

Accessing The Army National Guard To Support National Military Contingencies

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**ACCESSING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
TO SUPPORT NATIONAL MILITARY CONTINGENCIES**

**Viable Legal Parameters or Limitations
to Post Cold War Requirements?**

by

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THE RELUCTANT LONE SUPERPOWER

The international events of the last eight years have declared the United States the winner of the Cold War and the lone remaining superpower. As in previous post conflict periods, the American people have placed increasing emphasis on domestic programs and reduced emphasis on National Security needs. Today, this situation poses a significant dilemma for the U.S. military, as forces are pared down and operational requirements continue to increase.

Domestic pressure to control government discretionary spending (where the Defense Budget is derived) is particularly acute as domestic entitlement spending continues to increase. This pressure on the Defense Department budget will continue to force reductions in defense spending, while the geostrategic environment requires increased U.S. military involvement to meet defined National Security objectives. This resource reduction for the U.S. Army, has translated into 35 percent fewer forces, 38 percent less funding, and a 300 percent greater mission increase from 1988 to 1996¹.

This situation and the American people require the Defense Department to truly become innovatively efficient in it's approach to the development and employment of military

forces. This approach will require utilization of all forces in the most efficient and complementary fashion possible. A key part of this force that has not traditionally been integrated to meet operational requirements is the Army National Guard. Historically, during the Cold War the Army National Guard focused on mobilization training to meet the Warsaw Pact and domestic needs. As identified by Secretary of Defense William Perry, the Army National Guard can provide compensating leverage to relieve resource pressure and the intense Active force operational employment rate, while gaining beneficial training and experience. Those that would oppose this concept would certainly argue that the Army National Guard (ARNG) is not accessible under current law to support Post Cold War national military requirements.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the statutes that define the "accessibility" of the ARNG, and determine if the statutes provide adequate access to ARNG units and members to meet the national security needs of the United States in the post Cold War era.

EVOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENT

Since the passing of the 1916 National Defense Act, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has remained the primary reserve force of the United States Army. After 1916, under intense budget pressure the Army attempted to redesign the

ARNG to support active Army initiatives. The argument about the statutory "accessibility" of the ARNG to support national military requirements was invariably raised as a shortfall of the ARNG that caused an inefficient expenditure of scarce military funding.

After 1916, despite these discussions Army National Guard units and members were called-up to support non-domestic emergencies during World War I, World War II, the Berlin Crisis, the Korean Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War and Desert Shield/Storm². Throughout these security threats and the intervening years the question of availability or the statutory "accessibility" of the ARNG has caused significant concern amongst defense planners and military strategists. This concern has resulted in misperceptions, underutilization and attempts to eliminate or redesign the ARNG into an organization more responsive to perceived national security requirements.

These misperceptions were still prevalent during the coalition war led by the United States against Iraq in 1990-1991, which required 62,411 Army National Guard soldiers, 398 Army Guard units, 63 Army Guard Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel commands. This misperception continued despite the mobilization to deployment time for ARNG units averaging 31 days³. This fact coupled with lessons learned

from Guard unit mobilization and the changing nature of U.S. security requirements, illuminated the need for improvements in the statutes and regulations governing National Guard force employment.

The senior defense leadership addressed this need and in September 1993 established the DOD Senior Level Working Group On Accessibility to analyze the issue and make recommendations for improvement. This group included senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretaries of the services responsible for Reserve Affairs, representatives from the Joint Staff, Forces Command, the U.S. Transportation Command, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the chiefs of the seven Reserve Components⁴. Simultaneously, additional legislation was being considered to improve support and readiness of Guard forces that would be required to support the Post Cold War National Security Strategy.

Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense initiated action in to improve access and utilization of National Guard forces in support of national military operational requirements. This action resulted in some of the most significant changes to the regulations governing employment of National Guard units and soldiers since the 1916 National Defense Act.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The National Guard of the United States derives its origin from Article I, section 8 of the Constitution and the success of the "militia" during the Revolution. This same article provides the power to raise taxes and "to raise and support Armies". This article also provides for "organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress"⁵.

The Second Amendment passed on December 15, 1791 also enforces the militia concept or in current lexicon "National Guard" by stating "a well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed⁶." The Second Amendment was endorsed by "anti-Federalists" who feared elimination of the militia by "Federalists" that desired a strong standing Army. The ratification of the Second Amendment eliminated the potential threat of a large standing Army so feared by the anti-Federalists of the time.

As a prior militiaman, George Washington endorsed the establishment of a strong militia system in the United States. He also desired to improve the organization and

training of the militia. The limited resources of the fledgling United States did not allow paying for a large Army and he believed the United States should rely on the militia to meet a large part of the security needs of the early United States⁷.

In May 1792, Congress passed the "Militia Act" providing for two categories of militia. The "volunteer militia", similar to the Minutemen of 1776 would be the ready reserve and the "common militia" would be the vast majority of individuals, primarily ununiformed and unpaid. The 1792 Act established the idea of organizing the militia into standard divisions, brigades and the like, but left compliance up to the states. Modifications in 1795 and 1808 allowed the President to mobilize the militia by calling for units or volunteers, thus firmly establishing the militia under Article III, Section 2. This section states "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States; and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States⁸." Thus, Article III, Section 2 provides the legal foundation for access to the National Guard when called into service of the United States to confront a national emergency.

The 1792 "Militia Act" remained largely intact until the 1903 "Dick Act", which reaffirmed the National Guard as the

nations primary reserve force. This act provided increased federal control over the National Guard if the state agreed to accept federal funds to equip and train units. The acceptance of federal funds also opened National Guard units to inspection by "Regular Officers" and facilitated payment for "annual training⁹."

The 1916 National Defense Act, guaranteed state militias status as the Army's primary reserve force and mandated the term "National Guard". This act also stipulated that: (1) officer qualifications are determined by the War Department, (2) each unit will be federally recognized, (3) units will be organized in accordance with Army tables of organization and equipment (TOE) and (4) a number of fiscal provisions and training requirements. The President also received authority to mobilize the National Guard for the entire duration of an emergency. The growing specter of World War I and Pancho Villa's raid into the southwest certainly increased support for this legislation. Fifteen days after passing this act, President Woodrow Wilson called up the entire National Guard to suppress the perceived threat from Mexico¹⁰. Less than one year later the United States declared war on Germany and ultimately deployed 43 divisions to Europe, 17 of which were National Guard Divisions¹¹. Thus the National Defense Act of 1916 firmly established the National Guard as the

nations primary reserve force and eliminated the initiative by the "standing Army" to have a reserve composed of individuals with no state affiliation.

REQUIREMENT vs. CAPABILITY DILEMMA

The current international security environment finds the United States with many possible adversaries and the smallest military since WW II¹². To support the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement the U.S. military must be prepared to expand and project combat power, possibly in a much more rapid fashion, than previously planned for during the Cold War. U.S. forces must also be prepared to respond to a much broader spectrum of conflict ranging from Humanitarian Assistance to mid to high Intensity Conflict. As postulated before, in times of declining military budgets and uncertainty many today believe that ARNG forces are not "accessible" and do not provide a critical component to our national security. However, an analysis of the competencies and capabilities of ARNG forces reveals that many of today's peacetime engagement requirements could be met by ARNG units.

LONG STANDING LEGAL FOUNDATION

The 1916 statutes of Title 10 United States Code which govern mobilization and access to National Guard units remained largely unchanged until 1976. This change commonly referred to as the *Presidential Selected Reserve Callup*

(200,000), focused on the emerging need for Guard and Reserve forces in lesser regional contingencies during an ongoing major regional contingency. These statutes served the United States well when the focus of the National Guard was to mobilize quickly to confront a Warsaw Pact threat in Europe. These statutes governing ARNG mobilization under Title 10 of the United States Code are:

- **Section 672(a) FULL MOBILIZATION:** gives access to the total reserve force, but requires a declaration of War or national emergency by Congress.
- **Section 672(b):** authorizes involuntary activation of any number of Reservists for not more than 15 days per year. Although the purpose of this paragraph is generally thought to be for training, there is no stated purpose in the text. (Title 10, Section 270(b) states the annual active duty training requirements for Reserve component members).
- **Section 672(d):** authorizes the Service Secretaries to activate members of the Reserve components with their consent ("volunteers"). This authority was used by all Services in mid-August 1990 to support the initial U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
- **Section 673 "READY RESERVE":** is generally referred to as the **PARTIAL MOBILIZATION** statute. In time of national emergency declared by the President or otherwise authorized by law it authorizes ordering to active duty, without their consent, up to 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve for up to 24 consecutive months. This authority was used by President Bush on 18 January 1991 to support Operation DESERT STORM.
- **Section 673(b):** Orders to active duty other than during war or national emergency and gives access to 200,000 members in the selected reserve and would only require the President to notify Congress of the call-up. This provision passed in 1976 does not require consent of the reserve component member. This provision has a 90 day

activation, plus 90 day extension limitation. This is known as the **PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALLUP (PSRC)** and is what President Bush used on August 22, 1990. State governors must provide approval for call-up of State National Guard Forces. (Title 10, United States Code, and House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Forces April 21, 1994)

TITLE 10, Chapter 15 - "Insurrection"

- **Section 331 "Federal Aid for State Governments":** is authorized upon request by the legislature or governor of a state whenever there is insurrection against the state government. The President is authorized to call into Federal service the number requested by the state and use them to suppress the insurrection.
- **Section 3332 "Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal authority":** enables the President to call the militia into Federal service whenever he decides that there exists unlawful obstructions, combinations or assemblages or rebellion against the authority of the United States in any state or territory. The President may call into Federal service the militia of any state and use the armed (active) forces to enforce those laws and suppress the rebellion.
- **Section 333 "Interference with State and Federal Law":** authorizes the President to use the militia or the armed forces or both in any state to suppress insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy if necessary to ensure equal protection under Federal Law.
- **Title 10, Chapter 341, Section 3500 "Active Duty":** authorizes the President to call into Federal service any members and units of the Army National Guard whenever the United States, the U.S. Territories, Commonwealths or possessions are invaded or in danger of invasion by a foreign nation; whenever there is a rebellion or danger of rebellion against the authority of the United States; or, when the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States¹³.

POST COLD WAR ERA REQUIREMENTS

During and immediately following the Cold-War era, the

main challenge posed by the above statutes was "assured early access" of Guard forces to meet an ambiguous threat or contingency. (Title 10, United States Code (USC) 101(a)(13) defines a **contingency** as "a military operation that (a) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or (b) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty members of the uniformed services under section 672(a), 673, 673(b), 673(c), 688, 3500 or 8500 of Title 10 USC, Chapter 15 of Title 10 USC, or any other provision of law or during national emergency declared by the president or Congress)¹⁴ .

While threats to U.S. security evolved, the U.S. military decreased to it's smallest size in 50 years. This 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR) force operated at an increasingly higher operational tempo and personnel tempo. This BUR force increasingly required augmentation from the National Guard and Reserve to provide compensating leverage against the high active component operational requirements. The declining active military force structure of the early 1990s combined with the diverse ambiguous threats facing the United States reinforced the need for increased early use and access to National Guard forces. To face these

challenges, the Defense Department tasked the National Guard with a broader range of responsibilities to face this new threat.

However, gaining access to the National Guard or Reserve without their consent to confront these ambiguous security threats set a precedent and posed a potentially sensitive political issue. Activation of Guard or Reserve forces has a significant impact on the lives of individual soldiers and the economic well-being of their families and communities.

The strategic military focus of the United States also evolved to focus on the new dangers of: regional conflict; proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; threats to democratization; transnational dangers of terrorism and drug trafficking; reform in the former Soviet Union and dangers from a weak U.S. economy¹⁵. With the increased need for National Guard forces in peacetime contingencies, the long standing Title 10 statutes and support programs came under increasing scrutiny by the Senior Defense Leadership.

The primary concerns of Senior Defense leaders, the Service Chiefs and Commanders in Chief (CINCs) in the post Cold War era relating to ARNG and reserve component access were: **(1)** the limitations on activation and early assured access (90 days initially, plus 90 additional

days) Title 10, Section 673(b) PSRC, **(2)** early assured access to key reserve component capabilities to support mobilization (Defense Secretary authorization to call-up 25,000 key reservists), **(3)** domestic emergencies that exceed individual state ARNG capabilities **(4)** expanded access to Reserve Components for peace operations to satisfy Defense Planning Guidance and **(5)** the international implications and sensitivity that must be addressed by the President before calling up the National Guard or the Reserves¹⁶. Certainly many more issues could influence the decision to access the ARNG into any contingency. The focus of this analysis will be the five concerns identified above.

LIMITATIONS OR NECESSARY PROTECTIONS?

- ISSUES 1 AND 5 - 90 PLUS 90 DAY LIMITATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS:**

The existing 90 day, plus 90 day extension mobilization for reservists limitation under Section 673b prevented the CINCs from relying on ARNG combat forces, due to the time required to make them available for a contingency and the short remaining time they would be available to operate during the contingency requirement. As a result, the CINCs did not seriously consider employment of the ARNG unless a partial or full mobilization occurred to confront a contingency in their geographic area. This limitation also did not provide National Guardsmen a

realistic expectation of the duration of their service.

The Senior Defense Working Group (SDWG) found that the Presidential decision making process in an evolving crisis is not conducive to time sensitive access to the National Guard. This process requires consideration of international implications, coordination with Congress and other potential impacts. Activating any or all ARNG forces would reveal to our potential adversaries our intentions and may cause an inadvertent escalation of hostilities or threat to other U.S. military forces or civilians.

The delay caused by the presidential decision process prevents mandatory callup of ARNG units required to prepare the CONUS mobilization pipeline to move forces to react to a rapidly evolving crisis. This delay was mitigated by the use of ARNG volunteers under Title 10, 672(d) during DESERT SHIELD/STORM¹⁷. These selected volunteers provided needed capability, but not the total unit capability required by the CINCs.

To prevent or deter the escalation of a crisis in today's difficult geostrategic environment requires rapid action. However, the framers of the Constitution and subsequent Congressional leaders understood the necessity of Congressional support before committing U.S. military forces. This process ensures the commitment of the will of the American people, thereby ensuring the moral support for

employment of the total force. Without this Congressional approval process, active or reserve component forces run the risk of uncertain moral/psychological support, exposing a critical vulnerability and decreasing the likelihood of success. Illustrating this fact the Commander of Forces Command, Army General Edwin Burba recently told a reserve audience "When you come to war, you bring America with you." (Reserve Justice on Leave, Harry Summers, The Washington Times, 6 Feb 1997).

To alleviate this problem, in 1993 the President proposed to extend reserve activations under 673(b) to 180 days plus an 180 day extension. This resulted in development of a DOD Directive 1235.10 in July 1995 which under a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up Section 673(b) allows "ordering any unit and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit of the Selected Reserve to active duty (other than for training) for not more than 270 days, **without consent** of the member concerned to augment active forces for an **operational mission** other than during war or national emergency." Selected Reserves refers to those units and individuals identified by their respective services and approved by the CJCS as essential to initial wartime requirements¹⁸. This 270 day extension required the rescission of DOD Directive 1215.6, "policy on Active Duty Training and Active Duty for Special Work which formerly

required individuals to be counted against active duty end-strength if their assignment exceeded 180 days.

Additionally, recent legislation under Section 168, Title 10 USC provides relief by allowing Reservists on active duty more than 180 days for military-to-military contacts or comparable activities to be excluded from being counted against active component end-strengths^{19 18}.

Section 8130 of the DOD Appropriations Act for 1995 allowed funds appropriated for operation and maintenance of the military departments, Unified and Specified Commands and Defense Agencies to be used to reimburse pay, allowances and other National Guard and Reserve personnel appropriations when Reservists provide intelligence support to Unified Commands, Defense Agencies of Joint Intelligence Activities. This provision currently only applies to military-to-military contacts and intelligence-related activities²⁰.

This DOD directive effectively allows the President to order units or members of the selected reserves (ARNG) to duty to support peacetime contingency operations for an adequate period to support national military requirements. For ARNG units this provision still requires the consent of the State Governor under Title 10, Chapter 341, Section 3500 of the United States Code. During recent operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia, State Governors readily endorsed

sending their ARNG units and soldiers to support those peacetime contingency operations.

With the implementation of the 270 day activation provision, additional consideration was also given to support programs designed to protect Guard soldiers, their families and their employers from hardships caused by this extended timeperiod.

• **ISSUES 2 and 4 - EARLY ASSURED ACCESS AND EXPANDED ACCESS TO RESERVE COMPONENTS:**

Access to the ARNG is key to supporting an evolving national military crisis or lesser regional contingency. Particularly acute is the need for National Guard soldiers to establish the infrastructure to prepare units for movement, open seaports, open aerial ports and overseas movement support. The Army, defense agencies, other services and the supporting commands require early access to National Guard and Reserve units and members to set up and operate crisis action teams, deploy civil affairs, deploy Special Operations forces, establish mobilization stations and surge logistics and medical support. The 1976 amendment to Title 10,673(b) was intended to support this requirement. However, this statute does require the President to notify Congress and has only been invoked once during DESERT SHIELD²¹.

The infrequent use of this statute has caused it to become viewed as a de-facto mobilization authority. Consequently, this raises sensitive domestic and foreign policy issues that require resolution before the President or Congress can proceed, extending the time required to implement the call-up under 673(b).

To address this deficiency, the Department of Defense in 1994 requested the authority to call-up to 25,000 reservists to accomplish those time sensitive requirements²². Congress soundly denied this request under the belief that this would delegate a degree of mobilization authority to the Secretary of Defense. It was Congress's view that this would clearly contradict war declaration powers under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.

This situation results in the United States having to rely on the availability of volunteers with the proper specialties to meet the requirements of a less than declared national emergency or contingency. In response to this, DOD Directive 1235.12 states that for planning and programming purposes "for lesser regional conflicts, domestic emergencies, and other missions, where capabilities of the Reserve components could be required, maximum consideration will be given to accessing volunteer Reserve component units and individuals before seeking authority to order members of the Reserve components to active duty without their

consent. When Reserve component augmentation of the active force is required for major regional conflicts and national emergencies, access to the Reserve components and individuals through an order to active duty without their consent will be assumed²³."

The Air Force has been particularly successful in accessing their Air Guard and Reserve components during contingencies to augment active forces. This is accomplished through the use of Memoranda of Understanding or Agreement (MOUs or MOAs) with states, units or individuals. This requires detailed prior planning with the supported CINCs, Major Commands and units. This prior planning results in providing 2,000 man-years of augmentation annually to support ongoing operational requirements²⁴.

In contrast, the Army in 1995 programmed only 45 man-years to support the use of volunteers. After the release of the Senior Defense Working Group results, the Army increased planned funding in this category to 500 man-years. Prior to this reprogramming effort, the ARNG had developed the "PROJECT STANDARD BEARER" program which sought to improve access to selected units. This program identifies 53 Army National Guard units that sustain the highest state of deployability and are available in a volunteer status to support any contingency the President

directs. These units come from the Contingency Force Pool-1 and can deploy within seven days²⁵.

Secretary of Defense, William Perry on April 7, 1995 released a guidance memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Secretaries and DOD Agencies which urges increased use of Reserve forces in total force missions. This memorandum identified three areas that would improve success of Reserve Component integration: (1) better identification of and planning for requirements (2) flexibility in the training and employment of Reservists; and (3) programming the funding to meet these requirements including the use of already funded training²⁶.

A matching fund program to augment the costs to the Services and CINCs of Guard and Reserve deployments was established concurrently to encourage Reserve component utilization. This program alters the Cold-War era model of utilizing programmed ARNG funding to meet solely mobilization and mission essential task training and allows focus on recurring CINC or national requirements.

ISSUE 3: EMERGENCIES ISSUES THAT EXCEED INDIVIDUAL STATE NATIONAL GUARD CAPABILITIES

While under state control the National Guard is and will continue to be the first line of defense against emergencies that occur inside of a state. This capability provides the individual states the time tested ability to

respond to natural or civil emergencies. The concern of the SDWG was when the capability of a state's National Guard is overwhelmed by requirements and the statutory limitation on use of other National Guard or Reserve components inside of that state. Under current statutes, a Guardsmen can only be activated by the state which he/she is assigned, to confront an emergency inside of that state's boundaries. The statutes governing employment of Reserve components other than the National Guard are controlled by Title 10, USC 672(d), Title 10, USC 673 (Partial Mobilization) or possibly Title 10, USC 672(b) which allows access for up to 15 days.

The governors of 19 Southern States recognizing this problem developed a compact which would allow utilization of National Guard soldiers/airmen across state lines to address a specific crisis or emergency. A recent report by the General Accounting Office recognized the value of this idea after review of operations during Hurricane Andrew²⁷.

The SDWG also recommended that: (1) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs seek clarification of the ambiguity of Title 10, USC 672(b), ordering reservists to active duty without their consent and (2) the reserve components other than the Guard will develop plans for expanded use of volunteers to meet this threat²⁸.

IMPROVED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK vs. INSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS

With the recent improvements in the statutory and

regulatory guidance, there are minimal issues relating to access to the ARNG during an declared national emergency. The Department of Defense has made significant improvements to accessing ARNG forces by modifying statutes and regulations to meet future national security needs. These changes provide a significant opportunity to achieve both economic and DOD wide organizational efficiencies previously not possible. However, these same changes present the Army with the dilemma of utilizing trained and capable ARNG units as opposed to active Army units.

In this time of dwindling federal budgets and military force structure these regulatory improvements may not be enough to achieve the intended efficiency, if they pose a threat to active force structure. The use of ARNG forces in a peacetime operational role, much like any other force is to a certain degree an educational process. In some echelons of the Army, many believe that the ARNG is not and will not be capable of performing peacetime operational missions. Other segments of the Army also do not understand the flexibility options provided by use of ARNG forces in peacetime or the alternatives provided by the combinations of inactive duty training, annual training or active duty for special work on a sustained rotational basis.

The Army began to make progress in 1994. For the first time the Army requested the unconstrained

requirement for Reserve component support from the operational CINCs for fiscal year 1995²⁹. If the Department of Defense initiative to improve ARNG utilization is to succeed, those that do not understand this asset must become aware of it's capabilities and limitations. A necessary first-step is the integration of ARNG and Reserve components on a day-to-day basis, similar to the Air Force model. Possible other steps to increase ARNG integration into the Total Army mission are: (1) increase the limited military personnel funding available to ARNG active duty for special work and increase authority to transfer funding between accounts³⁰ (Service Secretaries recently received the authority to reduce the number of scheduled drill periods for selected lower priority Reserve units in order to increase the scheduled drills for higher priority units, by up to 10 percent ³¹), (2) improve long range planning to integrate ARNG units and individuals into recurring operational requirements, (3) consider changes to allow more flexibility in utilization of programmed drill and training time, and (4) develop a requirements determination and programming model similar to the Air Force. Legislative action has also begun that would permit active duty for special work tours that exceed 180 days without impacting on active Army end strengths ³².

Nevertheless, recent regulatory modifications provide

the Services, CINCs and Defense Agencies increased latitude and flexibility in utilizing of ARNG forces to support peacetime or regional contingency requirements. Without proactive initiative to incorporate ARNG forces into contingency requirements or peacetime operations, the improved regulations will be ineffective.

As each component is currently attempting to validate force structure needs and budgeting requirements for the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). ARNG units operating at 36 percent of the annual cost of similar active Army units provide the country a cost effective asset to meet many national security requirements³³. However, this concept is often viewed as reducing the relevance of the active force. To utilize ARNG units in ongoing peacetime contingencies in lieu of active component units presents a dangerous dilemma for the Army during this time of force structure justification. This fact will restrict the use of ARNG units in recurring operational requirements or peacetime contingencies.

Accessing the ARNG and the Reserves for peacetime contingencies and operational requirements will require innovation and an improved Army planning process. The need to elevate active Army awareness of ARNG capabilities and availability is equally important. Finally, to ensure achieving efficient utilization of U.S. tax dollars and

"Total Army" capabilities, the cultures inside of the active Army and ARNG will have to change to meet the resource constrained peacetime engagement challenges of the 21st Century.

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