The Goldwater Nichols Act Of 1986: Impact And Implications For The Marine Corps

SAW 1998

Subject Area General

THE GOLDWATER NICHOLS ACT OF 1986: IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MARINE CORPS

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May 1998
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16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:  
   a. REPORT  
      unclassified  
   b. ABSTRACT  
      unclassified  
   c. THIS PAGE  
      unclassified  

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  
   Same as Report (SAR)

18. NUMBER OF PAGES  
   57

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON


# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT iv  
INTRODUCTION v  
   BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES v  
   SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS vi  
   FOCUS OF THE STUDY vi  
   HISTORICAL REVIEW 1  
      A. DEFENSE REFORM HISTORY 1  
      B. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT 6  
      C. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 11  
   IMPACT OF GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT 14  
      A. JOINT WARFIGHTING 14  
      B. DEFENSE ACQUISITION 17  
      C. IMPACT ON THE MARINE CORPS 19  
      D. JOINT DOCTRINE 19  
      E. JOINT DOCTRINE 22  
   FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 27  
      A. TRANSFORMING THE MILITARY 27  
      B. ENHANCED JOINTNESS 29  
      C. INTEGRATED BASES 30  
      D. PREPOSITIONING 30  
      E. INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS 31  
      F. JOINT DOCTRINE 32  
      G. JOINT PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS 32  
      H. DEFENSE REFORM INITIATIVES 33  
   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 34  
   APPENDICES 36  
   REFERENCES 44
ABSTRACT

On the surface, it appears the Goldwater-Nichols Act merely increased the role and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, while decreasing the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs. This study concludes that the Goldwater-Nichols Act established an overarching framework within the Department of Defense that successfully transformed the military into an organization capable of planning and conducting complex joint military operations. More importantly, as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, the Combatant Commanders, the Service Chiefs, and the Service Vice Chiefs cumulatively play a vital role in military and strategic planning and coordination. Over the past decade, this unique system has proven effective and reliable. Recent military successes have created a climate of relative satisfaction between the civil, political, military leadership of the country. Accordingly, the probability of additional legislation seeking substantive reforms over the next decade is minimal. For such legislation to become law, agreement between the civilian and military leaders must be achieved, and an atmosphere conducive to change must exist. Review mechanisms such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Panel may take the place of dramatic legislative action as vehicles for future change.

This study concludes that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been favorable for the Marine Corps. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has allowed the Marine Corps to make a larger contribution to the American defense establishment. As a result, senior Marine officers have progressed to the upper echelons of Combatant Commands and the Joint Staffs. Therefore, the Marine Corps has emerged stronger and coequal to the other services. This enhanced position, coupled with the Marine Corps' unique capabilities, provides Combatant Commanders with a ready and relevant force. Given the anticipated strategic uncertainties, coupled with budgetary constraints, the Marine Corps can continue to expect an increased emphasis on jointness. The unique capabilities of the Marine Corps—expeditionary operations and integrated air ground combat power—coupled with an organizational mindset that encourages innovation, postures the Marine Corps well for the next decade.

This case study was conducted as a part of the United States Marine Corps Command Element Assessment and is designed to analyze how the Marine Corps is postured to fulfill future operational commitments. This command assessment consists of separate research studies analyzing the Marine Corps warfighting command element organization, component structure, and headquarters organization. As an adjunct to this assessment, this paper analyzes the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on the Marine Corps, as well as its future implications. Using a chronological research case study format, this paper conducts a historical analysis of defense reform from the National Defense Act of 1947 to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The Defense Reorganization Act (Public Law 99-433), commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), has been the most far-reaching defense legislation since the National Security Act of 1947. As Congressman Nichols stated in passing the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the 99th Congress finally accomplished President Eisenhower's aims in unifying the armed forces. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact and the future implications of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on the U.S. Marine Corps. The goal of the study is to present issues that may potentially impact the Marine Corps' role as an integral component of the U.S. national security apparatus.

As President Eisenhower envisioned, and because of GNA, strategic and tactical planning processes are completely unified and combat forces are organized into unified commands. Moreover, in the past service parochialism and the need for Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consensus diluted the quality of military advice. By appointing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the principal military advisor to the President, the quality of military advice to the national command authority has significantly improved.

The legislation's emphasis is on the integration of service capabilities through unified and joint action. The GNA ensures the CJCS, the Combatant Commanders, and their joint staffs will serve as the hub around which the service chiefs and their staffs cluster to provide their unique expertise and service capabilities. As a result, joint initiatives are emerging at an ever-increasing pace. The empirical effects of GNA implementation, coupled with geo-political uncertainty and domestic budgetary constraints, place greater pressures upon the services. Joint warfare being the
sine qua non of military operations, it is obvious that the Marine Corps must base its future plans upon the (direct and indirect) implications of GNA.

**SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS**

Although the impact of GNA ranges across the entire Department of Defense (DoD), this study focuses primarily on the Marine Corps. Specifically, this study discusses how the legislation, in its implementation, impacts the Marine Corps and, as a result of GNA, what the Marine Corps can expect in preparing for the future. This monograph analyzes the historical effects of the legislation, the resultant DoD organizational changes, and the potential ramifications of current joint initiatives on the Marine Corps.

The common belief is that if DoD is not innovative on its own, then Congress, as it has done so in the past, will enact further legislation similar to GNA mandating reform and innovation. Although such legislation is within the realm of possibility, it is highly improbable. Simply put, the general assessments of the effects of GNA upon DoD are positive. In the foreseeable future, no one would be willing to invest the political capital necessary to bring about further substantial changes within DoD.

Analysis of legislative reform shows that substantial defense reform requires an inordinate amount of time, political capital, and persistence. Therefore, rather than analyze proposals advocating dramatic changes that would exceed the scope and time frame of this study, this monograph's basic assumption is that joint warfare will remain the bedrock of military planning and operations over the next decade.

**FOCUS OF THE STUDY**

In keeping within the scope of the monograph, the following primary research question is the focus of this study: What are the future implications of the Goldwater - Nichols Act of 1986 for the
United States Marine Corps? There are important implications from the past that provide an insight into the prerequisite conditions necessary for future substantive legislation to be enacted. The study also explores: Has the Goldwater - Nichols Act fulfilled its legislative intent? What impact has the Act had on the Marine Corps? And, given the pressures on the defense budget, will Congress expand the scope of the Goldwater - Nichols Act?
DEFENSE REFORM HISTORY

In December of 1942, immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill held the Arcadia Conference in Washington, D.C., and established the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The purpose of these Combined Chiefs of Staffs was to better plan and coordinate the Allied war effort. Unlike the British Chiefs of Staffs, the United States had no comparable entity. In 1942, President Roosevelt established the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staffs. Admiral William Leahy, as the Chief of Staff to the President, also assumed the duties as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—first amongst equals.

Prior to the establishment of the JCS, the military services operated on the basis of its two autonomous executive departments, the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. In coordinating their actions, the Joint Army and Navy Board was formed to coordinate the defense of the Western Hemisphere, and to develop and coordinate the nation's strategic war plans. Several war plans were conceived, but none held much relevance to the war because the planning was done without direct input or coordination of the Allies. As a result, the JCS assumed all strategic planning and coordinating functions. The services, however, remained relatively autonomous under their respective executive department secretaries. Despite this informal relationship between the JCS and the services, the central planning and coordinating conducted by the JCS and their committees proved successful in the outcome of the war.
In the aftermath of World War II, while Europe was busy with reconstruction, the U.S. was propelled to the forefront with far reaching national security interests and responsibilities. The JCS continued to plan and coordinate joint and combined operations amongst the services and allies. However, as an ad hoc entity serving in an advisory capacity, this body lacked formal legislative authority over the autonomous services and the military departments. While the nation adjusted to its post war responsibilities, heated debates raged regarding the future structure of the military. Included in these debates was the role and organization of the JCS. The Department Secretaries recommended abolishing the JCS because the Joint Chiefs lacked the authority to enforce decisions, while the Army was in favor of creating one service under a General Staff.

The given role of the JCS appeared to conflict with the legitimate authority of the Department Secretaries. While the Secretaries sought to reestablish their preeminence within the military establishment, George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower led the movement for reform by advocating unification of the services. President Harry Truman strongly supported their position and urged Congress to unify the armed forces based upon the Army's (Marshall and Eisenhower) position.\(^5\) This proposal initiated a fiery debate in Congress. Not surprisingly, the Navy and the Marine Corps, not wanting to be absorbed by the Army, balked at the Army's proposal for unification. In one instance, "the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Chester Nimitz, charged that the ultimate ambition of the Army Air Force is to absorb naval aviation in its entirety and set up one large air force."\(^4\)

President Truman and Congress sought a compromise between the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, and Secretary of War, Robert Patterson. The two military departments agreed to a much-diluted version of the original unification proposal. Their proposal sought a loose federation between the services rather than actual unification as conceived by the Army.\(^5\) After lengthy debate, Congress passed the compromised unification plan and President Truman signed it into law as the National Security Act of 1947. Specifically:
This act created what was called the National Military Establishment, with a Secretary of Defense presiding over three co-equal services: Army, Navy, and Air Force.... *The act established secretaries of the Army (instead of war), Navy and Air Force, and for the first time gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff legal standing* [emphasis added]. It also created the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).\(^6\)

Considered as the most comprehensive national security legislation to date, the National Security Act of 1947 established an apparatus that could sufficiently support the nation's vast post war responsibilities. More importantly, this Act codified the relationship and the responsibilities between organizations charged with national security.

In 1949, further legislation expanded the National Security Act of 1947. This legislation changed the name of the National Military Establishment to the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense became a cabinet position with the Service Secretaries reporting directly to him; as a result, the Service Secretaries lost their cabinet positions. This amendment also created the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and directed the Joint Chiefs of Staffs to be the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense.\(^7\)

Despite the progress made by the passage of the Act, interservice rivalry continued to burden the DoD. Upon assuming the Presidency in 1952, President Eisenhower initiated *Reorganization Plan No. 6*. This plan further strengthened the civilian responsibility within DoD by removing the Service Chiefs from their traditional role as executive agents of the unified commands. Instead, the Service Secretaries were now charged as the executive agents for the unified commands. As a result, the unified chain of command was from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the designated Service Secretary of a military department. Finally, the Plan expanded the authority of the CJCS by allowing him to approve service nominations for the Joint Staff and the selection of the of the Joint Staff.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan was that it brought further Congressional scrutiny upon the Defense of Department and paved the way for additional reform. In his plan, Eisenhower stated:

1. We must organize our fighting forces into operational commands that are truly unified, each assigned a mission in full accord with our over-all military objectives.
2. We must clear command channels so that orders will proceed directly to the unified commands from the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of Defense.
3. We must strengthen the military staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to provide the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense with the professional assistance they need for strategic planning and for operational direction of the unified commands.
4. We must continue the three military departments as agencies within the Department of Defense to administer a wide range of functions.
5. We must reorganize the research and development functions of the Department in order to make the best use of our scientific and technological resources.
6. We must remove all doubts as to the full authority of the Secretary of Defense.

Taking the President's recommendations, Congress passed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, further refining the structure established by the National Security Act of 1947. This Act created the unified command structure by removing the Service Secretaries as executive agents and making Unified Commanders operationally responsible only to the President and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Unified Commanders were given operational control of the forces assigned. Subsequently, the Service Chiefs were then responsible only for organizing, training, and equipping their respective services. Furthermore, this 1958 Act significantly increased the authority of the CJCS, by allowing him to vote on JCS decisions, and directed him with the responsibility of managing the Joint Staff.

In increasing the authority of the CJCS over the Joint Staff, Congress explicitly stipulated that the Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority over the operating forces. In so doing, Congress preserved the civilian control of the military and centralized the DoD by strengthening the operational authority of the Secretary of Defense and broadening the scope of the CJCS.
The influence of the civilian leadership over the DoD was further expanded during President Kennedy's administration. Secretary Robert McNamara introduced the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) that linked the requirements of the national security strategy to a systems based approach for resource allocation. The institutionalization of this system within the DoD formalized the decision-making process used to determine requirements and then programmed, budgeted, and allocated resources over time to satisfy these requirements. More importantly, as an analytical process for decision-making, the PPBS allowed civilian analysts and defense experts to proffer advice on military matters. The abundance of military and civilian advice, coupled with the multi-year focus to determine military requirements for the "Five Year Defense Plan," resulted in an increase in the frequency of Congressional interest and involvement in defense matters.

Through the 1970s, as the reforms took hold, incremental changes continued within the DoD. Generally, these changes dealt with the realignment of secretariats and directorates within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff providing common support to all the Services. As the precursors to the current structure and role of OSD and Joint Staff, these changes continued to centralize DoD.

Of significance to the Marine Corps, the cumulative effects of the reforms were favorable. While supporting the Navy's central role during the debates leading to the National Security Act of 1947, the Marine Corps adeptly sought to enhance its autonomy. As a result, the legislation provided that the Marine Corps, a separate service within the Navy Department,…shall include land combat and service forces, and such aviation as may be organic therein."

In 1952, as a result of the Korean War, the Marine Corps became known "as an air-ground force in readiness unlike any of the other armed forces….To have a force most ready when the nation is least ready." The 82nd Congress amended the Act of 1947 to reflect: "The Marine Corps... shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings [emphasis added], and other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic within." This
legislation, written into law (U.S. Code, Title 10), protects the Marine Corps' structure, roles, and missions; thereby generally insulating it from inter-service politics and intrigues.\textsuperscript{15}

Additional legislation also enhanced the role of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In 1952, Congress allowed the Commandant to be a member of the JCS when matters relating to the Marine Corps were being addressed. The Commandant remained as such until 1978, when he was made a full sitting member of the JCS.

The common trends in defense reforms since World War II were directed to increase military efficiency and effectiveness through strategic planning and enhanced interoperability amongst the services, while reducing parochialism. However, the results of these reforms manifested themselves in American military failures in Vietnam (1965-1973), the Iran hostage rescue (1980), the Beirut bombing (1983), and interservice inoperability in Granada (1983). The lack of national consensus in determining clear political aims, through the use of military force, ultimately resulted in confusion, unnecessary constraints, service parochialism, and micromangement throughout the national security apparatus.

**THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT**

"The effects of GNA have been so imbedded that many no longer remember the organizational problems that brought about this law"\textsuperscript{16}

General John Shalikashvilli (Ret)

In the aftermath of the aforementioned military failures, Congressional hearings in the early 1980s focused on the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission and the Beirut bombing. These hearings uncovered significant waste and inefficiency in the seemingly unending procurement and acquisition chaos. Amongst much criticism, the Congressional hearings underscored problems associated with formulating effective military advice for the civilian leadership. It was concluded that as a result of the ineffective military advice, the civilian leadership generally discounted the operational risks associated with the selected military options.
Concurrent with Congressional action, DoD inquiries into the Iranian rescue and the Beirut bombing drew similar conclusions—the inability of the services to conduct joint operations under ad hoc and ambiguous command structures. Throughout 1981 and 1986, while intense debates and studies into the deficiencies of military advice, planning and execution, and management were ongoing, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, USAF, played a critical role in advocating further reform.

Through articles in professional journals, national newspapers, and congressional testimony, Jones publicly criticized the JCS structure. He concluded that the main problem in the joint system boiled down to four issues:

First, having the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisory mechanism for the President and the Secretary resulted in less than satisfactory inputs. The legislative requirement that the President or Secretary of Defense be informed if there were not unanimity among the Chiefs on an issue, resulted in a de-facto veto by any Service.

Second, the fact that the Joint Staff worked for the corporate body of the Chiefs and not the Chairman exacerbated the problem. Papers that went through four bureaucratic layers with five different organizations involved invariably resulted in little life left at the end....

Third, the Chairman was the only senior military officer who did not have a deputy. Here there were two basic problems. Better continuity was needed when the Chairman was out of town. The system of rotating the Chiefs to fill in for the Chairman was not satisfactory. Furthermore, the Chairman was so loaded with 'outside' activities that insufficient joint perspective was introduced into the budget process and other 'inside' requirements. As a consequence, the joint input during the budget process was primarily an endorsement of service inputs.

Fourth, there was insufficient experience among officers normally assigned to the Joint Staff and insufficient promotion opportunities for the most talented...17

General Jones recommended four actions that he felt would adequately resolve the issues presented above:

First, the Chairman to be the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. The Chairman would be expected to consult with the other Chiefs before making input. Furthermore, if a Service Chief felt very strongly that different advice should be forwarded, that Chief would have a full right to submit his own advice on that subject.
Second, the Joint Staff to work for the Chairman rather than the corporate body.

Third, establish the position of the Vice Chairman with the individual being the second ranking military officer.

Fourth, require greater joint experience before officers assume a senior joint position or are promoted within their service to flag rank. Joint Staff officers to receive promotion opportunities at least equal to those on Service staffs.18

Upon retiring in 1982 as the CJCS, General Jones continued to publicly raise the urgency of defense reform. In an article published in the New York Times, he summed up the following deficiencies plaguing the Department of Defense:

- strategy is so all-encompassing as to mean all things to all men
- leaders are inevitably captives of the urgent, and long-range planning is too often neglected
- authority and responsibility are badly diffused
- rigorous examination of requirements and alternatives are not made
- discipline is lacking in the budget process
- tough decisions are avoided
- accountability for decisions or performance is woefully inadequate
- leadership, often inexperienced, is forced to spend too much time on refereeing an intramural scramble for resources
- a serious conflict of interests faces our senior leaders
- the combat effectiveness of the fighting force—the end product—does not receive enough attention.19

Fueled by General Jones' observations and criticisms, both the House and the Senate initiated formal studies to ascertain the wide range of issues affecting the Department of Defense. Several influential figures in Congress led the reform movement; notably, Senators Barry Goldwater, Sam Nunn, and William Cohen; and Congressmen Bill Nichols, Ike Skelton, and the late Les Aspin. Congressional staff members such as Jim Locher and Archie Barrett became known as the foot soldiers who managed the intricacies of the congressional processes for the growing reform movement.20

Expectedly, the services resisted the reform movement. The Service Chiefs perceived the debate and the call for impending reforms as undermining their respective service roles and responsibilities. The retirement comments of General P.X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, reflected the prevailing view of the Service Chiefs: "My first concern is with a growing attitude in the Congress which places more credence in the views of staff members in matters dealing with the national security than in the views of the Service Chiefs... This attitude is driving a wedge between Members of Congress and the nation's principle military advisors."\(^{21}\)

Further exacerbating the services' position was the new Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Meyer. He continued to echo the views of General Jones by strongly advocating the need for urgent reform. General Meyer supported the belief that the dual-hatting of the service chiefs demanded dual loyalty and was the root cause of the problems plaguing DoD. As such, he advocated full-scale reforms rather than incremental changes.\(^{22}\)

Studies such as the *1985 Defense Organization: The Need For Change*, reaffirmed Congressional belief that reform was necessary and concluded there was:

- Imbalance between Service and joint interests
- Inadequate joint military advise
- Inadequate quality of joint duty military personnel
- Imbalance between the responsibilities and command authorities of the Unified Commanders
- Confused and cumbersome operational chains of command
- Ineffective strategic planning
- Inadequate supervision and control of Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities
- Confusion concerning the roles of the Secretaries of the Military Departments
- Unnecessary duplication in the top management headquarters of the Military Departments
- Congressional micro-management of the Department of Defense.\(^{23}\)

Congressional studies, coupled with mounting public and bipartisan political pressure, prompted President Ronald Reagan to join the debate. In response to this continuing debate, the President established the *Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management*. The Commission's charter directed it to study the issues and provide executive branch recommendations.

Not surprisingly, the Blue Ribbon panel's findings mirrored the Congressional view that reform was necessary. As a result, Congress later adopted many of the panel's recommendations in
formulating the reform legislation. This interaction between the executive and legislative branches was extremely important. First, it helped create a political environment conducive to support reform legislation of a substantial magnitude. Second, in fusing together a common view between the legislative and the executive branches, it allowed both to reap the political capital generated from the reform. Lastly, despite the services' opposition, this interaction established unanimity and a call for action. Aligned as never before, these factors together set the stage for historic change.

With strong bipartisan support, Congress passed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, thereby fundamentally changing the Department of Defense. While correcting the operational and administrative deficiencies plaguing the Department of Defense, GNA retained the organizational framework established by the National Security Act of 1947. The major provisions of the legislation underscore the expansive impact of GNA. These provisions are provided in detail as Appendix A. Highlights of these major provisions to the legislation are:

- designate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as the principle military adviser to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense;
- require the JCS Chairman to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans;
- require the JCS Chairman to advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands;
- strengthen and expand the "full operational command" authority of combatant commanders;
- specify that the functions of the Military Departments (to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, etc.) are undertaken to meet the operational requirements of the combatant commands;
- reduce personnel in DoD headquarters staff by 8,232; and
- reduce the personnel in non-headquarters elements of the Defense Agencies by 9,462.

Although the impact of the legislation will be discussed in the next chapter, for the most part, DoD has been very effective in implementing the provisions of GNA, except for the reduction in the size of headquarters staffs and personnel in non-headquarters elements of the Defense Agencies. In
fact, instead of reducing these staffs, they have mushroomed. As a result, many defense commentators contend that one of the unintended consequences of GNA has been a disproportional increase in the staffs. However, their observations fail to underscore that GNA, as well as the Congressional intent, mandated a reduction in staffs. For example, GNA mandated that the Joint Staff (be limited) to 1,627 military and civilian personnel. Ironically, the 1991 Authorization Act repealed the numerical limits on staffs, allowing the Joint Staff to grow to about 2,600 personnel. The Joint Staff comprises of about 1,400 personnel; however, another 1,200 personnel in Chairmen controlled activities report to the Joint Staff Therefore, any subsequent increases in the size of the DoD staffs are not a result of GNA, but in spite of it and contrary to its legislative intent.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

As Public Law 99-433, GNA comprises seventy-six pages of complex legislative language. Fortunately, in passing the legislation, Congressional intent was very straightforward and clearly written in Conference Report 99-824:

1. to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
2. to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
3. to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
4. to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
5. to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
6. to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
7. to improve joint officer management policies; and
8. otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.26

Congressman Ike Skelton (D, Mo.), one of the principal proponents of GNA, amplifies the congressional intent of GNA by stating that the GNA was to enhance the operational capability of the combined services by "elevating the CinCs [Commanders in Chief] to be the horse riders while the
Service Chiefs became the horse holders.27 This division of labor between the CinCs and the Service Chiefs optimizes their respective roles. The former focuses on warfighting while the later focuses on forces and resources. To coordinate these two distinct functions, the responsibility and authority of the CJCS was also significantly expanded. No longer was the CJCS "first amongst equals." As the senior military officer in DoD, the CJCS, and his staff, would now focus upon providing the best possible advice to the National Command Authority, divest of parochial views or service interests.

To insure that the services continued to provide talented officers with a common view for joint duty, Congress revamped the professional military education program in service schools to include joint military matters and the study of strategy and policy. The focus of the instruction was changed from management of service resources to operational planning and strategy development. Moreover, to attract the best qualified and the brightest officers for joint duty, Congress required a joint assignment as a prerequisite for selection to flag rank.

Lastly, Congressman Skelton points out that Congress reaffirmed the stipulation in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 that the Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff with command authority; as such, the civilian control of the military was enhanced. The authority of the Secretary of Defense was expanded across all military departments, combatant commands, joint staff, and DoD Activities. By placing the combatant commanders directly under the National Command Authority, Congress ensured that military power remained decentralized amongst the CJCS, the Service Chiefs, and the CinCs—all under civilian control. This precludes the possibility of an Armed Forces General Staff from emerging and ascending in power over its civilian leaders.

Given the effects of the legislation on the DoD and clear Congressional intent, Congressman Skelton strongly believes that the GNA, as the impetus in transforming the military, has been resoundingly successful in accomplishing its intended purpose. The military has been transformed
from an organization seemingly incapable of operating across service lines, to a capable organization that is much more competent in planning and conducting military operations, and developing the forces and resources to safeguard global national security interests.28

For the GNA to become law, consensus amongst the civilian and military leaders, and the executive and legislative branches of government was essential. Moreover, in the future, an atmosphere conducive to change as well as a willingness to innovate will be indispensable—a combination of conditions which very difficult to generate given the diverse views and interests that influence the actions of our political and military leaders.
Chapter II

IMPACT OF GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

The fact that it has been a decade since GNA was enacted, significant retrospection and analysis of the legislation has been conducted. Several defense journals have published informative essays, while professional military schools have held topical symposiums on all aspects of the legislation. However, notwithstanding the debate on the narrow peripheral issues that advocate further changes within DoD, it is important to review the broad impact of the legislation in two key areas that significantly influence how the U.S. military prepares and conducts operations--joint warfighting and defense acquisition.

JOINT WARFIGHTING

The former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Senator Sam Nunn, best summarizes the impact of the legislation: "By effectively implementing Goldwater-Nichols, DoD has enormously improved both the conduct of military operations and the management of defense resources." Much of this improvement can be attributed to the expanded role given the CJCS. As the principal military advisor, the Chairman is obligated to present his views impervious to service parochialism or the need for consensus. Moreover, given the Chairman's new statutory responsibilities, he and the joint staff are directly involved in all aspects of national defense. This allows for an authoritative body to coordinate the military action of the services and the combatant commands into conducting effective joint and combined military operations.

Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Desert Shield/Storm, being the first tests of GNA and joint warfighting, demonstrated that the military had significantly improved its capability in conducting joint and combined operations. In a large part, the successes of these operations were
attributable to unified planning with clearly delineated aims, responsibilities, and operational command of forces. The CJCS, in concert with the Service Chiefs, planned at the strategic level to support the political-military aims; while the CinCs planned and executed at the operational level to achieve the assigned military aims.

In less than five years since the GNA was enacted, the successes of these operations allowed the military to vindicate itself, and once again, regain the confidence of its civilian leadership and the American people. However, the critical analysis of these operations continued to highlight underlying problems:

Doctrinal differences among the services still exist and are frequently papered over. The services that depend most on support from their sister services—the Army is a prime example—champion jointness, at least as long as their central role is preserved. Services capable of semi-autonomous action like the Air Force, tend to go their separate ways. While the differences among the services are often an asset, it is not enough to let the services fight as they see fit. An effort must be made to harmonize their plans and operations.\(^{31}\)

The statutory authority and responsibility of the CJCS contained in Title II of GNA, and further amplified in DoD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, allow the Chairman to implement changes necessary to enhance joint warfighting. Amongst the fifty-four responsibilities of the CJCS listed in Appendix B, he is charged to:

- assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces;
- prepare strategic plans;
- assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs;
- develop and establish doctrine;
- periodic review of the curriculum of each professional military education school; and
- formulate policies for joint training of the Armed Forces.\(^{32}\)

As a result of the lessons learned from past joint operations, there has been tremendous emphasis placed upon developing a common doctrine to facilitate service integration and enhance the warfighting capability of a joint task force. To date, there are over one hundred joint doctrinal publications that provide a framework for conducting joint operations. Furthermore, *Joint Vision*
2010 (JV20 10), and Concept for Future Joint Operations - Expanding Joint Vision 2010 (CFJO), provide a vision buttressed on new operational concepts that allow the services to develop a common vision in meeting the uncertainties of future challenges.

To further coordinate the seamless transition from doctrine to operations, the 1993 revision of the Unified Command Plan transformed the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) to U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), a unified combatant command. Being a natural extension of GNA, USACOM has combatant command authority over more than 80% of the active forces in the continental United States (CONUS). As the trainer, integrator, and provider of CONUS based forces, tasked to fulfill worldwide operational requirements, USACOM melds the unique skills and capabilities that individual services have to offer.

In fulfilling its mission, USACOM has established an aggressive program for Joint Force Training. This training consists of three categories. Category I focuses on the service's operational and tactical issues such as unit-level service training, and service mandated entry-level training conducted during recruit training and individual service schools. Category II focuses on joint tactical and operational issues through field training and exercises of USACOM components. This type of training is essential because it enhances interoperability at the unit level by allowing components from various services and allies to come together and actually train and operate together. Lastly, Category III training is designed to exercise the joint force commanders and their staffs through scenario driven planning and execution that culminates with computer battlefield simulation of the joint plan.

Clearly over the last decade, joint warfighting has evolved into a cohesive doctrine that is being further validated and refined through training, exercises, and operations. This doctrine integrates unique service capabilities to achieve the desired operational and strategic effects in support of national policy objectives. With the prospect of joint and combined operations being
central to the national military strategy, joint warfighting, as the pathway to the future, provides a common link between the services and allied nations.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION

Central to the reform movement during the 1980's was the highly publicized issue of defense waste, fraud, and abuse. Public outcry on exorbitant costs for seemingly inexpensive items, such as $600 toilet seats, led to Congressional inquiry. A 1985 SASC Staff Report titled, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, highlighted problems in defense acquisition. Specifically, the report identified that the problems were due to insufficient linkage between national military strategy and the formulation of military requirements; failure to seek common equipment between the services; resistance to joint programs; and ineffective management of programs and service coordination of acquisition.

To better coordinate and manage acquisition programs, Congress, through GNA, directed the CJCS to advise the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets. Providing this advice to the Secretary, the CJCS can present alternative programs, and recommend priorities in defense acquisition that best fit the military strategy at hand. More than any other provision of GNA, this change provided the impetus for the Chairman to become actively involved in designing the force structure of the Armed Forces. This allows the CJCS to ensure that the proper force structure and resource allocation is determined to adequately support the strategy and the operational needs of the combatant commanders.

With the expanded authority of the CJCS, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has emerged as a key mechanism with significant impact on the defense acquisition process. The JROC emerged from the Joint Requirements and Management Board, which was established in 1984 to advise the JCS on major acquisition programs. As a result of GNA, the Vice Chairman (VCJCS) was appointed as the head of JROC, with the Vice Service Chiefs as its members. The JROC serves
as an advisory council to the CJCS in preparing advice for the Secretary of Defense. In so doing, the **JROC** assists the CJCS in identifying, assessing, and determining the priority of military requirements and acquisition programs to fulfill the needs of the military strategy.

Through the JROC process, the Chairman develops and submits the *Chairman's Program Assessment* (CPA) and the *Chairman's Program Recommendations* (CPR). These two documents are essential mechanisms that are derived through the interaction between the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the PPBS. This input from the CJCS melds the national military strategy with the forces and the procurement of the necessary resources. The two documents, CPA and CPR, are considered to be powerful. For example, the Secretary of Defense incorporated all of the Chairman's CPR recommendations, produced during December of 1994, into the Defense Planning Guidance of 1995.35

By centralizing acquisition and fusing the two planning systems together, increased research and development is focused upon multi-service acquisition programs and platforms. Unlike the past, where only select weapons systems were common amongst the services, now weapons systems and equipment are developed based on service and allied force interoperability. For example, significant resources are being expended to develop the Joint Strike Fighter. This one aircraft is projected to replace 5 different types of aircraft: the Air Force F-16 and A-10; Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18E/F and AV-8B; and also, United Kingdom Royal Navy VSTOL Sea Harrier. The anticipated replacement of over three thousand aircraft allows for reduced production, maintenance, and training costs, while also enhancing interoperability between the services and our allies.36

Many view the Chairman's expanded influence and the centralization of the acquisition process as a dilution of the services' traditional roles and responsibilities. On the surface, this view appears valid. However, in studying the dynamics of the JROC, the facts lead to another conclusion. Through the membership of the Vice Service Chiefs on the JROC, the services, rather than diluting, have actually enhanced their roles within the acquisition process. In the past, competition for
acquisition funding severely undermined the process, resulting in unnecessary duplication of effort and weapons systems, as well as creating a constant source of friction and parochialism between the services. With the JROC, the services actively participate by providing recommendations and prioritizing programs based upon a common vision and military strategy.

**IMPACT ON THE MARINE CORPS**

Prior to GNA, the Marine Corps, by virtue of its mission and integrated organization, was notably the most capable service of operating in joint operations. Configured to fight as air-ground task forces, Marines relied upon interoperability to synchronize the effects of air, ground, and amphibious forces upon the enemy. As such, and given the Marine Corps' reliance on strategic sealift and airlift, the Fleet Marine Forces have traditionally operated in synch with the other services.

The Marine Corps' historical innovation in amphibious warfare, use of rotary wing aircraft, and the official adoption of maneuver warfare, lends itself to an organizational agility and flexibility that allows it to easily operate across the full spectrum of conflict. Nonetheless, similar to the other services, the Marine Corps has also been greatly influenced by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The legislation has made the Marine Corps even more relevant as an essential pillar of national military strategy—it made the Marine Corps an equal participant. Although the Commandant was a co-equal member of the JCS prior to GNA, the expanded role of the Joint Staff and joint organizations such as the JROC has significantly enhanced Marine Corps participation and influence in strategy formulation and defense acquisition.

**THE FORCE OF CHOICE**

The enhanced role and influence of the Combatant Commanders in joint warfighting became an impetus for the Marine Corps' operational relevancy. Prior to GNA, services competed for their
operational roles and missions. As a result of GNA, the CinCs play a greater role in determining the
force requirements supporting their theater strategy and/or war plans. Given the post Cold War
strategic landscape, Navy-Marine Corps expeditionary forces lend themselves to the CinC's theater
strategy. By being forward deployed, these forces have the capability to send a strong message,
provide deterrence, demonstrate U.S. commitment, or act as an enabling force in time of crisis.

Expeditionary forces by definition operate from the sea within international waters, and their
presence does not require the permission or the support of other nations. These forces are well suited
for conducting bi-lateral exercises. Typically, Marine forces conduct combined landing operations
with allied forces and backload to amphibious shipping without drawing unnecessary attention. This
type of capability is important to CinCs because it requires minimal host nation support and does not
cause an obtrusive footprint ashore necessary for other types of forces. As such, during 1996, Naval-
Marine Forces supported over twenty-four contingency operations for the Combatant Commands.37

With the changes in the strategic landscape and the emphasis on jointness, a byproduct of the
increasing Navy-Marine Corps forward presence requirements has been the convergence of the two
services' strategic vision and operational concept From The Sea and Forward From The Sea,
published as a Navy-Marine Corps combined vision for the 21st century, enumerate the strategic
concept of littoral warfare. This concept relies upon Naval Expeditionary Forces operating from the
sea as deterrence, crisis response, and enabling forces for the combatant commanders. This common
vision is the guiding principle for developing innovative and interoperable concepts for future Naval
Expeditionary Warfare.

The Marine Corps provides the necessary and vital bridge between forward presence-crisis
response and an enabling force for sustained operations. During the Cold War, the Army and the Air
Force played a predominant role in countering the Warsaw Pact. Once the Warsaw Pact collapsed,
the residual missions left were more central to what the Marine Corps has always done--crisis
response. As such, since the 1990 post Cold War reduction of forces, the Marine Corps has been affected the least of all the services.

As Figure 1 depicts, using the 1990 Base Force as a baseline for measure, the Marine Corps has been reduced in force structure by approximately twelve percent, whereas the other services have been reduced approximately thirty percent. Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 2, the Marine Corps essentially retained its force structure while the other services have taken dramatic reductions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 90</th>
<th>FY 97</th>
<th>PERCENT REDUCED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>495,000</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>582,000</td>
<td>402,000</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>539,000</td>
<td>381,000</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINES</td>
<td>196,000</td>
<td>174,000</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Personnel Reduction FY1990 – FY 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 90</th>
<th>FY 97</th>
<th>PERCENT REDUCED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>18 Divisions</td>
<td>10 Divisions</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>546 Ships 16 Carriers</td>
<td>354 Ships 11 Carriers</td>
<td>36% 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>24 Fighter Wings</td>
<td>13 Fighter Wings</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINES</td>
<td>3 Divisions</td>
<td>3 Divisions</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Force Structure Reductions FY 1990 – FY 1997

Although the high demand of the CinCs underscores the Marine Corps' vital role in providing the nation's forward presence forces, there has been an adverse impact on the Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) role as the trainer vis a vis the Marine operating forces. As previously discussed, USACOM's growing role and influence in joint training has significantly enhanced cross service integration of component forces. This has diminished the traditional role of HQMC in the
tactical and operational training of the Marine Force. Aside from Category I training, which primarily focuses on unit-level and entry-level training, the Marine Corps, as a service headquarters, is not conceptually responsible for the training of the Marine component forces assigned to the combatant commanders. As the concept of joint force integration continues to evolve, the service headquarters' role as a trainer of operational forces will become increasingly restrictive.

COMPONENCY

This study is an adjunct to the overall Marine Corps' command assessment, which consists of several separate research studies. This command assessment analyzes the Marine Corps' warfighting command element organizations, component structure, and headquarters organizations. As part of this overall study, Toward a JCS Model: An Analysis of Marine Componency Functions, by Lieutenant Colonel Greg Ballard; MEF Command Element 2015, by Major Steve Zotti; and The Golden Opportunity: Reorganizing Headquarters, Marine Corps for the Future, by Major Robert Lanham, discuss the detailed changes in the sizes and the locations of the Marine Corps' operational level headquarters.

The above studies conclude that as a result of GNA, experiences from Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and the National Security Strategy requirements, the traditional Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters, supporting the geographic CinCs, have transitioned into deployable component headquarters. The Marine Corps has placed greater emphasis on developing stand-alone deployable headquarters, which adequately support the six geographic CinCs rather than just the two Fleet CinCs. These headquarters can function independently as component headquarters, command elements for joint task forces (JTF), or as advanced echelons (MEF Forward) for MEFs. As an example, the First Marine Expeditionary Force, a component
to USCENTCOM, also served as a JTF headquarters during *Operation Restore Hope* in Somalia (1992).

This greater emphasis on componency and JTF headquarters has elevated the Marine Corps' command and control architecture to interface with national command and control systems. Ongoing command assessment studies continue to develop innovative doctrinal and organizational concepts enhancing the Marine Corps' warfighting command elements and component structure.

**JOINT PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires that joint billets attract the best and the brightest officers. In support of this, the Secretary of Defense annually submits a *Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report to the President and Congress*. This report provides comprehensive information pertaining to joint officer management, underscoring congressional importance on quality officers for joint assignments.

The legislation did not significantly impact the number of joint billets assigned to the Marine Corps. Following the GNA, the Marine Corps continued to provide approximately three percent of its officer strength (approximately 550 officers) to fill its share of the joint billets on the Joint Duty Assignment List (approximately six percent of the joint billets). For purposes of comparison with other services, Figure 3 depicts the Marine Corps' share in staffing joint billets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Billets Distribution</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9340</td>
<td>3249</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3517</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer End Strength</td>
<td>226,939</td>
<td>78,313</td>
<td>56,033</td>
<td>74,722</td>
<td>17,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Officer End</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength in Joint Billets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Service Officer Breakdown of Joint Billets (Figures as of June 1997).
Despite the fact that GNA did not significantly change the Marine Corps' share in staffing joint billets in relation to its officer strength, the legislation's emphasis on jointness significantly increased the number of senior officer joint billets filled by Marines. Prior to the GNA, the Marine Corps on the average staffed eight senior officer billets per year (Appendix C). Since the legislation, the Marine Corps on the average has staffed fourteen billets. For example, prior to GNA only one Marine held the position of CinC:

- In 1980, General P.X. Kelly was appointed as CinC, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force by President Jimmy Carter. This task force later evolved into the U.S. Central Command

Since the legislation, five Marine generals have been appointed as CinCs:

- General George B. Crist U.S. Central Command Nov 85 - Nov 88
- General Joseph P. Hoar U.S. Central Command Sep 91 - Sep 94
- General John J. Sheehan U.S. Atlantic Command Oct 94 - Sep 97
- General Anthony C. Zinni U.S. Central Command Aug 97 - Present
- General Charles E. Wilhelm U.S. Southern Command Sep 97 - Present

As a result of increased joint general officer billets, positions within the Marine Corps, such as Assistant Division Commander, and the Recruit Depot Deputy Commanding General were left vacant. Given these vacancies, the Marine Corps asked Congress for an increase of fourteen general officers. In 1996, although the Senate supported this request and the House did not, Congress agreed to an increase of twelve general officers for the Marine Corps. This increase was in part due to the increased role of the Marine Corps within the joint community. However, despite this increase, as figure 4 depicts, the Marine Corps still has a lower ratio of general officers to end strength than the other services.
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

As a strong proponent of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), Congressman Ike Skelton has been intimately involved with service schools. He routinely lectures students at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and was the driving force in Congress in establishing the Marine Corps Research Center. He observed that prior to the legislation, "the Marine Corps had the worst schools compared to the other services." Since then, he notes "that the Marine Corps has come on board, and although the schools are small, they have become good by changing the instruction from management to strategy."⁴²

During 1988, Congress conducted its own comprehensive examination of how the services educate their officers. The House National Security Committee Special Panel on Military Education presented recommendations that have had a direct impact on Marine Corps PME, specifically the joint portion of the curriculum offered at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. To monitor the service compliance with Congressional and DoD objectives, the CJCS on 1 May 1990 published CM-344-90: The Military Education Policy Document (MEPD). The MEPD provides for the congruent efforts by service schools to achieve both mission unique and DoD desired educational goals. The MEPD also establishes a strict accreditation process whereby the Chairman can monitor service compliance with DoD objectives for the professional education of field grade officers.⁴³

In August 1989, the Marine Corps University (MCU) was established to reinforce the concept of PME as an essential part of every Marine's career. MCU provides a focal point for all PME programs within the Marine Corps. Centralized PME under the MCU made the non-resident PME programs coequal to the resident programs. Specifically, now the Command and Staff College non-resident program, like the resident course, is Professional Joint Education certified. Moreover, this adaptation in organization has been instrumental in improving the quality of PME by prudently managing finite educational resources. For example, by linking PME schools and the non-resident
programs, students in the non-resident programs are now afforded the opportunity to participate in
courses within the resident programs. This interaction fosters greater learning and develops lasting
professional relationships for the students in both programs.

Clearly, the effects of GNA on the Marine Corps have been significant and favorable. The
increase in CinC's authority enhanced the relevancy of Naval-Marine Forces. By ensuring that the
best-qualified officers serve in joint and high impact billets, the Marine Corps "earned a seat at the
table." While other services are being reduced in structure, the Marine Corps has maintained its
strength. Furthermore, the corresponding increase in general officers has enhanced the Marine
Corps' influence within the upper echelons of the joint community.
Defense needs to continue building on the Goldwater-Nichols reforms and extend the sense of jointness beyond the Department to the rest of the national security establishment and to our friends and allies abroad."44

National Defense Panel

Chapter III

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

TRANSFORMING THE MILITARY

Since the National Security Act of 1947, the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act established an overarching framework within DoD that successfully transformed the military into an organization capable of planning and conducting complex military operations. In addition, the GNA fulfilled its Congressional intent by improving the military advice to the National Command Authority, and reducing service parochialism by establishing clear lines of responsibilities amongst the civilian and military leadership of the DoD.

GNA implementation has ensured that mechanisms such as the CJCS, JCS, CinCs, and JROC continue to ensure that Congressional intent remains at the forefront in planning for and executing current and future operations of the U.S. Armed Forces. The legislation mandated clear national security responsibilities to the CJCS, the Service Chiefs, and the CinCs. The role of the Chairman and the Joint Staff remains central to military and strategic planning and coordination.

Over the past decade, this system has proven effective and reliable. The military successes during this period have created a climate of relative satisfaction amongst the civil-political-military leadership, who frequently comment that this is the best led, best trained military force the country has ever seen. Accordingly, the probability of additional legislation seeking substantive reforms being enacted over the next decade is minimal and not necessary.

As the future unfolds, the preponderance of changes throughout the DoD will evolve from within because "there is a lack of understanding in Congress about the Act [GNA] because the corporate memory is declining."45 With declining military experience and corporate memory within
Congress, lawmakers will not willingly invest the political capital to attempt deliberate and far reaching changes requiring broad and difficult consensus. Therefore, future changes for the military, and the Marine Corps in particular, will not be as a direct result of GNA, but will evolve from within DoD.

The Secretary of Defense, CJCS, VCJS, Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, and the Vice Service Chiefs go to great lengths to determine the significance of future changes affecting the military. Congress, rather than expand the intent of GNA or initiate similar reforms, will continue to play a significant role by periodically mandating that DoD review itself or make minor reforms. A recent example of this was the 1996 Defense Authorization Bill requiring a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) whose charter was to look beyond 2010 and make recommendations as to force structure. The National Defense Panel (NDP) consisting of distinguished civilians and retired senior military officers was formed to review the recommendations of the QDR and submit alternative views, if necessary.

Congressional intent in the QDR and NDP was to diminish influence of service parochialism in deciding future force structure. By encouraging such reviews, ideas percolate from within the DoD that apolitically focus on organizational efficiency and the agility to adapt to future uncertainties. These ideas also generate public and professional debate on important issues, thereby countering the fear of "strategic monism" taking root in DoD. This makes for an open system encouraging pluralism and innovation in thought and ideas. As a result of these reviews, intense scrutiny and debates are continuous in service schools, professional journals, and the media. These types of discussions are necessary to remain abreast of a rapidly changing strategic landscape.

As a result of the QDR and the NDP report, Transforming Defense, there is significant discussion on the future organizational structure of the military and the Unified Command Plan. However, over the next decade, the basic roles and missions of each service, combatant commanders, and the CJCS, will remain as mandated by the National Security Act of 1947, the Goldwater-Nichols
Act, and United States Code Title 10. The force structure of the military, however, will remain linked to the geo-political landscape influencing the implementation of the National Security Strategy. These ongoing reviews and debates have established several trend lines that exceed the scope of this study, but nonetheless may potentially impact the Marine Corps for the near and long term.

**ENHANCED JOINTNESS**

The NDP recently recommended that for the military to transform itself, competition among the services can assist in determining how best to exploit new capabilities or solve emerging challenges. In turn, this healthy competition will help build upon GNA with increased emphasis on jointness. This is exactly the type of outlook that is necessary to ensure that a balance exists between the unique roles of DoD, Services, CJCS, and the Combatant Commanders.

Although USACOM is the leading proponent of Joint Force Integration, the NDP recommended changes to the Unified Command Plan by establishing a Joint Forces Command and an America's Command. These recommendations will foster considerable debate, but the trend lines for the near term are clear--consolidation.

The impact of these reviews must not be underestimated. Within two weeks of the Secretary of Defense report, *Leading Change in a New Era*, the Joint Staff transferred command and control of the Joint Warfighting Center, the Joint Communications Support Element, the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, the Joint Battle Center, and the Joint Warfighting Analysis Center from the Joint Staff to USACOM. This action consolidates all the joint functions of force provider, integrator, and trainer under one command.

Consolidation of like organizations and capabilities will result in savings that are essential for recapitalization and modernization of future equipment. Being a large bureaucracy, DoD has historically been plagued by organizational inertia. However, the rapid consolidation of the various
joint activities under USACOM indicates that DoD is transforming itself far quicker than generally perceived. Therefore, the Marine Corps must continue to remain in front of evolving issues.

**INTEGRATED BASES**

The debate over base closures and realignment is one that Congress has continued to be intimately involved with. The Marine Corps has faired well in this area when directed to consolidate Marine Corps Air Stations Tustin and El Toro at Naval Air Station Miramar and Camp Pendleton. However, the Secretary of Defense, as well as the NDP have strongly recommended closing additional bases. The NDP goes further by proposing that the services share bases. For example, by consolidating the bases in Virginia under one command, the military may reduce base operating costs through reduced overheads; acquiring better rates on public service contracts. The Marine Corps needs to study this idea: Will integration of bases by states or regions under one command allow the military to reduce costs through better business practices? Will this allow the military greater leverage and buying power? What are the implications of such consolidation on training? Will it enhance interoperability by having like units from other services stationed together?

**PREPOSITIONING**

Although the Army has prepositioned materials and equipment in Europe and Korea since the 1950s, the Marine Corps has always been the leader in maritime prepositioning. To enhance its expeditionary capabilities during the 1980s, the Marine Corps prepositioned materials and equipment in Norway and also on board maritime shipping. However, since *Operation Desert Storm*, the Army has also adopted maritime prepositioning as a means to rapidly project its forces world wide.

As the proponent of maritime prepositioning, the Marine Corps needs to innovate further by analyzing the prepositioning concept in a broader joint context. Is it worthwhile to combine the various services' prepositioning programs under one? Will this enhance interoperability and further
encourage the services to procure common equipment? By having common equipment, will it also help our allies in times of crisis? Will this encourage our allies to become more interoperable or more dependent on U.S. joint forces?

INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak, recently suggested that the current security structure may not be configured to be the most effective and institutionally responsive to the dynamics of the Information Age and the emerging asymmetrical threats. The increasing reliance and influence of other government agencies, non-governmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, academia, and industry groups on military operations is creating a stove piped method of operations. This potentially dysfunctional structure widely disperses the functions among many different organizations, creating inconsistent actions or duplication of efforts. Therefore, organizational mechanisms must be established that provide the joint commanders instantaneous access and the ability to coordinate the functions of national instruments of power within the joint area of operations.

While the politically contentious debate for integrating the national instruments of powers continues, the Marine Corps needs to develop a program that allows officers exposure to government agencies and non-government organizations. Future conflicts will most certainly involve interagency coordination amongst the DoD, the Justice Department (FBI and DEA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Departments of State and Treasury, and private organizations. Therefore, the Marine Corps should advocate an Interagency Fellowship Program for mid-level officers to gain experience in how these organizations are structured and function. This will better posture the Marine Corps for the future, and enhance planning and interagency coordination. In so doing, the Marine Corps will provide a thoroughly qualified and a multitalented officer to the component commands and joint assignments. However, the costs associated with such a program may preclude
its implementation (increased training and education pipeline for mid-level officers and funding for the fellowships). Nevertheless, the importance of these external agencies on future operations requires serious consideration.

JOINT DOCTRINE

To better prepare Marines for joint operations, the Marine Corps needs to fully integrate Joint Doctrine into Service Doctrine. Despite the fact that there is an abundance of Joint Doctrine published, it is rarely emphasized in service manuals. When the School of Advanced Warfighting conducted a review of service doctrines, it found a lack of emphasis in joint operations. For example, doctrinal publications, such as the Marine Corps Warfighting or Campaigning, do not adequately address how the Marine Corps will operate and function as part of a joint task force. As jointness continues to dictate how forces are deployed and employed, it is absolutely imperative that Marines, not just school attendees, learn its grammar and calculus.

JOINT PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS

As a result of the QDR debates, significant attention has been placed upon the large staffs within the DoD. A review of the recent DoD report, Leading Change in a New Era, addresses this issue by recommending a reduction in parallel functions between the various staffs. As a result of these reductions, DoD anticipates the number of joint billets to be reduced on the JDAL by approximately two thousand billets. Although the report does not specifically identify the billets to be eliminated, the Marine Corps may see its fair share of the proposed reductions.

This reduction in joint billets places an even greater emphasis on the Marine Corps, as the smallest of the services, to ensure that it does not lose its "seat at the table" below the JCS/JROC/Joint Staff level. Marine officers filling mid-level joint billets play a significant role in representing the unique capabilities that the Marine Corps provides to joint operations. The reduction
in the JDAL will create more competition amongst the services for the senior officer billets. The Marine Corps has done relatively well in this area and must continue to nominate the best officers for high impact billets and regular joint assignments. In the aggregate, these officers provide a valuable service to the Joint Staff, the Marine Corps, and the nation.

**DEFENSE REFORM INITIATIVES**

The Secretary of Defense has directed that the military become leaner and more efficient by adopting better business practices. These practices emerged out of the Revolution in Business Affairs during the 1980s as a result of Corporate America reinventing itself. The Secretary has established a Defense Management Council with the Deputy Secretary, Service Under Secretaries, VCJCS, and Vice Service Chiefs. This Council is chartered to ensure that reform decisions are implemented expeditiously and that each service be reviewed for possible areas of improvement.

The Marine Corps has postured well with its expeditionary culture. Being agile, the Marine Corps needs to establish connectivity with corporate America to learn better and innovative ways to manage limited resources. The Marine Corps has taken advantage of this methodology to train its recruiters. To train the recruiting force, the Marine Corps provides the Xerox Sales Course for its recruiters, the Marine Corps should establish a similar program focused on developing resource management tools. Innovative Marine programs, such as Dynamic Decision Making, studying the decision making processes within the Stock Exchange, and seminars with representatives from Steelcase Corporation during the 1997 Command Element and Component Headquarters Conference, must be expanded to include mid-level officers and senior staff non-commissioned officers.

Commanders and staff officers are increasingly required to review and develop budget based operational and training plans. Therefore, it is prudent to meld our expeditionary culture with the business culture. Juxtaposed, both share a common focus and accomplish the mission at hand efficiently and effectively.
Chapter IV

CONCLUSION

The Department of Defense has evolved over the past fifty years into a capable organization attempting to transform for the uncertainties of the 21st century. The National Security Act of 1947 established the basic organizational foundation upon which the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 further refined the distinct roles and responsibilities of the civilian and military leadership. The GNA has successfully fulfilled its intended purpose by improving the quality of military advice given to the National Command Authority and the services' ability to conduct joint military operations. The legislation elevated the Marine Corps to a status coequal to the other services in staffing key billets on the Joint Staff and the separate Combatant Commands, resulting in an increasingly influential role for the Marine Corps within the national security apparatus.

As a result of the GNA, military operations have evolved into joint operations with supporting doctrine and command relationships. However, in the future, as defense resources decrease there may be a tendency for the services to become parochial; thus causing a backward slip to pre-GNA problems. The GNA ensures that CJCS, VCJCS, the Combatant Commanders, the Service Chiefs, and the Vice Service Chiefs cumulatively play a central role in developing programs and providing advice. Together, these military leaders ensure that parochialism does not overcome the judicious application of limited resources to transform the military for the 21st Century.

Over the past decade, this unique system has proven effective and reliable. The military successes have created a climate of relative satisfaction between the civil-political-military leadership of the country. Accordingly, the probability of additional legislation seeking substantive reforms over the next decade is minimal because for such legislation to become law, it not only requires agreement between both the civilian and military leaders, but also requires an atmosphere conducive to change. However, reviews such as the QDR and the NDP may take the place of over-arching
legislative action of the likes of GNA; in and of themselves, these reviews will become the vehicle for future change.

In closing, some aspects of the GNA have been painful in implementation. The Marine Corps PME program has evolved from a service focus to a broader joint and national security focus. HQMC continues to assign top quality officers to joint billets. This has resulted in a reputation within the joint environment that further enhances the Marine Corps ethos and influence throughout DoD. An example of this influence and reputation can be seen in the increase in the number of senior officers assigned to high impact joint billets since the implementation of the GNA. This increased role coupled with the Marine Corps unique warfighting capabilities provides combatant commanders with a ready and relevant force of choice.

Given the anticipated strategic and domestic climate, the Marine Corps can continue to expect an increasing emphasis on jointness. The unique nature of the Marine Corps--expeditionary operations and integrated air ground combat power--coupled with an organizational mindset that encourages innovative thought, postures the Marine Corps well for the next decade.
1. Designate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the principle military adviser to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense;
2. require the JCS Chairman to submit to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense and any JCS member's advice in disagreement or in addition to the Chairman's advice;
3. require the JCS Chairman to convene regular JCS meetings; to consult, unless impracticable, with other JCS members; and to consult, when appropriate, with the unified and specified commanders;
4. transfer to the JCS Chairman the principal duties now performed by the corporate JCS and update and expand those duties;
5. require the JCS Chairman to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans;
6. require the JCS Chairman to advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands;
7. require the JCS Chairman to submit a report every 3 years to the Secretary of Defense on the appropriateness of the roles and missions of the four services;
8. specify that the term of office of JCS Chairman shall end no later than 6 months after the beginning of a new Presidency;
9. create a new position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the grade of 4-star officer and designate the Vice Chairman as the second-ranking military officer [1993 Authorization Act made the Vice Chairman a member of JCS];
10. assign the JCS Vice Chairman, unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the duty of serving as Chairman in the absence of the JCS Chairman;
11. specify that the JCS Chairman manages the Joint Staff and prescribes its duties and staffing procedures;
12. specify that the operational chain of command, unless otherwise directed by the President, runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified combatant commanders;
13. authorizes the President or the Secretary of Defense to place the JCS Chairman in the channel of command communications between the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders;
14. authorize the combatant commanders to specify the chains of commands and organizational relationships within their commands;
15. strengthen and expand the "full operational command" authority of combatant commanders;
16. strengthen the authority of the combatant commanders over the selection, retention, and evaluation of their staff members and their subordinate commanders;
17. set out general principles for the Secretary of Defense to follow ensuring that the personnel policies of the four Services enhance the ability of officers to perform joint duties;

18. repeal the authority of the Secretary of Defense to reorganize DoD positions and activities that have been established in law;

19. direct the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures for the effective review of the programs and budgets of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities;

20. direct the JCS Chairman to advise the Secretary of Defense on the wartime preparedness of certain Defense Agencies;

21. specify the responsibilities of the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Secretary of Defense;

22. require the elimination of duplication between the headquarters staffs of each Military Department;

23. specify that the functions of the Military Departments (to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, etc.) are undertaken to meet the operational requirements of the combatant commands;

24. reduce personnel in DoD headquarters staff by 8,232;

25. reduce the personnel in non-headquarters elements of the Defense Agencies by 9,462; and

26. waive the requirements for 268 Presidential or DoD reports, notifications, and studies to be provided to the Congress.

APPENDIX B

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chairman; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and supported by the Joint Staff, constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense.

   a. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of annual policy guidance for the heads of Department of Defense components for the preparation and review of program recommendations and budget proposals.

   b. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans.

   c. Assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, including the direction of operations conducted by the Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

   d. Prepare strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.

   e. Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommend the assignment of logistics and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

   f. Prepare military strategy and assessments of the associated risks. These will include the following:

      (1) A military strategy to support national objectives within policy and resource-level guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Such strategy shall include broad military options prepared by the Chairman with the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

      (2) Net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared to those of possible adversaries.

   g. Provide for the preparation and review of contingency plan that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

   h. Prepare joint logistics and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

   i. Advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of
contingency plans, and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy on strategic plans.

j. After consultation with the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, establish and maintain a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

k. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of the requirements, especially operational requirements, identified by the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

l. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other components of the Department of Defense conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

m. If deemed necessary, submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense, to achieve greater conformance with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities for the requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

n. In accordance with guidance of the Secretary of Defense, recommend budget proposals for activities of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command, as appropriate. Activities for which funding may be required include:

(1) Joint Exercises

(2) Force Training

(3) Contingencies

(4) Selected Operations

o. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the Armed Forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.

p. Assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs.

q. Develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint training of members of the Armed Forces.

r. Formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces.

s. Provide for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
t. Submit to the Secretary of Defense, not less than once every 3 years, a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (roles and missions) to the Armed Forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

u. Prescribe the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman, JCS, subject to approval of the Secretary of Defense.

v. Exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff

w. Subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council.

x. Advise and assist the President and the Secretary of Defense on establishing Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to perform military missions and on prescribing the force structure of those commands.

y. Periodically, not less than every 2 years, review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command; and recommend to the President through the Secretary of Defense, any changes to missions, responsibilities, and force structure, as may be necessary.

z. Transmit communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, as directed by the President.

aa. Perform duties, as assigned by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command functions.

bb. Oversee the activities of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

c. Advise the Secretary of Defense on whether a Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command has sufficient authority, direction and control over the commands and forces assigned to the command to exercise effective command of those commands and forces.

dd. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on measures to provide for the administration and support of forces assigned to each Unified and Specified Combatant Command.

ee. Advise the Secretary of Defense on whether aspects of the administration and support necessary for the accomplishment of missions should be assigned to the Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command.

ff. Serve as the spokesman for Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands.

gg. Provide overall supervision of those Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities for which the Chairman, JCS, has been designated by the Secretary of Defense to oversee. Perform such other functions with respect to the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities as may be assigned by the Secretary of Defense.
hh. Periodically, not less than every 2 years, report to the Secretary of Defense on the responsiveness and readiness of designated combat-support agencies.

ii. Provide for the participation of combat-support agencies in joint training exercises, assess their performance, and take steps to provide for changes to improve their performance.

jj. Develop, in consultation with the director of each combat-support agency, and maintain a uniform readiness reporting system for combat-support agencies.

kk. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the periodic review and revision of the curriculum of each professional military education school to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters.

ll. Review the reports of selection boards that consider for promotion officers serving, or having served, in joint duty assignments in accordance with guidelines furnished by the Secretary of Defense and return the reports with determinations and comments to the Secretary of appropriate Military Department.

mm. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the establishment of career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty.

nn. Submit to the Secretary of Defense an evaluation of the joint duty performance of officers recommended for an initial appointment to the grade of lieutenant general or vice admiral, or initial appointment as general or admiral.

oo. Promulgate Joint Chiefs of Staff publications (JCS Pubs) to provide military guidance for joint activities of the Armed Forces.

pp. Review the plans and programs of the Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to determine their adequacy and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions.

qq. Provide military guidance for use by the Military Departments, the Military Services, and the Defense Agencies in the preparation of their respective detailed plans.

rr. Participate, as directed, in the preparation of combined plans for military action in conjunction with the Armed Forces of other nations.

ss. Determine the headquarters support, such as facilities, personnel, and communications, required by Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, and recommend the assignment to the Military Departments of the responsibilities for providing such support.

tt. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration, general strategic guidance for the development of industrial and manpower mobilization programs.

uu. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense military guidance for use in the development of military aid programs and other actions relating to foreign military forces.

vv. Formulate policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces.
ww. Assess joint military requirements for command, control, and communications, recommend improvements; and provide guidance on aspects that relate to the conduct of joint operations.

xx. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, statements of military requirements based upon U.S. strategic war plans. These statements of requirements shall include tasks, priority of tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance for developing military installations and bases, and for equipping and maintaining military forces.

yy. In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman, JCS, shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

zz. Perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

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| **TOTAL** | 18 | 15 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 8 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

Source: General Officer Matters Office, HQMC, Washington, DC - December 1997

APPENDIX C
ENDNOTES


5 Ibid

6 Ibid.

7 As the presiding officer of the JCS, the CJCS established JCS meeting agendas but did not vote on decisions.


10 Also known as the "Five Year Defense Plan". Now called the "Future Years Defense Program".


12 General Charles C. Krulak, Speech given at Marine Corps University, Quantico, Va., October 1997.

13 Title 10, United States Code, 5063.

14 Millet. 507.


17 Ibid.


20 Interview with Congressman Ike Skelton, 8 October 1997.


24 Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger letter to Honorable Les Aspin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 12 March 1986; Commandant of the Marine Corps letter to Chief Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy, 24 March 1986. These documents state that the Pentagon and the Marine Corps do not support H.R. 4234, 4235, 4236, and 4237. These four bills were precursors to HR. 4370. Entitled as "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," H.R. 4370 consolidated the four separate defense reorganization bills.


27 Congressman Ike Skelton, interview conducted on 8 October 1997.

28 Ibid


34 Ibid

35 The Defense Resources Allocation Process, III. 5-6.


38 Ibid., p.C-1.

39 Department of National Security and Decision Making, Naval War College, Newport, RI. 1997.


42 Congressman Ike Skelton, interview conducted on 8 October 1997.


45 Congressman Ike Skelton, interview conducted on 8 October 1997.

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