Reassessing the *Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States* (ANZUS): Post-Cold War Security Relations
CSC 1998
Subject Area – Topical Issues

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Reassessing the Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS): Post-Cold War Security Relations

Author: Major Michael J. Alexander, New Zealand Army

Thesis: The central argument of this paper is that the decline of ANZUS as a strategic partnership has contributed to an erosion of New Zealand Defence Force capabilities and has left a security void in the South Pacific. ANZUS is now redundant and should be replaced.

Discussion: There is a greater Australian, New Zealand and United States focus on the Pacific Rim than ever before. The circumstances indicate that there is an overlap of national interests that do not equate to the current security standoff between New Zealand and the United States. Given the changing regional and global conditions in the post-cold war era, it appears that the Australia-New Zealand-United States alliance is in jeopardy of becoming irrelevant.

From its inception ANZUS produced different perceptions of its meaning and intent in the minds of Australians, New Zealanders, and Americans. As a treaty it was a cornerstone to the security of Australia and New Zealand, but it was of low significance amongst the security priorities of the United States. Differences in perceptions regarding purpose and obligations were realized with the Australian and New Zealand commitments to the United States’ cause in Vietnam, and then the 1985 nuclear policy standoff between New Zealand and the United States. The security strategy of the United States and the domestic anti-nuclear legislation and sentiment of New Zealand continue to oppose each other diametrically.

It is in the national interests of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States for the framework of ANZUS to be adjusted against a vastly different backdrop compared to that of the treaty signing. New Zealand has the most to gain and the least to lose from such an adjustment. It is therefore New Zealand who must voice the overtures for a “life after ANZUS”.

Conclusions: Abrogating the ANZUS alliance is long overdue, with the most appropriate replacement option being a series of three bilateral agreements between the ANZUS partners. The first step required of New Zealand is a zero-based rationalization of its security strategy. The withdrawal of New Zealand from ANZUS will result in enhanced security cooperation with the United States and assist in reversing the decline of New Zealand defense capabilities.
INTRODUCTION

ANZUS IS DEAD

Alliances are not permanent, nor are they perpetual. They exist at the intersection of the interests of the participants, and change according to the circumstances, or disappear when participants no longer see any utility in them. For over three decades the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS), was a “success”. Whilst alliances are designed to further national interests, the interests of all three participating countries are being adversely affected by the continued existence of ANZUS in its current form.

There is a greater Australian, New Zealand and United States focus on the Pacific Rim than ever before. In the realms of security and trade the circumstances indicate that there is an overlap of national interests which do not equate to the standoff between New Zealand and the United States. Given the changing regional and global conditions in the post-cold war era, it appears that the Australia-New Zealand-United States alliance is in jeopardy of becoming irrelevant.

The central argument of this paper is that the decline of ANZUS as a strategic partnership has contributed to an erosion of New Zealand Defense capabilities and has left a security void in the South Pacific. ANZUS is now redundant and should be replaced.

This paper will examine the motivating factors and political parameters at the time of the birth of ANZUS and assess its evolution as a security alliance. The paper will also investigate the current security context to show that the suspended condition of the
alliance is no temporary state of affairs. A determination of the intersecting points of common interests embedded within national goals of economic prosperity, regional security, global stability, and shared values highlight that the modification of the ANZUS framework would be of benefit to all three participating countries. Finally, a recommendation will be made for an alternative framework agreement that invites mutual security gains to Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

The paper will conclude that abrogating the ANZUS alliance is long overdue, with the most appropriate replacement option being a series of three bilateral agreements between the ANZUS partners.
CHAPTER 1

“THE WHITE MAN’S PACT”¹

...I had reached the conclusion that in a world conflict, which I then regarded as a
distinct possibility, we could not and should not look to the might of the United
Kingdom to protect us, since she would have her hands full elsewhere; her position
as a world power was already diminishing.

Sir Percy Spender², Architect of ANZUS

For over a century Australia and New Zealand were under the umbrella of British
protection. The assurance of this protection was dealt a savage blow in 1942 when Britain
was unable to provide for the defense of the two countries at a time of need. The fearful
expenditure of Britain’s world-wide economic assets, the immense destruction and waste
of her industrial capacity, and the erosion of her Asian empire left Britain depleted, and
incapable of recovering her former strength.

The Second World War had demonstrated the vital importance of the United States
as a defense ally, but Dean Acheson’s defense perimeter of 1950 excluded both Australia
and New Zealand.³ It was in this situation that the United States, somewhat reluctantly⁴,
became the main protector of Australia and New Zealand in a relationship that was
formalized in the ANZUS Treaty of 1 September 1951. Much to the annoyance of

¹ A full reproduction of the ANZUS Treaty is at Appendix 1.
³ T.B. Millar, Australia in War and Peace: External Relations Since 1788 (Canberra, Australia: 1991), 164.
Churchill's proposal, the pact was signed by two Commonwealth countries without any British involvement.

The ANZUS Treaty was modeled after the NATO predecessor with focus on the Pacific region. It was not as tightly binding due to the omission of the phrase “an armed attack upon one constitutes an armed attack upon all.” The most important mutual obligations of the signatories were threefold. Firstly, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. Secondly, to initiate automatic consultations upon the emergence of a security threat. Thirdly, to act, but not automatically, to meet common danger.

The key security provisions of ANZUS are:

- A desire to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.
- A declaration publicly and formally of a sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of the parties stand alone in the Pacific area.
- Coordination of efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.

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4 For an account on the postures adopted by Dean Rusk and John Foster Dulles regarding a formal Pacific pact, see Sir Percy Spender, 65-67.
5 Sir Percy Spender, 98.
7 Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, at Appendix 1, 54.
Any action by one of the Parties to support another was restrained by constitutional processes. This implied that the actual contribution by each nation was not absolute. Domestic politics and processes could veto any support given by one member to another. The United States Congress could hinder, and possibly block Presidential moves to provide military aid to Australia and/or New Zealand. Although the President could order the deployment of forces in support of Australia and/or New Zealand, Congress would approve funding for sustained operations. Set against the high priority issues of countering the USSR in Europe and Asia, ANZUS was a low priority to the United States. A loud confirmation of this tenet was echoed a decade after the ANZUS signing. In 1963 President Lyndon B. Johnson stated to a joint session of Congress that the United States would keep its commitments “from South Vietnam to West Berlin”.8 ANZUS was never a one hundred percent security guarantee from the United States.

No formal military organization or structures resulted from the agreement. No ANZUS budget or finance was formulated: members paid their own way. No subsidiary organs were formally established. Whilst the partial security guarantee did not in reality extend to automatic collective defense, ANZUS did however result in very visible and tangible benefits to the two smaller partners, Australia and New Zealand.

Apart from the partial security guarantee, both Australia and New Zealand did however inherit a place beneath the United States’ strategic deterrence umbrella. The underpinning of this umbrella was nuclear deterrence.

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8 J.G. Starke Q.C., 236.
For Australia and New Zealand ANZUS resulted in continued council meetings and joint staff planning, assuring a close dialogue and relationship with the United States. Other results of the alliance were exchange postings of military personnel, joint exercising, operational doctrine and tactics sharing, intelligence sharing, cooperation on defense science matters, and interoperability of equipment.\(^9\) When considering relative intelligence collection assets and military industrial bases, the relationship represented a substantial net flow of intelligence, technology and equipment from the United States to Australia and New Zealand.

Although the formal aspects of the agreement and its tangible results are important, even more significant were the differences between the parties’ implicit and informal interpretation of what ANZUS meant. The underlying attitudes and motives of Australia and New Zealand on one hand and the United States on the other fueled these differences.

In a state of apparent isolation, it was evident that Australia and New Zealand were vulnerable, and possibly helpless, against a major opponent, such as China or the USSR. Small populations, limited industrial bases, and enormous territorial and maritime expanses were contributing factors. The primary motivation for Australia and New Zealand was the need for a powerful ally to provide a security guarantee. During World War II, it was predominantly United States air and naval power that had checked the Japanese tide across the Pacific. Consequently, a close and friendly relationship of

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partnership, including the staging of United States forces, had developed. It was natural that the two smaller countries should look towards the United States as the obvious candidate to be “big brother” in the southwest Pacific.

From the outset, actions by Australia propagated a high degree of motivation that was far more accentuated than those emanating from New Zealand. Australia originated the proposal for a formal security alliance between the three countries. As Sir Percy Spender said:

The dramatic and calamitous collapse of Malaya, Burma, Singapore, and Indonesia in early 1942, the Japanese conquest of the Philippines, their quick advance to and penetration of New Guinea, almost to the town of Port Moresby on its southern coast, brought home to my countrymen their isolation and vulnerability. They had learned at the battles of the Coral Seas and at Midway that the destiny of their country was intertwined with that of the U.S.A.\(^{10}\)

The United States was less than enthusiastic about signing a formal treaty with Australia and New Zealand, but was willing to offer a “Presidential assurance” in order to secure support for the United States’ proposed parameters for the Japanese Peace Treaty. New Zealand was more troubled with the possibility of Japanese remilitarization than a communist threat to her security but in light of her existing international burdens, which were unquestionably heavy for her size, needed to be convinced that any new commitment would be advantageous.\(^{11}\)

At the time when Australia approached the United States concerning a Pacific treaty, proposals for the forthcoming Japanese Peace Treaty were being mooted. The

\(^{10}\) Sir Percy Spender, 24.

\(^{11}\) Sir Percy Spender, 103-104.
United States proposal placed no restrictions on Japanese rearmament. In reaction, Australia told the United States in “...very blunt terms that Australia would not, under any circumstances, accept such a treaty”. The threat was Australian public exposure that the United States was focusing on the European theater, to the exclusion of the interests of the nations of the south and southwestern Pacific areas. The result would have been a build-up in Australian and New Zealand domestic opposition, with added pressure on the two countries to refuse signing the Japan Peace Treaty.

Although neither Australia nor New Zealand had the power to demand the terms of the Japanese settlement, the best they could hope for was to gain concessions on other fronts. The limited power and influence of the two countries compared to the United States meant a window of opportunity was open whereby leverage could be applied to acquire a formal political-economic-military linkage with the United States. It is likely that Australia and New Zealand would have pursued a formal treaty with the United States irrespective of the opportunity offered by the Japanese issue, however remote the chances were of securing one.

Some have asserted that ANZUS was a quid pro quo for a Japanese settlement that included a limited capacity for Japan to rearm. Another motivation to the Australian and New Zealand governments was to gain a consolation prize to reconcile public and parliamentary opinion towards a soft Japanese Peace Treaty signed seven days after

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12 Sir Percy Spender, 45 and 49.

ANZUS\textsuperscript{14}. Simply to limit the United States motivations towards ANZUS to purely Japanese linkages would be naïve; ANZUS was much wider in scope than a counter to any possible Japanese threat.

American motives for signing a Pacific security alliance are more difficult to discern. United States involvement in ANZUS could be viewed as nothing more than formalizing the feeling that the United States would get involved if either Australia or New Zealand were attacked; with or without an alliance.

At the time of ANZUS negotiations, the United States was locked into efforts to contain communism. The Korean War was raging. ANZUS benefited the United States’ Cold War objectives and strategy of containment in a number of ways. Embodied within Articles IV and V, an attack on one of the parties in the Pacific Region was deemed to be an attack that activated ANZUS in terms of collective defense. The assistance Australia and New Zealand could render if United States’ armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft were attacked was always going to be limited in terms of military forces.

Due to the unique geography of the south and southwest Pacific, one of the lessons of World War II was that air and naval forces were paramount in checking aggression in the region. The greatest level of support offered by Australia and New Zealand during that conflict was not in the context of military assistance, but in base facilities to support operations in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and southeast Asia. The lack of such facilities elsewhere in the south Pacific was, and still is, a severe impediment to the conduct of air and naval operations in the region.

\textsuperscript{14} J.G. Starke Q.C., 69.
Most importantly, with ANZUS the United States secured, within the Article IV limitation of “...constitutional processes…”, port access and facilities in the south and southwest Pacific. This sentiment was emphasized prior to the breakup by United States Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Paul Wolfowitz, who remarked that port and airfield access were among the five critical requirements of the alliance.\(^{15}\) Of these, he articulated, those of port and airfield access were also the most tangible.

Another benefit of the ANZUS Treaty was its value in formally demonstrating a strong anticommunist front in the Pacific. This contributed to the United States containment strategy by ensuring that there was no treaty vacuum in the southwest Pacific, and in accordance with Article VIII provided a foundation for expanding the Treaty area to link up with southeast Asia. Dean Acheson noted ANZUS would “...serve as a point of departure for the development of an effective system of regional security in the Pacific”.\(^{16}\) In Truman’s words, ANZUS gave the United States “...initial steps towards consolidation of peace in the Pacific”.\(^{17}\) ANZUS provided the building block that would deny the USSR any chance of acquiring a foothold in the Pacific, and put Australia and New Zealand firmly in the Western camp.

To an already heavily committed United States, another bonus for them was that it appeared unlikely it would be required to come to the aid of either Australia or New Zealand in the near term. The only scenarios which lent themselves towards the two


\(^{16}\) J.G. Starke Q.C., 73.

\(^{17}\) J.G. Starke Q.C., 73.
“down-under” nations requiring military aid from the United States were the instances of either: a general or global war, or a regional conflict against communist forces such as that which was ongoing in Korea. For the sake of United States’ national interests, these scenarios lent themselves towards unavoidable support to Australia and New Zealand; with or without a Treaty. For the United States, ANZUS, in many ways, was a cheap treaty. The chances of having to hold up her end of the bargain were remote, and she secured critical infrastructure for supporting potential military operations.

One of the disappointing aspects of ANZUS was that the negotiations and results were never supplemented by effective domestic informational plans. The limited exposure to the domestic populations of each country, and the lack of definitive wording in the agreement, opened up the possibility for differing views of what the relationship entailed. The ambiguous nature of the agreement had intended to provide a flexible relationship but instead contributed heavily towards the downfall of the alliance.

Although there was an absence of a categorical commitment of automatic assistance in response to a security threat due to “constitutional processes”, one of the misconceptions that perpetuated on the New Zealand side was equality of partnership. ANZUS became the central pillar for the security of both Australia and New Zealand, but it was never a partnership of equals. A continuing problem for Australia and New Zealand was the natural order of international relations: a country with a low degree of national power is limited in ability to influence a country with a higher degree of national power.

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18 J.G. Starke Q.C., 2.
The United States’ ability to influence its ANZUS allies and the inability of the reverse to occur was never fully comprehended in New Zealand.

Following World War II, a natural assumption on the part of the United States was that in times of activation of the ANZUS Treaty, Australia and New Zealand would provide staging and base areas for American forces. This perception was reinforced by uninterrupted port access and joint exercising from the time of the inception of ANZUS until 1985; a period of thirty-four years.

With the current absence of a direct threat to Australian and New Zealand security, there is less merit for either of these two countries to remain in a collective defense agreement with the United States. The obligations for such an arrangement remain high, whilst the potential benefits have declined. Both countries must now concentrate on indirect security threats embodied in global and regional instability.

The ANZUS Treaty meant far more to the two Antipodean countries than to the United States.\footnote{T.B. Millar, 168.} Since the threat of communist expansion has dissipated there is less motivation for the United States to provide a security assurance to Australia and New Zealand. The United States gains from a security relationship with Australia and New Zealand are now confined within two parameters. Firstly, the stabilizing footprint that each is able to project into their strategic areas of interest, and secondly political leverage contributing to global stability.

ANZUS reflected two fundamental facts concerning the Australian and New Zealand position: Australian-New Zealand interdependence and Australian-New Zealand
dependence on a United States security assurance. However one-sided the relationship was or became, the decisions on the part of Australia and New Zealand reflected independent choices to belong to a regional alliance system. With it, they took both its associated burdens and its windfalls.
CHAPTER 2

THE FIRST REALIZATION OF ANZUS MISCONCEPTIONS AND MISAPPREHENSIONS - THE VIETNAM VORTEX

...there are some aspects of the Vietnam situation which are so hazy that anything written, no matter how carefully, can be open to rebuttal.20

Even before the suspension of ANZUS, cracks were appearing in the New Zealand-United States portion of the relationship. The developing chasm was not evident in any formal ANZUS intercourse but within the psyche of the New Zealand domestic population and its interplay within domestic politics. Although always independent of economics and trade, ANZUS represented “…the spirit of cooperation, protection, and mutual respect…”21 between its members. There were two main influences which impacted severely upon New Zealand’s outlook towards its association with Australia and the United States; the legacy of involvement in the Vietnam War, and later, swelling anti-nuclear sentiments.

During the 1950s and 1960s, both Australia and New Zealand shaped their foreign and security policies to those of their two protectors in the region. ANZUS and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) marked an important confirmation in both countries’ strategy of “forward defense.” In the process Australia and New Zealand

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acquired a habit of military involvement in southeast Asian conflicts. Prior to the decisions to become involved in Vietnam, the backdrop included contributions of combat elements from each nation to: the Korean War\textsuperscript{22}, the Malayan Emergency (the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve which over the period 1960-63 also had a SEATO role for deployment to countries other than Malaya)\textsuperscript{23}, Thailand in response to the Laos "Crisis"\textsuperscript{24}, the Indonesian Confrontation\textsuperscript{25}, and remnant garrisons in the southeast Asia area as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s fear of communism became the dominant factor in Australian foreign policy as the weight of "the communist hordes" was felt with the turn of events both domestically and internationally.\textsuperscript{26} By 1960, the picture depicted an Asian region with a declining British influence. An increasing level of American interest and influence was filling the security void, with encouragement from Australia, in an effort to stem the flow of communism.

At the end of 1961 Australia was included in consultations between the United States and South Vietnam concerning military assistance to South Vietnam. Australia subsequently provided communications equipment, barbed wire, and other materials for

\textsuperscript{23} Keith Sinclair, 31.
\textsuperscript{24} T.B. Millar, 221.
\textsuperscript{25} T.B. Millar, 143.
\textsuperscript{26} T.B. Millar, 139.
village defense. By the beginning of 1962 it became clear that the United States intended Australia and New Zealand to become associated with its efforts in South Vietnam. There was an increasing need for the United States to secure credible allies to support its position in South Vietnam. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, at the May 1962 ANZUS Council meeting in Canberra, requested more assistance in Vietnam and made his views public in a subsequent address emphasizing SEATO obligations in southeast Asia.

Australia gave vigorous encouragement to the United States for an escalated commitment to the conflict by committing personnel as military advisors to the South Vietnamese in 1964. This move by Australia marked the beginning of military assistance to Vietnam by a nation other than the United States.

On 10 November 1964 a bill for selective conscription passed through Australian Parliament, and in April 1965 the announcement was made that Australia was to provide an infantry battalion. Sir Robert Menzies, Australian Prime Minister at the time, explained the Australian commitment within the context that: “The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of south and southeast Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and

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28 Terry Burstall, Vietnam: The Australian Dilemma (Brisbane, Australia: 1993), 12.

29 Trevor R. Reese, 303.


31 Trevor R. Reese, 304.
Pacific Oceans.\textsuperscript{33} This decision was the single biggest step by which Australia came to be committed to the Vietnam War, and was made despite the lack of any credible government in Saigon.

The watershed decision to send troops to Vietnam was essentially an Australian offer made to and urged upon the United States.\textsuperscript{34} Even when commitment undertook a qualitative change in June 1965, brought about by a Washington announcement which gave the United States commander in South Vietnam almost unlimited freedom in the employment of forces, this shift surprisingly had little effect on the resolve of the Australian government. Harold Holt, the 1966-67 Prime Minister of Australia, epitomized the identification with United States policy with his devoted declaration of Australia being “all the way with L.B.J.”.\textsuperscript{35} This statement severely limited any later flexibility in Australian policy.

An inherent risk in encouraging United States intervention in Vietnam was that “…if the war in South Vietnam should be lost, the American nation will never again deploy land forces in Asia”.\textsuperscript{36} The strength of an ANZUS deterrent in the defense of Australia and New Zealand would also be weakened.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Terry Burstall, 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} T.B. Millar, 223.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} For an account of the Australian proposal and discussion surrounding it at the military staff talks in Honolulu March/April 1965, see Peter Edwards, 584-585.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} T.B. Millar, 174.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 10 March 1966, 3.
\end{itemize}
Not only did Australia contribute to Vietnam, but it also became part of the United States’ global security system. Most important was the North West Cape radio station on Australia’s Indian Ocean coast operating under sole American control. Transmitting on very low frequencies, the station was designed to relay data, including nuclear strategic orders, from the United States to nuclear submarines. A number of other installations based in Australia, under the control of the National Air and Space Agency (NASA), appeared to perform both civilian and military functions.37

Australian commitment was designed to show that Australia was a willing ally, one that stood up to be counted, and thus deserved the United States security assurance which it received from ANZUS. This Australian commitment was also designed to encourage American commitment to the defense of the southeast Asia region. This position was markedly different from that which emanated from New Zealand.

As opposed to the Australians, government officials in Wellington were skeptical that the injection of military involvement into South Vietnam would succeed in propping up an unstable regime.38 However, there was a dilemma. The New Zealand Government was faced with the conflict that the United States was the final guarantor of New Zealand security. The arrangement was a low priority to the United States, but pressure was being applied in the search for credible and visible support for United States policies in Vietnam. An unspoken, but implied quid pro quo between collective defense and commitment to Vietnam developed.

In December 1961, the Chiefs of Staff Committee concluded that New Zealand should avoid military involvement if Australia was not a participant, but highlighted the need to preserve favor with the United States. The final recommendation made was that New Zealand should attempt to dissuade the United States from intervening in South Vietnam with combat troops.39

The New Zealand response to Rusk’s 1962 requests were a technical mission and token aid40, followed in 1964 by a small force of military engineers for the purposes of road and bridge construction.41 This contribution marked the arrival in South Vietnam of military forces from the next country after Australia.42

Pressure from the United States for New Zealand to be more committed was continued with another request in May 1964.43 The problem was that the Australian responses of encouragement to American policy in Vietnam tended to undercut the New Zealand argument of non-intervention. After United States retaliatory bombing north of the 17th parallel in February 1965, Paul Hasluck, Australian Minister for External Affairs stated: “It will harden the free countries of Asia to see this evidence of the continued determination of the United States to assist free peoples to defend their freedoms and to

39 Roberto Rabel, 15.
40 Trevor R. Reese, 304.
43 Trevor R. Reese, 304.
maintain their independence." The New Zealand Prime Minister confined himself to a brief statement that avoided expressing approval but instead explained the reasons for the American actions. In the face of United States urgings to match Australian efforts, it was becoming increasingly difficult for New Zealand to remain the lone voice of caution in ANZUS.

As opposed to the Australian message at the Honolulu meeting, the New Zealand one from Admiral Peter Phipps, Chief of Defence Staff, was a warning to be:

…conscious of the risks that the introduction of ground combat forces would lead to steady pressure for the expansion of foreign ground forces and that these would be subject to steady erosion by the Viet Cong without their numbers or capability ever reaching the stage where they would significantly improve the position of the Republic of South Vietnam.

Australia’s decision to respond positively to American requests to send a combat force was probably the most decisive swaying factor in the New Zealand decision to commit combat troops, in that: “New Zealand’s defence cannot be considered in isolation from that of Australia”. In providing military support for South Vietnam, New Zealand for the first time did not follow a British lead but followed a powerful American lead that had been encouraged by Australia.

As in Australia, the decision raised intense partisan debate and involved New Zealand in what was perhaps its first major domestic foreign policy debate, later to be

44 Trevor R. Reese, 320.
45 Trevor R. Reese, 321.
46 Roberto Rabel, 21.
47 New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, New Zealand Foreign Policy with Special Reference to Southeast Asia (Wellington, New Zealand: 1968), 15.
fueled immensely by United States operational methodology. Government justification to
the public was twofold: firstly, that the decision was made in support of countering
aggression against free people; and secondly, “…the ANZUS Treaty remains a central
element in our foreign policy and in the last analysis the firmest underwriting of our
security”.

Officially the emphasis of Government releases focused on New Zealand’s
national interest, idealistic interest, and the need to fulfill treaty obligations. In reality, the
most important motive was the maintenance of the American alliance. Even if the size of
the commitment showed that New Zealand was scarcely enthusiastic in becoming
involved, the payoff included the security assurances that came with ANZUS, and
maintaining a close relationship in order to open up trade opportunities. Maintaining a
close political relationship with Australia was also a large consideration.

In domestic political terms the commitment was far more important and
controversial than those made previously in Asia. A good deal of the concern stemmed
from a moral unease in that New Zealand felt obliged to commit troops in a situation that
seemed confused and explosive. The SEATO agreement entitled the signatories to assist
South Vietnam, but did not oblige them to. The New Zealand Government took great
care to limit involvement to that deemed necessary to satisfy United States expectations

48 New Zealand Parliamentary Records (Hansard), 28 May 1965.
49 Jim Rolfe, Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships (Wellington, New
50 Keith Sinclair, 29.
and requests, tempered by skepticism of success, cost, the continued commitment to
Malaysia, and the desire to avoid conscription.

New Zealand was not, and had not previously sought to be part of the United
States global security system in the communications and aerospace fields. However, there
were two scientific installations concerned with research of the upper atmosphere51, and
Christchurch was, and still is, used by the United States as a base for support to activities
in Antarctica.

The decisions of both Australia and New Zealand to become involved in Vietnam
had ANZUS undertones. Both felt that unless they honored their ANZUS alliance
obligations, and encouraged the United States to honor hers in return, security of the
southwest Pacific may have been jeopardized. Whilst not a tangible quantity, the
perceived requirement was to maintain a credit in the security balance. There is a
however compelling case that the United States employed alliance politics to squeeze
contributions out of New Zealand, and to a lesser degree Australia, which would assist in
the need to bolster legitimacy for the war. Australia and New Zealand were the only
Western nations to join the United States embroilment in the war but the war left all three
ANZUS partners “…groping for a post-Vietnam policy…”52

The American decision to withdraw ground troops from Vietnam, and the apparent
intention to have no more commitments of American ground troops to Asian conflicts,

51 A. Robinson, 18.

52 Malcolm W. Hoag, “Political and Strategic Relations (Australia-New Zealand-United States: The View
from Washington),” paper presented to the Conference on Australian-New Zealand-United States Relations,
at the Australian National University (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, February 1970),
27.
raised serious doubts in Australia and New Zealand. If the United States was unwilling to commit military forces to Asia, the inherent implication was that there was less American will for backing a security assurance to her allies. A change in policy, articulated in Nixon’s Guam doctrine, meant that with regard to allies America would “…look to the nation directly threatened to assume primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense”. This policy shift deflated the New Zealand perception of the strength of ANZUS, and sparked a realization that ANZUS was not a one hundred percent security guarantee from the United States. It is ironic that Australia and New Zealand went to war with one of the main motivations being alliance diplomacy; the net result of Vietnam was an ingrained reluctance on the part of the United States to provide military aid to the region in the future. The meaning of ANZUS was now even less clear.

Adding to this alarm was the fact that neither Australia nor New Zealand had been able to influence decision-making during the war with regards to its conduct. United States decisions to commence, suspend and resume bombing north of the 17th parallel were made without consulting Australia and New Zealand.53

The United States had lost a war which was morally ambiguous and during which the enormous American material superiority, both qualitative and quantitative, had been negated. This produced a wariness of doggedly following a United States lead in foreign policy. Added to this perception was that Nixon’s Guam doctrine reduced the deterrence value of security assurances in the region. The Vietnam War was an essential precursor in leading New Zealand away from blind faith in ANZUS. “The Vietnam War was most

probably the critical catalyst in leading New Zealand away from the role of faithful and unthinking ally.” 54

The net effects of Australian and New Zealand involvement in the Vietnam War were: (1) Psychologically, their populations became aware of Asian problems, and the concern to solve them, albeit with a wide span of opinion on the solutions. (2) Asian countries gained a greater awareness that Australia and New Zealand had interests in the region. (3) The relationship between Australia, New Zealand and the United States strengthened emotionally by the shared experience of the war, including the experiences of domestic polarization. (4) American leadership was viewed as an entity to be followed henceforth more cautiously, thereby weakening the Alliance.

54 Ramesh Thakur, In Defence of New Zealand: Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age (Wellington, New Zealand: University of Otago, 1984), 74.
CHAPTER 3
THE SECOND REALIZATION OF ANZUS MISCONCEPTIONS AND
MISAPPREHENSIONS - NUCLEAR STALEMATE BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND
AND THE UNITED STATES

Historically, nations have in general, though certainly not always, adhered to alliances because the consequences of abandoning an ally were deemed to be more risky than fulfilling one’s obligations. In the Nuclear Age, this rule no longer necessarily held true; abandoning an ally risked eventual disaster, but resorting to nuclear war at the side of an ally guaranteed immediate catastrophe.

Henry Kissenger\textsuperscript{55}

At the heart of the current ANZUS standoff between New Zealand and the United States is the issue of visits by United States warships. It is an irreconcilable issue due to two factors: New Zealand domestic anti-nuclear sentiment and the United States’ National Security Strategy.

The hawkish approach of New Zealand under the Robert Muldoon government ended when the Labour Party took up the reins with a July 1984 election win of fifty-six seats within a ninety-five seat parliament.\textsuperscript{56} The new Prime Minister, David Lange, inherited a well supported Labour policy that entailed denying access of nuclear-powered or nuclear weapon carrying warships, but at the same time wanting to remain an active member of ANZUS. The nuclear issue was linked with condemnation of French nuclear


testing on Mururoa Atoll and proposals for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). Both policies were popular in the south Pacific. This stance represented a substantial shift in New Zealand’s domestic policy and a stance that has been irreversibly solidified for the foreseeable future.

New Zealand had supported the resumption of United States’ nuclear testing in the Pacific in 1962\textsuperscript{57} and had not officially voiced any concerns about any potential nuclear strain of ANZUS. The New Zealand Government’s intentions were raised at the ANZUS Council meeting of 16-17 July 1984, and marked the first airing of differing perceptions between the participants.\textsuperscript{58} The United States and Australia agreed that port access was essential in the effectiveness of the Treaty.\textsuperscript{59} The New Zealand position included limited access for United States warships: any applications for warships that were discreetly declared non-nuclear would be approved. This position violently clashed with the United States “neither confirm nor deny policy”.

The Australian proposal of 28 August 1984, to the South Pacific Forum for a SPNFZ, was vigorously endorsed by the attendees. An important aspect of the proposal was that each nation could decide unilaterally on whether to allow port visits by nuclear ships.\textsuperscript{60} It is quite likely that Australia’s Hawke Government initiative was aimed at heading off any stronger proposals, thereby satisfying domestic calls to stop French

\textsuperscript{57} J.G. Starke Q.C., 196.
\textsuperscript{58} Dora Alves, 9.
\textsuperscript{59} Dora Alves, 14.
\textsuperscript{60} Dora Alves, 9.
nuclear testing, while simultaneously fulfilling a defense policy requirement for unlimited port and airfield access for the American military.

In February 1985, at the time that the port request for the USS *Buchanan* was denied, seventy-five percent of New Zealanders supported the concept of a nuclear-free state but seventy-eight percent continued to support ANZUS involvement. The Heylen poll of March showed that fifty-two percent of the population approved of the ban on nuclear powered vessels, and seventy-seven percent supported the ban of nuclear weapons. When asked to choose between ANZUS and letting ships in that might be nuclear armed, forty-five percent were for, forty-five percent were against, and ten percent were undecided. Interestingly, sixty-nine percent thought that if New Zealand were attacked, the United States would produce military aid in any case. At the time of the emerging ANZUS rift, the jury was undecided on the case of “nuclear-free New Zealand” versus “continued ANZUS participation”, but was decidedly anti-nuclear outside any ANZUS context.

Later in the year, the French intelligence service planted a bomb that sunk the Greenpeace vessel *Rainbow Warrior*. The ship had spearheaded protests against French nuclear testing at Mururoa. The bombing stirred up previously unknown levels of national outrage that spilled over into anti-nuclear opinion. Further fuel to the fire was that the bombing had taken place inside the port of Auckland; New Zealand sovereign territory.

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62 Dora Alves, 15.
Although one would have expected the anti-French anger to increase any anti-ANZUS sentiments substantially, this did not occur. In May 1986, eighty-two favored the general position that New Zealand should form alliances and seventy-one remained in support of being within ANZUS.63 This sentiment was reinforced by the domestic fury over Lange’s Yale speech of 1989, which mentioned in passing that New Zealand might soon lodge notice with the ANZUS Council to formally withdraw from the Alliance. Lange’s timing couldn’t have been worse. The first public report of his speech occurred on ANZAC Day, a day that honors those New Zealanders (and Australians) who fell in battle; all of which occurred in conflicts where participation was in concert with allies.64

The strength of anti-nuclear sentiment was opportunistically pounced upon by the National Party opposition in 1990 during the lead up towards elections. While the National Party was traditionally right wing, traditionally pro-collective security, and traditionally pro-United States, the opposition leader stated:

The provision for the NCND (non-declaratory policy) stance on nuclear weapons will be eliminated from our defence policy and we will give New Zealanders a clear guarantee that New Zealand will remain nuclear free - that is, free of both nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered vessels - under defence arrangements made by the National government.65

That opposition leader, Jim Bolger, was the Prime Minister of New Zealand from 1990 until 8 December 1997. For two terms the National Party Government, who had their majority under a “first past the post” election system, never attempted to reverse the


64 Ewen Jamieson, 68-69.

65 Ewen Jamieson, 70-71.
stance on visiting warships. Under the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation system, which took effect with the 1996 election, it is even less likely that the National-New Zealand First coalition will strive for a pre-Labour Government attitude. Under MMP the likelihood of coalition governments is high and all the parties, including National which is the most conservative of them, have recently affirmed a non-nuclear disposition.

The Government has no intention of ending the ban on nuclear-powered warships using any NZ ports, PM-designate Jenny Shipley said. She was responding to a report in the *Sydney Morning Herald* which said she may propose an end to the ban. The newspaper reported her as saying she would be prepared to raise the prospect but only in strategic circumstances. Her office issued a statement saying it was misleading and incorrect to suggest the Government has any intention of ending the ban, and she had made that clear to Australian journalists.66

Not only has the population of New Zealand been sensitized into accepting non-nuclear legislation including a ban on nuclear ships as the norm, but also the issue has predictably become a matter of national pride. The majority of the population did not experience World War II and there will be a continuing drift towards a greater proportion of people with no experience of the Cold War. In the absence of an obvious, serious, and publicly visible security threat to New Zealand, it is likely that anti-nuclear sentiments within the domestic population will continue to crystallize. To fly in the face of such marked public opinion would make for an interesting spectacle in a pre-election build-up under the MMP system, which almost automatically assures no clear single majority government.

Unlike that made by NATO in 1954\textsuperscript{67} there was no ANZUS consensus to rely on nuclear weapons. The question of the use of a nuclear deterrent was never subject to formal decision by the ANZUS Council. In Australia there was a realization that the nuclear deterrent umbrella “…on which our future security depends,”\textsuperscript{68} was “…the condition by which we live”.\textsuperscript{69}

New Zealand along with other ANZUS members actually opposed the denuclearization of Asia and the southwest Pacific area at the twelfth ANZUS Council meeting at Wellington (5-6 June 1963) because it would “…disturb the existing strategic balance and would increase the risks of aggression”.\textsuperscript{70} This decision inferred that New Zealand acceptance of ANZUS included nuclear deterrence. Even though opposed to proliferation, New Zealand was never in a position to develop an independent deterrent philosophy or strategy. In the absence of formal opposition through ANZUS Council meetings, the Article II wording “act” seems to have given the United States latitude to use nuclear weapons independently within an ANZUS framework as situations demanded. It is not surprising that the United States took considerable exception to having her warships banned from New Zealand ports.

\textsuperscript{67} J.G. Starke Q.C., 228


\textsuperscript{69} Sir Robert Menzies, in “Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives 38,” (Canberra, Australia: 1963), 1076.

\textsuperscript{70} Department of External Affairs, \textit{Current notes on International Affairs 34}, no. 6 (Canberra, Australia: 1963), 7.
Casper Weinberger, former United States Defense Secretary, left the door open for a New Zealand return to the fold in 1985\textsuperscript{71} but it remained linked to unconditional port access. After two frustrating years the non-negotiable issue of port access ended with the 1986 Secretary Shultz statement: “We part as friends but we part company as far as the Alliance is concerned”.\textsuperscript{72} The clash in differing perceptions had visibly surfaced.

The United States saw ANZUS as being a piece of the East-West strategy of nuclear deterrence, whereas the New Zealand Government of the time saw it as a regional security issue. “New Zealand has never formed part of the nuclear strategy. We have not asked nor do we expect to be defended by nuclear weapons. From our perspective, ANZUS has always been a conventional defence relationship.”\textsuperscript{73} This is somewhat of a reversal of the perception that New Zealand had let build up over a thirty year period. From a United States perspective it was, and still is, impossible to separate out the achievement of security and stabilizing effects into those provided by conventional and unconventional forces. It was a complete package stemming from a single security strategy.

The other clash of perceptions was that of rating the importance of port access within the terms of the treaty. The New Zealand view of the significance of port access was a resentment of the implication that their only contribution to ANZUS was the provision of port facilities for United States warships. The evidence cited was that only


\textsuperscript{72} Lt Col Frank P. Donnini, 111.
four had visited in 1981 and two in 1982.\textsuperscript{74} This displays a misunderstanding of one of the main tenets of the treaty: declaring, through a display, the sense of unity within ANZUS. Port visits and hosting of such visits display a visible commitment to the treaty by both parties. It also shows a lack of New Zealand awareness of the elements of United States benefit from ANZUS. The issue does not concern current port access but securing port access for any potential need in time of future Pacific conflict. A loss of port access negated one of the main benefits of ANZUS for the United States; that if attacked anywhere in the Pacific region, it could count on using Australia and New Zealand as bases. New Zealand military contributions in history had always been proportional, but very limited in scale. The loss of port access tipped the balance between a complete ANZUS Treaty being of mutual benefit to all parties, to that of being a United States liability with regards to obligations to New Zealand security.

The United States was, and still is, unable to cancel ANZUS because of Article X which states: “This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely”. Cancellation of club membership is purely on a voluntary basis. The imposed “punishment” was: to cut off the intelligence flow, cancel all exercises involving joint participation of United States and New Zealand troops, postpone indefinitely the annual ANZUS Council meeting, close the door on high level governmental contacts, and downgrade New Zealand’s status from ally to friend. Although the door remained open, the New Zealand anti-nuclear bill, which was

passed in the summer of 1987, and the Labour Party’s return to government in the same year sealed the fate of ANZUS.

New Zealand has always maintained that it is anti-nuclear not anti-American. This vocal viewpoint has been backed by its reaction towards both the French declaration to end nuclear testing at Mururoa and France signing the SPNFZ agreement. For the United States, however, it is a dangerous precedent to have an ally to which it gives a form of security guarantee, but does not receive full complimentary access to facilities such as ports, due to nuclear issues. Such an alliance would set strong overtones for other alliances of which the United States is a member. The May 1997 United States National Security Strategy states:

…our nuclear deterrent posture is one of the most visible and important examples of how U.S. military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion. Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In this context, the United States must continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile.75

Secretary Baker’s decision to reopen high-level contacts on 1 May 1990 has killed off any impetus for full ANZUS reconciliation.76 In reality ANZUS has degraded into two bilateral alliances, a truncated ANZUS between Australia and the United States, and Closer Defence Relations (CDR) between Australia and New Zealand.


76 Ewen Jamieson, 45.
The divergence in United States and New Zealand nuclear policy now and in the future makes the Alliance untenable. The United States declared term “inoperative”77 has applied to the United States-New Zealand leg of ANZUS for over eleven years. Since conflict in nuclear policy is certain to continue, ANZUS is broken. It is so badly broken that there is no repair kit available for its current format.

CHAPTER 4
COMMONALITY OF NATIONAL INTERESTS TODAY

Since the end of the Cold War the strategic threat to Australia, New Zealand, and the United States has transgressed from being the direct security threat embodied in the USSR’s expansion of power and influence to one of indirect threats. Even without such a large direct threat there is a surprisingly large overlap of national interests, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The visibility and priority of economic concerns have increased for all three countries. The intersections of national interests between the three ANZUS partners are greatest in terms of international outlook, maintaining global stability, and enhancing regional security and stability.

It may seem strange to single out Australia, New Zealand, and the United States as having over-riding common interests in the Asia-Pacific region, but all three share parallel domestic backgrounds which enhance the commonality of their international outlook. All three countries are founded upon the basis of a pioneer society with the overwhelming proportion of the populations being transplanted through European immigration. The three states share a language. Lastly, but most importantly, they have similar views in terms of national power structures. Australia, New Zealand, and the United States share similar democratic systems, albeit the American system embodies a higher level of liberal pluralism as opposed to the Australian and New Zealand systems which have a larger degree of conservatism inherited through the Westminster parliamentary structure. Notwithstanding this, the Australian and New Zealand reactions to the 1987 Fijian Coup
demonstrated an outlook aligned with that of United States foreign policy and security strategy.

Of the three ANZUS nations, only the United States has the power to directly influence the course of events globally. All three nations state that enhancing global stability is within their national interests. Whilst Australia and New Zealand can apply diplomatic leverage of a limited degree, they do not have the informational, economic, and military power to be effective globally. What the military forces of these two countries do allow, is a level of military contribution to international undertakings that provide legitimacy to a diplomatic stance through a physical commitment. It is unlikely, in the foreseeable future, that either will be capable of deploying more than peacekeeping forces or token elements to a coalition involved in a short-warning mid-level conventional conflict.

The southwest and south Pacific regions have changed in that they are no longer simply “…a tranquil backwater, secure in its isolation from unsettling and potentially hostile influences from abroad”. An increasing Soviet influence, in the form of fishing rights agreements with Kiribati and Vanuatu, was a concern up until the fall of the Berlin Wall. It remains to be seen whether China will emerge as a regional threat in terms of intentions and capabilities, but the end of the Cold War has produced greater uncertainty. In the absence of a squabble over Antarctic resources in the future, the closest major territorial dispute is the Spratly Islands. The other notable unresolved conflicts of the

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region are between the two Koreas and between China and Taiwan. The United States has provided both South Korea and Taiwan with differing forms of security assurances.

Of more immediate concern to an intersection between the national interests of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, is that the region is not exempt from more widespread instability. Vivid demonstrations of this phenomenon have been amplified over the last ten years in Vanuatu, Fiji, New Caledonia, and Bougainville.

The economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region has reinforced the increasing importance to all three ANZUS nations of their ties with this region. The security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region is of vital national interest to Australia and New Zealand. Both countries have increasingly recognized over the last three decades that their key to economic prosperity is tied to markets in the Asia-Pacific region. For New Zealand, “About forty percent of our merchandise exports go to east Asia, a figure which has trebled in a generation,”\(^79\) and the wider Asia-Pacific region accounts for some seventy percent.\(^80\) Whilst the realization in the United States has commenced, it has still not fully awakened to the rate of increasing interdependence between the state of its economy, prosperity, and the Asia-Pacific region. The degree of overlap in trade figures for Australia, New Zealand and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region indicates a conspicuous level of common economic interdependencies, although the linkages are primarily defined in individual terms. All three have a vested national interest in

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contributing towards the stability of the region. The intersection of these interests is the aim of keeping the Asia-Pacific free from destabilizing disputes, especially those that would affect trade and maritime passage.

The outstanding factor that will shape the Asia-Pacific strategic environment in the future is the rate of economic growth in the region and its impact on the changing relativity between the regional powers. Even with the present financial crisis in some regional states, Asian economic growth is predicted to continue at high levels over the next decade. As this occurs the relative economic size of Australia and New Zealand in the region will diminish. With that diminution in relative economic size will come a lesser relative size of national resources spent on defense. Improved military capabilities within the region, in conjunction with any deterioration in stability, will make for a more demanding operating environment for military forces. Economic growth and increasing interdependencies within the Asia-Pacific region channel ANZUS emphasis away from collective defense and towards collective security with the objective of maintaining regional stability.

Both Australia and New Zealand have the requirement for a partner in the region that has continued power and influence, and has similarly aligned strategic objectives in the Asian-Pacific region. The United States is the obvious choice for this partner. However, a revitalization of the collective defense arrangements between the three

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countries couched in ANZUS terms may tend to only emphasize their image as Anglo-Saxon outsiders.

The aim of political and security relationships between Australia, New Zealand and the United States must be aimed at providing a stabilizing influence in the region without alienating other countries. The ANZUS framework does not satisfy the requirement but instead is hindering the achievement of this aim.
CHAPTER 5
THE NET BENEFIT OF BURYING THE ANZUS CARCASS

The existence of ANZUS embodies costs and benefits, both tangible and intangible to the three participating countries. When these costs and benefits for each country are weighted against each other, the continued existence of ANZUS in its present state does not further the national interests of Australia, New Zealand, or the United States.

There are several indicators that New Zealand has a flawed security strategy. The first and most glaring indicator is that it does not have a stand-alone national security strategy that harnesses the informational, economic, diplomatic, and military arms of national power in order to achieve national strategic objectives. Upon what national strategic foundation is the military strategy based?

The impact of ANZUS on New Zealand security since the United States imposed a freeze in security relations has been negative, not positive. ANZUS no longer contributes to the security of New Zealand. New Zealand no longer has any effective formal security alliances except that provided by the Australia-New Zealand leg of ANZUS. But even though Australia has roughly five times the level of resources that New Zealand can draw upon, she is strictly limited to being a regional power. The power, influence, and defense capabilities of Australia are dwarfed many fold by those of the United States. Repealing ANZUS and increasing connectivity with the United States would actually improve New Zealand’s security posture.
Another major contributor to a lessening of the substance of New Zealand security has been the dramatic ebb in one of the national security tools; the New Zealand Defence Force. This decline has occurred for two reasons: a drastic drop in the defense budget and the degradation of interaction with United States forces. Although the decline in New Zealand Defence Force capabilities has been a gradual process, it has only recently been forcefully publicized:

US restrictions on defence cooperation with NZ are imposing a gradually tightening constraint, the Government has been told by the Defence Force. In briefing papers for the new Defence Minister Max Bradford, the Defence Force said the US has made it clear that constraints on defence cooperation, arising from the NZ anti-nuclear policy, will remain in place. Constraints primarily include a ban on multinational defence exercises involving the US and on bilateral defence cooperation including exercises and intelligence. The restrictions impose a gradually tightening constraint on the Defence Force ability to respond to new opportunities and demands of knowledge-based warfare, the papers said.  

The mid-1980s marked a change in defense focus for both Australia and New Zealand. In Australia it surfaced with the 1986 *Dibb Report* and *Defence of Australia 1987* which advocated the need for greater self-reliance in defense. In New Zealand thought processes were heading in the same direction with the 1987 white paper on defense policy which echoes the need to “…have a capability to operate independently,”

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although “…more likely in concert with Australia…”.\textsuperscript{84} This was the start of New Zealand’s defense problems which have continued to this day. Despite this and following policies, the intentions have not been backed by sufficient funding action.

Since 1989, New Zealand military spending declined by thirty.\textsuperscript{85} There was a reasonable expectation from Australia, in the light of being adrift from ANZUS, that New Zealand defense spending would increase considerably. New Zealand is trapped in what Dr. Dalton West called its “security dilemma”\textsuperscript{86} The greater New Zealand’s success in dissipating potential threats and deterring potential aggressors, the less of a requirement to do so. Whilst this approach is politically safe in New Zealand, it ignores destabilization as a major indirect threat to security through its effects on overseas markets.

\textit{The Defence of New Zealand 1991 (DONZ 91)} mooted the defense strategy of “self-reliance in partnership” by “…maintaining a level of armed forces sufficient to deal with small contingencies affecting New Zealand and its region, and capable of contributing to collective efforts where our wider interests are involved,”\textsuperscript{87} but: “In recent years the Defence Force has warned that its capabilities were slipping below credible minimum levels and that more money had to be spent”.\textsuperscript{88} The United States policy of no

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{85} “Defence gets $660m,” (Hastings, New Zealand) \textit{Hawkes Bay Herald Tribune}, 1 October 1997, 2.
\item\textsuperscript{86} Dalton A. West, “New Zealand Security Perspective,” paper presented at a seminar on Strategic Imperatives and Western Responses in the Pacific (Sydney, Australia: 9-12 February 1986),188.
\item\textsuperscript{88} “Defence gets $660m,” \textit{Hawkes Bay Herald Tribune}.
\end{itemize}
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intelligence flow, no combined exercises, and limited access to latest generations of technology and equipment has, and continues to, hurt New Zealand defense capabilities.

An important admission in DONZ 91 was that:

> The loss of exercising and training exchanges with United States forces has lowered the professional standards of our defence force. Australia…can not fill the gap since it depends itself on American doctrine, technology and standards. As a result, the ability to operate with our traditional allies in a modern combat environment and interoperability on land, at sea and in the air is steadily degrading.\(^{89}\)

This admission was never backed by increased funding over the period 1991-1997.

The recently released 1997 defense assessment\(^{90}\) was conducted within the framework of existing defense policy and does not question the strategy of “self-reliance in partnership”. The three principle elements of this strategy being: maintaining an independent capacity to deal with low level security challenges in and around New Zealand, contributing to regional security, and the capacity to contribute to global peace and security through peacekeeping contributions.\(^{91}\) Not only is the assessment founded upon a non-existent national security strategy, it is based on a six year old strategic capability requirement assessment.

The DONZ 91 requirement to maintain a “credible minimum” contribution to New Zealand’s own defense has been translated into “…capabilities that will allow New Zealand to play a defence role equal to the risks to its own security”.\(^{92}\) Both phrases are

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highly subjective plays on words. The wording of the second phrase and the results of the assessment indicate “the risks” actually means the probability of a direct threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of New Zealand. What this posture ignores is the true meaning of risk—the probability and the expected level of consequence of an occurrence combined.

Importantly, the DONZ 91 order of battle is not maintained with the assessment reducing the Royal New Zealand Navy by a frigate. Neither does it question the appropriateness of the remainder of the structure for achieving the principal elements of the defense policy. The assessment does not add a joint deployable headquarters to the order of battle, which historical lessons reveal is a precursor to the “self-reliant” portion of the policy. Another gaping limitation within the assessment is that the New Zealand Defence Force does not have any capability of forcible entry against even the lowest level of resistance from a potential adversary.

With regards to land force component deployment possibilities:

New Zealand would not need to consider the deployment of a brigade size force unless there was a serious change in the international situation. This would provide considerable time to build up to a deployable brigade capability.

The analysis adds, “…the basic building block for contributions to a coalition is the battalion group”. However, to rely on one hundred and eighty days warning for the

deployment of a brigade is a high-risk option in terms of modern warfare capabilities.

Such a premise clashes with contemporary maneuver warfare doctrine by automatically giving any potential adversary the opportunity to slip inside the New Zealand strategic decision cycle. Having an indefinable tripwire or decision point for mobilizing forces one hundred and eighty days ahead of deployment directly clashes with the statement that:

The determining factors of land force planning are deployability and readiness. Army contingents will be deployed overseas and our geography means that this will always be over long distances. As a small force, it must be capable to move at short notice to be of value. While this calls for a high state of readiness that can only be achieved with regular forces, part time reserves are important as the source of trained volunteers from which any prolonged deployment might be sustained.97

Modern warfare tends to be a “come as you are” show not a “come as you would like to be” one. There is a large risk that the deployment of a fully prepared and trained brigade under the current New Zealand defense structure will never be a viable option within the basket of military and non-military policy tools available to the Government.

Was the recent defense assessment based on a methodology of capability requirements or was it aimed at maintaining the status quo of defense structure? The assessment claims to increase funding which it superficially seems to do in pure monetary terms but the purported increase in spending “…would not raise the proportion of the nation’s GDP, but would hold it steady at about 1.1%”.98 Ominously the financial resources section is ahead of the discussion on force structures and generic military capability requirements, giving the impression that the foundation of the assessment was

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the former. When one considers the increasingly unfulfilled defense outputs, made clear in the *Defence Force Annual Report 1996*, along with the glaring equipment deficiencies highlighted by the peacekeeping deployments to Bosnia and Bougainville, it is difficult to see how an increase in defense spending equal to the level of GDP growth will arrest the erosion in defense capability caused by a thirty percent drop in spending since 1989.

A bold admission, or slip, by Don Mckinnon, New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (and Deputy Prime Minister at the time), was that the small increase in defense spending can be seen as “…gradual steps towards *rebuilding* our defence capacity….”. The improvement in capability is actually an attempt to regain capabilities lost. As Prime Minister Jim Bolger implied at the time of the assessment release, the plan is a “compromise” deal.

New Zealand’s defense problems do not stop with its own capabilities, but continue with the views of its friends, allies and “natural security partner”. Australia and New Zealand share a high degree of security interdependence that is continually and mutually reflected in CDR. Australia has voiced growing concern at the level of New Zealand’s defense spending. For the deployment of a 250 man contribution to the peacekeeping force of UNPROFOR (Bosnia), light vehicles were required to be fitted with diesel engines, and the armored personnel carriers were fitted with belly and side armor which was borrowed from the Australian Defence Force. During the recent contribution to the Truce Monitoring Group Bougainville, Brigadier Roger Mortlock the New Zealand commander of the Group reported that the New Zealand Army radios and vehicles were not mission capable; New Zealand Press Association, News Bulletin for Tuesday 9 December 1997, 1.


“The Defence gets $660m,” *Hawkes Bay Herald Tribune*.

Zealand’s defense spending, which is being rapidly outstripped by its Asian neighbors to the northeast. Whilst a hoped for result from the assessment was that: “Our friends and allies will be pleased to see that we are determined to reverse what they saw as declining defense expenditure and capability,” there has been little positive international reaction. The murmurs from Australia clearly indicate that the security strategy of maintaining a “credible minimum” defense force has failed to be achieved. In reaction to the latest New Zealand defense assessment, Australian Minister of Defence, Ian McLachlan:

…noted that the [New Zealand] Government had made clear its deep concern at the progressive erosion in the capabilities of the New Zealand Defence Force in recent years and its implications for effective collaboration with the Australian Defence Force…if fully implemented, will help to arrest this erosion…the decision to not take up the option available to New Zealand to acquire an additional two ANZAC frigates was clearly disappointing …particularly in view of the strong maritime dimension to NZ’s defence interests and responsibilities.103

Another source for the drop in New Zealand military capability has been the truncation of security cooperation in the realms of intelligence sharing, access to military equipment, exchanges, combined exercising, and regular high level dialogue. With regards to “…ability to take part in conventional military operations,”104 it is highly questionable whether the New Zealand Defence Force is capable of deploying a significant mission-capable combat organization into a conventional situation. If it were to, there is a high risk that the military contribution would be overshadowed by the


liability imposed upon coalition allies due to the level of support that such a force would require. General John Baker, Australian Chief of Defence Force, recently said that he is “…concerned about the ability of New Zealand to pull its weight in regional security and about the long-term rundown of the New Zealand defence capability,”\textsuperscript{105} and is “…concerned about our ability to operate together in the future”.\textsuperscript{106} After an eleven year break from meaningful interaction with United States military forces, interoperability in a mid-level conventional coalition is doubtful since:

Interoperability for everyone now means interoperability with the United States. It is the uncontested leader in military doctrine and technology, and its lead is lengthening. The participation of the United States in any major cooperative undertaking is essential, and all countries wishing to play an effective part in those undertakings have to be interoperable with the United States in communications, equipment and other critical aspects, such as operating procedures.\textsuperscript{107}

According to the defense assessment, the situation is going to get worse; a realistic assumption when Joint Vision 2010\textsuperscript{108} is taken into consideration:

The technological changes brought about through the RMA will make it more difficult to maintain interoperability among military forces when operating together. It means that in the future, making a useful contribution to any allied enterprise will require capabilities that are fully interoperable, particularly in intelligence gathering, communications and command and control.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{105} New Zealand Press Association Bulletin, Friday 20 February 1998.


\textsuperscript{108} Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Vision 2010,” (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, Pentagon, 1997).

ANZUS does not contribute towards the national interests of New Zealand, and as highlighted earlier, it is highly unlikely to do so in the near future. Whilst the wider relationship between New Zealand and the United States in terms of informational, economic, and diplomatic relations has recovered to a large degree over the last eleven years, military interaction has not. With the official removal of New Zealand as a member of ANZUS, it would be transformed in the eyes of the United States from an “unfaithful ally” to being a “friend with non-nuclear access.” Whilst losing a non-existent security guarantee and collective defense alliance it will gain a degree of security cooperation with the United States.

As a “friend” of the United States, the New Zealand Defence Force will regain the opportunity for increasing military professionalism through exercises, exchanges, dialogue at a senior level, and enhanced access to the United States military-industrial base. With renewed military interaction, interoperability with the United States will improve thereby giving the New Zealand Government a greater range of military options in the pursuit of strategic objectives.

The ANZUS split has had minimal short-term negative effects on the United States. There is no escaping the comparison between New Zealand and the United States in terms of power and influence, but there are two advantages that the United States can gain by having “official” ANZUS relations with New Zealand severed.

Firstly, consultation and interaction between the New Zealand and United States military can be returned to something approaching pre-1986 levels. The only barrier would be visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear weapon capable ships. There would be no
such ban on visits by ships for which there was already public knowledge of being non-nuclear powered and non-nuclear weapon capable. This would produce greater exposure of the New Zealand Defence Force to United States doctrine, communications, equipment and operating procedures leading to greater interoperability. Whilst the power of New Zealand forces is small in comparison, interoperability gives the United States the option of requesting military contributions from New Zealand for international political leverage.

New Zealand has made important contributions to regional stability through its unmatched closeness to Polynesian nations. Auckland remains the largest concentration of indigenous Polynesian people in the world. Most notably, stability contributions include the conduct of the Bougainville peace talks throughout 1997 and the commitment to, and command of, the Truce Monitoring Group, Bougainville from late 1997 to the present. The United States has neither the resources nor the inclination to take responsibility for suppressing every conflict around the globe, and arguably from its track record of such involvement, has a weakness in dealing with low-intensity conflict or operations other than war. Australia and New Zealand have a history of successful involvement in such operations. A strengthened New Zealand military would lead to some burden-relief for the United States through a greater capacity to deal with operations other than war in the southeast Asian and Pacific regions.

The second way in which the termination of ANZUS is in the interests of the United States is that it obeys the security maxim of avoiding entangling alliances. It would be one less security guarantee for the United States to concern itself with. In theory at least, the United States is still technically obliged to come to the defense of New
Zealand should it be attacked. The absence of a collective defense treaty gives the United States the choice to assist New Zealand in the event of such an unlikely occurrence.

The strength of the Australian-United States leg of ANZUS would suggest that it is not in the best interests of Australia for the alliance to evaporate completely. If anything, “…the bilateralization of the ANZUS consultative process has made this mechanism even more useful as a channel for Australian-American consultations, and increased Australia’s ability to define the agenda,”\textsuperscript{110} or as the Australian Minister of Defence recently stated: “…ANZUS will be even more important in the future than it has been until now”.\textsuperscript{111} The Australia-United States security relationship remains as Australia’s most important in terms of benefiting from a source of power and influence.

The implications of an unresolved ANZUS for the Australia-New Zealand leg of the relationship are more difficult to define. The Closer Economic Relations (CER) and Closer Defence Relations (CDR) agreements between Australia and New Zealand are a reflection of almost duplicate strategic interests. From a security perspective both countries can almost be considered a single unit. This overlap has been reflected in a relationship of continued close cooperation that has not been significantly impaired by a breakdown in security relations between New Zealand and the United States.

\textsuperscript{110} Richard W. Baker, Project Director, “Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; Fifty Years of Alliance Relations,” (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center International Relations Program/The Australian Institute of International Affairs/The Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, September 1991), xi.

It is however in the best interests of Australia for its two closest allies, New Zealand and the United States to be interoperable. An arrangement that provides this would at least provide for the capacity of these allies to be able to operate militarily together in circumstances where it is in the best interests of Australia for that to occur.
CHAPTER 6

THE FUTURE OF THE AUSTRALIA - NEW ZEALAND - UNITED STATES ALLIANCE: “IS THERE LIFE AFTER ANZUS?”

New Zealand can’t have it both ways.

Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, 1985\(^{112}\)

The Five Power arrangement is a consultative and co-operative partnership...

Right Honourable Sir Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister of New Zealand, in the House of Representatives, 4 November 1971\(^{113}\)

For a small country such as New Zealand, which is highly dependent on trade, isolationism is a superficially attractive but very dangerous alternative to being involved in world affairs. New Zealand’s strategic interests do not begin nor do they end at its shoreline. It would be a seriously flawed policy assumption to expect New Zealand to remain untouched by instability or any rising threats. New Zealand’s strategic center of gravity is its economic structure giving it a high level of competitiveness both domestic and internationally. The greatest threat to New Zealand’s security is the disruption of international markets and the resultant dampening of prospects for economic stability and growth. The degree of trade reliance of New Zealand GDP is its critical vulnerability.

\(^{112}\) Speaking at a National Defense University’s Pacific Symposium, quoted in Dora Alves, 61.

The New Zealand Government must employ a range of policy options, both non-military and military in nature, in order to be able to guard this critical vulnerability.

The decay of ANZUS has not only weakened solidarity of the western powers in the region, but a lack of strategic adjustment and/or compensatory defense spending by New Zealand is lessening the fabric of security and stability in the Pacific area.

The nuclear-access issue was neither linked to security strategy nor was it anti-American in nature. It was purely domestic political forces that caused the linkage of rising environmental concerns to impinge upon the ANZUS security relationship. However, the stand off between New Zealand’s domestic policy concerning nuclear material and the nuclear deterrent strategy of the United States will continue. ANZUS as a collective defense agreement has not and will not live within these parameters. The greatest policy implication is that this reality needs to be recognized, and both the discourse and the mechanics of the ANZUS relationships need to be adjusted accordingly. If this action is not taken the three pseudo alliance partners will not reap maximum benefit from their relationships.

The first step for New Zealand is to produce a security strategy that is wider-reaching than that articulated within the recent defense assessment which was based upon a six year old defense policy of “Self-Reliance in Partnership”. Defense does not equal security, but defense is a subset of security. Such a security strategy must harness all the national elements of power, including diplomatic, economic, informational, and military elements, in order to pursue national strategic objectives.
An appropriate aim for New Zealand’s security strategy is to “…cultivate alliances and friendships, manage bilateral ties to avoid friction, and work to build a system in which…”\textsuperscript{114} firstly, it fosters global and regional stability, and domestic security; and secondly, the use of military force is an unnecessary but feasible option for the national command authority.

According to New Zealand’s closest partner, the current defense policy of maintaining a “credible minimum” is not being met; therefore the policy has failed. Without a reorientation to a fresh security strategy, a radical increase in military funding levels will be required in order produce a capability to achieve the current defense outputs. Even with new security parameters, it is envisaged that the current spending level on defense is simply not enough to provide the Government with an appropriate range of viable military options to apply against contingencies.

The future must recognize common interests of the three ANZUS partners but work within conflicts and divergence in policies. ANZUS does not fit the current situation. Each country has a differing perception of its responsibilities for fulfilling treaty obligations.

A possible solution is to downgrade ANZUS to a security cooperation arrangement in place of a collective defense treaty. To be politically viable such an approach would require an Australian-United States bilateral overlay that encapsulates the relationship

which they presently have. This solution represents a major reengineering of ANZUS; a
difficult and possibly destabilizing proposition.

It is envisaged that the three legs of the triangle would be better served by a series
of bilateral links as follows:

(1) Australia-United States - barring the Antarctica becoming a major strategic focus
in the foreseeable future, Australia is always going to be more important to the United
States than New Zealand. A strong and suitable collective defense alliance exists under
the current arrangements set by ANZUS.

(2) Australia-New Zealand - the terms and conditions of the ANZUS alliance are also
an appropriate framework for this leg of the relationship. The high degree of security
interdependence and overlap of strategic interests indicate that the agreement between
Australia and New Zealand should also be maintained in a collective defense framework.

(3) New Zealand-United States - for the benefit of all three parties this leg of the
relationship needs to be modified from one of collective defense to collective security.

The Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) provides an example of a framework
which provides for consultation, exercising together in order to maintain interoperability,
exchanges, training opportunities, and access to equipment.

The important aspect of the FPDA is that it does not “…constitute a security treaty
but provide(s) the framework for security cooperation… acknowledging that stability and
prosperity are of direct interest…” 116 Such an arrangement with the United States would

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115 A full reproduction of the FPDA is at Appendix 2.

allow for security cooperation but deletes any security assurance. It provides for the potential to operate together in a time of need through being interoperable without any collective defense obligations from the United States.

The relationship would embody some unknown level of deterrent and promote peace and security. Any future potential adversary is unlikely to be able to gauge the extent of any United States reaction in support of New Zealand. Whilst a limitation on access to New Zealand waters by nuclear-powered or nuclear-capable ships would remain as part of the long-term relationship, it is difficult to calculate any threat driven shift in New Zealand domestic sentiment towards allowing nuclear ships into port. However, port facility access by nuclear-powered or nuclear-capable ships is not a prerequisite to security cooperation. Free and open access to those ships of which it is common public knowledge to be non-nuclear powered and non-nuclear capable would not violate New Zealand legislation or the framework of the security relationship. The recommendation is essentially that the eastern leg of the ANZUS alliance be downgraded in nature.

New Zealand currently enjoys the type of relationship outlined above with Britain. The ban on nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable shipping has been applied equally to ships of the Royal Navy. There is no collective defense treaty between the two countries yet there is a greater level of security and military interaction between the two compared with that which occurs between New Zealand and the United States. New Zealand recently contributed a contingent to UNPROFOR Bosnia of which part of the training of the first contingent occurred in Britain. New Zealand personnel have been contributed towards the British contingent for the Implementation Force (IFOR) and subsequently the
Stabilization Force (SFOR). Exchanges, joint exercises and high level consultations have continued unhindered since 1985.

For such a framework to be built it is not necessary for ANZUS to be canceled, but it is necessary for New Zealand to withdraw from the alliance. The remnant of ANZUS would translate to the AUS alliance. The formation of the other two legs of the triangle could be arrived at through the duplication of an Australia-New Zealand bilateral collective defense agreement couched in similar terms to ANZUS, and the formation of a bilateral New Zealand-United States defense arrangement framed along the lines of the FPDA. Possible criticism to such a framework is that it may possibly alienate those countries in the Asia-Pacific that are not included. The framework is, however, a series of bilateral links as opposed to a Asia-Pacific “white man’s pact,” and it is actually an official downgrading of the security relationship between the United States and New Zealand.

New Zealand has the least power and influence within ANZUS and also has the least to lose and the most to gain from a redefinition of the relationships. The “… most isolated developed country on earth,”¹¹⁷ must therefore be the most active partner to pursue such a change.

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

New Zealand’s security debate must be more than talk on whether or not we have frigates...the issues are more profound than this.\textsuperscript{118}

From its inception ANZUS projected different perceptions of its meaning and intent into the minds of Australians, New Zealanders, and Americans. As a treaty it was a cornerstone to the security of Australia and New Zealand, but it was of low significance amongst the security priorities of the United States.

The difference in perceptions regarding purpose and obligations was initially but mostly subconsciously realized with Australian and New Zealand commitment to the United States’ cause in Vietnam. The second and more apparent realization occurred with the 1985 nuclear policy stand off between New Zealand and the United States. The security relationship between the two countries has stagnated since. The security strategy of the United States and the domestic anti-nuclear legislation and sentiment of New Zealand continue to oppose each other diametrically. The ANZUS tail now wags the security strategy dog. ANZUS is unable to live usefully between the two and continues to be an obstacle for the provision of the three security pillars it was designed to provide, namely:

\begin{itemize}
\item A desire to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area.
\end{itemize}

♦ A declaration publicly and formally of a sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of the parties stand alone in the Pacific Area.

♦ Coordination of efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area.

It is in the national interests of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States for the framework of ANZUS to be adjusted against a vastly different backdrop compared to that of the treaty signing. New Zealand has the most to gain and the least to lose from such an adjustment. It is therefore New Zealand who must voice the overtures for a “life after ANZUS”.

The first step to be taken by New Zealand is a zero-based rationalization of its security strategy; not its defense policy but a security strategy harnessing all the elements of national power to achieve the objective. An appropriate aim for New Zealand’s security strategy is to “…cultivate alliances and friendships, manage bilateral ties to avoid friction, and work to build a system in which…”119 firstly, it fosters global and regional stability and domestic security; and secondly, recognizes the use of military force is an unnecessary but feasible option for the national command authority.

Inclusive of a new security strategy is the voluntary withdrawal by New Zealand from ANZUS and approaches made to: Australia for a bilateral collective defense treaty;

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and the United States for a bilateral collective security cooperation arrangement. Such a change will contribute towards the three pillars that ANZUS was designed to provide.

If a new security strategy is adopted which provides for improved security cooperation with the United States, it is likely that the New Zealand Defence Force will once again have access to United States doctrine, training, equipment, and high level consultations. Just as important will be a greater access to the development of a potential Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which Joint Vision 2010 strives for.

Interoperability is one of the keys to security strategy.

There is much vocalizing in New Zealand political rhetoric that the New Zealand Defence Force should focus its knowledge, training, and equipment solely on peacekeeping. There is a certain degree of naïveté contained within this theory. Unfortunately peacekeeping is not always as peaceful as it sounds, and there are many dead United Nations and NATO soldiers who can support this theory. Any peacekeeping force must possess three capabilities. Firstly, it should be able to enforce the agreement or apply terms of reference faced with one, both, or many hostile belligerents. Secondly, it should be able to maintain adequate force protection against the attack of any or all the belligerents. Thirdly, it should be able to understand the nature of war employed by the belligerents. Dependent on the exact nature of the peacekeeping mission, this implies a certain level of conventional and unconventional warfare capability and knowledge.

A policy which limits the New Zealand Defence Force to a “peacekeeping only” role verges on the edge of madness. Whilst outwardly appearing to be an attractive option, the costs of maintaining a force to support such a policy against the limited return
on national interest pursuit is unreasonable. A “peacekeeping only” policy ensures that the New Zealand Government has no military flexibility in its basket of policy tools for the pursuit of national interests. It is difficult to envisage any security path whereby the Government of New Zealand would not want to have a capable military force within its options for projecting national power.

If a new security strategy is not adopted, radical increases in military spending are required to give New Zealand the capability to achieve its own defense goals. The goals are threefold: maintaining an independent capacity to deal with low level security challenges in and around New Zealand, contributing to regional security, and contributing to global peace and security through peacekeeping contributions. By neither possessing a deployable joint task force headquarters nor a forcible entry capability, New Zealand has scored an “own goal” with regards to its own aim of maintaining an independent capacity to deal with low level security challenges in and around New Zealand.

The “credible minimum” strategy has failed. It is quite feasible to suggest that: “New Zealand’s defense capacity is so low it cannot honour basic treaty commitments”.120 As General John Baker, Australian Chief of Defence Force stated: “I know the problems we have on 2 percent of GDP in coping with the challenges we face…the challenge the New Zealand Defence Force faces of 1.1 percent being no less than our own”.121 The range of options that the Government has asked the military to provide is not being provided. The funding which the New Zealand Defence Force needs in order to supply

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120 “Moore slams NZ’s defence,” Press.
the range of credible options being asked for by the Government is not being supplied. The remedy required is “…concrete steps rather than nice words…”\textsuperscript{122} in the form of increased expenditure in real and effective terms.

Whether or not New Zealand pursues a new security strategy inclusive of rationalizing ANZUS relationships, it is unthinkable that it would not want to be an equal security partner with Australia. A change in Australian perceptions is required for New Zealand realistically to achieve an equal partnership. Nothing less than increased New Zealand defense spending will achieve such a change. Unless a proportion of New Zealand GDP equal to that spent by Australia is set aside, there will never be a psychological equality in the security relationship. Most importantly, in order to break the mold of the current security quagmire a revaluation of domestic sentiment is desperately overdue: “As much as New Zealanders would hate to admit it, Australia’s criticism of our defence capacity was correct”\textsuperscript{123}.


\textsuperscript{123} “Moore slams NZ’s defence,” \textit{Press}. 63
APPENDIX 1

SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES\textsuperscript{124}

The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,
Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan area,
Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,
Therefore declare and agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III

\textsuperscript{124} As reproduced in J.G. Starke Q.C., 243-245
The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.
This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

FOR AUSTRALIA: PERCY C. SPENDER
FOR NEW ZEALAND: C.A. BERENDSEN
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DEAN ACHESON
                                               JOHN FOSTER DULLES
                                               ALEXANDER WILEY
                                               JOHN J. SPARKMAN
APPENDIX 2

THE FIVE POWER DEFENCE ARRANGEMENT

Communique Issued at the conclusion of the Five Power Ministerial Meeting on the External Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, London, 15-16 April 1971

1. Ministers of the Governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom met in London on 15th and 16th April 1971, in order to consider matters of common interest to all five Governments relating to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore.

2. The Ministers of the five Governments affirmed, as the basic principles of their discussion, their continuing determination to work together for peace and stability, their respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of all countries and their belief in the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

3. In the context of their Governments determination to co-operate closely in defence arrangements which are based on the need to regard the defence of Malaysia and Singapore as indivisible, the Ministers noted with gratification the development of the defence capability of Malaysia and Singapore, to which the other three Governments had given assistance, and the decisions of the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, which had been welcomed by the other two Governments, to continue to station forces there after the end of 1971.

4. In discussing the contribution which each of the five Governments would make to the defence arrangements in Malaysia and Singapore, the Ministers noted the view of the United Kingdom Government that the nature of its commitment under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement required review and that the Agreement should be replaced by new political arrangements. They declared that their Governments would continue to co-operate, in accordance with their respective policies, in the field of defence after the termination of the Agreement on 1st November 1971.

5. The Ministers also declared, in relation to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that in the event of any form of armed attack externally organised or supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore, their Governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be take jointly or separately in relation to such attack or threat.

6. The Ministers reviewed the progress made regarding the establishment of the new defence arrangements. In particular:

a. They welcomed the practical steps being taken to establish the Integrated Air Defence System for Malaysia and Singapore on 1st September 1971.

b. They agreed to establish an Air Defence Council, comprising one senior representative of each of the five nations, to be responsible for the functioning of the Integrated Air Defence System, and to provide direction to the commander of the Integrated Air Defence System on matters affecting the organisation, training and development and operational readiness of the system.

c. They noted the progress made by the Five Power Naval Advisory Working Group.

d. They decided to set up a Joint Consultative Council to provide a forum for regular consultation at the senior official level on matters relating to the defence arrangements.

e. The Ministers also noted that further discussion would take place between the Governments on the practical arrangements required for the accommodation and facilities for the ANZUK forces to be stationed in the area. They looked forward to the early and successful conclusion of these discussions as an essential basis for the completion of plans for the defence arrangements.

7. The Ministers agreed that from time to time it might be appropriate for them to meet to discuss their common interests. It would also be open to any of the participating Governments to request at any time, with due notice, a meeting to review these defence arrangements.
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