HOW TO CHECK IF IT IS SAFE NOT TO RETEST A COMPONENT

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by

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### Abstract
This paper focuses on ways to reduce testing effort and costs associated with technology-advancement upgrades to systems with open architectures. This situation is common in Navy and DoD contexts such as submarine, aircraft carrier, and airframe systems, and accounts for a substantial fraction of the testing effort. This paper describes methods for determining when testing of unmodified components can be reduced or avoided, and it outlines some methods for choosing test cases efficiently to focus retesting where it is needed, given information about past testing of the same component. Changes to the environment of a system can affect its reliability, even if the behavior of the system remains unchanged. The new capabilities added by a technology upgrade can interact with previously existing capabilities, changing the frequency of their usage as well as the range of input values and, hence, changing their effect on overall system reliability.

### Subject Terms
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How to Check If It Is Safe Not to Retest a Component

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Abstract

This paper focuses on ways to reduce testing effort and costs associated with technology-advancement upgrades to systems with open architectures. This situation is common in Navy and DoD contexts such as submarine, aircraft carrier, and airframe systems, and accounts for a substantial fraction of the testing effort. This paper describes methods for determining when testing of unmodified components can be reduced or avoided, and it outlines some methods for choosing test cases efficiently to focus retesting where it is needed, given information about past testing of the same component. Changes to the environment of a system can affect its reliability, even if the behavior of the system remains unchanged. The new capabilities added by a technology upgrade can interact with previously existing capabilities, changing the frequency of their usage as well as the range of input values and, hence, changing their effect on overall system reliability.

Keywords: open architecture, reducing regression testing, automated testing, statistical testing, dependency analysis, reuse, technology upgrades.

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Introduction

Current US Navy combat and weapon system test procedures require an integration test event with every change to the software or system configuration to certify that the software-intensive system-of-systems is stable and functional. As more systems are moving to a modular open architecture, software configurations are changing with increased frequency, requiring more testing, which is expensive and time-consuming.

The Navy’s open architecture framework is intended to promote reuse and reduce costs. Ongoing research at the Naval Postgraduate School is developing improvements to the test and evaluation procedures that can contribute to these goals. Test and evaluation accounts for a large part of system-development cost, but the impact of open architecture ideas on this part of the process has been relatively modest so far. The purpose of this effort is to provide sound engineering approaches to better realize the potential benefits of Navy open architectures and to provide concrete means that support economical acquisition and effective sustainment of such systems.

The specific goals of this research are to enable: (1) identification of specific testing and checking procedures that do not need to be repeated after given changes to a system, (2) limiting the scope and reducing the cost of retesting when the latter is necessary, and (3) a single analysis to provide assurance that all possible configurations that can be generated in a model-driven architecture will satisfy given dependability requirements. This paper reports some results that address the first two of the goals listed above. A roadmap and technical approach for reaching the third goal are outlined in Berzins, Rodriquez, and Wessman (2007).

Technology upgrades are typically performed on a two-year cycle. They often involve migration to the best hardware and operating system version available at the time, where “best” implies a balanced trade-off between high performance and reliable operation. Typically, only a small fraction of the application code has been changed. However, current certification practices require all of the code to be retested prior to deployment, whether it has been modified or not. Retesting of an unchanged module can be avoided only if we can establish that it has not been adversely impacted by the change. Preliminary results on how to do that have been reported by Berzins (2008). In this paper, we further explore ways to determine whether it is safe not to retest an unchanged component under the assumption that the load characteristics of the component have not changed. We also address the problem of how to most effectively focus retesting for unchanged components in cases where the requirements and behavior of the component have not changed but the load characteristics have changed.

The latter situation has great importance for assuring reliability of reusable components. Many past cases of well-publicized software failures involved reuse of software components in new environments that had different characteristics than the contexts for which the components were originally designed. These components failed in their new environments despite the fact that they were well-tested and found to be reliable in the field under previous deployment conditions. Examples include the Patriot missile failure (Marshall, 1992) and the failure of the European Ariane 5 rocket (Jézéquel & Meyer, 1997, January).

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes methods for deciding when re-testing of unchanged components can be safely reduced or eliminated.
entirely; Section 3 presents methods for efficiently retesting reusable components for use in deployment environments with workloads that are different from previous deployments; Section 4 identifies some relevant previous work; and Section 5 presents our conclusions.

Deciding When Retesting Can Be Avoided

Our previous work identified two types of analysis that could enable safe avoidance of retesting unchanged components under certain conditions: program slicing and invariance testing (Berzins, 2008). These techniques are applicable in cases in which the requirements, code, expected workload and available resources of the component are unchanged. This section briefly reviews the approach and then examines in more detail what additional analysis needs to be done to safely reuse such components in the next release without retesting them.

Program slicing is a kind of dependency analysis that is based on the source code. Slicing algorithms are efficient enough to be used on practical, large-scale programs. If two different versions of a program have the same slice with respect to a service it provides, then that service has the same functional behavior in both versions, and retesting can be avoided if having the same functional behavior is sufficient to establish the reliability of the component (Gallagher, 1991, August).

Invariance testing is a kind of statistical, automated testing that is applicable to components whose code has changed but whose specifications and requirements remain the same. The purpose of an invariance test is to confirm that the changes to the code have not changed the behavior of the services it provides. In this kind of a situation, it is easy to implement a test oracle procedure (explained below) that enables affordable checking of large numbers of automatically executed test cases. Invariance testing can increase the number of components that can be certified not to need retesting when combined with program slicing (Berzins, 2008). Invariance testing can also be used to reduce the cost of retesting modules that need to be retested, even though their requirements remain unchanged. This includes unchanged components that depend on other modified components, which are identified by program slicing methods, as well as unchanged components whose expected workload has changed (see section 3).

We can omit retesting of a service if slicing and invariance testing confirm that its behavior is unchanged in the new release and that the following additional conditions are met:

1. The same functional behavior is appropriate in the new release, which occurs only if the requirements of the component are unchanged.

2. The same functional behavior is sufficient to meet the requirements only if the requirements do not contain timing constraints. If this is not the case, the timing constraints need to be retested because changes to hardware, systems software, and other components in the system can all affect timing. This can be done by using a kind of invariance testing that measures timing and by the methods described by Qiao, Wang, Luqi, and Berzins (2006, March).

3. Constraints due to shared resources need to be rechecked, which can usually be done via system-level stress testing. Such constraints include:
   a. Sufficient main memory and disk space
b. Sufficient I/O resources such as number of files that need to be open at the same time, printers, sensors, actuators, or other peripherals.

c. Sufficient network bandwidth to support worst-case communications load.

d. Effective access to showed databases and web services, including both timing and freedom from deadlocks.

4. The slicing analysis is only valid under the assumption that the machine code that is actually running corresponds to the source code that was subjected to slicing analysis.

5. The analysis depends on the assumption that the computer correctly translates the source code into machine language.

The fourth assumption is frequently made without explicit acknowledgement in theoretical studies, but it cannot be adopted without verification in serious risk analysis because of the following plausible failure modes:

1. Memory-corrupting bugs—these include out-of-bounds write operations on arrays and through invalid pointers. Such bugs can cause seemingly innocuous statements to overwrite parts of the program itself at runtime, with unpredictable and potentially catastrophic results.

2. Deliberate cyber-attacks—compromise of system security via network or unauthorized insider access to systems can deliberately modify machine code at runtime.

Memory-corrupting bugs are faults in the code that should be detected by test and evaluation processes, and some types can be prevented. One class of memory-corrupting bugs is caused by premature deallocation of dynamically created objects. Garbage-collection algorithms are supposed to prevent this class of problems so that garbage-collected languages such as Java and Lisp should be immune to this type of problem. Software written in languages without garbage collection, such as C, C++ and Ada, needs special quality-assurance methods to look for premature deallocation. There exist a variety of tools that can be used for this task, including Valgrind (2009, April) (see the system commands Memcheck and Ptrcheck) and Insure++ (2009, April).

We note that in the absence of perfect computer security, which is not likely to be attainable in the near future, no amount of test and evaluation can detect or prevent failures of the second kind because they are not present in the system while it is being tested; they only appear later—after attacks at run-time. We, therefore, recommend adding a design modification that checks at run-time whether component code is still the same as it was in the test load for all mission-critical systems that do not already have such a capability.

This can be done by packaging the machine code in blocks with secure digital signatures and adding a process that periodically checks the signatures while the system is running. To make this secure, the digital signatures have to be cryptographic checksums with strong encryption so that attackers cannot modify a code module and then forge a signature without knowledge of the secret key. The periodic checking process systematically scans the code modules and checks their digital signatures. If it discovers a modified module, it can repair that module and also report the problem to appropriate authorities. Repair can be accomplished by reloading the module from an uncorruptable source such as read-only memory or CD. Failure due to possible physical damage to media can be mitigated by redundant copies. The repair process checks the digital signature of the new
copy to verify its integrity and goes to alternative backup copies if there are any discrepancies. We note that this mechanism can be used to compensate for faults due to memory corruption regardless of whether they were caused by attacks or by faults in the code. The state of corrupted modules will usually have to be restored to the most recent, valid date after the corrupted code is repaired. Component designs may have to be augmented to provide this service. There is extensive literature on how to perform rollbacks, particularly in the context of database transitions. A discussion of this problem for object-oriented components can be found in Vandewoude and Berbers (2005).

The mechanism proposed above is similar to a scheme used by a telephone company to keep its software operational, despite the presence of memory-corrupting bugs, which were known to exist but whose source could not be located. This technology has been proven effective in practice and has been used for decades.

The mechanism can also repair faults due to corruption of data if the scanning process understands the data structures and has code to check the invariant constraints associated with them. This can be incorporated into the architecture via a standard interface that every data type must implement for a service that checks all associated data constraints and repairs them if needed.

Technology upgrades typically move to new hardware, which implies the use of new compilers and new versions of the operating system. Presumably, these underlying services are reliable, but, if we are to retest only a subset of the components in the new release, these assumptions need to be verified. This can be done using invariance testing, as explained by Berzins (2008). The correct operation of the new version of the compiler can be checked by combining invariance testing with the approach to testing translators described in Berzins, Auguston, and Luqi (2001, December).

Retesting Unchanged Components under New Load Conditions

The previous section discusses situations in which the following conditions hold:

1. The code of the component is unchanged.
2. The requirements and specifications of the component are unchanged.
3. The expected workload of the component is unchanged.

This section examines what should be done if the first two conditions are met, but the third one is not: the code and requirements of a component are unchanged, but the expected workload is different. This situation is expected when a component is reused in a different context. Such situations will be common when one of the stated objectives of open architectures is achieved: extensive reuse of common components across platforms.

In these cases, some retesting is necessary. We would like to do this efficiently by reusing previous test results and focusing additional testing effort on the system behavior that will be exercised more in the new workload than it was in the previous ones. We, therefore, seek a systematic method to generate new test cases that characterize situations expected in the new deployment context that were not expected in the previous deployment contexts. This informal idea can be made precise in the context of automated statistical testing (Berzins, 2008).

Automated statistical testing is characterized by the following properties:
1. Test cases are automatically generated by random sampling from an operational profile. An operational profile is a probability distribution that represents the relative frequency of different input values to the system under test in its expected execution environment.

2. Pass/fail decisions for individual test cases are automated and done by a single test oracle procedure that applies to all possible inputs to the service or system under test.

3. If the generated set of test cases runs without detecting any failures, a simple formula gives a lower bound on the mean number of executions with a corresponding statistical confidence level.

The significance of the first two conditions is economic: after the fixed initial cost of implementing the operational profile and the test oracle, the marginal cost of running an additional test case is very small. This is because there is no additional human effort associated with additional test cases; only additional computer resources are needed to run more test cases, and computer time costs much less than human effort.

The consequence is that very large numbers of test cases can be run economically, making it affordable to collect sample sets large enough to provide high statistical confidence levels in the results. Methods for determining the sample size needed to support conclusions of the form “the mean number of executions between failures is at least N with confidence (1- (1/N)” can be found in Berzins (2008). The significance of this is that it can enable practical testing to specified risk-tolerance levels, rather than testing until budget runs out. The latter does not provide high confidence in system reliability, although it occurs commonly in current practices.

Figure 1 shows an example of the situation described above. The distribution $g_1$ represents the operational profile for the initial deployment of a hypothetical reusable component and $g_2$ represents the operational profile characterizing a new environment in which the component is to be reused. Note that a wider range of input values is expected in the new environment. In this example, $g_1$ and $g_2$ are normal distributions; $g_1$ has a standard deviation of 1.0, and $g_2$ has a standard deviation of 2.0.
Figure 1. Operational Profiles for Two Different Deployment Environments

Figure 2 shows the profile difference for incremental testing that is derived from the distributions in Figure 1 and the resulting testing profile under the assumption that the number of test cases needed to reach the reliability goals associated with both the previous and the new execution environment are the same.

The profile difference is zero in the region where $g_1 > g_2$, and it is equal to the difference $g_2 - g_1$ everywhere else. The rationale for these choices is the following:

![Figure 2. The Derived Testing Profile](image)

The profile difference is zero in the region where $g_1 > g_2$, and it is equal to the difference $g_2 - g_1$ everywhere else. The rationale for these choices is the following:
The region where \( g_1 > g_2 \) has already been adequately tested since the expected number of samples from this region that were checked during prior testing using the profile \( g_1 \) exceed the expected number of samples from the same region that would be required in testing under the execution profile \( g_2 \), characterizing the new deployment environment. Therefore, we can avoid this region in the second round of testing, which is accomplished by setting the testing profile to zero in this region.

The remaining region needs more test cases for adequate coverage. If we consider an arbitrary slice of this region, we find that the area under \( g_1 \) in this slice represents the expected number of test cases that were run in the previous round of testing governed by the profile \( g_1 \). The area under \( g_2 \) in the same slice represents the expected number of test cases from the slice that need to be run in the second round of testing. The total area under the profile difference represents the number of test cases needed for the second round of testing as a fraction of the number of test cases required in the first round of testing. In the example, this fraction is calculated to be \( .552 \). The testing profile is proportional to the profile difference, which must be normalized by dividing it by the probability mass under the curve to make all of the probabilities add up to 1.

The more general case—in which the reliability goals in the two execution environments differ—has a similar rationale, but the two distributions have to be scaled to account for the differences in the number of test cases needed in each test.

Let \( N_1 \) be the number of test cases that were needed from profile \( p_1 \) for the first deployment environment and \( N_2 \) be the number of cases from a different profile \( p_2 \), needed for the second environment. Then, in the general case, the profile difference is zero where \( N_1\cdot p_1 > N_2\cdot p_2 \) and is equal to \((N_2\cdot p_2 - p_1\cdot N_1)/(N_1 + N_2)\) elsewhere.

The testing profile is again the normalized profile difference, obtained by dividing it by the area under the profile difference curve.

We are currently investigating effective methods for modeling operational profiles and for deriving model parameters from historical measurements of actual system loads. Such measurements can come from instrumenting systems to collect data during training exercises or actual missions.

The inputs to the software module must be analyzed to determine dependencies among them. It is also necessary to look for dependencies between the interfaces and other external environmental factors within the context of the operational profile and testing goals. If dependencies exist, they should be characterized.

Once the inputs and the relationship(s) among them are known, the next step is to estimate or specify the distributions that characterize the probabilistic behavior of the inputs. If there are dependencies, the notion of conditional distributions will be considered as a way to handle them. There also may be multiple possible distributions for each input, depending on the state of the environment. This also applies if the goals can vary from testing the normal range of inputs to testing extreme cases, which may be necessary for checking boundary conditions and checking the robustness of the component with respect to unplanned contingencies.
A histogram can be used to represent the new data resulting from the measurements to provide a visual check of the observations. However, it is advisable to fit a distribution based on a theoretical model of the expected distributions for the following reasons:

1. **Smoothing**—the histogram will show irregularities due to granularity of the random sampling in the measurements. These are not physically significant and are most effectively mitigated by finding the best fit to a smooth curve that interpolates between the samples and smoothes out the gaps.

2. **Extrapolation**—realistic probability distributions do not cut off suddenly but rather gradually decrease with long tails. Such tails are impossible to accurately estimate based solely on measured data because the number of observed samples is often too small to provide an accurate measurement near the extremes of the expected range of values. If we use the histogram as measured, it is likely that we will set the probability distribution to zero in places where it is actually small, but nonzero. Since this will result in tests that do not cover the full range of possible parameter values, we propose to use a theoretical model in this region and to do the extrapolation by matching the standard deviation of the actual measurements to the standard deviation of the theoretical model. This will smoothly extrapolate the tails out to or beyond the real limits of the input value range. Details about how to choose an appropriate theoretical model for this purpose are still under investigation.

We are also planning to investigate the effectiveness of Bayesian methods for estimating the distributions based on the actual data. This approach will also need a theoretical model of the probability distribution function, which will be used as the prior distribution.

![Figure 3. A Stress-testing Profile, s(x), Compared to an Operational Profile, g(x)](image)

The methods outlined above should provide a systematic way to deal with the “known unknowns.” However, military environments are characterized by uncertainty and surprises. To hedge against the possibility of “unknown unknowns,” we recommend running additional tests on components to be reused in new environments with a “stress-testing profile” that purposely exaggerates the range of expected input values. This kind of stress testing is difficult to put on a scientific basis because we are trying to hedge against
possibilities that we have no basis for predicting. The following heuristics are proposed as strategies to try:

1. Use a uniform distribution that extends from three to one hundred standard deviations in all directions from the measured mean of the distribution. This is illustrated in Figure 3. The curve $g$ shown in blue represents the normal profile, which is the same as the curve $g_1$ shown in Figure 1, and the curve $s$ represents the stress-testing profile. The curve $s$ has been scaled up by a factor of 10 to make it easier to see in the figure.

2. Use a uniform distribution that covers the entire valid range of input values. This will include completely unexpected input values.

Recalling that these strategies are intended to be used in the context of completely automated statistical testing, in which the marginal cost of running and analyzing additional test cases is very low, we recommend a mixed strategy that runs tests from all three of the proposed testing profiles, each with a number of samples derived from the risk-tolerance parameter $k$, specified by system stakeholders and the measured execution frequency parameters $es$ according to the relation $Ts = (kes) \log_2(kes)$, as explained in Berzins (2008). $Ts$ represents the number of the test cases that are needed for testing services to the statistical confidence level implied by the specified risk-tolerance parameter.

**Relevant Previous Work**

Methods for detecting memory corrupting bugs via static and dynamic program analysis have been studied (Alzamil, 2006; 2008, November). Program slicing (Weiser, 1984, July) has been used in a wide variety of applications, including testing (Binkley, 1998; Gupta, Harrold & Soffa, 1992; Harman & Danicic, 1995; Hierons, Harman & Danicic, 1999; Hierons, Harman, Fox, Ouarbya & Daoudi, 2002), debugging (Agrawal, DeMillo & Spafford, 1993; Lyle & Weiser, 1987), program understanding (De Lucia, Fasolino & Munro, 1996; Harman, Hierons, Danicic, Howroyd & Fox, 2001), reverse engineering (Canfora, Cimitile & Munro, 1994), software maintenance (Gallagher, 1991, August; Cimitile, De Lucia & Munro, 1996; 1994), change merging (Horwitz, Prins & Reps, 1989; Berzins & Dampier, 1996), and software metrics (Lakhotia, 1993; Bieman & Ott, 1994). More detailed surveys of previous work on slicing can be found in Binkley and Harmon (2004).


**Conclusion**

Program slicing and invariance testing are methods that can be used to identify cases in which it is safe not to retest an unchanged component. These methods need to be augmented with other means for establishing the absence of other possible failure modes such as the possibility of memory-corrupting bugs and timing faults. This paper identifies ways to solve these issues.

When components are reused in environments with substantially different load characteristics than previous deployment environments, it is important to test the
components under the new modes of operation. This paper presents systematic and
efficient ways to accomplish that.

Further work is needed to explore ways to address other possible failure models,
including possible interference due to shared system resources, and to address the longer-
term goal of eventually eliminating the need for repeating integration testing after every
system change. Specifically, more work is needed on methods for certifying the reliability of
architectures independently from the components that they contain and for certifying the
conformance of an implementation to a given architecture in order to attain the long-term
goals outlined in the introduction.

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How to Check If It Is Safe Not to Retest a Component

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Context

• Expected long term benefits from Navy Open Architecture
  – Business benefits:
    • Flexible acquisition strategies and contracts that enable **software reuse, easy systems upgrade**, and **shared data** throughout the Navy
  – Technical benefits:
    • Modular open architectures facilitate **system adaptation, portability**, interoperability, **upgrade-ability** and **long-term supportability**

• The Achilles Heel - Test and Evaluation
  – Current practices require **retesting unchanged components** after each system upgrade, typically every two years
  – Substantial budget and schedule are currently devoted to retesting
  – **New technology, processes, and policies** are needed to **safely reduce** this effort and free resources for testing new functionality

• Improvements sought by our research
  – Less time for testing, quicker response to changes
  – Improved reliability on larger scales without increasing testing cost
Scientific Roadmap - Objectives

• Safely reduce testing cost
  – Reduce the need for re-testing
  – Eventually eliminate integration test after every reconfiguration
  – Reduce cost of future system failures due to missed errors

• Make testing more effective by augmenting it with other quality assurance methods
  – Develop conceptually new and different methods to achieve dependability in Navy OA systems in presence of reuse, reconfiguration, changes and unpredictable environments

• Enable Persistent Open Architectures
  – The architecture should not have to change or be retested every time the system configuration changes
    • Methods that cover many configurations with one analysis
    • Avoid redundant retesting of previously existing modules and architectures
Scientific Roadmap - Approach

• Refine the open architecture concept to support system development and testing with interchangeable software parts that conform to persistent system standards
  – Requirements that are stable across all configurations
  – Both system-wide capabilities and subsystem/connection properties

• A Dependable Open Architecture should include:
  – Not only components and connections but also constraints expressing the most important dependability properties
  – Links to requirements, capabilities and standards
  – Variable parameters – KPP’s / features / Load characteristics
  – Components and connectors should be swappable within compatibility groups defined by testable dependability properties

• Apply testing and systematic quality assurance at the architectural level as well as the system implementation level
Long Term Solution Approach

- The proposed QA method is globally decomposed into five major steps:

1. Formulate dependability contracts
2. Test Components vs. Standards
3. Verify Architecture vs. Requirements & Standards
4. Ensure noninterference among components
5. Monitor environment assumptions
6. Monitor changes to executables

See 2007 Acquisition Symposium Paper for details.
Short Term Problems

• Current Navy combat system test procedures require an integration test for every:
  – System configuration (platform)
  – Changed system configuration (upgrade)

• Open Architectures support frequent changes to configurations
  – Retesting is expensive and time consuming

• Open Architectures support component reuse across platforms
  – Component workloads subject to change
  – New workloads expose new faults
Recent Work - Approaches

- **Reduce testing cost**
  - Methods to *identify components that do not need to be retested*
  - Methods to *limit scope of retesting* when it is needed
  - Methods to *completely automate* testing and analysis

- **Maintain safety**
  - Program slicing to confirm unchanged behavior of unchanged code
  - Automated testing to confirm unchanged behavior of modified code
  - Operational profiles to efficiently test reusable components in different environments.
When Retesting a Service is Necessary

• When its slice or behavior has changed

• When requirements have changed
  – New functionality needs to be tested
  – Test all affected components

• When the range of expected operating conditions has expanded
  – Even if there was no other change, new test scenarios are needed
  – Indicated by a modified operational profile

• When computing speeds or timing constraints have changed
  – Changed hardware processing rates can adversely affect scheduling algorithms and cause missed deadlines
Test Avoidance Example

= No retest due to slicing and invariance testing
Program Slicing

- Program slicing is a kind of automated dependency analysis
  - Same slice implies same behavior
  - Can be computed for large programs
  - Depends on the source code, language specific
- Slicing tools must handle arrays and objects correctly
  - Need to certify the tools to be used
- Unchanged component behavior depends on continued correspondence of machine code to source code
- Must certify absence of memory corrupting bugs
  - Tools exist: Valgrind, Insure++, Coverity,…
- Must ensure absence of runtime modifications due to cyber attacks
  - Cannot be detected by testing because modifications are not present in test loads
  - Need runtime checking, can be done using cryptographic signatures
How Much Invariance Testing is Enough?

• How many tests are needed to reach high confidence?
  – Stakeholder defines the acceptable risk threshold $k$
    • The expected frequency of behavioral differences in a given service is at most one in $k$ missions.

• Number of test cases is computed for each service in the middleware interface to the operating system
  – It is determined by the following formula
    $$T_s = (k e_s) \log_2 (k e_s)$$
    • Where $s$ is a service, $e_s$ is the mean number of executions of $s$ per mission, $k$ reflects stakeholder’s tolerance for risk as above

• Test cases are independently drawn from the probability distribution characterizing the mission, a.k.a. operational profile
  – Statistical confidence level is $1 - 1/(k e_s)$
    • Probability of making a false positive conclusion matches the stakeholder’s risk tolerance
## Current Policy for Mishap Risk Assessment

<table>
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<th>FREQUENCY OCCURRENCE</th>
<th>OF</th>
<th>MISHAP SEVERITY CATEGORIES</th>
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<td>MARGINAL</td>
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<td>4B</td>
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P: Probability of occurrence in the lifetime of an individual system, ranges taken from MIL_STD-882D
Testing Efforts vs. Acceptable Risk

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<th>$C$</th>
<th>$T_s$</th>
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<td>.999</td>
<td>$1.0 \times 10^4$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^9$</td>
<td>.999999999</td>
<td>$3.0 \times 10^{10}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of test cases required for different levels of risk tolerance

Testing cost characteristics

See paper in 2008 acquisition conference for details
Why Do We Need Operational Profiles

• Can be used to *automate selection of test cases*

• Reliability of a system is determined by the operational profile
  – Real systems have bugs, specification errors, requirement omissions, etc.
  – System reliability varies from 0 (always fails) to 1 (never fails) in different environments

• Operational profiles have proved useful in practice
  – Example: reliability testing of telephone-switching software

• It takes human effort to produce an operational profile
  – Measure the frequency distributions of executions and associated input parameters for each service
    • Can be collected on- or off-line
Benefits of Operational Profiles

• Reduces testing resources
  – Automatic generation of test cases
  – Efficient selection of test cases
  – Finds most frequent failures first
  – Supports reuse of previous test results

• Good software reliability checking
  – Statistically represents external environment
  – Suited for software reuse testing

• Ideal for Open Architecture applications by enabling automated statistical testing
Example of Using an Operational Profile for Reuse Testing

• Currently fielded software has been tested with N samples from operational profile g1(x) and functions reliably in that environment

• Software is being reused and placed in new environment represented by operational profile g2(x)

• What is the minimum amount of testing required to ensure operability and reliability in the new environment?
Operational Profile for Two Different Environments
Example of Using an Operational Profile for Reuse Testing (cont)

• Need additional testing in regions more likely in the new profile than in the old one
• The profile difference defines the needed test cases
  – $P_d(x) = \text{if } g_2(x) > g_1(x) \text{ then } g_2(x) - g_1(x) \text{ else } 0$
  – Must be scaled if reliability goals differ in the two environments
  – Must be normalized to become a probability distribution
Derived Testing Profile

Profile difference
mass = 0.552

Testing Profile
Example of Using an Operational Profile for Reuse Testing (cont)

• How to stress test the software?
  – Safety or operationally critical software
  – Extended boundary condition testing
  – Checks for “unknown unknowns”, prevents surprises from the new environment

• Rough guideline: test out to 100 standard deviations
Stress Testing Profile
Methods for modeling operational profiles

• Identify all environment inputs and their dependencies
  – Possible use of conditional distributions

• Estimate distribution for each input
  – Mathematical analysis and use of histogram “bins” when raw historical data is available
  – Smoothing, interpolation & extrapolation to tails where raw data is missing
Methods for modeling operational profiles (cont)

• Use of Bayesian methods for estimating distributions of actual data

• Implementing Stress Test profiles
  – When not enough information is known about current or past operational environments
  – Always for safety critical software

• Calculate statistical confidence levels in the profile model based on sample size
Acquisition Process Implications

• **Requirements** analysis needs to span the entire problem domain and system life, not just individual versions of the System of Systems
  – Same architecture must support all future versions and all platforms
  – Planned control of variation via ranges for parameters/features

• Re-orient development processes toward **Design-to-Tolerances**
  – Currently oriented towards Design-to-Fit, Test-to-Fit

• The architecture as a whole needs authority / priority
  – Responsible organization
  – Global system standards authority
  – Manage accountability for subsystems
  – Empower via change control, acceptance testing, budget control, contracts with incremental commitment
Acquisition Process Implications

• Domain requirements/Architecture development / QA need substantial time/resources/technology development
  – Must be included in the plan from the start
  – More detailed/precise standards and analysis needed
  – Shift from current requirements to likely requirements trajectories

• New QA technologies needed
  – Some known in labs but not used currently
  – Tailoring/improvement may be needed for practical use
  – Some areas need new methods to reach long term goals
  – Will need tech transfer, training, and process changes for best practical impact
Short Term Recommendations

- Testing profiles and statistical test results should be attached to reusable components in repositories.
- Operational Profiles should be measured based on observed data.
- Validity of pointers and storage recycling should be checked by tools especially if components not retested based on slicing.
- Absence of code modification should be checked at runtime via cryptographic signatures.
- Automated invariance testing should be applied to components whose specifications are unchanged but hardware or code affecting behavior has changed.
Short Term Recommendations (cont)

• Statistical testing should be performed for safety-critical and mission critical functions.
• Need uniform guidance for mission-critical reliability, analogous to MIL-STD-882D for system safety.
• Effectiveness and safety of slicing criteria for avoiding retesting should be validated with a case study/demo.
• Reusable components should monitor assumptions about their operating environment at runtime.
Conclusions

• The slicing and automated testing approach has a potential to **reduce testing duration and costs**
  – More research is recommended to substantiate the applicability of our approach to DoD systems
  – Experimental evaluation of slicing and invariance testing methods is needed

• Automated testing techniques can alleviate concerns about system risks due to technology innovations

• Measurement and analysis of the operational profiles of **reusable components** can be used to support analysis of changes in the operating environments
  – Hence determining whether additional testing is necessary
Backup Slides
Approach: Program Slicing [Weiser 84]

- What is a slice?
  - A self-contained subset of a program
    - Contains all of the code that affects its observable behavior
  - Determined by an observation point
    - Example: behavior of a single service
  - Contains only the relevant parts

- Why do slices matter?
  - Behavior invariance property:
    - *If a service has the same slice in two different versions of a program, it has the same behavior in both versions*
  
  - *If two slices are the same, the service does not have to be retested*
  - Slices can be computed on a large scale
    - Involves dependency tracing, data flow analysis, and control flow analysis
Invariance Testing Extends Program Slicing

• Used to check that behavior of modified code remains the same
  – Candidates: Open Architectures and higher level middleware
  • Enables effective slicing cutoff boundaries
  – Example: operating system interface
  – Example: upgrade from a deprecated interface
  – Example: baseline specific interfaces used by common components

• Enhances slicing to identify more components that do not need retesting

• Relies on a statistical inference with a very high confidence level
  – Needs large numbers of test cases
  – Economically feasible because this kind of test and analysis can be completely automated
  • Test cases - generate inputs by random sampling
  • Data analysis - compare outputs from two different software versions
Related Work

• Navy systems are designed with open architecture in mind
  – Hence encapsulating all system calls

• Program Slicing has been used in a wide variety of applications: testing, debugging, program understanding, reverse engineering, software maintenance, change merging, software metrics.
  – See paper for extended list of citations.

• Automate testing has been used to automatically generate open sets of test cases based on random samplings from implementations of operational profile distributions [Berzins and Chaki 2002]

• Prior work on quality assurance for flexible systems at the level:
  – Of requirements [Luqi, Zhang, Berzins & Qiao 2004] [Luqi & Lange 2006]
  – Of architectures [Berzins & Luqi 2006] [Luqi & Zhang 2006]