Americans are at a crossroads in history similar to the one we faced in the middle of this century. The Allied victory in World War II transformed the international system, and leaders recognized that there could be no return to traditional policies. Economic devastation and political instability in Europe, conflict in China, the advent of nuclear weapons—all posed immediate and long-term threats to the well-being of the United States and her allies. President Truman recognized the nature of the changes in his 1949 inaugural address: "Each period of our national history has its special challenges. Those that confront us now are as momentous as any in the past. Today marks the beginning of a period that will be eventful, perhaps decisive, for us and the world."

President Truman and others created a national strategy of containment. However, it is the process of defining and carrying out a successful strategy, rather than the strategy itself, that is instructive. For while we now look back on containment as an obvious choice, nothing was guaranteed: not the strategy itself, not the instruments through which it was carried out, and certainly not its success.

The military requirements to execute containment were, in the simplest terms, large standing military forces, nuclear and conventional. By the end of the Cold War, the Army had more than four divisions based in Europe, 11 more in the continental United States ready to reinforce rapidly, and a large reserve establishment. But that snapshot from the end of the Cold War is far different from what we understood the requirements to be at its beginning. The need for a large, well-trained, standing Army was driven home by North Korea's attack in 1950; until then many were uncertain that we still needed such forces. Our commitment to NATO began as a temporary measure, eventually evolving into a robust defensive capability. And while preventing Soviet domination of Europe was the predominant Cold War focus, between 1945 and 1989 the Army added 29 battle streamers to its flag—none of them for action in Europe.
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Throughout the Cold War, as our ability to counter the Soviet threat evolved, the nation and the Army met a variety of other threats—wars in Korea and Vietnam, and other missions of strategic importance but of lesser magnitude. If we learn anything from our Cold War experience it is that the Army must be able to fight and win a conventional war while remaining supple enough to adapt to other challenges. In the years to come, as in the past, we undoubtedly will be called upon to protect national interests in other places than those we now anticipate.

The uncertainty of the international environment makes the Army's task doubly difficult. Containment has given way to a national strategy of "enlargement," aimed at promoting the ideals of democracy and free-market economies. Military forces to support that strategy must be prepared to conduct a wide range of missions. Enlargement requires having an Army ready to fight and win major regional conflicts, as well as preparing and providing forces for a variety of operations other than war. The headlines told the story of our soldiers in Somalia, but there have been many more stories less commonly known. Skopje, Macedonia: 500 soldiers are helping to enforce the embargo against Serbia. The Sinai: 1000 soldiers stand watch as part of the Multinational Force and Observers. Incirlik, Turkey: Operation Provide Comfort II continues to deliver aid to Kurdish refugees. Throughout 1993, on an average day 20,000 US Army soldiers were deployed on operational missions in more than 60 countries. That number is in addition to the 125,000 soldiers stationed forward in Europe, Korea, Panama, and elsewhere.

The national strategy of enlargement requires a different kind of Army from the one we built for containment. It is a smaller Army to be sure—more than 30 percent smaller by the end of 1994—and it is an Army structured and trained to perform under a new set of conditions. The Army is shedding its Cold

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War overhead; we seek to understand and adapt to the post-Cold War world. We understand the difficulties of ethnic conflict and peace operations. We understand as well the need to be ready to fight and win two major regional conflicts. Most important, we understand that we cannot meet either of these challenges at the expense of our ability to respond to the other. We cannot consume our equipment or human capital in operations today and ignore investments that prepare us for future contingencies. We cannot optimize the force for peace operations at the expense of our ability to fight and win a war. We must raise and sustain a force capable of success at both missions. We must meet the challenges of peace.

Ethnic Conflict

One need not be a constant observer of foreign affairs to realize that a salient aspect of the post-Cold War era has been the rise of ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict is certainly not a new phenomenon. But the end of superpower confrontation, combined with the increased integration of the international system in both communications and commerce, has increased the significance of geographically limited conflicts between narrowly defined groups. For nearly two years, conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia have held the attention of citizens and diplomats alike as the United States supports United Nations initiatives in both regions.

The increased importance of ethnic conflict poses special conditions for strategists and for the use of military force. The origins of each dispute and the motivation of the combatants give each of these conflicts a special, if not unique, character. One school of thought identifies opposing cultures as a significant cause of such conflicts. Professor Samuel Huntington proposed that the paradigm to replace the Cold War would be a “clash of civilizations,” a view that identifies conflict as a product of divergent religious, cultural, and ethnic interests. Huntington suggests that incompatible views, combined with the increased contact between differing civilizations in the modern age, will be the source of conflict in the coming decades.

Other writers and analysts also view culture as a significant factor in group mobilization for conflict. In Balkan Ghosts, Robert Kaplan gives a vivid description of the centuries-old animosities that underlie the modern conflict in Bosnia. A study of the political mobilization of the Shi’a in Lebanon argues that their development as a political and military force was culturally based. A variety of observers of the Shining Path guerrillas stress that group’s roots in the Indian culture of Peru.

Still others argue that these same conflicts are better understood as rational responses to disintegrating state structures and related social and economic conditions. They suggest that problems arising from the disintegration of the Soviet empire or nations in Africa should be understood in terms of the basic economic needs of the populations. In this view, current conflicts in Bosnia and
"The increased importance of ethnic conflict poses special conditions for strategists and for the use of military force."

in various African nations, and potential problems within and among nations of the former Soviet Union, are the result of economic disruption and the uncertain security of the new state structures. These relatively rational concerns have little to do with ethnicity or culture. The root of conflict is the desire for security and economic well-being, not historic animosities or cultural differences.

Soldiers should understand this debate, but need not take sides in it. Each perspective provides valuable insights to the problems that the Army could face in such conflicts; each case presents comparable conditions that we must prepare to confront.

First, we can expect these conflicts to be localized in nature and to have unique contextual features. Whether the conflict is a "clash of civilizations" or cultural groups competing for territorial or economic advantage, the result is the same. The leaders of the competing groups will be pursuing relatively well-defined aims within a specific, often small geographic area. As the conflict continues, the groups play to cultural themes unique to those groups and regions. Peru, Somalia, Lebanon, Bosnia—each case is geographically limited, and each case has a different cultural context.

Second, the nature and scope of each conflict and the motives of the combatants indicate that decisions on the use of force in these conflicts will have significant political dimensions. Destruction of an opposing army generally will not resolve them. And if these disputes are not to be settled through mass migration, we can expect long-term solutions to be found primarily through political, not military, means. Military means may well be required to assist in the resolution of these conflicts, but we should expect the use of force to be tightly linked and coordinated with other forms of national power.

Finally, these conflicts will likely be attended to by a number of external actors. If Huntington is correct, local struggles will likely receive political and material support from members of the relevant "civilization" around the world. Even if we are not witnessing a clash of civilizations, it is clear from the examples of Bosnia and Somalia that localized conflicts engage an array of governmental and nongovernmental actors; a variety of nations, international organizations, and religious and ethnic groups have become significantly involved in both. The Cold War tended to produce a bifurcation...
of interests with respect to localized conflicts; the current international system permits many interests to surface simultaneously, all of which will affect how our soldiers, if committed, will carry out their missions.

**Issues for the United States**

Conflicts with these characteristics are significantly different from wars between nation-states. Our friends and foes may not be immediately apparent, and moral interests in the resolution of a conflict may be more important than defeating a clearly defined enemy force.

The expressions of surprise from some quarters that we would use military force in support of humanitarian goals ignore our history. The debate between our faithful adherence to moral principles and the pragmatic pursuit of national interests is hardly a new one. The dilemma, articulated so clearly in the Federalist Papers, precedes the founding of the Republic. The central question is how to reconcile a concern for moral principles with the imperatives of national power in order to create a meaningful policy that is understood and supported by the American people.

The tension between the moral and the practical is evident today. Citizens of the United States and many other nations are shocked by starvation, murder, and mayhem in various parts of the world. There is not an easy solution to be found, but the US Army accepts the linkage of moral and practical interests as a given. We cannot ignore the potential to deploy the Army to achieve humanitarian goals, but we also cannot ignore the reality that such a use of force may not be peaceful in the sense that we would like it to be. Support of humanitarian goals is part of our past, our present, and undoubtedly our future. The prospect for the future is that we will continue to be presented with hard choices, since we cannot do it all.

These matters point out the need for thoughtful examination of ways to respond to a policy of enlargement of democracy. New democracies are generally challenged to develop democratic institutions within their own cultural and historical contexts, to develop the role of their army in a democracy, and to define the rights of minorities. While some predominantly homogeneous nations exist—Japan and Korea come to mind—by and large the world is not geographically divided into exclusive, self-governing ethnic, cultural, religious, or economic blocs. And unless the international community is willing to accept forced migrations and ethnic cleansings, it cannot use ethnic homogeneity as an organizing principle—minorities will exist and governing structures must account for them.

It took six years for us to get from Lexington to Yorktown, and then six more to forge the set of political compromises embodied in our Constitution. More than half a century later, we fought a bitter internal war. We should not expect other nations to find it appreciably easier to devise accommodating political structures, nor should we expect the solutions embodied in our
version of democracy to be applicable in different cultural contexts. The political task at hand is to foster democratic governing structures that permit ethnically heterogeneous states to function. Our solution is federalism; we need to learn and understand what relationships will work in other cultures.

The Army should not take the lead in organizing or supporting the formation of democratic institutions in other nations. But the Army does have unique capabilities that have been used through the years to support their development. The military obviously can provide security; it reflects our purpose for existing. But our fighting forces also can provide medical treatment; build roads, buildings, and ports; and deliver a variety of supplies, to name but a few tasks. Perhaps most important is the Army’s ability to deploy a command, control, and communications structure to support civilian agencies more directly involved with the local national government. Nation-building is not an Army issue, but the Army is prepared to support those agencies of the government which are directly concerned with that task.

Issues for the Army

As we learn about ethnic conflict we should keep in mind that this phenomenon is not a new one for the United States or the Army. We have taken a number of different approaches to ethnic conflict in the past that help us understand what the Army might be called upon to do in the future. None of the three types of military responses that have been tried is universally applicable and all such responses have to be adapted to the task at hand.

First, we can send observers, or a lightly armed interposition contingent. This type of response works only if all parties to the dispute agree to stop fighting. In the Sinai, our Multinational Force and Observer battalion task force, in concert with similar units from Fiji and Colombia, stands between Egypt and Israel. There the concept has worked well. A similar United Nations mission in Lebanon to separate Israel and Syria has not worked well at all—same part of the world, similar antagonists, but different outcomes. Interposing light forces between antagonists is an effective confidence-building measure that can permit a peace process to move forward. It is not a technique that can impose peace on unwilling antagonists.

Second, we can deploy forces to contain conflict. Some call this the forest-fire approach: try to curb the spread of the conflagration and let it burn out. This method has been tried with some success on the fringes of the former Yugoslavia. We have about 500 American soldiers in Skopje, Macedonia, carrying out this kind of mission today. Containment is useful and serves a specific purpose, but it is a passive, defensive activity. Containment of this sort may be sufficient to protect US interests in some cases, but it will not resolve a conflict, nor does it help alleviate the human suffering inherent in conflict.

Third, we can deploy forces to impose peace through the forceful disarming of a hostile movement. We adopted this approach in December 1989
in Panama, with the support of the Panamanian population. When the Israelis tried it in 1982 in Lebanon, the local Arabs and Druze refused to be disarmed, and, indeed, spread their guerrilla resistance into Israel itself. Our own history reminds us that it is no easy task to defeat and disarm an aroused people.

Meeting the challenge of ethnic conflict requires more than a list of types of military operations. Both leaders and soldiers in these environments must be experts at their traditional skills but also must be adept at anticipating, reading, and reacting to the complex environment. Soldiers must be able to read the nuances of these situations. They must understand the nuances of changing military, political, economic, and cultural dimensions and have the agility to alter our military actions quickly in a dynamic environment. Meeting the challenge requires not necessarily new operations, but rather a new understanding of the specific conditions and environment of these conflicts.

For example, the concept of the objective is a traditional principle of war; given the nuances of ethnic conflict, our objective may well be defined in nontraditional ways. Destruction of the enemy army may or may not lead to success; there might not even be an army as we understand the term. Our military objective might well be defined in terms entirely different from a place on the ground or an enemy force. Skopje is not a key terrain objective in the narrow military sense of that term, but it is now one of many places where we find US forces. The military mission of those soldiers is to control their sector of the border, but their influence extends far beyond that mission or their presence in a particular geographic location.

Officers learning to prepare operations orders in the classrooms of our professional schools at Ft. Benning, Ft. Knox, or Ft. Leavenworth used to find the listing of friendly and enemy forces a fairly straightforward task. During the Cold War, the list was almost always composed of military units. But the antagonists in ethnic conflicts are not all in uniform, and the identification of probable opponents now is much more complicated. A few years ago, most soldiers would have had no idea what a nongovernmental organization was. Now squad and team leaders in the 10th Mountain Division regularly talk about “NGOs.” In fact, NGOs and newscasters have trained with us in our Combat Training Centers.

Understanding the nuances also means understanding the full significance of our actions. Destruction of the bridge at Mostar in Bosnia sent a message to all, but particularly to Muslims, whether engaged in the struggle or elsewhere in the world. US forces need to understand the import of their actions in the context of a specific environment—we need to understand what the bridges, or the monuments, or the buildings mean to the contending parties. We had very specific rules of engagement in Panama to protect certain structures. This detailed level of understanding will be the norm in future ethnic conflicts.
Most important, we must recognize that the use of force in ethnic conflicts is a policy decision that is subject to constant reassessment. This aspect of ethnic conflict is a reality that we must accommodate in our doctrine and training. In a simplistic view, decisions to use force follow a sequential relationship between the political and the military. First, national leaders decide the political objective, then we decide our military objective, and then the military commander applies force to achieve it. That model does not capture the reality of this type of conflict.

We must recognize that the application of force under these conditions may produce reactions that are not necessarily military in nature. Leaders of ethnic conflicts consciously appeal to the emotions of their followers and the rest of the world. Political objectives in such an environment can be as volatile as the emotions behind them. The local government and its leaders will react to those changes by repeatedly assessing political objectives and the military means appropriate to achieve them. Our own policymakers and military planners will do likewise. In situations where the actions of an infantry squad can have strategic importance, it is not unreasonable to assume that the use of the military will be modulated by policy considerations; our political decisionmaking processes and Army command structures must be able to establish and maintain tight policy control for as long as the operation is underway.

The Army is meeting new operational challenges by adjusting both its doctrine and its training. The June 1993 publication of our keystone doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, was a significant step in the Army’s adjustment to the post-Cold War environment. Our doctrine now includes substantive considerations of nuanced operations, including operations other than war, such as peace support, humanitarian assistance, and support to domestic civil authorities; it addresses the challenges of force projection; and it further develops the structure and planning considerations for joint and combined (multinational) operations.

We are putting theory into practice at our training centers. November 1993 saw the first exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center specifically
designed to train units in a scenario akin to ethnic conflict. In keeping with its intent to master peace support operations, the Army did not conduct this exercise alone. The simulated conflict area was dotted with soldiers, civilians, and representatives from the same nongovernmental organizations that we have seen in Somalia and Bosnia. Representatives from the International Red Cross, Save the Children, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, a United Nations Disaster Assistance Relief Team, CARE, World Vision, media representatives, and others all went to Ft. Polk, Louisiana. They went there to work with us, to simulate their roles in these kinds of operations, and to learn with us how we all can accomplish our missions as part of a team.

**Major Regional Conflicts**

The Army exists to fight and win the nation’s wars. That is a simple statement, but it is a task made particularly difficult by the inherent uncertainty of the future. While there are historical cases where nations and armies stand accused of total unpreparedness, the charge more often leveled is that the army prepared for the “wrong” war or the “last” war.

Historian Michael Howard predicts that we will almost certainly “get it wrong.” He said:

> I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives ... [It] is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.

Howard’s point is not that it is hopeless to prepare doctrine for a future war. Rather it is a recognition of the fact that the predictive certainty associated with the physical sciences is not a feature of the art of war. We cannot know with precision the character of our future enemy, the weapons he will possess, or the tactics he will employ; but that does not relieve us of the responsibility to prepare carefully for the future. That preparation cannot be for a single, predetermined threat, for our prediction of the character of that threat will, as Howard notes, certainly be at least partly wrong. Thus, we cannot optimize the force for a single threat. We must instead build a force with the capability to win in the most important contingencies, while retaining the versatility, flexibility, and residual force to win across the range of uncertainty inherent in our forecasts of the future.

The civilian and military leadership of the nation have been working hard to ensure that we do not get it too badly wrong. An important part of that effort is reflected in the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), whose illustrative scenario is certainly incorrect—as will be any attempt to predict future conflict and war. But the scenario of the BUR is sufficient to provide an intellectual foundation for planning a force structure that will help us to get it right when we must.
"The Army exists to fight and win the nation's wars — a task made particularly difficult by the inherent uncertainty of the future."

Through the process of the BUR, the Administration decided that "the United States must field forces sufficient to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts." We all hope, of course, that those conflicts never occur, but we cannot plan for national security on the basis of hope. Maintaining a force structure to fight and win those notional conflicts is strategically prudent. For the Army, being able to fight and win translates to a force of approximately one million soldiers, active, National Guard, and Army Reserve. It means maintaining a force capable of projecting power to any corner of the globe in a relatively short time. Intellectual and physical changes continue, with the goal of ensuring that the concept of a power projection Army becomes reality. This vision is producing an Army that is fundamentally different from the one with which we won the Cold War.

One measure of the magnitude of change the Army has undergone is the positioning of our forces. In 1989, 32 percent of the active Army was stationed in Europe; by the end of 1994 the number will be less than 16 percent, and by 1999 it will be under 14 percent. While the percentage of our soldiers permanently stationed forward has been decreasing, the number of soldiers deployed overseas on temporary operational missions has grown: we have seen a 300-percent increase in such missions since 1990. The Army is no longer forward-based, waiting near its battle positions for the outbreak of war—it is deploying forward and carrying out its missions every day.

The difference can be illustrated by comparing the life of a battalion commander in Europe in 1989 with the life of a battalion commander today. In 1989 that officer—and usually the rest of his division—was trained to defeat a single threat, an attack by Warsaw Pact forces that were located a few kilometers to the east. He had a plan with specific battle positions that he and his soldiers rehearsed at least monthly. To get to the fight, he planned to drive out the front gate of his garrison. His ammunition supply was permanently loaded on his vehicles, and he planned to resupply himself from specific points in Germany identified in his battle plan. That world began to change in November 1990 when the battalion commander found himself headed for Saudi Arabia.
A battalion commander today, wherever stationed, must be ready for a wide array of missions. In November 1993, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) simultaneously had battalions at the National Training Center in California, in Egypt on MFO duty, and in Somalia operating under the UN. That situation—a division simultaneously deploying units to a variety of locations—is common throughout the Army. The battalion commander and his peers in every Army division must train to fight and win, to succeed in many different situations. He or she must be ready to lead soldiers to success in any part of the world.

We cannot expect to have US forces present in any region at the start of a conflict; power projection, not forward basing, will be the model for future war. Historians may well point to Operation Just Cause in Panama as the moment when 20th-century, industrial-age warfare assumed the forms of warfare in the 21st century. Success in that operation required all the elements that will be essential to success in the future, elements that the armed forces are continuing to develop.

In Operation Just Cause, most units were deployed directly from the United States to military objectives in Panama. The operation was not preceded by a massive buildup of forces and logistical infrastructure in theater, as has been the case in most wars in our history. (Operation Desert Storm was marked by six months of preparation prior to combat.) In Just Cause, we moved forces directly to combat from the United States, and in about seven hours after our first action, we had secured 27 objectives. We were successful because we had the ability to deploy and employ decisive force rapidly.

Success also was a function of the simultaneous application of power by all the services throughout the area of operations. Coordinating the complementary capabilities of the Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force was not an easy task—it required specialized equipment and first-rate training to employ more than 300 aircraft in the skies of Panama in a six-hour period. Assets from all the services, from reconnaissance helicopters through stealth fighters, were employed essentially simultaneously to dominate the battlefield.

Finally, Just Cause was characterized by a combination of both traditional military missions—defeat of opposing armed organizations and seizure of specific objectives—and what might be considered nontraditional missions—establishing control of a population. Seizing the airfield at Rio Hato, assaulting the Commandancia building, securing Renacer prison—we had envisioned all of these tasks in generic terms and had trained for them. But success in Panama required more than effective application of force against specific units or physical objectives. Our six-hour assault took down an entire nation, and with it all of the associated governmental structures. It was not enough to seize our initial objectives; we had to establish control and maintain order until a civil government could be reconstituted. Imposing
order en route to a political settlement may well be a significant feature of nuanced operations in a regional conflict. The most significant nontraditional aspect of Just Cause was the ability of soldiers to react effectively to the very features of such missions for which they could not train specifically. They applied broad principles in unique circumstances and never failed to complete the mission.

The kind of major regional conflict envisioned in the Bottom-Up Review requires a force that can be projected directly from the United States, and it requires a force that can use to advantage the complementary capabilities of all the services through simultaneous employment. The force must be able to establish control over terrain and populations with equal facility; the purposes for which the United States employs force in the future will seldom be the task of pure destruction of an armed opponent or set of targets. Victory in a regional conflict will require us to dominate or control the land and the population, but only to support national strategic objectives and to sustain a political settlement in the region.

Our ability to meet these more familiar warfighting challenges requires sustained investment in specific equipment and arduous, realistic training. Acquisition of the C-17 transport aircraft, the construction or conversion of 19 cargo ships, and the establishment of a prepositioned Army armored brigade afloat all contribute to solving the strategic mobility problem that has plagued us. We continue to improve our ability to operate jointly, through improved command and control systems and through increased participation in joint training exercises. And we continue to be an Army trained and ready to be employed, not just to accomplish the missions we know of, but agile enough to get it right, quickly, when we find something new.

The Challenges of Peace

The challenge of balancing current and anticipated requirements is not a new one. We have been here before, and sometimes we made the wrong decisions. In 1885, we began a $127-million program to improve our coastal defenses against attack by Great Britain or Germany. At the same time, soldiers in our western frontier forts were still equipped with single-shot rifles when the magazine-fed repeating rifle was the dominant technology. In 1950, the readiness to cope with a major war had been sacrificed through unwise or deferred investment decisions. We must seek a balance between the pressing concerns we know and the prospects that we—and others—can only estimate.

To accomplish both tasks, and prevent either from destabilizing the other, we must recognize and reconcile the costs associated with meeting the challenges. We must acknowledge the number of soldiers required to maintain the current pace of operations. That number has been great—much greater than expected when the Berlin Wall came down. We are now conducting more
military operations than at any time since 1945, except during the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf wars. The requirement for forces deployed on operations is up 300 percent—from an average of 6000 soldiers a day in the spring of 1990 to more than 20,000 soldiers a day in mid-1994.

While the planned force structure can support that level of commitment, it does so at some risk. Forces committed to peace support or other kinds of operations are not immediately available for a regional conflict for two reasons. First, forces engaged in peace support operations generally cannot be withdrawn immediately or unilaterally. Those forces would presumably be preventing a conflict that could resume upon their withdrawal. Second, forces engaged in peace operations or operations other than war for extended periods may in fact require additional training prior to commitment to war; their equipment will almost certainly need maintenance. Modern war and modern weapons require high levels of training, advanced skills, and sustainment. Training is, to varying degrees, perishable and must be reinforced through practice. Such training and practice do not necessarily occur during the conduct of peace support operations.

When we commit forces to an operational mission overseas, we have not just committed that one battalion, brigade, or division. To sustain the pace of operations and maintain the quality and capabilities of the deployed force, we must establish a rotational base to allow units to recover from deployments, to retrain, and to prepare for the specific requirements of subsequent missions. For each force we commit to peace operations, we must count at least one in the pipeline getting ready and one, having just completed the mission, undergoing retraining. Both the time to prepare for and the time to recover from an operational mission may vary, but in general we have found that we must commit two additional units for each unit deployed. And depending on the intensity or duration of the mission, the ratio of units committed to units deployed could be more than that. The size of the force for a given operation is not measured simply by the number of soldiers on the ground in the mission area at any given time; it is that number plus those required to sustain the operation for its duration.

Deploying forces also costs money. The United States has tended to pay for current missions by diverting dollars from research and development, procurement of modern equipment, leader development, training exercises, and maintenance of facilities. In doing so, we sacrifice readiness. The principal success of the Army, and all of the services, has been to maintain our most important investments in the future while performing our day-to-day missions. But we are clearly on the margin of our ability to do so. The cost of deploying Army units to Somalia in FY 1993 was $321 million. That money was not programmed in the original budget. The Army executed the mission and paid the bills associated with the mission, but those bills were paid with
money taken from planned investments in readiness: soldier training and
replacement parts for their equipment. We cannot continue to pay for today's
missions with tomorrow's money without eventually degrading our ability to
get it right when we must.

In the long run, quality is at the heart of the issue. The technical skill,
the discipline, the initiative that we need from soldiers does not come acci-
dentally or inexpensively. A high-quality force is not simply the result of
recruiting the best young people, although that is obviously part of it. It is
also the result of investing in programs to train them, to provide them with
the best equipment, and to sustain them and their families. It is only through
such investment that our soldiers will be able to meet the demands that this
not-so-peaceful world is placing daily on the United States and its military
services.

NOTES
2. The term "ethnic conflict" has become common but is still impre-cise. The internal conflict in Somalia,
for example, is not between rival ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the term's common usage captures the idea of
regional, limited conflicts with specific cultural contexts.
3. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, 72 (Summer 1993), 22-49; "If Not
5. Augustus Richard Norton, Anvil and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: Univ. of Texas
Press, 1987).
example, Ton de Wit and Vera Gianotten, pp. 48-49, where they argue that the success of the Shining Path was
due to its alignment with long-standing cultural conflicts.
8. The US Army has participated in more than 100 operations other than war since 1775. While some of
these had a strictly military objective, many had a significant humanitarian component. This number does not
include the pure disaster relief operations to which the Army has regularly contributed. See John M. Collins,
America's Small Wars (McLean, Va.: Brassey's, 1991).
9. The 10th Mountain Division (Light) provided the majority of the soldiers deployed to Somalia.
11. The Bottom Up Review: Forces for a New Era (Washington: Department of Defense, 1 September
12. Some US forces, particularly US Southern Command, were in-country prior to the start of the
operation, but the vast majority of the combat power was deployed from the United States.
13. See for example the description of "stability operations" performed by an infantry company in Panama
following Just Cause in Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The
14. For a discussion of the strains that extended operational deployments place on soldiers and their
families, see David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, Peacekeepers and Their Wives (Westport, Conn.:
15. This is the rotational scheme used for the US Army battalion as part of the Multinational Force and
Observers in the Sinai. It takes slightly less than six months to prepare for the mission; the unit is deployed for
six months, and upon return it undergoes retraining. The British army also has found a rotational scheme to be
necessary for its deployments to Northern Ireland.

Autumn 1994