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This paper analyzes the operational environment to argue that competent stability operations are the most effective means to influence the population-centric vulnerabilities of prevalent adversaries. Lessons from the post-WWII occupation of Germany, CORDS efforts in Vietnam, and extensive U.S. stability operations history clearly demonstrate that security, expertise, and unity of command are the critical tenets of successful stability operations. Thesis recommends integration of these three tenets into the U.S. military for rapid adaptation of national power to the strategic environment. The efficiency of the U.S. to intervene successfully in failed states is dependent on security, expertise, and unity of command.
HOLE OF GOVERNMENT: SEALING THE GAP IN U.S. STABILITY OPERATIONS

by

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This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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INTRODUCTION

“*A grain in the balance will determine which individual shall live and which shall die,—which variety or species shall increase in number, and which shall decrease, or finally become extinct... The slightest advantage in one being, at any age or during any season, over those with which it comes into competition, or better adaptation in however slight a degree to the surrounding physical conditions, will turn the balance.*”

*Charles R. Darwin*

Darwin’s observations of environmental adaptation over 150 years ago are as applicable to human societies in the international environment today as they were to natural selection and survival of species in the physical environment he described. Today the United States must adapt to an environment significantly different than those (the multi and bi-polar worlds) dominating the 19th and 20th centuries. The traditional means of U.S. national power, so effective in earlier times, are increasingly inadequate to address the challenges of change in the 21st century.

The United States must adapt rapidly to the new environment or risk an increasing rate of national decline and subsequent Darwinian fate. National treasure, in many forms, has propped increasingly inefficient means for almost two decades. The instruments of national power must meet the challenge posed by vulnerabilities of new threats and capitalize on the inherent US strengths. Present and near future challenges demand means to effectively influence populations. The improvement in the proficiency of US

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stability operations holds the greatest promise for returns. Despite size and inertia, the US military is the instrument of national power best suited among national agencies for rapid, effectual change. The thesis of this paper is that the efficiency of the U.S. to intervene successfully in failed states is dependent on security, expertise, and unity of command. Failed states in this context include weak, liberated, and occupied states. While liberated and occupied states are relatively self-evident, weak states include those that may request external intervention, short of liberation or occupation, to provide essential government services to the populace. Instances of assistance to these weak states may occur during cases of insurrection, heavy terrorist or criminal activity, or humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.

A thorough analysis of the international operational environment will indicate that the character of competition and conflict among international actors is changing, much as it has through the course of recorded history. Actors, too, have changed. The nation state will remain the primary actor in the international environment into the foreseeable future, but numerous factors have effected significant change in that environment in the last two decades. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, the rise of trans-national groups and the effects of globalization and proliferation of technology have changed the global strategic environment.

Geographically identifiable vulnerabilities naturally accompany geographically identifiable actors such as nation states. Many of these traditional, geographically constrained vulnerabilities vanish with the amorphous transnational actors of today and likely future. The U.S. cannot TLAM (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile) Al Qaeda’s presidential palace or destroy its main power generation facility and therefore cannot
influence that organization in the same way it can a geographically identifiable nation. Just as these means of conflict have morphed over time, so too have the actors within it. This paper will argue that the rise of non-state and trans-national actors is in fact an outgrowth of the timeless concept of asymmetry—the natural avoidance of opponent strength within competitive systems.

Sun Tzu introduced asymmetry with “just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness.”\(^2\) Means, ways, and in this case, actors, have adapted to the unchallenged conventional dominance of a singular global power. One pits strength against weakness to impose one’s will. The U.S. is unable to effectively pit conventional strength against the non-geographic vulnerabilities of the new actors. The nature and definition of war remain constant while the vulnerabilities of the adversary have changed. The U.S. has yet to efficiently capitalize on the population-centric vulnerabilities of this threat.

This paper also argues that weak and failed states will continue to dominate the 21\(^{st}\) century environment due to the growing influence of non-state actors, resource scarcity, and other contributing factors. Failures and inefficiencies in response to successful terrorist events and nearly decade-long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have raised national consciousness of new threats. The national reaction, however, leaves much to be desired. Calls throughout the national political and security establishment range from complete national security overhauls to lesser inter-, and intra-agency reforms. An explosion of new terminology and competing definitions has largely

obscured real issues and true strategic analysis. This paper reviews the often chaotic national reaction to date, clarifies relevant terminology, and analyzes current and likely future conditions.

Fortunately, the means of response to the “new” actors, “new” environment, and “new” vulnerabilities are not new at all. This paper argues that focused attention on proficient stability operations is the most effective way forward. The US has a long history of stability operations with varying degrees of success. A critical analysis of that history highlights lessons, largely unlearned, from a number of case studies. US operations in WWII and Vietnam point to security, expertise, and unity of command as three critical elements of successful stability operations. Proper incorporation of these elements into U.S. stability operations will effectively address the population-centric vulnerabilities of 21st century adversaries.

Security, expertise, and unity of command have significant implications for multiple arms of the national security establishment. Recent national-level reform efforts and non-DOD agency actions indicate that rapid, effective adaptation is likely only possible in the US military. Finally, this paper makes recommendations to enhance security, expertise, and unity of command in DOD stability operations with respect to force structure, organization, education and training, doctrine, and interagency coordination.
Chapter 1

THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test [in terms of a political goal] the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

Carl von Clausewitz

Any competent analysis of a problem as complex as the global strategic environment faces many challenges. The greatest challenge of these in problem solving, so famously codified in Clausewitz’s quote above, is not, paradoxically, in the solving. It is in the observing, the identification of the problem. When asked what he would do if he had but one hour to save the world, Albert Einstein is said to have responded that he would spend fifty-five minutes defining the problem and only five minutes finding the solution. The premise that the quality of a solution is likely proportional to the true understanding of the problem guides the following analysis.

The effectiveness and efficiency of the United States’ response to 21st century challenges are unsustainable. The challenges are significant and bear both similarities and differences with the past. The character of war has changed and the United States national security establishment is late to adapt. This chapter first examines the historical trends of human conflict leading to the current international environment. It then provides analysis of the current era in terms of influences and actors with which the

United States must interact. Finally, trends are examined with the goal of identifying the likely direction of tomorrow’s international environment.

It is imperative early in this discussion to define the phrase “human conflict”, used many times throughout this paper in lieu of “war”. The definition of terms and phrases used to describe human interaction is often a source of misperception, serving to obscure issues before even the “meat” of problems are engaged. The phrase “human conflict”, for the purposes of this paper, is used to denote the actions resulting from tensions between groups of human society. Those groups can be identifiable through any common trait – be it religion, ideology, or geo-political border. They can include nations, terrorist or criminal organizations, business conglomerates, or ideological movements. Tensions may stem from any ideological, territorial, or other difference between groups, while the actions that result span the range of conflict – from traditional war of physical violence, to the full range of means available to that group, potentially including the remaining diplomacy, informational, and economic components of “DIME.” The importance here being the difference between “human conflict”, thus defined, and an often narrower interpretation of warfare. Whereas war is a “continuation of policy by other means,” human conflict includes all means by which politics are continued.

2 The acronyms “DIME” (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic), “DIMEFIL” (adding Financial, Intelligence, and Law enforcement to DIME), and “PMESII” (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information) are frequently used almost interchangeably in systems approaches to international actor means and vulnerabilities. The intent with respect to human conflict described here is not to espouse one over the other, but note that tensions generate actions that span the means available to the group employing.

3 Ibid., 99.
HISTORIC CONTEXT

“The events which happened in the past will at some time or other and in much the same way be repeated in the future.”

Thucydides

In order to gain appreciation and greater understanding of the current international environment, one must understand the context under which it developed. Although history does not repeat itself in detail, it does do so in general patterns\(^4\) which can only be discerned through analysis of historical context. The examination of this context will illustrate changes in the character of war over time and provide rather Darwinian insight with respect to the urgency of adaptation required by the United States today. This will be followed by analysis of the current environment and trends likely to shape human conflict deeper into the 21\(^{st}\) century.

Certain constants and variables have defined human conflict over time. The two most important constants are the nature of war itself and the idea of asymmetry. In fact, it is the combination of these two primary constants that have shaped the variations over time. As war is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,”\(^6\) human conflict is, in a broader sense, the action through any means to impose that will upon an opponent. Changes in the character of human conflict are within the instruments


\(^5\) Wording of this theme is taken from the 2009 teachings of Dr. Vardell Nesmith, faculty advisor and instructor at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA.

\(^6\) Clausewitz, *On War*, 83.
and methods, the means and ways, to impose that will. While technology is often preached as the primary driver of changes in warfare, the concept and application of asymmetry has maintained a strong hand in the shaping of those instruments and methods over time.

As the traditional tools of war morphed through technology and asymmetry, so too did the means of influence. Economic power expanded national means of influence most notably in the 80’s as illustrated in the starkly contrasting examples of USSR deterioration and Japan’s peaceful rise in the absence of any real military power. Furthermore, the very nature of actors within the environment has shifted from nomadic/agrarian/hunter-gatherer to city-state, to nation-state in response to human conflict. These examples are particularly noteworthy before launching an examination of the current environment in that they illustrate an historic context. The pervasiveness of human conflict remains, yet the character of that conflict, in methods, means, and even actors, is constantly changing.

Methods

Technological advances in weaponry have changed the character of warfare. Some advances in weaponry, such as the use of stirrups, the rifled bore and the bayonet revolutionized warfare in some way by providing significant advantage to their possessor. Stirrups stabilized warriors on their horses, freeing both hands for the employment of

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weapons - an advantage which spread across Asia and Europe over the 8th and 9th centuries. Similarly, increased range and accuracy of widespread rifling during the American Civil War spurred defensive fortifications not previously considered, contributing to the dissolution of shoulder-to-shoulder line formations facing each other on the battlefield.

Other advances, however, went further to affect the very character of human conflict itself. At different periods in history, the use of professional armies, combined arms, and nuclear weapons following WWII each had effects on societies at large. The complex employment of combined arms and rise of professional armies redefined those within society who fought. The separation of combatants from the general populace inexorably changed the calculus of war as an extension of policy. Though mass mobilization occurred in the French Revolution, American Civil War, and two World Wars, most decisions for war no longer required the personal involvement of entire societies. The threat of nuclear weapons post-WWII again changed the character of human conflict in that it affected the societal view of war in the major powers. The existential threat to the general populace again changed the political calculus of war.

Means

While technological advances at times revolutionized warfare and even affected the greater calculus of war from the societies involved, other historical dynamics illustrate more fundamental changes to the means of human conflict. Sun Tzu first wrote of diplomacy, deceit, and politics in warfare over two thousand years ago, but dynamics during the Cold War and Japan’s peaceful economic rise following WWII illustrate
expanded means of influence beyond the use or threat of violence. The international order which developed around the USSR and US from the late 1940s to 1980s was defined by bipolar conventional dominance, nuclear weapons, and the threat of escalation. Relevant to this discussion is that the erosion of that order occurred not due to traditional military force, but due to economic power. The Soviet fiscal pressure to match American military power, fund years of fighting in Afghanistan, and simultaneously provide essential services to their populace ultimately led to the dissolution of the USSR. Quite ironically, given the preponderance of military focus during that period, economic means were proven the critical element to impose will between the societies in conflict.

Similarly, the rise of Japan as a world power in the mid to late 20th century also lends credence to the broadening of the means of influence. With no military beyond the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) and a constitution expressly forbidding it, Japan’s influence in world affairs rose from zero immediately following its defeat in WWII to a close second by the late 1980’s. Adaptation of successful business practices and the slaving of technology to production efficiency precipitated a rapid growth in economic power. This power, exercised through trade and fiscal relations in an increasingly interdependent international economic environment, enabled Japanese global influence far beyond what its military power would engender.

**Actors**

Perhaps less obvious than the quantum changes in methods and means by which conflicting societies have influenced each other over time are evolutions in the shape of
actors themselves. Though only discernable over a broader span of history, societal actors morphed from tribal-based hunter-gatherers to city-states, and then from city states to nation-states. The appearance of significant non-state actors such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), transnational criminal cartels and terrorist organizations, as will be evaluated later in this paper, is the most recent evolution of the global actor. As early as 13,000 years ago, food production in the resource-rich Fertile Crescent permitted a sedentary lifestyle. This spawned the development of high population-density societies and eventually the specialized social and governmental structures of the city-state. Interactions and conflict between nomadic peoples and city-states generally favored the latter for many reasons, not least of which were the population density from which to draw armies and effective protection of the citizenry. The nation-state interactions considered the norm today are a relatively recent turn of events. Though state boundaries cover all but Antarctica today, as recently as 1500 they covered less than 20% of the Earth’s land area. This brief recount illustrates the fact that even the shape of global actors has changed over time in a shifting web of temporary alliances, combat, and conquest slowly reshaping the face of human society.

**Perception**

A critically important concept in this analysis is that behind the oft flippant remark, “perception is reality.” Thomas S. Kuhn, the influential 20th century philosopher

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9 Ibid., 266.
and science historian, describes the effects of human perception most accurately in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.” His premise is particularly relevant to the analysis of the international environment at any point in time. Human observation is far from neutral despite all efforts toward objectivity because it is tainted by the paradigm within which the observer is trapped. The effect of this paradigm-dependent observation is that humans’ view of the world environment depends largely on what they already believe to be true. Anomalies are often ignored or explained away until the preponderance of contradictory facts, termed a “crisis” by Kuhn, is such that quantum change in the paradigm, or theory of understanding, must occur to take them into better account.  

Instructive here is that descriptions, explanations, and therefore solutions to dilemmas are tainted by the accepted paradigm of the time. In relation to the case at hand, there existed periods of time between significant changes in methods, means, and actors noted above that the changing environment was not wholly recognized. That recognition delay has separated victorious generals from defeated, visionary statesmen from average, and flourishing societies from decline for millennia. We are in such a transition period today. As history rolled past the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a confluence of factors began to push the international environment into a paradigm still being defined. It is one which the United States must accept and react to in order to avoid decline.

POST-COLD WAR

The conclusion of WWII marked the end of the previous, multi-polar strategic environment and the beginning of transition to the bipolarity of the Cold War. Though historians call these periods by different names, that transition between periods occurred quite rapidly, with a relatively rapid acceptance of the new environment. The dominance of US – USSR superpower relations was established early in the Cold War due to the economic and military devastation of traditional European powers and the primacy of nuclear technology at the time. This obvious and abrupt upheaval of old world order established the new paradigm rapidly with little transition.

The current strategic operating environment, in contrast, is still in an extended transition. It began with the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and is still evolving today. (Current demographic, globalization and resource trends foretell the primary characteristics of the future environment, explored more deeply in the next section.) Future historians will eventually coalesce on a title and the rough number of years for this period, but perhaps not until the next “punctuation” or shock to the international environment redefines it altogether. Regardless of eventual title or length, several discernable trends characterize this period of transition. These critical trends are:

1. the rise of non-state and transnational actors,

2. a related prevalence of weak, liberated, or occupied states, and

3. a shift from traditional “D” and “M” means of influence to “I” and “E”, even among major traditional (nation-state) powers.
Rise of Non-State Actors

All three of these characteristics have been significantly affected by globalization. This shrinking of the world, in the broadest sense, rapidly increased with advances in information technology and communications. Accelerating communication, technology, information, travel, and economic interdependence over the last two decades spurred, and in fact define, globalization as it has evolved today. Though large swathes of the Earth’s population lagged behind the attendant information revolution, the Internet began making information, audiences, and technology available to all connected. Over this time we see the evolution and increasing influence of both lawful and unlawful non-state actors within the strategic environment.

A natural extension of free market connectivity and interdependence, many transnational businesses, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and supra-national bodies represent the growth or strengthening of lawful non-state actors in this period. Global automobile and aircraft industries, NGOs such as CARE International and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and an increasingly influential United Nations (UN) and World Bank exist largely outside the sphere of any one nation-state. These actors have added a new dimension to international relations through their respective economic wealth, direction of essential resources, or legitimizing role on a global scale.

Often wielding power equal to or greater than weak regional nation-states, global terrorist and criminal movements represent the unlawful non-state actor in today’s environment. They have fundamentally changed the character of human conflict over the
last two decades. Transnational criminal activities have been enabled by many of the same factors enabling legitimate transnational business – connectivity, global economic interdependence, and diffusion of technology. High profits and transnational range enable the strongest of these to withstand concerted joint, interagency, and international efforts such as those conducted by SOUTHCOM’s Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) in the Caribbean and Central and South America. Moves and countermoves across geography and technology play out between the drug cartels and anti-drug forces much like a traditional arms race between nation states. U.S. national resources now battle 1000nm plus range semi-submersibles in the drug war between a superpower and non-state actor – a dynamic hard to imagine just a couple decades ago.

In the same time, traditional cultures and religious ideals clashed with Western power and progressive/liberal Western culture.\textsuperscript{11} Latent anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism found a home in Middle Eastern ideologues. Modern terrorism has roots extending into the early Cold War period and is largely an asymmetric response to national monopolies on the use of force. Access to destructive power through mass transit and public audience through media provided asymmetric means of influence to elements ideologically opposed to ruling national powers. Only in recent years have terrorist organizations gained the power of influence at a traditionally national level. Many factors contribute to the rising influence of Al-Qaeda and related terrorist organizations, but weak states, destructive potential, and a sufficiently supportive populace are the most significant.

The marriage of a suicide-tolerant religion with violent extremists in a region of high male unemployment and weak nation states has elevated terrorist influence to a global level. Remnants of an infrastructure supported by the United States CIA to thwart years of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan laid the foundation for Al-Qaeda under Osama Bin Laden. Sufficient active (personnel and finances) and passive support of a resident Muslim population\textsuperscript{12} has enabled the organization to thrive during years of terrorist attacks on Western targets and asymmetric battlefield tactics versus conventional coalition military deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Weak and failed nation states, long a fixture in the international environment, aid the growth and are in turn weakened further by the rise of these actors, who in some cases supplant insufficient services provided by the state to the people.

**Weak, Liberated, and Occupied States**

The prevalence of weak and failed states has continued in the last two decades. The spiraling effect between strong illicit transnational actors and weakening states has already been noted, however, other factors also contribute to the number of weak nation-states. Growing populations in the poorest regions of the world place increasing strain on provision of essential government services. Though individual exceptions apply,\textsuperscript{12} U.S. Dept. of Defense. Defense Science Board and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*. Dept. of Defense (Washington, D.C., 2004).
poverty, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource constraints are leading determinants of state weakness.\textsuperscript{13}

Many terms are used to define state fragility across the institutions studying them. Most differentiate levels of degradation, such as “weak,” “failed,” and “collapsed” in Rotberg’s oft referenced \textit{When States Fail},\textsuperscript{14} or “vulnerable,” “fragile,” and “crisis” in the Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-07, \textit{Stability Operations},\textsuperscript{15} while others rank states across multiple factors contributing to overall weakness. Perhaps the most useful recent study is The Brookings Institute’s 2008 \textit{Index of State Weakness in the Developing World}, which draws data from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other sources to provide comprehensive evaluation of multiple factors within economic, political, security, and social welfare categories. Noting the three lowest scoring states, Somalia, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo as “failed” states with progressively better circumstances as “critically weak,” “weak,” and “states to watch,” the index provides not only rankings but a compilation of data indicating the type of weakness present.\textsuperscript{16}

It is sufficient for this study to define “weak” states as those failing to provide essential government services to their populace, spanning any of the categories noted


\textsuperscript{16} Rice and Patrick. \textit{Index of State Weakness in the Developing World}. 
above. These states generally include all those annotated as failed, critically weak, and weak in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Map of the Weakest States

As weak states continue to shape the strategic environment, so too does the prevalence of foreign intervention. Assistance to weak states in the face of internal, external, or natural disaster pressures has increased in recent years as the threats emanating from within their borders has taken center stage. A weak state anywhere in the world is increasingly seen as a matter for the international community, specifically the UN Security Council, as the international system is felt to be endangered if a member is seen to be no longer functioning. The international community, or coalitions acting in its name, now considers the invocation of human rights and the right to self-determination authorization to intervene in the internal affairs of a state with the object of

\[^{17}\text{Modified from Rice and Patrick, } \textit{Index of State Weakness in the Developing World}, \text{ 13.}\]
restoring state authority required for proper functioning of international law. This is in marked contrast to traditional international law, where territory would be open to conquest by expansionist powers.\textsuperscript{18}

Peacekeeping, liberation, or occupation of these states is increasingly common. The United States participated in an average of one military intervention every ten years during the Cold War, but has averaged one every two years since. By 2003, “Iraq was not the first but the seventh society in a little more than a decade that the United States has entered to liberate and rebuild. In 1991, the United States liberated Kuwait. In 1992, U.S. troops went into Somalia, in 1994 into Haiti, in 1995 into Bosnia, in 1999 Kosovo, and in 2001 into Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{19} Not limited to US involvement, new United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions now average one every six months, with most missions lasting five to ten years in duration.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Shifting Means}

The importance of national military and diplomatic means of influence is not eroding, but there is an increasing shift towards information and economic power in the strategic environment. Traditional military combat power remains the primary deterrent against threats to a nation’s sovereignty, and diplomacy still encompasses the official


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
discourse between international actors. Increasingly, however, interdependent economies and access of the populace to information have resulted in the growing importance of national economic policies and information “campaigns”. Economic sanctions, national import tariffs, and the establishment of regional free trade zones illustrate mechanisms of this globalization effect. The value of informational means of influence varies with the nature of the target audience. The speed and reach of global communications means populations are more susceptible to effects from both free and state-controlled media. Though domestic support of policy from open, liberal democratic societies is at greater risk than that within authoritarian ones, all nations now weigh courses of action against probable popular effects in both international and domestic environments.

FUTURE TRENDS

Surprise-tolerance, appreciation of human nature, and educated guess must coexist in any adequate analysis of the strategic operating environment. There is certainly no shortage of future studies. From JFCOM’s 2008 Joint Operating Environment (JOE),\textsuperscript{21} the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,\textsuperscript{22} to NATO’s Multiple Futures Project,\textsuperscript{23} many strive to peer into the “foreseeable future”. As esteemed author and strategic theorist Colin Gray is keen to

\textsuperscript{21} U.S. Joint Forces Command, \textit{The Joint Operating Environment} (Norfolk, VA., 2008), 51.


point out however, the future is anything but foreseeable. In perhaps the most insightful page of the 2008 JOE, a text box titled “Strategic Estimates of the Twentieth Century” documents snapshots of the strategic environment at approximate 10-year intervals. Summarily highlighting the human inability to foresee the future, the “Strategic Estimates” underscore the element of surprise in the international environment. Gray suggests that strategic planners “recognise that you and your successors will be surprised many times in the future, so that your challenge is to plan with consequences that are surprise-tolerant. You will be surprised, but you need not be disabled by the effects of surprise.”

Human nature provides theme to historic context. Thucydides, the 5th century BC Athenian general and historian, identified “fear, honor, and interest” as the primary eternal and universal motives behind political behavior. These are, in many ways, the foundation for the repetition of general patterns in human conflict throughout history. Though the detail of history varies with geography, time, and personality, the study of historic context with human nature in mind provides application to current and future events. Far from prescriptive, it nevertheless leads to insight beyond that of a mere collection of facts, thus supporting evaluation of the current and future operating environment.

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Adequate analysis of the operational environment demands that “educated guess” be added to surprise-tolerance and historic context. Extrapolation of current trends is required in order to provide a framework against which national adaptation can be analyzed, planned, and structured. Demographics, globalization, and resource estimates suggest several trends in the future strategic environment:

1. growing instability of Middle Eastern and African populations,
2. increasingly destructive capacity of the individual or small group, and
3. the reaffirmation of “Machiavellian” state politics (traditional state influence over the global commons)

### Population Instability

A combination of demographic changes and economy will foster increasing instability in key South-central Asian and African populations. Ninety-five percent of the world’s population growth over the next 20 years will occur in developing countries. Economic growth, particularly in extreme “youth-bulge” states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Nigeria, will fail to meet employment requirements of the expectant populations. This will result in a growing and volatile youth population in the very regions least able to sustain it. Nation-state resources will be challenged, and in some cases unable, to support citizen requirements even without the external pressures of adversarial states, non-state actors, or natural disasters.

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Extreme economic stratification within individual states due to socio-economic policy, authoritarianism, or corruption will exacerbate this problem even in cases of significant overall economic growth. Increasing access to information, while admittedly lagging the developed world, will only increase the expectations of this historically volatile population. From this dissatisfied population will come the greatest potential support for national revolutionary forces, violent extremist organizations (VEO), and organized criminal activity. Additionally, any change in global oil-dependency, either through depletion or alternative energy “epiphany,” will halt the transfer of wealth upon which many Middle Eastern societies rely, resulting in additional masses already prone to support of VEO.

**Destructive Capacity of the Individual**

Informational and technological aspects of globalization will further empower the individual and non-state actor. “As technological innovation and global information flows accelerate, non-state actors will continue to gain influence and capabilities that, during the previous century, remained largely the purview of states.”\(^\text{30}\) While increased availability of information has ushered new capacities for good in terms of education, enrichment and philanthropy, it has also empowered the destructive capacity of the individual. Continued diffusion of technology will grant small extremist groups and individuals increased ability to disrupt human society, while the increasingly connected global media will help carry their story. Chemical and biological weapon threats from

the extremist actor will increase, as will potential infrastructure effects from cyber threats.

Machiavellian State Politics

Though inadequate food and water resources are sure to strain both individual state and international welfare systems in production and delivery, scarcity of energy and industrial resources will drive traditional interstate conflict. Natural resources are finite, and the rapidly growing populations and economies of China and India are, even now, driving expansion of their military power. Traditional state versus state resource interests and the control or influence over global commons will become a factor once again with the rise of multiple powers on the international scene.

In *The Prince*, Machiavelli wrote that anyone compelled to choose between being loved and feared will find greater security in being feared as “fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.”[^31] As witnessed throughout history, the rise of new powers will eventually result in conflict of major-power interests. Those conflicts will not be decided on love, hope, or diplomacy. They will be resolved through raw destructive power or the reliable deterrence of its presence. While surprise-expectancy from non-state actors is likely imprinted on Western DNA by this point, consideration of surprise from a (far more powerful) state actor must remain on the consciousness.

Chapter 2

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

“There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.”

George Washington

The strategic operating environment has changed and the current means with which the United States influences that environment have grown inefficient. Previous chapters examined changes in methods, means, and actors over the course of human conflict and the international scene in the last two decades. Those changes, and the US national security establishment reaction to them, are the foundations from which to analyze what has made United States influence less effective and determine what means the national security establishment must develop to adapt.

It is critical to note what has not changed. Just as the recognition of tools did not necessitate the dropping of the whole bipedal idea in early man, so too does the recognition of new threats today not necessitate the dropping of what has worked thus far. Traditional nation-state conflict continues and will continue, even as non-state and transnational actor influence increases. Raw combat power will deter or defeat major power threats tomorrow just as it has throughout history, even while globalization, information, and technology growth emphasize information and economic means of influence. The demand for global energy and industrial resources will again drive

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1 Carol Kelly-Gangi ed., The Essential Wisdom of the Founding Fathers (New York: Fall River Press, 2009), 82.
national conflict between rising states just as it has for centuries. The United States must maintain credible conventional dominance even as it adapts to a new strategic environment.

All has not changed, but overwhelming conventional combat power, nation-state diplomacy, and traditional economic influence do not carry the same weight or leverage they did just a few decades ago. The string of Al Qaeda attacks on the United States or US interests across the 1990’s, culminating in the attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon in September of 2001, illustrated the relative impotence of conventional superpower might. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) since, leading to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), has cost much in terms of national human and capital resources.\(^2\) The heightened awareness of US citizen vulnerability and threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and regime willingness to use them led to a now seven-year invasion and liberation of Iraq. Internal dissatisfaction with the results of these three related campaigns caused the flurry of discourse, doctrine, and dilemma chronicled in the previous chapter.

General consensus of inefficiency is evidenced by the volume of attention within the national political and security establishment, but the breadth of proposed solutions and explosion of terminology often serves to obscure rather than clarify the baseline issues. The rise of non-state actors and prevalence of weak, liberated or occupied states are the environmental characteristics that must be addressed. The growing instability of

developing nation populations and increasing destructive capacity of individuals indicate continuance and, in fact, strengthening of these characteristics in the future. Continued United States inability to effectively influence non-state actors and weak, liberated, or occupied states will speed US decline in the international environment. Interestingly, independent analysis of each dilemma leads to a common solution.

THE NON-STATE ACTOR

The goal of the state, in dealing with any adversary, is the imposition of will upon that adversary. Will is imposed via many means – essentially all the “elements of national power,” often represented as DIME, DIMEFIL, PMESII, or some other amalgam. Assuming adversary resistance, these elements of power are brought to bear on adversary vulnerabilities to effect change. No different than opposing wrestlers in a match, strengths are pitted against weakness to influence, or pin in this case, the opponent.

“Traditional” adversaries such as nation-states, upon which the US instruments of power are so finely tuned, all come with “traditional” vulnerabilities in the simplest sense. They come with geographic vulnerabilities. The geographically identifiable and targetable vulnerabilities are nearly endless: communication nodes and information networks which may be disabled or destroyed, military, political, or financial centers which may be struck. Just as every wrestler walks into the ring with limbs which can be grabbed and manipulated to apply throws, holds, and maneuvers, every nation state has geographic vulnerabilities which may be targeted with the throws, holds, and maneuvers
of the state – in this case the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic powers of the United States.

The very reason the US is the lone “superpower”, or if you will, the very definition of the term, is because the US means of influence are so much greater than those of any potential opponents. Some means are disproportionately stronger than others. Conventional combat power and economic strength are far beyond the nearest competitors—even a rising China. Actionable diplomatic and informational powers are subjectively closer to average and perhaps even below average in some cases. In a profound twist of asymmetry, a powerful actor in the course of human conflict has evolved with no geographic vulnerabilities to grab and manipulate.

Adapting to strike perceived US weakness and avoid US strengths, Al Qaeda and related transnational terrorist groups pursue their cause against an assault from not only the US superpower, but a coalition of many willing nations. Even now, the organization’s continued evolution is evidenced by growing decentralization in response to coalition attack. The openness of the US Western liberal-democratic society is particularly susceptible to “terror” and terrorist acts. As this “weakness” stems from the very ideals espoused in the Magna Carta, codified in the Constitution of the United States, and generally ingrained in the principles of free people everywhere, shoring of the weakness is not an option worth arguing.

The solution to addressing the non-state actor is in the evolution of US strengths. With geographic vulnerabilities largely missing, the US must rapidly adapt strengths to

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existing adversary vulnerabilities. Fortunately, the experiences of T.E. Lawrence, the British pioneer of guerilla warfare, are particularly profound in a vulnerability analysis of these terrorist networks. After leading the 1916-1918 Arab revolt against Turkish rule, Lawrence presented “mobility, security, time and doctrine” as the factors most contributing to insurgency success.\(^4\) Sufficient similarities exist between his Arabian Peninsula insurgency campaign and current transnational terrorist campaigns to make his framework instructive.

Time and doctrine, as applied to current terrorist movements, provide insight but little vulnerability to work with. “Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.”\(^5\) Lawrence’s value of time holds true in a local insurgency against a foreign invader, but delayed terrorist action in the current fight works to US favor.

Doctrine, too, provides insight but little vulnerability enlightenment. Every society contains extremists in some form, just as surely as any distribution of people contains left and right edges on a Bell curve. Extremist ideologies and extremist leaders will continue to exist. Terrorist leaders will continue to use religion to rally activists to their cause—whether or not they truly believe the Islamic disfigurement they profess. The doctrine of terrorist actors, while drawing their participants, is also an inherent


\(^5\) Ibid.
vulnerability in that its extremism should be abhorrent to the masses. Counter-terrorist efforts have yet to effectively capitalize on this vulnerability and thus decrease the active and passive support of the population within which the terrorist organizations operate.

Lawrence’s insurgents found mobility and security in the populace of the lands in which they fought. Far from suggesting significant active support was required, he noted a very small but active minority may succeed with merely passive support of the surrounding population.\(^6\) Like Mao’s fish in the sea, the activist adversary, in this case, can melt into a supportive populace with ease, denying US power a target.\(^7\) The vulnerability of the mobility and security requirements for adversary success, therefore, is the support of the population.

In no way profound, the importance of population to the insurgent, and in this case the terrorist non-state actor, is well documented. Current instruments of national power, however, remain relatively ineffective against this vulnerability. Recent success versus terrorist insurgent forces in Iraq are likely due more to the 2006 Sunni “awakening” in Anbar Province than the subsequent “surge” of US forces.\(^8\) As noted in earlier discussions of the operating environment, the inability to provide sufficient security or adequate essential services to the population is a leading trait of weak states. Populace dissatisfaction, exacerbated by the attendant demographic and economic trends noted earlier drives the populations’ active and passive support of the illicit non-state

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6 Ibid.


actor we wish to influence. Popular support, vice geographic target, is the vulnerability to attack.

**WEAK, LIBERATED, OR OCCUPIED STATES**

In contrast to the analysis of non-state actors above, the analysis of weak nation-states is relatively simple. It is first important to note, however, that the desire to wield the capacity for effective intervention does not equate to any greater desire for intervention in a given case. As noted in earlier chapters, weak, failed, and collapsed states are a permanent fixture in the international strategic environment that is not going away anytime soon. The United States must have efficient means to intervene and influence the circumstances surrounding those states if and when the President dictates the country does so. As will be examined in future chapters, past Presidents have chosen to intervene many times, and with increasing frequency, even through the means to do so were often ill prepared for the task.

Weak states are defined by the failure to provide sufficient essential services to their populace across economic, political, security, or social welfare categories. In addition to providing relative safe-haven and opportunistic environments for illicit non-state actors, they contribute geo-political instability, human suffering, and masses often actively or passively supportive of VEOs. The United States must develop the capability to efficiently intervene on weak states’ behalf if deemed within US national interests to do so. Additionally, the US must develop the ability to effectively liberate or occupy a state with international sanction to give it back to the liberated government or create a
new government more amenable to the international community. Either case requires competencies for security and the establishment of essential services.

**STABILITY OPERATIONS PROFICIENCY**

As the preceding sections articulated, populations are central to effectively addressing both non-state actors and weak states. Absence of geographically identifiable vulnerabilities in rising non-state actors have made traditional instruments of US national power somewhat ineffective. The very traits that define a weakening state – the inabilities to provide sufficient security or essential social services to the populace – are those factors that generate sufficient populace support for the non-state actor.

These factors are exactly the ones Stability Operations are designed to bolster.⁹ Proficient US stability operation capabilities are the means necessary to effectively address non-state actors and weak states in the 21st century operational environment. Additionally, proficient stability operations are the means by which liberated and occupied states are efficiently and effectively managed. Having resolved that US stability operations must be strengthened to maintain national influence in the 21st century, the following chapters will recount US stability operation history, draw key tenets of those operations (from case study), and recommend action for successful stability operations in the future.

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Chapter 3

UNITED STATES STABILITY OPERATIONS

Stability operations in weak, liberated, or occupied states are the most prevalent military operations in US history. Since the Declaration of Independence, American forces have fought 11 wars that were predominantly conventional in nature.\(^1\) Despite engaging “in several hundred military undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations”\(^2\) over that same period, the US military regularly eschews analysis of these operations in deference to major combat operations, civilian agency concerns, and mistaken paradigms. The lessons of past US stability operations are critical to meeting desired national objectives around the globe. The USG neglects these lessons at its peril. Though defense from existential threat must retain primacy in the national security establishment, the historic frequency and cost of stability operations in terms of national resources and influence demand attention. The lessons of unity of command, security, and expertise must be effectively institutionalized.

Although recent difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan have shifted significant attention back to operations of this nature, attention is only the first step. Effective


adaptation requires not only acknowledgement that change is required, but identification of key tenets required for success and then efficient integration of those tenets within the instruments of national power. This chapter chronicles U.S. stability operation history, the remarkably consistent avoidance of lessons learned within the national security establishment, and elementary steps taken within that establishment as a result of recent attention. Later sections distill the lessons that should have been learned from past stability operations, while the following chapter argues the institutionalization of those lessons for maximum effect.

The latest U.S. military doctrine defines “stability operations” as those operations “encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”3 DOS’s related phrase, “stability and reconstruction,” is directed by their Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/CRS defines “stabilization” as the process “by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development.” Similarly, S/CRS defines “reconstruction” as “the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, 

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socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the
foundation for longer term development.”

An explosion of terminology regarding stability operation activities tends to
obscure rather than clarify effective analysis. It would appear that so much time is spent
defining new closely-related terms and writing obligatory chapters and sections of
doctrine explaining them, that insufficient attention is devoted to solving real problems.
An account of related terminology spanning the tenets, principles, and systems used by
DOD, DOS, and USAID to scope and define the topic leaves one troubled.  Two of the
most significant expressions attempting to help define the current environment and
appropriate reactions to it are “complex operations” and “irregular warfare.” Similar to
“transformation” during the Rumsfeld years, neither term provides value-added in the
description of warfare. Asymmetry still drives response, as dominance in one type of
warfare will provoke adversary capabilities in another. Calling this phenomenon
“irregular” or the concept that resolution of human conflict is “complex” does little to
further solutions. Though the term irregular warfare appears to have run its course,
quietly phased out of the latest 2010 QDR despite prominence in the 2006 version,

4 U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and U.S.

5 For expanse of current terminology surrounding “stability operations” see the U.S. Army’s
of Peace and Dept. of the Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for
Stabilization and Reconstruction, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/guiding_principles_full.pdf], and
USAID’s nine principles of development and reconstruction assistance [U.S. Agency for International
complex operations appears to have greater staying power, again, just as “transformation” remains a prominent fixture in command and program titles today.⁶

Variously called “post-conflict operations,” “phase IV,” “military operations other than war,” “stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations” (SSTR) and encompassing peace, counterdrug, counterinsurgency (CI), counterterrorism (CT), and noncombatant evacuation (NEO) operations, humanitarian assistance (HA), and shows of force, stability operations insight can often be thwarted by sheer volume of terminology.⁷ Miscues in relevant acronyms obscure concise analysis of stability operations further. Perhaps the most commonly used acronym in discussing elements of national power is the previously introduced term DIME. Whether used alone or as part of DIMEFIL or PMESII, the Diplomatic (or Political), Information, Military, and Economic terms delineate four elements of national power. The problem is that diplomacy, information, and economy are elements of power, while the military is an organization. Of course, all know the intent of the term “military” is really combat, or perhaps warfighting. That is the problem. DIME reinforces historic inaccuracy. Equating the U.S. Department of Defense to “combat” is an error that sustains a chronic “it’s not my job” syndrome concerning non-combat tasks within DOD and an equally strong “it’s not their job” cry from outside DOD. As the next section illustrates, “it” has been their job for the last 220

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⁶ Gen Paul Van Riper warns “[u]nfortunately, the bureaucratic procedures the military employed to develop and publish new service and joint doctrines diminished the classical theorists’ and contemporary scholars’ eloquent definitions. At the same time, these procedures added unnecessary terms.” Paul Van Riper, Planning for and Applying Military Force: An Examination of Terms (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 1, [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=646](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=646) (accessed 2/15/2009).

years, despite general unwillingness to accept it. “Contrary to popular belief, the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat.”

**HISTORY OF U.S. STABILITY OPERATIONS**

Due to the hundreds of U.S. operations that would be considered stability operations today by our current definition, it is useful to limit discussion to operations indicative of the times and analysis to those few major operations which most closely resemble the size and scope of those we consider today. As each of the four overarching tasks within stability operations[^9] are land-based affairs, we find the U.S. Army as the primary actor[^10]. The first century of the Army’s existence, with the exception of the war with Mexico in 1846, can be considered a largely “domestic” era in terms of Stability Operations (SO). In contrast to the years that would follow, most major operations prior to the 1898 war with Spain took place within the continental borders of the United States[^11].


The Domestic Era

Activities during the 1820s to 1840s westward expansion, the 1846-1848 occupation of Mexico and the occupation of the South following the Civil War were the most significant stability operations of these early years. Soldiers secured the West from native Indian tribes while building and protecting largely transportation infrastructure for national development. Security activities ranged from conventional warfare on the Great Plains to unconventional warfare in the Florida swamps and small mobile forces required to counter Indian tactics through the 1890’s. By the end of the century the Army had “acquired an impressive record in the conduct of irregular warfare against opponents who, fighting in accord with their cultural norms, had proved challenging and formidable. In the process, US soldiers had also played a critical role in developing the country’s transportation and communication systems, conducting scientific surveys and studies, promoting local education, and stimulating economic growth.”

The Army’s combat success over vast territory in the war against Mexico necessitated occupation of large areas. Under the Army’s general-in-chief, Winfield Scott, U.S. military governors developed programs to feed the poor, promote sanitation, and support local goods and markets. At the same time, guerrilla activities drew harsh measures, up to and including summary executions. This contrast between simultaneous support of local infrastructure and maintenance of security was even starker during

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12 Ibid.
occupation of the South in the Civil War, as a hostile population precipitated ever harsher Union policies as the war progressed.\textsuperscript{14}

Several aspects of the occupation between the end of the war in April of 1865 and the end of federal occupation in 1877 sound familiar today. Statesmen and Generals at the time grossly underestimated the time required for Southern reconstruction; insufficient forces were left for the job at the completion of combat and subsequent drawdown of the Army; and Reconstruction experience was largely forgotten by the Army of the 1880’s.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{A World Power}

The Spanish-American War signaled the end of the U.S. “domestic” era and rise of the U.S. as a world power, albeit below the level of England or France. The 1889 declaration of war on Spain was an inevitable move by a rising America and declining colonial power. The Treaty of Paris, signed just four months after opening hostilities, left the United States in control of Puerto Rico and Cuba in the Caribbean, and the Philippines and Guam in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{16} Four years of U.S. military government in Cuba instituted free elections, organized and trained a national military, and reformed health and public works. Within five years of granting Cuban independence, however, inexperience in self-government led to failures requiring US reoccupation of the island

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item[15] Ibid.
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for several years. Soldiers in the simultaneous military government in the Philippines adapted to a 14 year guerilla insurgency while performing similar humanitarian, government, economic, and security tasks. Here, a combination of “benevolent policies and ruthless measures” by U.S. troops successfully pacified areas before passing control to American civilian administrators. The islands were stabilized by 1913 and granted formal independence by 1946.

World Wars and Small Wars

The two other significant U.S. stability operations in the several decades that followed were the occupation of the Rhineland following WWI in Germany and the series of small wars led by the Marines in the Caribbean. Colonel Irwin Hunt, officer in charge of civil affairs during the U.S. participation in occupation of the Rhineland, reported that “[t]he American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.” Arguing for the development of U.S. Army civil administration competence during peacetime, the Hunt Report further noted that “despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern

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18 Ibid.

States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere, the lesson seemingly has not been learned.”

Protracted Marine interventions and occupations in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, unfortunately, generally supported national dictators in those countries once the U.S. departed, but valuable stabilization and counter-insurgency lessons were codified in the 1940 publication of the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual. Even though the Marines had “landed troops 180 times in 37 countries from 1800 to 1934” and been engaged beyond the continental U.S in each of the previous 36 years, they were lessons soon forgotten as preferred conventional wars in Europe and the Pacific came into focus.

U.S. stability operations from World War II through the end of the Cold War spanned a range from the large-force U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan following the war, and Vietnam, to largely advisory nature of counter-insurgent actions to support the governments of Greece and the Philippines. Other significant operations included those in Grenada, Lebanon and Panama, while more recent involvements in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans round out the list into the 1990’s. Sections that follow will provide deeper analysis of relevant WWII and Vietnam operations as those two represented the greatest resource challenges and most closely resemble the size and scope of current engagements.

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Volumes have been written about each of the operations noted above and many others omitted here, however, it is sufficient in this study to recognize the wealth of experience, both successful and unsuccessful, the U.S. has in stability operations right up to the present time. The military regularly provided or supported traditional security in terms of conventional or unconventional warfare and civil security in terms of law enforcement and police action. U.S. military commanders regularly provided essential services to the indigenous populace and U.S. troops performed stability tasks for which they had little training. Current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the space between combat success and strategic victory but national response to that gap tends to obscure the basic tenets of an effective solution.

**U.S. REACTION**

A flurry of debate, doctrine and terminology throughout national and departmental levels is the result of tension between ineffective means and the current strategic operational environment. That environment will continue to produce weak states and the stability challenges they present to U.S. national interest as it has for over two hundred years. Recent and continuing conditions conducive to non-state actors will only exacerbate this trend.

The latest period of conventional focus left the U.S. ill-prepared for the environment in which it found itself. Overwhelming U.S. conventional military success in 1991 Iraq coupled with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s transformation focus a decade later reinforced the tendency of the military to focus on combat alone. Early appraisals of conventional success versus the Taliban following September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda emboldened the subsequent March 2003 invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, little U.S. government attention was paid to capitalizing on post-combat gains.

Analysis of failure in post-conventional combat Iraq is complex, but several broad and familiar themes ring true. The accepted post-conflict planning, such as it was, assumed a much shorter and easier period of occupation than what was eventually required. The weight of effort transitioned from conventional to counter-insurgency, stability and reconstruction. U.S. forces were unprepared and insufficient in number for the stability tasks required of them. Finally, poor unity of command exacerbated dysfunction across national agencies towards a coherent plan.\(^22\)

While elusive strategic successes in Iraq and Afghanistan have since sounded the alarm within the U.S. security establishment for more effective national means in response, they should have re-awakened the U.S. to the fact that “conventional warfare” is really the exception to the norm of modern human conflict. Institutionalization of proficient stability operations, with their heavy population focus, must coexist with proficiency in existential, yet lower-probability, conventional warfare.

Instructive to the analysis of proper U.S. response is an account of current USG reaction since taking note of these threats in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan inefficiencies. The account documented here is necessarily selective due to the volume of actions taken across government in the last five to six years, but nonetheless representative of broad efforts. For the purposes of this study, these reactions can be

categorized into three categories. A general category calls for national reform. This includes debate at the legislative, national think-tank, and Secretary (government agency lead) and above level. The two specific categories are organizational changes within the Department of State and Department of Defense, the two most prominent government actors in this arena. Across all categories, calls for a “whole of government” approach and “unity of effort” are common.23

Calls for National Reform

National calls for security sector reform have become popular in recent years. Essentially founded on the principle that the current national security structure is incapable of adjusting to the current and future operating environment, they generally advocate some form of reorganization between the President of the United States and the individual agencies of government. This category of reform often focuses on the National Security Council (NSC) and supporting legislative levels, a civilian version of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, or large-scale redistribution of resources across agencies. 24 The Project for National Security Reform (PNSR) is

23 Typical statements occur throughout recent reports, guidelines and doctrine similar to this one from the Army’s Stability Operations manual: “Military forces have to operate with the other instruments of national power to forge unity of effort through a whole of government approach.” Whole of government in most cases meaning “sufficiency of government”, as anything involving the true whole of government would certainly be doomed to failure. Unity of effort, on the other hand, flies directly against historical precedent where unity of command has often determined success. U.S. Dept. of the Army, *FM 3-07: Stability Operations*, vii.

probably the most aggressive national call for reform, recommending wholesale changes across agencies, cabinet officials, legislative relationships, and fiscal resources.\textsuperscript{25}

**Department of State**

A number of steps have been taken within DOS to address perceived environmental changes in recent years. The Bush administration placed DOD in charge of stability operations two months prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq with the release of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24.\textsuperscript{26} The administration then released NSPD-44, placing DOS in the lead of stability operations when DOD’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (OHRA) proved ineffective. It also called for an interagency office within the Department of State to enhance the nation’s capacity to respond to crises in fragile states.\textsuperscript{27}

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created by Secretary of State Colin Powell in July of 2004 to fill that purpose. It has since pursued several concepts in support of its mission “[t]o lead, coordinate and


institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.\(^\text{28}\) These concepts include the Interagency Management System (IMS), the whole of government planning framework, and the Civilian Response Corps (CRC).

All three concepts have yet to be fully implemented. Though the whole of government planning framework remains an eight-page “principles of a planning framework” as of March 2010, some progress is definable with the IMS and CRC concepts.\(^\text{29}\) The IMS consists of teams at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to plan, direct, and integrate CRC personnel efforts into the effort at hand. The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) would be established by and report to the NSC Deputies’ Committee\(^\text{30}\) and remain in Washington, the Integration Planning Cell (IPC) would generally deploy to the geographic combatant command, and an Advance


Civilian Team (ACT) would work for the designated chief of mission (Ambassador) either with or without the military.³¹

The CRC is a partnership of eight government departments and agencies³² intended to provide the U.S. with “a pool of qualified, trained, and ready-to-deploy civilian professionals to support overseas reconstruction and stabilization operations.” It is to be comprised of Active (CRC-A), Standby (CRC-S), and Reserve (CRC-R) components. Active employees are to be “comprised of (250) trained and equipped (reconstruction and stabilization) first responders who can deploy in 48 hours to countries in crisis.” Standby members will number 2,000 drawn from the eight agencies and ready to deploy within 30 days. 45-60 day Reserve members will number 2,000 “drawn from the private sector and state and local governments across the United States, with expertise in the range of processes necessary in a transition from crisis including: policing and rule of law, infrastructure development, economic stabilization, state and local governance, agriculture, and provision of basic services.”³³

There exists very little funding for S/CRS projects despite over five years of extremely high visibility and demand for these capabilities. A good portion of what does exist has been granted via “1207 funding” through the DOD in a creative interagency


³² The eight government agencies involved with CRC are the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of the Treasury.

³³ U.S. Dept. of State, “Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)”
work-around to budget realities. Since 2007, S/CRS has directed up to $100 million from
the DOD budget pursuant to section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act.®
Establishing the CRC has been more problematic.

The DOS reported in September that “120 civilian experts will be onboard and
trained to deploy abroad by this spring, and the full complement of 250 is expected in
2011. The sum of the three components--Active, Standby, and Reserve--will eventually
swell to over 4000 personnel (once congress funds the Reserve component).”®
Additionally, as late as February 2010, Secretary of State Clinton relayed to the House
Foreign Affairs Committee that the FY2011 budget should allow staffing of the CRC
standby element.® There was no mention of the projected 2000-man reserve component.

Throughout the efforts within DOS related to stability operations over the last six
years, three projections seem remarkably clear. The first is that fiscal realities and
coordination across eight departments and agencies will continue to hamper CRC goals.
The second is that any hope of a “civilian surge” stemming from these rather small
number goals will go unfulfilled. The third is that USG intention to order government

34 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions are
Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2007), 17,

35 Jeffrey Stacey, “Department of State Responds to General Anthony Zinni’s ‘Smart Power’
Proposal,” The Washington Note (September 25, 2009),

36 Hillary R. Clinton, "Promoting Security through Diplomacy and Development: The Fiscal
Year 2011 International Affairs Budget," Secretary of State Opening Remarks before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee (Washington, D.C., February 25, 2010),
civilians and private citizens to foreign crisis within 2, 30, or 60 days notice is without historical precedent.

**Department of Defense**

Doctrinal changes within DOD in response to current environmental challenges take their lead from the nested national security documents discussed below. Practical application in the field largely adapts, as it always has, to the evolving situation it is presented with. Over time, field experience that the U.S. is gaining now will make its way into future doctrine. For now, reviewing current editions of the national security documents reveals reference to and focus on conflict intervention, weak states, and stability operations.

The 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) states that “Some conflicts pose such a grave threat to our broader interests and values that conflict intervention may be needed to restore peace and stability,” and further that “[o]nce peace has been restored, the hard work of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction must begin. Military involvement may be necessary to stop a bloody conflict, but peace and stability will last only if follow-on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful.”

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) continues, “The inability of many states to police themselves effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international system. Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to those

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inspired by violent extremism, threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states.”

Finally, the National Military Strategy (NMS) espouses the requirement to mesh offensive, defensive, and stability operations with, “[t]he Joint Force must be able to transition from major combat operations to stability operations and to conduct those operations simultaneously.”

As President George Bush signed NSPD-44 in 2005, the Secretary of Defense signed DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.05, since replaced by DOD Instruction (DODI) 3000.05 Stability Operations in September 2009. It is the primary action, much like the creation of S/CRS in State, which attempted to focus the Department on stability operations. It established stability operations as a DOD core mission equivalent to combat operations and mandated capabilities to lead and support broad spectrum SO, noting security, essential services, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance as primary components.

Since the original DODD in 2005, DOD has published several internal publications and assisted with the production of several joint interagency (IA) publications concerning SO. Latest editions of Joint Publication 3.0 Operations (JP 3.0), FM 3-07 Stability Operations, JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, JP 3-57

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40 U.S. Dept. of Defense, DODI 3000.05 Stability Operations, 10.

41 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0: Joint Operations, Change 1

42 U.S. Dept. of the Army, FM 3-07: Stability Operations
Civil-Military Operations, and Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept (SSTR JOC) all specifically address particular aspects of SO. Rarely accused of “not having a pub on that,” there is little doubt that the DOD bureaucracy can crank out paper. The sheer volume and breadth on the subject however, is not conducive to key historical insights from the nation’s wealth of SO experience.

Among the joint IA documents DOD has helped produce on this topic are the 2005 US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, 2009 USG Counterinsurgency Guide, and 2009 Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Heavily reliant on the principles of whole of government and unity of effort, these are also prominently written and intertwined with S/CRS processes.

Finally, the latest thinking and direction within DOD may come from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which focuses on counterinsurgency, stability, and

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counterterrorism operations, and the building of security capacity in partner states as two of the six “areas of particular need that require attention today and into the future.”

While advocating a whole of government approach to integrate all elements of national power, it unsurprisingly advocates “agile and flexible U.S. military forces with superior capabilities across a broad spectrum of potential operations” as a vital component in advancing U.S. national interests. DOD is supporting IA whole of government efforts while simultaneously focusing on independent SO capabilities.

OCCUPATION OF GERMANY DURING WWII

The U.S. occupation of Germany and the stability operations conducted in Vietnam two decades later are not models to be followed. They are simply two of the largest stability operation undertakings in modern U.S. history, borne of greatly different circumstances and composed of greatly differing means, which hold quite complementary and valuable lessons for continuing U.S. actions.

This examination addresses the U.S. occupation of Germany following World War II. As any account of such a complex operation may run volumes and still be deemed incomplete, it is important to narrow the scope of examination for the purposes of this study - specifically, the search for lessons applicable to stability operations of modern and future times. This analysis focuses on the functional lines of U.S. policy

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50 Ibid., 1.
guidance, the evolution and adaptations of those leaders required to carry it out, and the
general lessons to be gained from the experience. In WWII, a combination of advance
planning, political maneuvering, and adroit and adaptive leadership at strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of command enabled eventual success.

Military government and civil affairs were furthest from American minds
following WWI demobilization. Although personnel and experiences following U.S.
participation in occupation of the Rhineland were nearly forgotten, documentation
remained behind in the Hunt Report.\textsuperscript{51} Occasional War College committees kept it alive
during the 1930’s largely as it related to military law. By 1939, FM 27-10 \textit{The Rules of
Land Warfare} was published by the Judge Advocate General (JAG). With the war in
Europe now already underway, work on a manual specific to civil affairs and occupation
received new interest. FM 27-5 \textit{Military Government} was published in July of 1940 by
the same office. Together, FM 27-10 and 27-5 “would eventually be regarded as the Old
and New Testaments of American military government.”\textsuperscript{52}

Fortunately, the U.S. Army recognized the need to train and organize for potential
operations early. This early recognition was instrumental to Army success during
preparations for occupation in WWII. These were the first steps to mobilize for the post-
conflict occupation effort and initiated the substantial War Department efforts that were
to follow. Recognition of Colonel Irwin Hunt’s wisdom complete, or at least accepted,
the Department prepared for occupation. Though the nature of warfare remains constant,
the speed of current warfare and the current global strategic context make it unlikely that

\textsuperscript{51} Ziemke, \textit{The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946}, 3.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 4.
the U.S. will have “warning shots” as early as Department leaders did in the 1930s and 1940s. As it was, recognition of the work to be done did not come too soon. Internal organization and training preparations were challenging enough, but external impediments to success probably held the greatest risks to success.

In hindsight, the broad and substantial impediments to eventual success appear staggering. One can be left surprised that it “worked” at all. In addition to early recognition and preparation, policy, training and organization were fundamental to success in their own rights. Policy development and direction varied over the course of preparations for and execution of occupation. In August of 1945 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) expanded three sections of the pre-surrender directive, Combined Chiefs of Staff directive 551 (CCS 551), in order to form TALISMAN, the first approved post-surrender guidance for combined forces.\(^53\) The initial U.S. plan, the Morgenthau Plan, was unusually harsh and fortunately short-lived. Drafted by the Secretary of the Treasury, it focused on stiff German reparations and penalties for wartime actions. It rapidly became an embarrassment to President Roosevelt, a propaganda tool for German resistance elements, and a source of dissuasion for European leaders from trust in U.S. occupation leadership.\(^54\)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive (JCS 1067) that superseded the Morgenthau Plan in May of 1945 contained elements of the earlier harsh plan and codified centralized control by the U.S. Group Control Council in accordance with Secretary of State Edward Stettinius’ wishes. JCS 1067’s object was to establish a “stern, all-powerful military

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 100.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 103-106.
administration of a conquered country, based on its unconditional surrender, impressing the Germans with their military defeat and the futility of any further aggression.” It focused on the five points of denazification, demilitarization, control of communications (press, propaganda and education), reparation, and decentralization of the German government.\textsuperscript{55} Though Roosevelt’s stern view of German reparations remained relatively unchanged while in office,\textsuperscript{56} the ascendency of Harry Truman in April 1945 and political acumen of General Lucius Clay provided maneuver room for an effective occupation.

Beyond this broad political policy, effectively influenced by Secretary of War Henry Stimson,\textsuperscript{57} were the operational policies of General Clay as U.S. viceroy to make everything work. Saddled with the punitive restrictions of JCS 1067 and sensitive to strong denazification direction from Washington, he directed security and essential services in U.S. occupied territory to the populace.\textsuperscript{58} Encompassing the spectrum of political, economic, social, and security problems associated with occupation, the Army led the U.S. sector of postwar Germany through severe food shortages, infrastructure reconstruction and democratic reform. Despite State Department belief that Germans were incapable of democracy, Clay empowered Germans through regional administrators, disbanded U.S. regional commands, and established local security forces

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 212-214.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 445.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 103-104.

employing Germans. The decentralized local courts, administrations, and security forces “formed the basis for the development of these institutions for decades to come.”

Training was critical to developing the expertise the Army required to succeed. By initiating the School of Military Government in February of 1942 and the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP) in June of 1943 over the initial outrage of civilian agencies, the occupying force was equipped with personnel who knew what they were doing.\(^59\) The School of Military Government trained existing military officers for US and allied staff assignment while the CATP trained civilians from other government agencies for direct officer commissions as specialists and technicians in the field. Civilian selectivity for these military commissions was extremely high, accepting only 960 of 50,000 applicants in the last quarter of 1943.\(^61\)

Building expertise within the military was not without its difficulties. The very acceptance of military government as a solution was in question. Early consternation by the President and other political entities nearly cancelled the program multiple times in October and November of 1942.\(^62\) President Roosevelt expressed a view widely held by many, both then and now, that civilian government is best governed by civilians.\(^63\) It is not an uncommon thought in a liberal democratic society founded in civilian control of

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\(^{59}\) Ibid., 14.

\(^{60}\) The School of Military Government was conceived even before Pearl Harbor and established in February 1942 at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. (Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, 7-8.) The CATP rapidly expanded civil affairs training by leveraging ten prominent universities to train up to 450 trainees per month from June of 1943 through April of 1944. (Ibid., 18-20.)

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 19-20.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 12-16.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., 21.
the military. At that point in time, the absence of U.S. military coup attempts despite
over 150 years of U.S. military experience with occupation should have given him solace.
Fortunately, recognition that there was no one else to do it forced political hands into the
correct course of action.

By the summer of 1943, political preference notwithstanding, events in North
Africa made the requirement for military government clear:

They would require men and resources and the means to deploy them
when and where they were needed. The Army had this ability. The civilian
agencies did not, and as the summer progressed they became increasingly
doubtful of their own ability to meet the needs. Moreover, in September,
when the President created the Foreign Economic Administration to
consolidate the civilian effort, these agencies objected as much to a unified
civilian direction as they had to War Department leadership.64

By November of 1943, it could not be determined whether civilians would perform
better, but at the moment they could not perform at all. The President acknowledged this
state of affairs in a letter to Secretary of War Stimson in which he stated,

"Although other agencies are preparing themselves for the work that must
be done in connection with relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas, it is
quite apparent that if prompt results are to be obtained the Army will have
to assume the initial burden." Continuing, he assigned to the Army the
planning and execution of civil relief and rehabilitation "until civilian
agencies are prepared to carry out the longer range program."65

Unless and until there exists an expert civilian force of required size that can also
be ordered into harm’s way, the nation must train those “orderable” for the task at hand.

By training sufficient numbers of military personnel and commissioning adequate civilian

64 Ibid., 21.
65 Ibid., 22.
talent the Army was able to provide the expertise required to effectively occupy until such a time as security conditions and civilian personnel numbers allowed transition of control.

The Army-administered military government would continue until 1949 and the occupation until 1955, but by the summer of 1946 U.S. policy “was committed to reconstruction, currency reform, and economic reunification in Germany.” U.S. aid to Germany through 1949 for the years of direct military government totaled almost $3 billion under the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program, not including any surplus the U.S. military could afford. U.S. policy had returned to that first espoused by the original FM 27-5: the making of friends out of former enemies. “Certainly after 1946 there could be no doubt that civil affairs – military government had proven its value both in and out of combat or that the Army had demonstrated its competence to manage a major occupation in the national interest and the interest of a conquered people.”

Security, both conventional and civil, was paramount as occupation forces immediately followed or transitioned from combat forces in theater. Expertise, in the form of properly trained U.S. troops, delivered political, social, and economic reform to the occupied territory while actively avoiding humanitarian disaster. General Clay’s unity of command, though having to overcome conflicts between Supreme Headquarters,

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66 Ibid., 443.


Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and U.S. Forces in the European Theater (USFET) and the Army’s G-5 and the Control Council, enabled true unity of effort. Unity of command integrated all occupation efforts under one man while still answering to military lead in theater and civilian leadership in Washington.

Army preparation for an occupation task they did not want led to arguably the most successful endstate following major war in modern times. The fact that the U.S. Army accomplished this feat simultaneously in Japan under vastly different circumstances illustrates the effectiveness of their approach. The pre-existence of strong central governments, post-industrial infrastructure, homogeneous societies, and comparable Western value systems present stark differences between post-WWII Germany and modern Iraq or Afghanistan, however, the lessons in security, expertise, and unity of command are timeless and appear again and again throughout U.S. stability operations experience.

1967-1973 CORDS IN VIETNAM

This brief examination focuses on the U.S. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program and related efforts in South Vietnam between 1967 and 1973. Although the complexity of civil-military operations, volumes of historical text, and lingering scars on the American psyche complicate any analysis of the Vietnam War, a focused study can illuminate critical lessons relevant to present and

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69 Ibid., 447.
future U.S. operations. This study concludes that unity of command, expertise, and security were critical elements of successful U.S. Vietnam operations that can be advantageously applied to operations today and in the future.

A word of caution as to what this is and what it is not, both in terms of scope and application. First, this study is narrowly focused on specific civil-military operations of the time and as such avoids political assessments of vital national interest on the one hand, and intricacies of the U.S. domestic constituency on the other. Though both are unarguably critical elements of any potential national agenda, they are beyond the scope of this endeavor. Furthermore, as noted in the analysis of post-war Germany, this analysis does not propose a model. History, misapplied, rivals the ignorance of history in responsibility for losses of good men in modern times. Though the nature of humans, and thus the nature of war, does not change, the detail of war varies greatly. We occasionally find applicable truths amidst that detail. This study pulls specific lessons on security, expertise, and unity of command from the Vietnam CORDS experience that selectively apply today.

Certain elements of U.S. involvement pre-1968 are pertinent to the analysis of the follow-on CORDS program. From 1955 to 1967, the U.S. government (USG) poured human and capital resources into South Vietnam with little effect. U.S. advisors and resources from the International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund, two entities created to implement the Marshall Plan across Europe, provided assistance to the Republic of Vietnam as early as 1955.\textsuperscript{70} The State Department (DoS),

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture, and U.S. Information Service were each responsible for portions of the U.S. pacification assistance mission, ostensibly coordinated through U.S. Mission offices in Saigon. Military advisory missions and conventional forces, once introduced in 1965, were directed by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).\textsuperscript{71} USG pacification efforts were disjointed and largely ineffective. Indicative of the dysfunction were thousands of USAID workers sent to Vietnam in the 60’s and early 70’s – even though USAID received policy guidance from DOS, their nonmilitary assistance efforts were rarely coordinated with Embassy or military command officials.\textsuperscript{72}

USG had the right expertise across the agencies involved, but lacked a competent structure to meet the demands of the Vietnamese environment. Core competencies of the government agencies, once President John F. Kennedy established USAID in 1961, covered the knowledge and experience required to develop local and national government and assist the people of South Vietnam. By 1966, however, it was clear to President Lyndon B. Johnson that organizational problems were crippling USG efforts. His demand for a solution to the integration of civilian efforts, over strong opposition from


Secretary of State Rusk and Ambassador Lodge, resulted in the Office of Civil Operations. It was rapidly succeeded, however, by the CORDS program in May 1967.\textsuperscript{73} CORDS placed military advisers and civilian interagency personnel except those of the CIA under one civilian individual who was designated deputy MACV under General Westmoreland. With an equivalent 3-star and ambassadorial rank, Robert W. Komer orchestrated initial efforts with critical command of both interagency expertise and Department of Defense resources.\textsuperscript{74} The marriage born of necessity against civilian agency wishes became a phenomenal success, just as unity of command in WWII occupation was two decades earlier. Unity of command succeeded where unity of effort had failed.

Early successes of the program were not without friction. Soon after taking MACV command from Westmoreland in the summer of 1968, General Creighton Abrams fired Komer for mistrust and perceived intelligence failures following the Tet Offensive.\textsuperscript{75} With William Colby in Komer’s place, the CORDS/MACV efforts and impact accelerated. CORDS replicated “the identical management structure at every level of the South Vietnamese government (military region, province, and district)” for


effectiveness, and initiated a November 1968 Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) that emphasized Regional Forces and Popular Forces in a “clear and hold” strategy to provide local security in home provinces and districts. MACV stopped bombing North Vietnam and shifted resources to the APC support of South Vietnamese Territorial Forces securing the populace. As a result of pacification efforts, the South Vietnamese countryside grew increasingly hostile to Viet Cong (VC) insurgent forces until the last U.S. troops departed in 1973.

For the purposes of this study, the security provided by U.S. or U.S.-trained forces from 1968 to 1973 in Vietnam can be characterized as falling into one of three broad functional categories: conventional, civil security, and special forces. The unity of command harnessed under one civilian manager subordinated to Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) enabled each category. Dale Andrade accurately summarized the security challenge faced in Vietnam:

…the U.S. military faced arguably the most complex, effective, lethal insurgency in history. The enemy was no rag-tag band lurking in the jungle, but rather a combination of guerrillas, political cadre, and modern main-force units capable of standing toe to toe with the U.S. military. Any one of these would have been significant, but in combination they presented a formidable threat.

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76 Project on National Security Reform and Center for the Study of the Presidency, CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification

77 Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, 72.

78 Compelling evidence of the success of APC efforts is recounted in testimony from North Vietnamese Communist historians and the COSVN Resolution of March 1968. Ibid., 64-76.

The Vietnamese environment presented broad-spectrum warfare with significant external support. U.S. security forces required the conventional strength to counter Chinese and Soviet backed North Vietnam Army (NVA) “regulars,” the relative finesse to infiltrate and protect the population against VC insurgents, and the skills to prosecute individuals and high-value targets throughout the countryside.

The conventional, or regular, force requirements in Vietnam were indicative of the level of external support available to the NVA. U.S. forces, hindered by enemy sanctuary protected by U.S. political decision, remained superior in the conventional arena. South Vietnamese forces received some training and equipment for this warfare, but were never sufficiently postured to defend against the conventional forces that brought their defeat two years after the U.S. departed. Despite political limitations, the U.S. maintained conventional superiority. The flaw in U.S. conventional force was the readiness to use it too often when other methods may have produced greater long-term results.

U.S. forces also maintained Special Forces (SF) capacity in the form of Hunter-Killer teams. In fact, the Army’s 1962 Counter Insurgency Operations: A Handbook for the Suppression of Communist Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations specifically defined appropriate Hunter-Killer teams that were used in some degree by SF, but not undertaken by the Army as a whole.\footnote{Paul Melshen, “The US Marines’ Combined Action Program in Vietnam: The Formulation of Counterinsurgency Tactics within a Strategic Debate,” \textit{Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement} Vol 9, no. 2 (Summer, 2000), 64-66.} Also critical to counterinsurgency operations were increasing
US Army operations with the aboriginal “Montagnards” of the Vietnamese highlands.\textsuperscript{81} Greater acceptance of these situation-appropriate tactics by the Army at large may have improved the overall security situation; nevertheless, this category of warfare was a required component of security in Vietnam. Although institutional resistance decremented potential gains from SF tactics at the time, Marine and Army SF, in addition to many NATO and coalition forces, maintain strong capacities in this regard today.

Civil security forces and resettlement of the exposed population to areas those forces could control were the crucial elements of security in Vietnam because they provided for security of the populace. Securing the populace was critical to enabling local government, provision of goods and services from civilian experts and aid, and undermining of the enemy’s intelligence and logistics support. The success of the USMC’s Combined Action Platoons (CAP), though small in scale, underscored the importance of securing the populace in Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and pacification operations.\textsuperscript{82} Unfortunately, the structure and experiences of the U.S. Army delayed recognition and adaptation to this aspect of security until late in the conflict. Abrams slowly convinced the Army that support of pacification was their primary mission by the end of 1968 once CORDS and APC were fully underway.\textsuperscript{83}

Training with and support of indigenous forces is critical to civil security. Colby and Abrams immediately prioritized training and weapons to Regional Force companies


\textsuperscript{83} Sorley, \textit{A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam}, 60.
and Popular Force platoons, the two components of the Territorial Forces that remained in their home regions to provide local security. Several hundred 5-man U.S. advisory teams lived and worked with them. Securing the populace in this way lent legitimacy to the government while providing the population with “something to lose” in the form of services provided by CORDS civilian agency experts. The South Vietnamese countered VC insurgent forces when those forces impeded advantages enabled by civil security.

**LESSONS (UN)LEARNED**

While neither the occupation of Germany nor the CORDS experience in Vietnam provides a model or template to apply throughout future conflict, several lessons are applicable to current operations. The American experience in both cases clearly identifies unity of command as the primary enabler of success. It provided the mechanism for effective application of expertise in the form of both soft and hard national power. Interagency (IA) leadership, and indeed Congress, fretted over unity of command in the reconstruction plans for WWII and did so again in the CORDS pacification plans for Vietnam. In both cases those plans required Presidential mandate to proceed and in both cases they worked. History tells us that sufficiency of government, the effective integration of all necessary means of national power in pacification, stability, insurgency, and/or reconstruction operations requires unity of command.

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^84 Ibid., 72-74.
Much literature, and indeed much of current DoD and DoS doctrine, espouses “unity of effort” to address the “whole” or “sufficiency of government” widely deemed critical to our success in current struggles. Some accurately identify unity of command as a critical element and then water the impact by using the phrase unity of effort to describe it. Akin to describing a square as a rectangle, the description, albeit true, is wholly insufficient to one contemplating its reconstruction. Call a square a square and get on with building it.

During WWII the expertise required for post-war stabilization and reconstruction was built within the military structure by training military officers and commissioned civilian governance experts in schools established for that purpose. In Vietnam, the USG successfully orchestrated both military and civilian expertise through the MACV and CORDS command structure. The lesson carried forward is simply that expert participation is necessary for success. If existing experts from relevant government agencies cannot be directed to participate, then that expertise must be built within the military structure from those who will take orders. Although the goals and mission statements of current efforts within DoS’ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and Project for National Security Reform (PNSR) allude to potential changes for rigorous IA involvement, the track record is poor. “Every presidential administration in the past 60 years has implemented some form of policy directive in an attempt to spur cooperation and collaboration among government agencies. Some have been more successful than others have, but none has survived a

change in administration.” The historically glacial pace of governmental change predicts that near-term solutions will likely reside within DoD.

The DoD is uniquely suited for the traditional and civil security requirements of stability operations. The post-WWII occupation of Germany and the operations in Vietnam demonstrate the need for security efforts to be adequately resourced and effectively synchronized with each other. Only once conventional security was established and maintained in Germany did the effects of civil security enable greater stability operations. Similarly, South Vietnamese populace security improved only once MACV conventional warfighting efforts fully supported the APC pacification effort with Territorial Forces. Comprehensive security in weak, liberated, or occupied territory demands resources and mission sets that reside within DoD. Law enforcement and civil security capabilities can be boosted if and when required by commission of civilian agency expertise such as those found in Department of Homeland Security.

Unity of command, expertise, and security were proven tenets of successful operations in the World War II occupation of Germany and in Vietnam between 1968 and 1973. Each, leveraging off the others, was critical to improvements in Germany and South Vietnam during those periods. Though differences between these operations and current wars are immense, these three tenets provide transferrable lessons for the successful prosecution of current and future stability operations. It is likely that sufficient elements of governmental expertise and military force will reside in our national coffers for some time. Less likely, it seems, is that the USG will accept unity of command as a

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critical missing element of national power. “When the terrain doesn’t fit the map, trust the terrain.” It is time to drop the map in hand and chart a course through the terrain we are in. Unity of command, expertise, and security lessons from our World War II occupation and Vietnam CORDS experience provide some decent trail markers.
Chapter 4

RECOMMENDATIONS

“In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is.”

Yogi Berra

The most effective gains in U.S. national security can be made by incorporating security, expertise, and unity of command lessons into Department of Defense stability operations in weak, liberated, and occupied territory. The utility of conventional combat power is not, and will never be over. Human nature, interest, fear, and honor will drive major powers to conflict again. The global strategic environment, however, increasingly harbors adversaries resistant to conventional means. The permanence of weak nations and trends of globalization ensure operations of assistance, liberation, or occupation will continue. This is the environment to which the U.S. must adapt.

The vulnerabilities of non-state actors and the foundations of statehood are found in the population. Rising costs and declining influence are symptomatic of inefficient national means. In the spirit of combined arms, combat skill must be augmented with population skill. Proficient stability operations meet the requirement by filling the security, essential services, infrastructure, and humanitarian needs of a population. Proficient stability operations are the missing means, the hole in U.S. government influence.

Efficient filling of this hole demands an assessment of history, and the U.S. military has a long history of stability operations. Security, expertise, and unity of
command, properly applied, are the critical lessons of stability operations. The remainder of this chapter discusses what “properly applied” should mean to the U.S. national security establishment today.

**NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS**

1. The problems faced in the evolving strategic environment are not new. They are merely different from the recent conventional warfare paradigm of the Cold War. True, non-state actors have evolved, but their critical vulnerabilities are in the population and the U.S. has dealt with that before. Assistance to weak states and the liberation and occupation of territory has a long history. They will continue to have a long future. The continued insistence that current situations are unique, or somehow “different”, while not invalidating the past, certainly dampens the search for historical guidance.

2. Stop creating more terminology. Again, the current situation is not new. If only the terminology is new, we are impeding the progress of clarity, thought, and insight. The US has seen small wars, stability operations, unconventional conflict and asymmetric response before. Dropping “irregular warfare” from 2010 QDR lexicon was a good start.

3. Unity of command speaks to more than the military service. This is not about DOD versus DOS versus NSC or anything similar. It is about national interest. Human nature being what it is, each agency, each service, and each organization will develop a culture. Any culture developed within the national security establishment that is
antagonistic to command is detrimental to national security. The occupation of Germany post-WWII was commanded by military, turned over to civilian authority later, and was successful throughout. Vietnam CORDS proved the dysfunction of “effort” and subsequent utility of integrated civil and military command. The nation is not run by unity of effort and neither is any successful organization—to include every agency entrusted with U.S. national security.

4. The job of national security is too important to be left to volunteers. This can be taken wrong, as all Americans are volunteers—no one is forced into a job they do not want. The meaning here is that tasks critical to national security are too important for employees to “opt out” at the moment. This is related to unity of command. The adversary gets a vote, and the timing of U.S. action in response cannot be accurately planned in advance. As well-intentioned as public servants are, it is a mistake for the nation to rely on the raising of hands before each undertaking. The stakes are too high. The nation should demand the advanced dedication of professionals, regardless of the agency under which they serve. Commissioning civilian agency experts into the military as active Reservists has a proven record in the preparation and execution of occupation of

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1 Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, noted this problem in a November 2009 letter to Secretary of State Clinton: "No one questions the military's need for coherent command and control. Yet the same attention has not been paid to the civilian configuration, even though we are engaged in a long-term operation in which one of the central premises is a fully-integrated civilian-military effort." Continuing, he states, “[u]nless we create a civilian authority comparable to the military chain of command, this problem [Afghan exploitation] will deepen...” Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Envoy’s Cables Show Worries on Afghan Plans,” New York Times Online, January 25, 2010 [http://documents.nytimes.com/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in-afghanistan#p=1](http://documents.nytimes.com/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in-afghanistan#p=1), (accessed 2/20/2010).
Germany. A similar 4-month military and field specialist training CATP-like program would rapidly inject civilian talent into the nation’s strongest security and command structure when required.

5. National and IA reform efforts for the purposes of stability operations proficiency should focus on the period of time after receipt of authority from military command once security conditions allow. Reform efforts for DoS to lead all stability operations are ill-conceived as they contradict successful historic precedent and risk national distraction from the ultimate purpose: effective stability operations. Current national reform effort recommendations are monumental and will occur slowly and disjointedly, if at all. S/CRS changes within DOS are occurring at a glacial pace, and IA dynamics and fundamental hurdles remain. The Presidential directives and words of Theodore Roosevelt, as staunch a civilian agency advocate as there ever was, ring loudly.

6. Decisions for national intervention in weak states must consider estimates of the total costs, in terms of time, resources and manpower, to reach desired strategic endstates. The potential speed and dominance of U.S. combat power may drive initial costs lower but leave stability operation costs untouched, thus requiring an increase of military presence once conventional combat ends. The costs of population-centric stability operations are independent of technology. They remain tied to the populace area, density, and demands.

7. Endless variations of circumstance, personality, time, and location will subdue any precision-guided lessons. Embrace historical relevance, not for models to be
followed, but for lessons to be applied. General over specific, and broad over confined. Look out the window. Broad insight keeps your head up but excessive detail pulls it down. It is the merit, if not the practice, of operational design.

8. No more new terminology. DoD is the greatest offender with respect to unnecessary terminology mentioned in number 2 above. It obscures meaningful analysis by making communication more complex rather than more concise.

9. Support interagency SO development without relying on it in order to leverage talent in the event specific security conditions allow. SO development should be supported because they can provide unparalleled expertise to supplement DoD forces and they will constitute the body that DoD transfers authority to as security conditions allow. They must not be relied on because they will not always be available due to security conditions or other agency limitations. The DoD must allow for, but not rely on, any personnel or structures that might support U.S. troops.

10. Focus on autonomous SO proficiency. This will provide the greatest immediate benefit to U.S. national security due to the effects on populations that support both non-state actors and nation states. In this general nature, it is a direction that DODI 3000.05 and subsequent actions appear to support. Specifically, apply the lessons of security, expertise, and unity of command to autonomous stability operations:

   a. There are no military endstates, only national ones. The 2010 QDR opens with, “[t]he mission of the Department of Defense is to protect the American people and advance our nation’s interest.”² It does not have “as long as it involves

“combat” on the end. Military does not equal combat. The concept that the military is resourced and historically comfortable with stability operations well beyond combat boundaries should be integrated into planning and execution. It should truly provide unity of command and a continuum of effort across all phases of conflict.

b. Conventional and civil security must be preplanned to flow together, without pause, over the course of an operation. Unity of command is the enabler for all in the operational theater. Comprehensive security, both conventional and civil, is the enabler for all other stability operation tasks. Even a slight pause of indecision or disunity of command can give illicit elements within the population breathing room, threaten popular faith in U.S. or U.S.-supported security forces, and exponentially increase the costs of the total operation.

c. Maintain core stability operations expertise within the active military forces. Train general purpose forces to flow from offensive and defensive combat tasks to stability tasks and back again within continuous operations. Current Civil Affairs (CA) forces should coordinate general purpose force staff training, planning and execution functions on a regular basis to integrate SO proficiency into general purpose forces.

d. In the event of sufficient warning, the Federal Government should authorize the temporary reserve military commission of civilian agency experts. CA should initiate low-overhead CATP-like programs to indoctrinate surge numbers of trained military forces for SO. The CATP trained experts were successful with one month of basic military training and three months of language and specific skills training
after commissioning. Similar actions would bring the best experts into unity of command with the national force positioned and resourced for comprehensive security.

e. Increase the expertise available within the military by screening current and future reserve component personnel for matching skills such as governance, law enforcement, NGO, and contract management. Screened personnel not already in CA reserve units should be shifted to those units to train for that purpose during scheduled reserve training, thus increasing the depth of expertise within existing DOD manpower resources.
CONCLUSION

“The mission of the Department of Defense is to protect the American people and advance our nation’s interest.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

As of mid-2008, the Iraq War had cost the United States over 4,100 dead and over 30,000 wounded. U.S. military allies have suffered hundreds of additional casualties. Iraqi civilian dead may number more than 90,000, while over 8,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers have been killed. Fifteen percent of the Iraqi population has become refugees or displaced persons. The Congressional Research Service estimates that the USG now spends over $10 billion per month on the war. Total direct appropriations for Operation Iraqi Freedom from March 2003 to June 2008 have exceeded $524 billion.

The character of warfare has changed, but the nature of warfare has not. Human conflict continues to evolve in accordance with the nature of man, the wisdom of Thucydides, and environmental pressures. Major powers will once again vie for resources and be driven to conflict, but the current transitional era is marked by the conventional dominance of a single power. Natural asymmetric forces, in play since societies began competition, have driven insurgencies and non-state actors to prevalence. National and international security threats from weak, liberated, and occupied states, forever present in the global environment, will only increase under these conditions.

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1 Ibid., iii.
National political goals, therefore, will be inextricably linked to effectiveness of U.S. influence on these actors and states.

Fortunately, the solutions to both actors and states in this environment lie in one place – the populace. Also fortunate, though against the strong natural tendencies of both her politics and armed forces, is the fact that the U.S. has done this before. The U.S. has a long history of population-centric operations, termed stability operations in today’s parlance. Those operations demonstrate critical tenets of security, expertise, and unity of command for successful stability operations that apply not only to the military, but to the greater efforts of the U.S. government as it grapples for effective influence in the global strategic environment.

That wealth of experience also clearly establishes the Department of Defense as the primary participant due to orders, resources, and core security mission. The most effective step the U.S. can take towards achieving its political ends is the strengthening of stability operation means within DoD. Institutionalizing the critical tenets of security, expertise, and unity of command in accordance with the recommendations presented here will provide tangible results. The efficiency of the U.S. to intervene successfully in failed states is dependent on security, expertise, and unity of command.


VITA

CDR Pat “Fin” Hannifin was commissioned in May 1991 after completing a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Pennsylvania (NROTC) and a Masters Degree in International Relations from the University of San Diego. He served as squadron legal officer for the Pacific Fleet adversary “Bandits” of VF-126 at NAS Miramar in San Diego before attending flight school in May 1992. CDR Hannifin was designated a Naval Aviator and trained as an F/A-18C Hornet pilot at VFA-125 in Lemoore, California before a three year assignment to the VFA-27 “Royal Maces” from 1995 to 1998 in Atsugi, Japan.

CDR Hannifin attended U. S. Air Force Test Pilot School in Edwards AFB, California, graduating from Class 99A in December 1999, and completed his test tour at Naval Strike Aircraft Test Squadron (now VX-23) in NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. After serving one year in the Ordnance Support Team he led the T-45 test program as T-45 Project Coordinator, testing F/A-18 A-D, E-F, and T-45s.

CDR Hannifin completed his Department Head tour in NAS Oceana with the VFA-81 “Sunliners” where he served as Safety, Operations, and then Maintenance Officer while participating in Iraq and Afghanistan combat operations from the USS George Washington. “Fin” left VFA-81 for a tour as CNAL VFA Readiness Officer in April 2004 before returning to command the “Sunliners” in February 2007. He is now completing Joint Advanced Warfighting School at JFSC before beginning the Nuclear Power program enroute to Executive Officer, USS Harry S. Truman.

CDR Hannifin has over 2,800 hours of flight time in 33 different aircraft, of which approximately 2300 are in the F/A-18. He is married with three children.