The Questionable Training of the AEF in World War I

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"The most important question that confronted us in the preparation of our forces of citizen soldiery for efficient service was training."1

--- John J. Pershing

The Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces harbored no illusions about the myriad difficulties he faced in training his AEF for battle on the Western Front. Three fundamental factors would guide the molding of the AEF into an effective force. These were tactical doctrine, the availability and management of personnel and equipment, and training philosophies. An understanding of how these factors influenced the training of the AEF will provide an appreciation of the extent to which Pershing and the War Department were successful in shaping the AEF into an effective instrument of the nation's wartime policy.

The problems involved in training the AEF can best be examined within the context of the scope of the effort and the time constraints under which Army leaders presumed they were operating. The Regular Army in April 1917 numbered only 133,000 men and 5800 officers. The National Guard consisted of 67,000 men and 3200 officers. When those puny figures are measured against the prodigious quantities of cannon fodder the war was consuming—Sir Douglas Haig’s British Expeditionary Force suffered 60,000 casualties alone on the first day of the Battle of the Somme in July 1916—it is little wonder that virtually no one believed the United States could muster sufficient trained soldiers to have an impact on the Western Front prior to 1919.1 Assistant Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss wrote on 31 March 1917 that "the war must last practically two years longer before we can have other than naval and economic participation."4

By 11 November 1918, the enlisted strengths of the Regular Army and National Guard had swelled to 527,000 and 382,000 respectively, while the National Army, a wholly new component numbering three million, had been fielded. The officer strength of these three components stood at about 200,000.
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Of this four million total, over half served in the 42 combat divisions and support units of the AEF. Twenty-nine divisions and nearly 1.4 million soldiers saw combat. This astounding expansion occurred in just 19 months!

Yet numbers do not tell the entire story; the US Army was qualitatively inferior as well. Maneuver divisions had been created on paper by Leonard Wood in 1912, and while several served in the 1916 Mexican Punitive Expedition, they were not employed as such. Experience in leading and training larger units (division and higher) had passed out of the Army's consciousness since the Civil War. The Army had not even developed contingency plans for putting together a large force for participation in the World War, having been forbidden to do so by President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, both visionaries who believed a nation could remain aloof from war by refusing to prepare for it. The Western Front meant trained divisions, corps, field armies, and army groups, while the US Army still thought in terms of detachments, troops, squadrons, and regiments, even as it hastily mobilized larger units.

Thus, no matter how much the Army redressed its quantitative inferiority, the fundamental issue would remain the qualitative edge the AEF would display, not only over its German adversaries but also relative to its British and French counterparts. President Woodrow Wilson would be able to speak with authority at the peace table only if his Army had earned for him that right. Wilson's advisor, Herbert Hoover, acknowledged this fact in February 1917: "Our terms of peace will probably run counter to most of the European proposals and our weight in the accomplishment of our ideals will be greatly in proportion to the strength which we can throw into the scale."

Pershing himself echoed this thesis, writing to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker on 17 January 1918:

We must look forward to bearing a very heavy part in this conflict before it ends, and our forces should not be dissipated for a temporary emergency. Moreover, it is unnecessary to say, when the war ends, our position will be stronger if our army acting as such shall have played a distinct and definite part.

Such a position would not accrue to Wilson unless his Army indeed made a "distinct and definite" contribution to the victory. Authority would be
conceded by the Allies only if they perceived that the AEF was a highly trained military instrument without which the war might have ended in stalemate or defeat.

**Tactical Doctrine**

Turning first to the issue of tactical doctrine, it is generally agreed that doctrine, the accepted body of ideas governing the conduct of warfare, is the underlying basis of effective military training. In the business of war, where success depends upon harmonious action, all components of an army must sing from the same sheet of music.

In the case of the AEF, however, its tactical doctrine was ambivalent—ambivalence being defined as uncertainty or fluctuation, especially when caused by inability to make a choice or by a simultaneous desire to say or do two opposite things. The tactical doctrine of the AEF was fraught with such ambivalencies, thus failing to provide a sound basis for the training and subsequent combat performance of the AEF.

The basic ambivalence in the AEF’s tactical doctrine ensued from the fact that while Pershing professed a doctrine of open warfare, a bent for fluid movement decidedly at odds with the reality of the Western Front, he and the War Department in practice prepared an Army whose fundamental capability lay in inflicting casualties on the Germans in a static, grinding war of attrition.

It was just such ambivalence that confused Pershing’s subordinate commanders as they sought to train their units for combat. The AEF’s best corps commander, Major General Hunter Liggett, was prompted by this ambivalence to prepare a memorandum outlining his ideas on a tactical doctrine of “open warfare” that would permit his units “to train upon some practical line.” Liggett added the frustrating comment: “I can find nothing in the mass of literature I have received which teaches this, to me, essential question.”

Regarding this contradiction between Pershing’s stated preference for the tactics of open warfare, on one hand, and his design of an Army more suitable for sustained slugging, on the other, it is interesting to ask why Pershing did not admit to the reality that the Great War was one of attrition and train accordingly. Or why he did not, if he believed that a unique American tactical solution was necessary, define a tactical methodology in closer harmony with the nature of the war as he saw it. This is what the Germans had done in developing their infiltration assault tactics for 1918.

A partial answer may be that Pershing’s hidebound insistence on preparing his Army for open warfare had something to do with the “amalgamation controversy,” that political-military debate in which he strenuously fought off repeated Allied requests to employ AEF soldiers as individual

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fillers for their own depleted units. One of the arguments Pershing employed to keep these wolves at bay was his claim that the AEF must remain intact so as to be able to employ its unique tactical solution to the stalemate of the trenches. Having made such a case for open warfare, however, Pershing had boxed himself into a corner. To admit that he was wrong, and that the AEF would have to adopt some other tactical methodology such as attrition, would undercut his argument against amalgamation of US forces. He had to remain insistent that open warfare was the key to success, but in doing so he prevented himself from making an honest reassessment of the tactical problem, leaving his commanders without a sanctioned basis for teaching the attrition methodology they would in fact employ.

**Equipment and Personnel**

The next factor affecting training of the AEF was the issue of managing the personnel and material assets from which it was being formed. One can appreciate the difficulties faced in raising, equipping, and training such a large force in the short span of 19 months. Equipment difficulties were a particularly onerous burden on commanders as they tried to train. More burdensome, and for the most part self-inflicted, was the turbulence created by the War Department’s and Pershing’s personnel policies.

So far at least as equipment goes, there is conclusive evidence that America was unprepared for entry into World War I. Army inventories in April 1917 counted 587,000 Model 1903 Springfield rifles and 200,000 obsolete Krag-Jorgensens. Some American plants had been manufacturing Enfield rifles for the British, and when those contracts were satisfied the production lines were modified to produce a hybrid Enfield, the Pattern 17, capable of firing the American .30-06 cartridge. Production of Springfields was increased, but plants could manufacture only 1000 of these weapons per day at peak effort. With the bulk of the Springfields and Pattern 17s going to France to arm the AEF, divisions at home were left to train with the Krag-Jorgensens, Canadian Ross rifles, and some Russian Moisin-Nagant models.

These and other equipment and ammunition shortages hampered effective individual and unit training well into 1918. Recruits assigned to the 82d Division as late as October 1917 “were given 4-inch boards and told to cut out a rifle for learning the manual of arms.” A Stokes mortar platoon in the 82d never saw a Stokes mortar until it reached France. Machine gun training was likewise difficult to conduct. Some gunners never fired more than a few dozen rounds in the United States, and one soldier assigned to the 360th Machine Gun Company of the 90th Division, who had been with the division for some two months of training before the unit sailed in June 1918, “never saw a machine gun until a few weeks before going to the front in [the] St. Mihiel Drive.”
The official history of the 28th Division contains a record of that division’s equipment status all too typical of the conditions plaguing the Army:

Rifles, automatic rifles, trench mortars, 37, 57, 155mm guns used in combat were not secured until the division reached France. We had only one bayonet for every third man, which meant changing for drill. For several months we used improvised wooden guns for machine gun work. The one 37mm gun in camp was a novelty. The division had but a few gas masks, which made training slow and difficult. Of greater damage to effective training were personnel and organizational policies adopted by the War Department and by Pershing in France. The War Department at first relied upon volunteers for manpower, but soon adopted conscription. In September 1917, the first 297,000 draftees were inducted. The monthly flow continued at an uneven pace from then on, peaking at 401,000 in July 1918. In all, 2.8 million were conscripted. Two options existed to organize the draftees and volunteers into cohesive units. Divisions could be activated as men were available to fill

Yanks pose with wooden “machine guns” and a mock mortar. With weapons in short supply, necessity was the mother of inventive training tools.

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them. Or a number of divisions could be organized at skeleton strength, and then filled partially each month as the levy of inductees was parcelled out among them. The War Department opted for the latter course, and the effect on divisional cohesion was shattering. As divisions at reduced strength trained to certain levels of proficiency, these units would receive fresh groups of draftees. There were no basic and advanced individual training centers; recruits in large numbers were sent directly to their units of assignment. Unit training was put on hold as new recruits were absorbed and trained. At some point the interrupted unit training would resume, but no two units within a division would ever be on the same schedule.

This chaotic policy was compounded by the rigid embarkation schedules for shipping the divisions to France. As a division reached its place on the sailing list, if not already at full strength, it would receive either a fresh influx of draftees and volunteers or else wholesale reassignments of large groups of personnel from another division lower on the sailing list. In the latter case, serious damage to the cohesiveness of not just one division but two was thus inevitable. Moreover, the need to activate specialty units resulted in depriving previously trained units of large slices of personnel. The 82d Division on one occasion lost 3000 men who had been trained for three months as infantry to fill newly activated support units. Infantry companies of the 78th Division averaged 175 men in November 1917. By January 1918, these units could muster only 50 men daily, and by 1 April the entire division was at less than 50 percent strength. But the 78th Division sailed for France in June 1918 with its full complement of 28,000 soldiers.

Pershing in his memoirs commented acidly on the damage done to training by these War Department policies:

Divisions of 25,000 men, which should have been held intact, and each one perfected as an organized team, were constantly called upon to send large groups of their soldiers to other duties. The numbers taken aggregated from 15,000 to 40,000 men for each division. As green men were substituted ... training had to be practically started all over again with each reduction. ... All this was discouraging to their officers, disastrous to morale, threw upon the AEF an extra burden of training, and resulted in our having a number of divisions only partially trained when the time came to use them.

This criticism was, of course, justified, but for Pershing to be the critic was akin to the pig calling the sow a swine. Pershing himself must be censured for personnel policies that hindered training. Early on, he established a policy that each corps of the AEF would consist of six divisions, four to serve as combat units and two as replacement and training divisions. But the case of Major General William G. Haan’s 32d Division, a replacement and training division, illustrates the deleterious effects of this policy.
The 32d had arrived in France in February 1918, and immediately was broken up as fillers for other divisions and as laborers for the Services of Supply. In response to the German offensives in March, Haan was abruptly informed on the 31st that his regiments were being returned to him from Supply duty and that the 32d was shortly to enter the line. Haan wrote in his diary:

The division has been torn to pieces by the SOS and replacements. . . . And suddenly it is to be made ready for the front line. . . . The division now has: no artillery, no engineers, shortage in signal troops, shortage in machine gun troops, shortage in officers. For proper training there should be artillery and engineers present.

Of such personnel policies and equipment shortfalls, efficient combat units are not made.

Training Philosophies

The third and final factor that hampered the training of the AEF was the training philosophies adopted by both Pershing and the War Department. The manner in which training programs were organized and managed in France and the United States significantly hindered the speedy and effective molding of the AEF into a cohesive military force.

Early on, Pershing had worked a deal with the War Department regarding training policies. Because of the short time available to train them before they embarked, Pershing accepted responsibility for the complete training of the first four American divisions to arrive in France, the 1st and 2d Divisions of the Regular Army and the 26th and 42d National Guard Divisions. The divisions to arrive later presumably would receive some training at home, and to avoid duplication of effort Pershing suggested a division of responsibility. He would train the first four divisions in both trench and open warfare. The War Department would train all subsequent divisions in open warfare, and Pershing would complete their instruction in trench warfare when they arrived in France.

The central theme of training in France was to be the professionalization of the division through the progressive molding of its integral parts into a cohesive team. The divisional training programs devised by Pershing's staff were based on a three-phase, three-month plan spelling out in meticulous detail all aspects of the training an AEF division was to undergo. Phase one was devoted to the "acclimatization and instruction of small units from battalions down." The objective of phase two was the "hardening of the officers and men to all sorts of fire," to be accomplished by inserting the division into the line one company at a time alongside a French or British unit. In addition, American regimental, brigade, and division staffs were to be satellited on corresponding
Pershing's elaborate divisional training plans and the AEF schools worked at cross purposes.

Allied staffs to observe staff procedures. During phase three, the division as a whole was to be drawn together to conduct division-level training. 27

These well-intentioned unit training plans were gutted in practice by the elaborate system of specialty schools established under Pershing's direction. There were to be 13 army-level schools, their mission being to train officer specialists to serve in division and corps units, and to prepare officers for duties as instructors at corps-level schools. As each corps of the AEF was activated, it in turn was to establish nine schools, their mission being to train unit replacements and unit commanders. 28 And then there were the division schools. A system of division schools, to train a core of experts who would go forth to instruct the various elements of the divisions and provide the cadre to staff the army- and corps-level schools, was recommended to Pershing in July 1917. 29

While the establishment of these division schools was never mandated by Pershing, they were created in most of the divisions of the AEF nonetheless.

Why were such elaborate divisional training plans and schools developed, and what damage was done thereby? Pershing's "Uptonian pessimism" may have been the predominant motivation. Emory Upton, a post-Civil War critic of American military policy, believed that it took years to train an effective soldier, and that to throw a lesser-trained individual into combat was nothing less than criminal. Pershing and many officers of his generation subscribed to this exaggerated ideal, with many holding two years as the time necessary to turn a citizen-recruit into a finished soldier. Pershing recognized that he might not have two years to prepare his Army. Still, he refused to commit any of his forces to the line until he adjudged the whole to be fully ready to be formed into an independent American Army. He would take the necessary time to hone both his individual soldiers and his units to a razor's edge. 30 But his elaborate divisional training plans and the AEF schools worked at cross purposes.

Pershing's school system required cadre. Sometimes these were the best officers and NCOs, who were dragooned out of the divisions. In other cases, unit commanders would use levies for officers and NCOs to be sent to the army, corps, and division schools as opportunities to rid themselves of their troublemakers and poorest performers. 31 The resultant damage to unit training is apparent in either case. Further, units continuously had to send other officers and NCOs to the schools as students. The training of such units proceeded, leaderless. George C. Marshall noted that his 1st Division had to
organize a corps school at Gondrecourt, had to furnish both the officer and enlisted cadre to staff the school, and then had to supply the officer students who would attend the school. “This nearly exhausted the supply” of officers, he wrote, “and most of the companies had only one officer for duty.”

There were critics of Pershing’s Uptonian training program. Robert L. Bullard, as a colonel in command of a brigade in the 1st Division, noted: “The division Commander and many of his officers seemed to regard [Pershing’s training plan] as a puerility, a fad of schoolmen; very troublesome and irritating at a time when everybody was getting ready to fight.” Later, in January 1918, from his new position as commander of the 1st, Bullard wrote to James G. Harbord, Pershing’s Chief of Staff, that “the evident, patent need is not so much to be told or shown how to do but actually the doing ourselves. Great quantities of the best French and English experience have been translated and tell us how to do things . . . what we need is to do them ourselves.” Then there was Army Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, who noted: “The practical effect of the Pershing policy was that large bodies of American troops, divisions whose morale was at the highest point . . . found the keen edge of their enthusiasm dulled by having to go over again and again drills and training which they had already undergone in America.”

Pershing heard these criticisms directly from Secretary of War Newton Baker. Writing the AEF commander in July 1918, Baker stated his belief that in peacetime, extended training was desirable. But not so during wartime, since the impetus provided by proximate combat makes troops eager to learn, thereby shortening the training time required. Baker warned further that when troops were kept too long in training, their enthusiasm to learn was dulled.

Efficient and rapid unit training likewise suffered in the United States, but for different reasons. Whereas in France deficiencies stemmed from the practical effects of the establishment of the AEF system of schools and from Pershing’s Uptonian complex, the inefficient training of combat divisions at home resulted from the system established by the War Department itself.

Theoretically, the Army Chief of Staff was responsible for the direction of the training of the divisions in the United States. But during America’s involvement in the war, four different officers served as Chief of Staff for eight different periods. Hugh L. Scott served from April 1917 until he went to Russia on a fact-finding mission in May; Tasker Bliss was acting Chief until Scott’s return in August; Scott retired in September and Bliss became Chief, but he went off to Europe in the fall, whereupon John Biddle became acting Chief. Bliss returned for a brief period in December 1917, but was soon sent back to Europe as US Military Representative to the Supreme War Council. Biddle acted as Chief once again, until Peyton March’s appointment in March 1918. This game of musical Chiefs did not make for effective supervision of anything, let alone training, in the crucial early months of America’s involvement.
General Pershing was critical of the damage done to training by War Department policies, but, in the author’s judgment, “Pershing himself must be censured for personnel policies that hindered training.”

A War Department Director of Training, subordinate directly to the Chief of Staff, was appointed on 23 November 1917 to monitor and direct Army training in the United States, but this officer’s performance suffered because of the lack of direction and authority from above, at least until Peyton March took over. To compound the supervisory problem further, the Director of Training also served as the Chief of the Training Committee of the War College (later War Plans) Division of the General Staff. He thus served two masters, reporting to both the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War College (War Plans) Division.38

The real movers and shakers in training were the War Department bureau and branch chiefs. They, given the lack of opposition from a strong and stable Chief of Staff and Director of Training, had assumed responsibility for directing the training of units associated with their bureau and branch specialties. This ad hoc policy was given official sanction with the reorganization of the General Staff on 9 February 1918. In practice, the integrated training of divisions under the direction of division commanders could begin only when the bureau and branch chiefs were satisfied that the specialized units of the division were thoroughly versed in their respective roles. This philosophy of training was known as the “factory system.”39

One agency of the War Department recognized the consequences. The Army Inspector General received a memorandum on 31 July 1918 titled...
“Training of Troops in Camp in This Country,” written by Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Humber of the Inspector General’s office. Humber stated bluntly that, after personally conducting many inspections of units in training in the United States and after reviewing the reports of training inspections submitted by other inspectors general, “the results of the training . . . conducted have not been commensurate with the time and energy expended.” The reason for this wasted effort, Humber argued, was the “faulty system” that had been adopted by the War Department. This system emphasized the training of individual specialists and of specialty units first. So much stress was placed on the training of the exclusive parts of the division that these parts rarely were allowed to join together and become whole. This system of training explains Pershing’s oft-stated criticism that the divisions he received from the United States were not fully trained as cohesive units.

Humber’s criticisms were passed through the Director of the War Plans Division, General Lytle Brown, for comment before they were presented to the Chief of Staff. Brown, in defense of the system for which his staff section had proponency, concluded that all was well with the training management system as it existed. He responded to several minor points in the Humber memorandum, but ignored Humber’s central argument that the War Department philosophy of training specialists should be reversed. “It is believed that no further action is necessary,” he wrote.

Why did the War Department adopt and stick with the factory system to the detriment of the training of the combat division as a whole? I would argue that it was because officers of the War Department staff and agencies could not break free from the grasp of their own experience. Their own military heritage had consigned them throughout the bulk of their careers to small units on frontier posts operating under leisurely circumstances. Time aplenty was available for training individuals and small groups. When they were required abruptly to increase the scope and pace of their efforts by a hundredfold, they had neither the frame of reference nor the vision to do so.

Forced to train a mass citizen Army, these officers touted their own individual specialties as all-important and jealously guarded their prerogatives. Without the proximity of combat in France to force them to expand their views, these officers created the only system of training that would permit the perpetuation of their satrapies. From the myopic development and supervision of specialty training programs by War Department branch and bureau chiefs, to the inability of the War Department to halt the disruptions of divisional training occasioned by the wholesale dragooning of soldiers for specialty instruction, Army training managers in the United States could never bring themselves to subordinate their branch or bureau interests to the good of the Army as a whole. So long as this small-unit mentality prevailed, senior Army training managers in the United States could not embrace, except in rhetoric,
the necessity for the training of divisions in the harmonious employment of all the assets they possessed.

**Drawing Conclusions**

What then may we conclude from this examination of the training of the American Army in World War I? I would argue that the record is one of an Army not well prepared for the nature of the war it faced on the Western Front. Partially schooled in trench warfare and in an ill-defined doctrine of open warfare, but well trained in neither; grounded in the special techniques of its individual functions, but unable to perform in concert as a well-oiled machine; and in most cases unsure whether to look forward or backward for solutions to its problems—the AEF plodded forward. As George C. Marshall later concluded in a general assessment of the combat capabilities of the AEF:

[It was] difficult to carry out any operation exactly according to Hoyle, because of the limited amount of training and complete lack of experience on the part of the men and the young officers, and the frequent lack of material and other means which, theoretically, were supposed to be available.\(^4\)

In having to grope its way to victory, the AEF succeeded not because of imaginative operations and tactics nor because of qualitative superiority in open warfare, but rather by smothering German machine guns with American flesh. Tragically, with the AEF being likewise ill-schooled in the operations and tactics of an attritional war of position, even that smothering effect was of lesser impact than it could have been and needed to be if America was to claim a preponderant share of the Allied victory.

Regrettably, but predictably, the attitude of Allied leaders regarding the professionalism and performance of the AEF was negative. While these leaders jealously coveted American soldiers as individual fillers for their own depleted units, they nonetheless consistently criticized American military training as woefully inadequate. Haig wrote in May 1918: “It is ridiculous to think such an Army could function unaided in less than two years time.”\(^4\) The French echoed this sentiment: “To sum up, the state of instruction in the United States

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is not brilliant in spite of the efforts made during the last 8 months to improve it. These perceptions prompted Haig and French generals Ferdinand Foch and Henri Pétain to issue the following joint assessment at the 30 January 1918 session of the Supreme War Council: “American arms, if taken as an autonomous unit, could not be counted on for effective aid during the present year.”

Worse, these Allied assessments of the AEF became even more negative in the succeeding ten months of the war. Haig noted in his diary, after a 21 May 1918 visit to the 153d Brigade of the AEF 77th Division, that its brigade commander “begged me to leave my officers and NCOs (who were helping his troops) because it would be little short of murder to send his men into the trenches in their present ignorant state without them!” British Prime Minister David Lloyd George deplored the slow pace at which the AEF was committed to battle. Great Britain, he argued, had sent more than 650,000 troops into battle after nine months of war, while giant America could muster a mere 175,000 on the Western Front after a similar duration. The AEF had to make an effective contribution to the effort as soon as possible “to avoid a disastrous setback to the Allied Armies.”

French Premier Georges Clemenceau’s criticisms of the AEF were even more impassioned. Viewing what he interpreted as mass confusion in the rear areas of the AEF during the opening days of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, Clemenceau was appalled to the point of demanding that Foch, the Allied generalissimo, relieve Pershing of command of the AEF!

It remained for Sir Douglas Haig to provide the capstone Allied impressions of the AEF in battle. On 19 October 1918, he noted in his diary: “American Army: is not yet organized; it is ill-equipped, half-trained, with insufficient supply services. Experienced officers and NCOs are lacking.” And on 25 October 1918, with the Germans on the run, at a conference of the Allied military chiefs called by Foch to consider the terms of a possible armistice, Haig argued that the AEF “was not yet organized, not yet formed, and had suffered a great deal on account of its ignorance of modern warfare . . . [and] cannot be counted on for much.”

Allied leaders went to the Paris Peace Conference well cognizant of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which were premised on the idea of a “peace of moderation and righteousness.” But these were leaders who thought of the victorious outcomes of wars in other ways, through the Old World vision of national interests and of terms dictated to the vanquished. And among the members of this victorious coalition, it was to be “major powers . . . [who] arrogated to themselves the right to settle all basic territorial, military, economic, and political issues. . . . The secondary and minor powers were cast in the role of suitors, supplicants, or satellites.” What distinguished a coalition partner’s claims to major power status and the right to dictate terms of peace in the Old World vision was, as Herbert Hoover had suggested in February 1917,
the perceived contribution of that partner's military forces to winning the war. Wilson's ill-trained Army, in the view of his coalition associates, had not earned for America that status.

In the absence of an acknowledged instrument of victory, Wilson's calls for a "peace without victory" fell on unhearing ears. The AEF, because its leadership did not prepare it effectively for the war upon which it was embarking, failed to serve as an effective instrument of its nation's policy.

NOTES


10. Ibid., p. 74.


17. Vaux Papers, 90th Division File, Carlisle Project.


21. Ibid.


24. Haan Diary, pp. 76-88, 32d Division File, Box 2, Carlisle Project.

25. Ibid., pp. 94-95.

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26. Pershing Cable 228-S, 19 October 1917; War Department Cable 352-R, 2 November 1917; Pershing Cable 348-S, 7 December 1917; all quoted in USAIWW, XIV, 316-318. Memorandum for the Adjutant General, Subject: Training, 17 December 1917, National Archives, Records Group 165, Entry 754-63.


31. II Corps Schools Final Report, quoted in USAIWW, XIV, 400-02.


34. Letter, Bullard to Harbord, 1 January 1918, no subject. National Archives, Records Group 120, Entry 268, File 1019.


37. Ibid., pp. 378-79.

38. War Department, War College Division Cable 639-174, 23 November 1917. Subject: Training, quoted in the printed diary of Major General William G. Haan, Haan Papers, 32d Division Box 2, Carlisle Project.

39. Much evidence exists on the training of the subordinate specialties of US Army divisions at the expense of the training of the division as a whole. See "Report of the Baker Board," quoted in USAIWW, I, 55-89; War Department Document No. 656, Infantry Training (Washington: GPO, 27 August 1917); Memorandum, Director of Training to Chief of Staff, 22 December 1917, Subject: Organization and Training of Replacement Troops, National Archives, Records Group 165, Entry 10173-43; Pershing, II, 114-15; Pershing Cables 1342-S (19 June 1918), 1357-S (19 June 1918), and 1482-S (18 July 1918), quoted in USAIWW, XIV, 323-25. On the reorganization of the General Staff, giving responsibility for training to the bureau and branch chiefs, see Miller, "Development . . . Revolutionary War to 1920," 1-16, 17. For reference to the factory system of conducting divisional training by specialty as directed by the bureau and branch chiefs, see Memorandum, Director, War Plans Division to Chief of Staff, October 1918, Subject: Proposed Schedule for New Divisions, with comment by Colonel R. D. Black, General Staff, National Archives, Records Group 165, Entry 7431-77.


41. Memorandum, Director, War Plans Division to Chief of Staff, 7 September 1918, Subject: Memorandum of Inspectors, National Archives, Records Group 165, Entry 7431-71.

42. Marshall, p. 122.


44. See Coffman, p. 136, for French assessment of training the AEF 1st Division. For quotation on overall assessment of training in the United States, see Report, French GHQ, 1 January 1918, Subject: State of American Army on January 1, 1918, as quoted in USAIWW, III, 256-57. See also memorandum, 3d Section, GS, GHQ, French Armies of the North and Northeast, 8 January 1918, as quoted in USAIWW, II, 151.


46. Blake, p. 311.


49. Blake, p. 333.


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