported in 2007 that the U.S. government lacked a cohesive interagency PD strategy, despite the efforts of the Office of Global Communications. Successful PD will require active White House oversight to survive the interagency process. As mentioned earlier, the government needs to mobilize more personnel - particularly civilians – to win the PD front. But it must also coordinate civilians and military personnel among agency chains of

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146 Ibid.


command. This section will focus on possible models of interagency coordination already in place which could be applied to U.S. government PD crafting and deployment.

PD advocacy groups have called for the creation of a new agency or office to coordinate the PD elements of interagency policy formulation. One group suggested the U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy, which would report to the President through the Secretary of State. This is essentially a return to the USIA and unlikely to be realized due to bureaucratic opposition and prohibitive cost. In the meantime, the creation of the Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC), a State-led interagency group that includes Defense and intelligence community representatives, was an important step towards fixing the ad hoc nature of PD planning and execution. The GSEC serves as a “clearinghouse for war of ideas programs” and allows agencies and departments outside of State to offer input to the PD formulation. More work is needed, however, and the Administration should, as Under Secretary Hughes suggested to President Bush, “develop strategies and establish interagency agreements to better coordinate” PD programs.

There are several useful models of interagency coordination worth consideration: U.S Embassy Country Teams, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) which supports

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U.S. Combatant Commanders, and the recently established U.S. African Command (AFRICOM). Commanders’ Civil-Military Operation Centers (CMOC), now a part of joint doctrine, represent the natural evolution of adapting this successful model to an operating environment.

Embassy Country Teams, which are headed by the U.S. Ambassador, represent an effective interagency model which has functioned well for decades. The Ambassador (or Chief of Mission) remains “the central organizing principle for U.S. engagement overseas, across all regional combatant command” and State “retains lead responsibility” for U.S. foreign policy. Because the Ambassador is accredited to the host government as a plenipotentiary of the President, he or she effectively oversees and directs all U.S. government activities within the host nation. Country Teams are comprised of the senior U.S. government official from each Embassy section (see Appendix) including all interagency representation. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen noted the “critical value” of an Ambassador and Country Team as it is “a team that is inclusive of so many of our Federal agencies.” Importantly, the Country Team model functions almost simultaneously at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and also “supports joint operation planning.” This model could be applied to PD coordination with the appointment of a federal steward of U.S. PD or a “PD Czar” with a team, based on a

Country Team, of relevant agency representatives which could oversee and enact PD efforts and policies.

As mentioned in Section III, the Office of Global Communication was an attempt to consolidate PD coordination in one executive office. However, E.O. 13283, which created the OGC, conferred responsibility without authority. The OGC, according to the Order, was to advise the President and interagency leaders on “consistency in messages…to promote the interests of the United States abroad.” The Order, however, left “existing authorities” of all agencies unaffected, meaning Karen Hughes’ new position had neither authority on PD messaging nor the ability to compel any part of the Administration to act.\footnote{Executive Order no. 13283, “Establishing the Office of Global Communications,” Code of Federal Regulations, title 3 (January 21, 2003).} As a result, the OGC had minimal impact until it disappeared altogether with the change in Administration. The State Department remains the U.S. government’s lead PD agency, a role it has held since the USIA’s disbandment in 1999. Any new effort by the Administration to coordinate PD activities in a single office must take into account the impediments which confronted the OGC and led to its eventual irrelevance.

Another potential model that has shown success is the JIACG supporting a combatant commander. JIACGs are increasingly important to interagency coordination on a growing number of issues as commanders’ “original mission of warfighting has been expanded over recent years”\footnote{Edward Marks, “AFRICOM: Problems and Possible Remedies.” AmericanDiplomacy.org, January 3, 2008 \url{http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0103/comm/marksl_africom.html} (accessed March 9, 2009).} to include initiatives which incorporate PD and soft power such as humanitarian
relief operations, community relations projects or military exchanges. JIACGs are interagency staffs that “establish regular, timely and collaborative working relationships between U.S. government civilian and military operational planners.” JIACGs serve as advisory bodies for Combatant Commanders and consist of interagency representatives from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, the intelligence community and others as required. Because of their makeup, and like an Embassy Country Team, they provide both information sharing across the interagency community and institutional links to participating agencies. JIACGs especially help the commander, and by extension the interagency and U.S. government, in achieving strategic communications and PD goals by “supporting communication planning and actions…while supporting intended effects in all situations.”

The model extends beyond combatant commanders as even Joint Force Commanders (JFC) have public affairs officers (PAO) to “coordinate with civil affairs, information operations, Embassy public affairs officers, the intelligence community” and other domestic and international organizations to “deconflict communication strategies.” Similarly, a Joint Task Force’s (JTF) CMOC, as described in U.S. military joint doctrine, brings together “all organizations essential to mission accomplishment” under the JTF commander. According to doctrine, a CMOC influences soft power and PD operations as it provides “interface with State Department public affairs officers, USAID and the Country Team.” Of course, a JFC and

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160 Ibid., p. 36.
161 Ibid., p. 90.
162 Ibid., p. 98.
CMOC presence is usually limited to areas of military operations. However, the model and its demonstrated effectiveness show that PD and other soft power elements can be coordinated with the right mix of interagency participation and shared objectives. Rather than recreate bureaucracy, several JIACG-type staffs built around State Department regional Assistant Secretaries and empowered to craft region-specific messages would vastly improve the current, ad hoc method of interagency PD coordination.¹⁶³

Finally, the new U.S Africa Command (AFRICOM) structure is worth considering as a model of interagency coordination on PD. AFRICOM was formed with a founding principle of integrating civilian representatives such as diplomats into the U.S. military’s organizational hierarchy to enhance the command’s ability to shape the African security landscape. The Defense Department gave AFRICOM senior leadership positions to State as part of the expansion of State-Defense cooperation.¹⁶⁴ AFRICOM’s transition team said that its primary mission will be to “prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming conflicts” even though such tasks have historically been the job of civilian departments.¹⁶⁵ State-Defense cooperation now includes collaboration on strategic plans. Former Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte noted that “State now participates in many of [the Defense Department’s] most important defense policy and strategy initiatives, including the Quadrennial Defense Review and

the development of AFRICOM and [U.S. Southern Command] Theater Campaign Plans.”

The AFRICOM structure, therefore, is a senior-level version of the Country Team and JIACG models applied to a sprawling continent replete with cross-cutting interagency issues.

The AFRICOM model is still under evaluation, and there are some indications that improvements – especially relating to soft power and PD – are required. A GAO report noted that AFRICOM’s strategic communication program still needs improvement and emphasized the need for better State-Defense cooperation towards this aim. According to the report, both Defense and State “developed two separate documents to guide U.S. government communication on the establishment of AFRICOM, but neither document addressed the widely varying interests among U.S. government, nongovernmental, and African stakeholders.” The report added that “without interagency collaboration and synchronized effort with its U.S. government partners, AFRICOM may not be able to achieve the level of effectiveness it expects from its plans and activities.”

Ambassador Edward Marks went further, assessing that through AFRICOM the U.S. military has gone too far outside its mandate and that it should “modify its currently ambitious ‘soft power’ mission.”

“the relationship between AFRICOM and Chiefs of Mission should be formally defined to ensure that AFRICOM personnel deployed in connection with security assistance, “soft power,” and other assistance programs are deployed as elements of the relevant Country Team under

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168 Ibid.

the overall authority of the Chief of Mission, and that these activities are fully integrated into the relevant Mission Performance Plans at the planning stage. This may require amendment of the current Chief of Mission authority.”

Despite these critiques, AFRICOM represents an evolution in U.S. military and government-wide approaches to regional issues in which PD is a major factor.

No matter how PD institutional change occurs, it is now irrefutable that interagency coordination is necessary for successful and effective PD. U.S. government agencies, especially State and Defense, are increasingly organized to work closer together where possible on public messaging. As former Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte testified, the Secretaries of Defense and State should “ultimately hold ‘dual key’ authority” allowing both principals to vet efforts so that they meet Defense Department needs and foreign policy objectives.

**Increase Funding**

Congress should appropriate more funds for PD. Federal spending on PD has “remained at levels well below the USIA budgets at the start of the 1990s” and at just under $1.5 billion in 2008 is equivalent to France or Britain’s PD expenditures. The Pentagon’s control over foreign assistance funds, by contrast, expanded radically in the last years. Defense now disburses “more than 20 percent of U.S. official development assistance – up from 6 percent only five years ago.”

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170 Ibid.
commanders have “extensive budgets as compared to American ambassadors” including personal aircraft and extensive staffs numbering in the hundreds. The problem goes beyond simply a lack of funding for State operations; it reinforces the perspective overseas that the U.S. military controls U.S. foreign policy or at least represents the United States abroad on equal status to political leaders. The funding gap is adversely impacting PD operations and accelerating the disappearance of PD-focused diplomats around the world. In 2007, the GAO reported that close to 22% of State’s PD jobs worldwide remain unfilled due to staff shortages. The senior U.S. military officer, Admiral Mullen, has advocated that the State Department, USAID and other partners “should have the resources they need” to lead all key elements foreign policy, including PD.

There are several important programs that need more resourcing immediately. Specifically, Congress should increase support for exchanges of military personnel through International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs and civilians through programs such as the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) or Fulbright scholarships. In 2006, only $238.4 million was spent worldwide on academic exchanges, or about the cost of three V-22 Osprey aircraft. The Fulbright program, “America’s flagship” PD program according to

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174 Ibid.
Under Secretary Hughes, is at a record high but still only involves 4,000 individuals each year (1,300 Americans who go abroad and 2,700 foreign students come to the U.S.). As a time-tested program with an impeccable track record, Congress should significantly ramp up funding for Fulbright scholarships. The IVLP alone has included over 200 foreign heads of state (current and former) – a unique, powerful and long-term benefit for the United States born out of a modestly funded program that merits expansion. Exchanges like these increase mutual understanding and important contacts with the best and brightest, and in many cases future leaders, of countries around the world.

The Administration can easily harness experts in PD within the worlds of academia, entertainment, journalism and other fields to serve as an “expeditionary reserve corps.” The Council on Foreign Relations suggestion of a formal agency with structure similar to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s disaster relief model is worth further study. PD experts from academia, the private sector, and alumni of exchange programs provide a natural foundation for this agency, which could be drawn upon for coordinated global or regional programming in line with U.S. policy goals.

Another focus for additional resources is cultural centers around the world. There have been some efforts to rebuild the formidable network of American Centers, but due to lack of funding and restrictive security limitations, the paucity of U.S. cultural centers is noticeable

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while countries like France, the United Kingdom – and Iran – deploy more of their own. Our Cold War approach of cultural diplomacy, as described in Section IV, disappeared along with its funding when PD funding was cut and the USIA disbanded entirely. The United States should, as voiced by former chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Richard Lugar, “reinvigorate the old American Centers concept…putting new ones that are safe but accessible in downtown areas, support active cultural programming, and resume teaching of English.”

American Centers do not need to return to many of the areas in which they were closed after the Cold War. As a veteran PD officer noted, “we do not need clusters of cultural centers in Germany.” First world technologies of broadband information networks duplicate many of the benefits provided by a brick-and-mortar American Center. However, some cities in the developing world lend themselves to benefit from the American Centers model, such as in undeveloped but strategically important regions of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

A reasonable answer comes from the American Academy of Diplomacy, a widely-respected board of about 200 former senior diplomats. In October 2008, the Academy published “A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future” and called for major increases in PD resources for the State Department. Specifically, the Academy recommended doubling of academic exchanges,

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183 Ibid.
building 40 new American Centers, and appropriating an additional $610 million for PD through 2014. These are realistic and attainable steps towards improving U.S. PD capabilities.

Assess Impact

Edward R. Murrow illustrated the difficulty of assessing the impact of PD well: “No cash register rings when someone changes his mind.” Neither the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication nor E.O. 13283 made significant mention of ongoing assessment to measure the effectiveness of U.S. PD efforts. The U.S. government would benefit greatly from a regular report conducted by a designate of the Secretary of State to assess national PD requirements and capabilities. One option would be to adopt the Council on Foreign Relations’ 2002 suggestion to require a “Quadrennial Diplomacy Review,” modeled on the Defense Department’s “Quadrennial Defense Review” but even a brief, regular report would pay dividends.

Another approach, proposed by former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, would assess the impact of U.S. PD strategy in individual countries through a weekly report by an independent public affairs firm on how U.S. messages are received. This would begin to solve one of the biggest gaps in PD work – determining which programs work. These assessments are feasible

with regular country-specific opinion polls already in place. The University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy maintains a list of some of the many opinion polls, the breadth of which show that this kind of formal assessment process would not need to be a cold start.188

VI. Conclusion

After more than sixty years, the United States remains a superpower because of its ability to influence global events and trends. Many view U.S. power as mostly or singularly borne out of the country’s unmatched military capability, and that certainly is a major factor in the United States’ superpower status. There is no question that the use or threat of military force – the hardest among forms of hard power, has been highly visible over the last eight years of war in Afghanistan, and later, Iraq. There is equally no question that the United States must maintain this military capability to maintain its position as a superpower and its ability to promote American values – democracy, human rights and free markets – throughout the world.

However, both hard power and soft power are necessary for the United States to achieve its national security objectives and foreign policy goals. Both elements of power are forms of influence, specifically the ability of the United States to compel desired actions or ways of thinking from foreign decision makers. As this paper has argued, the use of soft power, and PD in particular, is as relevant and critical to U.S. national security as military capacity. To prevail against current threats to U.S. security such as militant extremism, the United States must be able to leverage information, perception and cultural outreach to maximum effect. As Admiral Mullen wrote, our “nation’s greatest strength at home and abroad, is not the arms we bear, but the example we set, the values we share.”189 PD is integral to this endeavor, and functions as a

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force multiplier when deployed judiciously alongside traditional diplomacy and national power. No other form of influence is as effective in reaching past institutional or political impediments to make the case for American policy goals as PD. No element of national power is better suited to the United States, a country with an identity based not on territory or tribe, but on a unifying idea of unity and liberty.

In the words of Senator Richard Lugar, “America’s best players in public diplomacy have always been its people and its ideas. The United States should get them back into the game instead of standing on the sidelines.”190 In order to carry forth the burden of our forefathers – to protect and spread American values – the United States must remain actively engaged in global affairs. Otherwise, PD efforts become irrelevant without national will to deploy personnel and resources to meet the challenge.

A Typical Embassy

Figure 1: Typical hierarchy and constituent parts of a U.S. Embassy
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**Vita**

Demian Smith was commissioned into the U.S. Foreign Service in March 2003. From 2006 - 2008, he was a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia. From 2003 - 2005, Demian served at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India. He was the Ambassador's Special Assistant and served as a Vice Consul.

Before joining the Foreign Service, he worked at the Washington, DC-based Atlantic Council, a non-profit research institution that focuses on NATO and trans-Atlantic issues. In 2000, he taught politics and history at the Royal Hospital School in Great Britain. Prior to that, he helped develop Israeli-Palestinian development programs in Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Ramallah.

In 2008, Demian received the Department of State's Superior Honor Award for his political reporting from Serbia during Kosovo independence and subsequent violent attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade.

Demian is currently a graduate student at the National Defense University's Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. He holds a BA in Government from the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. He speaks Serbian, Spanish, German and French.

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