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**Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities**

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Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities

Timothy M. Bonds, Myron Hura, Thomas-Durell Young
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001.
Preface

This monograph describes steps that the Army might take to improve the ability of Army Service headquarters to command joint task forces. In addition, it describes the capabilities that the Army will need from the other Services, joint organizations, and government agencies to accomplish future missions.

This research was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff G-3 and the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8 and was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources and Force Development and Technology programs. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.

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Summary

The U.S. military is frequently called on to respond to domestic or international crises. Typically, it uses joint task forces (JTFs) as the organizational structure to oversee the forces employed in these crises. The use of JTFs has been common over the past four decades but their use has increased over the past decade and the range of situations they have been called on to deal with has widened. Recent, well-known examples include operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and, domestically, the response to Hurricane Katrina.

In spite of this long-term and growing use, senior policymakers in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Army have expressed concern over shortcomings associated with using JTFs to provide the command and control in operations. Specific concerns included the amount of time it takes to establish these headquarters, the ability to staff them appropriately, and their ability to coordinate the efforts of their forces with those of other Services, U.S. government agencies, and forces from other countries. Given recent history and an uncertain future, military leaders understand that the demand for JTFs is likely to continue, the notice to supply them will be short, and the range of tasks they might be asked to accomplish will be wide.

Purpose and Approach

The U.S. Army asked RAND Arroyo Center to help it improve the ability of its tactical headquarters to exercise command and control over joint, interagency, and multinational forces to accomplish diverse
missions in a range of settings. In response, Arroyo researchers reviewed the history of U.S. Army JTFs, analyzing the missions assigned and problems encountered. They then analyzed alternative future national security environments with an eye to identifying the types of missions to which Army-led JTFs may be assigned. In light of these probable missions, they considered different approaches to providing JTF HQ and how they might best be prepared.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

After completing their analysis, Arroyo researchers arrived at the following conclusions:

- The demand for JTFs is likely to remain high.
- The process for identifying personnel for and assigning them to JTF HQ is too slow.
- Preparing for complex missions takes time.
- The Army can provide the core of a JTF for the ground-oriented missions.
- The Army will require support from other Services and government agencies outside the Department of Defense.

In light of these conclusions, Arroyo researchers made three recommendations about ways to improve the Army’s ability to stand up and staff JTF HQ.

**Assign to tactical headquarters—corps and divisions—the mission of serving as JTF HQ.** The Army should assign its four corps headquarters to high-priority missions, e.g., full-spectrum warfare, including stability operations or counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Division headquarters, both Regular Army and Army National Guard, should also be assigned missions, but more specific ones. Specific divisional missions could be given to more than one unit but on a staggered timeline so that one division would always be ready to carry it out. Army National Guard units might properly be tasked
to prepare for domestic emergencies, since such missions would mesh well with their state responsibilities.

**Prepare headquarters assigned JTF missions to command in complex contingencies.** To be ready to accomplish their assigned missions, Army headquarters will need to organize and train with other Service and interagency forces, typically under the command and control of a combatant commander. The new joint and interagency headquarters will need to develop end-to-end concepts of operation for operational- and tactical-level tasks in cooperation with the combatant commands, the other Services, and other government agencies. This includes identifying the interdependencies that the joint and interagency forces will have.

Preparing potential JTF HQ to command will require an investment on the part of the Army, the DoD, and other government agencies in committing units and in training them together. Of course, these commitments must work both ways—and Army units must be equally quick to support operations led by other Service components as called on to do so.

**Improve the process of staffing, training, and shaping JTF HQ.** Army headquarters and the major Army commands should help the combatant commanders develop mission-specific joint manning documents and interagency agreements to fill billets. Once alerted for deployment, the Army should press for JTF commanders to receive assigned personnel in time for them to participate in predeployment training. The Army should also seek to increase habitual relationships among Army headquarters and joint and interagency elements. This should include joint and interagency participation in Army-sponsored training and exercises.

None of the recommendations above will be easy to implement, and any effort to coordinate assignment of personnel from other Services and agencies will always face hurdles. But the reality is that the demand for JTFs will continue, and, if history is any guide, the Army will face the lion's share of this demand. Implementing the recommendations above will not only ease the process but also promises to make the Army more effective in carrying them out.
We would like to thank our study sponsors, Lieutenant General James Lovelace, Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Department of the Army (G-3), and Lieutenant General David Melcher, Deputy Chief of Staff (G-8). We owe a particular debt of thanks to our action officers, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Johnson (G-3) and Timothy Muchmore (G-8) for offering excellent insights, advice, and support. We also would like to thank Colonel James Dickens, Army Forces Command, and Lieutenant Colonel Ted Crisco, Combined Arms Command, for their many substantive contributions to our work.

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### Abbreviations

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<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>special forces group</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Background

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has employed joint task forces (JTFs) for more than 40 years. The headquarters established to lead JTF operations have been employed for an increasingly wide scope and scale of contingencies—and for increasingly challenging missions. In recent years, JTF HQ have become the operational-level command headquarters of choice—allowing combatant commanders (COCOMs) to focus their combatant commands and Service component staffs on theater-wide tasks.

The central role of JTF HQ was made clear in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report:

The joint force of the future will have more robust and coherent joint command and control capabilities. Rapidly deployable, standing Joint Task Force headquarters will be available to the Combatant Commanders in greater numbers to meet the range of potential contingencies. These headquarters will enable the real-time synthesis of operations and intelligence functions and processes, increasing joint force adaptability and speed of action.1

However, there is growing belief among senior DoD officials that JTF HQ have some serious shortcomings.2 The Deputy Secretary of

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2 Wolfowitz (2004), and Rumsfeld (2005a).
Defense directed Joint Force Command (JFCOM) to “investigate innovative ways to make Service operational headquarters immediately capable of commanding and controlling integrated joint operations.” Taken together, the views of the top DoD leadership regarding JTF HQ deployments can be summarized this way:\footnote{A useful and important exercise would be to “critique the critique” of JTF performance to ensure that attention is being paid to the most pressing shortfalls. In this study, however, we are responding to the leadership perspectives that have been expressed, since they represent an important, though not exhaustive, set of issues.}

- It takes too long for the lead Service to establish JTF HQ using current practices.
- The JTF HQ that have been established are often undermanned, underequipped, and undertrained and do not fully integrate the joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities needed to accomplish their missions.
- The Services should anticipate that the demand for JTF HQ will remain high, that notice will be short, and that the missions given to them will span the full spectrum of military operations.

**Definition of JTF Headquarters**

Joint doctrine describes a number of functions and boards, centers, and cells that may constitute a JTF or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) staff organization, as shown in Figure 1.1.

The JTF template has the following elements:\footnote{Joint Staff (2005).}

- a core element to provide the command group and various J-1 through J-9 staff elements typically included in JTF HQ
- trained personnel from the appropriate military Service to man the boards, centers, and cells (e.g., those shown in Figure 1.1) that the JTF commander decides to include in his or her headquarters
- joint augmentees to provide depth in such critical areas as intelligence (J-2), logistics (J-4), and communications (J-6)
Figure 1.1
Joint Task Force Headquarters Template

SOURCE: Joint Staff (2005).
NOTE: DCJTF = deputy commander CJTF.
a This function may be assigned to a subordinate commander.
• specialized joint and interagency elements to provide expertise in such areas as the detection, safing, and removal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); civil-military operations; and liaison with law enforcement authorities, as needed for the mission.

Within this general template, the composition of JTF HQ will vary greatly, from small organizations with only a few functions, to others with a complete joint staff and many boards, cells, and centers. Ultimately, no two JTF HQ will be alike; the JTF commander tailors his or her organization to include those elements needed for the contingency at hand, given the inevitable time pressures and constraints—such as the availability of key personnel.

**Study Objective and Analytic Approach**

The objective of this study is to help the Army improve the ability of its Service tactical headquarters to command and control joint, interagency, and multinational forces in diverse environments, across a range of missions, including those emphasized in guidance from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). In other words, our objective is to help improve the Army’s ability to plan for providing the core of future JTF HQ when requested to do so.

Our study objective motivated the following analytic questions:

1. How often have JTFs been employed and for what types of missions? What problems have emerged? Which of these problems are most important for the DoD and the Army to resolve? (Chapter Two)

2. What missions might be assigned to future JTFs? What Army, joint, and interagency capabilities will be needed to accomplish these missions? What future demand for these missions should the DoD (and the Army) anticipate? (Chapter Three)

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5 Rumsfeld (2006).
3. How might the Army use its tactical headquarters to meet the future demand for JTF HQ? (Chapter Four)

4. How should the Army prepare the JTF HQ that it provides to promote integration of joint and interagency capabilities? (Chapter Five)

The final chapter, Chapter Six, includes our conclusions and recommendations.
In this chapter, we describe observations from past and ongoing JTF operations. We begin by looking at historical JTF deployments to gain a sense of how many have been conducted, what missions they have undertaken, and how the headquarters were composed. We also examine how JTF HQ have been staffed.

Next, we assess some of the challenges that JTF HQ have faced in recent operations. First is Army tactical headquarters’ challenge in integrating the operations of joint and interagency forces. Second is Army headquarters’ challenge in establishing the functions and staffs necessary to command and control such complex missions as stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) or WMD-elimination operations.

Finally, we close this chapter by examining some DoD initiatives to improve JTF command and control in future contingencies.

**Historical Force Deployments**

The DoD has often created temporary task force organizations outside its permanent commands. Over the past four decades, temporary or ad hoc task forces have been established to conduct a variety of missions across the entire spectrum of military operations. These missions have ranged from military support to U.S. civilian authorities (e.g.,

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JTF-Katrina), to combat and stability operations (e.g., Multi-National Force–Iraq [MNF-I]), to counter-WMD operations (e.g., 75th Exploitation Task Force).

JTFs can be established by the Secretary of Defense, by a combatant commander, by a combined force commander (CFC) (e.g., Combined Force Command [CFC]–Korea or CFC-Afghanistan), or by another CJTF commander. Since 1970, JTFs have been established and deployed to conduct operations in approximately 300 separate contingencies. These contingencies have occurred within every geographic combatant command, for nearly every type of military mission, and span the scale from very small to very large.

A few of these operations (e.g., MNF-I) were organized along the lines of subunified combatant commands staffed entirely with individual augmentees (IAs) from the Services. Others have been commanded by Service tactical headquarters with little joint augmentation (e.g., JTF–Atlas Response providing humanitarian assistance to Zaire). Most, however, had a Service tactical headquarters as their core, with augmentation from joint forces and organizations.2

The employment of these joint forces in contingencies over the past four decades is summarized in Table 2.1. The first row displays the number of new JTF HQ assigned in each decade and deployed to contingencies. This number is displayed as an average for each year in the decades of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s and as the per-year value for the years 2000 through 2005. The second row gives the number of deployments continuing from prior years, again as an average for the same three decades and as the per-year value for the years 2000 through 2005. The third row totals the deployments of the previous

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2 Subunified commands constitute the totality of land, sea, air, and special operations forces (SOF) in an area of responsibility. Examples include Alaskan Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and U.S. Forces Japan; MNF-I plays a similar role in Iraq. Service tactical headquarters include numbered air forces, Army or Marine Corps divisions, Army corps, Navy battle groups, and some other formations. Most of the JTFs centered on a Service tactical headquarters “core” were augmented with specialized personnel and capabilities from the other Services, such as air, maritime, and special operations personnel augmenting an Army corps. Our analysis focuses on this last category of headquarters.
Table 2.1
Deployment of Joint Task Forces to Conduct Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of new</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>headquarters deployed each year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number continuing from prior year</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>headquarters deployed during year or decade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average JTF</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deployment duration, days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: U.S. Joint Forces Command (2005b), Estrada (2005), and RAND.  

Average for each year of the decade.

two rows for each time period. The last row provides the average number of days that each JTF spent conducting operations.³

Two interesting points emerge from Table 2.1. First, the 11 headquarters assigned and deployed in 2004 equals the average number assigned and deployed during the 1990s and is one more than the average for the 1980s. The number of operations continuing from the previous years rose dramatically over this same period: from an average of three operations continuing from previous years during the 1980s, to an average of nine in the 1990s, to 18 continuing operations in each of 2003, 2004, and 2005. This has resulted in the “piling up” of contingency obligations in recent years.

Also interesting for Army leadership is the average number of days spent deployed for these contingencies. As shown in the fourth

³ We scrubbed the original list to eliminate those operations commanded by the combatant commander directly (e.g., Desert Storm) or through the Service component of a COCOM (e.g., Vigilant Warrior). The remaining entries were either commanded by formal JTF HQ or by Service tactical headquarters acting in that capacity.
row of the table, JTFs were deployed for 63 days on average during the 1970s and well over 600 days through the end of 2005. Many of these contingencies continue today and hence continue to accrue still more days. The increasing length of deployments is at odds with the doctrinal notion that JTFs are temporary organizations. Indeed, some of the JTFs within the database have continued for many years, causing a long-term staffing demand.4

JTFs have been employed for a broad range of missions over the past several decades. The mix of contingencies and the change of that mix over time are also notable (see Table 2.2). The number of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTR (including HAST)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HD/CS</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show of force</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent positioning</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military supply</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td><strong>115</strong></td>
<td><strong>121</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** U.S. Joint Forces Command (2005c), Estrada (2005), and RAND. **NOTES:** HAST = humanitarian assistance; HD/CS = homeland defense and civil support; NEO = noncombatant evacuation operation.

4 Operations SOUTHERN WATCH and NORTHERN WATCH continued for most of the 1990s until the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). JTF-Bravo has conducted counterinsurgency operations in the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) since 1983; and Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)–West, –North, and –South have supported counterdrug operations (under various names) for nearly 20 years.
missions fitting the newly named category of SSTR operations has increased over the time period observed. Also increasing is the number of combat and HD/CS operations. On the decline is “show of force” operations and operations defined in the historical database as “contingent positioning” and “military supply.” (Although beyond the scope of our analysis, it is interesting to note that the number of NEOs has declined dramatically since the 1990s.)

Observations from Recent and Ongoing Deployments

In this section, we analyze in more detail some of the operations led by JTF HQ from 1999 through 2005 (see Table 2.3). This time period is interesting because it captures a particularly busy time for Joint Force Command, as we described in the last section, and because it includes strategic priorities both before and during the global war on terrorism. Typically, the lead Service provides most of the personnel required to staff JTF headquarters. This includes the headquarters functional staff (e.g., J-1, J-2) and the various boards, cells, and other centers required by the commander (as described in Chapter One). In addition, the lead Service takes the primary role of providing the critically important “unit fill.” This includes the signals, intelligence, and other elements needed to support headquarters operations.

Army commanders were assigned to lead many of the JTF HQ from 2000 to 2005. Of the JTF HQ assessed within this time period,

5 As we have already mentioned, what has changed most is the length of time over which these operations have continued.

6 We cannot say with certainty why the JTF form of headquarters was selected in these cases. In reading Joint Publication 3-33 (Joint Staff, 2007), we can speculate that forces from all the Services were judged necessary to accomplish these missions—hence, a JTF was selected to give the commander the necessary joint command authority. Also, it appears that Service tactical headquarters were used as a core in those cases in which they had many of the capabilities needed and could be deployed relatively quickly. Because these missions were planned to be temporary, a subordinate unified command was not necessary. (Although MNF-I has many similarities to a subordinate unified command, the presumption has been that the U.S. mission in Iraq is to be temporary. Therefore, a permanent structure would be an unnecessary—and politically awkward—step.)
Table 2.3
Joint Task Forces Operating from 2000 Through 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Core Unit</th>
<th>Lifetime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JTF-Bravo</td>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc (Army)</td>
<td>1983–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-4 (JIATF-South)</td>
<td>HD/CS</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>1989–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-5 (JIATF-West)</td>
<td>HD/CS</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>1989–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-6 (JIATF-North)</td>
<td>HD/CS</td>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc (Army)</td>
<td>1989–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Falcon/Join Guard</td>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>1999–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF–Skilled Anvil</td>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>7th Army</td>
<td>1999–2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF–Civil Support</td>
<td>HD/CS</td>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc (Army)</td>
<td>1999–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Access</td>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Medevac</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determined Response</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-Piton</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-Olympics</td>
<td>HD/CS</td>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc (Army)</td>
<td>2001–2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF–Full Accounting</td>
<td>MIA/KIA</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>2001–2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-HLS/HD</td>
<td>HD/CS</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>2001–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-GNO</td>
<td>Computer security</td>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>2001–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-509</td>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>2001–2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-510</td>
<td>Combat/SSTR</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
<td>2002–2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-160/170/GTMO</td>
<td>Counterterror</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
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</tr>
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<td>JTF-H</td>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
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<td>CJTF-180/76</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>XVIII Corps</td>
<td>2002–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Core Unit</td>
<td>Lifetime</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF–Autumn Return</td>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>10 SFG</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-519</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>7th Fleet</td>
<td>2002–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF-HOA</td>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>2nd Marine Division</td>
<td>2002–2005</td>
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<td>JTF-4</td>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc (Army)</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>SETAF</td>
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<td>CJTF-7</td>
<td>Combat/SSTR</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>V Corps</td>
<td>2003–2004</td>
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<td>JTF-58</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>7th Fleet</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>Ad hoc (Army)</td>
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<td>III Corps</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Ad hoc (Army)</td>
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<td>Ad hoc (Army)</td>
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<td>x 3</td>
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<td>SSTR</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
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<td>JTF–National Scout</td>
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<td>NORTHCOM</td>
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<td>CSF-536 (Tsunami)</td>
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<td>JTF-114</td>
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<td>JTF-Rita</td>
<td>HD/CS</td>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>5th Army</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** U.S. Joint Forces Command (2005c), Estrada (2005), and RAND.

**NOTES:** AFIC = Armed Forces Inaugural Committee; CENTCOM = Central Command; DNC = Democratic National Committee; EUCOM = European Command; FSSG = Fleet Service Support Group; GNO = Global Network Operations; HLS = homeland security; HOA = Horn of Africa; GTMO = Guantánamo; KIA = killed in action; MIA = missing in action; MNC-I = Multi-National Corps–Iraq; MNSTC-I = Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq; NORTHCOM = Northern Command; PACOM = Pacific Command; RNC = Republican National Convention; SETAF = Southern European Task Force; SFG = special forces group; STRATCOM = Strategic Command.
Regular Army or Army National Guard officers led more than half. More recently, the Army has provided the majority of personnel assigned to these task forces. Of the 3,900 billets authorized for the JTF HQ operating in 2004, more than 2,400 were assigned to be filled by the Army, either as part of a core headquarters unit or as individual augmentees.

It is interesting to note how much time the commanders and their staffs were given to plan and prepare for operations before they were deployed. A deployment warning order puts the assigned commander and his or her staff on notice that they may be deployed at a moment’s notice. Data concerning the time given to the commander and his or her staff to prepare for deployment after receiving a deployment warning order were available for 16 of the JTFs shown in Table 2.3. These data are compiled in Figure 2.1.

The warning time given to recent JTF HQ has varied considerably, with 30 percent of those shown here having greater than six weeks of warning and the remaining 70 percent having five weeks or less to prepare after receiving a deployment warning. Of this second category, two JTFs were given one week and two no time to prepare; essentially, their warning order was their order to deploy or begin operations.

The important question, though, is whether the warning times were generally adequate or too short. A longer warning time might be preferred to the degree that it leads to a speedier deployment. A quicker JTF deployment to a humanitarian assistance mission might speed relief to the victims of natural or other disasters. An earlier JTF HQ deployment to a WMD-elimination mission might mean the difference between success and failure. However, the data do not provide conclusive evidence that any mission failed simply because it took too long to prepare for—or that a premature deployment caused a mission to fail because of a lack of adequate preparation.

In fact, the most frequent comment made in after-action reports was not that these JTFs lacked sufficient time to prepare for deployment. Rather, it was observed that these JTFs had to adapt their organization and training for missions that they had not fully anticipated and

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then had significant shortfalls in many of the key specialties needed to accomplish those missions. Gaining the personnel needed to augment the deployed headquarters was more often an issue than was the ability to move an existing headquarters to a contingency. (Of course, forming a new headquarters completely ad hoc for deployment requires that all of the needed headquarters personnel be found.) More discussion on this topic appears in the next section.

Headquarters Structures of Selected Recent and Ongoing Operations

We examine in some detail eight of the recent contingencies described in Table 2.3, with passing references to a handful of additional operations.\(^8\) We chose several missions that featured deployed ground opera-

\(^8\) It is highly desirable to examine in depth as many of the cases in Table 2.3 as possible. Unfortunately, a detailed quantitative description has been documented for very few of these
tions, as shown in Table 2.4. The cases featured span a range of mission size, scope, type, and lead Services. The headquarters staffs that the lead Services established for these contingencies differ considerably. The JTF HQ in Table 2.4 are arranged in order of increasing manpower size.

The first headquarters shown in Table 2.4 was established through Special Operations Command (SOCPAC) under U.S. Pacific Command to deploy SOF to combat terrorism. This task force was deployed in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)—Philippines.9

The second headquarters was established by EUCOM to command JTF–Atlas Response (JTF-AR). EUCOM established JTF-AR to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in response to massive flooding in Botswana, Mozambique, and Zaire. U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) provided the 3rd Air Force

Table 2.4
Selected Recent Contingencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JTF-510</th>
<th>JTF-AR</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>CJTF-HOA</th>
<th>CJTF-180 and CFC-A/ CJTF-76</th>
<th>Skilled Anvil</th>
<th>MNC-I</th>
<th>CJTF-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>1,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>HAST</td>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Combat/ SSTR</td>
<td>Combat/ SSTR</td>
<td>Combat/ SSTR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>SOCPAC</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length (months)</td>
<td>44a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43a</td>
<td>44a</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18a</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: CFC-A = Combined Force Command–Afghanistan; CT = counterterrorism.

a Still in operation at the end of 2005.

operations. We were able to find detailed manning data for Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH, JTF-GTMO, JTF-Olympics, and the cases we chose to highlight in Table 2.4.

headquarters to command the task force. The headquarters comprised 147 military personnel and was in operation for a two-month period during 2000.

The next JTF HQ commanded SSTR operations in Haiti in 2004. The core of this JTF HQ was the Marine Corps 2nd Fleet Service Support Group. The JTF HQ included a total of 172 military personnel.

CJTF-HOA was established to address conditions that could spawn terrorism in the named portion of CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.\(^{10}\) The Marine Corps assigned the 2nd Marine Division as the core unit of a headquarters comprising 211 military personnel.

In May 2002, General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander, assigned the XVIII Airborne Corps to establish CJTF-180 to command and control combat and SSTR operations in Afghanistan. A total of 521 military personnel were ultimately assigned to the CJTF-180 headquarters. In 2003, CJTF-180 was split into Combined Force Command–Afghanistan to conduct operations at the strategic and operational levels and CJTF-76 at the tactical level. Derivatives of these commands continue operations today.

At the request of the Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR), EUCOM began planning operations to deter or defeat potential Serbian aggression against Montenegro. EUCOM assigned the U.S. Army, Europe, to stand up JTF–Skilled Anvil to command and control the anticipated operations. U.S. Seventh Army formed the core of JTF–Skilled Anvil, which included a total of 697 military personnel. JTF–Skilled Anvil existed for 12 months, from July 1999 through June 2000.

The last two columns in Table 2.4 describe MNC-I and CJTF-7. The CJTF-7 was established in May 2003, immediately after major combat operations in Iraq were declared to be over. In 2004, the duties of CJTF-7 were split between two new organizations: MNF-I to command operations in Iraq at the strategic level and MNC-I to command at the operational level. MNC-I was composed of 805 military personnel centered on the Army III Corps. MNC-I was subsequently under

---

the command of XVIII Airborne Corps and then V Corps in its return to Iraq.

**Staffing JTF Headquarters**

The composition of the headquarters staffs established for the JTFs described above is detailed in Table 2.5. For example, the command group of JTF–Atlas Response was staffed with 13 personnel, the J2 cell with 24, the J3 cell with 21, and so on. In addition to the joint staff, eight liaison officers were assigned according to the joint manning document.

### Table 2.5
**Staff Structure of Selected JTF Headquarters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JTF-510</th>
<th>JTF-AR</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>JTF-HOA</th>
<th>CJTF-180</th>
<th>MNC-I</th>
<th>JTF-SA</th>
<th>CJTF-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command group</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>182</td>
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<tr>
<td>J4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>J6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>96</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>127</td>
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<tr>
<td>J7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td>J8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J9/PA</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special staff</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>697</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** U.S. Joint Forces Command J-1-3, and Estrada (2005).

**NOTES:** LNO = liaison officer; PA = public affairs.
(JMD), as well as 29 personnel in the various specialty functions, such as the judge advocate general, the surgeon general, the chaplain, and so on. The total approved size of JTF-Atlas Response was 147.

In comparison, for CJTF-7, the command group alone was assigned 78 personnel, the J2 cell 428, and the J3 cell 251. Overall, the CJTF-7 headquarters was assigned 1,328 military personnel.

Since JTFs have historically been temporary rather than permanent organizations, they are manned from scratch when established in accordance with approved JMDs.11 As noted above, JTFs are often deployed on short time lines. Most of the recent JTFs accommodated short time lines by forming around a core unit provided by one of the Services. Typically, the soldiers assigned from the core unit satisfy from one-third to one-half of the personnel positions needed for the staff, and augmentees from the parent Service provide additional personnel. Individual augmentees from the other Services are used to fill the remaining positions. (See Figure 6.7 for the parent Service contributions in the cases of particular interest in this analysis.)

In principle, IAs should be provided from all of the Services. Unfortunately, the process to assign augmentees may take a significant amount of time. The process includes designing the JTF headquarters, developing a JMD to staff the positions identified, having the JMD approved by the combatant commander and the joint staff, and having the combatant commander formally request the forces needed.12 In the meantime, the lead Service often fills some of the shortfall by assigning its own personnel to augment those provided by the core unit. An

11 According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (undated a), p. 2:

Joint Manning Document—A manning document of unfunded temporary duty positions constructed for or by a supported commander that identifies the specific IA positions to support an organization during contingency operations. JMDs for permanent activities with a joint table of distribution (JTD) or joint table of mobilization and distribution (JTMD) should only identify IA positions for temporary military or DoD personnel. JMDs for activities without a JTD or JTMD (e.g., some JTFs) should identify all positions required for that activity to support the mission. Positions should be identified as unit fill, coalition fill, civilian/contractor fill, or IA fill on the JMD.

12 The procedures for developing and approving a JMD can be found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (undated b), pp. A-1–A-5.
excellent example is the formation and manning of CJTF-7 (see Figure 2.2).

The CJTF-7 was initially conceived to command and control SSTR operations in Iraq at the operational and tactical levels. It began with a staff of around 595 military personnel built around the Army V Corps. Over the course of its first few months of operations, CENTCOM realized that the CJTF-7 mission would include significant combat operations, a role in training Iraqi police and military forces, and growing security and reconstruction operations. A larger headquarters was deemed necessary, and a total of 1,400 billets were approved. However, it ultimately took six months to grow the headquarters staff size to 1,100 military personnel—still well short of its approved complement.

Although CJTF-7 is clearly an outlier, the need of JTF HQ to receive significant augmentation is consistent across all the cases for which we have data. Even when a Service provides the core unit of a

**Figure 2.2**
**Time Line for Manning CJTF-7**

![Time Line for Manning CJTF-7](chart)


RAND MG675-2.2
JTF HQ, approximately half of the personnel—and many of the specialties key to the assigned mission—are usually provided from other lead-Service sources or from the sister Services. Although they may deploy and conduct operations before receiving all their personnel, JTF HQ have their effectiveness limited to some degree until they receive the specialties key to the assigned mission.

**Integrating Joint and Interagency Capabilities**

Task forces are made joint when the forces and capabilities from more than one Service are needed to accomplish a mission effectively and efficiently. Joint forces that depend on each other to accomplish tasks and to mitigate risks are termed *interdependent*. Developing competence and confidence in joint interdependence is an important issue for the “dependent” force.

The Army has noted several interdependencies as particularly important in Army-led JTFs. In recent operations, ground forces have depended on air-delivered ordnance to pin or wear down superior numbers of enemy heavy forces and to allow maneuver in the face of these forces. Conventional forces have depended on SOF for their specialized capabilities in reconnaissance, direct action, coalition building, and operations to secure high-value targets. For their part, SOF have depended on conventional forces to provide security, quick reaction reinforcements, and logistics and to coordinate fires and maneuver to avoid fratricide. Conventional operations have depended on influence and information operations to achieve effects not possible with classic fires and maneuver alone. In the following subsections, we examine these interdependencies in more detail.

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13 These topics have been prominent subjects in Army after-action reports from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and the featured subject of several Army and joint reports and papers listed in the bibliography to this monograph.
Air-Ground Integration

Senior Army leaders have praised air support during the major combat operations of OIF and during later counterinsurgency operations. To a large degree, this was attributable to the strong teams that the Army and Air Force have created through many years of hard work. At the very heart of these teams are Air Support Operations Groups (ASOGs) and Squadrons (ASOSs), and their constituent Air Support Operations Centers (ASOCs), air liaison officers (ALOs), and Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs). The Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) and the Battlefield Coordination Detachments (BCDs) also helped coordinate efforts at the operational level.

**Air Support Operations Groups, Squadrons, and Centers.** Until recently, the Air Force had permanently assigned ASOGs, and their associated ASOCs, to Army Corps headquarters. The Air Force has also established habitual relationships between ASOSs and those Army tactical headquarters typically requiring significant air support in assigned operations (see Figure 2.3).

From the Army perspective, Corps headquarters have used their habitual relationship with their assigned ASOG to great effect. The V Corps credits its close working relationship with the 4th ASOG for allowing the Army and Air Force to develop a new role for airpower in shaping combat operations at the Corps level in OIF. This allowed V Corps much greater flexibility in using airpower to find and destroy priority ground threats on a compressed time line—very useful when a relatively small number of brigades face a heavily armed and numerically superior adversary.

The III Corps has similarly noted its relationship with the 3rd ASOG in its ability to integrate fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in combat operations at As Samawah. In addition, the III Corps developed a Joint and Combined Fires Effects Cell that integrated information operations, artillery, and airpower by functionally integrating its Force Field Artillery headquarters and Fire Support Element

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14 Wallace (2003), Metz (undated), and Kirkpatrick (2004).

with the 3rd ASOG (see Figure 2.4). In fact, the ASOG commander (and Corps ALO) was installed as the deputy commander of this cell.

**Air Component Coordination Element.** In mid-2002, the CENTCOM coalition forces air component commander (CFACC) created an Air Component Coordination Element as his representative to each of the other functional components (land, maritime, and special operations) and to CJTF-180 and CJTF-HA. An Air Force brigadier or major general commanded each ACCE.

The ACCE is the primary operational-level conduit to the other components. The mission of the ACCE is to effectively represent the CFACC to counterpart component commanders—for example, by providing a continuous flow of effective operational-level communications between the CFACC and the Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC). This requires that the ACCE participate in the CFLCC planning and execution cycles to represent the
Figure 2.4
III Corps Joint Fires and Effects Cell Organization for MNC-I

CFACC’s operational vision and intent. The ACCE provides the CFACC with presence in the host component’s headquarters and activities and the unique perspective that presence provides.

The Air Force is in the process of incorporating the ACCE concept into its doctrine and intends to propose that it be codified in joint doctrine.

**Joint Task Force Air Component Command.** The alternative to establishing an ACCE is for the combatant commander to assign a JTF Air Component Command. Joint doctrine makes provisions for air, ground, maritime, and special operations components to JTF commanders in a fashion similar to those serving under combatant commands. Joint Task Force 519, for example, has Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) assigned as the air component and I Corps as the land component. Joint Task Force–Liberia also had an air component, filled by
the 3rd Air Force from USAFE. Such an arrangement can help to clarify command arrangements in theater.

Conversely, CJTF-180 in Afghanistan did not have an air component. The CENTCOM CFACC provided support to CJTF-180 from the Persian Gulf CAOC. For the most part, this worked satisfactorily. However, this arrangement on occasion caused some confusion as to who had the authority to employ air-delivered weapons.

Occasionally, questions arose as to the rules of engagement and, thus, the approval authority for weapon delivery in delicate circumstances (e.g., areas close to villages) had to be sorted out. The CFACC and his designees (such as the CAOC director) have approval authority within the guidelines of the JTF commanders they support. The JTF commander can override decisions of supporting commanders and has the penultimate authority within his area of responsibility—second only to the combatant commander. The JTF commander should, in principle, also be able to delegate this authority to a subordinate commander (e.g., the commander of a named operation). Sometimes, however, it took some time to sort out the authority to approve the employment of air-delivered weapons among the various subordinate commanders. This kind of delay might, in some circumstances, impose an avoidable risk on interdependent ground forces.

**Battlefield Coordination Detachment.** The Army assigns BCDs to represent the theater Army commander to the CFACC of a selected combatant command. The BCDs typically take up residence within the CAOC once serious planning for the employment of ground forces in an operation begins. During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the BCDs helped to coordinate deep fires and air defenses, facilitate information flows, and integrate theaterwide fires and maneuvers. This relationship seemed to work well in both OEF and OIF and may be expanded by the Army in future operations.

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17 An important point is that the individual ground and air commanders change over time (because of duty shifts or deployment rotations, for example), place, and immediate tactical situation. Thus, the approval process followed may differ from the formal process and may change somewhat with each situation.
Integrating SOF and Conventional Forces

In both OIF and OEF, SOF have had important roles in major combat operations, counterinsurgency missions, and SSTR operations. During OIF, SOF also had a prominent role in searching for WMD before those suspected weapons could be used against U.S. and coalition forces. More recently, Army Special Forces played a prominent role in rescuing civilians in disaster response operations as part of JTF-Katrina.\(^{18}\)

SOF have traditionally operated independently in missions that demand small, discrete, and highly trained forces. In OEF, however, SOF and conventional forces frequently operated together. The unconventional warfare capabilities of SOF, when properly integrated with the firepower and manpower of conventional forces, have increased joint operational effectiveness in combat.\(^{19}\)

Unfortunately, difficulties integrating SOF and conventional forces emerged after the opening phases of the Afghanistan campaign. As the operation grew in numbers of assigned troops, CFLCC Forward was established at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, under the Combined Joint Task Force Mountain. Special Operations Forces had a separate reporting chain to Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)—North/Task Force Dagger, Joint Special Operations Task Force—South/Task Force K-Bar, or Task Force Sword. These task forces all reported to the combined force special operations component commander, who was under the operational control (OPCON) of the combatant commander General Franks. Hence, General Franks himself was the lowest echelon exercising unity of command over special operations and conventional forces in Afghanistan. This negatively affected the unity of effort between the CFLCC-Forward staff and the staffs of the SOF under the CFLCC-Forward’s tactical control (TACON) and restricted the ability of the CJTF Mountain commander to effectively coordinate with subordinate SOF units.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) In particular, the 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups contributed 20 boat crews that were credited with rescuing nearly 2,000 citizens in the first week after the hurricane struck. See “Few People, Small Boats, Big Effort” (2005).

\(^{19}\) Center for Army Lessons Learned (2002).

According to an early report,

The use of SOF in concert with conventional forces was difficult due to poorly defined command relationships and the predisposition of SOF to avoid information sharing or conduct effective parallel planning with conventional forces. SOF elements’ unwillingness to share information vertically with the CFLCC staff and horizontally with other conventional forces hindered operational and tactical planning and execution.21

Over time, informal relationships between members of the CFLCC staff and the SOF units helped to improve cooperation and information sharing between special operations and conventional forces. A later report stated, “SOF and conventional forces were conducting effective integrated operations alongside Afghan National Army and other host nation security forces. Rarely were Combined, Joint, Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) units acting unilaterally.”22

Three factors contributed to the significant improvement in integration described in the later report from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (2005b). First, accurate, timely, all-source intelligence was made available down to each Operational Detachment–Alpha via tactical Secret Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNet) terminals. Second, a CJSOTF was established with OPCON or TACON over most SOF and was itself under the OPCON of the newly created Combined Force Command–Afghanistan. The CJSOTF was required to brief the CJTF on all but routine operations. These OPCON command relationships helped ensure unity of effort by establishing a formal unity of command.23 But, perhaps most important, the CJSOTF was located across the street from the CJTF, and the CJSOTF commander participated in daily update briefings with the CJTF. This prompted conventional

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22 Center for Army Lessons Learned (2005b).
23 However, the unified command was also said to limit SOF freedom of action, slow concept of operations (CONOPs) approval, and cause CONOPs to be altered in ways that decreased SOF effectiveness and increased mission risk.
forces (CF) and SOF elements to work closely together and build the trust needed to integrate mission planning and execution.

Similar issues were observed early in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In the north, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was under the operational control of the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command and subordinated to JSOTF-North. Integrating these conventional and SOF caused friction, since these units did not habitually train together and hence had not developed the trust and procedures necessary for working through the issues that frequently emerge during operations. Conventional forces are traditionally the supported force, and the Army’s doctrine on integrating SOF and CF was not mature enough at that time to provide adequate guidance.24

The integration of SOF and CF in OIF seems to have improved after major combat operations when the Combined, Joint, Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) was established. The CJSOTF-AP has described integrated SOF/conventional force operations as “to the point of fusion” without having any formal command and control relationship. This was credited to the aggressive and effective use of SOF liaison officers and noncommissioned officers placed with each division, the CJTF, and other government agencies responsible for an area of operation (AO) in which SOF operated. One division reciprocated by placing a liaison officer at the CJSOTF. Perhaps more important, habitual relationships were formed at the company, battalion, and brigade levels. This aided planning and helped to deconflict and synchronize the execution of operations.25

**Integrating Conventional and Influence/Information Operations**

Army doctrine states that “information is at the very heart of many stability operations. In fact, IO may be designated as the main effort during certain phases of an operation.”26 This viewpoint was underscored by then–Major General Raymond T. Odierno when commanding the 4th Infantry Division in OIF: “Information Operations were

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24 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn (2004), Chapters 4 and 7.

25 Center for Army Lessons Learned (2003b).

26 Center for Army Lessons Learned (undated c), Chapter 2.
key to everything we did. Everyone in the Division was involved in IO.”\textsuperscript{27} Integrated information operations are equally relevant to combat operations and subsequent peace operations.

The ongoing combat, counterinsurgency, and stability and security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the importance of information operations, influence operations, and strategic communications. JTF commanders are increasingly obliged to plan and conduct strategic communications and influence/information operations simultaneously at the strategic/political, operational, and tactical levels. These strategic communications and influence/information operations must be integrated with simultaneous offensive and defensive operations throughout a campaign.

Strategic communications campaigns and influence/information operations involve a wide range of missions and activities. The aims of strategic communications and influence/information operations are to inform, foster changes in attitudes, and influence behaviors as appropriate for each of several target audiences, including

- enemy leaders and forces
- hostile, neutral, and friendly civilian indigenous populations.

**Strategic Communications Intended for Media Outlets**

Winning over communities and their leaders is an important component of the perception management battle and is central to strategic communications and information/influence operations. In OEF, tasks relating to information/influence operations have included establishing free medical clinics for Afghan civilians to gain local support and other civil-military operations.\textsuperscript{28} Similarly, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted parallel lines of operations in OIF, helping the local population deal with issues relating to sewage, water, electricity, and trash. These projects, which employed local labor, were aimed at helping the

\textsuperscript{27} Hollis (2004).

\textsuperscript{28} Center for Army Lessons Learned (undated d).
population, gaining favor with local leaders and populations, and keeping young men busy and out of the insurgency.

Recent operations underscore the need for leadership familiarity with IO capabilities; it is also important to develop habitual relationships with the military forces contributing these capabilities before hostilities begin. Military forces including civil affairs, civil-military operations, public affairs, psychological operations, and the Army’s 1st IO Command all contribute to information/influence operations. Special Operations Forces also represent an important IO capability, since their objectives and accomplishments are often aligned with IO objectives. At the more technical end of the spectrum, computer network attack, exploitation, and defense and electronic warfare (EW) provide capabilities to help commanders shape the information environment available to adversaries.

**Challenges Posed by Emerging Missions**

Occasionally, a new mission will emerge that poses special challenges to U.S. forces. Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the unique difficulties inherent in SSTR operations. In OIF, counter-WMD operations also gained a new prominence. And the challenge in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina focused the nation’s attention on military support to civil authorities. We will examine each of these operations in some detail in the following pages.

**Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations**

Operations that involve stabilizing a nation or region are constantly evolving, as is the DoD’s approach to accomplishing them. The DoD has been called on to conduct these sorts of operations many times over the past four decades. Some noteworthy examples are the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and operations in Haiti, El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo, Lebanon, and Somalia. The DoD has been engaged in simultaneous SSTR and combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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29 Center for Army Lessons Learned (2005a).
The assigned headquarters in Afghanistan grew to include Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (Senior Operational/Strategic HQ), Combined Security Transition Command (CSTC)–Afghanistan (Training HQ), CJTF-76 (Senior Tactical HQ), and the International Security Assistance Force (Senior NATO Command). Responsible joint headquarters in Iraq grew to include MNF-I (Senior Operational/Strategic HQ), MNC-I (Senior Tactical HQ), and MNSTC-I (Training HQ). Other ongoing missions include counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines and elsewhere in PACOM, stability and security operations in Kosovo (JTF-Falcon), counterterror detention operations in Guantánamo Bay (JTF-GTMO), and counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA).30

It is worth contrasting the extensive preparations that joint commands made for combat as opposed to the evolution of the SSTR mission in Iraq. The combatant command structure, with its separate components for operations on land, sea, and in the air, is well understood and began preparations more than a year before OIF. From the beginning of planning for OIF through the pronounced end of major combat operations in May 2003, the U.S. Central Command conducted combat operations through its components. The U.S. Third Army was named as CFLCC and thereby assumed command of all land forces in theater at the operational level and became the supported commander in its designated area of operations.31 The U.S. V Corps was assigned as the senior Army tactical echelon during major combat operations. V Corps was given a warfighting mission at the tactical level and reported to the CFLCC (see Figure 2.5).

Far less time was taken to prepare the headquarters to command full-spectrum counterinsurgency and SSTR operations, and its operating concepts were formulated on the fly. In May 2003, major combat was declared to be over, and operations entered a security and

30 JTF-HOA is an interesting case. Although the tactical maneuver forces are modest—currently, one rifle company—a fairly large headquarters has been established to lead these operations.

31 The CFLCC was the supporting commander in the west, where it provided ground forces to the air component commander, and in the Persian Gulf, where it provided forces to the Maritime Command.
Figure 2.5
Evolution of Combat and SSTR Operations in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major combat</td>
<td>SSTR operations</td>
<td>SSTR operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Separate tactical</td>
<td>• Corps becomes</td>
<td>• Corps refocused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operation echelons</td>
<td>CFLCC-I</td>
<td>as tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Corps supports</td>
<td>• Supports GCC</td>
<td>• Separate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>and OCPA</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Warfighting</td>
<td>• Warfighting</td>
<td>to support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mission</td>
<td>and SSTR</td>
<td>GCC, political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Joint, coalition</td>
<td>authority, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>forces</td>
<td>other major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Supports WMD,</td>
<td>activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>detainee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: Wallace (2003), Petraeus (2004), Schlesinger (2004), and RAND.
NOTES: CA = civil affairs; EAD = Echelon Above Division; GCC = geographic combatant command; GRD = Gulf Region Division; ISG = Iraq Survey Group; JCC = Joint Contracting Command; MNF = Multi-National Force; OCPA = Office of Coalition and Provisional Authority; TF = task force.

stability phase. The CENTCOM commander and staff redeployed to their peacetime headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Third Army delegated CFLCC responsibilities in Iraq to V Corps while retaining Army Service Component Command and CFLCC duties for the CENTCOM area of responsibility. The prevailing mood at senior levels of the DoD was that the post–major combat operations phase would center on the
rapid return of forces to the United States and the transition of government functions to a new Iraqi government.\textsuperscript{32}

The V Corps was given responsibility to establish and staff Combined Joint Task Force 7 and was given OPCON of the forces remaining in Iraq. Ultimately, the CJTF-7 staff had a much larger job to perform with only the original V Corps staff available to do it. The virulence of fighting in which the country was embroiled after the declared end of major combat operations was not anticipated by the SECDEF or CENTCOM, and the initial, sparse command structure needed significant augmentation.\textsuperscript{33}

Over the next seven months, the size of the CJTF-7 headquarters would grow to more than 1,100 personnel as the staff adapted to the new mission, which now included commanding joint and combined forces, at the operational and tactical levels, for simultaneous combat and SSTR operations. CJTF-7 now reported directly to CENTCOM and directly interfaced with a political authority—the CPA. In addition, CJTF-7 had some obligations to support the ISG in searching for Iraqi WMD, detainee operations, and SOF hunting for high-value targets.

In May 2004, another series of changes occurred. The DoD determined that separate operational and tactical commands were needed to better lead combat and SSTR operations in Iraq. Hence, MNF-I was established as the operational-level command in Iraq. MNF-I reported to CENTCOM and interfaced with the U.S. ambassador in Iraq. MNF-I was also given responsibility for detainee operations, overt special operations, the ISG, the MNSTC-I, the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Joint Contracting Command. MNC-I was established to command ongoing tactical operations.

The demands of the SSTR mission in Iraq were very broad, encompassing WMD elimination, intelligence collection, counter-

\textsuperscript{32} Schlesinger (2004).

\textsuperscript{33} It is unclear to us whether the current joint command structure is an appropriate template for effective future stability and reconstruction operations. Thus, our subsequent discussion of the evolving command structure should be viewed as only descriptive. Additional in-depth study, outside our current research efforts, is needed to develop a baseline template for future SSTR operations.
insurgency and counterterror, reconstruction, training, and a host of humanitarian and civil affairs operations and also included conducting combat operations. Ultimately, a large, diverse, and extensive command structure was established to cover all these demands. At the tactical level, this necessitated the close integration of land combat and noncombat power with strategic and tactical intelligence, as well as air power, special operations, strategic communications, and influence operations. In addition, it took a long time to identify, approve, and deploy the personnel needed to staff the CJTF-7 and, later, the MNF-I/MNC-I headquarters.

**WMD-Elimination Missions**

The most prominent example of a WMD-elimination mission is that given to CENTCOM during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Eliminating the threat of an Iraqi WMD program was the central objective of the war. However, the CENTCOM staff did not begin detailed planning to eliminate Iraq’s ability to hold and employ WMD until November 2002.\(^3\)\(^4\) The earlier primary planning emphasis was on counterforce (destroying WMD deployed to the field and destroying the means to employ WMD) and force protection (destroying weapons in flight and mitigating the effects of WMD use). Operations to identify, capture, secure, and exploit storage sites were treated as secondary, as they posed an additional burden on already strained combat forces. Therefore, these operations were largely planned and executed in an as-able-to fashion.

The exploitation of sensitive sites was delayed by several factors. First, no standing organization existed to plan and execute the full suite of activities involved in the identification, capture, security, and exploitation of WMD sites. Several organizations were quickly established, reporting through differing chains of command. The most prominent of these organizations was the 75th Exploitation Task Force (75th XTF) built around the headquarters battery of the 75th Field Artillery Regiment. The 75th XTF reported directly to the CFLCC

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\(^3\) Van Pelt and Currie (2004).
and commanded site assessment teams, mobile exploitation teams, and a nuclear disablement team (see Figure 2.6).

In addition, separate disablement and elimination (D/E) teams went forward with the 3rd Infantry and 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Divisions and the I Marine Expeditionary Force to secure and exploit chemical or biological weapons that advancing troops might find. Also, SOF operated in the western part of Iraq, looking for Iraqi theater ballistic missiles and WMD caches. These forces reported directly to CENTCOM, as did the ISG when it was established in June 2003.

Second, although the 75th XTF included interagency elements from the DTRA and the DOE, they did not train with these elements before the operation. Worse yet, some of the key personnel did

Figure 2.6
WMD-Elimination Operations in Iraq

NOTES: CFMCC = Combined Force Maritime Component Command; DTRA = Defense Threat Reduction Agency; DOE = Department of Energy; SSE = sensitive site exploitation; TSOC = Theater Special Operations Command.
not arrive in theater until after the end of major combat operations, and even then they did not bring all of their key pieces of equipment (e.g., radiological containment devices). In fact, the procedures to collect and secure radiological materials were not formalized until July 2003—well after the end of major combat operations.

Third, the 75th XTF and the later ISG were small in size compared to the number of sites that they had to examine, and they did not have their own transportation, communications, or security. Therefore, they relied on other units in theater on an as-available basis to help with their missions.35 These groups ended up conducting operations principally alone, with little prior coordination with maneuver units. The small total force size dictated that sites be exploited in serial—not parallel—fashion and periodic attacks on teams slowed progress.

This approach opened the opportunity for some materials to be missed because of poor intelligence on the location of materials or moved before they could be secured, and, in fact, many sites were looted before the teams arrived or before the sites could be adequately secured and searched.

**Homeland Defense/Civil Support Missions**

A prominent recent example of military support to civil authorities was the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Army elements reported through three chains of command: 1st Army commanded all 13,000 regular troops (from across all of the Services) under its authority as JTF-Katrina. These included headquarters elements from the 1st Cavalry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division, which commanded forces at the tactical level in New Orleans. Army and Air National Guard troops remained under state control, including those activated by the state governors for State Active Duty and funded under Title 32.36 The 35th and 38th National Guard Division headquarters provided command and control for National Guard

35 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn (2004), Chapter 4.

36 For a thorough treatment of the efforts of civil and military authorities in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, see Davis et al. (2007).
troops. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers commanded its own uniformed and civilian personnel (see Figure 2.7).

Command and control relationships among military forces operating under Title 10; National Guard forces operating under State Active Duty (including those funded under Title 32); Coast Guard forces operating under Title 14; and federal, state, and local civilian agencies and nongovernmental organizations had to overcome a lack of prior coordination at every level. The 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 1st Cavalry

Figure 2.7
Command Structure for the Hurricane Katrina Relief Mission

- No unified command
- Many players not used to working together and not familiar with large-scale problems
- Unity of effort achieved by consensus not command
- Interagency coordination required but difficult

NOTES: AC = Active Component; ASD = Assistant Secretary of Defense; CSA = Chief of Staff of the Army; DHS = Department of Homeland Security; FEMA = Federal Emergency Management Agency; HD = homeland defense.

37 Davis et al. (2007).
Division, and the 24th and 11th Marine Expeditionary Units were included among the active forces committed. The 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne, was the division ready brigade—assigned to be ready to deploy overseas on short notice. The 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry, had recently returned from a one-year deployment to Baghdad as part of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Thus, it was still in the process of resetting its equipment and rotating its personnel. Both Marine Corps units were preparing for overseas deployments. Therefore, each was deployed to JTF-Katrina without much prior planning for disaster relief operations and with very little coordination with local authorities before deployment.38

Lack of unit familiarity with the area was another issue. The National Guard units were deployed from several states, typically with little information on the situation. Ultimately, LNOs and directors of military support to civilian agencies were the keys to successful integration at the tactical level.

The briefings, press statements, and after-action reports generated during and after Hurricane Katrina mention some differences in the approaches used by the forces and organizations involved. An important example is the set of rules governing the conditions under which military forces can use force in carrying out their assigned duties.39

Rules on use of force (RUFs) differed by state and by the authority under which forces were operating. The National Guard forces operating under Title 32 in Mississippi and Louisiana used RUFs appropriate to the respective state constitutions as developed by the state judge advocates general and in response to directions from the respective state governors. The federal forces operating under Title 10 used RUFs approved by the 1st Army. All missions of any sort requested by

38 General Russell Honore, 1st Army commander, testified that when he first arrived in New Orleans, he did not believe that federal ground forces would be needed. See Davis et al. (2007).

39 The RUFs are only one example of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that must be established by the forces and organizations involved in a Civil Support contingency. We mention RUFs because they affect the civilians involved in a particularly profound way. The point is to highlight the differences in doctrine and TTPs that military and civilian forces should anticipate before being called to a contingency.
civilians had to be vetted through a central clearing organization at the state level before being accepted by the military.

**Department of Defense Initiatives to Improve Command and Control for Future Contingencies**

The DoD has begun several initiatives to improve the ability of the military to establish capable JTF HQ more quickly. The Secretary of Defense has directed the Services and combatant commands to take several specific actions to make selected headquarters capable of leading JTFs. Each combatant command has been directed to designate Service two- and three-star headquarters for priority support as standing JTF HQ.

The U.S. Joint Force Command has established two standing JTF HQ “core elements.” These core elements are offered by JFCOM to serve as the core of JTF HQ to be built from scratch or as a source of personnel and expertise to round out the staff of Service tactical headquarters. Each includes 58, primarily Reserve Component, personnel. The regional combatant commanders have also begun to establish or to identify standing JTF HQ and make other improvements to standing headquarters capabilities.

The JFCOM has also been tasked to develop a process to certify JTF HQ readiness. In addition, JFCOM has been assigned to expand the Joint Manpower Exchange program among the Services, the DoD, and other U.S. government agencies and to improve the JMD development process. Finally, JFCOM has been directed to develop both a training regime to support the operation of JTF HQ and a system to track expert personnel. Separately, JFCOM is also developing a joint

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41 Zimmerman (2004), pp. 28–32.
43 EUCOM has established the European Plans and Operations Center, which can in principle function as a JTF HQ. Similarly, PACOM has established JTF-519. Both of these standing headquarters would need extensive augmentation to lead a major operation.
command and control capability to enhance JTF HQ command and control systems and processes.\textsuperscript{44} This includes integrating them into the collaborative information environment to better integrate with joint, interagency, and multinational forces.

Additional guidance was given in the 2006 \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review Report}. Within that report, the Secretary of Defense provided specific guidance for expanding and improving joint force and JTF HQ capabilities:\textsuperscript{45}

\begin{itemize}
\item Transform designated existing Service operational headquarters to fully functional and scalable joint command and control JTF-capable headquarters beginning in fiscal year 2007:
  \begin{itemize}
  \item more robust and coherent joint command and control capabilities for the joint force in the future
  \item rapidly deployable, standing JTF HQ available to COCOMs in greater numbers to meet the full range of potential contingencies
  \item real-time synthesis of operations and intelligence functions and processes, enabled by these headquarters, thereby increasing joint force adaptability and speed of action
  \item high-quality, relevant plans, produced by these headquarters in as little as six months.
  \end{itemize}
\item Expand 20th Support Command capabilities to enable it to serve as a JTF capable of rapid deployment to command and control WMD-elimination and site exploitation missions by 2007.
\item Create National Guard joint force headquarters in each state.
\end{itemize}

Each of these initiatives should help speed the preparation and deployment of future JTF HQ. However, all of them together will not provide the sorts of headquarters needed to command any but the smallest JTF described in this chapter. Therefore, the Services will still be needed to provide the major portion of future JTF HQ.

\textsuperscript{44} U.S. Joint Forces Command (2005b), pp. v–vi.

Summary

Before moving on to a discussion of future missions, it is useful to sum our observations from past and ongoing contingency operations. First, JTFs are an increasingly popular way for combatant commanders to employ military forces in contingencies. The upsurge in JTF numbers over the past two decades should lead the Services to anticipate future periods of high demand. Recent operations demonstrate that the Army will likely be tasked to lead most of these JTF HQ and provide most of their staffs.

JTF HQ are designed to be temporary organizations but are increasingly remaining in service for long periods of time. This makes it likely that the competition will increase between JTF and other Service component and tactical headquarters for experienced staff and key specialists, as will Manning and capability shortfalls within each.

JTF HQ require substantial tailoring and augmentation to obtain the number of personnel and the skills needed to lead complex missions. Unfortunately, it can take up to six months to develop a JMD, obtain approval, and acquire all of the personnel with the skills needed. Thus, JTF HQ often lack staff in important specialties when they deploy and begin operations.

The forces that routinely train together before operations have been well integrated in theater. For example, the habitual relationships among ground forces and Air Support Operations Squadrons and Groups led to successful integrated operations during OIF. On the other hand, the lack of routine conventional and SOF training contributed to early difficulties in OEF and OIF. Conventional and SOF eventually achieved a significant level of integration when their headquarters synchronized planning and operations in theater.

Joint and interagency task forces were established ad hoc to conduct some of the most important missions in recent operations. These included WMD elimination, SSTR, and homeland defense/civil support. Each of these task forces was compelled to develop operating concepts and plans on the fly as its assigned mission unfolded.

Recent DoD initiatives to stand up some core JTF elements should help speed the preparation of JTF HQ for future contingencies.
However, Service tactical headquarters will still be needed to provide the core of future JTF HQ.
National security priorities have changed in both profound and subtle ways over the course of the current decade. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, emphasized the need to combat terror groups wherever they emerge or seek sanctuary. A more subtle effect has been the assignment of military forces to secure and stabilize nations—or populations in ungoverned areas—while sometimes also conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. These types of operations have highlighted the need for flexible and tailorable joint, combined, and interagency headquarters. Sometimes, these headquarters need to deal with a broad scope of tasks and, occasionally, these operations must be conducted on a large scale.\(^1\)

Another, and growing, danger is that posed by nuclear weapons and, to a lesser degree, biological and chemical weapons in the hands of terrorist or rogue regimes. The 2005 National Defense Strategy describes WMD in the hands of terrorists or dangerous regimes as one of the gravest threats facing the nation.\(^2\) Operations to eliminate WMD will consist of finding the materials and products of a WMD program, securing them, and removing these items from potentially hostile hands. Where intelligence is imperfect, or where those holding

\(^1\) We cannot know with certainty what missions JTF HQ will be assigned in the future. Most of the time, they are likely to be assigned small missions that are more or less routine. Occasionally, they will be assigned urgent missions that may also be large in scale or scope. It is important that U.S. forces be prepared to succeed in the contingencies that pose the gravest threats and be able to handle the many routine missions they are assigned.

\(^2\) Rumsfeld (2005b).
WMD oppose these efforts at a local or national level, it is likely that significant forces will be needed on the ground.

Emergencies and contingencies within the U.S. homeland constitute another high-profile demand for military capabilities. As demonstrated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the public looks to the military as a key source of aid in the wake of disasters. Recent uses of the military to guard airports and seaports and the deployment of National Guard forces along the border with Mexico are reminders that the nation’s leaders also need to employ military capabilities at home.

JTF HQ need to be prepared in advance to deal with these complex missions as they emerge. In this chapter, we assess the special challenges that these difficult missions may pose to future JTF commanders and suggest capabilities that these JTFs will need to succeed. We also estimate the aggregate demand for JTF HQ that the DoD should anticipate over the future.

**Stability, Combat, and Related Operations**

The Secretary of Defense issued a directive regarding SSTR operations. This directive states that

- Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission . . . [they] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.
- U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.
- The Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, and NGOs.
- The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams.
- Military plans shall address stability operations requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate.

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3 Rumsfeld (2005b).
• The geographic combatant commanders shall designate an appropriate military officer as the Joint Force Coordinating Authority for stability operations.

The Department of Defense defines stability operations as “Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.” The activities may include training, equipping, and advising indigenous forces; conducting counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations; conducting SSTR operations; and engaging in combat. Stability operations might include a broad spectrum of missions, such as training, counterinsurgency, SSTR, and combat. The U.S. role might range from small and focused to that of the primary military force in a contingency, with broad responsibilities across mission areas (see Table 3.1).

The smallest stability operations might involve a military advisory group or a special forces company providing training to a limited number of indigenous forces for a specific purpose. The Georgia Training and Equipping Program (GTEP) is one example of this type of operation. The GTEP ran from May 2002 through April 2004 and employed 150

### Table 3.1
**Stability, Combat, and Related Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Role</th>
<th>Train, Equip, Advise</th>
<th>Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency</th>
<th>SSTR or Combat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary/broad</td>
<td>Training brigade, division(s)</td>
<td>Multiple brigade, division, or corps</td>
<td>Multiple brigade, division, or corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major/broad</td>
<td>Mixed brigade of conventional/special forces</td>
<td>Mixed brigade(s) of conventional/special forces</td>
<td>Mixed brigade(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small/focused</td>
<td>Military advisory group or special forces company, batallion</td>
<td>Mixed batallion(s) of Special Operations Forces/Conventional</td>
<td>Mixed batallion, brigade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

special forces soldiers, support staff, and technicians to train approximately 2,000 Georgian troops in counterinsurgency operations. A major training effort may be required if the United States takes on a broader role. For the purposes of our categorization, this might include a major (although perhaps not the primary) role in training a client nation’s military forces—especially for a particular set of missions or capabilities. For example, more than 10,000 Colombian military personnel received some form of training in 2005 by U.S. forces. This included counterdrug, counterinsurgency, aviation, and general military instruction. They were trained by a varied group of U.S. military personnel from the 7th Special Forces Group, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), the II Marine Expeditionary Force, and the 2nd Naval Special Warfare Group.

In rare cases, the United States may take the primary role in training a nation’s military forces, including training for a reasonably complete set of skills and capabilities. Currently, the CSTC-Afghanistan has the mission of training the Afghan national army and security forces. To do this, a three-star officer is assigned to lead a mixed training force that typically includes a U.S. Army infantry brigade, Marine Corps, and allies from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Additional training is provided in the field by conventional and SOF. An even larger force supports the MNSTC-I. The command includes more than 2,000 trainers supporting an Army three-star officer. This is the equivalent of several U.S. training brigades devoted to the basic instruction of Iraqi army and security forces. Advanced training is provided to these Iraqi forces in the field by U.S. and coalition military forces and special advisory teams.

Of course, both the Iraq and Afghanistan training operations are part of a much larger set of operations in these nations that includes counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, stability and security, and

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7 As of this writing, the 53rd Infantry Brigade from the Florida National Guard had been assigned.
combat operations. The largest training, equipping, and advising operations that we have observed (in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq) have been components of full-spectrum operations. Therefore, at the highest level of commitment, the United States has made a broad commitment to the success of client nations and the training, equipping, and advising mission may be part of a larger investment in those nations’ stability and security.

Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations may also be conducted at different scales and scopes. JTF–Horn of Africa initially comprised a special forces battalion supporting a large JTF HQ. Eventually, the special forces battalion was reassigned, and a Marine Corps rifle company was retained to provide security while the headquarters continued to monitor the region and provide planning capabilities.

Larger operations may require substantially more forces. U.S. Pacific Command established JTF-510 to conduct counterterror operations on the Philippine island of Basilan. The initial U.S. contribution included 1,200 military personnel to conduct counterterrorism operations with the Philippine army. The U.S. Pacific Command designed JTF-510 to be the lead element, able to draw on a larger force when required. In this particular case, a larger force was not needed, and a small force was left behind to continue combined operations.

Larger forces may sometimes be required to conduct broader counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations. Continuing operations in Afghanistan have required several brigades of troops conducting offensive and defensive operations in the field. In Afghanistan today, the U.S. force is a major contributor, but the primary leadership has been turned over to a NATO command. In Iraq, the primary role is filled by the U.S. military, and U.S. forces have formed the backbone of several multinational divisions operating under a three-star Corps commander.

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8 Lieutenant General William Boykin, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighting, stated that it is useful to think of some counterterrorism operations as counterinsurgency to make better use of the full set of national capabilities. This seems apropos for the purposes of this report. Kruzel (2007).
To estimate future demand, we consider SSTR operations together with combat operations. Clearly, some SSTR operations have been undertaken without conducting simultaneous combat operations. At the small, focused end, Task Force Falcon has led U.S. SSTR operations in Kosovo without combat. A much larger operation involved an implementation force and, later, a stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United States began Implementation Force (IFOR) with a heavy division, so this was a major operation; but, although the forces were well prepared, neither the IFOR nor the Stabilization Force phase involved combat. Similarly, U.S. operations in Haiti and in Macedonia did not involve combat.

However, U.S. forces were prepared for combat operations in each of these cases. (In IFOR, the commanding general of the initial operation commented on the deterrent value of a main battle tank in the village square.) The very fact that the United States chose to send a heavy division to Bosnia speaks to the preparations for combat thought to be prudent. (Recall also the tragic record of the peacekeeping unit assigned to Srebrenica—ultimately unable to deter an attack on the civilian population.) Similarly U.S. forces were prepared to fight in Haiti, as were NATO forces in Kosovo. Clearly, U.S. and NATO forces have been engaged in simultaneous SSTR and combat operations in Afghanistan, as have been U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq.

At the high end of these operations, U.S. forces have conducted simultaneous SSTR, combat, counterinsurgency, and training missions. Operations in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan are the best examples of these full-spectrum operations. However, when U.S. forces were not prepared for a broad spectrum of operations, the results were undesirable or even disastrous. For example, U.S. forces in Somalia first limited their mission to humanitarian assistance. Later, they determined that they should stop attacks against the population by “technicals” and other warlord-led militia elements. Subsequent operations against these militias exposed a shortfall of U.S. troops and armored vehicles.

A question for the DoD is, for which of these missions should we prepare our forces? The answer will probably be, for some of each. The DoD should anticipate dozens of missions at the small end of each category, with perhaps a handful of missions requiring a major role for
U.S. forces. That way, forces will be ready for the most likely contingencies and will be able to grow capabilities to handle one or more large contingencies if needs warrant. We will return to the topic of demand later in this chapter.

**Missions to Eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Preparing future JTF HQ for WMD-elimination missions will depend greatly on the larger operational context. This includes whether the WMD-elimination tasks are conducted in a cooperative or permissive environment or as part of a war against a hostile regime. The Army should anticipate that a future WMD-elimination mission might include one or more of the following key activities:

- Detect, identify, and locate weapons and employment means.
- Neutralize opposing conventional forces.
  - Destroy or defeat hostile forces proximate to or defending a sensitive site.
  - Destroy or fix in place enemy forces able to interfere with WMD-elimination operations.
- Deny the enemy the ability to employ weapons.
  - Suppress the launch or firing of theater ballistic missiles, aircraft, and artillery.
  - Intercept aircraft, missiles, or munitions in flight.
  - Intercept employment by covert or irregular forces.
- Prevent movement or relocation of weapons.
  - Interdict movement of weapons between hiding sites.
  - Intercept attempts to smuggle weapons out of the country.
- Seize weapons arsenals and caches
  - at manufacturing and storage sites, depots
  - at deployed locations, including mobile artillery carriers.
- Manage the consequences of weapons use or agent release.

To accomplish these tasks, the JTF commander will need to command conventional warfighting forces in addition to units that
can deal with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The conventional warfighting forces will be relied on to perform all of the functions typical of contingency operations: entering the theater (by force if necessary), countering the forces of potential adversaries, protecting U.S. forces from WMD and conventional attack, seizing and securing objectives within the enemy’s territory, and all of the usual logistics and communications functions. These tasks will require joint, interagency, and, possibly, combined forces. For example, one can easily project that airpower will play a crucial role in forcing entry into a contested region and in cordoning off the area of operations from opposing conventional forces.

Therefore, the JTF HQ will have many of the same staff functions as a typical warfighting headquarters (see Figure 3.1). The crucial addition will be a cell with specialized WMD functions and relationships with the intelligence community, the DTRA, and the DOE.

The scope and scale of capabilities needed in the JTF HQ also will depend on the accuracy and precision of the intelligence received regarding the number and location of weapons. Highly precise and accurate intelligence will reduce the size of the area to be searched. As a specific example, consider a counterfactual—that Iraq had WMD and had placed them all in Building 9 of the At Tuwaitha facility. If the U.S. military knew that with certainty, a fairly small force would have been sufficient to search the building and locate the weapons and materials (see Figure 3.2).

On the other hand, if all of At Tuwaitha needed to be searched, a far larger force (or more time) would be needed to comb the hundreds of buildings and bunkers and the land in between. Moreover,

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9 The preparation of future JTF HQ for this mission will be facilitated by the 2006 decision to expand the Army’s 20th Support Command’s chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) capabilities. The 20th Support Command should be able to support future JTFs by conducting vital portions of the WMD-elimination and site exploitation missions since it became operational in 2007.

10 Chase (2006).

simultaneously securing and searching all of the 18 major sites on the ISG’s list would require a very large force indeed.

The level of opposition expected will also affect the scope of the task force duties. As the expected level of opposition increases, the capabilities of the task force and the headquarters commanding it must also increase (see Table 3.2). For example, if the intelligence services locate a weapon at a specific building that is only lightly held, it may be possible to accomplish this mission with a relatively small force of highly trained special operators. However, the size of the force required increases in proportion to the degree of opposition.

The commander can never be certain of the precision or accuracy of his intelligence beforehand; the degree of opposition is similarly uncertain. Therefore, the JTF commander must have a headquarters able to rapidly bring more resources to bear on WMD-elimination
Figure 3.2
Size of WMD-Elimination Force Needed to Search and Secure an Area

- Scope and scale of operations depend on:
  - Number and size of facilities to be searched
  - Degree of resistance by opposing forces

One building:
- 4 × 10-man teams
- 2 × 18 18-hour days

Entire facility (e.g., Tuwaitha):
- ~400 acres
- 184 buildings/21 bunkers
- 21 underground bunkers
- 320 × 10-man teams
- 5 × 18-hour days

18 sites nationwide:
- 5,760 × 10-man teams
- 5 × 18-hour days

operations as they proceed. It may be particularly desirable to have the ability to rapidly ratchet up the scale of operations to accomplish (or abort) missions that begin covertly.

The JTF commander for WMD-elimination missions will need to have access to a complete range of joint and interagency activities and assets. Chief among these will be the intelligence services and organizations to locate suspected WMD and the security of the facilities holding them. Moreover, the commander will need help from a comprehensive joint and interagency team to plan operations, conduct training, and hold exercises before engaging in operations.
Table 3.2
Potential Scope and Scale of WMD Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposition Capability</th>
<th>Raid Single Building</th>
<th>Search Portion of Single Site (Several Buildings)</th>
<th>Secure and Search Entire Site (100s of Bunkers, Buildings)</th>
<th>Secure and Search Multiple Sites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy brigade (each site)</td>
<td>Division, task-organized, heavy air support</td>
<td>Division, task-organized, heavy air support</td>
<td>Division, task-organized, heavy air support</td>
<td>Corps, heavy air support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry battalion, heavy arms (each site)</td>
<td>BCT, task-organized, heavy air support</td>
<td>BCT, task-organized, heavy air support</td>
<td>Division, task-organized, heavy air support</td>
<td>Corps, heavy air support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry company, some heavy arms (each site)</td>
<td>Elite infantry battalion, heavy air support, rapid ground reinforcements</td>
<td>Elite infantry battalion, heavy air support, rapid ground reinforcements</td>
<td>BCT, task-organized, heavy air support</td>
<td>Corps, heavy air support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security forces, light arms (each site)</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces Company (+), heavy air support, rapid ground reinforcements</td>
<td>Elite infantry battalion, heavy air support, rapid ground reinforcements</td>
<td>BCT, task-organized, heavy air support</td>
<td>Corps, heavy air support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: RAND.
Homeland Defense/Civil Support Operations

The U.S. military conducts two general types of missions within the homeland: homeland defense and support to civil authorities. Homeland defense is defined as “the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.” This may include threats “planned or inspired by ‘external’ actors . . . [that] materialize internally.” The DoD, in particular, places protecting the land, sea, and air approaches to the United States in this category. Civil support includes missions for which other agencies lead the federal effort but that may also require resources and expertise controlled by the military. These missions may include incident management, CBRNE consequence management, and support to law enforcement authorities (see Table 3.3).

At its lowest level of involvement, the Army might routinely assign companies or battalions to homeland defense. In accordance with the strategy, these small units would be tasked to help defend land and air approaches to U.S. territory. For example, the DoD has “placed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Scale/ Urgency</th>
<th>Homeland Defense</th>
<th>Incident Management</th>
<th>Civil Support, CBRNE Consequence Management</th>
<th>Law Enforcement Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large/crisis or catastrophe</td>
<td>JTF; multiple brigades</td>
<td>JTF; multiple brigades</td>
<td>JTF-CS; multiple brigades</td>
<td>JTF; multiple brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large/special</td>
<td>Mixed brigades</td>
<td>Mixed brigades</td>
<td>Multiple teams, companies, battalions</td>
<td>Mixed brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small/routine</td>
<td>Companies, battalions</td>
<td>Companies, battalions</td>
<td>Companies, battalions</td>
<td>Companies, battalions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

particular emphasis on implementing a robust air defense capability for the National Capital Region, using both air and ground air defense forces.”¹³ The ground portion of this force might consist of Regular or National Guard air defense units. Within the Capital region, these forces would serve under JTF-National Capital Region (JTF-NCR).

Should a proximate threat appear, these forces could be rapidly expanded to brigade, multibrigade, or a larger force. They would presumably fall under one of the JTFs that U.S. Northern Command has established to lead homeland defense missions and provide military support to civil authorities. These task forces include JTF-NCR, JTF-Alaska, and Standing Joint Forces Headquarters North. (Another JTF headquarters, JTF–Civil Support, provides military command and control to mitigate the effects of CBRNE events.)

Other military missions in the homeland fall under the category of support to civil authorities, or civil support. Incident management includes military support for a host of domestic events and activities, such as the Scout Jamboree and the military effort to locate and collect debris from the space shuttle Columbia disaster. Military forces have also been deployed to provide protection at national security special events, including presidential inaugurations, national conventions for major political parties, state-of-the-union addresses, and major sporting events such as the 2002 Olympics. Very large deployments of military forces for catastrophes include the disaster assistance that Regular and National Guard forces rendered after Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.

Military forces have been placed under the command of JTF HQ in past operations. At the small end, these forces might comprise a few companies providing logistics support to civil authorities, or they might offer specialized capabilities, such as air defense against potential terrorist use of aircraft. Larger special events might include the use of mixed brigades of forces conducting a variety of supporting tasks.¹⁴


¹⁴ An interesting approach has been proposed by several of our colleagues in related research. In that approach, the Army would create Civil Support battalions to cover each of the ten FEMA regions. Something similar to this approach was prescribed in the 2010 Quadrennial
The military also organizes forces to mitigate the effects of weapons of mass destruction. The National Guard is organizing 55 WMD civil support teams that operate under state control to augment civil emergency services and that can operate under federal control in times of crisis. Each has 22 members to provide communication links, assess damage, and manage consequences in support of local, state, and federal agencies. For larger contingencies, the National Guard is also standing up 12 Enhanced Response Force packages to locate and extract victims from WMD-contaminated environments, to conduct casualty and patient decontamination, and to provide medical treatment. The Guard is also creating a joint force headquarters in each state to improve command and control functions. The Marine Corps also has a battalion-sized chemical and biological incident response force, as part of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The Army has established the 20th Support Command, composed of a headquarters, two chemical battalions, and five ordnance disposal battalions to mitigate effects. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force chemical, ordnance disposal, medical, engineer, and other forces could be called on for the largest catastrophes.

Finally, the military provides support to civil law enforcement authorities. Small, routine support to federal counterdrug operations is provided through existing joint, interagency task forces. These task forces can call on the Coast Guard in its law enforcement role and on National Guard forces. Regular Army personnel help man these headquarters and can provide specialized units (e.g., medical, ordnance disposal, and logistics) to support law enforcement missions. The National Guard troops observing the fences along the southern U.S. border constitute a larger deployment of military personnel supporting border patrol activities.

Regular military and National Guard forces also provide support to law enforcement authorities in crises and after catastrophes. For

Defense Review Report. These battalions would be organized and staffed to rapidly provide a host of military capabilities to civil authorities. They would be able to provide command and control of military forces for the entirety of some contingencies. Alternatively, they could constitute the early entry command and control in larger contingencies—and relinquish that role to division headquarters once they arrived on the scene. See Davis et al. (2004, 2007).
example, National Guard forces augmented police and emergency services in Los Angeles in 1992 in the aftermath of the riots that summer. After the terrorist attacks in 2001, National Guard personnel provided security at airports, seaports, and public buildings. Military personnel also helped provide support to law enforcement during major disasters.

Homeland defense and civil support operations in the United States present their own challenges and demands. The major actors in these operations work largely in parallel. These include the lead federal agency, federal law enforcement agencies (including the Coast Guard), military forces providing support to civil authorities, state agencies, and local agencies. Unity of effort among these actors is achievable only by consensus and not by command.

Federal agencies do not come into play until state and local authorities are overwhelmed or the Department of Homeland Security anticipates that they will be overwhelmed “almost immediately.” The lead federal agency must then request military support.

Recent and potential homeland contingencies span a broad range of complex and difficult missions. They include

- interdiction (e.g., high-threat materials onboard civilian aircraft, boats, or vehicles)
- point defense of high-value facilities and special events
- humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
- management of the consequences of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons use or materials release
- border security.

The construct of JTF HQ will be substantially different for each mission described above. Because of the importance of these missions and the political imperative that they be accomplished swiftly and well, it is likely that the Army will need to have JTF HQ units ready and available at any given time.15 This is helped to some degree by dedicating the 5th Army to NORTHCOM; but additional division

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15 In fact, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Rumsfeld, 2006) contains a decision to organize a joint force headquarters in each state, manned by the National Guard.
headquarters will be needed to augment 5th Army headquarters and to conduct operations at the tactical level. This might include some combination of Regular and National Guard units. One of the most important activities for the military will be coordination with agencies outside Army and DoD control—including other elements of the federal government, state and local governments, and nongovernmental humanitarian assistance organizations. However, there is a limit on how far the Army can lean forward until asked for assistance, and even then, significant limits remain without a presidential directive.

**Estimating Aggregate Demand for Joint Headquarters**

In this section, we discuss historical demand and the guidance given by the Secretary of Defense in the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* and offer some thoughts regarding future demand. This comparison will be discussed in terms of the geographic combatant commands and the various categories of future missions (see Table 3.4).

The combatant commands will continue to assign Service component headquarters to execute theater functions. These include maintaining military-to-military relationships with allies and coalition partners in each geographic area of responsibility, theater security cooperation agreements, military training and other assistance, combined exercises, and other forms of cooperation. The combatant commands and their Service components will also maintain their readiness to fight and win wars and other major combat operations. The Army currently provides a theater Army headquarters to perform the component functions assigned to the Army by each regional combatant commander. These theater Army headquarters are typically thinly manned (see Chapter Four) and will likely continue to be very busy.

The Services will be tasked to provide additional headquarters for ongoing operations and contingencies. Today, the Army’s 2nd Infantry Division headquarters is forward deployed to South Korea. PACOM counts the I Corps as one of its standing JTF HQ, and EUCOM counts the 7th Army and a subordinate headquarters
Table 3.4
Composite Demand for JTF Headquarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theater Component Functions</th>
<th>Forward Deployed and Ongoing Operations</th>
<th>Major Combat</th>
<th>Stability, Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency</th>
<th>Homeland Defense/ Civil Support</th>
<th>WMD Elimination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFC-Korea</td>
<td>8th Army</td>
<td>1 division</td>
<td>2 MTW</td>
<td>International terrorist cells active in 80 nations</td>
<td>50 states, territories and D.C., 4 standing JTFs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>ARPAC</td>
<td>1 corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>7th Army</td>
<td>1 corps/ division</td>
<td></td>
<td>Historical demand (past 2 decades): ~3 to 12 Army-led JTF headquarters at one time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>3rd Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>6th Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>5th Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** U.S. Joint Forces Command (2005b), Estrada (2005), and RAND.

**NOTES:** ARPAC = U.S. Army Pacific Command; MTW = major theater war.
Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities

(currently, V Corps) together as one of its standing JTF HQ. The Army also sends headquarters to command ongoing operations in OIF and OEF, and the Army has a National Guard division headquarters deployed to command JTF-Falcon in Kosovo.

In addition to these forward deployed and ongoing operations, the Services will be tasked to provide forces to cover potential new contingencies. Over the past two decades, the Army has provided up to 12 JTF HQ in a single year to command forces in new and continuing contingency operations. (As we have seen, these numbers have increased to 24 in recent years.)

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report calls on the Services to be prepared to fight two major theater wars simultaneously. It is uncertain what forces combatant commanders might request to fight these wars. Some observers have suggested that the DoD should assign these contingencies to particular parts of the U.S. force structure now. However, it is our belief that future combatant commanders will need to make these decisions when the exact nature of a given major theater war becomes clear. The Services are obliged to have tactical headquarters prepared to respond as directed. For its part, the Army needs to have two tactical headquarters ready to command Army or joint forces in major theater wars.

Fighting terrorism anywhere it exists, and before it reaches U.S. soil, may cause a steady demand for JTF HQ. Where possible, the United States would prefer to contain and defeat terror groups early, before they can gain a stronghold anywhere in the world. The DoD notes that al Qaeda has terror cells in more than 80 nations—although this does not necessarily imply that the Services need to prepare to fight 80 counterinsurgency operations around the world. However, it should prompt the Services to be ready to provide a measured set of actions—focused training, counterinsurgency, or SSTR operations in

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16 The Secretary of Defense has directed each combatant command to establish a standing JTF HQ. PACOM and EUCOM have delegated this duty to assigned forces.

17 For example, it may be possible to rely on airpower to stop a North Korean attack against South Korea. However, it may be equally plausible that North Korea collapses, leaving control of its claimed nuclear arsenal in uncertain hands. In that case, ground forces may be in great demand to find and secure nuclear materials in the north.
some places and full-spectrum operations on a larger scale in others. A number of nations may request military training, advisors, or other forms of assistance from the United States.\textsuperscript{18} This assistance may be in the form of a few dozen advisors or may include combat forces with their own command and control.

Given the particular emphasis on WMD-elimination operations in the National Security Strategy, the DoD may establish one or two JTF HQ to prepare for this mission as well.\textsuperscript{19} As we noted in Chapter Two, a JTF HQ would need to be prepared for everything from securing materials in a cooperative operation to securing and searching one or more large facilities. These kinds of operations could involve complex combat, engineering, and reconnaissance operations and would require integrating operations with the activities of specialists from across the national security community.

Finally, there will be a continuing demand for JTF HQ ready to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions in the United States. To be effective, these headquarters will need to develop and maintain some relationship with each of the 50 states, four territories, and the District of Columbia. Several headquarters may need to be prepared to support the complete range of missions. Presumably, these headquarters will also lead or contribute to the four existing standing JTFs operating in the United States, as well as the WMD consequence management teams that have been established.

\textsuperscript{18} GTEP is one example.

\textsuperscript{19} The 20th Support Command can provide some specific WMD safing, removal, and consequence management. However, the broader warfighting roles that may be needed in operations at many sites or against opposing forces will likely require a full-spectrum JTF HQ. See Wendel (2006). The DoD may wish to have two headquarters prepared—one available and the other in reconstitution, training, or ready status.
CHAPTER FOUR

Approaches to Structuring Army-Led Joint Task Forces

The most challenging missions have always required commanders and staffs with very high levels of effectiveness in the planning and deployment stages—well before operations begin. Combatant commands have provided this early effectiveness in combat and other military operations by establishing permanent warfighting commands and continually planning and training. To accomplish their assigned missions in the manner desired, JTF commanders will need to become similarly prepared. This may require that at least one JTF be adequately prepared to accomplish the highest-priority missions at any moment.

When combatant commanders decide to establish a JTF HQ, they will tap the Service with the most pertinent expertise in the key functions and activities that the JTF mission will require. In this chapter, we describe three approaches that the Army might use when it is called on to provide the commander, the major portion of the staff, and the systems required for command and control.

Approach 1: Create JTF Headquarters from Scratch, as Needed, with Individual Augmentees

JTF HQ are sometimes staffed with individual augmentees rather than relying on an existing unit headquarters. Essentially, this is the default solution when no unit is available or appropriate to serve as a JTF HQ. Both the Multi-National Force–Iraq and the Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan are staffed this way. So too are the combatant commands and international military headquarters (such as NATO’s
allied command operations, formerly known as SACEUR, and Combined Forces Command—Korea).

For headquarters to be staffed by the Army, using individual augmentees minimizes the number of soldiers who must be assigned to headquarters staffs on a daily basis. Soldiers can be assigned when a specific need emerges for a headquarters, such as a new mission responsibility or a contingency operation.

The disadvantage of such an approach is that it takes longer to establish a headquarters staff from a group of individuals than to start with an existing unit headquarters. There will be some time lag while

- a headquarters is established
- the needed skills are determined
- soldiers with those skills are identified
- a formal request is made for those soldiers
- the request is approved
- the soldiers arrive
- the new headquarters is trained as a team.

Even more time will be required to obtain the personnel needed from the other military Services, joint organizations, and other government agencies, as we discuss in Chapter Five.

We have also heard reports that commands staffed by individual augmentees never develop the same cohesiveness as unit-based headquarters, although this problem is more difficult to quantify. Headquarters manned by core units share a common history, a collective sense of identity and mission, and a common tour length. These factors will usually increase the cohesiveness of the headquarters staff.

**Approach 2: Use Existing Division, Corps, or Theater Army Headquarters as the Core of JTF Headquarters**

A second approach for the Army is to assign JTF HQ duty to selected division, corps, and theater Army headquarters. If the JTF HQ to be
filled is large and diverse, a unit headquarters might provide the core, with additional capabilities to be filled from individual units (e.g., signal, military intelligence), individual augmentees, and the other Services. If the JTF HQ will be small, a fraction of an existing headquarters (such as a tactical command post [TACP]) may provide enough capability.

In the following subsections, we evaluate the ability of division, corps and theater Army headquarters to serve as JTF HQ.

**Approach 2a: Assign JTF Headquarters Duty to Division Headquarters**

Ample examples exist of divisions and division-sized units providing the core of JTF HQ; including CJTF-76 in Afghanistan, JTF-Liberia,\(^1\) TF Falcon (Kosovo), TF Mountain (Afghanistan), and the many task force headquarters engaged in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.\(^2\) Also, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division each provided a tactical operations center to the 1st Army to augment command and control for JTF-Katrina.

Division headquarters offer several advantages for leading JTFs. First, the ten Regular Army divisions have the advantage of being cohesive units. Their members have extensive experience training and operating together, which will likely improve their operational performance in the early days of a contingency. Division headquarters have proven able to quickly deploy and lead troops in a variety of contingencies. In addition, several of the eight National Guard division headquarters have been activated for division-level command, including the 40th and 36th Divisions in Kosovo and the 42nd Division in Iraq.

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1 JTF-Liberia was formed around the Southern European Task Force, a division-sized headquarters unit led by a major general typically commanding one or more brigades.

2 Although the division headquarters serving in Iraq have not been officially defined as combined or JTF HQ, the fact is that many of these task forces have indeed incorporated both combined and joint forces. Moreover, the scope and scale of the responsibilities of these task forces (such as TF Baghdad) are similar to those of many past JTFs.
Division headquarters also offer great flexibility in matching troops to the JTF HQ’s task at hand. The recent “Army of Excellence” division headquarters consisted of 300–500 soldiers. This number includes the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) headquarters and headquarters company, those Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) individuals assigned to divisions, and half of the division artillery headquarters and headquarters battery. (It is assumed that the other half of the battery will be shared among the firing batteries assigned to each brigade as the divisions are modularized.) As shown in Figure 4.1, new, planned division headquarters will have 484 soldiers in their command group, two tactical headquarters, and a main command post.3

Once the new division structure is realized, it will provide the Army with a great deal of flexibility in staffing headquarters for contingencies. Each tactical command post has roughly 90 troops—about the right size for small task forces, such as JTF-Olympics (security for the 2002 Salt Lake City, Utah, Winter Olympic games), JTF-Bravo, or JTF-Haiti, with some augmentation from the division main command post. The division headquarters as a whole will be about the right size for operations such as JTF-Liberia, CJTF-HOA, and CJTF-76.

Finally, the Army’s division headquarters are excellent places to develop or grow habitual relationships with many of the types of forces that are likely to be involved. These include Army Brigade Combat Teams and supporting brigades, the ALOs, and Air Support Operations Squadrons that help integrate air and ground power, SOF, and the tactical units supporting information/influence operations.

Some disadvantages also exist in using the division as the JTF HQ core unit. First, the existing division headquarters do not have all of their billets manned, and even more manpower will be needed to man the new-style division headquarters. Providing 484 headquarters soldiers for each of the Army’s ten divisions will require that more than

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3 The figure of 484 troops includes the C1 through C8 staff and special staff. The 484-troop figure is exclusive of the special troops battalion, the security company, and the network elements. With these units included, the total headquarters troop number is more than 900.
Approaches to Structuring Army-Led Joint Task Forces

Figure 4.1
Comparison of Staffing Levels of Division and Recent JTF Headquarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Manning Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 AD</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ID</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Cavalry</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ID</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 ID</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 ID</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mountain</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 ID</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82 AB</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 AB/AA</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New Division

Command Group-17

TAC 1-96

TAC 2-87

MAIN-284

Core headquarters/TAC: 484

JTF-Olympics

93

JTF-Bravo

143

JTF-Haiti

172

JTF-Liberia

345

CJTF-HOA

417

CJTF-76

514

Manning: 312–515\(^a\)

\(^a\)W/TDA, 50% division artillery.


NOTES: Division core or TAC is about the right size for smaller JTF HQ. AA = air assault; AB = airborne; AD = armored division; MAIN = Main Command Post.

RAND MG675-4.1

500 additional soldiers be added to the Army’s division headquarters accounts.\(^4\)

Second, when assigned as the core of a JTF HQ, the divisions would need to offload existing duties. One of their principal duties is the training and readiness oversight functions for the brigades with which they are habitually related. A similar issue is that of command echelonment. In past operations, brigade commanders have noted difficulty in reporting directly to the JTF commander rather than having a division act as the senior tactical ground command. The division

\(^4\) Even more troops may be needed if each new division is also to have a separate TDA and if none of the division artillery headquarters battery personnel are reassigned to division headquarters.
Echelon typically buffers subordinate brigades from changes in the JTF HQ personnel. In Afghanistan, the brigade staff also expressed the need for clearer lines of command authority to work effectively with other units also reporting directly to the JTF HQ. Brigades deploying as the senior tactical element require additional command and liaison elements, typically provided by the division. These kinds of issues should be resolved before deployment if a division headquarters is elevated to joint command at the operational level.5

In addition, the divisions are not typically as familiar as theater armies with the areas of responsibility of geographic combatant commanders. The divisions’ headquarters staff will need training to become familiar with the areas to which they may be deployed and may need augmentation from the theater Army staff.

**Approach 2b: Assign JTF Headquarters Duty to Corps**

Corps have roughly the right size and command structures to staff some of the larger JTF HQ, as shown in Figure 4.2, and are closer than divisions to exercising command at the operational level of warfare.6 In addition, the existing corps are manned at roughly the same level as the new-design corps—meaning that little new manpower will have to be assigned before the new-style corps can be established.

Corps commanders and staffs have traditionally had some association with geographic combatant commands and hence have some knowledge of theaters and coalition partners—but less than that of theater armies. In addition, corps have maintained some relationship with the tactical units posted with them. This includes division headquarters, Brigade Combat Teams, supporting brigades, and Air Support Operations Squadrons and Groups. These relationships could be maintained and expanded to better prepare corps headquarters to quickly take command of JTFs.

Today the Army’s corps still execute some training and readiness oversight functions for divisions and brigades and some rear-area functions in support of deployed units. Each of these functions will have

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5 Center for Army Lessons Learned (2003a).

6 Note that V Corps and SETAF are currently planned to stand down.
Figure 4.2
Comparison of Staffing Levels of Current Corps, New Corps, and CJTF-180

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Current Corps</th>
<th>New Corps</th>
<th>CJTF-180</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Corps</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>C1-17</td>
<td>C1-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Corps</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>C2-137</td>
<td>C2-153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Corps</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>C3-107</td>
<td>C3-102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII Corps</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>C4-39</td>
<td>C4-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETAF</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>C5-47</td>
<td>C5-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C6-47</td>
<td>C6-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C7-2</td>
<td>C7-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C8-4</td>
<td>C8-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C9-3</td>
<td>C9-37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Range: 363–689

Core headquarters/TAC: 490
Total: 552

aWith TDA, and corps artillery.

NOTES: Total TDA/TOE manning close to proposed size. IG = inspector general; SJA = staff judge advocate.

Finally, we should note that current operations are subjecting both the Army’s division and corps headquarters to a very high operations tempo (OPTEMPO), as shown in Figure 4.3. The headquarters of the Army’s ten Active Component divisions, several of the Army National Guard divisions, and the III, V, and XVIII Airborne Corps have been busy leading various task forces, the MNC-I command, and CJTF-76 in Afghanistan, in addition to con-
continuing operations in Kosovo. This OPTEMPO will increase when the V Corps is deactivated. Using division and corps headquarters as the core of a JTF staff will put added stress on them until they can offload (or conclude) some of their current tactical command responsibilities.

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7 Those deployments highlighted signify assignments officially designated as joint force or JTF HQ. Although not officially designated as JTFs, the remaining division assignments in Iraq typically included both joint and combined forces in “multinational division” areas of responsibility.
Approach 2c: Assign JTF Headquarters Duty to Theater Armies

Finally, the Army can assign JTF HQ duties to the theater armies, which are dedicated to their respective geographic combatant command. Theater army commanders and their staffs have a great degree of familiarity with the region and its unique characteristics and have the most experience in preparing theater-specific intelligence and plans and participating in theater-focused training and exercises. Theater armies are also in the best position to develop habitual relationships with the other Service component commands, with coalition forces, and with other U.S. government agencies operating in the region.

Theater army staffs have the functional form needed to rapidly stand up operations when called on. However, the theater armies typically have a small or even skeleton staffs. Figure 4.4 shows the manning for theater armies today, which ranges from 131 soldiers in the 6th Army (U.S. Army Southern Command) up to 854 for the 3rd Army (U.S. Army Central Command). All these armies, including even the 3rd Army—by far the biggest today—fall far below the 1,029 soldiers called for in the core of the new-design Army. Even if all the soldiers from the seven theater armies existing today were concentrated into five new-design armies, more than 2,000 additional soldiers would be needed to bring all the theater armies up to the new-design size.

Even the new-design army, if fully staffed, would need augmentation to staff the very largest JTF HQ. As shown in Figure 4.4, CJTF-7 required nearly 300 more personnel than the new theater army headquarters is proposed to provide. The current theater army–level commitments to MNF-I are about 800 troops with another 800 for MNC-I and 600 for MNSTC-I. The demand for extra troops to staff these very large JF/JTF HQ, on top of the extra troops needed to fully man the new-style theater armies, is probably unsustainable for the Army by itself.

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8 Note that the 8th Army and ARPAC may be combined at some point in the future (e.g., if CFC-Korea is disbanded). Also, the 1st Army has relinquished its continental United States role to 5th Army, which now serves as U.S. Army North.

9 As of this writing, plans call for the 1st Army to relinquish its homeland security role to the 5th Army and for the 8th Army to be combined with ARPAC at some unspecified date in the future.
Theater armies will inevitably have an important role in theater operations, whether they are assigned duty as a JTF HQ or that duty is assigned to a corps or division headquarters. Both corps and divisions will need regional expertise in planning and preparing for JTF operations, and much of that expertise is bound to come from the theater army. Also, the theater army will be vital in developing plans, end-to-end operational concepts, and habitual relationships with the combatant command, other Service component commands, and joint and interagency elements.
The theater army could also perform a role of inestimable value by helping the combatant command develop and gain approval for JMDs well in advance of contingency operations. Each Service and joint agency could then identify the personnel that they would provide in each situation. This would greatly speed the process of filling headquarters staffing needs—a process that currently takes a very long time, as we have discussed.10

**Comparison of Recent Contingencies with Existing and New Divisions, Corps, and Theater Armies**

As we mentioned, current-design Army divisions, corps, and theater armies would need varying levels of augmentation for the JTF HQ that have been recently established. The modular design canonical division headquarters structure (the “Army of Excellence” or AoE division) could handle such contingencies as JTF–Atlas Response and JTF-Haiti with some augmentation to its communications and command staffs (see Figure 4.5).11 However, JTF–Horn of Africa would have required augmentation to most elements of the division staff.

Similarly, the canonical Army of Excellence corps would need augmentation to staff CJTF-180 in several areas—most especially C2, C3, and the combination of civil-military operations (C9) and public affairs. Multi-National Corps–Iraq would require augmentation of the AoE corps in all areas with the exception of logistics (C4).

Interestingly enough, the number of billets in a doctrinal theater army is actually quite large. The U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency database describes an Army Service component headquarters of 1,330 soldiers; including the Early Entry Tactical Operations Center, main headquarters, and rear-area reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (rear and RSOI). This would be

10 Note, however, “Currently, the JMD for a Service headquarters designated as a JTF headquarters is developed after the mission has been assigned. There is no JMD ‘on the shelf.’” See U.S. Joint Forces Command (2005a, 2005b).

11 The shaded cells note staff divisions that would have required augmentation to fill the respective JTF HQ to their JMD-approved size.
enough soldiers (if all were deployed) to handle even very large JTF
headquarters, such as CJTF-7.12

However, as shown in Figure 4.4, theater armies are not staffed
at this level. Instead, most are kept at a skeletal size until some contin-
gency requires a more complete set of capabilities.13 The 7th Army pro-
vides an interesting example of a theater army assigned to man JTF–

---

12 Two caveats: First, although the total number of soldiers might be adequate, the spe-
cialties required in a contingency might not all be covered. Second, the rear and RSOI
soldiers might actually be deployed at home station and intermediate points rather than in
theater.

13 The 8th Army is the one theater army formation that has been maintained at about 600
soldiers over time. This is somewhere between the bare-bones 131 soldiers of U.S. Army
Southern Command and 158 soldiers of ARPAC, and the “full” U.S. Army Force Manage-
ment Support Agency complement of 1,330 soldiers.
Skilled Anvil in the Balkans. For this task, the 7th Army provided 343 soldiers for the headquarters. It required augmentation in nearly every staff element to grow to the 697 military personnel ultimately needed to man the JTF–Skilled Anvil headquarters. Much more augmentation would be required for today’s theater armies to man CJTF-7.

The new designs of divisions, corps, and armies would be much closer to the size needed in recent contingencies—if fully manned. Figure 4.6 reflects the degree to which JTF needs could be met.

The new-design division has the total troop numbers needed to meet the staff numbers required in all recent JTF HQ commanded by two-star officers. Some specific elements, such as the command element, plans (C5), and communications (C6) still need augmentation, but it may be possible to fill these needs by shifting headquarters staff around and receiving augmentees from a separate signals unit.

The new-design corps and new-design theater army also come closer than the AoE-design headquarters to meeting the needs of large JTF HQ. Again, some shifting around and augmentation of specialties will still be required. For example, the CJTF-7 headquarters had special needs for large command staffs, large numbers of intelligence (C2) specialists, and large civil-military operations (C9) and public affairs staffs. Each large contingency will always have some unique and specialized requirements for troops that must be met by augmentation. As we mentioned above, however, a substantial manpower increase will be needed to bring the divisions and theater armies up to the new design strength.

Finally, we note that each of the past contingencies we examined did, in fact, receive some number of augmentees from the other Services. Figure 4.7 depicts the number of personnel for each element and specialty that ultimately were provided by the lead Service. In the case of MNC-I, the Army provided 63 of the 81 personnel in the command element, 72 of 110 for the intelligence (C2) element, and 156 of the 232 for the operations (C3) element. The remaining personnel needed in these and other elements were provided by the other military Services. The result is that Army units will rely to some degree on the other Services to fill some of the capability requirements. (However, as we noted above, it can take some time for the manning requirements to be met.
Figure 4.6
Comparison of Staffing Levels of Recent Contingency Headquarters with New Division, Corps, and Theater Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>JTF-S10</th>
<th>JTF-AR</th>
<th>JTF-Haiti</th>
<th>JTF-HOA</th>
<th>New Division</th>
<th>CTF-180</th>
<th>MNC-I</th>
<th>New Corps</th>
<th>JTF-SA</th>
<th>CJTF-7</th>
<th>New Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td>C3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>377</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>C5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C8</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C9/PA</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>107</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td></td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>1,029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The gray shaded cells note staff elements that would have required augmentation to fill the respective JTF HQ to their JMD-approved size.

by augmentees. For example, it took more than six months for CJTF-7 to receive 500 of the augmentees approved within its JMD, and the total number of augmentees never reached the approved staffing numbers.14)

### Approach 3: Provide Forces to Standing JTF Headquarters Dedicated to Specific Combatant Commands

A third approach would be to simply provide staff augmentees, and possibly commanders, to the standing joint headquarters that the

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14 A DoD study group suggested that for JTF HQ operating in a hostile fire zone, the JMD should be filled to ≥90 percent. Joint Force Headquarters (2005b), pp. 11–12.
Figure 4.7
Comparison of Lead Service Fill with New Division, Corps, and Theater Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>JTF-10</th>
<th>JTF-AR</th>
<th>JTF-Haiti</th>
<th>JTF-HOA</th>
<th>New Division</th>
<th>CTF-180 (est.)</th>
<th>MNC-I</th>
<th>New Corps</th>
<th>JTF-SA</th>
<th>CJTF-7 (est.)</th>
<th>New Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>7/6</td>
<td>18/11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23/19</td>
<td>81/63</td>
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<td>78/43</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24/22</td>
<td>29/6</td>
<td>107/51</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>153/130</td>
<td>110/72</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>91/55</td>
<td>428/235</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21/18</td>
<td>51/18</td>
<td>95/33</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>94/80</td>
<td>232/156</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>23/19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>41/17</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33/28</td>
<td>52/43</td>
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<td>119/54</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>C6</td>
<td>17/14</td>
<td>27/10</td>
<td>46/14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>96/52</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54/20</td>
<td>127/70</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7</td>
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<td>13/11</td>
<td>60/44</td>
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<td>68/37</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special</td>
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<td>21/10</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>101/86</td>
<td>91/63</td>
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<td>92/61</td>
<td>86/47</td>
<td>89</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>805</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>1,029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency database, and Estrada (2005).
**NOTES:** The gray shaded cells note staff divisions that would have required augmentation to fill the respective JTF HQ to their JMD-approved size. Each cell contains, first, the total number of personnel assigned to the staff element indicated. The second number represents the number of those staff members provided by the lead Service.

combatant commands are establishing. Having a dedicated JTF-capable headquarters for each combatant commander has the presumed advantage of having a prepared headquarters, deeply immersed in the theater, ready immediately to deploy to contingencies.

Two important questions must be addressed in pursuing this approach. The first is how it will be staffed. In principle, a dedicated headquarters could have a partial staff assigned at any one time to be augmented when needed. Or it could be fully staffed all the time. A partial staff would allow the headquarters to be maintained in some state of readiness, but it would take some amount of time to collect
the full personnel complement and train them before deployment. The Navy has organized JTF-519 in this fashion.\textsuperscript{15}

In the case of JTF-519, a core group of 150 personnel working together daily in Pacific Fleet headquarters are also assigned to JTF-519. In the case of contingency operations, the JTF-519 headquarters are augmented with 250 additional personnel from the Navy, the other Services, and other government agencies.

Unless it has core units that are designated ahead of a contingency to provide key skills and functions, a partial-staffing concept may not be much better than relying on individual augmentees. A dedicated headquarters without full staffing or core units precommitted to rapidly provide these personnel does not have much of a time advantage over the ad hoc option outlined in Approach 1, above.

The second important question is how strongly these headquarters would be committed to their specific combatant commands. These headquarters could, in theory, be chopped to other combatant commands to lead high-priority missions out of their assigned areas. If they were made available in case of great need, this sort of arrangement might offer a combination of capable and flexible headquarters. For example, standing headquarters from SOUTHCOM, PACOM, and EUCOM might have been helpful to CENTCOM when multiple operations were under way in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, some operational needs are important enough and require a high enough degree of specialization that it makes sense for them to be dedicated to a single theater. Combined Forces Command–Korea and the 8th Army are examples of headquarters that are focused on a specific, high-priority mission.

In fact, both the rigid and flexible assignment options are analogous to the division, corps, and theater army structure that exists today. Each theater army is assigned to a specific command so that

\textsuperscript{15} The Pacific Fleet commander is the designated JTF commander, and his staff essentially “underwrites” the staff needed by JTF-519, filling in any vacancies that cannot be filled otherwise. Also, JTF-519 has identified I Corps as its JFLCC and the Pacific Air Forces as its JFACC—thereby reducing the number of staff needed at the JTF HQ to interface with air and ground forces.
it gains theater-specific knowledge and develops habitual relationships with the joint and combined forces in theater. However, they have not recently been assigned to out-of-area operations (although the question of doing so has arisen). Division and corps headquarters have historically been designated for specific contingencies or theaters but have also been chopped to other theaters as needs warrant.

Establishing one or more dedicated JTF HQ at each combatant command does not clearly provide more than the existing Service component headquarters structure and may duplicate the efforts of the Service component (as well as competing for skilled staff). One possible exception would be a JTF HQ assigned to a very specific mission. Current examples include JTF Global Network Operations at STRATCOM, JTF–Civil Support at NORTHCOM, and the Joint-Interagency Task Forces at SOUTHCOM, PACOM, and NORTHCOM. New missions requiring highly specialized expertise might constitute additional examples, such as WMD elimination. However, in this specific case, we believe that it may be preferable to assign a specialized headquarters (e.g., the 20th Support Command) to handle the detailed identification and removal tasks and a full-spectrum headquarters (i.e., a corps or the combatant command) to handle the broader operation.

**Approach 4: Provide Specialized Headquarters Augmentation to Combatant Commands**

In addition to the headquarters core units described above, the Army can (and does) provide significant additional capabilities (see Figure 4.8).

Specialized liaison units, such as Battlefield Coordination Detachments, psychological operations units (4th POG), civil affairs units, and information operations (1st IO) are also important.
Emerging missions will require specialized capabilities provided by existing units (e.g., 20th Support Command) and new units.16

**Meeting Aggregate Demand for JTF Headquarters**

The final issue we consider in this chapter is how the Services will meet future demands for leading JTFs. Each geographic combatant command and the Combined Forces Command–Korea currently has a theater army assigned to it. Although theater armies probably will not have the full new-design staffing, their operational command posts

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16 New units might include Functional Coordination Detachments (FCDs). In concept, these units might be similar to BCDs and be detailed to integrate conventional operations with SOF, Joint Psychological Operations Task Forces, Civil-Military Operations Task Forces, and other missions.
should be capable of staffing a Combined/Joint Force Land Component Command headquarters after receiving augmentation. In theory, theater armies could be made available for out-of-area operations, but it is likely that combatant commanders will keep them busy within their assigned theaters. For example, theater armies are traditionally tasked with developing relationships with other military forces in the region, overseeing theater support functions, and conducting important planning functions between operations. In the future, theater armies may also be given more command responsibilities at the operational level as the number of echelons in future contingencies is reduced.

This may leave corps and division headquarters as the principal means of leading JTF operations. Currently the Army’s corps and division headquarters are consumed by operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo and many smaller contingencies, as well as the forward deployments in Korea and PACOM. As these operations are completed, corps and division headquarters may be tasked to meet the demands of a host of operations, including WMD elimination, major combat operations, counterterrorism, SSTR, and homeland security. The Army will need to match the supply of corps and division headquarters against anticipated mission demands and provide time to reset those headquarters returning from deployments.

The Army may decide to generate “ready” and “available” corps and division headquarters for JTF operations in much the way it currently generates brigades in the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) process. Typically, “available” units are prepared to deploy immediately to conduct operations. “Ready” units are fully manned and equipped but may not have completed all necessary major readiness exercises before deployment. Units are in “reset” when they return from a deployment. The DoD goal ratio is one year deployed within three years for the Active Component corps and division headquarters and one in six years for the National Guard division headquarters. A notional example of potential future demands and a corps/division headquarters rotation scheme is shown in Table 4.1.

In this example, the demand is to have one division headquarters forward deployed in Korea. Three headquarters would be needed to prepare for combat, stability, and related operations, and one
Table 4.1
Notional Rotation Scheme for Division and Corps Headquarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Theater Component Functions</th>
<th>Type of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Forward Deployed and Ongoing Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC-Korea</td>
<td>8th Army</td>
<td>1 division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>ARPAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>7th Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>3rd Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>6th Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>5th Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Headquarters Demand**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Theater Component Functions</th>
<th>Type of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Forward Deployed and Ongoing Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available</td>
<td>Headquarters shown</td>
<td>1 division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready, reset</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** RAND.
headquarters would need to be prepared to conduct WMD-elimination missions. One National Guard division headquarters would need to be ready at any time to support missions in the homeland as they might arise (presumably, this would involve significant training events for those periods when no disasters or other pressing missions arose).

To satisfy this notional demand, one division headquarters would be forward deployed to Korea. As with the 2nd Infantry Division headquarters today, this division headquarters would not be in the division rotation. One corps and two Active Component division headquarters might be available to meet the needs of combat, stability, and related operations. One corps and five Active Component division headquarters could then be in some state of “ready” or “reset.” As mentioned in Chapter Three, several of these missions are likely to be ongoing at any one time. They are likely to be small in scale, meaning that the available headquarters will need to deploy smaller headquarters elements to provide command and control.

It is useful to acknowledge two very different conceptions of how headquarters might be assigned to combat, stability, and related operations. The first method would be to assign the corps and division headquarters equally to full-spectrum conventional ground operations. Giving equal assignments has the advantage of depth: The corps and divisions could relieve each other in a rotation or could be deployed together when contemporaneous contingencies demand a greater weight of effort. Each headquarters would, in theory, spend some time on combat training and some time on stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations across its scope of responsibility. A criticism of this approach is the potential for headquarters to slight some missions within the scope of its responsibilities. For example, the possibility exists that a headquarters might emphasize large-scale combat training over smaller-scale stability, counterinsurgency, or training and advisory missions.

A second approach would be to assign each corps and division headquarters to a specific subset of these missions. For example, one corps and one division headquarters could be assigned to combat missions, and the other corps or division headquarters could be assigned to prepare for stability, counterinsurgency, and training operations. The
advantage is that each headquarters could then focus on a narrower set of mission-essential tasks, and there would arguably be less chance that some missions would be slighted during planning and exercises. However, dividing responsibilities in this way would reduce the headquarters’ depth in responding to contingency needs. If combat needs were greater than anticipated, the Army might run out of trained headquarters staff. Worse yet, a given headquarters would not be prepared for the full range of events that might occur in its AO—e.g., an adversary might force a headquarters prepared for stability operations into combat situations for which it is not manned, trained, or equipped. Also, this approach risks overspecializing the Army more generally—by breaking it up into pieces, each of which is capable of conducting only a narrow scope of tasks.

One National Guard division headquarters could be available to support missions in the homeland, with seven Army National Guard division headquarters in ready or reset mode. In a steady state, this would mean that each Army National Guard division headquarters would need to be manned and prepared to immediately execute operations for six and one-half weeks each year. Assuming that each soldier normally drills one weekend per month, with an additional two-week annual drill period, this implies that roughly one-third of division headquarters personnel would be on watch at any one time during a division’s assigned six and one-half weeks of responsibility.

Finally, one corps headquarters could be available for counter-WMD missions. Two active division headquarters could be in ready or reset status. As noted above, counter-WMD missions might involve significant combat activities. Therefore, these headquarters would need to prepare to conduct the full range of combat and WMD-related tasks.
JTFs are intended to quickly focus limited forces on a discrete mission. Typically, JTFs emphasize speed of deployment over mass and thus depend on close integration of disparate capabilities to accomplish their missions. Indeed, the DoD emphasizes joint and combined operations conducted by integrated, interdependent forces.1 This integration includes military forces and other specialized organizations across the military, intelligence community (IC), and U.S. government agencies.

**Integrating Joint Operations**

Units that routinely plan, train, and exercise together are more likely to integrate their operations more effectively at the start of a contingency. When flag officers and their staffs are given command of a JTF, it is vital that they have the ability to present an integrated force with units from multiple Services and agencies. To do so quickly and effectively, it is essential for commanders to have established habitual relationships with the elements they depend on from each of the other Services and defense agencies.

As stated in Chapter Two, the relationship between conventional Army forces and these elements has improved markedly during recent operations. It is vital that the Services maintain the progress made and work to further strengthen these ties.

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1 Rumsfeld (2006).
Unfortunately, the natural tendency is for air and ground forces and SOF to scale back their joint interactions once contingency operations have been concluded. Also worrisome is the possibility that each Service will emphasize—or even learn—different lessons from recent contingencies and then adopt modernization programs that weaken joint integration. For example, there is some potential for the reorganization of Air Support Operations Groups and Army corps and divisions to weaken the close bonds developed between Air Force and Army tactical elements over so many years of effort.

**Integrating Air and Ground Operations**

Since ground forces depend on air, special operations, and influence/information operations forces for mission effectiveness—and air for force protection—it is necessary for Army-led JTF HQ to ensure that the necessary levels of integration have been achieved. Two developments are likely to affect these habitual relationships and how they help support contingency operations. First, the Army has increased the number of its Brigade Combat Teams, maneuver battalions, and reconnaissance battalions. These echelons normally receive air liaison officers and tactical air control parties. Increasing the numbers of brigades and battalions receiving airmen increases the demand on ALOs and TACPs. In addition, the Army has indicated that it may go to war (or conduct other operations) in the future with fewer echelons—e.g., with a theater army directly commanding several divisions in a major combat operation rather than employing a corps as the senior tactical headquarters. This affects the traditional association of corps headquarters and Air Support Operations Groups normally assigned to corps.

The Air Force has also begun to change how it will support Army tactical headquarters (see Figure 5.1). The Air Force will continue to support corps, division, and brigade headquarters with air liaison officers and maneuver and reconnaissance battalion headquarters with both ALOs and TACPs. The Air Force has agreed to increase the number of airmen assigned as ALOs and TACPs to support the
increased numbers of Army units. However, the Air Force no longer plans to habitually relate an Air Support Operations Group with each corps headquarters.

The near-term Air Force plan is to continue to staff four active and two Reserve Component Air Support Operations Centers. Over the long term, the Air Force plans to stand up a total of eight Air Support Operations Centers fully staffed with approximately 100 airmen and equipped with the needed systems. An additional two personnel packages will be staffed to provide a training and rotational base.

The one great unknown is how or whether the habitual relationships between Army and Air Force units that have proven to be so important to past operations will be maintained. The current Air Force
plan is to pool the ASOC packages in such a way that Army tactical headquarters will be paired with them before deploying. The Air Force plans in this way to support up to two ASOCs at a time continuously for 90 days each. The habitual relationships would be maintained by the ALOs and TACPs at corps, division, brigade, and battalion headquarters, although these elements, too, may be deployed for shorter periods than will the Army units they are supporting.

**Integrating Conventional and Special Operations Forces**

The deployment and use of a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) has been described as the key to effective SOF integration in conventional operations.\(^2\) In the past, closer conventional force/SOF synchronization has been achieved, in part, by exchanging more liaison teams between conventional and special operations headquarters. However, Army special forces units are already hard-pressed to provide sufficient liaison to conventional units. During major combat operations in OIF, some entire Operational Detachment–Alphas (ODAs) were essentially dissolved to provide operators to staff liaison teams.\(^3\) Navy and Air Force special operators have similar issues.

The operations and contingencies in which conventional force commanders will have the occasion to lead or support SOF are likely to increase in the future.\(^4\) The Secretary of Defense directed the Army and Marine Corps to suggest ways for conventional forces to take a greater role in traditional SOF tasks as part of the Integrated Joint Ground Force Capability Study.\(^5\) In addition, the Special Operations Command has established a JTF to plan and lead counterterrorism operations that includes conventional forces. Generally, there is no formal command relationship between these forces before deployment. In some cases, it may be appropriate to establish OPCON/TACON command arrangements—however, this can lead to the suboptimiza-

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\(^2\) Rumsfeld (2006).

\(^3\) Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn (2004), Chapter 7.

\(^4\) See, for example, Magnum (2004).

tion risks mentioned above. In other cases, clearly designating support relationships may be preferred.

Successfully integrating SOF and conventional forces requires habitual relationships during predeployment training and the exchange of liaison officers for planning and execution. Newly appointed JTF commanders will not be able to achieve this integration on their own, particularly within the short time lines available to stand up their headquarters before deployment. Therefore, habitual SOF/conventional force relationships and training must be fostered at the combatant command or Army headquarters level.

**Integrating Information/Influence Operations and Strategic Communications**

Newly assigned JTF commanders and their staffs must have formal mechanisms to develop IO plans with these experts before deployment. Waiting until arrival in the theater is too late to begin coordinating all the elements contributing to the IO campaign. The theater army, corps, and division-level staffs need to have some experts with formal instruction in IO planning and targeting and clearly defined roles. Most of the expertise will continue to be scattered across various units within the Army, the other military Services, joint organizations, and various U.S. government agencies. The JTF commanders will need help from the combatant command and Army headquarters to quickly assemble needed expertise and formulate appropriate plans.

**Augmentation from Other Services, Joint Organizations, and U.S. Government Agencies**

To be fully ready to conduct operations, headquarters assigned to lead JTFs typically require substantial augmentation. Additional staff members are needed to add depth to the various divisions, boards, centers, and cells; expertise in areas not typically found within the core unit; and specialties needed from other Services or government departments. Conceptually, a JTF HQ might need some (or even all) of the elements depicted in Figure 5.2.
For example, an Army-led JTF HQ core will require an air element to plan integrated air and ground operations. The air element will consist of the appropriate air liaison officers, TACPs, and—where airpower plays a prominent role—an Air Support Operations Center to provide the needed planning and execution capabilities. For large operations, the theater army may assign a Battlefield Coordination Detachment to the theater C/JFACC to provide additional air-ground integration support.

Another specialized element will be needed to integrate SOF and conventional force operations. Ideally, a SOF element would be attached to the JTF HQ. The presence of special operators on the JTF HQ staffs is crucial to planning joint operations involving SOF. However, as noted above, special operators are typically in short supply and
few may be available for JTF HQ duty. The other integration element could be a conventional force Functional Coordination Detachment. Such a detachment could be assigned to the theater Special Operations Command to help plan SOF operations in proximity to conventional forces in a similar way that the BCD at the CAOC helps plan air operations in the presence of ground forces. Such a detachment may be particularly important when few special operators can be spared as liaisons to the JTF HQ.

Contingencies emphasizing influence and information operations will require a specialized element to provide the required expertise. It might consist of a joint information operations task force and elements from Army Psychological Operations Groups, the 1st Information Operations Command, and public affairs. It might also include elements from the other Services.

Finally, augmentation will be needed from the other Services to deal with operations in the air, at sea, and in other environments. These specialties, and additional manpower to fill needed billets within each division of the joint staff, will be met with a JMD. As argued above, this JMD needs to be constructed and approved before the JTF is called to duty so that it can be filled much more quickly once the JTF has been activated.

When the mission includes complex operations, such as SSTR, additional specialized capabilities will be needed. Military personnel with specialties in civil affairs and civil-military operations will be needed to staff adequately sized civil affairs, Psychological Operations Centers, and Civil-Military Operations Centers. The military will need help from agencies outside the DoD, including the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and potentially others.

For WMD-elimination missions, specialists will be needed from the DOE, the DTRA, and the intelligence community. Military specialists will be needed from the special operations community and the Army’s 20th Support Command.
Training and Exercising with Joint and Interagency Forces

The deploying headquarters will not be fully ready until it has received, trained, and exercised with those joint and interagency elements providing the needed capabilities. These Service, joint, and interagency specialties must arrive in time to train, plan, and exercise with the core of the JTF HQ. A natural point at which to integrate these specialists would be when the Service headquarters is assigned a joint mission. Ideally, this would be early in the ready phase of the ARFORGEN cycle, as shown in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3
Integration of Army, Joint, and Interagency Capabilities During Training

SOURCES: U.S. Army Forces Command (2005b), and RAND.
NOTE: REF = Ready Expeditionary Force.
RAND MG675-5.3
Summing Up: Actions Needed to Ensure Timely, Effective JTF Headquarters Deployment

The Army cannot, by itself, ensure timely delivery of the capabilities needed by the headquarters assigned to lead JTFs. Providing these capabilities early enough to effectively integrate with the JTF core will require the concerted efforts of all echelons of the cognizant combatant commands, the Services, joint staff, DoD agencies, and other U.S. government agencies (see Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4
Contributions Needed from Agencies Across the U.S. Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DoD agencies, intelligence community, DOS, DOE, DOJ, DHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide specialized planning, intelligence, operations cells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Special expertise, e.g., WMD, STRATCOM/information operations, health, and law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- LNOs, National Security Officers Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC, JFCOM, STRATCOM, SOCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Build CONPLANs and designate Services and joint organizations to fill JMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Specify JTF command relationships (e.g., OPCON, TACON)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide SJTF CE and COCOM SJTF headquarters elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish joint and combined training program and schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- JTF HQ augmentation and special capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQDA/MACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide specialized headquarters “plugs” (e.g., 20th Support Command, 1st Information Operations Command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide BCDs and FCDs, planning and intelligence cells with regional expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Habitual relationships with components, joint and interagency, allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps/divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide JTF HQ core, ALO, assigned supporting units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: RAND.
NOTES: DOS = Department of State; DOJ = Department of Justice; CONPLAN = contingency plan; HQDA = Headquarters, Department of the Army; MAJCOM = major command.

RAND MG675-5.4
What the Army Can Do

The Army can improve the speed with which JTF HQ may be deployed by providing a fully manned, equipped, and trained unit to serve as the JTF HQ core. This unit may be a division, corps, or theater army. Each of these units will bring with it habitual relationships with Army and other Service tactical units, liaison officers, and supporting units.

Theater army, corps, and division headquarters will need significant augmentation to be fully functional in a joint and combined role. Some of this can come from tactical units habitually associated with corps and divisions. Examples include signals, military intelligence, ASOCs, and liaison units from SOF, IO, and other specialties. Additional resources may come from the assets that normally support the theater army. Examples include an ACCE, ABCD, other Functional Coordination Detachments, or planning cells with regional expertise. The theater army also brings habitual relationships with the other Service components, theater-oriented joint and interagency elements, and coalition partners.

Army major commands and Army headquarters can bring specialized headquarters plugs, including 20th Support Command, 1st Information Operations Command, and Functional Coordination Detachments. The Department of the Army can also provide help by obtaining needed capabilities from the other Services, joint organizations, and interagency elements.

What the Combatant Commands and Joint Organizations Can Do

The combatant commander is crucial in organizing capable JTF HQ. The combatant commands can build a JMD for contemplated missions ahead of the assignment of a JTF to a mission, as opposed to the current practice of developing a JMD after the JTF is established. The combatant command could then request the forces to fill these billets from supporting Services and joint organizations when the JTF is stood up. As stated above, PACOM has taken this approach with JTF-519.

JFCOM has a potentially important role in identifying Service personnel with the needed expertise and may also provide plugs from the two standing JTF core elements. JFCOM also has an important
role in establishing joint and combined training programs and rotation schedules.

**What the DoD and Other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies Can Do**

DoD agencies, the intelligence community, and other governmental departments will be depended on to provide specialized planning capabilities, intelligence, and liaison capabilities. These capabilities are absolutely vital if the overarching U.S. mission is to succeed.
Conclusions

We have synthesized the following conclusions from our research.

The Army should anticipate that the demand for JTFs in the future is likely to remain high. JTF HQ have led most U.S. missions over the past 30 years—from small and focused to very large and broad—and the use of JTFs has increased over time. The aggregate commitment for JTF HQ of all types may be fairly large. In addition, JTFs are remaining in service for an increasingly long time once established.

The process to identify and assign key personnel to JTF HQ needs to be improved. Both existing and newly formed JTF HQ need substantial personnel augmentation to lead complex missions. The lead Service will need key skills from the other Services, other joint organizations, and other U.S. government agencies. Key personnel will be in high demand—and JTF HQ are in competition with other Service and joint headquarters for experienced staff and key specialists. It can take up to six months—and perhaps longer—through the existing procedures to obtain all of the personnel needed.

JTF HQ need time to prepare for complex missions. Emerging missions, such as stability and related operations, WMD elimination, and homeland defense/civil support, are complex. Mission success requires dedicated headquarters that have conducted the necessary long-lead planning, organization, and training to be ready to begin operations promptly. This, in turn, requires that the needed staff and specialized cells from all the Services and multiple U.S. government agencies be assigned and integrated well before operations begin. The
JTF HQ will also need to train, exercise, and integrate operations with the headquarters of those forces on which it is critically dependent (e.g., air forces).

The Army can provide the core of JTF HQ for ground-oriented missions. Army corps and division headquarters can supply most of the personnel and many of the skills needed to establish JTF HQ. The Army can also contribute specialized units to augment and provide key capabilities for JTF HQ.

Army-led headquarters need support from joint and interagency organizations. The Army will depend on planning and execution capabilities from the other Services to command and control forces operating outside the ground environment. In addition, specialized planning and execution capabilities will be needed from joint and interagency organizations for SSTR, WMD-elimination, and homeland defense/civil support missions.

Recommendations

Assign to tactical headquarters—corps and divisions—the mission of serving as JTF HQ. The Army should designate its remaining corps as JTF HQ cores and assign each to high-priority missions that feature ground operations. For example, I Corps and III Corps might be assigned to missions that the Army has informally termed full-spectrum warfare, including stability and security operations, counterinsurgency operations, and combat operations. Combat operations would include those operations larger in scale and scope than counterterror and counterinsurgency operations—up to and including major combat operations.1 The assigned corps headquarters would need to strike the appropriate balance among these missions, ensuring that it could provide a sufficient headquarters staff slice for the kinds of contingencies most

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1 We believe that a JTF HQ must be accomplished across this spectrum of operations. Attempting to subdivide these missions further would limit the ability of commanders to adapt to changes in enemy tactics. As an example, we note that the joint commands conducted each of these kinds of operations in both OIF and OEF after what was supposed to be the conclusion of major combat.
likely to erupt. Similarly, the XVIII Airborne Corps might be assigned the mission to counter the proliferation of WMD. This should include the full range of potential missions as described above—from supervising cooperative divestment of materials, to securing materials in failed states, to conducting counterproliferation operations in the presence of hostile forces, including conducting combat operations as necessary.

*The Army should also assign its Active Component division headquarters to missions as part of its force generation process.* Division assignments may, and probably should be, more specialized than those given to the corps, as dictated by contemporaneous needs. For example, the Army might assign two or more division headquarters on staggered time lines to prepare for SSTR and counterinsurgency operations. That way, one division headquarters would be available at any given time to provide additional support to these operations. Similarly, several divisions might be assigned to prepare for major combat operations on staggered time lines or to support other missions as needs dictate.

*The National Guard division headquarters should also be assigned to missions.* Several National Guard division headquarters have proven their ability to command operations in Kosovo and Iraq. Therefore, it is possible to assign them to deployed operations once they have been mobilized and trained. Perhaps more important, National Guard headquarters also offer several unique features and capabilities before they are federalized. They can use their proximity to federal, state, and local government agencies to prepare concepts and plans to meet longstanding and emergency mission needs. In addition, National Guard division headquarters personnel can operate under State Active Duty to conduct operations in the law enforcement and civil government

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2 The corps headquarters must guard against a bias to overprepare for one mission at the expense of preparing for others. For example, corps headquarters were very well prepared for major combat operations before OIF but were much less well prepared for the SSTR operations as they eventually emerged. Future planning and training cycles must strike a balance among these potential missions.

3 The XVIII Airborne Corps might be a particularly good candidate for the counter-WMD mission because of its expertise in conducting forced entry operations and its close relationship with units that conduct rapid response operations (e.g., the 82nd Airborne Division).

4 At the time of this writing, ARFORGEN is that process.
domains. For these reasons, it might make sense to have National Guard headquarters designated for homeland defense/civil support missions.

*The theater armies should continue to execute the tasks that they have already been assigned.* They are best postured to help the combatant commanders develop concepts and plans for the missions they are assigned within their respective areas of responsibility. The theater armies also constitute the best venue for training with allies and coalition partners.

**Prepare Potential JTF Headquarters to Command in Complex Contingencies**

To be ready to accomplish their assigned missions, Army headquarters will need to organize and train with joint and interagency forces. Joint and interagency headquarters will need to develop end-to-end CONOPs for operational-level and tactical-level tasks in cooperation with the combatant commands, the other Services, and other relevant government agencies. This includes identifying the interdependencies that the joint and interagency forces will have and developing trust and confidence within and across these forces so that dependencies will be supported and forces will not be put at undue risk.

Preparing potential JTF HQ to command will require an investment on the part of the Army, the DoD, and other government agencies in committing units and in training them together. Of course, these commitments must work both ways—and Army units must be equally quick to support operations led by other Service components as called on to do so.

**Improve the Process to Staff, Train, and Shape JTF Headquarters**

Army headquarters and the major Army commands should help combatant commanders develop mission-specific JMDs and interagency agreements to fill billets well before a JTF receives a warning order for deployment. The Army should press for JTF commanders to receive assigned personnel in time for them to participate in predeployment training and exercises. The Army should also seek to increase habitual relationships between Army headquarters and joint and interagency
elements. This should include joint and interagency participation in Army-sponsored training and exercises.

JTF HQ will need the ability to rapidly scale up their size to command very large and complex operations—including receiving the appropriate mission “plugs” from the other services, joint organizations, and government agencies. JTF HQ will also need the ability to rapidly deploy small headquarters elements, sufficient in themselves to command small groups of forces or to “fall in” on or augment an existing unit headquarters (a BCT, for example). It may be necessary to deploy many such small headquarters components in a given year, stretching the parent headquarters ability to provide sufficient skilled personnel. The Army might be able to conduct some functions via “reachback” to the home base. When physical proximity is essential, a headquarters’ capabilities might be augmented with personnel from other headquarters in the available or ready pools that have already trained to perform the same missions.

We believe that the preceding recommendations, if fully implemented, would have beneficial effects on the Army’s ability to deploy. The potential benefits of providing JTF HQ with focused preparations are summarized in Table 6.1. The first step is to designate the headquarters to be given priority to receive the staff, equipment, training, and preparation time for an assigned mission. Ultimately, any of the three corps, ten Active Component divisions and eight National Guard division headquarters might be assigned. Having several such headquarters available provides added capacity to meet the needs of missions broad in scope or large in scale. It also provides a “deep bench” during periods of particularly high demand or frequent missions. Once assigned to a mission, these headquarters can be placed on a schedule that yields a ready unit when the deployment order is issued.

The second step is to improve the process to identify and assign needed staff who are outside the parent unit headquarters, including

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5 Note that the JTF HQ attributes discussed in Chapter One are listed here in reverse order. That is because we conceived of the Army first assigning and preparing its own forces to lead headquarters and then finding and training the forces needed from other Services. Together, these preparations would ultimately improve the timeliness of JTF HQ deployment.
Table 6.1
Potential Effect of Improved Headquarters Preparation on Mission Readiness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Readiness to lead missions</td>
<td>Designate headquarters given priority to staff, equip, train, and prepare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity for broad mission scope and high frequency</td>
<td>Each of 3 corps and 18 division headquarters assigned to lead missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>Assigned headquarters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: RAND.

key personnel provided by other Services, joint agencies, and the inter-agency process. If the current processes and practices are improved, designated headquarters could identify and train with key staff before deployment. Just as important, personnel assignments could be adjusted to better shape a JTF HQ as the parameters of the assigned mission became clear. The result would be preidentified and trained staff ready for the order to fill JTF HQ slots.

Finally, the headquarters should be prepared as a unit once the core unit and the augmentees have been identified and assigned. Designated units could, in theory, be placed into an ARFORGEN-like process as soon as they have been assigned. Placing these headquarters into a regular process should increase the predictability of future deployments and should help focus training and preparation on the assigned missions.
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