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**THE PATH TO FINALLY REALIZING THE ADAPTIVE PLANNING VISION OF
DEFENSE SECRETARIES RUMSFELD AND GATES**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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Abstract

It is now 2009 and after five years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has failed to achieve the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Adaptive Planning (AP) vision of shortened planning cycles and easily adaptable plans. The SecDef mandated a paradigm shift in DoD planning, but after years of meetings and a large Joint effort at great cost to the taxpayer, there has been no added capability to improve DoD's ability to defend the United States. This paper argues that the SecDef's AP vision can be realized with proper leadership to navigate bureaucratic and personality conflicts, by recognizing the major problems with AP within the DoD, and changing the approach to solving them through historical analysis and new implementation guidance.

Planners across the DoD are very familiar with the *AP Roadmap*, written by Secretary Rumsfeld, and the *AP Roadmap II*, written by Secretary Gates, that provide strategic direction to achieving AP. Unfortunately, there has been no leadership applied to the SecDef direction to successfully morph the DoD and plan differently by negotiating obstacles and pitfalls of the federal government bureaucracy.

The hate and discontent between crisis action planners and contingency planners is overwhelming and it completely inhibits progress to create a plan that DoD can execute. This constitutes one of the major problems that the DoD must deal with by removing the barriers created from years of failed, half-hearted attempts to satisfy the requirements established by the SecDef.

New leadership can change the way DoD plans using a holistic approach to solving existing problems. New implementation guidance based primarily on establishing and updating strategic guidance for senior US leaders can achieve the desired AP vision.

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I. Introduction

It is now 2009 and after five years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has failed to achieve the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Adaptive Planning (AP) vision of shortened planning cycles and easily adaptable plans. The SecDef mandated a paradigm shift in DoD planning, but after years of meetings and a large Joint effort at great cost to the taxpayer, there has been no added capability to improve DoD's ability to defend the United States. This paper argues that the SecDef's AP vision can be realized with proper leadership to navigate bureaucratic and personality conflicts by recognizing the major problems with AP and by changing the approach to solving them through historical analysis and new implementation guidance.

On November 26, 2001, the SecDef, Donald Rumsfeld, flew to Tampa to see General Tommy Franks, Commander, US Central Command (CENTCOM). General Franks outlined the invasion of Iraq in Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003, which was extremely frustrating to Secretary Rumsfeld. The plan had not been noticeably changed since Operation *Desert Storm* in 1991. The methodical scheme with its months-long timeline did not comply with the Secretary's ideas for improved efficiency or "transformation." The plan had been approved in 1996 and was updated in 1998, but Secretary Rumsfeld felt its assumptions were woefully out of date and did not reflect current intelligence. In a meeting on December 4, 2001, Rumsfeld demanded alternatives and innovative thinking. How would the plan be executed on short notice versus an extended timeline? What was the shortest period required to deliver enough forces to accomplish the mission? What if the President was willing to accept more risk? Despite obvious flaws, OPLAN 1003 was the only one available if the President decided to go to

war with Iraq immediately, because a complete rewrite of a contingency plan would take months.¹

President Bush signed the launch order at 6:30 PM on March 19, 2003 for OPLAN 1003 to initiate Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF). Strategic objectives were to disarm Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), end Saddam Hussein's support of terrorism, and free the Iraqi people.² The Strategic Goals were to remove Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athists from power and establish a stable, secure, peaceful, and democratic Iraqi Nation to become a fully functioning member of the community of nations. Thomas Ricks wrote, "History's judgement will be that the US invasion of Iraq was based on perhaps the worst war plan in American history and that its incompleteness helped create the conditions for the difficult occupation that followed."³

In May 2003, President Bush announced major combat operations were over in Iraq and many forces began redeployment home. Some US citizens saw his statement of "mission accomplished" as a win in the war. At that time, there was no noticeable insurgency in Iraq and many Iraqis were glad the US was there. The end of combat operations signified the end of neither combat nor operations, but the transition to the next phase of the long-term campaign.

New strategic objectives shifted to reflect the change: maintain stability, search for Iraqi WMDs, find Saddam, rebuild/build government, Phase 4 operations, and de-baathification/dissolve the Iraqi army. (The traditional phases of a military campaign

¹ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pp. 35–44.

² Mike Allen and Dana Wilbank, "Where Are Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction?" *Washington Post*, March 23, 2003.

³ Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), p.115.

identified in Joint publications are phase zero - *shape*, phase one - *deter*, phase two - *seize initiative*, phase three - *decisive operations*, phase four - *stabilize*, and phase five - *establish civil authority*.)

In July 2003, the mood at the Pentagon was that the US had won and should prepare for the next requirement. However, US casualties started to grow with an insurgency that US leaders did not acknowledge. Meanwhile, there was resistance in every town with suspected Iranian support. Planners started to search for answers and the US had to re-learn to fight insurgency quickly. As a result of the US delay in action, Al Qaeda in Iraq had the advantage. In 2003, at the direction of Secretary Rumsfeld, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P), working with the Joint Staff (JS) J7 Directorate, undertook an initiative to shorten the time required to produce plans and ensure they could be readily adapted to a constantly changing strategic landscape.⁴

On July 1, 2004, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez relinquished command of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) to General George Casey, which showed US commitment in elevating the leadership to a four star position with more robust staffing. General Casey created and employed a new campaign plan issued on August 5, 2004. This plan recognized that the Coalition was no longer an occupying power but instead supported the Iraqi government and sought to implement the goals contained in the UN vision for Iraq. The mission stated, *“In partnership with the Iraqi Government, MNF-I conducts full spectrum counter-insurgency operations to isolate and neutralize former*

⁴ COL Paul Martin, James Stevens, and COL Mike Schneider, “Adaptive Planning,” Approved Working Group Abstracts, 75th Military Operational Research Society Symposium (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Academy, June 2007), http://www.mors.org/publications/abstracts/75th_abs.pdf.

*regime extremists and foreign terrorists, and organizes, trains and equips Iraqi security forces in order to create a security environment that permits the completion of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 process on schedule.”*⁵

Since 2005, the end state shifted again as things changed. *“Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.”*⁶ Initial lines of operations were security, governance, economic development, and transition using information operations throughout the operation. Lines of operations transitioned to diplomatic, political, economic, and security using strategic communications throughout the operation. A new constitution was ratified in a national referendum on October 15, 2005 and on December 15, 2005 elections for a new National Assembly were held under the new constitution. Although there was increased violence in Iraq in 2006, Iraq has become increasingly peaceful in 2007 and 2008. Following the successful January 31, 2009 elections in 14 provinces, Iraq will certainly promote even more required changes in the US approach.

This brief synopsis of OIF serves to point out a typical, current, military operation that starts with a plan which will change over time as the situation changes. General Casey’s plan was the fourth campaign plan employed by Coalition forces during only 18 months between the overthrow of the Saddam regime and the first Iraqi elections of January 2005.⁷

⁵ Dr. Donald Wright and Colonel Timothy Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, June 2008), p.177.

⁶ U.S. Government, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” accessed December 12, 2008, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html.

⁷ Dr. Donald Wright and Colonel Timothy Reese, p.177.

The 2005 Contingency Planning Guidance by the SecDef directed Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to develop designated, priority contingency plans using a new approach. Transforming contingency planning requires modernizing the way DoD thinks about and develops its processes and resources for planning. This transformation does not entail complete elimination of current processes; rather, it requires a mixture of new and existing capabilities. Secretary Rumsfeld's vision was for CCDRs to produce plans more quickly, adaptively, and of higher quality.

The new approach was expected to improve efficiency by taking advantage of virtual tools to conduct planning with participation from around the world at the same time. That would include interagency coordination that was admittedly missing until the plan was already completed. "Secretary Rumsfeld sought an approach that would considerably shorten the time it takes to produce plans and to create plans that can be adapted to a constantly changing strategic landscape."⁸ The result was Adaptive Planning.

On December 13, 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld approved the Adaptive Planning (AP) Roadmap and directed its "expeditious implementation." This act represented a significant shift in the way the DoD thinks about military planning. "The impetus for change was a recognition that the accelerating pace and complexity of military operations require that the President, SecDef, and CCDRs have the ability to respond quickly to new threats and challenges."⁹ In March 2008, SecDef Robert Gates published the Adaptive Planning Roadmap II endorsing the efforts of his predecessor with minimal changes.

⁸ Ryan Henry, Adaptive Planning memorandum, August 26, 2003.

⁹ LTC Robert Klein, "Adaptive Planning - Not Your Great Grandfather's Schlieffen Plan," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/jfq_pages/editions/i45/20.pdf (accessed February 27, 2009).

The result of the SecDef push to revise planning has had a negligible effect. The OSD-P and Joint Staff J7 were assigned the original lead for DoD to direct AP efforts and make it a reality. Recently, US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) was given the lead. Unfortunately, the efforts of the Joint Staff J7, J5, J3, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), OSD, JFCOM, and others are not well coordinated, have not been resourced, and are not held to obey directives from higher authority.

II. The Situation-Planning in the DoD

“When I've asked to see various plans, I've not been happy with what I've seen. They are neither imaginative nor creative. Clearly the plans are old and have been on the shelf for too long. I've just not been happy. We've got a long way to go.”¹⁰

- Secretary Rumsfeld

This chapter discusses the state of planning in the DoD prior to the initiation of the Global War on Terrorism and the resulting new way to plan envisioned by Secretary Rumsfeld and his successor Secretary Gates. According to Major General Stephen Silvasy, Jr., US Army (retired), former Director of the Joint Staff J-7 (Interoperability), “The US previously had only 65 deliberate plans that existed to provide information to the J3 if the situation required military use. At that time, only two CCDRs from US Pacific Command (PACOM) and CENTCOM had recurring responsibilities to brief their plans to the SecDef on Korea, Iraq, and two plans on Iran compared to numerous plans briefed now.”¹¹

Following the 1980's, aspects of US planning and capabilities were not adequate to help US forces meet regional strategic requirements. The inadequacy was caused by the US focus remaining largely on US-Soviet and NATO-Warsaw Pact conflicts. At the time Operation *Desert Storm* began, US efforts were still Eurocentric¹² as noted by a lack of termination criteria¹³ and lack of post conventional war planning to provide security and allow a smooth transition to civil authority.

¹⁰ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p.25.

¹¹ Major General Steve Silvasy, USA(ret), interviewed March 23, 2009.

¹² Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War, Vol IV, The Gulf War*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), p 154.

¹³ The specified standards approved by the President or the SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2006), p. III-5.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the military had no plans for Afghanistan, the sanctuary of Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network. There was nothing on the shelf to pull down to provide at least an outline. OPLAN 1003 for Iraq did already exist, but again, CENTCOM had not updated it for three years.

Secretary Rumsfeld

Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor describe Secretary Rumsfeld as an “indomitable bureaucratic presence” in their book *Cobra II*. They wrote, “It was a commonplace among the Bush team that the military needed stronger civilian oversight and Rumsfeld exercised control with the iron determination of a former corporate executive. He had a restless mind and would brag that he was genetically impatient.”¹⁴

Secretary Rumsfeld wanted AP to be a Joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require. He wanted a networked, collaborative environment with regular involvement of senior leaders like the President and the SecDef and plans containing a range of viable options that can be adapted to defeat or deter an adversary to achieve national objectives. At full maturity, AP would form the backbone of a Joint adaptive system supporting the development and execution of plans that preserve the best characteristics of present-day contingency and crisis planning with a common process.

Secretary Rumsfeld wanted to change the planning process from the systematic, months-long planning process to a new process that could be rapidly updated as conditions changed. He insisted the 24-month deliberate planning cycle was too slow and

¹⁴ Michael R. Gordon & Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), p.1.

inflexible. He wanted a 6-month planning cycle that used modern technology to quickly update approved plans with current situation, intelligence, objectives, planning considerations, and assumptions. Contingency plans needed to incorporate better, detailed courses of action including sufficient branches and sequels¹⁵ to support crisis planning and execution. Secretary Rumsfeld said, “Today’s planning environment requires a process that quickly produces quality plans that readily adapt to changing circumstances.”¹⁶

In December 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld personally took charge of the mobilization and deployment system inspecting the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). According to Bob Woodward in his book *State of Denial*, “Secretary Rumsfeld believed he had lifted a big rock and found a system that was totally flawed. As a result, he started personally deciding which units would deploy and he imposed an extraordinary degree of micromanagement that frustrated and enraged the military.”¹⁷ Secretary Rumsfeld centralized the planning process, which slowed it vice speeding it up as intended. Throughout his tenure as SecDef, he reviewed all requests for forces and only he would authorize a unit’s deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan.

Despite his micromanagement and leadership style, he was a visionary in recognizing the planning problems and pursuing a solution. According to Secretary

¹⁵ A branch is a contingency option built into the basic plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. It answers the question, “What if . . . ?” A sequel is a major operation that follows the current operation. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. It answers the question, “What’s next?” - United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0, p. 155.

¹⁶ United States Department of Defense, “*Adaptive Planning Roadmap*,” (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2005), p. i.

¹⁷ Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp.103-104.

Rumsfeld's *Adaptive Planning Roadmap* of 2005, AP is the Joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically in a networked, collaborative environment. "AP requires the regular involvement of senior DoD leaders and results in plans containing a range of viable options."¹⁸

Secretary Rumsfeld wanted to shrink the time required for a top tier plan from 24 months to six months by initiating an aggressive approach that would dramatically improve the existing system. Unfortunately, DoD did not attain the level of planning Secretary Rumsfeld desired before he left the job and was replaced as SecDef by Robert Gates on December 18, 2006.

Secretary Gates

Within days of Secretary Gates taking office, the updated Joint Publication 5.0 for Joint Operations Planning was signed (December 26, 2006) by General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). This doctrine states:

"Joint operation planning is the overarching process that guides Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises. Planning is triggered when the continuous monitoring of global events indicates the need to prepare military options. Joint operation planning is an *adaptive*, collaborative process that can be iterative and/or parallel to provide actionable direction to commanders and their staffs across multiple echelons of command."¹⁹

The updated Joint Publication 5.0 also states:

"Joint operation planning requires dialogue among senior leaders, concurrent and parallel plan development, and collaboration across multiple planning levels. Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promote early understanding of, and agreement on, planning assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key factors. The focus is on developing plans that contain a variety of viable,

¹⁸ United States Department of Defense, "*Adaptive Planning Roadmap II*," (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2008), p. ii.

¹⁹ United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0, p. 11.

embedded options for the President and SecDef to consider as the situation develops. This facilitates responsive plan development and modification, resulting in constantly up-to-date plans.”²⁰

The Joint Operation Planning Process also promotes greater involvement with other US agencies and our multinational partners. The Joint Operation and Planning Execution System (JOPES):

“formally integrates the planning activities of the entire Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) during the initial planning and plan refinement that occurs both in peacetime and when faced with an imminent crisis. While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, the focus is on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities in response to a foreseen contingency or an unforeseen crisis. The majority of JOPES activities and products occur prior to the point when the CJCS approves and issues the execute order, which initiates the employment of military capabilities to accomplish a specific mission.”²¹

Secretary Gates signed the *AP Roadmap II* on March 5, 2008 to continue the previous efforts to transition planning in DoD. He directed the expeditious transition of JOPES to the AP and Execution System (APEX). He emphasized the melding of planning and execution into a cohesive system that delivers relevant, comprehensive, and feasible plans that can seamlessly transition to execution. He said, “It is important that DoD embrace new processes, systems, and technologies that further enhance our ability to rapidly develop, assess, adapt, and execute plans in a dynamic environment.”²²

Secretary Gates has formally adopted the concept that the Pentagon alone cannot do national security planning and budgeting based on the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report. The report states, “The DoD supports institutionalizing whole-of-government approaches to addressing national security challenges. The desired end

²⁰ Ibid., p.I-11.

²¹ Ibid., p. 31.

²² United States Department of Defense, *Adaptive Planning Roadmap II*, p. 1.

state is for US government national security partners to develop plans and conduct operations from a shared perspective.”²³

Thus, the original AP vision of Secretary Rumsfeld to renovate planning in DoD was validated by Secretary Gates and it remained a priority under new DoD leadership. Unfortunately, the DoD still finds plans taking long periods of time to coordinate due to competing requirements eroding finite time and resources to work the plans. There is a lack of accessibility to senior leaders to gain needed insight and direction for plans. Many operators argue that it is easier to build a plan from nothing than to convert an existing plan to the realities of a crisis action scenario.

This chapter discussed the state of planning in the DoD prior to the initiation of the Global War on Terrorism and the resulting new way to plan envisioned by Secretary Rumsfeld and his successor Secretary Gates. Based on the direction by the SecDef, the DoD took action in an attempt to achieve AP.

²³ Walter Pincus, “Pentagon Recommends ‘Whole-of-Government’ National Security Plans,” *Washington Post*, February 2, 2009, p.11.

III. Attempts to Satisfy SecDef Intent²⁴

“The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is getting an old one out.”²⁵ ~ B.H. Liddell Hart

This chapter discusses the attempts made in the DoD since Secretary Rumsfeld first initiated his dream to develop AP. It analyzes major problems like bureaucratic and personality conflicts that DoD never addressed and new problems created by poor leadership and lack of proper planning. AP problems include division between planners, a lack of unity in AP definition and DoD vision, and the focus on technological solutions only.

To best analyze the current AP situation in DoD and the attempts to develop AP, over 60 questionnaires were sent throughout the DoD to people involved in planning on Joint Staff, OSD, COCOMs, services, and agencies. Over 20 recipients responded to this “command climate” survey of AP from three Joint Staff directorates, three geographic COCOMs, two functional COCOMs, two services, and one agency. It is readily evident to even a casual observer that AP is a very contentious issue within DoD. As a result, no respondents authorized public release of their input. Most respondents felt AP has not been effectively implemented and the remaining respondents felt it has been minimally effective.

Contentiousness in the DoD

The level of anxiety and in some cases animosity in DoD regarding AP can best be displayed by sharing some of the quotes from the survey from various commands:²⁶

²⁴ Section III heavily uses input from DoD respondents who required non-attribution for their participation.

²⁵ Bernstein, Adam. “Admiral Arthur Cebrowski Dies; Led Pentagon Think Tank.” Accessed May 19, 2009. <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/akcebrowski.htm>

²⁶ Additional quotes are available in appendix A.

- AP proponents try to bully and drive their issues from the top down. They have not improved JOPES. They have reduced the quality of OPLANS and they have created problems based on lies that do not exist. They have failed to demonstrate any compelling need to change.
- AP has stalled. DoD has developed two adversarial camps and there is no leadership that forces them to work together. AP has in effect split the JPEC into a Crisis Action Planning community and a Contingency Planning community, essentially led by the J3 and the J5/J7 respectively.
- The initial AP effort was done with malice and forethought in an attempt to throw the existing systems and doctrines out completely...most of the JPEC remains suspicious.
- OSD-P attacks anyone who highlights the shortcomings in the AP vision.
- AP has not really changed anything. Deliberate planning efforts are still stove piped with US only participation and little to no interagency interface.

More feedback, most of which is negative, on AP can be read in Appendix A. To summarize the feedback, all respondents confirmed that there are major problems with AP and its implementation. Most people shared the problem as a chasm between “future plans” planners and “crisis action” planners. Crisis action planners point out that their single most caustic aspect of AP is the broad assumption that the current JOPES Crisis Action Planning (CAP) process is broken and dysfunctional which they vehemently deny. Future plans planners share an opinion that traditional “JOPESTERS” [DoD personnel who use the JOPES Automated Data Processing (ADP) application] have made AP implementation difficult and the AP community meets a lot of resistance to change from the JOPES community.

Given the various responses, we begin to understand that the current AP implementation has been dysfunctional at best in attempting to follow the AP Roadmaps. There have been limited and uncoordinated efforts in DoD compounded by a lack of desire to make it a reality. There has also been a waiting game played by people

expecting AP to dissolve as yet another passing attempt at improvement. There is a major and obvious disconnection in AP implementation between the DoD J3 Operations directorates and the DoD J5 Planning (with Joint Staff J7) directorates. Dialogue between these entities routinely grows heated and contentious when discussing AP. There has been a failure to collaborate between different commands or even directorates to share ideas and contribute. In 2005, PACOM released an official message from their J5 requesting rapid fielding of AP tools yet PACOM J3 did not even endorse it internally. Pursuit of tools as an initial step in problem solving is not surprising since the American fixation has been on the technical.²⁷

AP tools are a large cause for the problems encountered implementing the SecDef vision. The planning community made a visible mistake by pursuing technology to reach AP goals as an initial step. As Colin Gray wrote in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, “new technology, even when properly integrated into weapons and systems with well trained and highly motivated people, cannot erase the difficulties that impede strategic excellence. A new device, even innovative ways to conduct war, is always offered as a poisoned chalice.”²⁸ Instead of making sure that any resources applied to AP supported the process, DoD pursued a material solution forcing the process to deviate.

Changing the way the DoD does planning is a major undertaking. Most people think the concept of AP is good; however, Information Technology (IT) tools can not achieve the AP vision by itself. A respondent to the survey argued that AP efforts have actually resulted in more work for most people involved in planning and only facilitated

²⁷ Arthur K. Cebrowski, “Transforming Transformation-Will it Change the Character of War?,” April 19, 2004, p.2.

²⁸ Colin S. Gray, “Why Strategy is difficult,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1999, p. 9.

incrementally better plans. AP is ultimately about the process of how we conduct planning.

AP Defined

One clear problem identified in the AP survey is how disparate the definition of AP is to DoD members. If you ask 10 people to define AP, you will get 10 different answers. In their words, AP is a single, continuous planning process... planning is no longer “deliberate planning” and “crisis action planning.” AP is the concept of developing a course of action and having the ability to keep it current and executable. AP is the attempt to take what was a 24 month planning process and compress it into a 12 month, eventually 6, then maybe as little as 1-3 months, process. AP will facilitate the creation of Concept Plans (CONPLANS) or OPLANS that are fully vetted with other CCDRs, Services, and even agencies based on changing assumptions and planned in a resource constrained environment. Respondents’ statements in their own words included:

- Better and more timely planning to support commanders and senior political leader decision-making in the new global strategic environment of the 21st century. At full maturity AP and Execution will be a collaborative system that will facilitate the rapid development and upkeep of plans and when needed transition to execution....a "living" plan.
- Adaptive Planning is an initiative which promotes the establishment of conditions that will enable operational plans to rapidly react to changes in the STRATEGIC environment which includes strategic guidance, intelligence, or the invalidation of critical planning assumptions. It was originally implemented in order to "fix" the way contingency plans were written, that is, to shorten the process from a 2 year cycle to 6-9 months.
- For frequent updates to planning assumptions and more frequent revisions to the plan based upon revised assumptions. Also, more frequent involvement by senior leadership, i.e. the In-Progress Review (IPR) process.
- AP is the vision by SecDef to transform the way we plan and execute Joint operations. APEX is the system that replaces JOPES and its ultimate goal is to provide a seamless end-to-end planning to execution system. First, plans have to be relevant.

- AP is a philosophy driving a set of planning and decision-making processes that is enabled through technology. AP is military (DoD) planning that is adaptable and agile. AP is adaptable to the ever-changing geographical, political, and military environment, enabling planning through fluid decision-making methodologies. AP reflects agile processes and loosely-coupled technologies that provide key attributes in any environment (those that are well-structured as well as those that are austere) such as reliability, redundancy, survivability, etc.

An extensive alternative definition for adaptive planning was provided in a Joint Chiefs of Staff presentation and panel discussion at a 2006 DoD Modeling and Simulation Conference. “Adaptive Planning (AP) is the Joint capability to create and revise situationally relevant plans rapidly and to a high level of quality, as circumstances require.”²⁹ These presentations described transforming DoD operational planning to adaptive planning (and subsequently to APEX) by the following:

- Make planning seamless – from deliberate planning through crisis planning through execution;
- Produce plans faster (and to a higher standard): in months, not years, including:
 - A 6 month goal;
 - Real-time collaboration and iterative planning;
 - Parallel planning across multiple echelons to the extent possible; and
 - Frequent harmonization of planning considerations (e.g. approaches, courses of actions) at all levels throughout the process – even after the plan is completed: *i.e. living plans*;
- Generate plans with significantly more options, adaptable to a variety of changing circumstances, and, whenever possible, presented automatically inclusion in plans;
- Continuously adapt to changing world conditions;
- Mitigate risk across plans by better comprehending the collateral impacts of execution and of changed circumstances;
- Shared plans, planners, planning tools, and relevant data bases (networked):
 - Automatic triggers that alert planners to the possible need for modifications, adjustments, or revisions;
 - Integrated tool suites for faster analytical feedback and broader collaboration;
 - Living plans are updated routinely to reflect changes in guidance and/or the strategic environment.³⁰

²⁹ Tim Hoffman/T. Gilliland, Planning Community Overview Presentation, Presented to DoD Modeling & Simulation Conference, 2 May 2006.

³⁰ Ibid.

A living plan is described by former Joint Staff member Lieutenant Colonel Robert Klein in his *Joint Forces Quarterly* article as “a plan maintained within a collaborative, virtual environment and updated routinely to reflect changes in intelligence assessments, readiness, Global Force Management, transportation availability, guidance, assumptions, and the strategic environment. Both automatic and manually evaluated triggers linked to real-time sources will alert leaders and planners to changes in critical conditions that warrant a reevaluation of a plan’s relevancy, feasibility, and risk.”³¹

Shared DoD Vision

The overwhelming response from survey participants to identifying the problem with AP was the lack of shared vision across the DoD. Without a common, shared understanding of the term "adaptive planning" and plan of action to define and provide a path to achieve the end-state, it is impossible to reach "mission accomplishment." It is hard to achieve synergy to facilitate "change management" without a common thread of mission orders defining, integrating, and synchronizing mission elements and segments. Lack of a common shared view to facilitate an integrated mission focus is manifested in the term "living plan," yet it is not defined and operational process activities and updates for such have not been defined / identified. Unstructured updates to plans can have a negative versus positive impact on plans maintenance. There must be a structured approach through defined and aligned/synchronized process activities and integrated schedules.

³¹ Lieutenant Colonel Robert Klein, p. 87.

There has been too little collaboration since inception with the broader JPEC on AP concept, intent, and vision resulting in too little cooperation and buy-in from the JPEC users required to implement AP recommendations. AP leadership for the SecDef failed to define AP and facilitate change management through a managed, common, shared view within and across DoD elements and segments.

Leadership (or lack thereof) is the main cause of most problems. To expect that people with different priorities and working in different organizations will just come together and work well, just for the common good, is unrealistic. Personalities have not mixed well in some cases but over the years there have been good personality mixes with no integrated effort. AP can be achieved with a shared vision through leadership which is the art of convincing people to do what they otherwise would not do.³²

CFAST

In the DoD today, no AP discussion is complete without inclusion of the application Collaborative Force Analysis, Sustainment, and Transportation (CFAST) by contractor Development, Planning, Research & Analysis (DPRA). CFAST is an extremely contentious piece of software among planners. One must realize the extreme division in DoD between supporters and opponents of this tool that was conceptualized by some to satisfy all of the SecDef goals. According to Gerald Seib, “One of Americans most charming traits is their belief that they can find a quick, simple solution to every problem. One of Americans most dangerous traits, meanwhile, is their belief that they can

³² Judge Thomas Moyer, *The Civic Virtue of Leadership*, accessed March 25, 2009, <http://www.beavton.k12.or.us/home/district/ohio-state-university-superintendents-academy/>

find a quick, simple solution to every problem.”³³ DoD was true to this observation and attempted to find a quick and simple solution to AP.

According to the DPRA web page, their company produces technology that enables military leaders to plan all aspects of a campaign.³⁴ A current description of CFAST by the developer is:

a portal-based, collaborative campaign planning environment that utilizes some of the fastest-growing areas of technology in the market today...CFAST provides a set of business tools and supporting infrastructure that shortens deliberate and crisis action planning, command exercises, force modernization studies, and analysis. Real time data immediately updates interactive map displays and other visualizations for continuous monitoring and effective response to dynamic situations. CFAST provides the missing front end of the current deployment planning process. It links the campaign to the movement plan. Rapid resequencing of the priority of transportation flow results in true dynamic, rapid, and accurate TPFDD construction. Planners prioritize forces grouped using force modules recommended by the application, or their own modifications. Forces and sustainment are automatically flowed using the best solution. CFAST assists the war-fighting commands and their service components in day-to-day operations as well as during crisis action and deliberate planning. With CFAST, planning phases can overlap concurrently with parallel planning at all levels. The end result is plans are done faster and more accurately. CFAST is execution-centric, capabilities-based, and uses end-to-end planning for deployments—a true fort-to-foxhole planning environment.³⁵

This description advertises that CFAST can currently shorten deliberate and crisis action planning and produce plans faster and more accurate. This claim is not true because DoD is unable to transfer plans created in CFAST into ADP JOPES for seamless execution. Quotes from the various DoD responses share details, thoughts, and important perceptions to truly grasp the severity of the current situation:

- The current working relationship between the contingency planning community and the Crisis Action Planning and Execution folks is ugly. No one in the planning community believes that CFAST should/could replace the JOPES application. Each side thinks they are the center of the universe.

³³ Gerald F. Seib, "In Handling Iraq, wish for Best, Plan for Worst" *Wall Street Journal*, Nov 19, 1997, p 24.

³⁴ DPRA personnel were contacted for input but they did not respond to questions regarding AP.

³⁵ DPRA, inc., "CFAST", (accessed March 2, 2009) <http://www.dpra.com/index.cfm/m/269>.

- After so much money has been spent, there has been no real material improvement for the DoD. The marketing campaign about the capabilities of CFAST and DRRS (DoD Readiness Reporting System) are grossly misleading.

- Many J3 members argue that CFAST has been force fed on the community, it cannot produce an executable TPFDD, and in a crisis they believe it is less man hours to start over than to update a CFAST TPFDD.

-CFAST development is not going very well. Its development schedule continually shifts to the right and I am not sure if it is going to survive.

-There was nothing wrong with the TPFDD. The decision making process of planning, and ultimately execution, is the main cause for deficiencies in the DODs planning and execution effort, not its IT (JOPES). Living Plans has been ill-defined; leading many in the community to concentrate on sourcing TPFDDs rather than address higher level problems.

- The core vision has COCOM Living Plans at the center. Planning must support Execution. The concept slide incorrectly shows APEX supporting the Living Plan. As described in the AP Roadmap II, the living plan has automatic triggers which generate continuous plan reassessment. Even CFAST does not support the living plan concept. From a process perspective, the COCOM planners cannot react to daily changes.

- Initial development of the AP process was preceded by development of the CFAST program – thus, a program in search of a process. Development of the AP process as an eventual replacement to the JOPES was neglected while continued development of CFAST as an operational prototype for deliberate/contingency planning continued. CFAST development was conducted outside of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. CFAST was, and continues, to be developed in isolation from other planning and execution tools/programs. It was originally developed as a transportation analysis tool, not a planning tool. Due to its programming, it is unable to become a Global Command and Control System (GCCS) application. Thus, it remains to this day, not fully interoperable with JOPES, Joint TPFDD “feeder” tools, or service sourcing tools. Therefore, its application as an execution tool is nil.

The following opinions were shared by those DoD planners who support CFAST and its contributions to improving plans in DoD:

- The current suite of planning tools, ADP JOPES, was proven to be inadequate as evidenced by Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) analysis tool doing most of the real work with OPLAN 1003V. ADP JOPES legacy architecture would not support the change needed to meet the vision. A study was done to look at the process and determine what kind of prototype should be built and that was how CFAST was born. The net-centric, collaborative nature of the prototype allowed planners to work

distributive and in parallel rather than in series. However, change is not swift, especially when humans are involved. It takes leadership to drive change. CFAST was initially developed by the same company that developed JFAST. The old deliberate planning system did not provide relevant plans. Just the mere fact that plans took ~two years to build with transportation/logistics feasibility analyses done at the end of the process, meant that by the time the planning was done, the plan was out of date. Also, the old way had very little involvement from senior leadership until the end and provided, in most cases, the "one" option.

-CFAST is the closest IT tool out there to build TPFDDs in a collaborative environ. It is not fully functional right now; it has some issues. However, it has the potential to be a major enabler. There is currently a tension between the execution folks who use JOPES and the plan builders...multiple issues of pushing TPFDDs from CFAST to JOPES. If changes are made in JOPES, there is no way to see how execution is unfolding through CFAST. It allows for distributed planning from multiple locations for rapid synthesis of information.

The complete history of CFAST is not clear and requests for feedback from DPRA were not answered. A report claimed CFAST was created in 1994 or 1995 and that DPRA modified JFAST software that was first used in Operation *Desert Shield* with other projects for sale to the government. There was not a large response to CFAST in the 1990's with its focus on the TPFDD. It was updated and attempts to sell to the government continued. After 2001, DPRA gained a foothold with CFAST in OSD following Secretary Rumsfeld concerns about the TPFDD and the initiation of an AP concept.

Research does verify some of the negative points raised in the previous comments provided by those opposed to CFAST. Briefings and reports in the Pentagon alleged that JOPES could not perform to SecDef required levels and then stated that CFAST could meet the SecDef requirements. The following quotes were taken from the CFAST System Requirements Utilization Document Draft dated August 8, 2002. The document was submitted to fund a prototype of CFAST for their Dynamic TPFDD effort:

CFAST is a candidate system to meet SecDef guidance to provide a collaborative tool that will help shorten the Deliberate Planning timeline... Though CFAST satisfies many of the same requirements as GCCS and JOPES, it is a separate TPFDD building and analysis suite of applications that utilizes the same data as JOPES applications, but operates and functions independently of JOPES and GCCS. Guided by Joint Vision 2020 and the 2002 Contingency Planning Guidance, CFAST enables decision superiority through advanced information sharing and collaboration... Collaborative planning tools planned for the CFAST Portal are required throughout the JPEC. In the near future the deliberate planning process will be compressed from a two-year effort to a one-year process. The current JOPES ADP system is limited in its support of this effort. It is necessary for the Joint Staff to identify and demonstrate a potential suite of software applications, develop those applications, and deploy them for use by the CCDRs, services and combat support agencies during future deliberate and exercise planning. CFAST will incrementally add functionality with initial capability delivered based on the current working prototypes within six months from contract award. Additional features will flow into the models in a priority determined by the Joint Staff J7 as the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR), based on the needs of the JPEC. CFAST, transformational in nature and design, will automate the current TPFDD file building process and in conjunction with other tools, allow staff officers to model several strategic and theater transportation Courses of Action (COAs) and provide recommendations to the commander based on adequacy, feasibility, and applicability compared to other COAs. These essential capabilities do not currently exist within classic ADP JOPES ... CFAST provides a wealth of integrated, collaborative tools that can be exposed to the Joint/Coalition community via the familiar, Windows/Web environment. These tools bring together the individual process associated with planning, execution, exercises and programmatic into a single unified process... The evolutionary approach also ensures that development efforts are driven by current objectives and policy. CFAST demonstrates a revolutionary approach to not only reducing the time required to develop plans but to develop higher quality plans quickly... it allows new dollars to be focused primarily on developing those CFAST elements that can fully transition the sequential, and in many respects manual, process of today into the collaborative, parallel processes required to deliver higher quality plans in less time.

In October 2002, a Joint Staff J7 action officer, Major Dave Cohen, presented a CFAST decision brief to the DoD leadership. The purpose of the brief was to obtain Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) endorsement of strategy to use CFAST to satisfy a Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) tasker on improving deployment processes. The 2002 Contingency Planning Guidance had dictated major OPLANs be delivered in one year vice current two-year timeline. He stated:

- Current ADP JOPES applications do not allow for collaboration or rapid TPFDD building/sourcing
- JOPES 21 (formerly JOPES 2000) does not add these collaboration or rapid TPFDD building/sourcing capabilities
- Building and sourcing the TPFDD are the long poles in the tent
- No Other Options Available for Consideration
 - No other software packages allow for rapid TPFDD building/sourcing
 - No JOPES capability
 - No other commercial software products available
 - Collaborative tools exist, but they do not build TPFDDs
- What constitutes DPG tasking completion/success?
 - CFAST fielded at PACOM and CENTCOM
 - TPFDDs built for major OPLANs using CFAST modules; speed to be a minimum of 30% faster
 - TPFDD to produce no more fatal errors than JOPES processing
 - Basic collaboration achieved with COCOM and component staffs

CFAST Benefits:

- Quality
 - Ability to build/analyze TPFDDs for ALL potential COAs
 - Transportation becomes measure of merit in COA analysis
 - Greater TPFDD fidelity in shorter planning time
 - Collaboration enables better cross-talk between COCOM and component staffs
- Cost & Time Savings: \$1.5 Million/year & 10 months/plan
 - Reduced & Eliminated Sourcing Conferences
- PACOM has volunteered to sponsor/manage demo
 - History with CFAST through Dynamic TPFDD
- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence.[ASD (C3I)] concerns raised re: interoperability
 - Some issues may have work-arounds
 - Remaining issues require ASD (C3I) to review policy in light of new technologies
- J3 conducting planner-level review of GCCS Operational Requirements Document
 - 64 GCCS requirements met by CFAST
 - Areas covered include Force Generation, Collaboration, System Performance, Reliability, Security, and Training
 - Reviewed by JFCOM Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO), OSD, and Joint Staff J7 Knowledge Engineering
- JS J7 recommended JROC endorse the proposal to have PACOM, supported by JS J7, CENTCOM, and other COCOMs, sponsor Deliberate Planning Tool Demo to satisfy Defense Planning Group and for JROC to recommend US Army as Lead DoD Component/Executive Agent .³⁶

³⁶ Major Dave Cohen, Joint Staff/J7, Conventional War Plans Division, “Collaborative Force-Building Analysis, Sustainment, & Transportation (CFAST) Decision Brief,” October 8, 2002.

CFAST was accepted by DoD leadership with funding that has not terminated to date. CFAST received resources but the development and implementation of the AP strategy did not. DoD pursued CFAST to achieve the SecDef goal to cut the time it took to plan from two years down to six months using primarily technology. There was an over reaction to a technical solution when technology can only support this very complex planning process. Harry Yarger reminds us in his article “Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy” that:

“All complex systems are inherently nonlinear. In linear systems, changes in output are nearly proportional to input; the sum of the inputs equals the output in a more-or-less predictable fashion. Most people think from a linear perspective and in a linear fashion, and indeed planning operates in large measure on linear assumptions even though practical experience often belies this approach. The difference is accounted for in planning with reserve forces and planned branches and sequels.”³⁷

Technology like CFAST cannot inherently bridge nonlinear thinking to linear thinking to produce a living plan. CFAST was an application on the market that found a niche when Secretary Rumsfeld announced his desires to plan differently and coined the phrase “Adaptive Planning.” Research shows that senior DoD leaders to include Secretary Rumsfeld were presented information that misinformed them to believe that ADP JOPES could not change to meet the new need. DoD then invested money in CFAST and years of competition with failed interoperability began.

Other Technical Approaches

CFAST is not the only application or tool used by members of DoD to achieve AP. In 2007, JFCOM merged several programs under different management structures into one program that became the Joint Capability Requirements Manager (JCRM).

³⁷ Harry R. Yarger, "Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy," Letort papers, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, February 2006, p. 23.

JCRM is an attempt directed by the Director of the Joint Staff (DJS) and the OSD Readiness leadership to develop a technical solution that follows DoD process for Joint force providing. Developers of JCRM conducted numerous interviews and collaboration forums in order to deduce the total force providing process incorporating all COCOMs, Services, and DoD agencies. The technical solution they are currently developing is designed to support a process vice deviate or drive a process. To their credit, all members of the J3, J5, and J7 even remotely engaged in planning were invited to participate in identifying DoD processes and the tool is less contentious than CFAST as a result.

JCRM serves as the Global Demand Manager and exchanges data with services' sourcing and execution tools for three of the four force providing requirements (force rotations, Requests for Forces, and Individual Augmentees. Plan requirements would complete the Global Demand picture if they resided in or were accessed by JCRM. CFAST and service sourcing tools have some process and capability redundancies and prohibit the generation of a Joint solution as long as they are not interoperable with existing, fielded Joint systems of record.

There are other people who have advocated for new techniques or technologies in an attempt to make AP a reality. Some advocates purport that tools achieve AP by cross correlation of all available DoD documents and the tasks listed in the Universal Joint Task List, CJCS Manual 3500.04C. Discussions include an incorrect belief that AP will be achieved after the planning community garners a common understanding of, and agreement upon, the meaning and semantics of APEX-related terminology and concepts

using Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), lexicons, taxonomies, and ontologies³⁸ for APEX capabilities.

Colonel Ed Hatch from the JFCOM Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO) office wrote in 2007 that living plans are possible through APEX by broadening concepts through computer-supported sense-making and advances in the C2 of military operations.³⁹ He wrote about adaptive enterprise technology (Sense and Respond), operational environments as complex adaptive systems,⁴⁰ and from the unavoidability of unpredictable, discontinuous change as a consequence of doing business in the Information Age.⁴¹ He discussed APEX as a “continuous distributed time-sensitive a-cyclical nuanced and non-linear late binding process, fully integrating monitoring, assessment, planning, execution, and adaptation.”⁴² Colonel Hatch wrote about the use and adaptation of metaknowledge describing contextually-variable military operations in the form of cross-correlated templates and their illustrative vignettes. Colonel Hatch continued by discussing neutrosophic logic,⁴³ ontologies, biomorphic reasoning mechanisms, spatiotemporal tracking, Amenuensis/Knowledge Collector, and Human Interface Manager that provides the integration of the human components of APEX with the functional, computational, and communications resources.

³⁸ Lexicon: the vocabulary of a particular language; taxonomy: the science or technique of classification; ontology: a rigorous and exhaustive organization of some knowledge domain that is usually hierarchical and contains all the relevant entities and their relations. Defined at www.freedictionary.com.

³⁹ Colonel Edward Hatch, “Beyond Living Plans: A Living Military Command And Control Process For Adaptive Planning And Execution,” September 21, 2007.

⁴⁰ Murray Gell-Mann, *The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex*, (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1994).

⁴¹ Stephan H Haeckel, *Adaptive Enterprise: Creating and Leading Sense-And-Respond Organizations*, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999)

⁴² Col Edward Hatch.

⁴³ Neutrosophic logic is a philosophic concept dealing with the imprecision of the real, complex, chaotic operational context. Florentin Smarandache, *A Unifying Field In Logics: Neutrosophic Logic, Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Set, Neutrosophic Probability* (Third Edition), (Rehoboth: American Research Press, 2003)

This approach is not unique in attempting to convert the operational art to science, but it is not what the SecDef wants. Even though Colonel Hatch states the real world is uncertain and the overall global operational context is characterized by complexity and chaos in his paper, his approach reflects a dangerous perspective many people share in DoD in trying to quantify and then analyze aspects of war that will always be immeasurable.

Carl von Clausewitz's (1780–1831) "fog of war" is the main factor that makes some commanders willing to take high, prudent risks and others extremely cautious or deliberative in making decisions. The uncertainties and imperfections in the knowledge of the situation on which the commander bases his decisions and actions can never be fully mastered, regardless of one's advances in information technologies. Clausewitz ridiculed thinkers such as Dietrich Heinrich von Buelow (1757–1807), one of the leaders of the mathematical school, who took all moral values out of the theory and dealt only with materiel, reducing all warfare to a pair of mathematical equations of balance and superiority in time and space, and a pair of angles and lines.⁴⁴

Dr. Milan Vego warns in *Joint Forces Quarterly*:

"Since the mid-1990s, a systems (or systemic) approach to warfare emerged gradually as the dominant school of thought in the U.S. military, most other Western militaries, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This was exemplified by the wide and almost uncritical acceptance, not only in the United States but also in other militaries, of the claims by numerous proponents of the need to adopt network-centric warfare (NCW), effects-based operations (EBO), and most recently a systemic operational design (SOD). Classical military thought was declared unable to satisfy the requirements of the new environment that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War and the advent of advanced information technologies and increasingly lethal and precise long-range weapons. Clausewitz's ideas on the nature of war were ignored. Human activity is so complex that it operates outside the physical domain. A more serious problem is that

⁴⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, ed. Werner Hahlweg, 16th ed. (Bonn: Ferdinand Duemmler Verlag, 1952) 137, 244–245.

proponents of the systems approach ignore the fact that the tangible and intangible elements of the situation cannot simply be reduced to nodes and links. The human factor is the key element in analyzing the situation at any level of war, but especially at the strategic and operational levels, that is, those levels at which a war is won or lost. The traditional way of military thinking is not only far more comprehensive but also far more realistic, dynamic, and flexible than systems thinking.”⁴⁵

Shimon Naveh wrote in his book *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, “Systems do not behave exactly as individual components or even as a quantitative sum of individuals; the general performance and function of a system usually produce results considerably different from that of the arithmetical-linear summation of results of the individual ingredients that compose it.”⁴⁶ Secretary Gates said, “Never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, which are inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be sceptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise.”⁴⁷

Positives from the Years of Effort

It is completely disingenuous to say there has been no benefit to AP since its inception. At a minimum, the chasm between CAP and contingency planning is more apparent and no organization can fix a problem until it is identified. Secretary Gates has identified AP as a critical transition item for the new Obama administration. Where the Initiation Stage from *Adaptive Planning Roadmap I* concentrated on fixing the planning, the current Implementation Stage described in *Adaptive Planning Roadmap II* is supposed to bridge the gap between contingency planning and CAP.

⁴⁵ Milan Vego, “Systems Versus Classical Approach to Warfare,” (accessed March 1, 2009) http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/10.pdf

⁴⁶ Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 79.

⁴⁷ Robert M. Gates, remarks before the National Defense University, Washington, DC, September 29, 2008, available at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1279.

A respondent to the AP survey stated, “The biggest improvement to planning provided by AP is that COCOMs are following a tighter orchestration of IPRs (In-Progress Reviews) which gets plans in front of the SecDef quicker and within shorter intervals.” The IPR process is a huge improvement for senior decision makers because plans get regularly reviewed and discussed by the SecDef on his calendar every Wednesday when he is in town. The senior leadership gets regular insight into the planning efforts going on and are able to make better informed risk assessments.

One survey response stated, “There is not a negative aspect to AP. It just needs to replace deliberate and crisis as the planning process in use to avoid the disparate approaches.” Another response stated, “AP implementation has harvested the development of solid planning processes and supporting tools.” One COCOM, NORTHCOM, has taken advantage of the AP process with CFAST to develop several plans for Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) directed tasks. The plans have been developed with sufficient detail to obtain SecDef approval and withstand the scrutiny of capability assessment analysis.

This chapter discussed the attempts made in the DoD to develop AP since Secretary Rumsfeld first initiated his AP concept. It analyzed major problems like bureaucratic and personality conflicts that the DoD never addressed and new problems created by poor leadership and lack of proper planning. AP problems include division between planners, a lack of unity in AP definition and DoD vision, and the focus on technological solutions only.

IV. Proposed Adaptive Planning Implementation

*“Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well prepared plan.”*⁴⁸
-Napoleon Bonaparte

This chapter proposes a fresh, holistic approach to achieving AP without shortcuts to affect change by addressing policy, leadership, doctrine, organization, training, personnel, and materiel. Change is hard, particularly in the military, but this fact is not limited to just AP within the DoD. The community most likely affected by a new initiative will resist most, if not all, new initiatives, regardless of purpose or scope.

Why has AP not been achieved? Many argue that we have been doing AP for generations and it is nothing new. Some argue the DoD dragged their collective feet to avoid the task until a new SecDef or administration was established. It has not been achieved because it has not been a priority regardless of the verbal and written direction provided by the SecDefs as evidenced by the lack of fiscal resources applied to it. DoD violated the “Simplicity” principle of war and diffused the effort leading to a current state of minimal, if not no, AP development. Planning is extremely difficult and can not be made easy by technology or other material support which is the biggest problem with current AP efforts.

The goal should be to develop a common process that is not currently shared by COCOMs, Services, and DoD agencies. There is room for improvement because planners must plan without wasting precious time doing so. If you give a military staff member six months or 24 months, he or she will take six months or 24 months to plan. Quite frankly

⁴⁸ Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1978) p. 239.

and ironically, AP has not been achieved because DoD failed to plan how they want to plan and planning starts with policy from the highest levels of government.

Policy

Policy is the establishment of goals and objectives and it serves as the greatest opportunity to improve the existing planning system. AP must exist to improve the establishment and refinement of national policy. Discussions / thoughts / theories / memos / etc. regarding AP must migrate into policy. Colin Gray wrote, “Strategy is neither policy nor armed combat; rather it is the bridge between them. The strategist can be thwarted if the military wages the wrong war well or the right war badly.”⁴⁹ Objectives that are published for planners are usually in civilian terms so AP should seek to accurately convert civilian objectives to military objectives.

Harry Yarger wrote that the future cannot be predicted with sufficient precision because the frictions are too great to plan for successfully. Strategy is always seeking a balance between specificity and flexibility in establishing boundaries for planning. The planner must understand the difference between planning and strategy in order to execute strategy successfully. Planning bridges the gap between strategy and execution, but many military professionals confuse these entities. Yarger argues that, as a consequence, “planning-level thinking is often applied in the strategy development process or when planning objectives and concepts are elevated to the strategic level. When this occurs, even though the plan may be successful, the resulting strategic effects fail to adequately support, or are actually counterproductive to, the stated policy goals or other interests.”⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Colin S. Gray, p.9.

⁵⁰ Harry Yarger, p.44, 45, 48.

Laser light guidance will not come down from higher so planners must go back up the chain and request more dialogue. Planners must mandate more dialogue with Joint Staff and OSD counterparts to ensure policy is established and thoroughly understood. Time with the President and SecDef will be minimal for even the top priority plans identified in the *Global Employment of the Force* (GEF) much less other plans. Preparation to create concise, cogent questions, comments, and concerns is an absolute necessity to maximize the opportunity.

Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. It is the thought process commanders use to visualize how best to efficiently and effectively employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission. Operational art also promotes unified action by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the national strategic end state.⁵¹ Real examples of military operations reveal that objectives will change all the way up to initiation and even during execution. AP must assist planners in this reality of constant change in order to be useful.

The commander's operational vision is expressed in his *intent* transmitted to subordinate tactical commanders. It is critical for success that the operational commander imparts his personal vision of victory and the conditions and methods for obtaining it to all subordinates.⁵² Helmuth von Moltke, Sr. (1800–1891), the Prussian and German Chief of General Staff (1857–1888) believed that it is far more important that the high

⁵¹ Joint Publication 5.0, p. xvi.

⁵² Milan Vego, "Systems Versus Classical Approach to Warfare," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/10.pdf

commander retain a clear perspective of the entire state of affairs than that any detail is carried out in a particular way.⁵³

AP should also require and facilitate assessment. Planners have to develop an assessment process early to ensure determination or measure of success for each phase of the operation. This assessment must be briefed and approved by the leadership to further clarify military approaches are pursuing civilian objectives.

Dr. Vego said that clear understanding of the national policy or objectives for any plan is critical and fundamental to operational success because objective is the heart and soul of the Operational Art.⁵⁴ If AP only existed to improve determination and clarity of objectives and provided for updates of objectives from the leadership, it would be an overwhelming success.

Leadership

Unity of command is missing in the AP process. Joint Publication 3.0 states that unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization — the product of successful unified action. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective⁵⁵, which did not happen for AP implementation.

⁵³ Daniel J. Hughes, *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993), 184.

⁵⁴ Dr. Milan Vego, June 27, 2009.

⁵⁵ United States Department of Defense, US Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2008), p.A-2.

Failed leadership caused the lack of unity of command preventing the organization and implementation of AP as reflected in the comments from DoD respondents:

- JPEC in-fighting over control of change and who is in charge is preventing success. Competing entities are more defensive than visionary to properly revise Joint Strategic Planning and the specified tasks of formulating political-military assessments, defining pol-mil objectives and end states, developing strategic concepts and options, and allocating resources.
- To fully embrace the AP vision both the JS J3 and JS J5/J7 must be part of the process improvement. The AP Executive Committee (EXCOM) is correctly led by the Director of the Joint Staff (DJS) since he holds sway over both directorates, but the level below has only JS J7 participation and often the JS J3 rep does not even attend.
- The current situation reveals the Under Secretary of Defense - Policy (USD-P) leads AP process and policy. JS J7 leads functional and operational aspects of AP. DISA has designated separate Technical Program Managers for each GCCS-J/JOPES, CFAST, and Net Enabled Command Capability (NECC). Requirements processes are separate for each DISA program. As a result, DoD will never achieve the AP vision. The first reaction by the federal government on any problem is to establish a new governmental office of responsibility to better define the problem and make recommendations to fix it. DoD does not need to do that. The best solution to achieve unity of effort is to use JS J3 leadership as the supported entity and JS J7 and JFCOM as supporting. The AP effort lacks a clear vision, a single focal point. Various organizations are working toward what they perceive to be the goal but the efforts are not aligned for optimal performance.
- The intent of AP is often misunderstood. Implementing a department-wide "process" requires the full cooperation of the key stakeholders (JS, Services, CCDRs, DoD Agencies, etc.) and significant research and coordination. The implication on the Services with regard to just Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Training, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) is significant and not equally understood throughout DoD because the definitive guidance and mid/end states have not yet been clearly articulated.
- One reason implementation has been difficult is the "tri-chair" concept. OSD, JS J7, and JFCOM all have roles in the AP implementation effort. They have worked hard at forming a team and serving as a synched group, but sharing the lead is challenging and is complicated even more by the role CFAST and CFAST development plays within AP. The AP EXCOM identified this issue and tasked the AP Implementation Team (APIT) to develop recommendations for a single AP "program manager." JFCOM serves as a "[Program Executive Office] - like" Single Enterprise Capability Manager for AP. JFCOM has been designated the AP initiative functional sponsor for the development of a long-term plan for the integration of the AP initiative and NECC. The JFCOM mission

is to work the AP initiatives in coordination with the JPEC (AP user community) and for AP EXCOM approval.

Clearly, AP lacks direction and unity and planning is challenging when strategic guidance is not as directive as it should be without enforcement. There are new governance relationships in DoD for AP attempting to address this challenge. For example, a newly published CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3265.01, C2 Governance and Management, formally calls for an APEX Working Group led by the JS J3 and JS J7. This may assist in getting AP moving forward but leadership in AP has to be exerted at a higher level.

Although not optimal, efforts are being made to address AP challenges by the J3 sections of Joint commands. In January 2009, the JOPES Actions Group (JAG) conducted its initial meeting in accordance with the new C2 Governance structure. The JAG is one of two sub-working groups under the APEX working group and is responsible for policy, process, and procedures across the spectrum of Joint operation planning and execution. The JAG is J3 centric and replaced the JOPES User Advisory Group (UAG) that met quarterly with JOPES users from throughout the JPEC. The APEX working group (co-chaired by JS J3 and JS J7) will try to mesh the interests of two very different world views to best support the warfighter. It is the intent of Joint Staff J3 to report the decisions of the JAG to the APEX WG once it begins formal proceedings. This will formalize the JAG positions in accordance with the C2 Governance structure.

There have been numerous attempts to determine authoritative data sources within DoD with no unified approach. Working groups such as the JFCOM C2 Authoritative Data Sources Working Group hosted by the J87 meet to conduct unclassified virtual meetings to address history, background, and construction of DoD data needs to formally

capture lessons learned. Representatives participate in the DRRS+ (DoD Readiness Reporting System) Program Office Working Group to continue to develop Courses of Action (COAs) and execution timelines for a DRRS+ Program Office. The working group is led by JS J39 with reps from JS J8, OSD (Personnel & Readiness), OSD (Networks & Information Integration), DISA, and JFCOM J88 and J3/4. Initial action was directed by the DRRS EXCOM on Nov 18, 2008 and the DRRS EXCOM on Jan 27, 2009 directed expanding the effort to look at the possibility of creating a single Program Management Office (PMO) by combining the proposed DRRS PMO with the AP PMO effort and an FMIP PMO. Consolidating all three of these PMOs into a single PMO could provide efficiencies compared to the cost of standing up three separate offices and serve to further integrate the efforts/requirements of all three.⁵⁶

The AP Implementation Team (APIT) is composed of JPEC representatives and is COCOM J5/JS J7 centric. They meet monthly as an O-6 level forum, tri-chaired by OSD-P, JS J7, and JFCOM J3/4 to provide recommendations and advice to the AP EXCOM on DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training and Education, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities) issues regarding APEX. This forum could provide tremendous input to AP but, as described by an AP survey respondent, “is unfortunately viewed in the CAP community as just another meeting by some and not even attended by others.” It could contribute greatly as an avenue for change. Under the new leadership, DoD needs only one working group to review ADP JOPES, CFAST, DRRS, and other tools to

⁵⁶ John Wellman, JFCOM J88 Joint Combat Capability Developer (JCCD) Weekly Activity Report(WAR), 9-13 Feb 2009.

ensure they support process. Continued discussion regarding development of tools supporting the entire AP community remains very important.

Another attempt to try and force independent commands to merge AP applications is the AP Huddle. JFCOM J8 hosts this huddle as an O-6 level forum with participants from OSD, JS, JFCOM, and US Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Participants advertise they are attempting to sort out how the more mature AP capabilities fielded today (and on the radar of DoD senior leadership) will migrate, integrate, and interoperate applications such as JOPES, CFAST, JCRM, and a multitude of others. This forum was generated by senior leadership discussions at the Command and Control (C2) Senior Steering Group/C2 Integration Board regarding the need to look at the broader AP process and the key pieces (capabilities) to ensure no duplicative capability development and that they are also aligned to budget programming. This is further highlighted by several key DoD efforts to include the budget development process for Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012, recent Deputy SecDef direction regarding linkage of APEX and NECC, and the recent JROC direction for an application called Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis (ISPAN) as DoD's Joint strategic/operational COA development capability.

Leadership in AP has been most diluted by three stove piped EXCOMs chaired by DJS that supervise different aspects of AP. The DRRS EXCOM is chaired by DJS and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness (DUSD-R). The Force Management EXCOM is tri-chaired by DJS, DUSD-R, and the Deputy Commander of JFCOM. The AP EXCOM is chaired by DJS and the USD-P. DoD must reduce these three EXCOMs to one EXCOM to efficiently manage the new process. DoD would save time and resources immediately with drastic improvement to unity of command and

effort. This one EXCOM must immediately fuse the funding to programs such as CFAST, DRRS, and FMIP. Although DoD does not fund or budget most disparate pieces that currently compose AP, funds from DRRS assigned by Presidential Decision Memorandum for a Global Visibility Capability will give AP needed resources without the inefficient current approach. This will establish immediate momentum in AP because to date all direction from the SecDef has not been enforced and only a rapid shift in money can generate a rapid movement in DoD.

OSD does not need to be intimately involved as they are currently staffing programmers and developers for tactical applications. OSD involvement beyond EXCOM supervision has not been efficient as evidenced by poor implementation of AP and DRRS as an additional example. Colin Gray said:

“It is vital to recognize potential tension in three sets of relationships: between politicians and commanders, between commanders and planners, and between commanders and theorists. Military professionals must simplify, focus, decide, and execute. Politicians, by virtue of their craft, perceive or fear wide ramifications of action, prefer to fudge rather than focus, and like to keep their options open as long as possible by making the least decision as late as feasible. Although commanders are gripped by operational requirements, planners—especially if unschooled by real operational experience—are inclined to live in an orderly world where a model of efficiency and compromise is acceptable and is a driver.”⁵⁷

All levels must exert leadership to achieve this needed balance between military operations, military plans, and OSD civilian leadership to attain the AP vision. JFCOM, who is tasked by the Unified Command Plan as the Joint force integrator and to supervise the Joint deployment process from planning to execution, is now tasked to lead the AP process integration. JFCOM J3 as a single entity can improve operations and planning integration managing the AP effort under a single EXCOM leadership. The SecDef

⁵⁷ Colin Gray, p.11.

should give JFCOM complete control over this initiative to include both process improvement and program development. JFCOM should report through the JROC on programs and requirements and through the Operations Deputies (OPSDEPS) on process. JFCOM has a challenging mission dealing only with the problems of the COCOMs and services, but they must be careful not to bureaucratically bind AP in a web of JCIDS, Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), and others like most new programs do. The JPEC should completely review all AP initiatives/changes to process or programs with emphasis on ensuring processes and programs for planning and execution remain fully interoperable and executable. While planning can be a valuable learning process for planners according to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5, “plans and orders exist for those who receive and execute them rather than those who write them.”⁵⁸

Doctrine

AP must follow doctrine established in Joint Publications 3.0 and 5.0 and the JOPES Volumes. DoD will obviously need to continually update doctrine to reflect the changes implemented to realize the SecDef vision. DoD members have to ensure doctrine is a starting point and is subject to change. Doctrine cannot be quoted as the only solution, but must be living and be written and rewritten. With proper adjudication across DoD, doctrine can be updated to reflect the realities of current DoD operations in the AP environment. DoD should take concepts and ideas and improve the previous JOPES policies and IT to meet the needs of AP rather than creating a whole new AP concept. It

⁵⁸ Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5, *Planning*, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1997), p.89.

is far easier and more efficient to update existing doctrine and fielded applications than to implement a brand new approach.

The doctrine that has changed and will change to accommodate AP impacts far more than just the US. The US must realize that doctrine changes influence or at least confuse most countries around the world especially NATO. A good example is “Effects Based Operations” that generated worldwide doctrine change and the creation of new offices by our allies to embrace it only to learn in 2008 that it had been dismissed as a mistake or flawed concept. Changes in doctrine are simple in DoD with a sizeable budget, but changes to other defense organizations can deplete resources that could be applied to other needed areas.

DoD must better integrate doctrine with AP because current doctrine is not completely merged with the term or “AP” acronym. For example, AP is not included in the GEF publication, which is critical for current planning. It is not even included in the DoD Dictionary and acronym list. AP is listed but is defined as “allied publication; antipersonnel; average power” per Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, April 12, 2001, as amended through October 17, 2008.

In addition, doctrine must be written to lend to the enforcement previously articulated and noted to be lacking. AP mandates have not been successful but can be in the future if enforced. Doctrine cannot leave commands to determine on their own if steps in the planning process are required or subjected to a commander’s interpretation.

For example, Joint Publication 5.0, *Joint Planning*, needs to be updated due to the ineffective verbiage utilized to describe the National Strategic End State. The end state

must be correct because it is critical to ensure tactical efforts are contributing to the goals and objectives at the highest level.

For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the President and SecDef typically will establish a set of *national strategic objectives*...Achievement of these objectives should result in attainment of the national strategic end state — the broadly expressed conditions that should exist at the end of a campaign or operation. The supported CCDR must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state is established when possible. Often this end state is uncertain, difficult to determine with clarity, or an estimate based on assumptions and unpredictable conditions in the operational environment. In some situations, operations must begin before a clear understanding of the end state is determined. For all cases, the CCDR must work to frame the problem with the best information available and be prepared to reassess the situation and reframe the problem, as required.⁵⁹

The country's leadership has to set national strategic objectives. Achievement of these objectives, if nothing in the situation changes, will result in attainment of the national strategic end state if there is a good plan. Leaders must ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state is always established. End state can not be uncertain or difficult to determine to ensure the elements of national power can achieve it. The words underlined above have to be eliminated from doctrine with the same approach throughout all planning doctrine.

Organization

COCOMs must be organized to support AP by staffing J5 directorates with Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), National War College (NWC), Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), or service war college graduates who will maintain the DoD OPLANs. COCOMs who assign a person by name to maintain a plan and who frequently monitor the plan have living plans. An OPLAN renewal process must include

⁵⁹ Joint Publication 5.0, p III-5.

personnel by name who are solely focused on updating that plan. This approach is similar to allowing mechanics to put their names on military vehicles or crew chiefs to put their names on aircraft. There is pride in ownership and a person accountable for a plan keeps it living. The plan manager also needs a named secondary and tertiary manager for depth. The manager's job as a planner should be to keep the plan living by personally reviewing the plan on a regular schedule and scheduled reviews of senior leader end state, objectives, assumptions, and risk.

In addition, all cabinet departments need to provide a point of contact by name for the top priority plans at a minimum to facilitate a better coordinated effort and ensure the interagency effort truly exists. The National Security Council has to provide the policing function to enforce it. According to Major General Stephen Silvasy, US Army (retired), "it is very difficult to integrate interagency planning and even harder to execute."⁶⁰ Department representatives will make sure that plans built in AP have interagency considerations which will facilitate transition from contingency plan to crisis action plan. Once the DoD is able to plan within the AP vision, it can expand to plan with other departments in the US government in an interagency fashion to provide more efficient and effective military capability as an element of national power.

According to General John Foss, US Army (retired), former commander of US Army Training and Doctrine Command, a plan cannot be kept alive 24 hrs a day. He said in an interview that he does not think anyone meant for it to be like that. He said, "The SecDef did not want a plan on the shelf for two years and then try to execute it. Living means someone is keeping it warm. Senior generals and admirals understand that the

⁶⁰ Major General Steve Silvasy, USA(ret), interviewed March 23, 2009.

TPFDD reflects the priorities when it was created and, if the situation changes, the forces they need will be different.”⁶¹

DoD must also be organized to at least address the insatiable appetite of IPRs necessary in AP. The SecDef has committed himself to IPRs but he does not have time to do them all formally. The SecDef will deal with the top priority plans and as many other plans as his schedule will permit, but more important things arise on the SecDef’s schedule and routinely IPRs are rescheduled. A component of AP not being effective is the sheer mass of plans requiring review with all the issues of the department. DoD must make each IPR less formal by using technology to support the process and informally present OPLANs to the SecDef at his desk or even while he is travelling. OSD must satisfy the lack of SecDef availability with other senior civilians to provide some insight from a senior civilian perspective which is better than no input.

Training

The current training received by staff officers on AP is inconsistent. AP must be added to all Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) levels I and II. Intermediate education for Majors and Lieutenant Commanders and top-level education for Lieutenant Colonels and Commanders must include AP. Educating the military force on the change from deliberate/contingency planning and CAP to AP is a very long process. AP has not permeated all instruction in the Joint warfighting functions of DoD. JFCOM as the Joint force trainer has to ensure AP is taught by all services, all DoD educators understand AP, and AP is taught to standard.

⁶¹ Gen John Foss, USA(ret), interviewed November 21, 2008.

Training can not be an afterthought or the first item to lose funding when budgets are cut. It is rare to have DoD field a capability simultaneous with needed training because unfortunately training is not a priority in DoD. This is not merely the fielding of a process, but also a philosophical approach to planning reflecting a paradigm shift. AP requires a high-level perspective of training across all services and the Joint community to make the philosophy of AP an integral part of service education and JPME.

The DoD is making a large mistake by not taking better advantage of the intellectual capital resident in the four service and three Joint top level schools and four service advanced warfighting schools for the intermediate level.⁶² The Joint Staff should assign each school to a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) to conduct planning required for their course requirements. The opportunity exists for the schools to provide tremendous support to the COCOMs by working real plans for staffs that are already low on both trained planners and time to work plans.

For example, in anticipation of likely hostilities, the Naval War College began to study the possibility of war with Spain. In 1894, a student, Lieutenant Commander Charles J. Train, completed a plan for war with Spain as a War College requirement, and in 1896 another student, Lieutenant William W. Kimball, wrote a paper entitled “War with Spain.” According to David Trask in his book *The War with Spain*, when Secretary of the Navy John D. Long convened the Naval War Board to plan for the impending war,

⁶² Each service has a Top Level School: Army War College, Air War College, Naval War College, and Marine War College. The three Joint Top Level Schools are JAWS, NWC, and ICAF. Each service also has intermediate level advanced warfighting schools: the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), the US Navy Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC), the US Army School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the US Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS).

Lieutenant Kimball's plan, with only slight modifications, became America's first deliberate war plan.⁶³

Joint and service war colleges will embrace this new role and the students will greatly appreciate their direct contribution to DoD efforts at the strategic level. Learning of wars past at JPME compounded with campaign planning makes war college students uniquely qualified to contribute. According to Napoleon Bonaparte:

*"Tactics, evolutions, artillery, and engineer sciences can be learned from manuals like geometry; but the knowledge of the higher conduct of war can only be acquired by studying the history of wars and the battles of great generals and by one's own experience. There are no terse and precise rules at all; everything depends on the character with which nature has endowed the general, on his eminent qualities, on his deficiencies, on the nature of the troops, the technics or arms, the season, and a thousand other circumstances which make things never look alike."*⁶⁴

In addition, training and education must address the reality that planners inherently try to reduce risk and must address two-sided communication. Planners must push articulated cost, benefit, and true risk to the commander for a decision and expect to assume more risk than they want. Planners must be trained to listen before they talk to be a good planner. Under AP guidance, planners must hear frequent feedback from their leadership to ensure they are planning to accomplish strategic goals and objectives. Planners must have constant exchange with other directorates to ensure coordinated efforts are pursued that will ensure a feasible plan is written that is also executable.

Planners must learn to have an attitude or understanding that change will happen and they must resist human nature to lock a plan down, rest on the completion of a plan,

⁶³ David F. Trask, *The War with Spain*, (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), pp. 72-80.

⁶⁴ Rudolf von Caemmerer, *The Development of Strategical Science During the 19th Century*, translated by Karl von Donat, (London: Hugh Rees, 1905), p.275.

and not continually update a plan. Planners must frequently remind themselves that they are not operators and must embrace the reality that they are strategic logisticians specializing in moving the pieces to the right place at the right time to achieve strategic objectives.

Students of planning have to learn to resist the natural tendency to have all the answers to questions in plan creation. Faculty must expose students to unexplained or unpredicted changes to a situation during planning. Harry Yarger wrote:

“Scientific or Newtonian thought dominates most Western thought. As a result, military planners tend to seek certainty in their planning processes—direct cause and effect—even at the expense of accuracy or reality. But such Newtonian thinking at the strategic levels distorts reality and obscures the actual complexity, leading to faulty assumptions and hiding potential issues and options. Strategic thinking is better served by openness to possibilities rather than a constrained perspective.”⁶⁵

Clausewitz recognized the difference in reality and planning with his concept of friction. He cautioned, “The good general must know friction in order to overcome it whenever possible, and in order not to expect a standard of achievement in his operations which this very friction makes impossible.”⁶⁶ Yarger also wrote, “Friction at the operational and tactical levels is mitigated by proper planning and appropriate anticipation and reaction—branches and sequels to the plan. In essence, the good general creates a black and white reality by attempting to account for everything possible in the planning process.”⁶⁷

J3 planners frequently argue that DoD has never executed a contingency plan in the history of the military because every plan requires changes that may be slight but are

⁶⁵ Yarger, p. 43-44.

⁶⁶ Clausewitz, p. 120.

⁶⁷ Yarger p. 43-44.

usually drastic to match the situation. DoD still must train to plan because training prepares the entire unit for better CAP and execution.

Personnel

According to Joint Publication 5.0, the center of gravity (CoG) of a friendly or enemy force is “a source of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.”⁶⁸ In DoD, the planning CoG is the personnel who are assigned to the various elements at the Joint, interagency, or multinational organizations involved in creating or updating a plan.

DoD can better accomplish assigned missions and better take care of their personnel by improving in the creation and development of planners to better understand planning and strategy. The Marine Corps has enlisted planners that can work an entire career in the planning world. The Army has officers that are dedicated planners with a FA59 Military Occupational Specialty. In the Air Force, there are enlisted Logistic Planners (JOPESTERS) that plan but they do not have officers who grow in this arena. Consequently, almost any Air Force officer in a planning job is almost undoubtedly trained “on the job” at a CCDR staff, major command staff, or Air Operations Center. Obviously, there is no uniform policy in the DoD which must be changed to mandate all services maintain officer and enlisted planners.

The DoD has been struggling with the challenge of developing, maintaining, and tracking Joint manpower. The DoD trains their personnel at great expense to the taxpayer and then can not quickly identify that individual for surge capability at war time or for future assignment. DoD does not need more mandates or requirements. Previously tasked

⁶⁸ Joint Publication 5.0, p. 132.

entities have to complete the task, staff the solution, and then implement it. For example, the Joint Deployment Training Center in the USJFCOM J7 has been working an effort to create Joint skill identifiers based on JROC Memorandum.

In addition, it is egregious in this day and age that DoD will graduate hundreds of trained planners from the Joint and service war colleges in June 2009 and those people will not move directly to AP billets. The services understand they are supposed to push 51% of graduates into Joint billets but there is no system to grade the effort and verify. Without the skill identifier capability, the graduates move on to their next assignment and fleeting knowledge of AP is degraded over time. At a minimum, every graduate from the Joint war colleges (JAWS, NWC, and ICAF) should move to only J5, J35, JS J7, or inter-agency planner jobs with no exception. That will give the taxpayer better value for the expense and will greatly enhance AP implementation with a more efficient interagency process.

The services who man, train, and equip the force must take a more proactive role in developing and keeping active duty planners. Until then, the knowledge base lies in the GS civilians and contractors. On most staffs, a military planner provides about six months to two years of effective input. Then he or she moves on in their primary career path and leaves the civilians and contractors left to plan and train the replacement. DoD does not need to create a whole new mindset under AP which would potentially undermine vast knowledge of existing processes and systems. This business is not a game or experiment and it is successfully executed every day.

The J3 operations community maintains government civilians to retain critical historical knowledge of previous good and bad efforts. The J5/J7 planning community is

led by mostly military who regularly change out with constantly shifting corporate knowledge. Most planning historical knowledge rests in the minds of contractors never welcome in policy discussions due to the potential impact on future contracts. The planning community must expand their historical and technical knowledge base with government civilians to ensure a level playing field. DoD should look across current policies that allow retirees to rejoin an organization without at least a one year "break in service." This would help programs and organizations retain trained, talented personnel within DoD.

Materiel

Materiel is purposefully discussed last in implementing AP because we need all other changes planned prior to pursuit of technology to support it. Marine General James Mattis, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and Commander of JFCOM, said in a newspaper interview that the essence of war-fighting is "improvise, improvise, improvise" and he urged realism as well. "War is fundamentally a social problem that needs human solutions," he said. "I want the best possible technology in the hands of the troops, but the thought that this will solve the problem of war is foolish." He said that while the character of war may change, its fundamental nature does not. A reading of complex systems theory, he said, shows that no amount of technology can make war a perfect system; the variables are too great.⁶⁹

As previously stated, the establishment of goals and objectives serves as the greatest opportunity to improve the existing planning system. Thus, the material piece of

⁶⁹ Matthew Jones, <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/01/robots-have-place-army-future-panel-agrees>; viewed January 27, 2009.

AP must exist to improve the establishment and refinement of national policy constantly. Technology does offer a tremendous benefit to improve planning in DoD but it can not be overemphasized. Tools and technology must support the process to facilitate the process and interaction between people at all levels.

Material support to AP must be simple with a goal of accessing only one application by the planner to perform the full spectrum of expected requirements. This technical piece must intuitively provide most importantly the latest input from the President, SecDef, or CCDR presenting the problem in their mind. AP material solutions must include the C2 relationships preferably depicted in a wiring diagram, updated goals, objectives, end state, termination criteria, and intent regarding Joint, interagency, multinational and non-governmental organizations.

Material support to AP should provide a collaborative ability to push answers and information back up to the country's leadership to save time. Planners' exposure to the leadership will be minimal at best so their input must be concise and easily presented. It should provide easy access to historical content, problem discussions from mission analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. This is critical due to the constant turnover of personnel in the military to ensure quick situational awareness for new planners. The solution should apply to all plans to facilitate applicability to all agencies and it should decrease the current time and complexity involved in planning collaboration.

AP tools must provoke timely input and feedback from the leadership for top priority plans at a minimum. Technical prompts or questions can assist by minimizing or even avoiding ambiguous responses. Planners must record the time lapsed for the entire process and for each entity of plan development to assist in process refinement and to

observe problem areas. These tools must ensure risk is addressed and captured at all levels realizing that a decrease in risk in one level does not decrease risk in the other levels. Tools that provide similar capability to include time and risk already exist in the US Government at minimal cost. The current Joint Force Provider process runs on a simple government application facilitating critical dialogue from COCOMs to the Joint Staff to the force providers for dramatically less money than current proposed AP solutions that are not interoperable.

Maintaining a running clock for time lapsed to conduct overall planning and planning at each step cannot be overemphasized. Many planners responded to the SecDef plans for initial AP by saying DoD can reduce the time required to plan simply by requiring OSD and SecDef to reduce the amount of time plans sit on that side of the Pentagon. A running clock serves as a reminder and provides meaningful data for plan status and future plan preparations.

AP should drive the integration of force sourcing capabilities across planning and execution through process, functionality, data decomposition, and analysis. Global visibility of requirements cannot occur without the inclusion of planning requirements within the toolset. Changes in execution sourcing must inform the planning community to enable the living plan concept. Planners assigned by name to monitor their plan for a COCOM have to see the current operations sourcing to identify risk with the plan's apportioned forces.

As previously discussed, ADP JOPES was not the problem that Secretary Rumsfeld thought it was because DoD executed the CENTCOM TPFDD as planned. ADP JOPES certainly had problems identified and the frequent delays in developing /

upgrading JOPES created high levels of frustration in the force projection arena since the 1990s. It can be argued that the development of CFAST generated the dramatically improved speed in updating the currency of ADP JOPES through competition. A different perspective argues that the improvement to JOPES was due to the increased funding to the Global War on Terrorism and DoD budget supplementals to pay for long standing requirements. Regardless of how or why, developers have technologically advanced ADP JOPES in the new millennium. Developers have integrated it with web services to allow web-enabled interface for real and training operations. ADP JOPES can be further updated as an existing and deployed system of record to meet the needs of planning and operations directorates.

As highlighted in the “Leadership” section, JFCOM will lead the technical development of future applications to ensure that technical solutions previously developed by Joint Staff J7 and COCOM J5’s can move their data into the system of record for force projection developed by Joint Staff J3. Strong leadership on material development is critical because there is no need for niceties since that approach was taken with no positive results.

According to JFCOM, CFAST is quickly becoming untenable because COCOMs admit there are significant CFAST/JFAST problems to work. CFAST is now at version 5 and it simply is not ready for use in a real contingency because it still cannot deliver an executable TPFDD after four previous versions. It lost focus and wasted time and money causing reduced funding necessary to make even its core competency functional. CFAST was a bright idea prototype that has not transitioned to the program of record for sustainment. According to some advocates in DoD, there are some modules that should

be moved to the program of record that could be sustained. The department is now spending far too much money keeping CFAST alive without much payback.

JFCOM is working with DISA, the materiel developer for CFAST, in analyzing all areas of development, testing, and technical support associated with CFAST in an effort to understand why earlier success has translated into today's challenges. JFCOM's goal is to provide DISA clear and concise prioritized guidance on behalf of the operational community. CFAST resources are also under review to determine if there are any disconnects between the level of effort required and level of emphasis applied within the DoD to deliver CFAST.

A contributing factor to the delay in AP implementation is differing opinions of AP end state. Some believe the desired end state of AP is not to replace existing processes and tools (JOPES the DoD system and ADP JOPES) but instead it is intended for AP and JOPES to compliment each other. Others argue AP tools should/will replace GCCS systems such as JOPES. The materiel end state of AP must be one integrated system so CFAST development code must be pushed to ADP JOPES developers, both of which work at the DISA, for immediate integration of beneficial aspects and termination of redundant or failed aspects. Milestones and reviews must be established and strictly adhered to ensuring all are moving in the same direction under a unified effort. DoD must reduce the multitude of duplicitous databases and software programs created by services, COCOMs, and independent contractors.

This chapter proposed a fresh, holistic approach to achieving AP without a technological shortcut. Change can occur by addressing policy, leadership, doctrine, organization, training, personnel, and materiel and not just one aspect of the AP problem.

AP must ensure promulgation of strategic end state and objectives supported by technology.

V. Conclusion

*“The plan is nothing, but planning is everything.”*⁷⁰ - Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower

The SecDef’s AP vision can be realized with proper leadership to navigate bureaucratic and personality conflicts, by recognizing the major problems with AP in the DoD, and by changing the approach to solving the problems through historical analysis and new implementation guidance. This thesis discusses the state of planning in the DoD prior to the initiation of the Global War on Terrorism and the resulting new way to plan envisioned by Secretary Rumsfeld and his successor Secretary Gates. It discusses the attempts made in the DoD since Secretary Rumsfeld first initiated his AP dream to develop AP and it analyzes major problems like bureaucratic and personality conflicts that were never addressed and new problems created by poor leadership and lack of proper planning. Finally, it proposes a fresh, holistic approach to achieving AP without shortcuts to affect change by addressing policy, leadership, doctrine, organization, training, personnel, and materiel.

AP is needed because it seeks to improve existing planning processes and therefore improve the US ability to implement its elements of power which is exactly what is required today. Secretary Rumsfeld saw the lengthy time required to plan and the division in the DoD bureaucracy which he sought to fix. Secretary Gates reviewed the previous efforts and continued Secretary Rumsfeld’s work with AP.

The simple irony is that we cannot plan the way we want to plan much less a campaign. Trained and untrained planners in DoD argue a two theater war, a one theater

⁷⁰ Wikipedia, “Plan,” Accessed May 19, 2009, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan>.

plus, continental defense, and other approaches to how the US should plan for the future. The bottom line is the US must be able to plan without wasting precious time. Author and reporter Joe Galloway discussed his thoughts on how the DoD prepares for the future as a military and he said that whatever you prepare for is not going to be what happens to you.⁷¹ Thus, AP must bring needed flexibility and agility to a slow, inflexible process. The goal must be a common process shared by COCOMs, services, and DoD agencies which currently is not the case with much room for improvement.

Some argue that we have been doing AP since the 1700's and some argue the DoD dragged their collective feet to avoid the task but that simply is not true. Tremendous amounts of time and effort have been invested in AP. DoD violated the "Simplicity" principle of war and diffused the effort leading to a current state of minimal, if not no, development. As a result under the current approach, DoD will be unable to solve everything described in the AP Roadmaps. Units should create plans by setting the framework to allow planning continually and provide for easier adjustments over time as things change. The whole community must be adaptive.

Technical solutions were pursued too quickly to provide the SecDef with a solution. Technology can not fuse humans together because personalities matter more than any process or machine. We must bridge contingency planning to CAP with leadership and supported by technology.

AP has not been achieved because a lack of unity of effort, personality conflicts, and lack of operational focus had an unintended but predictable consequence of dividing the contingency planning side and the CAP camp. This is obviously completely contrary

⁷¹ Joseph Galloway interviewed April 2, 2009.

to what AP was created to solve. The end result is many contingency plans developed with marginal input from the CAP planners. Additionally, CAP planners have little or no confidence AP contingency plans are operationally executable.

A standard approach under the SecDef AP definition will establish the ends. Ways and means to attain those ends must be established with SecDef approval and then implemented by one unifying leader at the four star level. OSD must be removed as a functional or technical lead and resume their established goal to supervise the DoD. JFCOM as the assigned leader must create a sense of urgency that does not currently exist. A Program Executive Office (PEO) must be created with clear and achievable end states and supporting milestones. The PEO must then define the problem statement and the process, analyze the process and determine where the bottlenecks are, determine the products that must be delivered, revise the process, and publish in the appropriate enclosures in JOPE Volume I. Then and only then should the DoD determine the IT support requirements for AP following by assignment of resources based on these clearly defined priorities. Organizations must be held accountable and hindrances to goal achievement must be crushed. Current personality conflicts are completely unacceptable in any professional environment especially the DoD.

The new approach can then be anchored in doctrine and JPME to ensure DoD is a unified, educated fighting force. We do not need more tools or process improvement as much as better education and more importantly there needs to be enforcement and discipline of the process.

With this new synthesized approach by planners, AP will be a success. AP can bridge the critical chasm between US leadership, planners, and crisis action personnel by

facilitating dialogue and interaction. It will be successful if it focuses on establishing and frequently updating goals and objectives with a clear end state and termination criteria, solid assessment with realistic measures of success or effectiveness, risk assumption, and clear command and control within 6-9 months of plan initiation/rewrite.

Appendix A – Additional quotes not authorized for attribution

- Joint Staff J7 in the past has prevented COCOM J3 inputs from getting to the senior leaders.
- DoD leadership has believed the PowerPoint presentations for the past 5 years without seeking any independent verification.
- If you ask the CAP planners here if they ever envision using an AP produced plan, without exception, they say no.
- Crisis action planning still requires a small group of dedicated/experienced professionals to be locked in a room until they can come up with a plan that will work.
- Nothing incites a more negative response than to have relatively young planners give an AP presentation to leadership that contains an assertion that the current CAP process is old, archaic, and broken or that anyone who defends the current CAP process is out of touch with doctrine, does not understand the issue, and is not amenable to change.
- The timeline and tools in AP do not improve the quality or speed in which a plan is developed. For instance, previous conferences and meetings at USTRANSCOM or the owning Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) still take place. AP was supposed to eliminate or minimize these trips with a simple, innovative collaboration capability.
- "Marketed" focus has been on Information Technology (IT) and less time spent to address re-engineering, revision, redefinition of process activities/sub-process activities and their alignment, synchronization, and/or integration. Without "holistic" re-engineering of the contingency planning process (to include resulting products, personnel training and education, and IT to facilitate, enable, and support the process) we can not integrate crisis action planning and execution.
- Lack of unity is the biggest problem. Having the (Joint Staff) J7 and J3 driving two trains is difficult to support.
- The AP governance structure leans too heavily in the J5 lane due to initial focus of AP and alienates the J3 community. The J3 community is fine with this arrangement since they "execute real world operations" and have little time for the J5 efforts.
- AP is supposed to get us to plan more quickly and more responsively along several COAs to both push execution and eventually to push programming as well.
- A process that enables planners to provide a plan to decision-makers where decision-makers can spend 80% of their time working on Courses of Action and making the decision vice spending 80% of their time being brought up to speed on the situation.

- The ability to rapidly modify a plan based on the restrictions provided from leadership based on the global demand that must be maintained.
- The process/sub-process activities, procedures, and products to conduct all functional aspects of Joint operation planning to meet strategic national defense/response objectives. Plans (result of the process) are to provide a current foundational baseline for review, update/modification to allow responsive execution through deployment and sustainment of US Armed Forces.
- AP is the concept of creating a "system" or "family" of processes that will enable the rapid creation of plans from concept to operational status in days or weeks vice months or years. The concept also extends into the maintenance and update of the developed plans to quickly effect changes.
- Adaptive planning is the process by which contingency plans are developed. APEX is composed of the tools that are used to produce the plans. The process is defined in JOPEX Vol I for both AP and CAP. Two different communities lead AP and CAP. AP is a J5 lead and CAP is a J3 lead.
- The Joint capability to, on demand, rapidly and systematically create, revise, and execute plans as circumstances require
- ADP is the ability to consolidate the planning process with near real time information in an automated way by data mining authoritative data sources and plugging that data into the plan at the right location and time. Biggest use in my view is the crisis action planning process. This means that some data will change based on DTG information was solicited.
- The fact that Joint Staff J7 and J3 are not synchronized prevents the adaptive planning definition from becoming reality.
- Planners who use CFAST and executers who use JOPEX need to be in synch with each other. Now they have two "languages" to learn...CFAST for planning and JOPEX for execution.
- Many within senior DoD leadership are intent on improving the Joint operation planning and execution process, but remain ignorant of the complex, intertwined processes and all the service and Joint programs that support the process. Many of these leaders are more focused on programatics than on process improvement. The vast majority of effort is on the Materiel solution with little emphasis on the DOT_LPF.
- CFAST and AP were initiated by the planning side of the JPEC with little to no input from the execution side of the JPEC, thus severely hindering any and all efforts to improve the Joint operation planning and execution process.
- \$100M+ later, we have a failed system that OSD is driving to fix. To what end?

- The CFAST technology solution to contingency planning has improved that process.
- CFAST implementation has been challenging and AP & CFAST are very closely linked. Many consider CFAST the AP technology. As an example, the AP Technology Requirements Working Group held in June 2008 was basically a CFAST requirements working group. Validated AP technology requirements were voted on at the conference yet there was no obvious way to fund or develop requirements since it did not fit within CFAST. "CFAST is not AP, but is a technology that enables AP" was discussed at length during the Requirements Working Group, but it is still very difficult to separate the two.
- The primary focus has incorrectly been on the TPFDD. Proper understanding of the problem, mission, and concept of operations are the most important parts of the planning effort. From your mission analysis and concept of operation you determine the force required to achieve success with some degree of certainty. Time-phasing the force is trivial compared to proper development of the plan. Yet, the AP planners continue to put most of their effort into the TPFDD.
- Most would argue that based on the force strain and the need for a longer planning cycle to actually get the work done, that "living plans" have yet to be achieved. Global Force Management process is doing a better and more timely risk analysis assessment, but there have been no improved processes and integration for logistics and transportation planning.
- The AP process, to include the APEX process, remains a planning construct, as opposed to a planning and execution construct. Rather than develop the process, and associated tools/programs, to ultimately fulfill the requirements of plan execution, AP/APEX is a purely planning process, without the necessary mechanisms to carry plans developed in AP/CFAST through to execution. Merely changing the name from AP to APEX does not negate the fact that, due to a lack of full interoperability between AP/CFAST and JOPES (the system of record), products developed utilizing AP/CFAST are not executable.
- This separation of processes and functionality represents a giant step backwards from the integrated system as contained in JOPES. The only additive tools utilized are DRRS and CFAST which are not Joint and interoperable.
- The initial benefits of the proposed IT solutions and methodologies (drag and drop functionality, eliminated travel to collaborate, easy to learn and use tool, etc.) were misstated. AP has increased workload without a commensurate increase in resources.
- DoD placed initial emphasis on an IT solution without operation process re-engineering and without establishing a synchronized means to improve and integrate the various elements within and across DoD key stakeholders.

- utilizing the JCIDS process, the end state must be developed so that contingency planning and crisis action planning and execution use the same process, the same tools, but develop different products (OPLAN vs. OPORD).

- CFAST problems and the lack of contract maintenance support have led to mission failure during AP conferences. There is no redundancy to support the war planner if CFAST crashes.

-Senior retired DOD planners got the attention of senior military members and fed them a line of BS; it has not met its promises over many years; costly; developers are working very well with service HQs to improve it; to be able to execute a plan built in CFAST, way too many manual efforts need to take place; you can not have a living plan developed in CFAST, put on the shelf in JOPES for execution, and still keep it living.

- Based on APIT Meetings for over a year, COCOMs and even JS J7 are extremely frustrated with it. COCOM planners are very dedicated and my impression is they really want, and need, CFAST, but with upgrade delays, poor IT support, and program changes CFAST as a program has proved challenging and difficult.

- CFAST was built under the direction that it would replace ADP JOPES so interoperability with global command and control systems were not factored into the design.

Appendix B - Acronyms

ADP	Automated Data Processing
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AP	Adaptive Planning
AP EXCOM	Adaptive Planning Executive Committee
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution
APIT	Adaptive Planning Implementation Team
ASD C3I	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence
C2	Command and Control
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CAPE	Crisis Action Planning and Execution
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CFAST	Collaborative Force Analysis, Sustainment, and Transportation
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
COA	Course of Action
COCOM	Combatant Command
CONPLAN	Concept Plan
DIO	DRRS Implementation Office
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DJS	Director of the Joint Staff
DoD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Training, Personnel, Facilities
DRRS	Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System
DUSD-R	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GEF	<i>Global Employment of the Force</i>
ICD	Initial Capabilities Document
IPR	In-Progress Review
ISPAN	Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis
IT	Information Technology
JAG	JOPEX Actions Group
JCA	Joint Capability Area
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCRM	Joint Capability Requirements Manager
JFAST	Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFCOM	US Joint Forces Command
JOPEX	Joint Operation and Planning Execution System

JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Committee
JS	Joint Staff
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
MNF-I	Multinational Force –Iraq
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NECC	Net Enabled Command Capability
NORTHCOM	US Northern Command
OIF	Operation <i>Iraqi Freedom</i>
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OPSDEPS	Operations Deputies
OSD AT&L	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
OSD NII	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks & Information Integration)
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD-P	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
PACOM	US Pacific Command
PEO	Program Executive Office
PMO	Program Management Office
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
STRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TRANSCOM	US Transportation Command
UAG	User Advisory Group
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USD-P	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

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