Stalin’s Plague: The Impact of Psychological Trauma on Russian National Security Considerations

Europe depends on Russia as the only economically viable source of hydrocarbon based energy sources. As time passes Russia’s energy monopoly over the European market will increasingly shape the domestic and international political policies of the European countries into a relationship that will placate Russian actions. The Europeans will be forced to accept a tolerant position with Russia in their interest of ensuring a stable supply of energy, with the aim of preventing punitive price increases or an embargo. The transfer of European wealth to Russia in payment for that energy will drastically increase the level of Russian influence in European affairs. That amalgamation of influences could be leveraged against European nations and could ultimately lead to a dramatic restructuring of the political dynamics in European affairs.
Stalin’s Plague:  
The Impact of Psychological Trauma on Russian National Security  
Considerations  

by  

Eric Meinhardt  

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.  

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.  

Signature: ____________________________  

April 2010  

Thesis Adviser:  Doctor Robert Antis
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to all of those who continue to suffer in silence long after the physical wounds have healed. So often it is only after decades have passed that individual survivors are able to sort out the why of tragic events. Those years are lost in a wilderness of confusion and intrusive memories. May the remaining years contain peace and the elusive happiness that has been missing for so long in those who have suffered so much.
Acknowledgements

This thesis has given me the opportunity to consolidate many disparate thoughts, formed over many years into a more complete idea. I have been struggling to answer the question of how people manage to survive after surviving devastating events to their countries, villages, societies and families. The writing process could not have been accomplished without the presence of meaningful distractions to maintain my sanity and provide good humor. First among those distractions are my very good friends Nicole, Andrew and John. Together they are the foundation upon which I have built my reputation in Norfolk’s finest and sometimes most notorious, establishments.
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ABSTRACT

The Russian Federation is pursuing a national security strategy that primarily utilizes economic power with the goal of dismantling the European security alliances. The Russians may feel compelled to pursue this strategy over more cooperative partnership building strategies because they could be suffering from an unprecedented, unrecognized epidemic of generationally transmitted psychological stress disorders, most notably Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, which could be driving their motivations to seek security above all other alternatives.

Europe depends on Russia as the only economically viable source of hydrocarbon based energy sources. As time passes Russia’s energy monopoly over the European market will increasingly shape the domestic and international political policies of the European countries into a relationship that will placate Russian actions. The Europeans will be forced to accept a tolerant position with Russia in their interest of ensuring a stable supply of energy, with the aim of preventing punitive price increases or an embargo. The transfer of European wealth to Russia in payment for that energy will drastically increase the level of Russian influence in European affairs. That amalgamation of influences could be leveraged against European nations and could ultimately lead to a dramatic restructuring of the political dynamics in European affairs.
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about Russian national security strategy, the Russian domestic factors that motivate that strategy and possible responses that address those underlying motivations. The goal is to illuminate a possible undiagnosed psychological public health issue that heavily influences the Russian domestic environment through a reexamination of Russian history from the Stalinist period. This issue is of concern to Western policy makers because of the important role that Russia’s domestic environment influences, and therefore limits their foreign policy strategy options. This thesis asserts that security is the overriding goal of Russian strategy, and will continue to be because of the unseen effects of widespread psychiatric anxiety and stress disorders in the Russian population inflicted during the Stalinist period. In this domestic Russian context, national security is defined as possessing a realistic means of significantly influencing the decision making in European nations and those countries that share national borders with the Russian Federation.

Russia plays a major role in Europe’s political stability and economic prosperity due to its possession of vast oil and natural gas reserves. Due to its proximity to European markets and the lack of a suitable economic competitor for those products, Europe is highly dependent on Russia for oil and gas imports, which are critical to all aspects of European economies. The Government of Russia does not appear content to rely on friendly relations created through the goodwill of its diplomatic corps to achieve influence. Instead, the Russian government appears to be seeking to achieve influence by
controlling foundational elements of its neighbor’s economies where it can, and resort to military force only when all other options are not practical. To achieve that goal the Government of Russia re-nationalized key segments of the energy industry in the last decade and now exerts an unprecedented amount of influence over its neighbors through a monopoly control over the supply and transportation segments of the energy industry. It now possesses the means to influence directly and affect the individual lives of virtually every citizen of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Austria and Cyprus. Those nations are all at least 80% dependent on Russian oil, gas and coal imports for their domestic energy needs. Those nations are all European Union members. Many non-European Union European nations such as Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Serbia have similar levels of dependency on Russian energy imports. ¹ This national security tool was first used in January 2009 against Ukraine. As a contrast in foreign policy approaches, the Russians employed military force against Georgia in the summer of 2008 because they lacked decisive economic influences over the Georgians as means of coercion. Russia’s development of significant economic influences over European nations constitutes the first half of the thesis.

The thesis then proceeds to address the underlying question of why the Government of Russia seeks to build a national security capability that is intended to dominate its neighbors. Despite living through the most peaceful seventy year period in its history and having every indicator of sustained peace, Russia continues to view

Europe and the United States as direct security threats. This thesis proposes that Russia’s security driven mindset is due in part to an epidemic of psychological anxiety and stress disorders created during the Stalinist period.

This epidemic of psychological anxiety and stress disorders was begun by Joseph Stalin when he unleashed a reign of terror during the Great Purges in the early 1930s. Adolph Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 also contributed an unprecedented psychological attack on a significant percentage of Soviet citizens. This twenty year period only ended with the death of a Stalin in 1953. Only recently has the long term psychological consequences of such traumas been recognized in survivors of horrific, violent events. They represent the unforeseen, or perhaps the intended, second and third order effects of Stalin’s and Hitler’s policy decisions.

The most distressing consequence of the effects is the generational transmission of stress disorder symptoms. As will shown, research shows that stress disorder symptoms are easily passed from generation to generation in families, from parents to children, who unwittingly inherit many of the socially destructive activities and behavior altering symptoms of their parents and relatives. This transmission cycle repeats itself as children grow, and in turn have children of their own unless medical treatment can break the pattern. The long term medical and social consequences of this transmission pattern are the creation of widespread societal patterns of anti-social behavior including criminality, substance abuse and prostitution. Since Stalin’s death, those afflicted with stress disorders may have unwittingly passed their psychological ailments to their

children through this generational transmission mechanism. These assertions are based on the rapidly growing body of research from the psychiatric and psychological fields that began with America’s Vietnam veterans in the mid 1970s.

This epidemic of stress disorders could be a key element shaping the Government of Russia’s perception of their strategic environment that informs and shapes Government of Russia domestic and international policies. In the domestic environmental context, this unseen epidemic could be a significant contributor to the abysmal levels of substance abuse, abortion rates, and criminality prevalent across Russia. All of these societal problems have behavioral roots. Additionally, the generational transmission of hidden mental health disorders may very well be the catalyst spurring the Russian demographic decline. This depopulation trend has the potential to become Russia’s most important national security issue. As Eberstadt states, “between 1975 and 2000, the number of young men ages fifteen to twenty-four ranged between ten million and thirteen million. By 2025, on current UN projections, the total will be barely six million. Apart from the obvious military implications of this decline, there would be economic and social reverberations.”

Stress disorders are an important, but neglected consideration in evaluating the Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity of the Russian strategic environment. Due to the behavioral aspects of stress disorders, they represent a source of chaos and friction for Western strategists and policy makers in their dealings with the Government

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of Russia. As will be explained in the stress disorder section, individuals who have acquired stress disorder symptoms behave in a counterintuitive manner due to their altered perceptions. They are primarily motivated to achieve security in their lives, which is now governed by constant personal insecurity. By understanding this foundational motivation behind Government of Russia decision making, we gain a far more coherent view of the Joint Operating Environment that informs our decision making process for strategy development. Equally important, by understanding the Russian domestic environment, Western policy makers could make more informed policy decisions that affect relations with Russia.

It is in our national interests to maintain cooperative and transparent relations with Russia. Presumably, it is very much in Russia’s national self-interest to reciprocate and maintain excellent relations with Europe and the United States. The obvious question is why are the bilateral relations between the United States and Russia so often contentious in tone and nature? In order to foster a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia, adjustments to our current level of comprehension behind Russian strategy motivations could be required in order to prevent a new prolonged period of antagonism between all parties. Those strategy adjustments should address the source of Russia’s intense need for national security, the hidden epidemic of stress disorders which could also be the underlying catalyst for the sudden demographic decline in Russia. Its possible that the key to establishing a productive relationship with Russia is through their national security perceptions. This can probably only be accomplished by first addressing the Russian public’s mental health needs. The alternative choice entails a great deal of risk for Europe and the United States.
This thesis examines many seemingly disparate Russian societal issues and organizes those situations into chapters that address the following issues:

a. Europe’s energy dependence on Russia,
b. The Government of Russia’s re-nationalization of the energy sector,
c. The mental health epidemic in Russia, and
d. The influence of the mental health epidemic on Russian strategy.
e. Recommendations for addressing the influence on traumatically induced stress and anxiety disorders in civilian populations.

This approach was chosen to show the ways and means available to Russian strategists, followed by the domestic considerations that will shape the possible end states that the Government of Russia may choose in order to meet/achieve those domestic needs. Some key recommendations are presented which could significantly deescalate the Russian’s view of their external, or international, environment. Any solution to this problem will require an international, interagency and a joint approach by all those involved.
RUSSIAN DOMINATION OF EUROPEAN ENERGY IMPORTS

Sources of Energy for Europe

The European Union’s dependency on oil, gas and solid fuel imports is a strategic economic vulnerability. The magnitude of the risk associated with that vulnerability depends on the number of economically suitable suppliers available to importing countries. Of the energy exporters supplying the European Union, Russia is the only supplier that has the ability to establish a monopoly control over the energy sector. This is due to Russia’s geographic proximity and the lack of other suitable energy suppliers. As a result, Russia is the key to European stability and prosperity due to its possession of vast oil and natural gas reserves, all critical components of European economies.

The 27 member nations of the European Union depend on an array of energy sources to meet their individual domestic needs. According to the 2006 data published by the European Union¹, that range of sources and their percentage of usage amounted to:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Energy Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Usage (Mtoe)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>673,47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>437,93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid Fuels</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>325,23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>255,34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>129,15</td>
</tr>
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² Mtoe stands for million tons equivalent of oil. This is a rough unit of measure based on the energy released during the combustion of a set unit of oil.
The specific amount of each type of energy used by the individual European Union member states varies according to domestic energy production and other factors. Overall, domestic European Union energy production satisfies 46% of the European Union’s energy needs. The remaining 54% of the energy demand is imported. The imports are primarily oil (60% imported), gas\(^3\) (26% imported), and solid fuels, primarily coal (13% imported).\(^4\)

For oil, the European Union relies on the following primary sources for the majority of imports: OPEC\(^5\) (38%), Russia (33%), Norway (16%) and Kazakhstan (5%). Total European Union oil imports for 2006 were 608 Mtoe. The European Union’s gas dependency is spread among many suppliers, though the four primary suppliers are: Russia (42%), Norway (24%), Algeria (18%) and Nigeria (5%). Solid fuels (primarily coal) are imported into the European Union from a more diverse range of suppliers: Russia (26%), South Africa (25%), Australia (13%), Colombia (12%), Indonesia (10%) and the United States (8%). To summarize, Russia accounts for 33% of European Union oil imports and controls the transit of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Russia accounts for 42% of the gas imported into the European Union.\(^6\)

The European Union’s Second Strategic Energy Review described the dependency situation as:

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\(^3\) The term gas refers to liquid natural gas, propane and other pressurized gases. Gases are commonly used to heat homes and provide fuel for cooking. The term does not refer to gasoline or petrol.


\(^5\) OPEC stands for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

The overall picture masks the very high import dependency on one supplier for certain countries. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Ireland, Sweden and Finland are completely dependent on one supplier for gas imports, while Greece, Hungary, Austria are more than 80% dependent on the same (monopoly) supplier. Moreover, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland are nearly fully dependent on one oil supplier (more than 95%). Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Cyprus are also almost completely dependent on a single supplier for coal.

As the production of European energy sources declines through depletion, the dependency of the European Union on imported Russian energy sources will continue to increase.

**European Energy Supply Trends**

The European Union is projected to become more dependent upon energy imports to meet its needs for oil, gas and solid fuels. Two primary reasons account for the European Union’s projection: depletion of domestic resources and the phase out of nuclear power plants, primarily in the former Communist nations. This decline in resources is acknowledged in European Union publications, and also put into a context that broadly paints a view of the energy situation in the year 2020:

Europe has always relied on external supply of energy sources to meet its demand and it will continue to do so. Currently estimated at more than 54% of its needs, this external dependency is expected to increase up to 56% in 2020, when oil prices over 100 US$/barrel (in 2005 money) are assumed in combination with the implementation of Europe’s New Energy Policy. Import dependency would be a bit higher (e.g. 59% in 2020) with more moderate oil prices (e.g. 61 US$/barrel) as fossil fuel demand would be higher. This dependency is not a problem in itself. However, it requires an active energy security policy, building up internal strengths

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8 Ibid., 19.
through a well-functioning internal energy with good interconnections, diversity in the types of energy used, clear regulation for security of supply and mechanisms for cooperation to deal with crises. It requires also an effective external action aimed at diversification of suppliers and supply routes as well as closer cooperation with producers and consumers. In view of the predicted growth of world energy demand, competition for resources will get tough and the market power of the few large energy exporters will increase further.9

These concerns over the consolidation of market power “in the hands of the few large energy exporters” is a growing national security issue for European Union member nations. Since there are no oil or gas reserves left in the European Union member nation’s territories, over time the dependency on the few suppliers of those products will only increase, as will the cost for those resources.

The amount of oil remaining in the world provides a useful timeline to consider courses of action to mitigate this eventuality. The European Union relies on British Petroleum’s (BP) worldwide oil reserves estimates in its reporting:

BP considers that the world’s proved oil reserves amount to 41.6 years of current production. The reserves-to-production ratio for the Middle East is much higher: 82.2 years. It is 21.8 years for Russia. Enerdata estimates the world’s proved reserves at 47.4 years of current production.10

The world’s remaining gas reserves are estimated to last 59.8 years (Enerdata) and 60.3 years (BP) at current production levels.11 Again, the European Union relies on BP to provide accurate estimates of the amount of gas reserves and their locations. BP

9 Ibid., 23.
10 Ibid., 34.
11 Ibid.
estimates that the former Soviet Union contains 30%, while the Middle East contains 41.6%, with Oceana and South Africa each possessing 8%.\textsuperscript{12}

The amount of worldwide coal reserves offers a much more optimistic outlook in terms of distribution and amounts. European Union reporting states two sources for the consumption estimates based on current production levels: 133 and 150 years remaining supply. Of course this optimistic scenario is tempered by the massive contribution of atmospheric carbon dioxide that burning coal for electricity production causes and the direct impact this has on global warming. North America, the Russian Federation and Asia/Oceana have an equal share of the world’s remaining coal reserves, about 30% each. Those three sources represent the vast majority of the world’s coal reserves.\textsuperscript{13} The overall, unavoidable trend is an increasing reliance on Russia for European Union oil and gas imports.

**Distribution Networks for European Energy Imports**

To satisfy the energy shortfalls of European Union member nations the importation of oil, gas and coal is required. Of those three energy sources, coal is the easiest to transport due to its solid nature. Any railroad movement is aided by Europe’s extensive rail network. Oil and gas are more difficult to transport due to their liquid states and distant points of origin.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 35.
The most efficient means of transportation for oil and gas are through pipelines, followed by seaborne shipment. Oil and gas are primarily delivered to European markets by pipelines. The European Union relies on Russia to provide the majority of these products. This situation is due to two overriding factors: 1) Russia possesses the oil and gas and 2) Russia built an extensive infrastructure during the Soviet era that includes refineries and the pipeline network to deliver those products to European markets. This infrastructure gives Russia a dominant market position among the other energy suppliers. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, those pipelines now cross multiple European borders.

Russia’s market dominance is further strengthened by the lack of competitors and pipeline options that supply Europe with energy. Significantly, there are no oil or gas pipelines that connect the Middle East to Europe. The geographically closest pipeline(s) run from Baku, Azerbaijan through Tbilisi, Georgia to Ceyhan, Turkey. The other pipeline is managed/owned/operated by the Caspian Pipeline Corporation (CPC). The CPC pipeline runs from Tengiz, Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. All other pipelines transit through Russia to bring oil and gas to European markets.

**Russian Domination of European Energy Imports**

Russia is the dominating energy supplier to all European nations due to their vast natural resource wealth and energy pipeline infrastructure. These energy reserves are primarily located in Russia’s Siberian regions. The Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also contain significant reserves of oil and
natural gas. But they are isolated geographically with the only existing means of bringing those products to markets in Europe or China through the existing Russian pipeline networks.

To mitigate this dependency on Russian pipeline infrastructure, a significant amount of discussion has centered on the proposal to build a pipeline across the Caspian Sea that would bypass Russia and Iranian territory. The intent behind this proposal is to diversify the number of gas providers that supply European nations which would increase the security of the gas supply. According to a detailed analysis of the Central Asian gas industry conducted by the International Crisis Group (ICG), this project will not provide a meaningful alternative to Russian supplied gas. The report states:

With the very recent agreement between Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, a new pipeline is to be built along the Caspian from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to Russia, and the existing CAC pipeline in western Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia to be revamped and expanded. If all goes as planned, even more Central Asian gas will flow to Russia, increasing the amount of that country’s gas available for Europe, but also increasing European dependence on Russia.14

Russia will remain the primary gas provider to Europe for the foreseeable future. Proposals concerning the construction of an alternative pipeline across the Caspian Sea basin to alleviate this dependency on Russia for energy transportation are somewhat optimistic. The ICG sums up the situation as:

The trans-Caspian pipeline was never going to change Europe’s dependence on Russia; whether or not it has become much more unlikely does not change the fact that European importing countries must focus on a strategy that acknowledges what was already largely true: dependence

on Russian gas cannot be avoided; Central Asia will not change that fundamental fact of life.\textsuperscript{15}

The only real alternative is to bring gas to European markets with ships specifically designed to transport liquefied natural gas (LNG). The stark truth is that Russia will continue to be the dominant supplier of gas for Europe.

\textbf{Energy as a Russian National Security Tool}

The Government of Russia is fully aware of the economic and political ramifications of Europe’s dependency on Russian oil and gas imports. The wide ranging strategic implications of this situation have been present in the minds of Russians and Europeans since at least the 1970’s. Indeed, that awareness was a driving force behind the aggressive privatization of the Soviet heavy industry and energy sectors shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) describes this period of privatization as:

The most controversial aspect of the early post-Soviet economic transition was the effort to privatize state-owned and operated production facilities, in particular, the so-called loans for shares program. In 1995, the government auctioned off to local banks shares in 29 of the most potentially lucrative firms, including major oil companies and mineral producers (Yukos, Lukoil, Sufgutneftegas, and Novolietsk Iron and Steel). The banks held the shares as collateral against which they issued loans to the government to finance its ballooning deficits. The auctions were controlled by individuals with close ties to the Yeltsin regime and whose banks won the bids. They obtained the shares at a fraction of their market value and were able to keep them when the government failed to pay back the loans. The government did not challenge their control of these assets because their owners financed Yeltsin’s reelection as president in 1996. They used their new wealth to gain control over other interests such as the media. The privatization program also resulted in small and medium-

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
sized firms owned by those who managed them during the Soviet period – the red directors.\textsuperscript{16}

Since the elevation of Vladimir Putin to the offices of President and subsequently Prime Minister that began in 1999, the Government of Russia has effectively reasserted control over Russia’s natural resource wealth, in addition to establishing order and stability in the country after a chaotically managed transition from Communism to a free market democracy. The CRS provides a detailed summary of the Government of Russia’s activities under the stewardship of Putin to reestablish control over Russia’s natural resources wealth; it is included in Appendix A for accessibility. A brief excerpt of the summary is given here:

If President Putin’s first term of office was marked by achieving economic stability and launching some critical reforms, the second term (2004-2008) was largely characterized by the government’s re-establishing control over critical sectors of the Russian economy. It has done so by acquiring the assets of companies that had been privatized during the Yeltsin regime and taken over by so-called oligarchs via questionable transactions. The Putin Administration has been re-nationalizing companies directly by taking control of assets or indirectly through ostensibly private sector companies in which the Russian government has substantial ownership…. From 2004 to 2006, the government took control of formally privatized companies in certain “strategic” sectors: oil, aviation, power generation equipment, machine – building and finance…. In the oil sector alone, state-owned companies controlled 16.0% of crude oil production in 2003 and in 33.5% in 2005, a figure that the OECD estimates to have risen eventually to over 40% after all of the Yukos’s assets had been distributed.\textsuperscript{17}


Revenues from those commercial sectors are disbursed to the investors in those corporations in the form of dividends. The Government of Russia is now a majority stakeholder and principal recipient of revenues, and hence holds a significant vote over the activities of those corporations. These corporations have become the commercial instruments of Russia’s national security arsenal; they are the means by which the Government of Russia is able to achieve desired ends. In the long history of Russia, these corporations could possibly represent the most powerful national security tools that any Russian government has ever possessed. The ways now available for the Government of Russia to achieve desired end states through these commercial means is an unprecedented challenge for the European community.

For example, if the Government of Russia chose to restrict oil and gas exports to a recipient country, the other downstream customers are also negatively affected. The effects of such an action can suddenly escalate a bilateral dispute into a multilateral crisis involving the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On the other side of the issue, a nation that decides to restrict the flow of oil or gas through a transiting pipeline would instantly feel a tremendous amount of international pressure to cease those activities. If a European Union or aspiring European Union member nation should attempt such an action, it would suffer an untenable level of sanctions by parties on all sides of the issue. In a more dramatic example, it is a feasible conclusion that newly independent former Soviet republics in central Asia could face the very real prospect of a Russian military intervention in response to blocking of oil and pipeline resources.

In January 2009 an energy coercion scenario played out during a price dispute between Ukraine and Gazprom. The dispute quickly escalated into a European-wide
crisis when Gazprom stopped delivery of gas to Ukraine. The European Union officially describes the crisis in these terms:

The crisis resulted from an unresolved commercial dispute between Naftogaz (Ukraine) and Gazprom (Russia). Gazprom stopped supplying gas for Ukrainian….. From 2 January, gas deliveries to several European Member States were affected, notably Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and above all Bulgaria and Romania. Gas deliveries gradually shrank on the Western Balkan route and at Western Ukraine entry points. During the night of 6-7 January, all supplies through Ukraine to the EU where cut. There were no Russian supplies to Europe from 7 January to 20 January.

In response, the EU, led by the Czech Presidency and the Commission, mediated between the partners at company and government levels…… This resulted in an agreement on 18 January between the Russian and Ukrainian Prime Ministers. On 19 January, within the political agreement Gazprom and Naftogaz signed a new 10-year agreement on the purchase of gas Ukraine and the transit of gas to the EU via Ukraine. On 20 January, normal gas transit towards the EU resumed.18

This crisis over the price of and payment for gas deeply affected Europe. It clearly showed the true impact of Europe’s dependency on Russian energy imports, the true scope of which was probably beyond the ability of most governments to accurately assess. This crisis clearly showed that the Government of Russia now possesses an unprecedented ability to influence the daily lives of Europe’s civilian population, and to impact negatively in a substantial way through non-lethal, non-kinetic the economies of many nations in Europe. The European Union officially describes the impact of the gas crisis in these terms:

The ultimate sufferers from inadequate and inefficient gas security of supply arrangements in Europe are European citizens (dependent on gas for cooking and heat, directly or via district heating; many dependent on gas-fired electricity generation) and industry (e.g. power sector, chemicals,
fertilizers). Gas supply disruptions are a serious issue for electricity generation in several Member States, hence the likelihood that a gas crisis can become a much more disruptive energy crisis.

Costs of supply disruptions can be considerable, as demonstrated in the January crisis, directly affecting industry (e.g. temporary closure of plant; requirement on power plants to switch fuels, provision of back-up fuels or insurance-type contracts), then households. Significant economic damage was felt in the Member States most affected in the January crisis.

Supply disruptions will have impacts on jobs. Some 25% of gas consumption in the EU is in industry (fertilizers, other chemicals, etc.). Interruption of supplies to such continuously running enterprises is a negative factor, potentially putting jobs at risk.19

More importantly for the Government of Russia and the nations of Europe, the gas crisis showed how the European Union immediately stepped in to mediate the issue because of the transnational downstream and collateral impact of the gas shutoff on the other European nations which rely on the gas delivered through pipelines that crossed Ukrainian territory. The immediate European Union response was due to the immediate needs of the people, and those needs almost immediately surpassed the ability of free market mechanisms to resolve the dispute over pricing. The European Union summarized the international response to this emergency as:

The main driver for the issue of the effectiveness of emergency arrangements and their impact on the mitigation of disruptions by the internal gas market and on solidarity is the evidence of unilateral and uncoordinated action by some Member States in gas supply emergencies. There are several problems with this. By creating doubt on when emergencies will be declared in parts of the internal gas market, when non-market actions will be introduced, confusion is created around the basic agreement on having the internal gas market mitigate supply disruptions for as long as possible. Once an emergency is declared, clarity is needed on what this implies. Gas market players from several Member States have raised the issue of uncertainty about continued access to

19 Ibid., 15.
storage in neighboring countries in a crisis, despite commercial contracts, for example.\textsuperscript{20}

The lessons learned from the Ukrainian gas crisis offer an interesting contrast to the Government of Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in August 2008. In both cases instruments of national power were used to achieve a political goal. By all analysis, the non-lethal application of the energy market had a far greater impact on a far greater audience than any military action could hope to achieve. Additionally, energy politics has a wider range of applicability than military options. The most obvious example is found in manipulation of the price for oil and gas. If the Government of Russia decided to raise the price of gas by one U.S. dollar per cubic meter of gas, then the civilian population must pay for that increase out of their household incomes. This results in less money being available to the nation for economic activity, and for tax revenues. Conversely, the additional dollar’s worth of profit represents an increase in the revenue for GAZPROM and the Government of Russia by extension. That financial windfall can be directly applied to any project specified by the Government of Russia.

The Government of Russia has the ability to impede economic activity in its energy customers while at the same time increasing its revenues. In a pessimistic scenario, European energy recipients could inadvertently finance a military buildup of both their nation and the Government of Russia through price increases for either the energy itself or its transit fees. For example, every price increase that is paid by an energy consumer to GAZPROM represents profit for Government of Russia tax revenues.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 14.
Those revenues can directly fund Government of Russia military programs. European payments are now a tremendous source of the Government of Russia’s discretionary funding through price manipulation of the oil and gas supplies. This situation and its possible consequences are described by Colonel Richard Anderson\textsuperscript{21} as:

More important to European Union and other consumers of Russian energy, these policies are aimed at increasing the Russian state’s economic instrument of power and, more specifically, to be able to set prices in regional gas markets and obtain increased political leverage from the control of this hugely important energy source. Regardless of whether or not Russia will deliberately try to leverage the political decisions of EU leaders over the longer term through the might of its gas (although it appears that is in fact the very outcome planned for by Russian leaders), it would be unwise for the EU to rely upon any one source for 30% of its energy. Given the unreliable nature of the source, Europe’s politicians may find they are beholden to Russia. Even worse, they could become the key factor in literally and figuratively arming a clearly resurgent Russia. Rather than telling their constituents they may have to ration heat or electricity in winter, it would be much easier to simply turn a blind eye to undesired Russian behavior, or as in the case in Ukraine, succumb to Russian pressure. The security implications of this Russian influence are profound.\textsuperscript{22}

**Russian National Security Goals**

Clearly the nationalization of Russia’s natural resources and manufacturing economic sectors is a deliberate, coordinated action led by now Prime Minister Putin. The actions of Gazprom during the Ukrainian gas shutoff is universally seen as a political means of coercion to compel Ukrainians to ease away from seeking membership in North

\textsuperscript{21} Colonel Richard Anderson is a fellow of the Senior Fellows Program in the College of International and Security Studies of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmish-Partenkirchen, Germany. He is currently a senior-level educational institution Military Fellow of the International Security Studies Program of the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

Atlantic Treaty Organization. Those events beg the question of what is the goal of the Government of Russia’s energy consolidation strategy and why does Russia feel threatened?

A key American foreign policy goal has been to successfully integrate Russia into the global economy in order to ease Russian concerns about its security. The idea behind this goal is that an integrated Russia will see the benefit of stability in achieving economic growth that benefits the majority of all citizens.\textsuperscript{23} To achieve this and other stability oriented goals, the United States has given more than $16 billion\textsuperscript{24} in assistance to Russia since 1992.\textsuperscript{25}

Despite these efforts, the Government of Russia has taken efforts to influence through decisive economic and military means the decisions of Ukraine and Georgia. Despite living through a tremendous period of economic growth that has benefitted most of the world, especially the still communist governed People’s Republic of China, the Government of Russia views Europe and the United States as its most significant national security threat. According to multiple sources, Russians still consider the U.S. as their principle adversary. According to public opinion polls conducted Dr. Stephen White,  

\textsuperscript{24} According to Stewart Goldman of the Congressional Research Service, the $16 billion in assistance “included over $3.7 billion in Freedom Support Act (FSA) aid for democratization, market reform, and social and humanitarian aid. Most of the rest went for Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR or Nunn-Lugar) and other security-related programs.”
“The most hostile country outside of the former Soviet republics, in the view of the respondents, was the United States.”

Dr. Sergei Smolnikov contends that “In particular, Russia’s instinctive policy to consider the West as threatening and something to be opposed may be of use domestically, but in the long term it will undermine rather than enhance Russia’s strategic and economic interests.” Similarly, Dr. Stephen Blank of the U.S. Army’s War College Strategic Studies Institute views the current state U.S.-Russian relations in these terms:

As Moscow grows more autocratic at home, aggressive in its policies, and more truculent in its rhetoric, it is increasingly dominated by a threat perception based on its inability to imagine a world without the presupposition of conflict and threat and frank admission of its adversarial relationship with Washington even as it offers strategic partnership, as in its new foreign policy concept…. Apart from confirming Russian threat perceptions and Moscow’s propensity to manufacture wholly fabricated threats, he thus also suggests the enduring imperial drive in Russian think that contributes so much to its presupposition of being in a state of ongoing conflict with its neighbors.”

Moscow thus discerns or claims to discern dawning threats from U.S. and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization military power even though in actual fact today it has the most benign threat environment in its history. Dr. Blank points out that Moscow tends to “manufacture wholly fabricated threats,” which raises the question of why has this behavior become an accepted trait of Russian governments since the Stalinist period? The level of concern for security in Russia is further expressed in a Chaillot Paper by Dmitri Danilov, who states “the movement of NATO military infrastructure to its borders

has worried Russia. Both sides (NATO and Russia) have admitted the absence of a mutual military threat, but this has not eliminated the need to make adjustments to Russia’s defence planning.”

So why in an era of unprecedented economic progress has the Government of Russia persisted in a pattern of security centric behavior? The answer to this question, it seems, is that Russia is suffering from a hidden epidemic of mental health disorders initially created during Joseph Stalin’s Great Terror and then cemented during the Great Patriotic War that began 1941. For a twenty year period, from 1929 until Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union, especially Russians, suffered the greatest human tragedies in human history. The long-term medical and societal implications of those events are only now being understood by medical professionals. But in this context, the opinions and actions of the Government of Russia begins to make sense as they search for security.

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This section addresses the domestic environment that shapes strategy development inside the Government of Russia. This thesis proposes that Russian society is unknowingly coping with first, second and third order effects of an epidemic of stress disorders which began during the Stalinist period. The strategic effects that emanate from this domestic situation are difficult to judge, but the general trend of the Government of Russia towards acquiring state control over economic sectors as a means of building powerful national security tools is a consistent theme in Soviet and Government of Russia policy. To classify this trend as a holdover from Soviet era ideology is a tempting mischaracterization of a very complex Russian cultural perception of their strategic environment. The re-nationalization of the Russian energy sector is counter-intuitive to a Western cultural perspective. From a Russian cultural perspective, altered by persistent anxiety and stress disorder symptoms, those actions provide security against the hostility of foreign nations. The domestic environment, especially the cultural aspects of that environment, is an important motivation to any nation’s strategy development process.  

Colin Gray asserts the importance of the domestic cultural environment in his statement:

States, and other politically organized units, compete for power and influence, most typically in non-violent ways. State behaviour, including the waging of war, must be conducted by representatives of specific


31 Colin Gray is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading.
cultures, and their choices cannot help but be coloured by perceptions, attitudes, and habits of mind, that should be termed cultural. To say that, however, is not to argue that cultural impulses frequently will be permitted to override calculations of interest. Politics, and war as an instrument of policy, fundamentally and permanently is about power and is conducted according to the lore of reason of state. Each political culture pursues its reason of state after its own cultural fashion, but generally subject to acute recognition of the discipline provided by balancing power.32

Stress disorders are now woven into the unseen fabric of Russian society. This situation must be recognized and addressed in order to achieve a meaningful relationship with the Government of Russia.

This chapter asserts that the Russian population is suffering from wide-scale stress disorders. The first step in that process is to explain what a stress disorder is and how it affects the individual. The emphasis will be upon Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), as the most likely initial stress disorder leading to the present environment. Secondly, we will review the rates of PTSD incidence among children, adults and soldiers when exposed to warfare, natural disasters and combat. The third step in this discussion is to look at Russian history from the beginning of the Stalinist period. Finally, we will briefly review what many people describe as the collapse of the Russian demographic – population decline, alcoholism, drug abuse, criminality – and link those trends to stress disorder induced behavior.33 Stress disorders in Russia could be as severe a public health problem as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria are for sub-Saharan Africa.

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder

Russia’s domestic environment is shaped by its recent history and culture - the modern day manifestation of a society’s historical experiences. Russia is driven by the collective need to establish security for the Russian nation. Achieving national security is a fundamental mission of any government. What sets Russia apart from other nations is their methodology and the subtext that drives this need. In order to achieve security, the Russian government seeks to develop national security tools that far exceed the capabilities of its neighbors. This overwhelming need became apparent immediately after the end of the Second World War, also known as the Great Patriotic War in Russia. That need for security is a direct result of the traumatic events that millions of Russian survivors of Stalin and Hitler experienced. A growing body of psychological research is illuminating the true level of suffering that survivors of traumatic events carry with them for the remainder of their lives. Many survivors of traumatic events are now known to suffer from a psychological trauma called Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. This is a medically recognized condition by the professional medical communities in Western nations. A prominent research and clinical practitioner in this field, Dr. Shiraldi describes PTSD in general terms as:

Post-Traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) results from exposure to an overwhelmingly stressful event or a series of events, such as war, rape or abuse. It is a normal response by normal people to an abnormal situation. The traumatic events that lead to PTSD are typically so extraordinary they would distress almost anyone. These events are usually sudden. They are perceived as dangerous to self or others, and they overwhelm our ability to respond adequately…PTSD refers to deep emotional wounds. In 1980, following the Vietnam experience, the American Psychiatric Association
formally diagnosed PTSD, categorizing it as one of the anxiety disorders.\textsuperscript{34}

In America’s attempts to understand and rectify the tragic experiences of many Vietnam veterans, much progress has been made in identifying PTSD as a valid medical issue. PTSD is the hidden cost of war, the price a society incurs when people’s actions cause deep suffering in others. How deeply PTSD symptoms will effect an individual depends on the severity of trauma experienced. Dr. Shiraldi explains that man’s intentional actions lead to the most severe cases of PTSD:

Intentional human traumas are usually the worst. PTSD symptoms resulting from such stressors are usually more complex, are of longer duration and are more difficult to treat for a number of reasons. Such traumas are typically the most degrading and cause the most shame. They often involve feelings of being stigmatized, marked, different or an outcast (as in rape). Man-made traumas are also most likely to cause people to lose faith in humanity, in love and in themselves.\textsuperscript{35}

People develop PTSD symptoms through exposure to traumatic events. There are no identifiable biological or hereditary factors associated with an individual’s potential risk for acquiring PTSD. The PTSD Sourcebook lists a number of potentially traumatic events and stressor that could cause PTSD in an individual. Prominent in the list are combat, civil war, resistance fighting, rape, physical abuse, emotional abuse, intimidation, torture, being held hostage, prisoner of war experiences, internment in a concentration camp, victim of cult abuse, bombing (e.g. Hiroshima), sniper attack, witnessing parents fear reactions, alcoholism participating in violence/atrocities (e.g. Nazi doctors or as soldiers), or identifying with the aggressor/perpetrator. Without

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 7.
exception, those situations describe the daily horrors experienced by the civilians and soldiers caught up in the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Those daily horrors affected individuals, many of whom may have unwittingly carried the psychological consequences, such as PTSD, of those events with them for the remainder of their lives.

The consequential effects of PTSD on an individual varies according to the magnitude of emotional distress experienced. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), a person is diagnosed with PTSD if they meet the DSM-IV-TR (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - 4th edition – Text Revision) criteria for PTSD for Providers and Researchers criteria. The current definition of PTSD as established by the APA and United States Department of Veterans Affairs is found in Appendix B. In addition, there are further criteria for differentiating cases of complex PTSD which involve long term traumas associated with concentration camps, forced prostitution, brothels and prisoner of war camps to name a few examples. The long term severe cases of PTSD often involve traumas typically involve the victim being held captive.\(^{36}\) It is of particular importance that all of the situations described in DSM-IV-TR criteria were daily occurrences experienced by millions of people during the four year Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union.

**Effects of Stress Disorders on the Individual and Society**

PTSD essentially results in a debilitating loss in trust and faith for the victim, which triggers a constant state of vigilance against danger in the individual. As the

victim survives through horrific events, the inherent sense of good in the world, good in
their fellow mankind, and the optimism that is found in all people is heavily eroded. To
varying degrees, the victim’s inherent mental coping mechanisms learned during their
life’s experiences are overwhelmed by consistent subconscious attempts to make sense of
the traumatic experiences. The result is an anxiety disorder that requires professional
medical care in order to alleviate symptoms. In the most severe cases, classified as
complex PTSD, the traumatic crisis is often caused by the deliberate harmful actions of
people against people such as torture and rape. PTSD symptoms can last a lifetime if not
diagnosed and left untreated. The symptoms vary in their severity but commonly include
mental fatigue, physical fatigue, social disengagement, a sense of being stigmatized,
trouble sleeping, and hyper-vigilance among many other possible symptoms. PTSD is
the manifestation of a constant state of fear inflicted by the victim’s experiences. It is
devastating to a person’s mental health and that person’s relationships with all of those
around him. Victims typically feel that the only people who can understand and accept
them unconditionally are those who went through the same experiences with them:
comrades, squad mates, shipmates, and friends for example. Unless an individual has
experience with PTSD either directly or indirectly, for example as the commanding
officer of a soldier who develops PTSD symptoms, they typically have no comprehension
how invasive PTSD symptoms can be to the victim. According to Dr. Shay, “I do not
believe the PTSD criteria capture the devastation of mental life after severe combat
trauma, because they neglect the damaging personality changes that frequently follow

37 Shiraldi, 8-12.
38 Jonathon Shay, M.D., Ph.D., is a staff psychiatrist in the Department of Veterans Affairs
Outpatient Clinic in Boston.
prolonged, severe trauma.”\textsuperscript{39} PTSD and other stress disorders have significant effects on behavior with long term consequences for the society.

Incidence and Consequences of Stress Disorders among Children

In the previous twenty years a growing number of researchers have focused on measuring the incidence of PTSD among populations subjected to war and natural disasters. Research has revealed that children are especially susceptible to traumatic events, such as war, because of their youth and lack of psychological maturity. Marina Ajdukovic studied a group of refugee children during the war in the Republic of Croatia and found that “Posttraumatic stress reactions were weakly present in 19% of the adolescents, moderately present in 52.4%, and intensely present in 28.6.” In a study of 791 Sarajevian children during the Bosnian war, it was found that “41% of our sample experienced clinically significant interviewer reported PTSD symptoms, and 18.2% had moderate to severe PTSD symptoms.” Those studies were conducted in the Balkans region where the children witnessed and typically experienced the events as non-combatants. In the case of children directly participating in combat operations, it was found that former Ugandan child soldiers were found to have a 97% rate of clinical post traumatic stress reactions.

In the case where children were directly targeted by enemy combatants, Laufer and Solomon’s direct analytic research on the impact of terrorist incidents on Israeli youth revealed a high level of psychological impact:

Our findings show that 42% of the Israeli adolescents who participated in the study suffered from moderate to severe level of posttraumatic symptoms. Comparison of war zones is problematic because of differences in social context and levels of exposure, as well as in research tools. It may be noted, however, that studies of Palestinian, Kuwaiti, Eritrean, and Bosnian children and adolescents report that between 43% to 73% of them suffered from moderate to clinical levels of PTSD (Farwell, 1999; Macksoud & Aber, 1996; Nader et al., 1993; Smith, Perrin, Yule, Hacam, & Struyland, 2002; Thabet & Vostanis, 1999; Thabet et al., 2002).  

There is growing evidence that child survivors of traumatic PTSD causing events carry those psychological wounds for the rest of their lives. Without psychiatric treatment, those childhood survivors probably will not be able to process adequately those traumatic events and memories as an adult could. As a result, those memories become intrusive and are constantly reoccurring in the mind of the victim. This is a hallmark PTSD symptom, and forms the basis for the victim’s hyper-vigilance behavior. According to Dr. Shiraldi, hyper-vigilance behavior encompasses feelings of vulnerability, fear of a repetition of the traumatic event, anticipation of disaster, rapid scanning of the environment for threats, being overprotective or over-controlling of loved ones, carrying of weapons for defense and exaggerated startle response. In addition to these behaviors, the victims experience physical symptoms associated with elevated states of mental awareness such as elevated levels of stress hormones, heartbeat, blood pressure and sweating as the body attempts to cool itself while anticipating danger.  

Even with treatment or the ability to deal with those memories, childhood survivors are

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still susceptible to intrusive flashbacks when their senses detect a trigger such as a smell, sound or sight that was associated with the traumatic event. In a study of childhood survivors of the Holocaust, researchers discovered that “this group might be at risk during stressful times, irrespective of their good day-to-day adjustment.” The researchers noted that this statement only applies those Holocaust survivors living in Israel who responded to their requests for interviews. They reported a very high non-response rate, which suggests that for many survivors the prospect of reliving those horrors is unthinkably painful.

Children are an especially vulnerable population to the psychiatric traumas of war and other wrenching events. Experiencing a military invasion with the subsequent separation from parents, witnessing the death of parents and friends, and contending with the deprivations and privations caused by violent displacement are difficult events for adults to accept. Children are even less prepared or capable of dealing with such traumatic events.

Childhood development of PTSD, if untreated, is a gateway illness to more severe psychiatric illnesses as the child grows into adulthood haunted by the traumas they experienced. Ajdukovic’s research with displaced Croatian adolescents led her to conclude that “Traumatized adolescents may drop out of school, engage in promiscuous sexual activity, and abuse drugs or alcohol. Juvenile delinquency, eating disorders, and

other maladaptive behaviors are common.”  

46  Adjukovic explains the psychiatric motivation for this behavior, stating:

   Adolescents who grow up in a war environment face issues of security and social structure that threaten normal biopsychosocial development. Their lives and the lives of their family and friends are at risk daily. They may have lost or been separated from family members, and been uprooted or expelled from their homes. Their parents are typically unemployed, and relations within the family drastically altered.  

47  

More disturbingly, Leverich and Post studied a group of adults who experienced childhood traumas that resulted in diagnosed PTSD. Their research indicates that people who experienced early childhood traumas that resulted in PTSD are at a statistically significant risk of development bipolar illness as adults. Bipolar adults are more susceptible to a “a greater number of subsequent manic or depressive episodes, faster cycling pattern, more suicide attempts, and an increased number of additional psychiatric and medical disorders, including a higher incidence of alcohol or substance abuse.”  

48  

Incidence and Consequences of Stress Disorders among Adults

All human beings are susceptible to PTSD given the proper amount of psychological trauma. It is analogous to breaking a bone. Some people have higher bone density and are not prone to break bones very easily. Other people do break bones easily. Similarly, some people are more susceptible to PTSD causing events, others have more resistance. But all people can suffer from a broken bone when exposed to sufficient


48  Gabriele Leverich, and Robert Post. Course of Bipolar Illness after History of Childhood Trauma. The Lancet; April 1-7; 367, 9516.
levels of physical trauma, and all people are capable of developing PTSD when exposed to sufficient levels of traumatic events. Dr. Shiraldi estimates that at least half of the American population will experience at least one PTSD causing event during their lifetime, but that only between 7-12% of the adult population will develop PTSD symptoms from the experience.\(^{49}\)

The amount of traumatic stress a person experiences is proportional to the severity of the incident. Dr. Norris led a team of colleagues in surveying the results of PTSD research over a 20 year period. Their research focused on surveying the level of PTSD symptoms in over 60,000 individual survivors of all age groups from over 30 countries during 102 separate traumatic episodes. Those episodes included the gamut of natural disasters, industrial and nuclear accidents, and wartime situations. That survey revealed that:

Relatively few samples (11%) showed only minimal or highly transient impairment, whereas approximately half of the samples (51%) showed moderate impairment, indicative of prolonged stress. The remainder showed severe (21%) or very severe (18%) impairment, indicative of clinically significant distress….the review showed that the effects of disasters may be quite enduring. Duration cannot be divorced from magnitude, as stronger effects are also more likely to persist.\(^{50}\)

In times of war, the rate of PTSD logically increases due to the mental stresses of combat. Dr. Shay states that “that 35.8 percent of male Vietnam combat veterans met the


\(^{50}\) Fran Norris, Matthew J. Friedman and Patricia J. Watson. “60,000 Disaster Victims Speak: Summary and Implications of the Disaster Mental Health Research.” Psychiatry 65 no.3 (Fall 2002): 241.
American Psychiatric Association diagnostic criteria for PTSD at the time of the study, in the late 1980s.”51

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) first recognized PTSD symptoms during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This war became a traumatic experience for Israel for one key reason; it created severe mental anxiety in the combatants. It was the first conflict where the actual outcome of the war was in doubt, and where the Egyptian and Syrian armies fought at a level of competence previously unseen by the IDF. The specter of defeat and the consequences that portended for the civilian population of such a tiny nation combined with an unprecedented level of effort required to win the war was a new experience for Israel. In this context, the description of the conflict and its ramifications provides a clear example of the devastation that traumatic stress can incur. Dr. Gawrych provides an insightful contextual description of the effects of battle on the IDF in the 1973 war, an extended quotation which is provided in Appendix D. Briefly, Dr. Gawrych surmises that Israeli Defense Forces were unprepared for the combat intensity that resulted from fighting a near peer land war with a greatly improved Egyptian Army. Dr. Gawrych describes this situation as:

For the first time in its modern history, Israeli soldiers suffered a high incidence of combat shock, something for which its medical corps had failed to prepare adequately. Until 1973, few psychiatric cases resulting from battle situations were reported in Israel, in large measure because previous conflicts – with the sole exception of the first Arab-Israeli war – were quick victories with relatively few causalities. In 1973, however, Israeli soldiers fought in a war noted for its lethality and intense, prolonged fighting. Ariel Sharon, one of Israel’s most flamboyant and controversial commanders, pointed out the uniqueness of this fourth Arab-
Israeli conflict: “I have been fighting for twenty-five years, and all the rest were just battles. This was a real war.” The intense fighting in 1973 produced a high ratio of psychiatric cases, with figures ranging from as low as 12.3 to as high as 23.1 percent of all nonfatal casualties. Unprepared to treat such victims of war in 1973, the IDF had to develop a doctrine for treating battle stress victims after the war. This involved, for example, the assignment of professional psychiatric teams to medical battalions at division level.52

The Israeli experience shows that a surprise attack followed by intense prolonged combat with the very real prospect of suffering defeat has a far more debilitating psychological impact on soldiers than quick victories. The Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights battle spaces of the 1973 war did not have any large civilian populations living on the land. One can extrapolate how a surprise attack followed by high intensity conflict over the course of weeks would impact the civilian population living in that battle space.

During the Chechen conflict from December 1994 to August 1996, Major General V.S. Novikov, a member of the Russian Federation Army Medical Services, screened 1,312 soldiers who either were or had served in combat during the conflict. The Chechen conflict was notable for its duration and level of violence. His results were:

28% were healthy and the other 72% had some type of psychological disorder (46% exhibited asthenic depression, a weak, apathetic or retarded motor state) symptoms, such as insomnia, lack of motivation, high anxiety, neuro-emotional stress, tiredness, and hypochondriacally fixation (when a soldier is primarily concerned about cardio vascular functioning. Frequently, this is expressed as concerns about heart attacks, difficulty in breathing, and may be diagnosed as a panic attack); and the other 26% exhibited psychotic reactions such as high anxiety or aggressiveness, a deterioration of moral values or interpersonal relations, excitement or depression.53

Major General Novikov has provided some extremely valuable information concerning non-American combat survivors. Research clearly indicates that combat, as has been long understood, can have long lasting debilitating psychological ramifications for soldiers. Major General Novikov also observed that long term combat operations take an even greater toll on the psychological well being of soldiers. That psychological toll can be exceptionally high. According to Alexander Kucher in his study of the mental health of Russia’s Chechen War veterans:

Nearly 35,000 soldiers and their families (the latter often forgotten by military specialists) had received psychological counseling since 1996. Many suffered from PTSD, characterized by increased aggressiveness and emotional instability. This affliction resulted from recollections of comrades who died, and manifested itself in nightmares and insomnia. Similar symptoms were even found in the parents of soldiers if the latter did not return from the war.54

Civilians exposed to the incredible stresses of combat, without the benefit of military training to inculcate them to levels of extreme stress, would presumably suffer a higher rate of PTSD. The longevity of those symptoms would depend on a variety of factors such as witnessing the death of family members, or experiencing atrocities committed against the civilian population. Important to this discussion is Alexander Kucher’s observation concerning the parents of those soldiers who did not return from the Chechen conflict. This may be the first study to assess the psychological impact on the parents of soldiers listed as missing in action. That parents may suffer PTSD symptoms over the unknown status of their children is an important factor in our assessment of stress disorder prevalence among Russians.

54 Ibid, 51.
Stress Disorder Symptoms in Combat Survivors

Veterans diagnosed with Combat induced PTSD suffer greatly, and mostly in silence. The symptoms that are listed in the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria cannot convey the pain of the psychological suffering. Dr. Shay summarizes the key symptoms of combat induced PTSD:

All may be understood as the persistence of past traumatic experience in the present physiology, psychology, and social relatedness of the survivor. The symptoms can range in severity from mild to devastating, and not everyone will have all of the symptoms at the same time:

- Loss of authority over mental function – particularly memory and trustworthy perception
- Persistent mobilization of the body and the mind for lethal danger, with the potential for explosive violence
- Persistence and activation of combat survival skills in civilian life
- Chronic health problems stemming from chronic mobilization of the body for danger
- Persistent expectation of betrayal and exploitations; destruction of the capacity for social trust
- Persistent preoccupation with both the enemy and the veteran’s own military/governmental authorities
- Alcohol and drug abuse
- Suicidality, despair, isolation, and meaninglessness

Such unhealed PTSD can devastate life and incapacitate its victims from participation in the domestic, economic, and political life of the nation. The painful paradox is that fighting for one’s country can render one unfit to be its citizen.55

Because of the significant social consequences of untreated and often times undiagnosed PTSD, the families of PTSD victims tend to suffer as much as the victim. Emotional isolation, spousal and child abuse and alcoholism are a few of the issues that PTSD victims and families tend to deal with. Dr. Shay states “unhealed combat trauma – and I suspect unhealed severe trauma from any source – destroys the unnoticed

substructure of democracy, the cognitive and social capacities that enable a group of
people to freely construct a cohesive narrative of their own future.\textsuperscript{56} The social
implications for a nation dealing with an unrecognized mental health epidemic are
profound. Lack of faith in democratic principles and a lack of participation in democratic
processes all erode those processes that build societies. Those undiagnosed survivors
who turn to alcohol and other drugs to ease their torments through self-medication
influence a great many people over the course of their lives.

\textbf{Intergenerational Transmission of Stress Disorder Symptoms}

During his work with combat veterans, Dr. Shay has found that “when combat
trauma results in domestic violence and pathologic family life, there is an
intergenerational transmission of trauma. A number of men in our program have children
who are currently in prison.”\textsuperscript{57} Dr. Shiraldi explains how children raised in a household
with parent(s) suffering from mental illness “learn to fear separation, avoid intimacy, or
overachieve…. Any parental difficulties can be passed on to the family.”\textsuperscript{58} That
intergenerational transmission of psychological trauma is a key concern in our discussion.
If enough members of a society have been afflicted with PTSD, what are the overall
ramifications for that society?

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\textsuperscript{56} Glenn R Shiraldi, \textit{The Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Sourcebook Second Edition} (United States McGraw-Hill, 2009), 181
\textsuperscript{57} Jonathon Shay, \textit{Achilles in Vietnam – Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character} (New York: Scribner, 1994), 195.
Dr. Shiraldi lists a substantial number of symptoms that are associated with untreated PTSD.\(^\text{59}\) That list is included here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symptom</th>
<th>Symptom</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>Impaired relationships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Isolation</td>
<td>Suicide</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low self-esteem</td>
<td>Drug Addictions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>Eating Disorders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personality disorders</td>
<td>Medical Illness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dissociative disorders</td>
<td>Homelessness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cynicism</td>
<td>Loss of Religious Faith</td>
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<tr>
<td>Re-victimization</td>
<td>Child and spousal abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difficulty handling stress</td>
<td>Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anxiety Disorders (eg panic disorders, phobias)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Family disruption (e.g. conflict, divorce, secondary wounding)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Dysfunction or sexual acting out</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The symptoms of the victim can all be transmitted from the victim to family members. If the victim abuses a spouse, children or others living in the household and inflicts a traumatic psychiatric injury on others, then a self-perpetuating cycle begins. Over the course of generations, the original events that caused the initial stress disorder are forgotten and all that remains is a family stricken by a pattern of violence and antisocial behavior as annotated by Drs. Shay and Shiraldi. As those individuals with

\(^{59}\) Ibid, 44.
untreated stress disorders find themselves engaging in alcoholism, sexual and drug
related risk taking behaviors and eventually criminal activities. Those behaviors begin to
inadvertently negatively affect their neighborhoods and again perpetuate psychological
traumas among the residents of their neighborhoods and the victims of their criminal
activities.

**Russian History Since 1914**

The rapidly growing body of scientific research on psychological stress disorders
strongly suggests that Russia is suffering from an unseen epidemic of generationally
transmitted psychological stress disorders caused by a century of some of the most
horrific events in human history. Beginning in 1914, the First World War inflicted much
suffering on Russia, as it did on all participants. The Communist revolution of October
1917 ushered in a period of vast social changes. Those events quickly eclipsed the
suffering that Russia experienced during the First World War. In order to consolidate
power, the new Soviet government began to systematically destroy the fundamental
structures of Russian society. In this process, the Soviet’s removed the social
foundations of Russian culture. The Russian Orthodox Church was criminalized.
Dependency upon the Soviet government for all of the necessities of life became
institutionalized.

Joseph Stalin’s seizure of the Soviet leadership after the death of Lenin ushered in
a new era of brutality. The collectivization of farmlands saw the forced deportation of
millions of serfs to Siberia. The Soviet efforts to modernize Russia, including the
educational system, became instruments of power used to destroy family cohesion and
build a new Soviet society where an individual’s loyalty belonged to the party and Stalin. All forms of security and sources of strength for the individual were systematically altered by the Soviets to achieve their ideological goals through a strategy of terror in order to forge the Soviet Union. For example, the Russian Orthodox Church was heavily repressed and criminalized, family structures were eroded through boarding schools and youth organizations, and the rationing of food became linked to participation in Soviet political activities.

The Russians were systematically stripped of their societal foundations in the pursuit of a dictator’s demands for absolute control. Paranoia became encouraged at every level of society. The people were psychologically conditioned over decades, told that foreign agents were intent on destroying Communism and had infiltrated everywhere. People were arrested for sabotage, put on trial, denounced by family and coworkers and sentenced to a lifetime of hard labor. The Gulag prison system swelled with millions of political prisoners. Families suffered tremendous personal losses as life completely changed from anything in living memory. The adults who remembered life under the Tsar could be blamed for secretly harboring a certain amount of skepticism about the outlandish claims from this new Soviet Government. Perhaps life under the Tsar’s was not the idyllic period of Russian prosperity, but the Russian people experienced vast social upheavals as the nation industrialized and undertook the challenges of universal education under Soviet rule.

Despite all this change, perhaps the majority of Russians could be forgiven if they did not completely embrace the paranoia of the Soviets who warned against capitalist saboteurs and fascist agents intent on destroying the dream of communism through
sinister plots? Those claims were so outlandish that they could hardly have a basis in reality. On the sunny morning of June 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 1941 every warning propagated by the Soviet regime became true as Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. This event could have destroyed the last psychological foundation that gave strength to individual Russians and the belief that the world outside of the Soviet Union had not transformed into a body evil nations clamoring for the destruction of communism.

The ensuing struggle would last four years and result in the largest loss of life in human history. Until the end of the 1980’s the psychological effects of this cataclysmic series of events on the Soviet population was not apparent, and not at all understood. Today, in 2009 the effects of those events are only now becoming alarmingly apparent. It was only with the medical professions identification of stress disorders, in particular Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in America’s Vietnam veterans, that the true extent of the psychological trauma endured by the Soviet Union able to be recognized. Since the 1980s a rapidly expanding body of clinical research has forced societies to accept that people can suffer debilitating psychological effects from acts of violence. This profound revelation has led to a change in attitude of the United States military which has pioneered the research through the Veterans Administration.

However, the true social and psychological damage caused by the Soviets from 1917 through the end of the Great Patriotic War are not yet fully appreciated. Certainly, a great deal of empathy exists for the Russian people and their sacrifices. But the years of Soviet isolation during the Cold War dampened many avenues of understanding towards the needs of the Russian people. Appreciation for those events is growing in
recent years; David Glantz has written extensively on the conflict and sums up the experiences:

The war on the eastern front – the Soviet Union’s self proclaimed “Great Patriotic War” – was one of unprecedented brutality. It was a war to the death between two cultures, which killed as many as 35 million Russian soldiers and civilians; almost 4 million German soldiers and countless German civilians; and inflicted unimaginable destruction and damage to the population and institutional infrastructure of most of central and Eastern Europe….. More important still, the searing effect of this terrible war on the Russian soul endured for generations, shaping the development of the postwar Soviet Union and, ultimately, contributing to its demise in 1991.60

As chilling as that summary is, it does not fully convey the unimaginable magnitude of the terror, suffering, personal loss and panic experienced by the individual Russian survivors. In addition, those same survivors had just lived through Stalin’s Great Purges.

The Psychological Legacy of Stalinism and the Great Patriotic War

By comparing the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and Russian History from the October 1917 Revolution until the death of Stalin in 1953, it is clear that the population under Soviet rule were exposed to extraordinary acts of terror and war. Determining how many people were potentially exposed to events that could result in PTSD is somewhat problematic. The most significant problem is obtaining accurate data for key events. A review of the available literature sources shows that only two events offer acceptably valid figures, the Great Terror and the Great Patriotic War. Incomplete data is available for the numerous mass deportations and famines caused by Soviet policies. By taking the

figures that are available we can estimate the potential number of people exposed to PTSD conditions.

The first population are the prisoners of the Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei (GULAG) or Main Camp Administration of the Soviet Union’s concentration camps. According to Applebaum’s analysis of available archival GULAG records, and the intricacies involved in the creation of those figures by the Soviet authorities, “the total number of forced laborers in the USSR comes to 28.7 million” during the years 1937-1953. This figure represents the number of people who were convicted by the Soviet courts and passed through the GULAG prison system, including special exiles. Applebaum acknowledges that many of these prisoners died during captivity and others were conscripted from the GULAG camps directly into the Red Army after the Nazi invasion. The number of conscriptions from the Gulag into the Red Army is not available. The number of prisoner deaths reported from the Gulag system is available, which she cautiously reports as 2,749,163. Applebaum’s caution stems from the incomplete nature of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (referred to as the NKVD) archives that contain those particular mortality figures. Other authors such as Klevniuk also used the NKVD archives and obtained similar figures as Applebaum when tallying the number of Gulag prisoners.

61 Anne Elizabeth Applebaum (born July 25, 1964 in Washington, D.C.) is a journalist and Pulitzer Prize-winning author. She has been an editor at The Economist, and a member of the editorial board of the Washington Post (2002–2006). She is married to Foreign Minister of Poland Radoslaw Sikorski.


63 Ibid., 583.

The second population that lived through potential PTSD situations during the Stalinist period were the soldiers conscripted into the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. There are three components to consider: killed in action, wounded in action/missing in action, and those on active duty at the end of the war. Those figures provide us the total number of individuals who served in the Soviet Army (Air Force included in Army statistics), Soviet Navy and NKVD during the conflict. In Slaughter House, a figure of 14,700,000 is given for killed during the conflict. Missing or captured is listed at 10,008,434. Those figures also include some five million other causalities, but there is no specificity as to which branch of the Soviet government they belonged to. There is no mention of a separate category for political commissars or Communist Party officials. Overall, Slaughter House lists the number of war casualties at 28,000,000.

Authors Glantz and House list Red Army personnel killed or missing at 10,008,434 and 18,190,693 as the total of wounded and sick. The exact number of civilian casualties will probably never be known with any degree of certainty. The official census figures show a decline of 26,168,000 people between 1941 and 1946. That leaves an estimated 16,160,000 civilian casualties (after subtracting the ten million combatant deaths) according to Soviet census data. Soviet census data deliberated excluded Gulag prisoner deaths as a matter of policy. That overall ambiguity from the Soviet casualty figures will forever shroud the true magnitude of the Russian people’s

loss and sacrifices in a veil of tears. Slaughter House states that “although incalculable, the civilian death toll was even more staggering, probably reaching a figure of another twenty million souls. In addition, the dislocation of the Soviet Union’s wartime population was catastrophic.”

In summation, approximately 28.7 million people passed through the GULAG prison system. During the Great Patriotic War, approximately 26 million deaths were recorded by Soviet authorities. Another 18 million wounded and sick are reported for a total figure of 72.7 million people who either died or were grievously impacted during the Stalinist period.

Shortly after the end of the Great Patriotic War, a new slogan entered the Soviet vernacular that reflected the sheer magnitude of this loss. Even Stalin had to acknowledge the sacrifice made in defense of mother Russia by the entire population by approving a slogan that encapsulated Russia’s experiences. It came straight from the shattered souls of those left to weep over the dead - “Nothing is forgotten, no one is forgotten.” This slogan captured the emotions that drove the survivors to rebuild and pursue a strategy of achieving overwhelming national security the Russians. It is the unprecedented enormity of this sacrifice, the psychological cost of it, which concerns us today.

In previous sections, we saw that 72.7 million Russians either passed through GULAG concentration camps or became causalities during the Great Patriotic war. This figure gives us a rough baseline population figure from which we can estimate the

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68 Bonn, 10.
69 Ibid., 12.
number of people who potentially were exposed to PTSD causing events. It probably is a safe to assume that complex PTSD symptoms could have resulted from the willful infliction of terror by Stalin’s security apparatus on the various peoples of the Soviet Union in order to achieve absolute power.

Considering that the population of the entire Soviet Union was 170 million people in 1947 that figure represents over 40% of the entire Soviet population. If we consider that each of those persons had at least one person who cared for them deeply (say a relative or other loved one), we could multiple that figure by a factor of two to reach a total of 140 million people. Although such speculation is beyond the scope of this paper, it is sufficient to assert that the era of Stalinism and the Nazi invasion of Russia affected nearly the entire population of the Soviet Union. It is entirely possible that every single citizen knew someone who was killed or wounded during those years.

How much of an effect those events had on individual Russians is difficult to measure. As discussed in earlier sections researchers discovered that between 18-60% of children and adults in psychologically traumatic situations, such as war and internment in concentration camps will develop PTSD symptoms. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 showed the effect of a surprise attack followed by high intensity conflict on soldiers, with the percentage of soldiers experiencing combat stress disorders ranging from 12.3-23.1%. It is important to remember that during the Great Patriotic War, the bulk of Russia’s population lived in the European battle spaces, constantly exposed to the full magnitude of the combat operations during the four years of war. The civilian population suffered extreme deprivation, exposure to the elements, the constant threat of violence from Nazi extermination units and a myriad of almost unimaginable atrocities. With this in mind,
we can estimate the number of civilians potentially exposed to events that could cause PTSD.

If we consider only the 72.7 million people affected by the GULAG and war, and multiple that figure by the percentages discovered in the research we find that between 13 and 43 million people would have experienced at least moderate PTSD symptoms. If we consider that each of those 72.7 million people had at least one relative who cared deeply for them, then another 70 million people were potentially deeply affected by those events, bringing the range of potentially affected with PTSD symptoms to 26-86 million people. There are many unknowns from those events that preclude exact determination. For example, how many Russian children were displaced, or were forcibly abandoned when their fathers were summarily conscripted into the Red Army, or saw their families murdered? How many people watched loved ones starve to death during the winters? How many children were victimized by predators while their parent(s) worked eighteen hour days inside of the vast armaments factories for years on end? Those numbers are unknown to us, but could substantially add to an already staggering number of potential psychiatric casualties.

The estimated number of Russians potentially affected by PTSD for this period is significant. Considering that the entire population of the Soviet Union in 1946 amounted to 170 million people, it is possible that at least one third of the entire population was potentially exposed to psychological conditions severe enough to incur at least a moderate stress disorder. Those individuals became the parents of the next generation of Russians, destined to raise children while dealing with an untreated stress disorders. That legacy could account for the litany of societal ills that Russia is now wrestling with.
Tremendous societal issues stem from this period. The working class of the Soviet Union suffered cruelly under Stalinism. They most directly shouldered the physical and psychological burdens of the GULAG, of forced industrialization, and served in the ranks of the Red Army. The Soviet upper class, the Communist Party members, ruthlessly exploited the lower class. An example of this situation is the plight of the poorest of Russians, those descendents of the serfs. For generations this group was tied to the lands of mother Russia. During the Soviet period of collectivization, they were literally torn from the land and forced to urbanize in the rapidly industrializing Soviet Union, or exiled in Siberia, in order to bend their will to Stalin’s rule. State enforced social upheavals of this magnitude could easily have produced significant psychological traumas among that group.

Russia after Stalin – Growth and Collapse

After the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, the Soviet leadership focused on rebuilding the Soviet Union and ensuring the safety of its citizens from further invasion. Purges, mass deportations and the other instruments of state sponsored terror used by Stalin came to end with his denunciation. Nikita Khrushchev would usher in a period of great social reform compared to the reign of Stalin. The Soviet Union made tremendous progress during this period rebuilding their country and developing nuclear and space technologies. Clearly the population was motivated to succeed. This drive to succeed could have its origins within the little understood psychological condition termed

Posttraumatic Growth (PTG). Israeli psychologists Avital Laufer and Zahava Solomon characterize PTG as:

Posttraumatic growth has received considerably less attention than the negative outcomes of traumatic exposure. Posttraumatic growth is defined by significant changes for the better in self-image, world-view, and relations with others as a result of exposure to a traumatic incident (Tedeschi, 1999). Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) list five areas of possible improvement or growth after trauma: new possibilities, relating to others personal strength, spiritual change, and appreciation of life. They found that of the students in their sample who had experienced a negative event, 60% reported mild to considerable posttraumatic growth. Moreover, both their and others’ findings show that persons who experienced serious incidents reported greater posttraumatic growth than those who had experienced more moderate ones (Park, Cohen, & Murch, 1996; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996).71

According to their research, Laufer and Zahava contend that is possible for an individual to possess symptoms of both PTSD and PTG. Clearly, in the Soviet Union there was drive to succeed and make life better for the Soviet peoples. The leadership after Stalin, inspired by their victory over Nazism, began to rebuild Russia. Those with a preponderance of PTSD symptoms possibly rallied behind those with a preponderance of PTG symptoms.

After the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, the Russians were left to rebuild their country without any significant psychological medical treatment to help with their transition to a peacetime environment. They came home to raise families, as is reflected in the population increase throughout the Cold War period. The Soviet population rose, despite the hurdles presented by the dramatically decreased number of men in the

population. The Soviet Union achieved the highest standard of living in its history during this period.

In 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved, surprising the world with the suddenness and speed of its collapse. In a period of relative prosperity in comparison with the conditions present at the end of the Great Patriotic War, the event today is puzzling. Tellingly, the NATO intelligence services did not anticipate the Soviet collapse. At the time, the Soviet Union was still a functioning police state that effectively repressed its population. The Soviets were arguably far more effective than the South African Apartheid regime in its oppression efforts during the same time period. In comparing the current day North Korean and Zimbabwean social conditions to those of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the Soviets were in a far better position. The People’s Republic of China, in a similar position to the Soviets in the 1980s, found a far more effective way of solving their problems that kept the Communist Party firmly in control of the country. It is feasible that some relatively unique set of circumstances existing inside of the Soviet Union contributed to its sudden collapse.

In searching for the root cause of the collapse, widespread stress disorders could be a prominent contributing factor that unconsciously motivated the Soviet leaders involved in the decision making process. When faced with the considerable challenges confronting the Soviet Union in the 1980’s, the subconscious need for security in a PTSD context could have led some individuals to conclude that the individual republics were better off alone, rather than shackled with potential betrayers. It is worth noting that the

founders of the Soviet Union built a nation while facing considerably greater challenges. Consideration should be given to the demographics of the Soviet leadership present in 1989. Those Soviet leaders who were adults during the Great Patriotic War died in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Very quickly after the prominent leaders of that generation passed away, the Soviet Union collapsed. We can speculate that they were the glue that held the nation together, perhaps exhibiting behaviors associated with Post Traumatic Growth. They could psychologically process the events of Hitler’s invasion, and deal with them more effectively than the children of that period.

The follow on generations, baby boomers and Generation X and Y in our vernacular, have overseen the largest Russian governmental and social transition since the 1917 Communist revolution, but overseen a transition that was apparently without any purpose. Prominent among those who oversaw its dissolution were Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, both of whom were children during the Great Patriotic War. It is possible that the children of the Great Patriotic War were not able to process adequately those cataclysmic events because of their very young age. As a result, their PTSD symptoms were ticking time bombs to Soviet society.

The postwar period saw great advances in the Soviet Union as the nation settled into a peacetime economy. Significant amounts of reconstruction and social progress were made compared to the outright terror experienced during the 1930s. Stalin was denounced and his crimes were made public, resulting in a substantial decrease in politically motivated arrests. But during this period new societal trends began to emerge. Notably, an increasingly disturbing trend in the population began to take root, an epidemic of alcoholism and domestic violence. Europeans, including Russians, have
historically consumed alcohol for a wide variety of cultural and practical reasons. Debilitating levels of epidemic alcoholism are not part of the historical records. Indeed, according to data uncovered by Cockerham, “historical sources indicate that before the 1917 Russian Revolution Russians did not consume as much alcohol per capita as French or Italians.”73 After the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany a trend in widespread alcoholism began to emerge in the Soviet Union. This new behavioral trend could be the result of a societal wide attempt to self-medicate PTSD and other anxiety disorder symptoms through the use of alcohol. The sudden rise in alcoholism after the war could be the behavioral indicator that wide spread psychiatric injuries were inflicted among the population.

Interestingly, Eberstadt74 links Russia’s declining birthrates to this same period. He states, “Russia’s abrupt and brutal swerve onto the path to depopulation began during the final crisis of the Soviet state. Over the two decades before Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power in 1985, Russia’s births regularly exceeded deaths. After 1987, however, births began to fall sharply and death totals to rise.”75

Researchers have demonstrated that untreated PTSD symptoms in children frequently lead to antisocial and self-destructive behaviors as those children attempt to process the trauma.76 More disturbingly, those children with PTSD symptoms are at

74 Nicholas Eberstadt holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
greater risks for developing bipolar mental disorders and other increasingly debilitating and socially disruptive mental illnesses. If a significant portion of an isolated population is afflicted with an epidemic of stress disorders, then the research indicates that those ailments worsen with time and are transmitted generationally. This seems to be the situation in Russia in their Baby Boomer, Generation X and Y populations. The Soviet Union was isolated from virtually all foreign influences throughout its history. At the same time, the Soviet Union made tremendous progress after the Great Patriotic War, as the adults of that generation rebuilt the nation. Once that generation passed, the society began to decline in surprising ways. This research indicates that untreated mental health symptoms may continue to increase in severity throughout a person’s lifetime having a commensurate effect on the victim’s surrounding community.

Russia’s societal ills became increasingly apparent, and alarming after 1991. According to Tapalina, “In 1994-2002, the Russian alcohol consumer made a big leap in liquor and alcohol consumption. In 2002 he drank 29 liters more in a year than in 1994, and 5.5 liters more of pure alcohol….This means that in 2000-2002, the average Russian drinker drank a half liter of vodka every two or three days.” While alcohol consumption for the sheer sake of alcohol consumption is common in Western cultures, regular and excessive alcohol consumption is indicative of deeper societal problems and the individual’s dissatisfaction with their life situation. According to Tapalina’s research into Russian alcohol consumption:

A significant role is also played by other factors, including family conditions (mental illness, criminal propensities, bad habits among family members, fighting, divorce, impaired association, and a lack of order and control or responsibility for the family). According to the RMEZ data, the highest proportion of people who drink alcohol to excess (30 percent in 2002) was observed among respondents characterized by a very low level of responsibility for themselves and their families, in particular among people who do not care at all whether they will be able to provide themselves with all of the necessities in the next twelve months.\(^79\)

The symptoms mentioned in Tapalina’s research are all underlying issues for the root causes of alcoholism. And all of those issues figure prominently in the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and other stress disorders. Russians are using alcohol excessively as a means of self medication, as they are unable to understand and cope with their psychiatric symptoms.

Today the Russian Federation is facing a demographic collapse.\(^80\) The birth rate is far exceeded by the death rate. The rate of HIV/AIDS is estimated to be in epidemic proportions, alcoholism is approaching unprecedented levels for Russian society. The litany of evils pervading Russian society includes disproportionate levels of organized crime, criminal street gangs, wide spread trafficking in women, drug syndicates, rampant prostitution, skyrocketing rates of female infertility stemming directly from repeated abortions as a means a birth control, and out of wedlock births.\(^81\) Further, Russia is systematically failing in the most fundamental of all social arenas, maternal healthcare. According to Massey, “Today fewer than one in three Russian newborns is healthy,

\(^79\) Ibid.
disease rates among Russian children are surging, and shrinking access to quality family planning and prenatal care has worsened the state of women’s reproductive health across Russia.82 All of those social problems are leading to the depopulation of Russia as the death rate accelerates and birth rates continue to decline.83

The current Russian demographic situation is the worst case scenario imaginable for the generational transmission of severe mental health diseases. It is also Russia’s most important national security issue, and as of this time is not yet recognized as a foundational problem underlying Russia’s societal crisis. The clearly visible effect of this mental health epidemic is widely recognized as a national security vulnerability. Eberstadt states “between 1975 and 2000, the number of young men ages fifteen to twenty-four ranged between ten million and thirteen million. By 2025, on current UN projections, the total will be barely six million. Apart from the obvious military implications of this decline, there would be economic and social reverberations.”84 At some point in the near future, Russia could find itself unable to fill its economic and national security personnel needs. This could result in a porous border situation for a nuclear armed state, which invites a whole host of domestic problems.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA’S SOCIETAL ILLS
FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Influence of a Mental Health Epidemic on Russia

The Government of Russia’s behavior and actions strongly suggest they are constantly motivated by fear of other nations, almost sixty-five years after their victory or Nazi Germany, and after the longest period of peaceful development in Russian history. The previous chapter showed that many victims of state terror, purges, combat related psychological trauma and other atrocities inflicted by people on people are caught in a state of constant psychological motivation to deal with danger due to the development of anxiety disorders. As a further consequence, we learned that victims of psychological traumas tend to seek security above all other considerations in their daily lives. Research also shows that symptoms of psychological illnesses are easily passed to children through the generational transmission of stress disorders mechanism.

The enormities of the suffering experienced by the Russian people during the Stalinist period suggest that millions of Russians were exposed to the horrific conditions that create anxiety and stress disorders. In practical terms, the psychological consequences of this situation suggests that the Government of Russia and its citizens subconsciously act as if the Great Patriotic War never ended and they are simply in an operational reset waiting for the resumption of hostilities. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ensuing period of economic and social upheaval caused by the poorly
managed transition to a free market economy must have appeared terrifying to a great many Russians from an anxiety disorder context. From that period of chaotic transition we have seen a new generation of Russian leaders rise from the ashes of the Soviet security services. These leaders exhibit behavior associated with both post traumatic stress and growth in that they have reasserted an authoritarian level of control over key economic sectors and focused on the security of the nation. Their actions as leaders are extremely popular with the Russian people: President Putin’s approval ratings in foreign policy are at 65%. More tellingly, the opinion polls show that nearly 66% of Russians feel that “the West, it is generally agreed, is interested in Russia’s impoverishment and collapse.”

Government of Russia activities that are seen as authoritarian to liberal democracies are viewed as reassuring to the Russian population. The psychological influences on Russian society virtually preclude an Orange or Rose revolution in Russia. Public opinion polls indicate that the Russian people feel they are being led by true patriots within the Russian cultural context.

Russia’s possible epidemic of stress disorders presents a very unusual governmental challenge for the United States and European nations. What westerners perceive as non-threatening rational actions may very often be interpreted very differently by the Russians, many of whom are interpreting international relations through a stress disorder prism that dwells on recognized PTSD symptoms involving mistrust, conspiracy and paranoia. An important challenge for the U.S. is finding a way to forge a strong and mutually beneficial bilateral relationship with Russia when they are

2 Ibid., 43.
almost incapable of establishing trust on an individual level. A key practical challenge for the west appears to be engaging Russian leaders, civil servants and societal elements who are the more functional members of their PTSD centric society in a manner that does not trigger “irrational” PTSD behavior. But this pattern of behavior in itself could be easily construed by Russians as foreign plot involving some form of intrigue.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Government of Russia has continued to place an overriding emphasis on a national security posture intended to deter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This is in spite of the fact that since 1991, the only demonstrated national security threat confronting Russia is the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Chechnya and their terrorism centric campaign against greater Russia. But the Government of Russia views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s expansion, led by the United States, as their primary threat. Apparently the Government of Russia views the prospect of an American Missile Defense System in Europe as a key strategic threat, despite the fact that the Russian nuclear weapons arsenal would easily overwhelm the limited scale of any proposed missile defense system. Despite all evidence to the contrary Russia views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most successful stabilizing and peace promoting alliance in world history, as an active threat to their security. Why would a Russia that literally controls the oil and gas supplies to Europe be threatened by a missile defense system? From a

3 Ibid., 156-158.
rational standpoint, the Government of Russia should have a vested national security interest in seeing the economic development of its former communist satellite nations.

The Government of Russia is clearly preoccupied with its national security. Russian fears of invasion and coercion by foreign influences, whether by a national entity or economic power, appears to drive their decision making. This attitude persists despite ample evidence clearly showing that European nations, whether European Union or North Atlantic Treaty Organization Member States, are incapable of acting of their own initiative to preserve European peace.6 Additionally, the incoherent, disorganized manner in which Europe reacted to the Ukrainian gas dispute with Gazprom confirms the lack of European unity on many issues of great national security importance.7

Apparent Russian National Security Strategy and Goals

The Government of Russia appears to be pursuing a strategy that places national security tools that emphasize economic coercion as the first priority. A key objective of that strategy appears to be erosion of collective European defense alliances. That strategy considers the United States to be the greatest perceived threat facing Russia today. To minimize this threat and increase Russian national security, a rational course of action would be to minimize U.S. involvement and influence in North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Government of Russia has already seen that European nations were

unwilling to intervene in the Balkans to preserve the peace. It required American leadership within North Atlantic Treaty Organization for those operations to substantively begin. By minimizing America’s role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Government of Russia may perceive that the alliance could become a far more politically paralyzed organization. The total dissolution of North Atlantic Treaty Organization could naturally be the ultimate, if somewhat unlikely goal of the Government of Russia’s security strategy. Whether or not the erosion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s will to act is the Government of Russia’s goal, they will appear intent on pursuing national security priorities at the expense of other societal needs because they are unable to perceive any threat greater than those external to Russian territorial boundaries.

From a Western perspective, a fragmented Europe will reinitiate the conditions that ultimately led Europe to fight two world wars and cause horrific casualties and damage across the European landmass. From the Russian perspective, a policy of divide and coerce is the only feasible option to contend with a European hegemony. This view makes sense from a Russian historical perspective. Russia fought invasions that originated after a European consolidation of power during the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War and both World Wars for example. Whether those European consolidations were accomplished through the pen or the sword is irrelevant to Russian strategists, the end result was a European army invading Russian territory and killing Russians. Given

8 Smolnikov, 60.
9 Ibid. 60-61.
this historical context and near-exponential increase cost in terms of lives of each successive European invasion, Russian strategy obviously incorporates historical trends and apparently intends to devise strategic effects that will minimize the risk of a European invasion. Given the economic tools now consolidated in the hands of the Government of Russia, this goal is clearly feasible.

These challenges, this complexity in the strategic environment, will become more pressing if Russia continues its slide into demographic collapse. If Russia collapses in upon itself, the instability created across one sixth of the earth’s land mass could quickly become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s greatest security challenge for the next century. For example, due to the trending demographic collapse it is conceivable that twenty years from now Russia will be unable to defend its Siberian and central Asian oil and gas reserves that Europe relies upon to fuel their economies. If those energy supplies are threatened by an external military threat or internal civil disturbance, Russia may be forced by circumstance to request European Union assistance, and by extension the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to secure Russia’s energy reserves. The possibility that Russia will need European security assistance in the coming decades is paradoxical with their apparent goal of minimizing American involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But whatever the future may hold for Russia, their national security strategy will eventually affect the U.S. ability to support stability in Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization mechanism.

The collapse of Russia due to the long term consequences of an epidemic of anxiety disorders is a strategic problem. But Russia, though important, is potentially only one example that speaks to the possible magnitude of this problem. It is a far more
sobering prospect to consider that unseen epidemics of anxiety disorders stemming from traumatic experiences may be a root cause of the problems confronting many underperforming nations in the third world. If this is true, then understanding this phenomenon may be a key pre-requisite to the international community’s development efforts across the globe. Nations such as North Korea, Haiti, Zimbabwe, Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan are confronting challenges that are difficult to comprehend in the west. Stress disorders may be the hidden problem that seemingly prevents those nations, and many others, from achieving their true potential. In the mean time, those nations present the international community with a continued series of humanitarian disasters and threaten international security.

**Proposed Solutions**

The infliction of anxiety and stress disorders among a larger percentage of a nation’s population may have potentially disastrous long term consequences for a nation, and the surrounding regional stability. In the case of Russia, the effects of Stalinism and the Nazi invasion may only now be recognizable. It is possible to postulate that the Nazi invasion may have been the final act that created such an epidemic. If so, then Russia’s national security concerns, specifically fear of invasion, may be the most prevalent subconscious preoccupation among those who are afflicted with the disorders. Russia today is focused on rebuilding a formidable national security posture to deal with perceived threats, while its population is sliding into true third world status. This dichotomy of resource prioritization suggests the immense subconscious hold that traumatically induced psychological stress disorders have on perceptions of its victims.
Similarly, the Russian resource allocation dichotomy also indicates just how significantly this situation affects stability in Europe and the greater developed world.

The first recommendation for solving this problem is to conduct an assessment to determine the scientific and medical validity of this thesis. The study should focus on the prevalence of traumatically induced anxiety and stress disorders in a given community that has experienced a devastating event such as war, and how those events affect that society as a whole, and characterized the long term societal consequences stemming from those events. This assessment should strive to accurately gauge the levels of alcoholism, drug abuse, criminal gangs, prevalence of domestic violence and other personally destructive risk taking behaviors that contribute to or are caused by a psychologically traumatized societal environment.

The scope of this study initially should focus on one smaller nation or region for the sake of expediency. If traumatically induced psychological stress and anxiety disorders are found to significantly affect the health of a society, then further studies will need to focus on identifying those nations that are suffering from these epidemics. The context in which these epidemics are created could play an important role in mitigating their effects, so it is important to determine when the epidemic began and the events surrounding that event.

Based on the results obtained from these studies suggested in the first recommendation, further studies would need to be conducted (perhaps simultaneously) to determine how the epidemics affect regional stability, internal development of the country, suitability of foreign aid that include the psychological and medical needs of the population. For example, mental health professionals could be able to suggest guidelines
and policy changes based on their extensive practical experience dealing with PTSD victims. Their knowledge could provide constructive insights for refinement of foreign policy that intends to reduce friction between nations where such an epidemic is a substantial component of the geopolitical context. The scientific study of this situation could become a long term effort as the international community attempts to resolve the issues in order to establish long term stability in afflicted nations.

If the existence of traumatically induced mental health epidemics is verified, outreach programs that address this public health issue through educational materials for the population and training of medical professionals will be key component of any solution. The public education part of this process, the strategic communications aspect, will be critical to achieving long term success. If the long term public education campaigns from the HIV/AIDS programs are an example of the education processes that could be undertaken.

The cost, or risk associated with not addressing the potential issue of widespread traumatically induced psychological causalities in a society are potentially dire. These causalities could be a foundational component to the root causes of international instability. As an example of these challenges, Russia has been used as an example in this thesis due to its strategic importance to world security. Their situation highlights the possible impacts that a psychological stress disorder may have on a nation, a society and neighboring countries. The issue could be of such importance that western politicians, diplomats and other professionals should at least familiarize themselves with the concept and consequences of a mental health epidemic. In Russia’s situation, the challenge for the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union is to
preserve and strengthen those alliances and relationships that have kept the peace and promoted economic prosperity without provoking the stress disorder symptoms that could be influencing much of Russia’s society. Given the historically antagonistic nature of relations with Russia since 1945, this task appears daunting. A significant underlying factor in that challenge is addressing the root medical needs of the mental health epidemic, which could be the cause of Russia’s sudden demographic decline.

The ultimate strategic goal could become the prevention of Russia becoming a failed state due to its disturbing trend towards demographic collapse. A real challenge will be the race for Russia to accomplish its national security goals before it collapses demographically. The long term overarching priority will be the mitigation of mental health issues in Russia in order to aid their internal stability. If Russia becomes a failed state or a collection of poorly governed republics, Europe’s energy supplies could easily be threatened and nuclear proliferation would become an even greater source of concern, while the conditions that allow narcotics trafficking and international terrorism to thrive could become entrenched and pose long term stability challenges on a global scale. These are some of the potential effects of widespread traumatically induced psychological casualties in a society.

An underlying goal of this thesis is to create a better society for the Russians and all of those societies suffering from structural faults in their countries. Clearly this thesis presents a less than complimentary view of Russia’s societal challenges, and how those

challenges translate into real world dilemmas for other nations. One of the hurdles confronting any awareness campaign will be starting the public discourse on stress and anxiety disorders, especially because prominent symptoms are feelings of stigmatization and isolation.

Overcoming the social barriers to promote psychological health will require the assistance of America’s most potent foreign policy tool – our popular culture. The strategic communications aspect of the issue awareness and education programs should be combined to begin addressing substance abuse and domestic violence. An example of this integration can be found in the VH1 cable television network’s Celebrity Rehab television series. Since VH1 and MTV are broadcast on Russia’s cable television networks, they have taken a substantial step towards raising awareness of their cycle of addiction, symptoms and treatment process among the Russian public. By addressing addictions and de-stigmatizing the issues through medical explanations, the VH1 network is performing a valuable public service. It is unlikely that any government is capable of communicating this socially sensitive topic as effectively as VH1 has done.

The communications and educational aspects of the public awareness campaign could require the assistance of non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations due to the humanitarian nature of the issues. The linkages between psychiatric disorders and risk taking behaviors imply that humanitarian efforts have a vested interest in assisting with any relief programs. This common ground could be the unifying factor for the healing processes to gain momentum in affected societies.

Finally, it is important to consider the wider ramifications of psychological traumas on all societies. Failed states have their own unique histories and circumstances
that hinder their ability to achieve peaceful and productive societies. The generational transmission of stress disorders may have an underlying role in those failed states. For example, Haiti is composed primarily of the descendents of African slaves. It is difficult to imagine a more psychologically traumatic event than enslavement during the colonial period. Centuries later, Haitian society struggles daily to make the smallest development gains while undergoing universal condemnation for lack of effort by many developed nations. By increasing our understanding of psychological trauma, humanity may be able to more rapidly achieve peace and stability on a global scale.
Appendix A. Congressional Research Service Summary of Russian Energy Sector Nationalization under President Putin

If President Putin’s first term of office was marked by achieving economic stability and launching some critical reforms, the second term (2004-2008) was largely characterized by the government’s re-establishing control over critical sectors of the Russian economy. It has done so by acquiring the assets of companies that had been privatized during the Yeltsin regime and taken over by so-called oligarchs via questionable transactions. The Putin Administration has been re-nationalizing companies directly by taking control of assets or indirectly through ostensibly private sector companies in which the Russian government has substantial ownership.

The first major step in this direction was the government’s attack on the Yukos oil company and its president, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. On October 25, 2003, Khodorkovsky was arrested and charged with tax evasion. Other Yukos executives were also arrested. Eventually Khodorkovsky was sentence to eight and a half years in an East Siberian prison. Khodorkovsky had acquired Yukos and several other companies in the loans for shares auctions in the mid-1990s. While his ostensible violation was tax fraud, many experts contend that Khodorkovsky’s real “crime” was to have crossed a “red line” in challenging Putin politically by financing several opposition political parties. Khodorkovsky also challenged the government’s monopoly on oil transport by proposing the construction of privately owned oil pipelines. In the end, the government seized
Yuko’s assets to pay tax penalties and sold them at below market value prices to Rosneft, a state-owned oil company. Yukos was left bankrupt. The case is noteworthy not only for the government’s reassertion of control of the oil sector but also for the apparent weakness of the judicial system which allowed the government to skirt legal procedures that might have ensured impartiality.

From 2005 – 2007, the government increased its stake in the oil industry through Gazprom, the state-controlled company that has a monopoly on Russian gas exploration and production. It bought controlling shares in Sibneft, a once private company. It also bought Sakhalin Energy Company, which had been led by Shell Oil and in TNK-BP, a joint venture between BP (British Petroleum) and a group of private Russian companies. The latter two acquisitions occurred after the Russian government cited projects by these companies for environmental regulation infringements and licensing issues. As a result of these acquisitions, state control of the oil industry increased from around 18% to over 50% between 2004 and 2007, according to one estimate.

From 2004 to 2006, the government took control of formally privatized companies in certain “strategic” sectors: oil, aviation, power generation equipment, machine – building and finance. For example, the state-owned defense equipment company Rosoboronexport took control of Avtovaz, the primary producer of Russian cars. In June 2006, it took 60% control of VSMPO-Avisma, a company that accounts for two-thirds of the world’s titanium production. In 2007, United Aircraft Building Corporation (UABC), a company that is 51% government controlled, combined all of the Russian companies producing aircraft. The OECD estimates that the government’s share of Russia’s equity market capitalization increased from 20% in mid-2003, to 30% in early
2006. In the oil sector alone, state-owned companies controlled 16.0% of crude oil production in 2003 and in 33.5% in 2005, a figure that the OECD estimates to have risen eventually to over 40% after all of the Yukos’s assets had been distributed.¹

Appendix B: DSM-IV-TR criteria for PTSD for Providers and Researchers

In 2000, the American Psychiatric Association revised the PTSD diagnostic criteria in the fourth edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR). The diagnostic criteria (Criterion A-F) are specified below.

Diagnostic criteria for PTSD include a history of exposure to a traumatic event meeting two criteria and symptoms from each of three symptom clusters: intrusive recollections, avoidant/numbing symptoms, and hyper-arousal symptoms. A fifth criterion concerns duration of symptoms and a sixth assesses functioning.

Criterion A: stressor

The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following have been present:

1. The person has experienced, witnessed, or been confronted with an event or events that involve actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of oneself or others.

2. The person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: in children, it may be expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behavior.

Criterion B: intrusive recollection

The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in at least one of the following ways:

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1. Recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, or perceptions. Note: in young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed.

2. Recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: in children, there may be frightening dreams without recognizable content

3. Acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including those that occur upon awakening or when intoxicated). Note: in children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur.

4. Intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.

5. Physiologic reactivity upon exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event

Criterion C: avoidant/numbing

Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least three of the following:

1. Efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma

2. Efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma

3. Inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma

4. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities

5. Feeling of detachment or estrangement from others

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6. Restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings)

7. Sense of foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, or a normal life span)

Criterion D: hyper-arousal

Persistent symptoms of increasing arousal (not present before the trauma), indicated by at least two of the following:

1. Difficulty falling or staying asleep
2. Irritability or outbursts of anger
3. Difficulty concentrating
4. Hyper-vigilance
5. Exaggerated startle response

Criterion E: duration

Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in B, C, and D) is more than one month.

Criterion F: functional significance

The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

Specify if:
Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than three months
Chronic: if duration of symptoms is three months or more

Specify if:
With or Without delay onset: Onset of symptoms at least six months after the stressor.
Appendix C. Dr. Blank’s Assessment of Russian Threat Perceptions

In Russia’s case we can attribute the current impasse to persisting Soviet mentalities, structure of government, and policies carried over to the present. Indeed, this author has argued that, from Moscow’s side, this adversarial posture derives inherently from the autocratic, regressive, and neo-Tsarist structure of its government. But the factor is then reinforced by its perception of American policies. As Moscow grows more autocratic at home, aggressive in its policies, and more truculent in its rhetoric, it is increasingly dominated by a threat perception based on its inability to imagine a world without the presupposition of conflict and threat and frank admission of its adversarial relationship with Washington even as it offers strategic partnership, as in its new foreign policy concept.

Moscow thus discerns or claims to discern dawning threats from U.S. and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization military power even though in actual fact today it has the most benign threat environment in its history. For example, Lieutenant General V.A. Gusachenko wrote in the General Staff’s Journal, Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), that Russia faces real threats to its security “in practically all spheres of its vital activities.” He is not alone in arguing this way. Solovtsov recently said that,

Some potential threats to the defense and security of the Russian Federation, including large-scale ones, remain, and in some sectors, are intensifying. Moreover, the possibility cannot be ruled out that major armed conflicts could arise near Russia’s
borders which will affect its security interests, or that there could be a direct military threat to our country’s security. This is graphically illustrated by the military aggression unleashed by Georgia overnight from 7 to 8 August against South Ossetia.

It is notable that Solovtsov, who in this is representative of both the political and military elite, omits the fact that on August 7-8, 2008, and even now, South Ossetia was recognized by everyone, including Russia, as Georgian territory. Hence there was never any threat to Russia from Georgia. Apart from confirming Russian threat perceptions and Moscow’s propensity to manufacture wholly fabricated threats, he thus also suggests the enduring imperial drive in Russian think that contributes so much to its presupposition of being in a state of ongoing conflict with its neighbors.¹

Appendix D. Dr. Gawrych Description of the Psychological Effects on the Israeli Defense Forces in the 1973 War

In light of these Israeli operational and tactical achievements on both fronts, many Western observers have unabashedly awarded Israel a military victory in 1973. In contrast, Israeli society, for the most part, assessed the 1973 War in rather more negative terms, even though the conflict ended with the IDF possessing the initiative.

A decisive victory on either front had eluded the Israelis. Once the second cease-fire was realized, the Israelis quickly understood how ill prepared their army had been for the war. The outbreak of hostilities had surprised virtually everyone in Israel. Worse, no one expected three weeks of intense fighting with such heavy casualties. During the war, moreover, there were moments of great anguish and peril. When the fighting ended, Israeli losses proved staggering for a small country of over three million people that had come to expect a decisive victory with relatively few casualties in a short war. Over 2,800 Israeli had been killed, at least 7,500 had been wounded, and some 500 Israelis had become prisoners of war. If the United States had experienced equivalent losses in the Vietnam War, it would have suffered 200,000 American dead – a figure four times the actual number.

Furthermore, the Israelis incurred a new type of casualty. For the first time in its modern history, Israeli soldiers suffered a high incidence of combat shock, something for which its medical corps had failed to prepare adequately. Until 1973, few psychiatric cases resulting from battle situations were reported in Israel, in large measure because
previous conflicts – with the sole exception of the first Arab-Israeli war – were quick victories with relatively few causalities. In 1973, however, Israeli soldiers fought in a war noted for its lethality and intense, prolonged fighting. Ariel Sharon, one of Israel’s most flamboyant and controversial commanders, pointed out the uniqueness of this fourth Arab-Israeli conflict: “I have been fighting for twenty-five years, and all the rest were just battles. This was a real war.” The intense fighting in 1973 produced a high ratio of psychiatric cases, with figures ranging from as low as 12.3 to as high as 23.1 percent of all nonfatal casualties. Unprepared to treat such victims of war in 1973, the IDF had to develop a doctrine for treating battle stress victims after the war. This involved, for example, the assignment of professional psychiatric teams to medical battalions at division level.¹

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Vita

Eric Meinhardt is a Security Engineering Officer in the Department of State’s Foreign Service. Eric’s assignment history includes one year tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, and two year tours in Ethiopia and Abu Dhabi. In between those overseas tours, he also completed two separate assignments in Washington that entailed significant temporary duty in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Eric began his professional career with a Bachelor’s of Science Degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of North Dakota in 1997. He worked for three years in the chemical forensics and pollution abatement field for private industry before joining the public sector. Eric’s chiseled features and ability to tolerate intolerable situations with a good bit of humor have earned him little in the way of recognition. Most notably, Eric has received multiple Superior Honor Awards and has consistently been recognized for his efforts in writing employee evaluations. His ability to persevere and accomplish difficult tasks in austere environments has added a nuanced richness to his experiences. By having his perspectives shaped through the harsher realities of austere environments, Eric has come to appreciate the significant challenges faced by many of the world’s underprivileged peoples. If in some small way Eric can assist in helping people understand the challenges they face as a means to improving their lives, he will have accomplished the underlying goal behind his thesis effort.