

The Atomic Bomb: Memory and Its Power on Japanese Pacifism

**A Monograph
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Abstract

ATOMIC BOMB MEMORY AND JAPANESE PACIFISM by MAJ W. Maria Bochat, U.S. Army, 49 pages.

Japan's pacifist identity and security practices have deep roots with the atomic bomb. The victims experiences and Japan's preferences in dealing with the memories distinguishes their nation and allows them security opportunities that other nations do not enjoy. The changes to Japanese Culture since the atomic bomb shows an emergence of a new identity closely tied to nonviolence. Japan's external identity as a global peace broker developed while the internal identity appears to constantly redefine itself and grow. The balance of Japan's External identity and internal identity are critical to Japan's social stability especially in regards to the nation's security. Keeping the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is essential to the foundation of the nation's Pacifist identity even today.

The atomic bombs are international symbols of extreme collateral damage and targeting of civilians. This violence against civilians has kept the story in the forefront of the global history. The Japanese understand the power of the victim's memory and continue to cultivate it. A reflective look, through the Japanese perspective provides greater understanding of the long-term effects and consequences of aggressive, violent actions taken against a country. This look includes the response of the international community.

Currently, members of the ruling party propose revisions to their constitution and military missions. These revisions will compete with the Japan's highly developed image as cultivators of peace. The international community, especially those in Asia will watch with great anticipation, as the consequences of such actions will have far-reaching changes in the security posture of Japan. Some members of Japan appear to be interested in changing parts of its nation's identity and the sentinels of such change have close relationships with the constitution, military and the atomic bomb memory. Engagement with Japan must include a deep understanding of the atomic bomb experiences as they have intimate relationships with Japanese violence in a somatic, spiritual, and psychological way.

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Introduction

Twenty-six year old Toshiko Saeki was at her parent's house when she heard about the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. As soon as possible, she travelled from the outskirts into the city to look for relatives; the devastation shocked her. She was unable to recognize her own brother after bumping into him in the streets of Hiroshima because of his disfigurement. Because of her visit, Toshiko herself suffered from radiation sickness for the rest of her life and earned the title "Hibakusha," the informal name given to victims of the atomic attacks. "Hibakusha", literally means, "bomb-affected people" in Japanese. Toshiko never forgot the images of charred, naked, bald victims deposited along the roadways. Nor did she forget the images of those suffering from discolored, oozing cracks and fissures where their faces used to be. Swollen, burned corpses lay in every imaginable condition; many of them filled the rivers of Hiroshima, where they had fled while trying to escape the thermal blast and fires of the atomic bombs. Toshiko's story is one of thousands. She and the oceans of victims were unable to comprehend the extent of the damage to their home and city. Three days later, another atomic bomb devastated Nagasaki.¹

Japan had previously dealt with the effects of traditional fire bombings in sixty-seven cities. Toyama saw the most severe devastation with ninety-nine percent destruction of the city.² The physical destruction and human suffering from the atomic bombs during the final stages of World War II on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan were unprecedented. The final numbers

¹Toshiko Saeki, "Hibakusha Testimony" available from http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/visit_e/testimony_e/testimo08_1.html, assessed 17 December 2009. Toshiko's story is only one in thousands. Other testimonies are available on at the virtual museum of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

²United States Government, *Chronology 1941-45* (Washington D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1991). The measurements used by the U.S. survey teams could not compare the 99% destruction of Toyama to the destruction felt by Hiroshima and Nagasaki because of the unknown damage of residual effects of the atomic bomb.

pronounced sixty-six thousand dead and sixty-nine thousand injured in Hiroshima and thirty-nine thousand dead and twenty-five thousand injured in Nagasaki.³

Why was the destruction so severe? The residents perception that their cities were not targets resulted in casualties that exceeded American expectations. The population of the two cities did not think they were targets for several reasons:⁴ Specifically, the rumors were that many of the Japanese that previously emigrated to the United States were from Hiroshima; another assumption was that Nagasaki would not be a target because the city held the largest concentration of Christians, and finally, both cities appeared to be “off-limits” since they had not been a target for previous conventional bombings.⁵ This false sense of security among the inhabitants of both cities increased the devastation since much of the population was commuting to work, school, and performing their daily routines at the time of detonation. These bombs however were different from anything previously experienced by any living human being and changed the Japanese nation’s relationship with violence forever.⁶

It is difficult for a person outside of Japan to comprehend the effects the atomic bomb on Japanese culture. Grant K. Goodman, author of *America’s Japan: The First Year 1945-1946*, worked as a Japanese linguist assigned to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers during the occupation of Japan following World War II.⁷ During an interview, he asserted that he did not believe the atomic bomb affected Japanese culture at all.⁸ He came to this conclusion due to

³Chairman’s Office, “The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” in *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 91.

⁴Morale Division, “The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale,” *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), 91–95.

⁵*Ibid.*, 91-95.

⁶*Ibid.*, 91. The disfigurement, injuries, and physical effects were different from the traditional burn victims of incendiary bombs.

⁷Grant K Goodman, interview by author, 27 August 2010, Lawrence, Kansas.

⁸*Ibid.*

the minimal information news coverage provided about the weapon during his tenure at the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers and his many visits to the Hiroshima Peace Museum.⁹ In his words, “The museum was more like an amusement park than a former site of an atomic bomb.”¹⁰ He probably did not see much literature regarding the atomic weapon during his tenure as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers due to the censorship practices of the American occupying forces.¹¹ No forms of media could contain images or mention the atomic bombs because the occupying forces feared the negative impact on reconstruction efforts.¹² The World War II museum exhibits in the United States can be very uncomfortable for people of Japanese descent to visit with their emphasis on depicting the war through their propaganda posters with buck-toothed, ape-like characters conducting atrocities. The Hiroshima Peace Museum, in contrast, is soft, has an interactive children’s exhibit and looks more like an art museum with its many structures and statues. Perhaps the American experience requires strong images of hate to remember the reason for the violence while the Japanese experience does not want to relive the atrocities, lies, or the reasons for the violence. This shapes and influences the Japanese national narrative today.

A narrative is a description that gets at the essence of a culture’s shared understanding of: history, current state, and future goals of its members. This story emphasizes flows and relationships between its members to identify emergent themes. These themes can often show a

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid. When he made this comment he was referring to the presentation, the gift items available and the overall atmosphere. This is Goodman’s perception.

¹¹Eiji Takemae, Robert Ricketts, Sebastian Swann, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japanese and its Legacy* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002), 67.

¹²Ibid. Many leaders within U.S. led occupation feared the information of the atomic bomb would incite movements that would work against the occupation forces.

cultures propensity for patterns of behavior within certain conditions.¹³ The Japanese narrative helps to understand the nation's cultural and identity changes that are due to the atomic bomb. The nature of Japanese experiences, their particular narrative, distinguishes them from all other nations.¹⁴ The narrative will take us on a journey from the atomic weapon, the consequences of the bomb to the choices the nation made for its new security identity. The central element of the narrative is the victim's experience of personal devastation, the differences from the traditional bombings, and the choices the nation made to cope with this level of violence. The atomic bomb has become Japan's most significant national experience.

How have the bombs and their consequences affected the Japanese national narrative? The fact that the United States ended the war with the use of atomic weapons changed the Japanese national narrative in several ways: an external identity as a global peace broker developed, the internal identity moved towards a new social contract in respect to violence, and the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki solidify as an institution. These memories carry so much power because the atomic bombs represent the most extreme example of collateral damage through the targeting of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II.

A reflective look, through the Japanese perspective, at the cultural changes that occurred in Japan after this event can provide a greater understanding of three resulting changes: the strategic external approach to engaging with the rest of the world, the domestic changes in institutions such as the police force, and the role of the memory in shaping her history as a nation.¹⁵ The Japanese narrative will give the reader contextual information to better comprehend

¹³United States Army Field Manual (Interim) FMI 5-2, *Design*, 25.

¹⁴Robert Kellogg and Robert Sholes, *The Nature of Narrative* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 4. This statement simply refers to the fact that Japan has a monopoly on atomic bomb victims because it is the only nation to have experienced it.

¹⁵Ibid, 105–126. For this paper, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic bomb memories are an institution because the victim's memory is cultivated for a very specific purpose and it utilized to legitimize

the journey of this nation, which is now a leader in peace maintenance, in terms of its experiences with violence that had deeply somatic, spiritual and psychological effects.

This paper will not address the decision to drop the bomb, as volumes of literature already discuss this very question.¹⁶ This paper will also avoid the painful details of this weapon's conception, its effects, or the great responsibility the United States felt for its use as it spent the following decades in a cold war with the Soviet Union. Further, this paper will not enter the debate whether the bomb brought about unconditional surrender or the Soviet Union's imminent entrance as Japan's adversary. This paper will be limited to the Japanese narrative in the context of its relationship with violence and its role in the world, changes that happened domestically and in terms of the institutionalization of memory.

Atomic Bomb, Seeds of Antinuclear Allergy

It was a blinding flash of light coming from the sky, Ito told *The Japan Times*. Then came the heat. It felt like molten steel poured on my body.

Hiroshi Ito, *Nagasaki Survivor*

Until that day, it was unthinkable for ordinary people to hear his voice. The emperor told the people to endure the unendurable and prepare for whatever might come. People were devastated by what they'd heard, especially after being constantly informed by the government that the country was winning the war. All the neighbors gathered around the radio and most of them cried bitterly for a long time. Nonetheless, they were somehow encouraged by hearing his majesty's sacred voice.¹⁷

Emperor Hirohito gave his radio address to the Japanese people on August 15, 1945, on Domei News Radio, controlled during World War II by the Ministry of Communications. The

the Japanese Pacifist identity. This memory is critical to all of Japan's relationships with violence.

¹⁶Two interesting approaches to this question are found in Francis X. Winter, *Remembering Hiroshima* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009) and Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).

¹⁷Kuniko Katz, "Kuniko Katz' essays, articles and letters to Editors" available online at <http://www.scarsdaleemura-kara.com/emperor.html>; accessed 10 March 2010. This quote clearly communicates the significance of hearing the emperor's voice publically for the first time. Many Japanese survivors of World War II clearly remember this speech and how they felt the day, they heard it.

tone of his message was solemn and avoided the direct use of the word *surrender*. He spoke of what the Japanese were trying to accomplish then thanked his subjects for their hard work and perseverance without forgetting to talk about the new and “cruel bomb” that forced the nation of Japan to agree with the conditions set in Potsdam.¹⁸ Emperor Hirohito told the people it would be difficult but that they must comply and stay true to their spirit because this bomb had already cost too many innocent Japanese lives.¹⁹ He did something interesting by insinuating that it was the Japanese people’s duty to accept these conditions because refusal would ultimately bring the total destruction of human civilization.²⁰ The specific language was extremely important to the people for the reconstruction to work. This radio message by the emperor was significant to the Japanese people because it was the first time in history that the common citizen could hear his voice.

History of Violence

I was afraid during my first vivisection²¹, but the second time around, it was much easier. By the third time, I was willing to do it.²²

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Vivisection in this quote is the act of operating on subjects while awake, alive, and without medication.

²²Hongo. Dr Ken Yasuda has publicly described the atrocities in Japan in print and on television interviews. Dr Yasuda says that he believed he had no choice in the matter of operating and started to feel more comfortable the more he operated on live victims. The Chinese held him as a Prisoner of War after this duty in China. Since his appearances and descriptions, he has received threats and many letters asking him to stop with his descriptive memories of such atrocities.

Violence and destruction were more than common knowledge and history to Japan. They were enshrined beliefs and tenets within their military society.²³ During the World War II, the Japanese military was notorious for its use of extreme violence against its neighbors in Asia and its own population inside its borders.²⁴ Terms such as the Asian Holocaust,²⁵ the Rape of Nanking²⁶ and Unit 731²⁷ are well known examples of Japanese violence during World War II. In Nanking soldiers held “killing contests” with innocent civilians to see who could kill the most civilians in the least amount of time.²⁸ Another practice was soldiers cutting open pregnant women to expose fetuses.²⁹ Unit 731, commanded by General Shiro Ishii, was responsible for conducting an estimated 10,000 biological experiments on Chinese, Russian, and American prisoners of war with such chemical and biological agents as anthrax, typhoid, plague, and other diseases.³⁰ Given the history of cultural violence, it is ironic that the Japanese nation now defines itself as a peaceful nation.

Japan is a communal nation that has the propensity and history to use compromise in politics to solve problems. This statement uses the definition of politics as a process that groups of people use to make collective decisions. However, positions that the Japanese take do not necessarily have to have ideological or moralistic premises. This means their political choices

²³Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security, Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Cornell University: Cornell University Press, 1996), 47-8, and 58.

²⁴Ibid, 47-48.

²⁵Ralph Blumenthal, “The World: Revisiting World War II Atrocities; Comparing the Unspeakable to the Unthinkable” available online at <http://www.nytimes.com>; accessed 23 January 2010.

²⁶Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking*. (New York: Penguin Books, 1998).

²⁷Hal Gold, *Unit 731 Testimony*. (Singapore: Yenbooks, 1996), 32-6.

²⁸Chang, 83-88.

²⁹Ibid, 91. There were many reports that the fetuses were the product of rapes by the Japanese Military. Photos and explanations of the mentioned atrocities are available in *Rape of Nanking*.

³⁰Gold, 32-6.

look more like *realpolitik*, which is diplomacy that has a basis in perceived practical considerations.

Multiplicity

The most critical thing to understand is that the Japanese mind has no problem with multiplicity. A relevant and great example of narratives with competing paradigms is the surveyed reactions of the atomic bombs of victims only days after the incidents. The victims expressed three competing responses to the bombs. These responses were horror in regards to devastation of the bomb; anger towards the government that dropped the bomb and the Japanese government that caused the bombing; and, the most telling about the nation's ability to detach itself from a situation, admiration for the technology behind such a bomb that could inflict that much damage.

A competing narrative to the historical violence and the unwillingness of the Japanese to take moral or ideological stances in politics is the Japanese longstanding relationship with Confucianism. Pacifism is in absolute harmony with the Japanese foundation in Confucianism for three very important reasons. Japanese society values social harmony, civic volunteerism, and peace activities. The Japanese Interpret Confucianism and their post war constitutional law liberally or strictly depending on their needs.³¹ Japan takes the previously mentioned tenants of Confucius teachings along with ancestor worship and deities but stayed away from the teachings that referred to morality. The nation was no longer able to gain global power through a military arm, but through economic power.

³¹Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security, Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Cornell University: Cornell University Press, 1996), 26. The Japanese are able to take parts of Confucianism that are practical to their everyday lives and apply them, as they are able to take parts of the religion that do not work well with their culture and exclude them.

Although some Asian neighbors could accuse the Japanese of not living an authentic life in regards to moral or ideological constructs, it would be hard to find a nation that can accuse the Japanese mind of not being situationally aware of circumstances at the time of defeat. The Japanese are acutely aware of what their defeat in World War II meant to the nation. The Japanese assessed that it would have to take responsibility for their actions during the war. They understood that the United States would force demilitarization of all areas of society and industry that helped perpetuate the war. They correctly diagnosed their domestic situation as close to being a failed state. Japan came to the realization that in its own self-interest it would have to redefine its identity and its perception in the international community. This redefinition did not come to fruition at this time.³²

The immediate problem in the eyes of Japanese was dealing with defeat and figuring out how to get past it. Because of the cultural distaste for revisiting anything negative, they decided that they did not want to address war atrocities and wanted to focus on rebuilding. The nation understood that Asia was not ready to address Japan in a positive manner. Japan also understood that at that particular moment, post-World War II, they were not in a situation to engage the world externally.

Although the Japanese nation as a whole conducted great introspection, due to the Supreme Commander of Allied Power's policy of censorship, there was a part of their history, they were unable to explore. The Allied Occupation forces were determined to influence the rebuilding of Japan, and part of this process included the censorship of any media that

³²The devastation on all cities in Japan were so severe that most citizens were in a mode of survival. This basic survival coupled with the censorship of details regarding the atomic bombs did not give the nation the true narrative of the atomic bomb victims until the Bunker incident many years later in 1954.

communicated criticisms of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.³³ Because the Allied Powers owned the translation assets, they played the leading role in censoring almost all information related to the atomic bomb.³⁴ This censorship not only covered newspapers and radio but also applied to literature, art, movies, plays, school textbooks, and even scientific and medical research.³⁵ This left the Japanese unable to understand or properly comprehend a unified reaction to the nuclear bombings

Having the United States act as Japan's occupation force intentionally, or unintentionally, did a few things. The world held its breath as it watched the United States execute reconstruction, and more importantly, as it watched the Occupation Forces try the Japanese war criminals and deal with Japan's war responsibilities. As the world watched, Emperor Hirohito retained his position as a symbol of the nation but still was not in court as a criminal. The United States censored information regarding Unit 731's human experiments in hopes that the information would be useful. A definite move that may have gone unnoticed by the outside world, but was not lost on the Japanese nation, was a short sentence for a former war cabinet member of Japan, Nobusuke Kishi, who waited out the American purge of the former ultranational leadership until the purge rescinded in 1952. He later became the prime minister when Japan joined the United Nations Security Council and received the UN Peace Medal in 1979. These examples were just a few of many that gave hope to the Japanese nation's perception that they could somehow avoid taking war responsibilities.

³³Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann, 67.

³⁴Grant K. Goodman, *America's Japan, The First Year 1945-1946* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 46-7.

³⁵*Ibid.*

The nation was able to trade space for time as the American occupation took root.³⁶ Japan was able to hide under the United States umbrella as they healed and licked their wounds. The peace constitution that Americans helped the Japanese write bought them a sort of structural protection. Japan saw security in economic and political terms and worked to gain strength in these areas. But because of the of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers' policy of censoring any mention of the atomic bombs, the devastation of the weapons would not be used to start the pacifist movement until an opportunity presented itself in 1954.

Domestic Reconstruction

It was not merely the overthrow of their military might--it was the collapse of a faith, it was the disintegration of everything they believed in and lived by and fought for. It left a complete vacuum, morally, mentally, and physically.

-General Douglas MacArthur

The magnitude of the devastation not only caused physical deaths among the civilian population and military personnel, but also effectively destroyed the industries of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, effectively halting Japanese industry.³⁷ An estimated quarter of the total Japanese population lost their wealth because of the war and millions of people were homeless.³⁸ The immediate and critical effects of the weapon were the loss of key infrastructures such as communications and transportation.³⁹ The government failed to respond first to the needs of the victims, and second to the logistical support of the responders themselves.⁴⁰ The most obvious failing was the lack of resources to deal with the medical needs of personnel that were victims of

³⁶A strategy term, often used essentially means buying time. You give up some land, for example, to buy you more time.

³⁷Chairman's Office, 9.

³⁸Christopher J. Coyne, *After War The political Economy of Exporting Democracy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

³⁹Chairman's Office, 9.

⁴⁰Ibid. Promises of medical personnel and equipment for devastated Japanese victims went unfulfilled.

blast and radiation.⁴¹ The loss of hospitals and staff, coupled with a lack of knowledge of how to treat radiation sickness, hindered medical efforts to mitigate the effects of the bombings.⁴²

Due to the loss of infrastructure in the bombed cities, and Japan in general, the message of the total devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed surreal to the rest of Japan and did not affect the country as it might have if it happened today.⁴³ The Emperor mentioned the use of evil weapons, but did not expound on the description, devastation, or the physical outcome. Those not involved in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although fearful of such a weapon, did not focus on the atomic bomb for a couple of reasons. First, Japan in general was completely in ruins because of the expansive allied firebombing campaign. Most major cities in Japan burned quickly by incendiary bombings due to poor construction materials and engineering.⁴⁴ Second, even those who escaped the effects of the atomic bombings, or conventional bombings, struggled to live meagerly. All Japanese citizens had little to eat and many were homeless.⁴⁵

The Potsdam Declaration⁴⁶ had two primary goals for the occupation of Japan. The goals were the demilitarization of the nation and the democratization of Japanese Society.⁴⁷ Japan had been at wartime tempo since 1939, and understood she could no longer continue with basing its security on military power. Although the exhaustion from an extended war and the devastation

⁴¹Ibid, 9-11. Radiation sickness was new to the medical community of all nations at this time. Most hospitals merely cleaned up the victims with iodine and did what they could to make the patient comfortable.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Richard B Frank, *Downfall, The End of The Imperial Japanese Empire* (New York: Penguin books, 2001), 349-351.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid. Conditions of all Japanese lives so meager and squalid that information of outside human suffering did not register properly. The average Japanese citizen simply could not take in the information about Hiroshima or Nagasaki even if it were readily available.

⁴⁶Proclamation of Japanese Surrender

⁴⁷Foreign Relations of the United States, "Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, July 26 1945," Potsdam Conference. Berlin: US Government Printing Office, 1960. Vol 2.

produced by the atomic bombs made it easier to change the nation's attitude toward its security policy the road to democracy proved difficult because democracy felt like a western characteristics. The road to democracy proved difficult because democracy felt like a western characteristic. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese are unwilling to lose human life for moral or ideological causes, such as democracy, because it is not practical and therefore not worth dying for.⁴⁸

LTC David P. Cavaleri, a retired Army officer, wrote a paper titled "Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations", discusses some "themes that merit consideration" that are applicable to the Japanese domestic reconstruction.⁴⁹ The Japanese, perhaps not intentionally, looked at legitimacy, security, commitment, situational understanding, unity of effort, infrastructure, economic status, planning effort, media and the culture's historical legacy and key lessons they learned from World War II and applied them to their new identity.⁵⁰ The "themes" chosen by the occupation force were the formal institutions, such as the constitution, official law, regulations, and standards enforced by law, commonly known as the rule of law.⁵¹ The American occupation placed a great deal of faith in existing formal institutions and left the identity building of Japan to the Japanese people.

Initially, Japan did not fully develop what the nation would become but it did understand that there were no longer any incentives for Japan to involve its military as part of its security policy. The American umbrella of protection was free at this point and gave the Japanese the idea

⁴⁸Katzenstein, 209.

⁴⁹David P Cavaleri, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*, (Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 7, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 19.

⁵⁰Ibid, 19.

⁵¹Ibid. The American Occupation identified the mentioned themes as necessary to stand up democracy in Japan. The most important were the constitution and the economy.

that their interest laid not so much in concern for the balance of power as in the ability to stabilize the nation's society. Due to the devastation it experienced, Japan decided that it must base its stability and security on economic growth. The world watched as the American forces quickly purged the existing leadership, tried war criminals, and completely disarmed the ultranational military, while at the same time ensuring the creation of democratic institutions within a pre-existing framework.

The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers was responsible for controlling Japan's economy, demilitarization, and reform, but most encompassing is the suppression of any form of Japanese aggression. The U.S. occupation elected to focus efforts on political reforms that would push Japan into democracy and ensure the nation would be incapable of militarizing again. This effort included rewriting the constitution, educational reform, more correctly reeducating Japanese society, redefining the Emperor and women roles in society, property rights reform, and economic reforms.

Constitution

Thanks to Article 9, Asians trust--well, not quite trust Japan--but at least view this country with some forbearance. But change Article 9 and Asians will believe we are a state capable of warfare and they will become tense, Shida said. Then if Japan destroys Article 9 outright and sends soldiers abroad, Asia will explode.⁵²

CHAPTER II: RENUNCIATION OF WAR

Article Nine:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of

⁵²Eric Prideaux, "Surrender Spared a Young, Doubting Kamikaze" available at <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070815w1.html> accessed 24 March 2010. Masamichi Shida was a Kamikaze that was about to go on mission when the Japanese surrendered. This testimony was just another example of the Japanese government's situational awareness and how it comes to terms with the conditions. Masamichi claims that when the military realized it could no longer prevent the retaking of the Philippines, the navy taught pilots to dive into enemy vessels or other targets. These pilots understood the mission was certain death but rationalized it was in the dense of the nation.

force as means of settling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁵³

The constitution the U.S. led occupation force helped write was another example of how the Japanese culture changed.⁵⁴ The authors of the constitution may not have thought directly about violence when putting the constitution together but the legacy it has on the Japanese use of violence is profound. Pacifism replaced ultranationalism by directly limiting the ability of the state to wage war and by increasing the rights of the average citizen, political left, and women. Specifically Japan did not only overcome the violence directly related to war; it took the inertia of the defeat, militarization, occupation, and constitution to affect its view of structural violence.⁵⁵ Structural violence in Japan at the time was the unequal balance of power between the elite and the average Japanese citizen. Interestingly, the movement started in 2007 for constitutional revisions addresses increasing military power and rewriting individual rights. Both would increase the ability and propensity to conduct violence externally and internally. The memory of the atomic bombs continues to stop measures to conduct violence related to war.

Article Nine of Japan's new Constitution renounces war and forbids the maintenance of armed forces.⁵⁶ Liberalization of resources greatly changed lives of the three million peasants that acquired land, and redistributed power within the nation. Japanese democratization built its foundation on inspirations from U.S. Bill of Rights, the New Deal social legislation, liberal

⁵³Text taken from the Constitution of Japan, Chapter II, Article 9 (1946).

⁵⁴Because Australia, India, New Zealand and the United Kingdom made contributions to the Japanese occupation force, the majority of the occupation was indeed American.

⁵⁵Akihiko Kimijima, "Revisiting the Pacifism of the Japanese Constitution" paper is based on a paper previously at the Asian Forum for Constitutional Law held on September 22-25, 2005 at the College of Law, Seoul National University, 1.

⁵⁶United States Occupation Force, "The Constitution of Japan," available from Solon Law Archive, May 10, 2004. <http://www.sdon.org/constitutions/japan/english>, accessed 23 January 2010.

constitutions, and transferred sovereignty from the Emperor. Education reform meant moving from the German education system to that of the United States. Thus, primary education with a “Gymnasium” to train children after elementary was replaced with grades, including junior high and high school much like the United States. General Douglas MacArthur also tried to Romanize Japanese writing with hopes to simplify education, but was unable to do so completely.

General Douglas MacArthur and his occupation force were able to accomplish most of the goals it set in the beginning. They did not completely dismantle the *zaibatsu*, Romanize the Japanese written language, or treat all war criminals with the same aggressiveness.⁵⁷ Ultimately, they were able to suppress Japan’s anger enough, especially in regards to the atomic bombs to complete reconstruction. The Japanese waited patiently for the occupation to end before the leaders of the nation debated on their new identity. The nation spent almost a decade in discourse gaining the trust of the people, resolving issues with identity and domestic balance. Hence, after the occupation, there appeared a volume of antiwar and anti-atomic bomb movies, books, plays and other cultural art.

Probably the most important aspect of occupation that helped Japan become who they are today was the often-overlooked enormous economic package that included experts in specialized areas. This included correcting the misunderstanding that the “made in Japan” moniker meant shoddy quality and work to the world. In 1950, the Department of the Army brought Dr. W. Edwards Deming in to help with the Japanese Census.⁵⁸ His real expertise was in quality control. It was in this role that he, as the expert, changed international perception regarding the quality of

⁵⁷Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 5. *Zaibatsu* is a Japanese term that refers to the large family owned conglomerates that controlled much of the Japanese economy prior to World War II during the Edo and Meiji periods

⁵⁸Rafael Aguayo, *Dr Deming: The American Who Taught the Japanese about Quality* (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990), vii, xi, 6.

Japanese-made goods. This doctrine was hungrily accepted.⁵⁹ Dr. Demining helped the Japanese nation's science, technology, and business professionals with their problems; he was so successful that until this day, there is an industry award with his name on it.⁶⁰ Additionally, prohibition against American companies and investments in Japan's infant economy ensured positive progress. Being within the American Security umbrella and the implementation of peace constitution were critical to Japan's ability to grow into an economic power to engage the world. However, without the perception of Japanese pacifism, the economy could not flourish, as the world would always question the motives behind the aggressive economic growth.

With this economic recovery and the improved perception of the quality of Japanese manufactured goods, Japan gained international legitimacy in the idea of attaining social stability through economic growth. This economic growth continued because the nation no longer had to invest all its resources in the military. Consequently, the military quickly lost its connection to the people of Japan and marginalized. The police force, however, was still necessary to present peace in the nation's eyes and remained closely tied to the society.

1950s—Internal Political Debate and Catalyst to the Anti-Nuclear Movement

The nation spent most of the 1950s in discourse about what Japan should become as a nation. While the argument on what Japan should look like continued, the Japanese helped the United States' efforts during the Korean War. Although not publicized, especially to its own

⁵⁹Jean-Pierre Lehmann, *The U.S. Occupation of Japan- Four Lessons for Iraq* available at the Globalist, 2004, 3.

⁶⁰Ibid, xi.

citizens, one third of the ships in Inchon, South Korea, contained Japanese crews.⁶¹ Another key fact not advertised was that Japanese businesses benefited from the Korean War as United States ships docked and received services in Japanese ports, along with various equipment and machines, throughout the duration of the war. In 1957, after Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi took office, he believed that Japan was ready to move to the right and started to push domestic issues, education, and labor legislation. The Japanese did not have issues with these changes in movement because they worked to balance out the very western institutions the occupation had left behind. However, when Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi attempted a year later to strengthen the Japanese defense forces, and attempted to reform the police as an institution, the Japanese masses were opposed to this because they believed the move was a step back ultranational ideal. Both the elite and the masses of the Japanese population stuck firmly to the concept of unrestrained economic growth of the nation and completely avoided any adjustments that may have led to the use of force by its military or police.⁶²

As Japan worked to determine the role of the military within Japanese society an incident occurred that served as a catalyst to push Japan into a the pacifist identification. The true transition of Japan into becoming the torchbearer of peace and the anti-nuclear movement began when a Japanese crew of a fishing vessel, the Daigo Fukuryu Maru [Lucky Dragon], experienced fallout from a U.S. hydrogen bomb test on the Bikini Atoll in 1954.⁶³ Of the twenty-three crewmembers, one died of radiation poisoning. This experience-awakened Japan's victim identity, exonerated the Japanese from previous offenses, and granted authority to start its peace movement. With the prohibition against discussing atomic bombs lifted, Japan engaged the world

⁶¹Katzenstein, 201-202.

⁶² Ibid, 74, 77,78, 115, 118, 197, 199-200.

⁶³Bikini Atoll is near the Marshall Islands, and the incident happened on March 1, 1954.

on the foundation of an improved economy, a peace constitution, and as atomic bomb victims. This incident used the victims of nuclear weapons as an impetus to new identity as a nation of anti-nuclear pacifists. This critical act launched Japan as the torchbearer of pacifism and peace brokering.⁶⁴

The U.S. occupation was responsible for the removal of the institutions that left Japan incapable of waging war again. This essentially severed the ties between the military and society forever. The once ultranational military that consumed every aspect of the average Japanese citizen's life was now unpopular for its role in Japan's post-World War II society. The Japanese military, even today, has much less prestige and trust than the Japanese police. The Japanese lack of trust and faith in the military had deep roots in World War II; it grew more negative during the Kobe Earthquake in 1995.

Japan ranked fifth in "peacefulness" according to a "Global Peace Index" survey of one hundred and forty nations. This survey bases sixty percent of the indicators on internal institutions and forty percent on external engagements. Positive peace is not a simple lack of conflict in the survey, and refers to the aggressive pursuit of peace. Japan scored high due to its identity structures and institutions that create and maintain peace. This survey also looked at the UN definition of a "Culture of Peace" which placed values on rejecting violence, endeavor to prevent conflicts and aims to utilize solving problems through discourse. Japan, the only Asian

⁶⁴Oros, 43. The other sets up several competing visions for the country at the time but for this paper the center-right, multilateral security framework for an Asian organization that looked closely like NATO is applicable evidenced by Asia's emerging international institutions. "Pacifists from the left sought to make Japan the "Switzerland of Asia" by advocating unarmed neutrality, essentially sitting out the emerging Cold War." One competing arguments such as a move to have the Japanese align themselves with the communists but this movement was easily pushed aside as the Soviet communists did not come to the aid of the Japanese and the long history China made the relationship with Chinese communists less palatable.

nation in the top twenty, outranked only by countries such as Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and New Zealand.⁶⁵

The most applicable aspects of the aforementioned survey to the Japanese relationship with peace are the indicators the survey utilized. Both internal and external conflicts are indicators along with the number of organized crime victims. To this end, Japan's relationship with organized crime is another example of the nation's ability to tolerate competing narratives. A look at examples of the how organized crime played a role with the American Occupation, Japanese police, Japanese military and Japanese society post atomic bomb can highlight the national level of comfort with multiplicity within the nation and need consideration when engaging Japan.

During the ultranational years, even the Yakuza had to help with the war effort, so because of limited personnel, assets, supply and demand, they were almost nonexistent during this time. The Yakuza revived with the American occupation. The occupation forces could not completely understand the Japanese relationship with the Yakuza but found themselves utilizing them in a similar manner as the Japanese did.⁶⁶ The Yakuza organization claims lineage to the *machi-yakko* (city servant) and perceived their identity to be honorable outlaws. In the 1600s, the *machi-yakko* would help repel attacks from unjust samurai and became popular heroes in many instances. The yakuza often resolved disputes but generally solved problems through violent

⁶⁵Global Peace Index, "Methodology, Results & Findings" report for vision of humanity project, available at <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/images/content/documents/2007%20GPI%EIU%20Report.pdf>, 4

⁶⁶David E Kaplan, Alec Dubro, *Yakuza: Japan's Criminal Underworld* (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2003), 5.

methods. When the occupation needed help breaking up communist demonstrations, for example, the Yakuza obliged.⁶⁷

The relationship that Japanese culture has with its organized crime is worth mentioning because it reveals yet another instance of realpolitik. Japanese society understands crime exists and is accepting of the Yakuza as an organization that keeps foreign criminal influence at a manageable level. The Yakuza also holds a special relationship with Japanese culture.⁶⁸ The history started in the feudal societies in Japan. They were the lower classes as they made their living peddling questionable goods and conducting unlawful gambling. Unlike most organized crime families of the world, Yakuza are not secret and operate overtly like any other business. Japanese society had no problems with organizations like Yakuza as long as they remain within their social sector and help the nation as a whole. This is especially true if they keep foreign criminal competition out. Generally, the police and the rest of society will look the other way.⁶⁹ The Yakuza as an informal institution seems to understand its place and role in society and vice versa.

The most popular example of the Yakuza's support of the nation was during a national disaster. During the 6.8 magnitude Kobe Earthquake in 1995, the *Yamaguchi-gumi*⁷⁰ (the Yakuza group that resided in Kobe) mobilized a disaster response effort that included the use of one of its helicopters. This was a result of the government's slow response.⁷¹ The Yakuza set up stations

⁶⁷Katzenstein, 66-67

⁶⁸Gerald L Curtis, *The United States, Japan and Asia*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 117.

⁶⁹Katzenstein, 66-67.

⁷⁰Glen S. Fukushima, Great Hanshin Earthquake. JPRI Occasional paper No 2, (San Francisco: Japan Policy Research Institute) 1995.

⁷¹Ibid.

that served meals, water, and other sundry items paid from their own pockets.⁷² The reason this relationship worked was that the Yakuza did what was best for society at the time.

The Japanese police force is an intriguing, adaptive institution that survived the ultranational violent practices, having reduced violence to an almost nonexistent level after the occupation.⁷³ It is important to understand that this nonviolence is not the type typically associated with Mahatma Gandhi.⁷⁴ Because of their special place in society and the trust the population has for them, the police are able use forms of coercion and intimidation that in western societies may seem to violate individual rights. This is an interesting by-product of the Japanese ability for to interpret legal meaning with flexibility. Depending on the nature of the situation and the wanted result, a law is strictly followed or liberally adhered. Certain coercion, even if it may appear harsh, is worth it. However, overt violence of the kind that occurs often in the United States happens rarely.⁷⁵

After the atomic bomb, the surrender, and demilitarization of ultranational movement, the Japanese police immediately sought to stabilize society. The police missions changed to meet the social needs of the devastated Japanese people. The police became a blend of traditional police, social surveillance and worked to respond to the societies evolving needs.⁷⁶

Memory

The year 1949 saw the approval of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction law. Today the Peace Memorial Park covers an area of a little over one hundred and twenty-two thousand square meters with fifty-six monuments. Although it took years to build into what it is

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Katzenstein, 66-67.

⁷⁴Katzenstein, 211.

⁷⁵Violence is defined as actual shooting or beating of a suspect.

⁷⁶Katzenstein, 21.

today, one thing has remained constant. The mayor of Hiroshima has made a peace declaration on 6 August every year except 1950. A look at the August 6, 2002; peace declaration after the United States experienced September 11, 2001 is interesting and shows a concept important to Japanese understanding of peace. The mayor of Hiroshima spoke of reconciliation and quoted President Kennedy regarding the need for mutual tolerance.⁷⁷ Japan's Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Museums are ideal sites to explore the complicated narrative of the Japanese nation since the Second World War. Japan is comfortable with and able to engage the world with its pacifist, nonviolent identity despite a history of violence that much of Asia still remembers.⁷⁸ The need to turn the unsettling, difficult memory into a softened memorial is the way the Japanese elect to preserve their memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Until recently, the museums focused solely on the atomic bomb and the stories that resulted from the victims. To a Japanese mind, the act of remembering the ugly parts of the history leading up to the atomic bomb was not necessary for self-preservation at many levels.

Memory in this Japanese narrative unveiled the way Japanese culture interpreted history, memorialized symbols and softened their past. This version of the image the nation wants to display has many subliminal messages that play around the world. One example is the gift of the Hiroshima Peace Bell to the United Nations Association in 1954. This gift was significant because its timing was prior to Japan's admittance to the United Nations. The bell rings twice

⁷⁷Mayor of Hiroshima, "2002 Peace Declaration," available from <http://www.pcfcity.hiroshima.jp/virtual>. accessed 30 March 2010. "The United States government has no right to force Pax Americana on the rest of us, or to unilaterally determine the fate of the world. On the contrary, we, the people of the world, have the right to demand "no annihilation without representation".

⁷⁸Christopher J. Coyne, *After War The political Economy of Exporting Democracy* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008), 30. Coyne brings up an interesting idea that may explain the Japanese nation's ability to push aside the violence and pursue an economic way of thinking during its reconstruction. Reconstruction efforts, according to Coyne, can present opportunities if the existing constraints change so opportunities are possible. In the case of Japan, it appears that the constraints no longer exist due to several variables but all link back to the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

every year--once in the spring at the vernal equinox and the other when the United Nations General Assembly meets. The ringing of the bell is supposed to remind the nations of the pursuit of peace. This act may seem benign but serves a purpose in reinforcing Japan's collective narrative.

1964 Olympics

The 1964 Tokyo Olympics served as a platform for Japan to show the world how far they had come both in promoting peace and in developing their economy. These games also worked to restructure the Japanese domestic narrative internally and the Japanese international narrative externally. The image and political message the Chinese put forward during the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing bears some striking similarities to the 1964 reaction to the Tokyo Olympics such as the animosity toward the host of the event and showcasing of the host nation's growth.⁷⁹ Many of the ruling conservative Japanese were able to display symbols and reinvent new meanings for things that were once key symbols during the ultranational movement.

Education was critical to the nation's memory as it communicated and institutionalized favorable national symbols, concepts, and history to the world. Education played a significant role in legitimacy due to the special, historical relationship the Japanese Ministry of Education has with the nation's identity. Any change in the nation's direction required the Ministry of Education to construct its dogma. During the Ultranational regime, the ministry of education played a critical role in keeping the nation focused on its path. The Olympics involved the

⁷⁹Christian Tagsold, "The 1964 Tokyo Olympics as Political Games" available at The Asian-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus <http://www.japanfocus.org/christantagsold/3165>. Tagsold compared the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo with the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Interestingly, he claims that both used the Olympics as a world stage to increase potency of national symbols of authority. Although the Japanese introduced specific national symbols with new meanings, both the Japanese and Chinese Olympics appeared to have some symbolic acts bypass legal and moral obstacles established by the International Olympics Committee. One example is that principally the city government and not the national government must run Olympics.

Ministry of Education because the promotion and regulation of amateur sports fell under the Ministry's area of responsibilities.⁸⁰

The Ministry of Education took this opportunity to place the Emperor, the rising sun flag, and the Japanese Military in the forefront as symbols of peace. To educate the world on how far the nation had advanced technologically, the Ministry broadcast the *Shinkansen* bullet train, the world's fastest train at the time, worldwide. This worldwide broadcast of the Olympics in color, via satellite was the first of its kind and had great impact on changing the Japan's international image. Most of the world had no idea that the broadcast worked with significant American assistance.⁸¹ Although the use of the Emperor to proclaim the opening of the ceremony seemed innocent and benign, the International Olympic Committee required that the head of state perform this role. The Japanese Olympic committee practiced legal flexibility in interpreting the IOC rules. According to the Japanese Constitution, the Prime Minister should officiate the opening ceremonies. The Japanese Olympic Committee argued that the emperor *was* the official symbol of the nation. The significance of the symbol emplacement by the conservatives probably went unnoticed by the average Japanese citizen and most of the world. The significance of the rising sun flag as an unofficial national flag also escaped the audience. The final torch runner's story was highly publicized as he was born the day the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Moreover, to put the 1964 Olympics into historical context, it is important to note the games took place in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. This international event took the world to the brink of a devastating nuclear war and remained fresh in the public mind.⁸²

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Ibid. United States government and U.S. commercial agencies owned the satellite assets that were responsible for broadcasting. Much of the supporting technical expertise and equipment on the ground were also American.

⁸²Ibid.

This precedent of many symbols reintroduced in the 1964 Olympics codified the story behind them. The memory of the atomic bomb made it easier for these changes of meaning to cultural symbols as they arose with their new significance. Internationally and domestically, the *hinomaru* (rising sun) as Japan's flag came to stand for national pride and peace at the same time. Thus, the *tenno* (emperor) again opened the 1972 Sapporo Winter Games and the 1998 Nagoya Winter Games with only a slightly modified title as "patron" of the games.⁸³ This reinforced Japan's Post war identity.

Stages such as Olympics and World Expos were once great opportunities for countries in Asia to highlight their progress. However, in the Japanese tradition of reevaluating their self-interest, the feeling that the cost of such events worth has declined. Many Japanese citizens use the basic argument that the economic costs of the games and the required infrastructure are prohibitive and wasteful without benefiting the population.⁸⁴ Despite this shift, an interesting approach seen during Tokyo's bid for the 2016 Olympic Games was Ishihara Shintaro, the very nationalist mayor of Tokyo, trying to revive the atmosphere of 1964 with plans and advertisements that are full of nostalgic allusions to 1964.⁸⁵

As strange as it may sound, there was great debate in Japan after the 1964 Olympics whether the nation should consider pursuing a nuclear program. With Japan's concentrated population, industry and neighbors such as North Korea and China, Japan started to worry that old grudges could result in nuclear weapons employment against its homeland. There is great debate about the prediction of whether Japan will ever develop nuclear weapons. The Neo-realists

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid. This is another example of the internal identity changing without compromising the external identity. Internal changes or movements within Japan survive and present themselves as long as they do not jeopardize the international identity as Pacifists.

⁸⁵Ibid.

believe Japan will undoubtedly develop nuclear weapons because of the North Korean and Chinese threat, while the Liberals cite the fact that Japan did not make any movement towards nuclear weapons even when North Korea was known to have them and communicated intent to launch them at Japan should the need arise.⁸⁶

Using strict interpretation of the constitution's article nine, Japan could not maintain nuclear weapons or conduct military programs in space. Although Japanese history highlights Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" given on February 5, 1968, there are declassified documents that claim Prime Minister Eisaku Sato communicated to Ambassador Alexis Johnson the desire to have nuclear capabilities in support of Japan's national defense.⁸⁷ This "support" appears as United States nuclear capabilities in Okinawa. The memory of the atomic bomb in concert with Japanese public opinion and the constitution are critical to maintain Japan's pacifist identity. The Japanese stand by the image of the Prime Minister Eisaku Sato as the responsible force of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles declared to the Japanese people. This peaceful memory of Prime Minister Esaku Sato becomes history as he became the first Japanese Citizen (and Asian) to become a Noble laureate.

Future of Memory

To tell the truth, I'd like to lock away that painful and sorrowful scar at the bottom of my heart, and not talk about it. But 61 years after that unforgettable day, I feel that I must

⁸⁶Jeremy D Mayer, "International relations theory and Japanese Pacifism: Why Tokyo did not go ballistic over North Korean Nukes" (Springer Netherlands volume 15, Number 2, 1996), 50-62. Mayer uses this example as an indicator that Japan has no interest in nuclear weapons.

⁸⁷Masakatsu Ota, "Program on Global Security and Disarmament" working paper number 4, available at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/pasd/bulications/nuclearquaqPCSD>. cites Declassified State Department Cable from Alexis Johnson to Dean Rusk, confidential 267, Jan 14 1969, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-69, Box 2249, Record Group 59, National Archives in College Park, Maryland as the source for this statement. Ota's comment contradicts Mayer's opinion that Japan is not interested in nuclear weapons security. Although Prime Minister Sato's interest is to U.S. security umbrella, the change in posture would indicate that at this time, members of Japanese government were willing to change its international identity in order for perceived security.

pass the story on. We, the atomic bomb survivors, will one day all be dead. I speak to you in the belief that accurately telling the facts in the testament to my life.⁸⁸

War related museums in Japan are rare. The most well known and most visited are the Peace Museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These museums do not attempt to contextualize the memory of the war that led to the atomic bombs but rather focus on the devastation of the bombs themselves and the suffering of the victims. As conservatives started to push for an increase in military strength and Prime Ministers started to pay homage to the *Yasukuni Shrine*, home of twelve class “A” war criminals, the peace museums started to increase the exhibits that show atrocities the Japanese military committed in World War II.⁸⁹ This change is significant and promising as it shows the adaptive nature of the memory of the atomic bomb. This responsive approach should help keep the memory adjusted enough to keep the nation’s pacifist identity.

A competing ritual to the services conducted at the peace museums such as the annual peace declaration is the ceremonial events that occur on yearly on August 15. There are three components to the observances of that day: the prime minister’s statements memorializing Japanese and other victims, the prime minister’s speech given at a bereavement ritual in Tokyo’s Budokan Hall with Japan’s top leaders which include the emperor and empress, and an optional visit to the Yasukuni Shrine to honor the war dead and indirectly honor their actions.⁹⁰ Non-

⁸⁸Sakue Shimohira, “Plea of Atomic Bomb Survivor” available at http://www1.city.nagasaki.jp/peace/english/survivor/sakue_shimahir.html accessed 10 March 2010

⁸⁹Information on the shrine and its purpose are available at <http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english>. accessed 17 January 2010. A visit to this shrine is significant and controversial to some due to the twelve class “A” war criminals kept there. In addition, the site keeps the imperial family. Homage to this shrine is often translated as homage to nationalists days. It is also the only place and time the Emperor of Japan bows.

⁹⁰Information on the bereavement ceremony is available at <http://www.nipponbudokan.or.jp/>. Although these bereavement ceremonies are rarely reported/covered by news agencies in the United States, Asian countries often cover the ceremony and its contents. Countries such as Korea and China often report the speeches and the utilization of such words as “condolences” as evidence that the Japanese are still refusing to take responsibilities for their actions during World War II.

Japanese audiences carefully choose the words during the speeches and ceremonies that usually produce reactions. Use of such words as “condolences” to other nations instead of “apologies” infuriates many neighboring countries in Asia. The important distinction is that condolences simply shows sympathy for experienced pain, grief or misfortune while an apology would be an acknowledgement of expressing regret or asking for pardon for a fault or offense.

The memory of this narrative serves to provide the public opinion a competing story to the recent increase of society that sees no value in pacifist or victim identity. Change in public opinion will move in subtle ways such as the subtle word choices of condolence versus the word apology as mentioned before. The use of “incident” to describe acts of aggression is a classic example of textbooks downplaying the official history or a way to ignore some aspects of the war. The push to change textbooks in either direction has so far, avoided any radical changes from the established status quo. In Japan, institutions are critical to education of the public and ceremonies are a public expression of popular sentiments. The tolerance of a shift in paradigm from the pacifist identity is just as telling as a protest against a paradigm shift.

I get a strong feeling that Japan is leaning to the right that we're going down a road that we've been down before.⁹¹

Japan has taken the atomic bomb and used it to redefine its identity as a pacifist nation. This new identity has remained for sixty-five years and appears to be stable but is constantly tested not only by external pressures to contribute more significantly in conflicts the United States engages in, but also by internal pressures to improve the Japanese quality of life. The most important pressure comes from inside Japan as some of the ruling party publicly declares that it is

⁹¹George Nishiyama, “Hiroshima a Pacifist Bastion” available from mmondreams.org/headlines05/0804-03.htm accessed 17 December 2009. Sunao Tsuboi, was about 1 km (0.6 miles) from ground zero -- the point where the bomb detonated -- was hurled 10 meters (30 feet) through the air and suffered burns over much of his body.

time for change in Japan's security identity. External pressures have come from requests for Japan to increase its efforts to take part in conflicts around the world, but the push to increase Japanese military missions outside of the current peacekeeping missions are currently subdued by Japan's pacifist identity, atomic bomb memory and public opinion.

Earlier mentioned examples of reinvented symbols codified the pacifist identity and increased national pride. The 1964 Tokyo Olympics portrayed the unofficial flag as a sign of peace, the Japanese Emperor as a defacto head of state and the Japanese Military as an instrument of peace. Televised annual visits of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Tokyo's Yasukuni shrine for war dead acted as homage to symbols of Japan's past militarism.⁹² The increase in nationalist historians claiming school textbooks incorrectly portray Japan's actions during World War II may start a rewriting of Japan's history that may uproot Japan's current manifestation of pacifist identity.

In Japan, the radicals within society are not as dangerous to national identity as the power of public opinion itself. On November 25, 1970, Yukio Mishima, a famous Japanese writer, along with four members of the Tatenokai,⁹³ visited the Eastern Command of the Japanese Self Defense Forces with the intent to raise a movement to restore the powers of the Emperor and demanded the abrogation of the constitution that he said was written solely by the United States.⁹⁴ He committed *seppuku* after he made a public speech from the headquarters building to an audience

⁹²Ibid

⁹³John Nathan, *Mishima A Biography* (Tokyo; Charles E Tuttle Company, Tokyo 1974), 229. The **Tatenokai** or Shield Society was a private militia in Japan led by the Yukio Mishima. Mishima founded the Tatenokai in 1967, recruiting its membership primarily from the staff of *Ronso Journal*, an obscure right-wing college newspaper. In an unusual move, the Tatenokai was granted the right to train with the nation's armed forces, the Jieitai. In 1970, a group of Tatenokai briefly seized control of the Jieitai's headquarters and attempted to rally the soldiers to stage a coup d'état and restore imperial rule. When this failed, Mishima and Masakatsu Morita, the Tatenokai's main student leader, committed *seppuku* or ritual suicide.

⁹⁴Katzenstein, 30 and 191. Tatenokai was an extreme paramilitary organization.

that rejected his efforts.⁹⁵ In 1970, public opinion fought against such thoughts. Consequently, in its domestic policies, especially in regards to security, Japan did not care about the logic of the global system or the legal limitations placed on them in Japan's Peace Constitution.⁹⁶

As Japan's A-bomb victims such as eighty-five-year-old Sunao Tsuboi pass away, it will be interesting to see if sufficient "memory" remains to keep Japan's pacifist identity. Any mention of changing the constitution was easily subdued until recently when in 2005, Junichiro Koizumi, Japanese Prime Minister, proposed to increase Japanese Defense Force roles in international affairs. Some proposed changes included the maintenance of a defense force controlled by the Prime Minister and a movement to set up a military court system so Japanese defense force members could be tried as soldiers instead of civilians. The reforms regarding military modifications took a new stance of war related violence. The subtle proposed modification of the preamble, individual rights, and ethno-cultural practices, are related to structural violence (if unchecked and has the propensity to disrupt the balance of powers. The included reforms to permit state funding of religious institutions and reducing constitutional amendments requirements are troubling and defiantly concern the pacifist movement.⁹⁷ Shinzo Abe, Junichiro Koizumi's successor, as prime minister also believed in the revisions and took major legislative steps towards allowing a national referendum in April 2007.⁹⁸ Although this incited a protest by the public, there is a governmental campaign to educate the public about the

⁹⁵Seppuku is a Japanese Ritual Suicide that is committed because of dishonor one may perceive. This is a way to restore honor in a person. Seppuku occurred during the Samurai period but continues today. Although Seppuku is not unheard of, Mishima's seppuku, especially for the abdication of the constitution is extreme even in Japan.

⁹⁶Katzenstein, 191.

⁹⁷"Japan Approves Constitution Steps" available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6652809.stm> accessed 23 March 2010.

⁹⁸Ibid. The current ruling party believes that with proper education, the public would support the proposed changes to the constitution.

proposed legislation and a referendum with the purpose of starting discourse regarding constitutional reform in 2010.

Japanese public opinion prevented the opposition from revising any part of the constitution; most importantly, Article Nine, the peace clause. At this time, there is still a significant enough segment of the public that continues to resist. As the nation loses its A-bomb victims, the accounts in most Japanese textbooks are critical to the memory of the atomic bomb being strong enough to maintain the pacifist identity.

Japan's relationship with violence after the bomb is not simply antimilitarism or pacifism.⁹⁹ It is much more comprehensive than addressing a security identity, but has to do with the way the nation engages the rest of the world and operates itself. The defeat shattered the world of all-Japanese and made them engage in "soul searching" to figure out exactly who they were as a people. Japan existed over sixty years in a violence vacuum.

To the United States, involved in continuous conflict in the Middle East since 2002 including Afghanistan, as long as Japan works to support United States efforts, America will support Japan's move toward more military capabilities but the movement must not look like nationalist needs or motives. However, the nations in Japan's immediate neighborhood are concerned that this increase in military posture can translate to aggressive movements towards longstanding territorial disputes with China, Russia, and South Korea.

Conclusion

Japan has a unique perspective on the issue of nuclear weapons as a consequence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹Oros, 5. The oversimplification that Japan is simply pacifist or antimilitary is incorrect, as it does not address the nonviolence of all of its institutions- internal, external and memory.

¹⁰⁰This was President Obama's response to a journalist question on his position whether he thought the use of the Atomic bomb as "just." Actual transcripts of the press conference are available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barrack-obama-and-prime-minister-yukio-hatoyama-japan-joint-press>. Conservative Blogs and papers believe that it is our responsibility to argue that

President Barack Obama's 2009 response to a Japanese Reporters question regarding the president's understanding of the historical meaning of the Atomic bomb and his opinion on the decision to drop the weapon solicited comments across the United States last year. Many conservatives believed the President's job was to defend the decision to utilize nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during WWII. The evidence presented in this paper argues otherwise. Defending the decision to drop the bomb would send conflicting messages to the internal, external and memory portion of the current narrative. The first lesson learned from the Japanese narrative is the power of carefully selected words made by powerful individuals to the public. If the President made a statement he agreed with the decision to drop the bomb and further added that, it was "just," even if he qualified this statement by showing compassion for the victims or discussing the lives saved by the atomic weapons, he would affect several populations and schools of thought.

The President's support of the bombs could ignite an increased effort to move in the direction of increased military capabilities and/or a reinvention of the nation's security identity. The move would not operate under the current umbrella of commitment to helping the world in its engagements but would likely be to protect itself from allies that appear to cooperate when their true intentions are not in concert with Japanese interests. This would not cause a sudden return to ultranationalism but could result in a slow questioning of the nation's current identity. This new shift would greatly affect the internal dynamics of discourse. As the year's progress so does, the percentage of the Japanese public that is less educated about and more detached from

the use of the weapon was" just." Extensive opinions by Catholic theorists are also available regarding opinions that any weapon utilized to kill civilians indiscriminately is not "just." Francis X. Winter, *Remembering Hiroshima* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009) presents extensive information on the "justness" of the atomic bomb.

the atomic bombs. This and a reeducation movement internally could increase the perception of instability in the region with neighboring countries questioning Japanese intentions and plans. Since Japan depends heavily on its economic relationships, any choices they make will be gradual require alliances of some sort for resources. Indicators of such changes would be modifications to the constitution in regards to article nine, individual rights, state sponsored education incentives and most importantly any manipulation of the atomic bomb memory.

The most devastated members of Japan's society however, would be the individuals critical to the institution of the memory of the atomic bomb. The whole premise of the pacifist identity is the pursuit of peace as clearly defined in the previously mentioned UN definition of "Cultural Peace."¹⁰¹ By the president agreeing to the bomb being "justified," he would violate a fundamental duty of cultural peace, which is to reject violence. Since the changes in Japanese culture are not a direct result of the decision to drop the bomb, he would violate the tenant, which is the endeavor to prevent conflicts by addressing the root cause. The violence inflicted by the bomb is the cause of Japan's security identity. Addressing the decision to drop the bomb would simply address an issue that would surely incite conflict of the worst kind, war related violence and structural violence. President Obama's words are not neutral, as he did acknowledge the experience of the atomic bomb creating a special narrative for the Japanese people.

The Japanese narrative is important to engaging the nation in any capacity. The pacifist identity has institutionalized effects of the weapons for its security identity but more importantly showed the world the long-term cultural effects of such violence on a nation's internal and external institutions. An assumption that the results of the surveys conducted by the occupation forces in both cities affected the American decision makers immensely as the occupation brought

¹⁰¹Information on the definition and explanation of "Cultural Peace" is available at www.unac.org/peace/decade accessed 12 March 2010.

in extraordinary resources dedicated to the reconstruction of Japan.¹⁰² The United States comprehensive economic package that included experts and image consultants helped Japan immensely.

A reflective look at the assumptions such as the one made that Nagasaki was safe because of its large Christian population is insightful on how the Japanese perceived the United States at the time.¹⁰³ The assumption that the peace museum would have to avoid the contextual information leading up to the bombs found the lack of discourse influenced generations of Japanese that essentially have no memories regarding the role of their nation in wartime crimes. Luckily the memory institution learns quickly and slowly started to incorporate its wartime actions in the peace museum as they realize suppression of any information good or bad will have causal outcomes that have delayed response.

Japan continues to experience unique choices as they work through the consequences of the bomb. The victim's personal experience of violence makes the atomic bomb the most significant, polarizing issue. Japan's ease with multiplicity/competing internal narratives keep internal harmony so the external identity as a global peace broker works seamlessly. Consequently understanding the journey to today's pacifist identity will give the outsider insightful contextual information to make informed decisions regarding the Japan's propensities and tipping points.

Recommendations

On March 9, 2010, the Democratic Party of Japan delivered on their election pledge for transparency by exposing the former party's "secret" agreements with the United States that truly are not secret. This paper described the preference of the average Japanese to avoid confronting

¹⁰²Chairman's Office, 91.

¹⁰³Ibid. 91–95.

ugly truths. A rational mind could ascertain the probability of nuclear weapons on American naval ships docked in the ports in Okinawa or Yokosuka, Japan. Yet, with all of the military bases on Okinawa and Japan there have been relatively small amounts of demonstration or opposition until now. The current party appears to be trying to mobilize the public to become aware of the United States special relationship with Japan in regards to its security.¹⁰⁴

A current emerging theme perpetuated by the ruling party is the possible repercussions from the bilateral security relationship the United States. To this end, the current plans to build a new Japanese military base on Futenma, Okinawa are on hold as the current administration cites that the move of much of the marine garrison from Okinawa to Guam should mean the postponement of building efforts in Okinawa. Many American international relations advocates accuse the Japanese of having a contradictory and hypocritical nuclear posture.¹⁰⁵ This perception of hypocrisy to an American is just another example of the Japanese comfort with multiplicity. The Japanese have no issues with developing their security around the United States Nuclear umbrella while criticizing the United States for having nuclear weapons in their docked ships or landing aircraft. This strange co-existence of competing narratives is confirmed by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's assertion that Tokyo will continue to bar United States Nuclear weapons from Japanese territory and waters and in the same breath dismissed the idea that Washington alter is certification policy. The Prime Minister claims certification can be achieved

¹⁰⁴ Bruce Klinger, "Politics of Well-Known Japanese "Secrets" Risk American Nuclear Umbrella" available at http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/wm_2844.pdf. In his WebMemo, dated March 24 2010 accuses the Japanese of being hypocritical and makes some recommendation of engagement for our government. The "Secrets" are also not secrets, as most Japanese citizens understand that there is a propensity for U.S. ships or aircraft to carry nuclear weapons may be present when they are enroute to a hostile location for example.

¹⁰⁵Ibid. Many International relations advocates believe the Japanese are standing under the Nuclear Umbrella while criticizing the nuclear weapons themselves.

through visual inspection of the model of the ship or aircraft can provide the propensity of a strategic nuclear weapon on board.¹⁰⁶

The United States must increase its discourse with Japan regarding international nuclear policy and Japan's nuclear stance. This review should be a dedicated task force that conducts an extensive review of all the competing security narratives in Japan to redesign a new solution. The Japanese will make uncomfortable requests of the United States such as agreeing to adopt a "no-first-use" nuclear strategy or declare a nuclear free zone in northeast Asia. Both of these requests sound absurd to the United States, which uses deterrence as the central theme to its nuclear defense. Japanese leaders understand completely that the request to adopt no-first-use policy is merely a public expression that cannot come to fruition at this time. Many American citizens feel we should completely avoid engaging in the memory of the atomic bombs. Specifically, that the president of the United States should not officially visit Hiroshima or Nagasaki because of its symbolism.¹⁰⁷ Although this declaration of not visiting the atomic bomb cities is to support the U.S. decision to drop the atomic bomb, it is the correct move because, symbols are extremely important to Japanese culture. Symbols are important as evidenced by the examples given in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. The presence of the President of the United States in the cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki would force the Japanese Public to deal with two competing narratives at once, which historically is not the preference of the Japanese mind. The disputes must utilize bilateral review.

¹⁰⁶Ibid. The Asahi Shimbun, "Okada: Nuclear Weapons Ban Unchanged," dated March 11, 2010, at <http://www.asahi.com/english/> accessed March 24, 2010. Most newspaper articles in Japanese Newspaper regarding the discussion on the "secret" alliances have been removed.

¹⁰⁷Ibid, 2. The president of the United States at Hiroshima or Nagasaki would have the same effect described as the Emperor opening the Olympics. Meaning, depending on the presentation of the media, a short clip of the President presenting a wreath at one of the former sites of the atomic bomb serves as a powerful image. This image translates as the United States making an apology for the atomic bomb use.

This task force should understand that it will take years of focused efforts that include assessments with regular engagements with the public to result in change. Moreover, there should be an increase of certain types of military specialties that the Japanese Culture have no current issues with. As an example, a recommendation would be to develop a bilateral consequence management training force with the ability to respond to a spectrum of events from natural disasters to Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and Radiological Disasters. This would improve the Japanese national narrative in several ways: it would give the Japanese an external identity yet another skill related to its current global peace broker role, give the internal identity comfort towards increasing the ability to indentify, contain or respond to protect its people and its neighbors should the need arise and honor the memories of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The only way to improve the United States Security relationship with Japan is total engagement with the Japanese Culture. Given the contextual information of Japan's atomic bomb journey, it is critical to peace maintenance; engage all aspects of Japanese society with the spirit of cooperation, understanding that the direct approach is the least preferred method by the Japanese nation.

Military Leaders that understand dynamics of the Japanese Defense Force relationship with Japanese society ensure meaningful, lasting outcomes in any endeavor. Protection against all consequences or prediction of every action are impossible however; understanding the relationship Japan has with violence will go far in interpreting actions of the Japanese Military and their culture. A true understanding of Japan's identity reveals it is much more than the westerner's oversimplified, superficial, understanding that it is all about "losing face." John Hersey's *Hiroshima* gives an outsider a look at the stories of six Japanese Atomic Bomb victims

supported by the narratives of German, Jesuit Priests that were also there.¹⁰⁸ Although this book will not make one an expert, it is a book that will help the reader understand the reason for the power of the atomic bomb memory. The book will help the reader understand the large-scale psychological impacts by putting a very intimate face on the destruction. Disregarding the most critical event in Japanese History ignores the Japanese pacifist identity that was born from it.

¹⁰⁸ Hersey, John. *Hiroshima*. New York: Random House, Inc, 1985. This book comprehensively follows the lives of six atomic bomb victims. Each victim comes from a different place in society and gives the reader a look into Japanese culture. The additional perspective of the German Jesuit Priests complements the Japanese story for a better narrative. If pressed for time, this book is a must read for any professional encounter with Japan. Hersey does not inject himself or agendas. This story leaves the reader to make conclusions.

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