Army PERSTEMPO: Strategic and Operational Challenges of a Soldier Issue

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**Army PERSTEMPO
Strategic and Operational Challenges
Of a Soldier Issue**

by

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ABSTRACT

Changes in the world order since 1989 have changed the assignment pattern and character of service for today's soldier. Power projection demands that soldiers participate in more deployments than previously. The drawdown has reduced the number of active duty soldiers by 275,000, or 36%. The net result is that the Army has committed fewer soldiers to more deployments with a corresponding increase to the personnel tempo, or PERSTEMPO, experienced by soldiers.

Army and civilian leadership are concerned that this increase in PERSTEMPO may be reaching or even has exceeded tolerable levels. The character of deployments is increasingly Operations Other Than War. The basis for concern is the adverse impact of being away from home station on readiness and the preparedness of our soldiers, and the erosion of warfighting skills. What may constitute the breaking point is unknown. There are perceived indicators that readiness has declined. This, in turn, has jeopardized the Army's ability to fight and win our nation's wars.

Units incur some PERSTEMPO to maintain training readiness. Historical PERSTEMPO rates are inadequately quantified to draw conclusions about 'normal' or acceptable' PERSTEMPO rates, and do not provide an adequate tool to predict impacts on readiness. The joint nature of operations requires there be an approach common to all the Services. Recommendations to address Army PERSTEMPO are grouped into four categories: reporting, policy, force structure, and training.

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A Changed Paradigm

Changes in the world order since 1989 have resulted in dramatic changes to the character of service for today's soldier. The monolithic Cold War threat has ceased to exist and no longer requires large overseas presence fixed to meet that threat. No longer do we have large formations based overseas to which soldiers are assigned on permanent change of station. Those large deterrent formations once permanently based in Western Europe are now reduced to a much smaller structure to demonstrate America's commitment to our Allies. National interests, however, still require American servicemembers committed to global deployments to meet contingencies across a wide spectrum of conflict.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 the nature of deployments in which US servicemembers have participated has changed and their pace increased. While these deployments have increased in frequency and duration, the active Army has drawn down by 275,000 soldiers, or 36%[1], statistically increasing the rate of soldier deployment. The resultant increased rate of deployment, referred to as "Personnel Tempo," or PERSTEMPO, has degraded quality of life and impacted unit morale. That degradation becomes a disincentive for the quality personnel upon which we rely to enlist or reenlist. This manifestation will ultimately cause a reduction in the overall quality of the servicemember and reduced end strength if soldiers are not accessed or retained in sufficient numbers. "Recruiting and retaining quality people significantly affect readiness"[2] is one of the conclusions drawn by former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, in the 1996 *Annual Report to the President and Congress.* How much PERSTEMPO is normal or reasonable is unknown as well as how much may be acceptable to our soldiers. Senior Army and Defense leadership are justifiably concerned about where a breaking point may be.

"Taken together, the growing strains on military personnel and families, diminished training, a quality of life deficit, eroding maintenance and the inexorable pressure of budgetary constraints present a picture of a dangerously overextended force."[3] Given this situation, the media is similarly becoming increasingly aware and concerned about the readiness and ability of the Army to successfully accomplish assigned missions.[4]

     Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) appears on the surface to be a muddy-boots personnel management issue, but is in fact a strategic and operations problem. This paper will discuss the nature of PERSTEMPO, its importance, means to mitigate its adverse effects, and specific recommendations.

The Nature of the Problem

The *National Military Strategy of the United States* lists the three components of our strategy as **"peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention,** and **fighting and winning our Nation's wars**."[5] A characteristic of Peacetime Engagement is increased deployment and Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO). A common thread developing in the character of these increased deployments, however, is that units are not always deployed to perform the primary mission or purpose for which they were designed. Oftentimes units deploy into a spectrum of conflict and operations short of war, collectively referred to as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The conduct of OOTW is characteristically personnel intensive. The bottomline result of the increased OPTEMPO, and specifically deployments associated with OOTW missions, is a degradation in overall training readiness in warfighting skills.

The Army has established a precedent for high quality and immediate response to OOTW. Civilian experiences with the military have been positive and this has fostered increased trust and dependence. With the increase in trust and reliability, there comes a greater willingness to use military force in what may appear to be non-traditional roles. This has the potential net effect of increasing the frequency and length of deployments, and creates an added 'overhead' to the force structure requirements of the 2-Major Regional Conflict (2-MRC) strategy upon which the military force structure is based.[6] Former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, has further suggested that foreign aid cuts will also force the US to become increasingly dependent on the use of the military as an instrument of diplomacy.[7] This implicitly forecasts even further increases in units' **OPTEMPO**.

This 'OOTW overhead' constitutes force structure requirements for which the military is inadequately resourced. Under the 2-MRC strategy, it is assumed that the second conflict begins sufficiently after the first conflict to withdraw and retrain, if necessary, forces deployed on **OOTW** to prepare them for commitment to the second MRC. If the initial OOTW deployment was directed to meet a National Interest up front, it cannot be assumed that this interest will change with a second MRC to permit the military to withdraw and recommit those forces elsewhere. Forces are particularly vulnerable during withdrawal. The withdrawal itself may also create a temporary increase in force requirements to provide for force protection.

Every unit deployed on OOTW operations will have at least some of their core combat skills degraded and require retraining after the deployment. Even support units deployed to perform the unit primary mission will experience degradation of individual core combat skills such as physical fitness and rifle marksmanship. Skills such as these are essential to maintain warfighting readiness. Unit commanders must retrain and requalify soldiers to established training standards in preparation for future deployment, and must report this training status through monthly Unit Status Reports.

Joint Pub 3-0 discusses strategy in terms of *Ends, Ways* and *Means. Ends* are the national and military objectives, *ways* are the national policies and military concepts to attain those objectives, and *means* are the resources, and military forces and supplies.[8] The dynamic of PERSTEMPO constitutes an element of *means.* Excessive PERSTEMPO, or PERSTEMPO improperly compensated for, can affect or degrade the effectiveness of the national strategic *means.* Forces readily available may be insufficient to simultaneously maintain commitments

and meet contingencies; or those forces can be left inadequately prepared, neither trained nor ready, for a warfighting deployment.

The impact on the American soldier is increased time on deployment and a shift in expected assignment patterns. Soldiers will be stationed for longer periods in the Continental United States (CONUS), but their tours will be unpredictably interrupted with hazardous deployments, often more than once during an assignment. "Stress is exacerbated when the deployments are unanticipated, when their duration is uncertain and when service members are placed in harm's way..."[9] Soldiers will adapt in time to the changed assignment pattern. Deployment unpredictability is the paradigm that causes the greatest anxiety and for which soldiers may not be able to adapt without compensation or mitigation of the effects of PERSTEMPO.

The number one priority for readiness included in the June 1994 report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness was to ensure the quality of personnel. Secretary of Defense Program Decision Memorandum II, issued in October 1994, formally tasked the Joint Staff to convene a working group to examine PERSTEMPO in the uniformed services. The Joint Staff PERSTEMPO Working Group (PWG) initiated study and provided their first report in June 1995. The PWG initial assessment of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Readiness Report was that

> PERSTEMPO (defined by the DSB as the amount of time units and their assigned personnel are gone from home) in fact had an impact on morale, retention, and readiness; PERSTEMPO rates had been impacted by force structure changes; and only the Navy had developed PERSTEMPO measurements and thresholds.[10]

The potential adverse impact of PERSTEMPO on readiness has not been overlooked by the Legislative leadership of the United States. With the Department of Defense Appropriations

Bill for 1996, the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations directed the

Department of Defense to submit a report on the "units, mission areas, or particular skills being

used consistently in each Military Service because of the support to operations other than war."[11]

This requirement spawned efforts in the Services to measure and quantify PERSTEMPO.

Measurement of Army PERSTEMPO could be construed as just another report requirement, but

the need for measurement appears in total or part in a variety of defense and personnel issues.

Former Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin dedicated an entire section of the *1996 Annual*

Report to the President and Congress to the subject of PERSTEMPO, "Managing Time Away

From Home: Personnel Tempo." The Report concluded that,

> although much of the satisfaction that comes from military service is the
> opportunity for individuals to do what they have been trained for ... extensive
> deployments increase the time that service members are away from their families
> and communities. This cannot help but impact the way military members and their
> families feel about serving their country.[12]

Military and civilian media continue to address PERSTEMPO with a variety of human

interest stories that describe hardship on soldiers and their families.[13] Such vignettes reinforce the

military leadership's impression that, first, PERSTEMPO has increased, and second, that there is

a breaking point that may be an unknown, but is fast approaching. Such vignettes can have the

effect of creating self-fulfilling prophecies. If leadership and soldiers think that increased

PERSTEMPO is having an adverse effect on training, readiness and quality of life, then it has

and will continue to do so until the prophecy is dispelled or the reality is changed, and the trend

in morale is altered.

The most immediate readiness concern is that there will be a sharp drop in retention and

recruiting of the high quality personnel required. One of the conclusions reached by the June

1994 report of the DSB Task Force on Readiness was that PERSTEMPO caused lower morale which led to poor retention and reduced readiness.[14] Subjectively, increased fatigue, frustration and stress on soldiers and their families would support this conclusion. To date, however, there is no conclusive empirical data to support either leadership's concern or the DSB's observation.[15] Data is arguably so incomplete that accurate conclusions cannot be drawn.

Significant change in recruiting is of particular concern to military planners considering changing demographics of American society. Faced with a shrinking recruit pool, recruiting will become more competitive with potential for a reduction in the quality of the individual recruit, and a corresponding reduction in the overall quality of the force.

The 1994 report of the DSB Task Force on Readiness also concluded and substantiated that a result of increased tempo of deployments was indicators of increased suicide and family violence rates.[16] That conclusion is partially supported by the 9 April 1997 House Committee on National Security report on Military Readiness .[17] This is evidence, at least in part, of other potential adverse effects on personnel and readiness.

The inability to predict future readiness appears to be a particular source of frustration for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An important consideration in planning future deployments, particularly in OOTW scenarios that are not the units' primary mission, is the effect that this deployment will have on future readiness. This is a part of the total cost of doing business. Planners must have proactive means to assess the impact on readiness, and what may be required for units to recover. Plans must include measures to compensate soldiers and units to mitigate adverse effects of PERSTEMPO.

All of this is not to say that PERSTEMPO by and of itself is necessarily bad. Units must

incur some PERSTEMPO for no other reason than to meet minimum peacetime training requirements. There is anecdotal evidence that the current increase in PERSTEMPO and OOTW deployments is having an adverse impact on training. There is no hard data or consensus, but there is emerging subjective assessment of reduced proficiency demonstrated by units at the National Training Center. This reduction is attributed to units not training as intensely as in previous years.[18] In a recent article in *Army Times* unit commander observed that, "Deployments are up so much right now that we're basically catching ourselves coming and going ... I don't think we are training with as much intensity as we did before."[19]

Senior leadership requires a tool with which to assess PERSTEMPO, predict the impacts OOTW deployments will have on readiness, comprehend the true readiness cost of deployments and upon which to base a scheme to meet near term future contingency requirements. The Army does not currently have an adequate system or means to measure PERSTEMPO and there is institutional resistance to putting one in place. There is general acceptance of Service differences in the nature of PERSTEMPO and the means to measure it. Given the joint nature of present and future deployments and decision-making, it may no longer be prudent to accept different Service measurement tools.

Definition and Description of PERSTEMPO

The Army has adopted the following definition and division of responsibility for

PERSTEMPO:

PERSTEMPO is the rate of deployment for Army elements measured as a percentage. PERSTEMPO consists of two components:

-DEPTEMPO: percent of time spent on "out of station operational deployments" by unit. DCSOPS (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations) responsibility.

-SKILLTEMIPO: percent of time spent on "out of station operational deployments" by MOS and skill level. DCSPER (Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel) responsibility.[20]

Qualitatively there are differences in the type of day spent away and the manner in which each is currently treated:

First, there are unit deployments as directed by the National Command Authorities. The nature of these deployments vary from combat to non-combat missions which include: US civil deployments, humanitarian international, counterdrug, UN Staff; Special Forces deployments, major training exercises and mission support. Examples of mission support include REFORGER, Bright Star, and JTF-B, but not the Army Training Centers,

The Army tracks soldiers on these deployments if the period of the deployment is at least 7 days, or 3 days for Special Forces soldiers.[21] These deployments are tracked using the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS). Unit personnel clerks input the deployment location and projected return date into the soldiers' master automated file using codes published by the Army Adjutant General for the specific deployment. This data field is inherently inaccurate, unreliable and untimely.[22]

Despite inaccuracy shortfalls, this is an improvement over the observations of the PERSTEMPO Working Group's Initial Report in May 1995 that the Army measurement was inadequate and missed "periods of time away from home station lasting less than 30 days, and unmarried individuals deployed not as part of a unit are not counted regardless of deployment duration."[23]

The automated master file data base is used to develop SKILLTEMPO reports to provide Army leadership and personnel managers with visibility primarily on what Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) are experiencing the most tempo. These PERSTEMPO reports provide good visibility of current trends, but do not provide a comprehensive historical data base for comparison or detailed analysis.

There is a certain 'feel good factor' soldiers initially derive from participation in a unit deployment. Soldiers' service satisfaction is initially high because they have the opportunity to perform in their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in an actual unit deployment to do what they enlisted to do. This may be the primary contributing factor to reenlistment rates appearing to actually increase for units starting a deployment.

The nature of unit deployments, however, is that they have the greatest potential to be dangerous, and are, therefore, inherently the most stressful for soldiers and their families.Unit deployments are also characteristically unpredictable and in response to a crisis or incident. Because of the importance and urgency, soldiers are essential to their units but at the same time, the soldier becomes unable to respond to 'home crises' such as the death of a family member or birth of a child. Thus, despite the 'feel good factor,' unit deployments over time are the most stressful and likely to have an adverse effect on morale and readiness, exacerbated by frequent

deployment. It is these OOTW unit deployments that have received the attention of the media and Congress.

Unit training readiness is eroded by OOTW deployments. Units cannot expect to perform all the mission essential tasks, and some warfighting skills will deteriorate. Infantry units deployed to Haiti, for example, performed defensive and patrolling tasks, but did not have the opportunity to train such tasks as a coordinated attack on a fortified position. Infantry units' defensive patrolling skills were reinforced, but their attack skills deteriorated. Individual core combat skills such as rifle marksmanship and physical fitness also deteriorate unless the situation permits the conduct of this training. Increasingly, vignettes indicate units' efforts to maintain these skills by conducting core combat skill training during OOTW deployments. Rotation of combat units in Bosnia through firing range facilities is an example. Leadership initiative, available facilities and resources, and opportunity are the key elements.

For those individual and collective skills that deteriorate, retraining opportunity must be afforded to the unit upon return from a deployment before that unit can meet readiness expectations. The impact is a period of unit unreadiness until the soldiers and the unit can train required tasks to standard, and additional PERSTEMPO as the unit will inevitably be required to spend some amount of time in the field as part of that retraining.

Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and off post training constitute the second type of deployment. A result of the Army drawdown is increased unit opportunities to deploy and train at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; or the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

PERSTEMPO caused by these deployments is not, but should be tracked, and it is anticipated this policy will soon change.

CTC rotations are resource intensive training deployments using shared training facilities that must be scheduled well in advance, and are, therefore, more predictable. It is discretionary training, but because it is scheduled well in advance, CTCs tend to become a driver of unit training programs. Units scheduled for a CTC rotation who are deployed upset the rotation schedule. Rather than leave the CTC unused for a training rotation, other units may backfill on relatively short notice. This is cost effective utilization of training resources, but potentially creates inordinate uncertainty for the units who backfill. Uncertain PERSTEMPO is more stressful and therefore less desirable than predictable PERSTEMPO that is scheduled and anticipated. A precedent recently made at the National Training Center was to cancel a rotation because the scheduled unit was not adequately prepared and would incur unnecessarily high PERSTEMPO as a result.

Because CTC rotations are conducted off post in a highly visible training environment, unit chains of command are reluctant to permit soldiers the same flexibility to respond to family crises that may be possible in home station training exercises. The CTC-replicated combat environment provides a training experience in which commanders both want their units to do well and gain the maximum training benefit. Every soldier seemingly becomes essential and indispensable.

Units are logically assumed to be better trained overall following a CTC rotation. The deployment to the training area constitutes beneficial training by itself. CTC rotations, however,

are scheduled on an annual basis Army wide. Sometimes, this may mean inopportune times for specific units based on unit calendars.

Home station training prior to the rotation is essential to maintain individual skills such as physical fitness and individual rifle marksmanship. CTC rotations are diminished in their execution and derived training value when units are denied the opportunity to prepare. CTC rotations become training readiness 'peaks,' not conducive to sustainment of consistent training readiness. PERSTEMPO for units training at the CTCs, then, increases because of preparation, the deployment to the CTC, and to retraining to compensate for degradation of individual skills.

The third type of deployment is to local or home station training areas. The mission of Army units in peacetime is to train and prepare for hostilities and execution of the primary mission for which designed. For combat units in particular, this requires moving to a tactical field setting. This is discretionary training planned for by the chain of command based on analysis of unit training requirements.

Because training and assessment resources are not as extensive as at the CTCs, this training is second in overall quality to a CTC rotation. Like CTC rotations, it is somewhat predictable if for no other reason than the requirement to coordinate use of land resources. It is conducted under unit control, and, therefore, is inherently more accommodating to permit soldiers to respond to 'family crises.' Local training is probably shorter in duration and easily scheduled around weekends and holidays. Commanders have the flexibility to adjust training plans based on unit progress and their assessment of training proficiency. Local training areas are likely in proximity to other training facilities such as those which are required for physical fitness or rifle marksmanship. It is the least stressful, most controlled training.

Mitigating PERSTEMPO's Effects

There are a number of means by which to mitigate adverse effects of PERSTEMPO and still meet mission requirements. This section will discuss a number of those which are currently in place or could be adopted. Specific recommendations as to which portions of these strategies to pursue are contained in the final section, Conclusions and Recommendations. Means to mitigate PERSTEMPO are broadly categorized as Army policy, financial incentives, force structure, basing, assignment of missions, training, and expectations.

The first of these categories is Army policy. The active Army has already implemented enlisted personnel assignment policies aimed at reducing the stress of reassignment following redeployment and providing some stability for the soldier and his family. The PERSCOM Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate uses stabilization rules to 'fence' soldiers participating in deployments from the additional turmoil of reassignment immediately upon return from deployment. CONUS-based soldiers deployed 61 to 139 days are stabilized for 4 months upon return, unless they volunteer for subsequent deployment or are directed based on Army requirements by PERSCOM. CONUS-based soldiers deployed for 140 or more days are not eligible for a long overseas tour (i.e., Germany) for 6 months or a short overseas tour (i.e., Korea) for 12 months following return from deployment.[24]

This policy is advantageous to the soldier and his family in that it takes away some of the uncertainty and anxiety about reassignment immediately upon return. It may be uncertain at the outset of the deployment, however, as to the length of the deployment and whether or not the soldier will be eligible for stabilization upon return. Interestingly, there are no policy provisions for the stabilization of officers. Unlike enlisted personnel assignments, officer assignments are

not automated, invariably involve telephonic contact between the officer and PERSCOM, and stabilization policies apparently are considered to be unnecessary.

There is a readiness challenge and loss of predictability for commanders of other units to which those deployed soldiers will be assigned upon return from deployment. Soldiers assigned to units notified for deployment who have been identified by PERSCOM for reassignment are intended by PERSCOM to proceed on their assignment instructions to provide readiness predictability. Due to the sense of urgency associated with deployment, the soldier should be considered more important to the unit to which currently assigned and should be a personnel asset for that unit commander. When this occurs, PERSCOM must cancel assignment instructions and notify the gaining command.

Another policy measure is to establish an annual ceiling goal for the number of days soldiers may be deployed, or gone from their bunk or home station. This has essentially already been done. Initial discussions appeared to indicate that a goal of 150 days deployed was a suitable target. More recently, however, Army leadership has made it clear that 120 days should be established as the 'mark on the wall' for soldiers to be deployed,[25] but has not yet provided definitive guidance on how to implement this goal.

A goal of 120 days should apply to unit operational DEPTEMPO, not the total amount of time soldiers should be gone from the unit area or home station in a year. As discussed in the previous section, units, especially combat arms units, must have time to train and soldiers must have the opportunity to attend required professional development schools. The disadvantage of a 'ceiling,' whether or not qualified, is that soldiers' perceptions embrace 120 days as the cutoff for deployment or field duty and it may have an adverse impact on morale if they exceed that

ceiling. Managing 120 days as such a cutoff is impractical and takes away commanders' prerogative to plan training and maintain readiness of their units.

A PERSTEMPO potential adverse impact on married soldiers is increased stress, possibly resulting in legal separation or divorce. Another policy measure to mitigate PERSTEMPO is to reduce the number of married first-term soldiers, or bureaucratically discourage young first term soldiers from getting married. This measure is aimed primarily at young married soldiers, arguably the least mature soldiers and married relationships impacted. Such a controversial measure was considered by the Marine Corps in 1993. A Marine Corps Commandant Message to All Marines, ALMAR 226-93, directed a plan to phase out recruitment of married enlistees.[26] This directive was subsequently rescinded, but held much favor among middle and junior grade leadership of the Marine Corps. Such policy is politically and legally infeasible. It also has potential adverse impact on the propensity of new recruits to enlist by discouraging or portraying the service as less attractive.

Incentive bonuses are a second means to mitigate PERSTEMPO. Bonuses could be offered for soldiers to enlist or reenlist in Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) which experience exceptionally high SKILLTEMPO. Such decisions are made periodically on enlistment and reenlistment bonuses as a strength management tool for those MOSs that are having difficulty meeting end strength goals. Decisions tend to be made when MOS end strengths show signs of difficulty and are more subjective than objective. SKILLTEMPO data could provide a measure of predictability so that bonuses could be adjusted at about the same time the initial deployment occurs which will increase PERSTEMPO. Bonuses are then adjusted

proactively to offset any decrease in soldiers' propensity to enlist or reenlist and ensure there are no shortages in those MOSs.

Creating a 'deployment bonus' would make deployments a little less distasteful to the soldier and his family and provide an incentive for the deployed soldier. Separation pay compensates spouses, which discriminates against single soldiers. Hazardous duty pay rewards risk, but discriminates against soldiers participating in more benign OOTW deployments. Additional increases to the Army's budget are difficult during periods of fiscal austerity, but the benefits of the expense may warrant consideration.

Force Structure is a third means to mitigate the effects of PERSTEMPO. Force structure is currently designed to support the National Military Strategy requirements of "fighting and winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously."[27] As discussed in the 'Nature of the Problem,' the post-Cold War period (since 1989) has added an increasingly large dimension of OOTW overhead that has increased PERSTEMPO for all the Services..

The active Army end strength could be increased against the current force structure. This permits greater percentage of fill to mitigate shortages created by soldiers in transit from one assignment to another or too close to their separation date to be deployable. It also gives commanders greater latitude to spare those soldiers with extenuating circumstances or 'family crises.' A greater percentage of fill permits deployments to be spread across a much larger population, thereby statistically reducing SKIILLTEMPO.

When units are maintained at or below authorization, or soldiers are released for various reasons (medical, support for a family crisis), then soldiers from other units must be identified as personnel fillers to ensure the personnel readiness of deploying units. Soldiers are presented

with potential uncertainty or unpredictability associated with being notified for service as fillers. Filling shortages immediately prior to deployment has the side effects of increased personnel turnover, and reduced unit cohesion and continuity, all of which decrease readiness.

Unit DEPTEMPO could provide data upon which to base decisions about whether to increase the size of the force structure for specific units in greatest demand. One of the criticisms aimed at gathering PERSTEMPO data is that it would be used for just that purpose. Admittedly, it is inappropriate to reduce force structure decisions to a simplistic equation without subjective assessment of its appropriateness.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) maintains a classified list of those low density/high deploying units across all the services with the highest OPTEMPO. The JCS also enumerates metrics for consideration by commanders when the rate of deployment exceeds stated parameters.[28] This list and metrics, entitled "Global Military Force Policy (U)," provides one means to mitigate PERSTEMPO. If, for example, there are not enough Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units to meet the Commanders' in Chief (CINC's) deployment requirements, then there is a force structure shortfall. PERSTEMPO data, both DEPTEMPO and SKILLTEMPO, provide empirical means to assess requirements for additional PSYOP force structure.

The currently convened Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is chartered to assess the threat, the response to threat, and the strategy, all of which defines the "question of needs"[29] for the US military. It is unfortunate that Army PERSTEMPO data collection efforts are neither complete nor adequate to facilitate such decisions. Given fiscal constraints, it is unlikely that there will be any additional force structure made available for the Army, and possibly not for the

Services overall. General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the JCS, held open the door for potential force reductions by stating that the "QDR is not about protecting today's force; it is rather about shaping tomorrow's force."[30] Despite the possibility of force reductions, the QDR still appears to be an excellent and unprecedented opportunity to shape the force to 'right-size' future operational deployments and tempo.

Decisions that concern the basing of Army units are a fourth means to mitigate PERSTEMPO. If; for example, a certain type of CONUS-based unit is required repeatedly or for extended periods in a forward theater, it may make more sense to forward base that unit. This reflects a return to the Cold War paradigm and requires infrastructure support. Germany and Korea are examples of theaters where sufficient infrastructure exists to absorb new units. There is turmoil associated with unit moves to the forward theater and the subsequent reassignment of personnel replacements to sustain those units, but forward basing affords soldiers more opportunities to return to their bunk or quarters.

The recent Air Force decision to forward-base KC-135 aerial refueling tankers at Mildenhall AFB in England provides an example of such a decision. By forward-basing KC-135 tankers, the requirement to place airmen on temporary duty to support refueling operations over the northeast Atlantic is eliminated. Airmen can perform the same mission from their home base in Mildenhall. This example may not be currently applicable to the Army, but situations and deployment strategies could change.

Units of the same type with high PERSTEMPO could be assigned to the same installation or in geographic proximity. This would not reduce PERSTEMPO per se, but it would reduce some of the turmoil and uncertainty associated with reassignment or crossleveling of soldiers

between units that exacerbate the effects of PERS TEMPO. The requirement for permanent

change of station for soldiers of the predominate MOS in these units is reduced as the majority of

requirements are at one installation. Assignment managers can build up' units preparing for the

next deployment with soldiers who have not just returned from other deployments. If there is a

need for cross leveling or fillers, they come from the same installation. Soldiers and families are

able to establish themselves into one installation and community thereby reducing the anxiety

experienced when moving to a new assignment.

The Army fundamentally did this with the Special Forces and PSYOP/Civil Affairs units

stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Recent decisions to base the majority of Patriot Air

Defense Missile battalions at Fort Bliss, Texas, provide another example. Such a strategy

requires a suitably benign environment to avoid a security risk by putting 'like unit' eggs in the

same installation basket, and the installation must have an infrastructure sufficient to facilitate

the physical deployment of the units.

As demonstrated in the Pacific by the Marines in Okinawa, there may be fewer countries

willing to permanently host basing of US troops. At the same time, our *National Security

Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* mandates increased overseas presence. Presence will

become more creative in nature and will cause additional temporary deployment of US troops in

overseas locations. The need to provide troops with the maximum predictability will require a

predictable deployment plan and schedule, and the discipline to adhere to that schedule.

Selection of the specific unit or component for a deployment <u>mission</u> is a fifth means to

mitigate PERSTEMPO. Global Resourcing is a technique that has routinely been used with

success. This technique essentially divides deployment responsibilities among units with lower

PERSTEMPO. This works best with same or similar units who can simply fall in on the mission. The deployment of 25th Infantry Division units to Haiti to replace units of the 10th Mountain Division provides an excellent example as do the forces rotating through deployment to Bosnia.[31]

Global resourcing may also, with sufficient time to prepare, include units of a different type. The Army and the Marine Corps have both used units in 'non-standard' missions to provide relief for units with high PERSTEMPO. In Haiti, for example, units of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) were reorganized and retrained to replace light infantry units. Artillery units from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, were used during the 1980s Cuban boatlift to help guard refugees. Currently only subjective 'lessons learned' exist to assess how much time is required for such retraining prior to deployment and upon return to regain mission readiness skills. Collection of PERSTEMPO data would provide an empirical means to assess time requirements.

These techniques may solve the challenge of unit DEPTEMPO, but may exacerbate individual SKILLTEMPO for soldiers rotating between units. For longer operations, units should be alerted or scheduled well in advance. This permits personnel agencies to avoid assigning recently deployed soldiers to units that may soon deploy. The Marine Corps is able to make such a consideration in individual assignments because unit deployments are based on a long-term, predictable unit deployment schedule. Army deployments have been in response to contingency and crisis situations that have not lent themselves to long range predictability. The current rotation of Patriot units into Southwest Asia or light infantry units to the Multi-National Force Observer Mission in the Sinai, provide good examples of long term deployments that can be predictably scheduled. If Bosnia deployments are to be extended overtime, this is also an

example of a deployment that should be scheduled among units who do not have as high

PERSTEMPO rates as those currently deployed.

There is increasing reliance upon reserve component units and individuals to offset

requirements on the active force. Unit callups for deployments longer than the 2 week annual

training period are subject to Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) or partial

mobilization, both measures require at least a degree of political resolve or risk taking.

The use of Reserve Component (RC) volunteers may be a viable alternative for certain

deployments, but is not optimized by Army unit structure:

> A recent study on volunteerism acknowledges that the Air Force 'uses volunteers
> routinely for peacetime operations.' The reason is simple: air crews are small and the
> skill levels of reservists are equal to or better than the AC. The other Services, especially
> the Army, require greater numbers of individuals in units (vessels) that require lengthy
> post-mobilization training and cohesion prior to deployment.[32]

Use of military force within existing legal and political constraints is time consuming and RC

unit readiness posture is not as responsive as that of Regular Army units. This precludes the RC

from being considered component of choice for time sensitive situations. RC units could be used

as follow on forces for Regular Army units which first respond. In the 1992 Hurricane Andrew

relief effort, for example, the 82d Airborne Division was alerted first and replaced by 10th

Mountain Division and Florida Army National Guard units.

A vignette in the same publication about an Army postal unit created ad hoc out of RC

volunteers suggests the impracticality of such a strategy for future deployments. During a US

forces' deployment a RC postal unit was required, but couldn't be called to active duty without

the 200,000 PSRC authority; "Volunteers were called for and a provisional unit created which

did not function well."[33]

Training constitutes a sixth category of means by which to mitigate PERSTEMPO. Multi-echelon training trains more than one unit vertically at the same time. Army Field Manual (FM) 25-100, *Training the Force,* includes a discussion of multi-echelon training. Army unit leaders have a mechanism already in place to monitor the consolidation and efficiency of appropriate multi-echelon training in conjunction with normally scheduled Training Briefs to their chains of command.

Conduct of multi-echelon joint training provides the efficiency of simultaneous integration of the services and reduces the number of times subordinate units must take to the field to train to established mission standards. Such scheduling reduces the freedom and latitude of operational and tactical level commanders to plan training based on unit assessments and specific training requirements to modify training plans to take corrective action or accelerate training while being conducted. There will be competition with the 50 or so headquarters identified as potential Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters if not properly considered, but this coordination hurdle is not insurmountable. Defense and joint leadership have the potential ability to coordinate and monitor through the joint readiness reporting and the CINCs' quarterly reports as required by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness.

Training exercises can also be conducted using units further down the deployment priority list or in secondary missions. This is one of the Marine Corps' initiatives to mitigate the effects of PERSTEMPO.[34] This affords training opportunities to units who may not otherwise have such opportunities and reduces PERSTEMPO for high deploying units. Drawbacks include loss of a mission training opportunity for the initially deployed units, and it may preclude training together of habitually associated units.

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Another approach is to assign dual missions to combat arms units. FM 25-100 also requires unit commanders to discern their unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL) from pertinent mission statements, contingency plans and unit organization. Periodically, units' status of training as measured against these tasks is briefed to the chain of command with the accompanying training strategy. Units could be assigned 'secondary mission tasks,' but not train to standard or be held accountable for successful execution of those tasks without adequate preparation. This quantifies the possibility of use, for example, of infantry units in a military police role in deployments such as Haiti or Bosnia.

These 'secondary mission tasks' require time to train before units are deployed to execute them. The nature of soldiers and units lends itself well to flexible requirements. Soldiers are well motivated, mission oriented, physically fit and accustomed to living in austere conditions. Soldiers and leaders are taught to think, not simply respond. Units have viable command and control structures and personalities. The bottom line is that military units are disciplined, willing to leam and will stick with any mission until successfully completed. Civilian agencies experience with Army units has been positive[35] and contemporary units' performance has been superb, thereby insuring a high level of trust by all Americans. Historical PERSTEMPO data provides an empirical assessment of the time required to prepare for the deployment and to retrain primary warfighting skills following the deployment. The benefit to the unit is a mission task list and doctrine prepared well in advance and pulled off the shelf when required.

A training management strategy contained in FM 25-100 and integral to Army training doctrine is the training cycle. Units in a GREEN cycle are typically fenced from all administrative requirements to conduct large unit collective training. To prepare, the AMBER

cycle provides opportunity for individual training to prepare base skills for collective training. RED cycle provides a predictable window for soldiers to take leave, attend required schools and for the unit to perform those non-mission essential, but required administrative tasks that keep divisions and installations running smoothly. A key element to this training doctrine is enforced predictability by locking-in training six weeks prior to its conduct to prevent disruption of required training, reduce turmoil, and ensure the conduct of quality training.

Borrow on those concepts of FM 25-100 and assign rotational deployment responsibility among Army Divisions for specified periods of time. This would be proactive global sourcing and is comparable to the Marine Corps' rotational unit deployment schedule. This provides predictability to commander's training plans for mission essential training. Annual rotation of mission responsibility among the divisions provides personnel managers adequate long term predictability to manage shortages and accommodate priority units. Personnel managers can prepare units for a deployment responsibility 'window' by ensuring key vacancies are properly filled. Soldiers recently deployed can avoid undue PERSTEMPO by not being assigned to units responsible for meeting OOTW and other deployment requirements. Annual rotation also provides division commanders with adequate long term opportunity to rotate primary deployment responsibility among the units within the division.

A seventh category of means to mitigate PERSTEMPO addresses soldiers' expectations. FM 100-1, *The Army,* discusses the nature of service and hardship soldiers will be expected to endure. While data is less than optimal, the Army's current PERSTEMPO is still shown to be less than that of the Navy and Marine Corps. The ethos of a sailor or Marine is different from that of a soldier. Sailors, especially those with sea ratings, expect to be at sea. Marines

understand long deployments and expect that separation. Frequent deployment for *soldiers* marks

a change in the service paradigm that is not yet fully understood, and expectations have not

changed to meet this new paradigm. Soldiers' expectations can be modified through publications

and media, the message conveyed to new soldiers in their training, and through what leaders and

mentors tell new soldiers. Time will modify expectations to fit this new paradigm as our

leadership better understands and reinforces this changed paradigm.

What remains unknown is potential new soldiers' propensity to enlist for this new

paradigm. The 1994 DSB Task Force on Readiness concluded that,

> overall the propensity of America's youth to serve in the Armed Forces, as measured by the Youth Aptitude Tracking Study, has declined in the past three years. Likewise, the propensity of parents and other influencers to recommend military service to young people is decreasing.[36]

Public media articles that address the increased hardship and PERSTEMPO, whether

interpreted correctly by the authors or not, serve to exacerbate the emerging reluctance of

Americans to serve in the military.

It may well be that a number of soldiers become soldiers because the Navy and Marine

Corps spend too much time away--

> Although much of the satisfaction that comes from military service is the opportunity for individuals to do what they have been trained for ...the extensive deployments increase the time that service members are away from their families and communities. This cannot help but impact the way military members and their families feel about serving their country.[37]

The hazard of an all-volunteer Army becoming increasingly unmarketable is that it will

not be able to attract sufficient numbers of qualified recruits to meet end strength requirements.

"Quality of life programs provide assurance to service members that their families will be taken

care of during deployments -- an important consideration with a more mature and family oriented

all-volunteer force."[38] Soldiers must not perceive any erosion of benefits. The result is stress caused by additional uncertainty which may discourage quality soldiers from remaining in the Army.

Force reductions potentially cause an increase in PERSTEMPO by sharing deployments among fewer units. Further cuts in the future will only make matters worse. This will exacerbate any unmarketability the Army may have with new recruits. Any changes as to the character of soldiers' service expectations must be done gradually, carefully, and offer suitable enticements or means to mitigate or offset the increased tempo of service deployment.

Conclusions and Recommendations

PERSTEMPO is not necessarily a problem to be solved, nor should it become one. It is a dynamic that has always existed to one degree or another, and is different between the services, Army units, and MOSs. To have some amount of PERSTEMPO is both of necessity and inherently good. What is vital is the impact the PERSTEMPO dynamic may have on readiness and the ability of the Army to accomplish its mission in the face of the changed post Cold War paradigm. Human behavior is not an absolute science, and available quantitative tools must be exploited to more accurately understand, predict and mitigate adverse impacts on readiness. There are certain policies or techniques that are beneficial to offset adverse effects of PERSTEMPO and optimize readiness.

PERSTEMPO may be a personnel challenge, but it is not the personnel managers who have the resources, ability or staff responsibility to solve personnel tempo problems by themselves. Solutions must be holistic in nature. The joint nature of operations now and for the foreseeable future mandates that there be a common approach between the services. Recommendations for treatment of Army PERSTEMPO are grouped into four categories: reporting, policy, force structure and training.

First, there should be a standard means to report and understand PERSTEMPO uniformly across all the services. Definitions and means to capture data differ with the Services, making it difficult if not impossible to make coherent comparisons among the Services. Data collected in the same manner will most certainly show different PERSTEMPO types and rates among the Services. A new approach would provide the CJCS and OSD with a common and understandable yardstick for measuring PERSTEMPO and its effect. Current measurement tools

do not support commanders and instill no confidence in our civilian leadership. The Defense

Management Data Center (DMDC) and Army decision makers must be furnished with better

data than they now have to make informed decisions about personnel policy, assignment of

missions and establishment of force structure.

Shape the measurement tools to count what is required. Measurement tools to date have

measured that which they have been capable of measuring. The current Army measurement is

inadequate. It "misses periods of time away from home station lasting less than 30 days, and

unmarried individuals deployed not as part of a unit are not counted regardless of deployment

duration."[39] Difficulty in presenting SKILLTEMPO type data may also indicate problems in

personnel accountability. There will be costs associated with hardware and software modification

or procurement, but this should be acceptable. Leverage off the shelf technology to

accommodate what is required. Military ID cards with bar codes have been issued to service

members, but we have not yet exploited that initiative. Efforts must increase accounting accuracy

without incurring additional force structure requirements or inordinate workload on personnel

managers.

Adopt a uniform standard of measurement across all the Services. The DSB Quality of

Life Task Force recommended standardization of the methodology of counting time by using the

simple formula: *"one day away = 1 day away."*[40] There is general agreement that this is the

definition that should probably be used, but difficulties in assessing PERSTEMPO to the

standard of this formula have caused redefinition. The 'one day away' formula will highlight

differences among the Services, Army units, and specialties, but won't tell soldiers, sailors,

airmen or Marines anything they haven't already figured out for themselves. Each type unit and

branch of the Service has a different culture, mission, training requirements and, therefore, different expectations. The Army currently cannot quantify what is normal simply because no accurate data has been compiled.

The Army and the DMDC must "build" an accurate data base. This facilitates proactive force structure and strength management decisions to shape the future force and maintain readiness. Perhaps most importantly, it enables the Army to empirically answer and address the tough, detailed questions posed by civilian and military leadership. Ultimately, the services must justify force structure and expense, especially in a constrained fiscal environment, to civilian lawmakers. Empirical PERSTEMPO data assists by providing statistical and comprehensible justification.[41]

Measure <u>unit</u> tempo, or DEPTEMPO also. Modify current unit status reporting procedures to empirically capture the number of days during the report period the unit was deployed and the type of deployment. Current procedures capture only subjective assessments. Since many deployments involve portions of units, a workable definition must be determined, such as '51% of the authorized structure,' or the 'unit commander and any portion of the unit.'

Modify Army FM 25-100 to provide means by which to include DEPTEMPO as part of the Quarterly Training Brief process. This provides commanders with an accurate picture of the PERSTEMPO cost for both deployments and retraining that must be conducted following deployment. The Quarterly Training Brief process also provides a mechanism for leadership to interact and adjust training or deployment plans as required.

The second category of recommendations is policy. Army leadership has made clear the goal that units deploy for no more than 120 days a year. Indications are the average is 140-160

days.[42] One hundred twenty days should be the planning goal for the length of scheduled unit deployments only, and not include training days. Units deployed must be afforded time for retraining and normal training following the deployment. Every unit type and 'personality' is different, and each has different training requirements. Commanders must have the latitude to determine how much training is required to achieve desired readiness and the responsibility to schedule and conduct that training wisely. There is no data available that may indicate what normal' SKILL- or DEPTEMPO is to meet routine training requirements. A more accurate and detailed PERSTEMPO data base enables quantification of 'normal.'

One hundred twenty days is a suitable length of time for units to be employed in missions other than that for which they are intended, such as OOTW, without unduly adversely affecting training or an appropriate warrior mind set. Shorter deployment periods and frequent rotation of units and personnel through a theater causes inordinate turmoil and precludes adequate preparation. A conclusion drawn by General (Retired) Wayne Downing in his report on the Khobar Towers bombing was that the extremely short tours of the Air Force security, intelligence and counter-intelligence personnel adversely affected the "continuity and effectiveness of force protection teams and individuals."[43] Considering these assessments, 120 days is also the minimum length of time units should be deployed as the turmoil associated with more frequent turnover may adversely affect the ability of units to protect themselves and accomplish their mission.

US Atlantic Command (USACOM) recommends, based on experiences in Guantanamo with migrant camp operations, a longer standard tour length of 179 days to ensure requisite continuity.[44] This is fundamentally the same arguments made by General Downing. USACOM

also recommends that the tour length be standard between the services participating in the same deployment to avoid adverse morale developing from tour length inequity.

Reserve Component volunteers can be integrated as individual fillers when practical and if vacancies exist. It is advantageous to reduce PERSTEMPO to spread the deployment missions out over as large a population as possible. RC volunteers increase the available population without increasing force structure or active component end strength. RC volunteers not be utilized at the expense of the team work and integrity of established units. RC components are also not a consistently reliable asset in terms of the number, rank and specialty of the volunteers to be a viable part of a strategy to reduce PERSTEMPO.

Designate a "Mission Division" and rotate the mission responsibility among the divisions on an annual basis. A predictable rotating responsibility enables personnel managers and resource allocators to program resources to maximize readiness for the upcoming mission division. This may be *defacto* rotation of tiered readiness, but it is a pragmatic policy considering constrained personnel and fiscal resources. Soldiers with high SKILLTEMPO can be assigned to units that will not soon assume mission responsibility. Divisions can maintain normal RED - AMBER - GREEN training cycles for subordinate units. The key benefit is predictability not only for commanders and staffs, but for the soldier and his family. The Army must maintain a "credible capacity to coerce"[45] to en sure that both the American public and potential adversaries remain convinced of the capability and willingness to commit forces.

The third category of recommendations is force structure. The cumulative deployments since the end of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm should be used as the model to forecast rate of deployment and type units deployed. PERSTEMPO data provides a quantitative measure

for 'low density/high deploying' units or low density MOSs to determine if there is adequate force structure to sustain the anticipated number and rate of deployment.

A ratio of 3:1 should be used as the baseline for force structure. There must be no more than 1/3 of the total of any type unit or MOS deployed routinely. Of the remaining units of the same type, there must be at least the same number of those deployed prepared to deploy and take their place. The remainder are in training, either retraining following deployment or training to prepare for the next deployment. Normal leave and schools are considered in the last category. Track unit time away when planning deployments and future deployment schedule. Using the example of the Navy model, there is ideally a ratio of time at home station to time deployed of 2:1. For every six months deployed, a unit would be at home station not to deploy for the next 12 months. The rate of deployment and type units are continually reviewed and adjustments made as needed.

Training constitutes the fourth category of recommendation. Inferred in this category are commanders' prudent decisions regarding the amount, intensity and conduct of discretionary training. Continue to conduct multi-echelon training. Rather than conduct training exercises to meet tactical unit requirements, and also place units in the field to meet Corps and Echelons Above Corps (EAC) training requirements, layer tactical unit training requirements under the Corps/EAC training and execute simultaneously. Current USACOM and US Pacific Command initiatives to train potential JTF headquarters have the potential to become additional, if not redundant, training for Corps' headquarters with a resultant increase in PERSTEMPO for those units in support. "The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that combining *Service-unique* and joint training is probably the best way of reducing operational tempo."[46]

Guidance for the conduct of multi-echelon training is already contained in FM 25-100. Joint pubs must incorporate similar guidance for multi-echelon and JTF-specific training.

Devote a portion of future revisions to FM 25-100 to a retraining strategy for units coming off deployment. Guidance and philosophy are necessary on how to quantify individual training, crew drills and other collective training, and how to develop unit collective training strategies to recertify units for their primary combat mission, and the time that may be required. TRADOC schools should follow with appropriate revisions to training manuals to complement this strategy.

The Department of Defense and our civilian leadership are firmly committed to the All Volunteer Force. We compete for an increasingly small percentage of the American population with increasingly technical desired qualifications for our recruits. To do so successfully, the services must be able to attract both the quantity and quality of recruits required and retain them in sufficient numbers. It is not safe to assume that sufficient numbers of potential recruits will remain willing to serve solely because of patriotic motivation, willing to endure any hardship. Soldiers must accept some hardship, but that hardship must be understood, reasonable and carefully managed to maintain our current readiness levels and guarantee long term future readiness.

[1]   West, Hon Togo D., Jr. and Gen Dennis J Riemer, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1998,* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff; US Army) 16.

[2]   Perry, William J. *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 1996) 27.

[3]   Spence, Floyd D. "Military Readiness 1977: Rhetoric and Reality" (Washington, DC: House Committed on National Security, 9 April 1997) 22.

[4]   Bradley Graham, "Military Forces Are Near 'Breaking Point,' GOP Report Charges," *Washington Post,* 9 Apr 97, A14.

[5]   Department of Defense (DoD), Organization of JCS, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995,* "A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement" (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995) i.

[6]   For a more detailed discussion, see Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom Up Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Oct 93).

[7]   See "Foreign Aid Cuts Force U.S. to Use Military More, Says Christopher," *Baltimore Sun,* 26 Oct 96, 9.

[8]   Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC, 1 Feb 95), 1-4.

[9]   Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, Subj: "Report to the House Appropriations Comittee: Support to Operations Other Than War and its Impact on Tempo Rates," 26 Jun 96.

[10]   DoD, JCS, "Initial Report of the PERSTEMPO Working Group" (Washington, DC, May 95), 3.

[11]   DoD, Office of the Under SecDef for Personnel and Readiness, Memo, Subj: "Report to the House Appropriations Committee: Support to Operations Other Than War and Its Impact on Tempo Rates," 26 Jun 96.

[12]   Perry, 27.

[13]   Several examples are contained in references in the Bibliography. They include: Ian Fisher, "For G.I.'s, More Time Away From Home Fires," *New York Times,* 24 Dec 95, 1; and Steven Komarow, "Smaller Forces, More Missions Add Up to GI Stress," *USA Today,* 8 Oct 96, 10.

[14]   DoD, Office of the Under SecDef for Acquisition and Technology, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness" (Washington, DC, Jun 94), 13.

[15]   Per discussion with Mr Ron Canada, Chief, Retention Management Division, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia. Mr Canada further stated that, although inconclusive, it appeared that in units that were deployed, retention rates actually increased. Explanations for this increase could be that there was increased job satisfaction and reward in being deployed for the sake of a National Interest. Retention, however, may also be a technique for soldiers to reenlist for options which would reassign them from the current unit of assignment. This same dynamic was briefed to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 5 Mar 97 and is addressed in Andrew Compart's article, "Deployed Soldiers More Likely to Reup," *Army Times,* 31 Mar 97, 10.

[16]   DoD, Office of the Under SecDef for Acquisition and Technology, 12.

[17]   Spence, 17.

[18]   Ibid, 9 and 14.

[19]   Sean Naylor, "Creeping Hollowness", *Army Times,* 3 Feb 97, 15.

[20]   This definition is attributed to "PERSTEMPO UPDATE", a briefing for the Army PERSTEMPO Working Group, 16 Dec 96, chart #12. The same definition has also been incorporated in other briefings given by Army ODCSPER staff officers.

[21]   "PERSTEMPO UPDATE", chart #11.

[22]   This is based on the author's experience from July 1995 through July 1996 while serving as Chief of Field Artillery Branch, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, Total Army Personnel Command, in Alexandria, Virginia. This conclusion was supported by the PERSCOM PERSTEMPO report project officer during an interview on 16 Dec 96.

[23]   DoD, JCS, "Initial Report of the PERSTEMPO Working Group," 11.

[24]   Stabilization Rules were provided on 12 Dec 96 by MAJ Mason, Operations Management Division, Enlisted Management Directorate, PERSCOM, on a briefing slide dated 24 Jun 96.

[25]   LtGen Theodore Stroup, "America's Soldiers, Presenting Our Nation's Best," *Army* magazine, Oct 96, 146.

[26]   Commandant Marine Corps, Unclassified Message to All Marines, ALMAR 226-93, Subject: "Fostering Responsible Marriage Choices for First Term Marines," 05 1630Z Aug 93. A discussion of the message can be found in two articles in *Marine Corps Gazette,* October 1993: Cdr Eugene T. Gomulka, USN, "Marines Strive to Save Marriages," 29; and Maj Robert G. Baker, "Junior Enlisted Marines and Marriage: A Dangerous Mix," 30.

[27]   *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995,* ii.

[28]   JCS SECRET Message to Chief of Staff, Army, and other addressees, subj: "Global Military Force Policy (U)," 231301 July 1996.

[29] William Perry, GEN John Shalikashvili and John White, "Beginning of the Quadrennial Defense Review," DoD briefing to the *Federal News Service,* 12 Dec 96.

[30] GEN Shalikashvili as quoted in the 12 Dec 96 Briefing, "Beginning of the Quadrennial Defense Review.

[31] See Sean Naylor's series of articles in *Army Times:* "Creeping Hollowness," 3 Feb 97, 15-17: "Striking a Balance," 10 Feb 97, 17-19; and "Readiness is in the Eyes of the Beholder," 17 Feb96, 18-21.

[32] Charles E. Heller, *TOTAL FORCE: Federal Reserves and State National Guards* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 7 Dec 94), 43.

[33] Ibid.

[34] DoD, Deputy Undersecretary for Defense, Memo, Subj: "Report to the House Appropriations Committee: Support to Operations Other Than War and Its Impact on Tempo Rates," 26 Jun 96, 9.

[35] SSgt Terry Webster and Capt Larry George, "On the Fire Line," *Soldiers* magazine, Nov 96, 14-17.

[36] DSB Task Force on Readiness report, June 1994, p11.

[37] Perry, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress,* March 96, 27.

[38] Ibid.

[39] DoD, YCS, "Initial Report of the PERSTEMPO Working Group," May 95, 11.

[40] DoD, Organization of the Under SecDef for Acquisition and Technology, "Report of the Defense Science Board on Quality of Life," Oct 95, 69.

[41]   For a discussion on the political dimension of military effectiveness, see Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, *Military Effectiveness, vol 1: The First World War* (Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman, mc, 1988), 4.

[42]   Spence, 6.

[43]   Gen (Ret) Wayne A. Downing, *Force Protection Assessment of USCENTCOM AOR and Khobar Towers* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 30 Aug 96), 18 & 19.

[44]   DoD, CINC USACOM and Assistant SecDef; Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, "Migrant Camp Operations: The Guantanamo Experience," May 96, 15.

[45]   Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Peacekeeping Post Cold War" (Unpublished manuscript accepted for publication in the *Journal of Small Wars and Insurgencies).*

[46]   DoD, Organization of the Under SecDef for Acquisition and Technology, "Report of the Defense Science Board on Quality of Life," Oct 95, 70.

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