Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning

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PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides overarching guidance and principles governing the planning of campaigns at the combatant command and subordinate joint force levels. It focuses on the methodology for translating national and theater strategy into planning actions required to design and synchronize a campaign plan. It describes joint campaign planning across the full range of military operations at the strategic and operational levels of war. It discusses campaign planning within the context of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and guides planners to necessary planning references.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

JOHN P. ABIZAID
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
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Campaigns are the operational extension of a commander’s strategy. Campaigns may vary drastically in scale, from a large major theater war campaign conceived and controlled at the combatant command or even National Command Authorities (NCA) level, down to smaller scale campaigns conducted by joint force commanders (JFCs) subordinate to the combatant commander.

Campaign plans are joint in nature. Campaign planning is aimed at developing the operational direction needed to resolve a particular situation deemed vital to national interests. Within the context of campaign planning, operation plans (OPLANs) are developed in support of operational objectives.

Guidance from civilian and military policymakers is a prerequisite for developing a military campaign plan. Military campaigns are not conducted in isolation of other government efforts to achieve national strategic objectives. Military power is used in conjunction with other instruments of national power — diplomatic, economic, and informational — to achieve strategic objectives.

Operational art requires the JFC to focus on strategic objectives that may be several operational steps removed from current activities. Joint operation planning can be described in terms of its contribution to a larger purpose. Campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of the combatant commander’s theater and defines the framework in which an OPLAN fits. Campaign planning offers purpose and a common objective to a series of OPLANs. Existing OPLANs, operation
Executive Summary

Campaign planning is used for combat operations, but also has application in military operations other than war (MOOTW).

Campaign planning generally applies to the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war. Combatant commanders and other JFCs may develop campaign plans for peacetime, conflict, or war.

Multinational planning consists of five basic elements: (1) multinational integration; (2) strategic integration of campaign plans; (3) theater integration; (4) bilateral campaign planning; and (5) interagency coordination. The term “multinational operations” describes joint military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. Planning for such operations is accomplished through national and international channels, and collective security goals, strategies, and treaties are taken into consideration in each phase of the planning procedures. Multinational integration involves planning for multinational operations accomplished in national and international channels. Collective security goals, strategies, and combined OPLANs are developed in accordance with individual treaty or alliance procedures. Strategic integration pertains to the hierarchical organization of bilateral or multilateral bodies established to define objectives and strategy. Theater integration occurs when joint operation planning is integrated with alliance or coalition planning at the theater or operational level by the commander of US national forces. Bilateral planning involves the preparation of combined, mutually developed and approved plans governing the employment of forces of two nations for a common contingency. Interagency coordination occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

Campaign Plan Design

Because theater-level campaign planning is mostly art, it is inextricably linked with operational art, most notably in the design of the operational concept for the campaign. This is primarily an intellectual exercise based on experience and judgment. The result of this process should be an operational design that provides the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means.
Operational design essentially involves understanding strategic guidance, identifying the adversary’s critical factors, and developing an operational concept to achieve strategic objectives.

To that end, the elements of an operational design are a tool to aid the combatant commander and planners in visualizing what the campaign should look like and shaping the commander’s intent. The key to operational design essentially involves (1) understanding the strategic guidance (determining the desired end state and military objective(s)); (2) identifying the critical factors (both principal adversary strengths, including the strategic centers of gravity (COGs), and weaknesses); and (3) developing an operational concept that will achieve the strategic objective(s).

Campaign planners must determine what set of military conditions will lead the opponent to capitulate or change its actions. The key is to determine adversary critical factors, i.e., the critical strengths and weaknesses. The most important of these aspects is the adversary centers of gravity (COGs).

While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there are always situations arising in the present that might require US military response. Campaign plan design begins with strategic guidance in the form of military strategic aims or objectives that define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives. The thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels is commonly referred to as the desired “end state.” The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action; they should address both the desired political and military conditions after the military strategic objectives are attained. Although it has often been the case in past military operations other than war (MOOTW) situations that end state and supporting military conditions defining success were ill-defined or even absent, it is imperative to have a clearly defined end state here as well.

The campaign planner must go through a process of distilling strategic guidance into military objectives. This entails determining what set of conditions must exist for the opponent to capitulate or change its behavior to meet the political aims. As part of that analysis, the planner must understand both the sources of the adversary’s strength and the key points of vulnerability. One of the most important tasks in this process is identifying the adversary’s critical factors, i.e., principal strengths and weaknesses. Critical strengths include those adversary capabilities considered crucial for the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s). The most important among those capabilities are the COGs, those aspects of the adversary’s overall capability that, theoretically, if attacked and neutralized or destroyed will lead either to the adversary’s inevitable defeat or force opponents to abandon aims or change behavior.
Critical vulnerabilities are adversary capabilities that are vulnerable to attack.

Campaign planners must also identify and protect friendly COGs.

The campaign plan includes an operational scheme and describes when, where, and under what conditions the combatant commander intends to give or refuse battle.

The operational concept addresses the defeat mechanism, application of forces and capabilities, sequencing, synchronization, and operational functions.

The adversary COG may be attacked directly or indirectly.

Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of the adversary’s capabilities that are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results, disproportionate to the military resources applied. Without this critical analysis of the adversary, it will be very difficult to develop realistic courses of action (COAs), especially those involving a deception plan or ruse.

Just as the planner decides how to attack the adversary’s COG(s), so too must the critical vulnerabilities of friendly forces and assets be identified and analyzed. If, in a given operation, US power projection capability was identified as a friendly COG, then long sea and air lines of communications from the continental United States might be considered a friendly critical vulnerability.

A campaign plan normally consists of an overall operational scheme for the entire campaign, while subordinate component commanders will draw operational schemes for their respective components. The concept should also contain in general terms a scheme of when, where, and under what conditions the combatant commander intends to give or refuse battle, if required. The concept must explicitly state that the focus is on the destruction or neutralization of the adversary’s COG(s).

Because each campaign is context specific, there is no commonly agreed-upon checklist of prescriptive elements for an operational concept. At a minimum, the concept should address the method of defeating the opponent (defeat mechanism), application of forces and capabilities, sequencing, synchronization, and operational functions.

To attack the adversary’s COG(s), there are essentially two approaches: either direct or indirect. Direct approaches are used when the adversary’s COG is comparatively weaker than the force friendly forces can apply to destroy, overwhelm, neutralize, or defeat it. Conversely, indirect approaches are used when the adversary’s COG is not readily assailable, highly protected, or ill-defined. In MOOTW, the adversary’s COG(s) are usually difficult to identify and attack directly. Because the adversary’s COG will most likely be heavily defended, the indirect approach may offer the most viable method to exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses by attacking them along decisive points. While decisive points are not COGs, they are essential in attacking COGs.
### Executive Summary

The campaign planner should consider several aspects regarding the application of forces and capabilities. Specifically, the planner must determine where the main and secondary efforts will be. Sequencing operations to achieve the overall objective, i.e., the destruction or neutralization of the adversary COG(s), involves several key factors. Sequencing includes the determination of phases required (assuming objectives cannot be accomplished in one major operation) as well as plans for branches, sequels, and operational pauses.

Phases are a logical way of organizing the various activities in a campaign. Because each phase involves one or more decision points, the planner must think through as far as practicable the possible branches or options resulting from each decision or action. Branches and sequels are primarily used for changing deployments or direction of movement and accepting or declining combat.

Operational pauses help commanders avoid culmination. Because military operations cannot always be conducted continuously, there may be a need to plan for periodic pauses. Operational pauses may be required when a major operation has temporarily reached the end of its sustainability. Operational pauses help commanders avoid culmination.

Campaign plans synchronize and integrate operations by establishing proper command relationships among subordinate commands, by clearly describing the concept of operations, by assigning realistic tasks and objectives, and by effectively task-organizing assigned forces.

### Deliberate Planning During Campaign Plan Development

Deliberate planning is driven by strategic guidance. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides guidance to the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. Military plans developed through the deliberate planning process also consider and incorporate the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.
Campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of the combatant commander’s theater and defines the framework in which an OPLAN fits. **In deliberate planning, the combatant commander plans for a broad range of potential contingencies.** Deliberate planning generally applies to the conduct of combat operations, but can also apply to MOOTW and include theater engagement planning in order to accomplish theater strategic objectives.

An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan and includes a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and time-phased force and deployment data. Deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic process and provides the joint planning and execution community with an opportunity to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime. **In its basic form, deliberate planning has five phases: initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans.**

In the initiation phase (Phase I), the combatant commander receives the task assignment. Phase II, the concept development phase, can be seen as an orderly series of six steps: (1) mission analysis; (2) planning guidance; (3) staff estimates; (4) commander’s estimate; (5) combatant commander’s strategic concept; and (6) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept review. In Phase III, plan development, the basic OPLAN or CONPLAN and supporting annexes are prepared. Plan review, assessment, and validation by the Joint Staff and Services takes place during Phase IV. In the final phase (Phase V), all required supporting plans are completed and reviewed by the supported commander.

**Crisis Action Planning During Campaign**

**Plan Development**

While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there are always situations arising in the present that might require US military response. **Crisis action planning (CAP) procedures provide for the transition from peacetime operations to MOOTW or war.** Deliberate planning supports CAP by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing contingency plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of COAs and execution planning during crises.
CAP is fluid; therefore, planning procedures are inherently flexible. Even so, there are certain key activities or phases that take place during the six phases of CAP.

During Phase I, “Situation Development,” an event with possible national security implications occurs, is recognized, and is reported through a variety of means to the National Military Command Center. In Phase II, “Crisis Assessment,” the diplomatic, military, economic, and political implications of the crisis are weighed. A decision is made on a possible requirement for military force, and current strategy and OPLANs are reviewed. During “COA Development” (Phase III), one or more combatant commanders are tasked to develop recommended COAs, or the NCA may even develop a COA. “COA Selection” occurs during Phase IV, and the necessary detailed planning is performed to execute the NCA-approved COA in Phase V, “Execution Planning.” The decision by the NCA to deploy or employ US forces is implemented in Phase VI, “Execution.”

CONCLUSION

This publication provides overarching guidance and principles governing the planning of campaigns at the combatant command and subordinate joint force levels. It focuses on the methodology for translating national and theater strategy into planning actions required to design, synchronize, and integrate a campaign plan. It describes joint campaign planning across the full range of military operations at the strategic and operational levels of war. It includes concepts pertaining to campaign plan design, deliberate campaign plan development, and campaign plan development. It discusses campaign planning within the context of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and guides planners to necessary planning references.
1. Campaign Planning

a. General. Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of theater campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives.

b. Purpose. Campaign planning provides a method for joint force commanders (JFCs) to achieve their strategic military objective. A campaign is planned, prepared, and executed by a JFC. Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. The campaign plan is the JFC’s vision of accomplishing the ultimate strategic objective through a series of intermediate-operational objectives. Campaign planning is aimed at developing the operational direction needed to resolve a particular situation deemed vital to national interests. Within the context of campaign planning, operation plans (OPLANs) are developed in support of operational objectives. Figure I-1 provides key aspects on the purpose of campaign planning.

“A prince or a general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and resources doing neither too much nor too little. But the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms of action as in the ultimate success of the whole. What we should admire is the accurate fulfillment of the unspoken assumptions, the smooth harmony of the whole activity, which only becomes evident in final success.”

Carl von Clausewitz
On War, 1832

2. Fundamentals

a. General. Campaign planning is the glue that binds component, supporting, and
interagency operations together at the operational level. The coordinated functioning of component and supporting elements can be achieved through the interactive process of building plans and communicating the intent of those plans to the higher headquarters, Service and/or functional component commanders, supporting commanders, and other government and nongovernment agencies. Fundamentals of a campaign plan are shown on Figure I-2.

b. Characteristics. Characteristics of a campaign plan include the following.

- It is the way that the JFC coordinates, employs, and sustains over time the available resources.
- It is a phased series of major operations to bring about decisive results from the major operations or battles.
- The synergy of these phased major operations creates an operational advantage that degrades or eliminates adversary centers of gravity (COGs).
- A key characteristic of a campaign is the JFC’s authoritative synchronization and integration of air, land, sea, space, and special operations efforts along with deployment and sustainment to attain the strategic or operational objectives.
- Information operations must be integrated into the normal campaign planning and execution process.
A campaign plan translates strategic guidance into operational direction for subordinates. It provides broad concepts for operations and sustainment to achieve strategic or operational objectives.

c. Considerations. The considerations for developing a campaign plan include the following.

- What military or related political and social conditions (objectives) must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)

- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
• How should **resources** of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)

• What is the likely **cost or risk** to the joint force in performing a particular sequence of actions? (Considered during course of action (COA) analysis).

3. **Strategic Guidance**

Guidance from civilian and military policymakers is a prerequisite for developing a military campaign plan. Campaigns are not isolated from other government efforts to achieve national strategic objectives. Military power is used in conjunction with other instruments of national power — diplomatic, economic, and informational — to achieve strategic objectives. Depending on the nature of the operation, a military campaign may be the main effort, or it may be used to support diplomatic or economic efforts. A campaign must be coordinated with nonmilitary efforts to ensure that all actions work in harmony to achieve the ends of policy. An understanding of the strategic and operational objectives is essential for campaign planning.

4. **National Strategic Planning**

a. It is at the national strategic level where a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational security objectives. The National Command Authorities (NCA) provide guidance and national resources to accomplish military objectives. Activities at this level include:

• Establish national and multinational military objectives;

• Sequence initiatives;

• Define limits, synchronize the efforts, and assess the risks, costs, and consequences of specific actions and operations of all the instruments of national power; and

• Develop global strategies to achieve these objectives.

b. Strategic planning is done primarily at the NCA level. Decision makers look at the entire world situation as it affects, or is affected by, the use of US military forces.

5. **Regional Strategic Planning**

a. In regional planning, geographic combatant commanders focus on their specific regions as defined in the **Unified Command Plan** (UCP). Today, geographic combatant commanders, and their subordinate JFCs are primarily responsible for campaign planning. Campaign planning can be conducted anytime by the combatant commander in response to assignments from the NCA or as established in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The commander may also determine that a need exists to prepare plans to cover contingencies not assigned by the JSCP.

b. Geographic combatant commanders and their subordinate JFCs primarily accomplish theater strategic and operational level planning. It is at this level where campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within their operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by:

• Establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish strategic objectives;

• Sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives;

• Initiating actions; and
Applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.

6. Functional Strategic Planning

Functional plans (FUNCPLANs) involve the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or nonhostile environment. Examples include plans for disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and continuity operations.

7. Support Strategic Planning

Combatant commanders with functional responsibilities, i.e., US Space Command (USSPACECOM), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), US Special Operations Command, and US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and their component commanders may conduct planning. They view their planning problem as unconstrained by geography. The command perspective shapes both the choices of the COA and the resources provided for planning. Strategic planning for possible sequential or concurrent execution of more than one operation outweighs the regional perspective of any single commander. Likewise, planning is subordinate to each supported combatant commander’s concept for the particular theater in order to support that concept.

8. Campaign Planning

a. Joint operation planning can be described in terms of its contribution to a larger purpose. Campaign plans are joint plans. Campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of the combatant commander’s theater and defines the framework in which an OPLAN fits. Campaign planning offers purpose and a common objective to a series of OPLANs. Existing OPLANs, operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), or FUNCPLANs may also provide the basis for development of campaign plans.

b. Through theater and subordinate campaign plans, strategic and operational
planners synchronize national and theater ends, ways, and means to attain national strategic, supporting theater strategic, and operational level objectives.

c. Several US combatant commanders have developed campaign plans in varying degrees and under a variety of names. In the Pacific, the geographic combatant commander for US Pacific Command establishes a campaign plan both in warfighting strategy and in war plans developed in response to tasking from the NCA in the JSCP. The combatant commander’s planning tasks are not limited to those specified by higher authority. The commander of the Combined Forces Command in Korea also sets forth a campaign for the defense of the peninsula in a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-approved war plan. In US Central Command (USCENTCOM), the combatant commander has established a series of plans that fulfill the requirements of a campaign plan.

d. Preparation of campaign plans involves more than just the JFC’s staff. Campaign planning is commonly accomplished in coordination with:

- Higher military headquarters;
- Subordinate component headquarters;
- Military allies or coalition partners;
- Other government agencies; and
- International organizations.

e. Service or functional component commanders, such as the joint force land component commander, joint force maritime component commander, or joint force air component commander, prepare major OPLANs that implement the concept of the JFC’s campaign plan as it affects their respective component forces.

9. Campaign Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

a. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of a major theater war (MTW). However, campaign planning is an effective methodology for situations other than war. Combatant commanders and other
JFCs may develop campaign plans for peacetime, conflict, or war. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, campaign plans must integrate all instruments of national power — political, economic, informational, and military — to attain national strategic objectives. This is particularly relevant for campaigns involving military operations other than war (MOOTW).

b. **Unity of Effort.** Gaining and maintaining unity of effort in interagency environments requires constant attention. Commanders remain aware of the goals and objectives of the various participants. They recognize that control of national forces and nonmilitary partners by their political leaders may affect mission accomplishment. Commanders constantly work to sustain political consensus among the leaders, nations, and organizations involved in the operation. MOOTW campaign planning considerations include the following:

- Statement of the national problem.
- Relevant national interests.
- Stated or perceived military mission.
- Nature of physical environment (geography, climate, access from US and US bases, etc.).
- Nature of society (e.g., population and demographics, history, general culture, economy, politics, infrastructure, military and security forces, potential destabilizing factors, insurgencies, etc.).
- Nature of external forces, including other nations, international, and transnational forces.
- Nature of the crisis, to include identification of critical events, economic problems, natural disaster, government reaction, recent military defeat, religious influences, or ethnic conflict.
- Impact of time as it affects the environment and key players. Any critical upcoming events that can be influenced.

*MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations, and often the military may not be the primary player.*
• Host-nation support (HNS) agreements exist that can support this operation; how local, regional, national or international laws affect the operations in the operational area. (Laws of war apply to this operation and the impact on support in the operational area.)

• Significant logistic support considerations: geography, supply, facilities, transportation, maintenance, labor resources, health service support, personnel service support, field services, and field sanitation, etc.

• General types of US support actions that should be contemplated, the resources that they will require and how the actions of other than US forces and their support resources may be coordinated for the operation.

• Legal status of US personnel in the operational area (i.e., combatant vs. expert on mission, prisoner of war vs. illegal detainee, etc.).

c. **Subordinate Plans.** Subordinate JFCs develop subordinate campaign plans to accomplish tasks required to execute MOOTW. These may include transition operations between MOOTW and war. For example, a flexible deterrent option (FDO) such as a show of force, coupled with public statements of concern, to demonstrate US national resolve could be designed as the first phase of a campaign. The second phase could be a well-publicized selected mobilization of Reserve forces. If these actions do not deter an aggressor, then the remaining phases of the campaign could be initiated and likely carried out to conclusion.

For additional guidance on MOOTW, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. See Appendix A, “Flexible Deterrent Options,” for additional information on FDOs.
1. General

a. Theater-level campaign planning is mostly art. It is inextricably linked with operational art, most notably in the design of the operational concept for the campaign. While facilitated by such procedures as the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and commonly accepted military decisionmaking models, the operational design process is primarily an intellectual exercise based on experience and judgment. The result of this process should provide the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means for the campaign.

b. The elements of operational design are a tool to help combatant commanders and their planners visualize what the campaign should look like and to shape the commander’s intent. The emphasis on the specific elements of an operational design may vary depending on the strategic objectives in a particular theater. Not only does the theater strategic environment affect operational design, other factors such as the availability of HNS, the allocation of strategic mobility assets, the state of the theater infrastructure, and forces made available for planning all have an impact on the operational design. In the final analysis, the goal of a sound operational design is to ensure a clear focus on the ultimate strategic objective and corresponding strategic COG, and provide for sound sequencing, synchronization, and integration of all available military and nonmilitary sources of power to that end. The key elements of operational design are: (1) understanding the strategic guidance (determining the desired end state and military objectives(s)); (2) identifying the critical factors (principal adversary strengths, including the strategic COGs, and weaknesses); and (3) developing an operational concept or scheme that will achieve the strategic objective(s).

2. Strategic Guidance

a. The NCA or the combatant commander promulgate strategic guidance (see Figure II-1). In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. It should define what constitutes “victory,” or success (ends), describe the method of employing military force (ways), and allocate adequate forces and assets (means) to achieve strategic objectives. As such, strategic guidance normally contains the following:

- Strategic end state (definition of victory or success).
- Resources (forces, to include multinational, time, space).
- Restraints (prohibitions and restrictions, e.g., geographical, weapons, methods, rules of engagement (ROE)).
Chapter II

Constraints (obligatory or must do, logistics, ROE).

Strategic assumptions.

Note: When conditions imposed by strategic guidance are so prescriptive as to prevent the attainment of the established objectives, the combatant commander must request relaxation of either the limitations or the strategic objectives themselves.

Campaign plan design begins with strategic guidance in the form of military strategic objectives that define the role of military forces in the larger context of national strategic objectives.

This focus on the military strategic objective is one of the most important considerations in operational design. The nature of the political aim, taken in balance with the sources of national strength and vulnerabilities, must be compared with the stakes, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the opponent in order to arrive at reasonably attainable national military objectives. The strategic guidance must establish whether the combatant commander is to pursue a limited or unlimited strategic (political) objective. This distinction is absolutely essential to ensure the right match between political and military objectives.

Figure II-1. Role of Strategic Guidance

- Underlying Cause of War
- Attainment of Strategic Ends
- Termination of Hostilities
- Resolution of Conflict
- End of Combat Operations
- Leverage to Prevent Renewed Activities
- Achieve and Sustain Political Objectives
- Secure Terms Favorable to the United States
- Control Over the Adversary
- Redeploy Forces
- Postconflict Activities

Before forces are committed, the combatant commander must know how the National Command Authorities intend to terminate the operation and ensure that its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level.
b. Desired End State. The thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels is the desired “end state.” A strategic end state simply means the required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. Normally this constitutes crisis resolution and the disengagement of the military instrument of national power from the contingency. The NCA should clearly describe the desired end state before committing the Armed Forces of the United States to an action. The desired end state should include both the desired political and military conditions after the military strategic objectives are attained. The desired end state is usually determined at the national-strategic level, preferably with input from the supported combatant commander. Although the combatant commander could define the end state, it would have to be formally approved by the NCA.

- In multinational settings, military committee directives provide the strategic direction for campaign planning. But these are normally broad, generalized documents that normally lack the details of a plan for employing and sustaining large forces. It is especially important in multinational situations, therefore, that the combatant commander and planners clearly understand the conditions that the country’s (and/or alliance or coalition) political leadership wants the military instrument to establish in terms of the internal and external balance of power, regional security, geopolitics, and so forth. When objectives are unclear or ambiguous, the combatant commander or subordinate JFC must seek clarification and convey the impact, positive or negative, of continued ambiguity to the NCA. The interagency coordination process can assist the combatant commander in this effort.

See JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I, for information on the interagency coordination process as it relates to campaign planning.

Note: Although they are related, the term “end state” should not be confused with “commander’s intent.” Commanders at all echelons issue a commander’s intent,

United Nations Security Council resolutions may also provide the basis for the conduct of military operations.
but their intent does not specify the political conditions that must exist after military objectives have been achieved. To enhance clarity and promote unity of effort, it is useful to reiterate the end state in conjunction with the commander’s intent in the campaign plan.

See example campaign plan format in Appendix B, “Theater Campaign Plan Format.”

- Although it has often been the case in past MOOTW situations that end state and supporting military conditions defining success were ill-defined or even absent, it is imperative to have a clearly defined end state here as well. In that event, the combatant commander and planners will have to solicit additional guidance from the NCA and through the interagency process to ensure that the intent is clear and an end state is clearly defined. And while there may not be an armed adversary to confront in a MOOTW situation, the combatant commander still has to think in terms of causes and effects that will lead to success. Examples of a military condition that would have to be achieved to support the strategic end state might be something like “restoration of basic services;” “formation of a professional anti-drug force;” or “mitigation of the consequences of a nuclear accident.” While these examples are probably more typical of a major operation with joint forces in a supporting role, they serve to illustrate the link between military and strategic objectives.

- Defining the end state — which may change as the operation progresses — and ensuring that it supports the achievement of national objectives are critical early steps in the operational design process. Aside from its obvious role in accomplishing the strategic objective(s), clearly defining the end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign.

- Campaign planners must plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process and update these plans as the campaign evolves. To maintain the proper perspective, they must know what constitutes an acceptable political-military end state; i.e., what military conditions must exist to justify a cessation of combat operations. In examining the proposed national strategic end state, the combatant commander and the staff must consider whether it has reasonable assurance of ending the fundamental problem or underlying conditions that instigated the conflict in the first place.

- When addressing conflict termination, campaign planners must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include

- Conflict Termination. Every campaign and every strategic effort is directed toward a goal, and at some point military action eventually ends. Just as the combatant commander must clearly understand the desired end state, so too must the termination criteria for the campaign be understood. If the NCA do not adequately articulate the termination criteria, the combatant commander should request further guidance or clarification, as appropriate. The decision as to when and under what circumstances to suspend or terminate combat operations is a political decision. Even so, it is essential that the combatant commander play a major role in the decisionmaking process. The combatant commander should ensure that political leaders understand the current political-military situation and the implications, both immediate and long term, of a suspension of hostilities at any point in the conflict.
disengagement, force protection, transition to postconflict operations, and reconstitution and redeployment. Planners must also anticipate the nature of postconflict operations, where the focus will likely shift to MOOTW; for example, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, or enforcement of exclusion zones.

- In formulating the theater campaign plan, the combatant commander and staff should ensure the following:

  - Conflict termination is a key aspect of the campaign planning process.
  - Emphasizing backward planning; decision makers should not take the first step toward hostilities or war without considering the last step.
  - Defining the conditions of the termination phase. The military objectives must support the political aims — the campaign’s conflict termination process is a part of a larger implicit bargaining process, even while hostilities continue. The military contribution can significantly affect the political leverage available to influence that process.
  - Considering how efforts to eliminate or degrade an opponent’s command and control (C2) may affect, positively or negatively, efforts to achieve the termination objectives. Will opponents be able to affect a cease-fire or otherwise control the actions of their forces?
  - Interagency coordination plays a major role in the termination phase. View conflict termination not just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new posthostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems.

- d. Military Conditions. Strategic (political) objectives describe in broad terms where the United States wants to go. Military objectives describe what has to be accomplished militarily in order to get there. In other words, the combatant commander has to delineate the military conditions that must exist in order to accomplish the strategic objectives, and must ascertain what political effect military forces must achieve in the operational area to that
This requires a clear understanding of when military force is the main effort and when it is acting in support of some other instrument of national power. This relationship is not as obvious as it may seem. In an MTW, military operations can usually proceed in a straightforward manner. However, it is increasingly common that military operations are so closely integrated with other government activities that these nonmilitary actions have to be considered an integral part of the campaign. The complex political-diplomatic environment in many MOOTW scenarios, where it may be difficult to distinguish between enemies, bystanders, and interagency players, only serves to underscore the importance of clearly focusing on the strategic objective(s).

3. Identifying Critical Factors

“The first task . . . in planning for war is to identify the enemy’s centers of gravity, and if possible, trace them back to a single one.”

Carl von Clausewitz On War, 1832

a. Once the combatant commander and the planners have determined what set of military conditions must exist for the opponent to submit to US will (the strategic objective), the focus now shifts to how they will achieve that objective. The most important task confronting campaign planners in this process is being able to properly identify the adversary’s strategic COGs, i.e., the sources of strength, power, and resistance. Campaign planners must first understand both the sources of the adversary’s strength and the key points of vulnerability; these are referred to as the adversary’s critical factors.

- The COG concept is useful as an analytical tool, while designing campaigns and major operations to assist JFCs and their staffs in analyzing friendly and adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Analysis of COGs, both friendly and adversary, is a continuous process throughout a major operation or campaign. This process cannot be taken lightly, though; a faulty conclusion as to the adversary COGs because of a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences; specifically, the inability to achieve the military objectives at an acceptable cost and the unconscionable expenditure of lives, time, and materiel in efforts that do not produce decisive strategic or operational results. Accordingly, a great deal of thought and analysis must take place before the combatant commander and staff can determine proper COGs with any confidence.

- Before attempting to identify the adversary COGs, planners must first understand the complementary relationship of the adversary’s COGs to the other critical factors. These are important distinctions, because
understanding the relationship among the critical factors (and COGs in particular) not only permits but compels greater precision in thought and expression in designing the campaign.

- **Critical capabilities** are those adversary capabilities that are considered crucial enablers for the adversary’s COG to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s). **Critical requirements** are those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. **Critical vulnerabilities**, on the other hand, are those aspects or components of the adversary’s critical capabilities (or components thereof), which are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results, disproportionate to the military resources applied. In general, friendly forces must possess sufficient range (i.e., operational reach) and combat power to take advantage of the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities; otherwise, these weaknesses cannot be targeted as physical objectives that are key to mission accomplishment (see Figure II-2).

![Figure II-2. Characteristics of the Adversary’s Centers of Gravity](image-url)
In general, the higher the level of war is, the fewer potential COGs there will be (ideally, planners can identify the COG) and they will tend to be more intangible in nature. At the strategic level, a COG might include an alliance or coalition, national will or public support, or the national leadership’s will to fight. Identification of the adversary’s strategic COG is usually a difficult and challenging task because of the large number of intangible elements involved. An operational COG, on the other hand, is normally more tangible — for example, a powerful element of the adversary’s armed forces. It is that concentration of the adversary’s military power that is most dangerous to friendly forces or the one that stands between those forces and the accomplishment of their strategic objective.

b. The importance of identifying the proper COGs cannot be overstated. Determining the adversary’s strategic COG and critical vulnerabilities is absolutely essential to establish clarity of purpose, to focus efforts and, ultimately, to generate synergistic results in the employment of one’s forces. In fact, detailed operational planning should not begin until the adversary’s COGs have been identified. Identifying COGs is an analytical process that involves both art and science. A proper analysis must be based on a detailed knowledge of how opponents organize, fight, make decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. The key to this process is intelligence that anticipates the commander’s intelligence needs and is timely, objective, usable, available, complete, accurate, and relevant.

• From a procedural perspective, the analysis of the adversary’s COGs is a key step in the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) process. In the third of four steps in the JIPB process, joint force intelligence analysts identify adversary COGs. The analysis is conducted after an understanding of the broad operational environment has been obtained and before a detailed study of the adversary’s forces occurs. The analysis addresses the adversary leadership, fielded forces, resources, infrastructure, population, transportation systems, and internal and external relationships of the adversary. The goal is to determine from which elements the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength (means), or the will to fight. A determination is then made to see if the tentative or candidate COGs are truly critical to the adversary’s strategy. This analysis is a linchpin in the planning effort, since the essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities in order to destroy or neutralize them, employing both kinetic and non-kinetic means of attack.

See JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, for detailed information on the JIPB process as it relates to campaign planning.

• The most effective method for planners to conduct an analysis of the adversary’s COGs to identify its critical vulnerabilities is to visualize the COGs in terms of a system i.e., what are its functional components (critical requirements) and how do they relate to one another? What elements within this “system” protect, sustain, or integrate its various elements or components? Once a detailed systemic analysis is completed, the planners should then try to identify the critical vulnerabilities within that system. For example, assume that the JFC’s staff have determined that the adversary’s integrated air defense system (IADS) is a critical requirement
Campaign Plan Design

for the derived adversary operational COG. Upon conducting their systemic analysis, they determine that the IADS primary weakness is, among others, its radar network. Since the radar sites are especially vulnerable to high-speed anti-radiation missiles when turned on, the planners deduce that the radar network constitutes a critical vulnerability. The planners can then devise a method of attack to destroy this derived vulnerability which will ultimately neutralize the derived operational COG.

- Within the context of pitting friendly strengths against adversary weaknesses, the combatant commander will understandably want to focus efforts against those critical vulnerabilities identified within the critical requirements (enabling objects or functions) that will do the most decisive damage to the adversary’s COGs. However, in selecting those critical vulnerabilities, planners must also compare their degree of criticality with their degree of vulnerability, recuperability, and redundancy, and to balance those factors against friendly capabilities. The combatant commander’s goal is to now aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an adversary in as vulnerable an aspect as possible, and in as many dimensions as possible. In other words, the combatant commander uses force strength to undermine the adversary’s strength by exploiting adversary weaknesses.

- Another major element of properly identifying the adversary’s COGs and underlying critical vulnerabilities is having a thorough understanding of the adversary and how it thinks. This is not as simple as it sounds; not only must intelligence analysts and planners develop an understanding of the adversary’s capabilities and vulnerabilities, they must take into account the way that friendly forces and actions appear from the adversary’s viewpoint. Otherwise, planners may fall into the trap of ascribing to the adversary particular attitudes, values, and reactions that “mirror image” US actions in the same situation, or by assuming that the adversary will respond or act in a

At the operational level of war, the adversary’s COG is usually an element of the adversary’s armed forces.
particular manner. Likewise, what might be a critical requirement for friendly forces might be less so, or not even important to the adversary. **This means that those factors that might influence the adversary to abandon or change its strategic objectives must be fully understood by campaign planners.** Not only is this analysis key to determining how to attack the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities, it would be very difficult to derive realistic adversary COAs or develop effective deception plans or ruses without it.

c. **Validity Testing.** Before solidifying COGs into the campaign plan, planners should analyze their **validity.** The destruction, neutralization, or substantial weakening of a valid COG will result in changing an adversary COA or denying its strategic objectives. If a COG does not meet this criteria, then planners must review the previously identified critical factors, look for other critical vulnerabilities, or reassess how to attack the previously identified critical vulnerabilities with additional resources. The conclusions, while critically important to the campaign planning process itself, must be tempered with continuous evaluations and reassessments, because **derived COGs and critical vulnerabilities are subject to change at any time during the campaign or major operation.** Accordingly, JFCs and their subordinates should be alert to circumstances during execution of the campaign that may cause derived COGs and critical vulnerabilities to change and adjust friendly plans and operations accordingly.

d. **Protection of Own Center(s) of Gravity.** Just as the combatant commander plans to attack the adversary’s COGs, so too must critical vulnerabilities of friendly forces and assets be identified and analyzed. Long sea and air lines of communications (LOCs) from the continental United States or supporting theaters could be a critical vulnerability for a friendly COG. A friendly COG could also be something more intangible in nature. During the Gulf War, for example, USCENTCOM identified the coalition itself as a friendly strategic COG and took appropriate measures to protect it.

In conducting the analysis of friendly vulnerabilities, the combatant commander must decide how, when, where, and why
his or her forces are (or might become) vulnerable to hostile actions, and then plan accordingly. This planning goes well beyond force protection. The combatant commander must achieve a balance between prosecuting the main effort and providing operational protection. In providing operational protection, the combatant commander should focus attention on and assign adequate forces and assets to the most essential elements in the theater to protect friendly COGs.

4. Operational Concept

a. General. Even at this stage of the operational design development process, it is still very much an intellectual exercise. The combatant commander has to assimilate many variables under conditions of uncertainty to form a vision for the requisite military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of forces and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. Campaign planners should never lose sight of the fact that strategic objectives must dominate the campaign planning process at every juncture. If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or “nesting” is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross purposes.

- The thought process that ultimately leads to the development of a COA should capture the essence of operational art and provide the foundation for the campaign plan. It expresses in clear, concise, conceptual language a broad vision of what the combatant commander plans to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The commander’s intent, clearly and explicitly stated, is an integral component of the concept. Normally, a campaign plan consists of an overall operational scheme for the entire campaign, while subordinate component commanders will draw operational schemes for their respective components.

- The concept should also contain in general terms a scheme of when, where, and under what conditions the combatant commander intends to give or
refuse battle, if required. Above all, the concept must make explicitly clear that the focus is on the destruction or neutralization of the adversary’s COGs. The concept should exhibit creativity and avoid discernible conventions and patterns, should make full use of ambiguity and deception, and should provide for speed of execution. The concept should also be grounded in the elements of operational art to help visualize the campaign in terms of the forces and functions involved. How the commander applies operational art will vary with the nature of operational conditions, the nature of the strategic objectives, the time and space available in the theater, and the number and types of forces involved.

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, contains a detailed discussion on all the facets of operational art; as such, Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” in JP 3-0 should be used in conjunction with this publication, as well as the supporting appendices in this publication.

- Because each campaign plan is context-specific, there is no commonly agreed upon checklist of prescriptive elements for an operational concept. However, at a minimum, the concept (scheme) should address the method of defeating the opponent (defeat mechanism), application of forces and capabilities, sequencing, synchronization and integration of forces and capabilities, and operational functions.

b. Defeat Mechanism. At the strategic level, the combatant commander has to determine what set of political-military conditions will achieve the required strategic aims. In most situations, all the complementary instruments of national power will come into play, but military action may end up being the main effort at the strategic level. In that case, the theater design should focus on the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities that lead to the destruction or neutralization of the adversary’s strategic and operational COGs as previously described.

- The essence of operational art lies in concentrating (in some way) US military resources against the adversary’s COGs to achieve US strategic and operational objectives. There are two approaches to accomplish this, so campaign planners will have to decide between the two methods, given the theater circumstances. The decision facing the planners is whether to attack the COG directly or indirectly (see Figure II-3). JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, states that “To the extent possible, JFCs attack adversary centers of gravity directly.” In theory, direct attacks against adversary COGs resulting in their destruction or neutralization are the most direct path to victory. This is accomplished through the direct application of a major part of one’s own and friendly forces and assets (by air, missile, special operations, and other deep ranging capabilities) against the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

- In some situations, the direct approach may entail an attack focused on the bulk of the adversary’s forces with the explicit aim of destroying or annihilating those forces in the shortest possible time. When one’s own combat power is overwhelming, or the adversary force is deemed particularly vulnerable, a direct approach can sometimes be the most practical and effective way to decisively attack the adversary’s COGs. However, this approach is often situationally dependent. In MOOTW, for example, the adversary’s COGs may be difficult to identify and attack directly.
Another planning consideration is that the adversary’s COGs may not be open to direct attack because of its inherent strength, its key elements are well protected or obscure, or because it is by nature abstract or intangible. The latter is especially true at the national-strategic level. There is a finite range beyond which the joint force might not be able to operate or maintain effective operations, i.e., its operational reach. Operational reach challenges can be addressed in campaign plans. And last, constraints or restraints, political or otherwise (e.g., ROE on the employment of US forces), may preclude a direct attack on the adversary’s COGs.

Another consideration is when a direct attack against an adversary COG means attacking into an opponent’s strength, then the JFC should seek an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks. In this manner, the adversary’s derived critical vulnerabilities can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over its COGs. For this same reason, it follows that an adversary vulnerability is not worth attacking unless it contributes to the elimination or serious degradation of the adversary’s COGs.

At the strategic level of war, indirect methods of defeating the adversary’s...
COG could include depriving the adversary of allies or friends, weakening the national will to fight by undermining the public support for war, and breaking up cohesion of adversary alliances or coalitions.

- At the operational and tactical levels of war, the most often used method to weaken or neutralize the selected COGs indirectly is through a series of attacks against selected aspects of the adversary’s combat power (For example, by sequencing combat actions to force the opponent to divide its forces in theater, destroying the adversary’s reserves or elements of adversary base of operations, or preventing or hindering the deployment of the adversary’s major forces or reinforcements into the theater). Indirect methods of attacking the adversary’s COGs (through critical vulnerabilities) could entail reducing the adversary’s operational reach, isolating the force from its C2, and destroying or suppressing key protection functions such as air defense.

"Every point of the theater . . . is of military importance, whether from its position as a center of communication or from presence of military establishments or fortifications. . . . Others [decisive points] have a value from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against them. . . . The decisive point of a battlefield can be determined by:
1. Features on the ground.
2. Relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim.
3. Positions occupied by the respective forces."

Lieutenant General Antoine-Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, 1838

- There may often be cases where the combatant commander will have insufficient combat power to obtain leverage against the adversary’s COGs with a single blow. In this situation, the JFC must be selective in where to focus efforts, and the indirect approach may offer the most viable method to exploit adversary critical vulnerabilities through the identification of decisive points. Decisive points may be a geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary and greatly influence the outcome of an operation. Decisive points are not COGs; they are the keys to attacking or protecting them.

Although most theaters of operation may have numerous decisive points, only a few will truly have operational or even strategic significance relative to the derived adversary COGs. The art of identifying decisive points is a critical part of the work cut out for campaign planners. Normally, there are far more decisive points in a given operational area than can feasibly be seized, retained, or controlled with forces and assets available. Accordingly, the planning staff should study and analyze potential decisive points and determine which of them offer the best
opportunity to indirectly attack the adversary’s COGs, extend friendly relative operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. Afterward, the combatant commander should assign sufficient forces and assets for attacking, seizing, or controlling these decisive points.

c. Application of Forces and Capabilities. After the decisive points have been identified and vetted, campaign planners should consider several principles regarding force application. First, an operational plan should not be completely constrained by the strategic plan’s force allocation or apportionment. A campaign plan should be designed to accomplish the assigned theater objectives. Second, campaign planning is inherently an iterative process, with forces being requested and approved for certain early phases, while still more forces may be needed for the later phases.

- In addition to requesting and distributing forces and assets, the campaign planner must also consider withholding some capability as an operational reserve. In designing a campaign, the operational commander should decide early on which area (or function) of the theater will be the main effort and which will comprise secondary efforts. This action is necessary for the sound application of economy of effort and allocating disparate forces, to include multinational forces.

- Designation of the main effort can be addressed in geographical (area) or functional terms. In developing the operational concept, planners determine those tasks essential to the accomplishment of the military objectives and assign them to subordinate commanders either as area (geographic) responsibilities or as functional responsibilities. Area tasks and responsibilities focus on a specific area to control or conduct operations. Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve two or more Military Departments operating in the same dimension or medium, or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. In either case, designating the main effort will establish where or how a major part of one’s own forces and assets are employed to attain the primary objective of a major operation or campaign.

- The designation of the main effort facilitates the synchronized and integrated employment of all combat elements while leaving the greatest possible scope for the initiative of subordinate commanders. The operational commander must provide adequate support to ensure the quickest possible accomplishment of the tasks assigned to the forces operating in the sector of main effort. As such, the concept of operations must clearly specify the nature of the main effort.

- During a major operation, forces deployed or employed as the main effort are sustained with supporting forces and assets. If conditions change and success of the overall mission can be obtained at less cost or more quickly through another approach, the operational commander should shift the main effort to the new approach. When this occurs, priorities of support must be changed to ensure the success of actions in the newly designated main effort. Secondary efforts, as the term implies, are subsidiary or ancillary to the main effort. They are characterized by a lack of operational depth, assignment of forces with fewer capabilities, smaller reserves, and more limited objectives.
d. Sequencing of Operations. Sequencing is the chronological arrangement of events within a major operation or campaign in the order most likely to achieve the overall objectives. It is a subset of the concept for arranging operations (see Figure II-4). Proper sequencing helps the combatant commander determine which operational objectives have to be achieved and by when in order to establish the conditions for subsequent operations. Sequencing includes the determination of phases within operations, as well as plans for branches, sequels, and operational pauses.

- Even though sequencing adds chronological structure to the concept, the sequence of events necessary to achieve the desired operational conditions cannot be rigidly established. In fact, during execution, the combatant commander should be prepared to change or adjust the sequence for accomplishing principal tasks to exploit vulnerabilities (branches), adjust tempo, or adapt to outcomes (sequels).

- Phasing. Phasing is a basic tenant of campaign plan design. Phasing assists commanders and staffs to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. Since a campaign is required whenever pursuit of a strategic objective is not attainable through a single major operation, the theater operational design includes provision for related phases that may or may not be executed and can, in some cases, overlap with activities occurring either simultaneously or in sequence. Phases are a logical way of chronologically

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**Figure II-4. Phases — Joint Campaign**

- **DETER/ENGAGE**
  - CRISIS DEFINED

- **SEIZE INITIATIVE**
  - SEIZE INITIATIVE/ASSURE FRIENDLY FREEDOM OF ACTION/ACCESS THEATER INFRASTRUCTURE

- **DECISIVE OPERATIONS**
  - ESTABLISH DOMINANT FORCE CAPABILITIES/ACHIEVE FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE

- **TRANSITION**
  - ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL AND RULE OF LAW
  - REDEPLOY

Actions to Assure Full Spectrum Dominance
organizing the diverse, extended, and dispersed activities involved in the campaign. Also, a campaign plan design may also have several aspects, each to be executed by different forces or different kinds of forces. The campaign planner’s task is to devise a combination of actions over time that most effectively and quickly achieve the strategic objective. While each phase may be distinguishable from the others as an identifiable episode, each is necessarily linked to the others and gains significance only in the larger context of the campaign. The manner of distinction may be separation in time, space, or a difference in aim or of forces assigned. Each phase should represent a natural subdivision of the campaign’s objectives, e.g., “establish dimensional superiority.” As such, it is imperative that the campaign not be broken down into numerous arbitrary chunks that may inhibit tempo and lead to a plodding, incremental approach.

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, contains a detailed discussion of the phasing model.

“These phases of a plan do not comprise rigid instructions, they are merely guideposts. . . . Rigidity inevitably defeats itself, and the analysts who point to a changed detail as evidence of a plan’s weakness are completely unaware of the characteristics of the battlefield.”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

• In conceptualizing the campaign plan design, each phase should be viewed as an essential component in a string of events that are related in cause and effect. Like a chess player, the planner must learn to think beyond the next move, to look ahead several moves, and consider the long-term results of those moves and how to exploit them. Likewise, every move by the joint force must take into consideration the adversary’s reactions or anticipations.

• The actual process of developing the sequence of phases in a campaign operates in two directions simultaneously, i.e., forward and backward. Campaign planning begins with both the current situation and the desired end state in mind — recognizing, of course, that the end state may change as the situation unfolds. Forward planning proceeds from the current conditions at the outset of the campaign, focusing on near term objectives while envisioning the sequence of mutually supporting phases. The combined results of this process set the stage for the eventual decisive action that achieves the campaign’s objectives.

• At the same time, however, and as a check on the plan developed to this point, planners have to envision a reasonable set of phases backward in time (and event) from the desired end state toward the present, a process called “backward” or “reverse” planning. Theoretically, for the plan to succeed, the two sets of opposed but sequenced phases have to mesh. From a more practical perspective, forward planning provides planners with a better idea of what is feasible in the near term, while reverse planning provides better focus over the long term.

• As a general rule, the phasing of the campaign should be conceived in event-driven terms rather than time-driven. However, resource availability depends in large part on a time schedule — such as sustainment or deployment rates — rather than the events of war. The challenge for planners, then, is to reconcile the reality of time-oriented deployment of forces and sustainment with the event-driven phasing of operations.
Taking the long view, the combatant commander and planners must ensure that forces and assets arrive at the right times and places to support the campaign and that sufficient resources will be available when needed in the later stages of the campaign. This is a key point, because sustainment is a significant aspect of the campaign. Specifically, effective phasing must address how the joint force will avoid reaching a culminating point (see Figure II-5). If resources are insufficient to sustain the force until the accomplishment of the strategic objective, considerations may demand that the campaign be phased. Each of these phases must be supportable in turn, and allow those portions of the joint force requiring it, to be reconstituted in the course of the campaign. In some cases, sustainment logistic requirements and political factors may even dictate the purpose of certain phases as well as the sequence of those phases. For example, phases may shift the main effort among Service and functional components to maintain momentum while one component is being resupplied.

Branches and Sequels. Since no plan can be accurately projected with confidence much beyond the initial stages of the operation, flexibility must be built into not just the campaign plan itself, but the execution of it as well. Accordingly, branches and sequels are fundamental considerations for each phase. They are primarily used for changing deployments or direction of
movement and accepting or declining combat. Branches are often decisive for the outcome of a major operation or campaign, because they allow the operational commander to act faster than the opponent to exploit emerging operational situations. A branch is essentially a different path to the same end state of the ongoing operation. Sequels, on the other hand, anticipate subsequent actions or major operations contingent upon the outcome of ongoing operations. For every action or major operation that does not accomplish a strategic objective, there has to be a sequel for each possible outcome, i.e., “win, lose, draw, or win big.”

- Once the planners have thought through as far as practicable the possible branches and sequels within each phase, they must now determine what or where the decision points (not to be confused with decisive points) should be. Such decision points are often represented by battles or engagements which, despite everything being done to anticipate their outcome, can be either lost or won. Each branch from a decision point will require different actions and each action demands various follow-up actions, i.e., sequels or potential sequels.

For more information on the role of branches and sequels in the planning process, see Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” in JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

- Operational Pauses. The JFC should aggressively conduct operations to obtain and maintain the initiative. However, there may be certain circumstances when this is not feasible due to logistic constraints, force shortfalls, or political considerations. Therefore, operational pauses may be required when a major operation may be reaching the end of its sustainability. As such, operational pauses can provide a safety valve to avoid potential culmination, while the JFC retains the initiative in other ways. However, if an operational pause is properly executed in relation to one’s own culmination point, the opponent will not have sufficient combat power to threaten the joint force or regain the initiative during the pause.

- Operational pauses are also a useful tool for obtaining the proper synchronization of sustainment and operations. Normally, operational pauses are planned to regenerate combat power or augment sustainment and forces for the next phase, although this will result in extending the duration of a major operation or campaign. Moreover, operational pauses properly planned and sequenced will ensure that the JFC has sufficient forces and assets at his or her disposal to accomplish the ultimate goal of the major operation or campaign. However, planners must guard against cutting the margin of sustainment and combat effectiveness too thin. Executing a pause well before it is actually an operationally mandatory
action provides for flexibility in the timing of the pause and allows for its early termination under urgent conditions without unduly endangering the future effectiveness of the unit.

• The primary drawback to operational pauses is that they obviously reduce operational tempo and risk forfeiture of strategic or operational initiative. It is therefore incumbent upon the JFC to plan on as few operational pauses as possible if any and, consistent with the concept of operations, to alternate pauses and tempo between components of the force. In this manner, a major portion of the JFC’s forces can maintain pressure on the opponent through offensive actions while other components pause.

e. Synchronization is another key aspect for designing a major operation or campaign. In contrast to sequencing, synchronization is defined as “the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.” Clarity of operational intent is critical to ensure synchronization of effort by all forces, especially so in multinational operations. Synchronization of joint forces and assets should, among other things, focus on defeating the adversary’s COGs by maximizing relative combat power at the decisive time and place. All the key functions and elements of the joint force should be fully integrated to that end. Campaign plans synchronize and integrate operations by establishing proper command relationships among subordinate commands, by clearly describing the concept of operations, by assigning realistic tasks and objectives, and by effectively task-organizing assigned forces. Ideally, synchronization should be event- rather than time-driven. Finally, synchronization, although distinct from sequencing, must still allow for flexibility by providing decision points and a series of branches and sequels (discussed above).
“In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of the campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to the circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country.”

Napoleon I
Maxims of War, 1831

SECTION A. DELIBERATE PLANNING PRINCIPLES

1. Strategic Direction

a. Strategic direction is transmitted through hierarchical levels of strategy: national security strategy (NSS), national military strategy (NMS), and theater strategy. Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services. Consistent with the strategic guidance contained in the President’s NSS and upon NCA direction, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) develops the NMS, which serves as CJCS advice to the NCA on how to employ the military in support of national objectives.

b. These strategies integrate national policies, objectives, and resources with theater military objectives and concepts. After the National Security Strategy is published, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff translates the worldwide military strategy into specific planning requirements. These national security and military strategies provide strategic direction for the combatant commander and, in combination with the theater strategy, provide guidance for planning of campaigns and major operations within the area of responsibility (AOR).

2. Strategic Plans

a. The JSCP (see Figure III-1) provides guidance to the combatant commanders and Service Chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP integrates the deliberate operation and engagement planning activities of the entire Joint Planning and
Execution Community (JPEC) with a coherent and focused framework. Military action is not the only possible response to situations that threaten US national interests. All instruments of national power — military, economic, diplomatic, and informational — are considered in the formulation of national policy.

b. Military plans developed through the deliberate planning process also consider and incorporate the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power. Specifically, combatant commanders must explicitly relate military FDOs to the FDOs under the other instruments of national power as they develop OPLANs according to adaptive planning principles.

See Appendix A, “Flexible Deterrent Options,” for more details on FDOs.

3. **Combatant Command Guidance**

   a. Combatant command strategic planning provides the framework for employing forces in peacetime and in response to crises. Campaign planning will provide the operational direction to the detailed development of OPLANs and CONPLANs.
b. Combatant command planners develop peacetime assessments that ease transition to crisis or war as well as to postconflict. Peacetime intelligence and logistic assessments, for example, are essential for force projection operations and transition to combat operations.

SECTION B. DELIBERATE PLANNING

4. General

a. In deliberate planning, the combatant commander plans for a broad range of potential contingencies. Deliberate planning most often applies to the conduct of combat operations, but can also apply to MOOTW. Deliberate planning can also include theater engagement planning in order to accomplish theater strategic objectives. The uses of deliberate plans include providing a useful base for addressing contingencies not previously envisioned or planned for.

b. The types of deliberate plans are (see Figure III-2):

- OPLANs;
- CONPLANs with or without time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD); and
- FUNCPLANs.
See JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

5. Deliberate Planning Process for OPLANs

a. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan and includes a full description of the concept of operations and all annexes applicable to the plan as well as the TPFDD. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provides estimates for their movement into a theater. OPLANs can be quickly developed into an operation order (OPORD). OPLANs are normally prepared when:

   • The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning;

   • Detailed planning will contribute to deterrence by demonstrating readiness through planning; and/or

   • Detailed planning is required to support alliance or combined planning. OPLANs facilitate the transition to war and, through the development of supporting plans by both supporting commands and Defense combat support agencies, establish the feasibility of the plan’s concept of operations.

b. Deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic process and provides the JPEC with an opportunity to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime. In its basic form, deliberate planning has five phases (see Figure III-3): initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans.

6. Initiation (Phase I)

a. During this phase, peacetime deliberate planning tasks are transmitted (primarily via the JSCP), forces and resources are apportioned, and planning guidance is issued to the supported combatant commander. During deliberate planning, combatant commanders prepare plans, including campaign plans, primarily in direct response to taskings in the JSCP.

b. Strategic requirements or tasking for the planning of major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources in order to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions. Deliberate plans may include the elements of campaign planning discussed in Chapter II, “Campaign Plan Design.”

7. Concept Development (Phase II)

a. After the combatant commander has received the task assignment, the staff analyzes the mission and develops tentative COAs to accomplish the mission. The concept development phase has six steps as shown in Figure III-4.

b. Step 1 — Mission Analysis. The first step in the development of a military concept of operations begins with a careful analysis of the task assignment. The combatant commander or subordinate JFC must determine the military objective, review what resources are available for use in developing the plan, analyze the adversary and the
physical conditions that affect the task, and review the guidelines that have been given by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- The primary focus of the planners during this stage is as follows:

  - Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks in order to develop a concise mission statement. Specified and implied strategic tasks are derived from specific NCA guidance, national (or multinational) planning guidance documents such as the JSCP, the UCP, or from combatant commander initiatives. The national military objectives form the basis of the campaign’s mission statement.

  - Consider the forces that have been apportioned for planning, the capabilities of the adversary, the terrain, geographic features that support friendly and adversary forces, and climate.

  - Incorporate controlling factors levied by others that will influence the military operation, such as diplomatic agreements, economic conditions in the host country or countries, and host-nation issues, to include support agreements, etc.

  - Gather facts and develop assumptions where appropriate.

  - Conduct a preliminary risk assessment. This entails determining...
what obstacles or actions may preclude mission accomplishment.

- Determine the end state (see Chapter II, “Campaign Plan Design”).

- Determine adversary and friendly COGs (see Chapter II, “Campaign Plan Design”).

- The primary product of this first step is the tentative **mission statement**. The mission statement carries throughout the planning process and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the strategic concept, and the completed plan.

- The focus on writing the mission statement is on brevity and clarity. The mission statement is a clear and concise statement of the objective to be accomplished and the purpose.
Deliberate Planning During Campaign Plan Development

- The mission statement forms the basis for COA development, staff estimates, and the commander’s estimate.

  c. Step 2 — Planning Guidance Development. This step has two primary objectives. The first objective is to provide sufficient planning guidance to the combatant commander’s (CINC’s) staff to permit them to develop COAs and staff estimates. The second objective is to communicate planning guidance to the subordinate commanders.

- Initial Guidance. The commander focuses the staff’s planning efforts by providing a framework that includes the following:

  • Mission Statement. The restated mission statement developed in step 1.

  • Assumptions. Assumptions that address gaps in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue. The commander considers assumptions handed down from higher echelons as facts. When dealing with an assumption, changes to the plan may need to be developed should the assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of their influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in a plan. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue. Assumptions are made for both friendly and adversary situations. The planner should assume that the adversary would use every capability at his disposal (i.e., nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), asymmetric approach, etc.) and operate in the most efficient manner possible. Planners should never assume an adversary has less capability than anticipated, nor assume that key friendly forces have more capability than has been demonstrated.

- Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare. This is an especially sensitive area since adversary use of NBC weapons has the potential to significantly affect US operations. The adversary’s NBC capability presents major defensive problems and requires in-depth study and detailed planning.

  Guidance for NBC defense operations is found in Appendix 2 to Annex C in CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance), and in JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments.

  • Nuclear planning considers the possibility that nuclear weapons may be used in combat. Planners must assess the impact that will have on their operations. Because the use of nuclear weapons in any military operation would be so influential, the joint planner must realistically appreciate both the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons and the fact that the combatant commander does not effectively control the decision to use them.

  • Nuclear planning guidance issued at the unified or combined command level is usually based on political policies. It stems from national-level considerations, but is influenced by the military mission. USSTRATCOM conducts nuclear planning in coordination with the geographic combatant commanders and certain allied commanders.

  Guidance for documenting the planning for nuclear operations is found in the JP 3-12 series of joint doctrine.

- Political Considerations. Planning for the use of military forces includes a
discussion of the political implications of their transportation, staging, and employment. The combatant commander’s political advisor is a valuable asset in advising the combatant commander and staff on issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing, and support agreements.

- **Tentative Courses of Action.** The combatant commander gives the staff his or her preliminary thoughts on possible and acceptable military actions early in the planning process to provide focus to their efforts, allowing them to concentrate on developing COAs that are the most appropriate.

- **Planning Schedule.** The commander usually issues a planning schedule with the initial guidance, although this practice varies between commands. The chief of staff normally draws up the schedule that sets milestones or deadlines for completing staff estimates, and for completing and distributing various elements of the plan.

- **Initial Staff Briefings.** Initial briefings include such subjects as terrain, climate, demographics, adversary capabilities, the legal environment, and other relevant planning factors. These briefings assist the Plans Directorate (J-5) staff to formulate additional tentative COAs and focus the joint staff divisions as they analyze tentative COAs and develop recommendations for the combatant commander.

- **Initial Commander’s Intent.** The commander’s intent describes what situation or “landscape” the commander wants to see after the military mission is accomplished. It deals only with the military aspects of the situation. It is written in a free form and is broader than a mission statement, but shorter than a strategic concept. It may include sequence of actions by the commander’s force elements and their posture for future operations. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent.

  - CINCs begin to form their intent as they analyze their mission, and the ensuing result provides the initial impetus for the entire planning process.

  - The commander considers staff estimates and the commander’s estimate, refining the intent. The commander’s intent clearly states the combatant commander’s decision and summarizes the combatant commander’s rationale for that decision.

  - The commander’s intent becomes a tool to communicate valuable guidance from the combatant commander to the staff and subordinate commanders. It may also contain an assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk during the operation. It provides focus and helps subordinates pursue the desired end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned.

- **Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).** These are a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decisionmaking process that affects successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical information and priority intelligence requirements.

- **Course of Action Development.** To develop COAs, the staff must focus on key information necessary. This helps
to focus staff efforts and concentrate valuable resources on developing feasible COAs that have a high likelihood of contributing to mission success.

- A COA consists of the following information: **what** type of action; **when** the action begins; **where** the action takes place; **why** (commander’s intent); and **how** (method of employment of forces).

- A valid COA must be: (1) **Suitable** — It can accomplish the mission and comply with the commander’s guidance. A COA must also be consistent with approved joint doctrine. (2) **Feasible** — It must be able to accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource constraints. (3) **Acceptable** — It must balance cost with advantage gained by executing a particular COA. (4) **Distinguishable** — Each COA must be significantly different from the others. (5) **Complete** — It must incorporate major operations and tasks to be accomplished, to include forces required, concept for sustainment, deployment, employment, time estimates for reaching termination objectives, reserve force concept, and desired end state.

- **Planning Directive.** The combatant commander normally communicates initial planning guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure that everyone understands the commander’s intent and to achieve unity of effort. Generally, the J-5 coordinates staff action for deliberate planning. The J-5 staff receives the combatant commander’s initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff assessments. The combatant commander, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the combatant commander and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts can be avoided by this early exchange of information.

d. **Step 3 — Staff Estimates.** Staff estimates are the foundation for the combatant commander’s selection of a COA. In this step, the staff divisions analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. Not every situation will require an extensive and lengthy planning effort. It is conceivable that a commander could review the assigned task, receive oral briefings, make a quick decision, and direct writing of the plan commence. This would complete the process and might be suitable if the task were simple and straightforward.

- Most combatant commanders, however, are more likely to demand a thorough, well-coordinated plan that requires a complex staff estimate process. Although written staff estimates are not mandatory, most will be carefully prepared, coordinated, and fully documented.

- The combatant commander’s entire staff is deeply involved in the deliberate planning effort. Most major joint staff divisions prepare staff estimates; in addition, input may be solicited from the combatant commander’s special staff on specialized or technical matters. The J-5 gathers information, proposes, and revises tentative COAs.

- The purpose of the staff estimates is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished and to determine which COA can best be supported. This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the combatant commander the best
possible information to select a COA. Each staff division:

- Reviews the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective;
- Examines the factors and assumptions for which it is the responsible staff;
- Analyzes each COA from its staff functional perspective; and
- Concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA can be best supported from its particular staff functional perspective.

Because of the unique talents of each joint staff division, involvement of all is vital. Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the COAs, and potential deficiencies that are simply not known at any other level, but nevertheless must be considered. Such a detailed study of the COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands.

The form and the number of COAs under consideration change during this step. These changes result in refined COAs.

The product of this step is the sum total of the individual efforts of the staff divisions. Complete, fully documented staff estimates are extremely useful to the J-5 staff, which extracts information from them for the commander’s estimate. The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting commands as they prepare supporting plans. Although documenting the staff estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the commander’s estimate, they should be sent to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes for their supporting plans.

- The principal elements of the staff estimates normally include mission, situation and considerations, analysis of opposing COAs, comparison of friendly COAs, and conclusions. The details in each basic category vary with the staff performing the analysis. The principal staff divisions have a similar perspective — they focus on friendly COAs and their supportability. However, the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) estimates on intelligence (provided at the beginning of the process) concentrate on the adversary: adversary situation, including strengths and weaknesses, adversary capabilities and an analysis of those capabilities, and conclusions drawn from that analysis. The analysis of adversary capabilities includes an analysis of the various COAs available to the adversary according to its capabilities, which include attacking, withdrawing, defending, delaying, etc. The J-2’s conclusion will indicate the adversary’s most likely COA and identify adversary COGs.

CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), Enclosure S, contains sample formats for staff estimates.

- In many cases the steps in the concept development phase are not separate and distinct, as the evolution of the refined COA illustrates.

- During planning guidance and early in the staff estimates, the initial COAs may have been developed from initial impressions and based on limited staff support. But as concept development progresses, COAs are refined and evolve to include many of the following considerations.

- What military operations are considered?
Where they will be performed?

Who will conduct the operation?

When is the operation planned to occur?

How will the operation be conducted?

An iterative process of modifying, adding to, and deleting from the original tentative list is used to develop these refined COAs. The staff continually evaluates the situation as the planning process continues. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they tend to emphasize information collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are expected to indicate which COAs can be best supported.

e. Step 4 — Commander’s Estimate. The combatant commander’s study of the situation, coupled with a review of the existing theater strategy and strategic estimate, is a continuous process from which strategic concepts are formulated and COAs are derived to become the basis of the theater campaign plan.

- COA Analysis. Analysis of the proposed COAs provides the staff with the following:
  - Potential decision points;
  - Task organization adjustments;
  - Data for use in a synchronization matrix or other decisionmaking tool;
  - Identification of plan branches and sequels;
  - Identification of high value targets;
  - Recommended CCIRs;
  - Wargaming. The planning staff should also determine the wargaming methodology for the COAs. Wargaming is a key analytical tool because it represents a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the campaign or major operation, given the joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary assets and possible COAs, and the theater or joint operations area. Each method within a proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or adversary force interaction.
    
    For a detailed discussion on the wargaming process, refer to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

- COA Comparison. COAs are not compared to each other in the wargaming process. The COAs are individually evaluated against the criteria established by the staff. A detailed analysis with the entire staff (and with components, if possible) must be conducted to determine the recommended COA. The planning staff then quantifies each COA by ranking them according to each criterion. An alternative method to the points-based decision matrix is to construct an advantages and disadvantages matrix. Computer-assisted modeling and simulations can also be used, if available, to compare the outcomes of each scenario to the desired outcomes.

- COA Selection. Using a decision support template, points-based decision matrix, or other types of decisionmaking tools, a COA is selected for recommendation to the JFC. All COA results from wargaming, synchronization
matrices, and other decision support tools are briefed to the JFC. Regardless of the decision-support tool used, the JFC makes an informed decision based upon his or her staff’s recommendations and tempered by the JFC’s intuitive judgment and experience. The purpose of this phase is to formally compare COAs for the combatant commander to develop the strategic concept.

- In deliberate planning, the **commander’s estimate** is the document that clearly states the combatant commander’s decision and summarizes the combatant commander’s rationale for that decision. The commander’s estimate becomes a tool to communicate valuable guidance from the combatant commander to the staff and subordinate commanders. As such, it is a valuable planning tool for the staff and subordinate commanders.

- Generally, after receiving direction from the combatant commander and drawing from the information in the staff estimates, the J-5 assembles the staff estimates and drafts the documentation for the commander’s estimate. It is prepared for the combatant commander to describe the chosen COA. In deliberate planning, the commander’s estimate is a planning document used by the command.

  *CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), Enclosure J, contains a sample format for a Commander’s Estimate.*

f. **Step 5 — Combatant Commander’s Strategic Concept.** The combatant commander’s strategic concept, formerly called the “concept of operations,” is used as the vehicle to distribute the combatant commander’s decision and planning guidance for accomplishing JSCP or other CJCS taskings. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an OPLAN or CONPLAN. It is an expanded version of the COA selected in the commander’s estimate prepared during Step 4. The strategic concept is a narrative statement of how the combatant commander expects to conduct operations to accomplish the mission. It serves two primary purposes. It clarifies the intent of the commander in the deployment, employment, and support of apportioned forces, and it identifies major objectives and target dates for their attainment.

  The combatant commander’s strategic concept is written in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the combatant commander’s overall view of how the campaign or major operation will be conducted. The elements of information that are included in the combatant commander’s strategic concept are depicted in Figure III-5.

  See *CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), and CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)*, for details and formats.

g. **Step 6 — CJCS Concept Review.** Once the combatant commander’s strategic concept is prepared, it is briefed and forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. The process is the same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANs, whether they are new plans or existing plans for which the concept has changed. Reviews should be completed within 60 days of referral; however, the Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if necessary. With CJCS approval, the combatant commander’s strategic concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. It will be used in paragraph 3 (Execution) of the Basic Plan and described in detail in Annex C of the OPLAN.
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COMBATANT COMMANDER’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT

1. SITUATION
   - probable preconditions for implementation of the plan
   - deterrent options included in the plan
   - adversary forces
   - general tasks of friendly forces
   - expected operations of other friendly commands that will influence the plan
   - assumptions, including level of mobilization
   - legal considerations

   - who will be employed
   - where forces will be employed
   - when forces are to be phased into the theater
   - general description of how forces are to be employed
   - conventional, nuclear, and other supporting operations
   - deception
   - necessary deployment of forces
   - tasks of each subordinate and supporting command
   - required supporting plans

   - concept of logistic support
     - stockage levels, pre-positioned war reserve stocks, consumption levels
     - mutual allies’ support requirements and inter-Service support

   - command relationships
   - command and control requirements
   - succession to command

Figure III-5. Combatant Commander’s Strategic Concept

- **Initiation of Review.** The Joint Staff conducts the review for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the Joint Staff receives the combatant commander’s strategic concept, it determines whether the concept is in the proper format, conforms with JSCP guidance, is consistent with joint doctrine, and is therefore ready for review. If not, the submitting headquarters is notified by memorandum or message.

Chapter III

The Services submit comments to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

• **Review Criteria.** The purpose of the concept review is to:
  
  • Determine whether the scope and concept of operations satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the assigned task;
  
  • Assess the validity of the assumptions (they must be reasonable and consistent with strategic guidance);
  
  • Evaluate compliance with CJCS guidance and joint doctrine; and
  
  • Evaluate **acceptability** with regard to expected costs and political supportability. Acceptable plans are proportional and worth the anticipated cost.

• **Review Comments.** Comments back to the combatant commander concerning the concept are classified as “execution-critical,” “substantive,” or “administrative.”
  
  • Execution-critical comments describe major deficiencies that negatively affect the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples of such deficiencies include failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistic shortfalls.
  
  • Substantive comments pertain to less critical deficiencies such as deviation from CJCS guidance or JOPES formatting. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.
  
  • Administrative comments are offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and other minor errors.

• **Review Results.** Results of the review are forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum or message stating that the concept is either approved for further plan development or disapproved and requires significant changes before resubmission.

• **Post-review Actions.** The supported commander incorporates changes required by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A formal change incorporating all execution-critical comments is submitted to the Chairman within 30 days of receipt of the review results. Substantive comments must be incorporated when the plan is submitted for review in its entirety in the plan review phase of the deliberate planning process.

8. Plan Development (Phase III)

   a. Once the combatant commander’s strategic concept is approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it becomes the concept of operations for plan development and subsequent phases of the deliberate planning process. In the plan development phase, the staff expands and formally documents the concept of operations in the appropriate OPLAN format. The process is the same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANs. CONPLANs and FUNCPLANs are not as fully developed as OPLANs.

   b. **CONPLANs** do not require the level of detailed planning in support, sustainment, or transportation that OPLANs do. Unless the supported commander requires it, annexes and appendices are not required to be as fully developed as in an OPLAN, and generally TPFDD development is not required. Therefore, CONPLANs present a less complicated plan development problem than
Deliberate Planning During Campaign Plan Development

OPLANs. Because OPLAN development requires all the procedures for the plan development phase to be accomplished and CONPLAN development does not, subsequent discussion of the plan development phase will focus on planning procedures for OPLANs.

c. During the initial steps of Phase III, the focus moves to the component commanders. Planners on the staffs of the component commands begin developing the total package of forces required for the operation. They start with the major combat forces selected from those apportioned for planning in the original task-assigning document and included in the combatant commander’s concept of operations. Working closely with the staffs of Service headquarters, other supporting commands, and combat support agencies, they identify requirements for support forces and sustainment.

d. The supported commander consolidates each component’s forces and supplies, and phases their movement into the theater of operations. The resources are proposed for arrival in-theater and at the final destination using apportioned intertheater transportation, combatant commander-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate command. The strategic movement is simulated in a computer model, which provides reasonable assurances to the combatant commander that the operation is transportation feasible.

e. The later steps of the phase fill the plan’s hypothetical (notional) units with actual units and those supply entries that can be replaced. In the refinement step, movement of these units is again computer-simulated, and USTRANSCOM develops movement tables. The final documentation for the transportation-feasible OPLAN is prepared. The plan development phase is depicted in the eight sequential steps shown in Figure III-6. These steps may overlap, be accomplished simultaneously, or repeat. The same flexibility displayed in the COA refinement process of the preceding phase is seen again here, as shortfalls are discovered and eliminated. Computer support within JOPES makes the timely development of a realistic flow of manpower and supplies possible.

See JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, and CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), Enclosure C.

f. Automated Data Processing (ADP) Support. The plan development phase produces huge amounts of information about the forces, the equipment and materiel support to those forces, and the time-phased movement of personnel and materiel to the operational area. To manage this mountain of information, planners need ADP support. The JOPES provides ADP support to OPLAN development. JOPES is accessed by planners and throughout the JPEC through the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Planners use specialized application programs in JOPES and interface with other application programs through JOPES to create a TPFDD computer file. The TPFDD is created by entering and relating data supplied by sources throughout the JPEC and generated by JOPES and JOPES-related applications.

9. Final Plan Review (Phase IV)

a. In this phase, the Joint Staff performs or coordinates a final review of OPLANs submitted by the combatant commanders. It is a formal review of the entire plan, including TPFDD, updated medical working file, and appropriate civil engineering support planning files, if applicable. When an OPLAN is approved, it is effective for execution when directed. Approval of the plan is the signal to subordinate and supporting commands to develop their plans in support of the combatant
commander’s concept. The supporting commanders don’t wait until the plan is approved before beginning to develop their supporting plans; they have been involved in doing this while the combatant commander has been building the plan.

b. Approval of the OPLAN during final review depends on whether it satisfies the CJCS task assignment and demonstrates the effective use of apportioned resources. This is summarized as adequacy and feasibility. In addition, OPLANs are reviewed for consistency with joint doctrine and acceptability.

- The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations are capable of satisfying the task assigned in the JSCP. The review assesses the validity of the assumptions and compliance with CJCS guidance.

- The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished using available resources. The primary factors considered are whether the resources apportioned to the combatant commander for planning by the JSCP and Service planning documents are being used effectively or whether the plan exceeds the apportioned resources.

- OPLANs incorporate appropriate joint doctrine from publications in the Joint Doctrine Publication System. Incorporating appropriate joint doctrine when preparing OPLANs speeds up the adaptation of OPLANs to specific crises during crisis action planning. Incorporating appropriate joint doctrine also facilitates execution of operations during all phases of operations for crisis resolution.

- The review for acceptability ensures that plans are proportional and worth the expected costs. It joins with the criterion of feasibility in ensuring that the mission can be accomplished with available resources and adds the dimension that the plan can be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position.
Using this criterion, the plans are also reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with domestic and international law, including the law of war, and are militarily and politically supportable.

c. OPLANs submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review are referred to the J-7, which conducts and coordinates the final plan review. Other Joint Staff directorates, the Services, and defense agencies are consulted as required. Review comments are categorized as discussed in Review Comments in paragraph 7 of this chapter.

d. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances warrant. Review results are forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the plan is given one of the following dispositions: (1) Approved (effective for execution, when directed) — any critical shortfalls within plans that cannot be resolved by the supported commander will be outlined within the review comments and the approval memorandum; or (2) Disapproved — within 30 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum, the supported commander sends a message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stating his or her intentions concerning incorporating all execution-critical comments. A formal change incorporating CJCS execution-critical comments to correct resolvable items must be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within 60 days of receipt of the review results. Substantive comments must be incorporated into the first change to the OPLAN or by the next CJCS review. Within 15 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum, the supported commander sends a message to the component commands notifying them of:

- OPLAN approval status;
- OPLANs replaced, deleted, or changed as a result of CJCS review; and
- Component commands’ responsibilities to notify supporting commands and agencies of OPLAN effectiveness and tasks.

Within 15 days of receipt of the supported command’s OPLAN review notification message, component commanders send a message to all supporting commands and Service agencies who are assigned tasks within the plan, relaying OPLAN status and effectiveness. When a formal change is received, the Joint Staff reviews it to verify incorporation of CJCS comments. The scope of the review is determined case by case. The supported commander normally reviews and approves supporting plans prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders and other agencies. Supported commanders advise the Joint Staff when issues from these reviews cannot be resolved between the commanders concerned.

10. Supporting Plans (Phase V)

a. During this final phase of the deliberate planning process, the supported commander directs the preparation and submission of supporting plans. These deal with mobilization, deployment, and employment. Paragraph 3 of the OPLAN and paragraph 3 of the plan summary clearly documents the task assignments. As required by the combatant commander’s task assignment, component commanders, joint task force (JTF) commanders, supporting commanders, or other agencies develop supporting plans. Many of the supporting commanders in turn assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans. As an extreme example, a local unit-recall roster ordering an individual Service member to report for duty in case of a contingency can be considered a supporting plan.
b. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures)*, contains specific instructions for assigning discrete plan identification numbers (PIDs) to every OPLAN entered into the JOPES system. Supporting plans are assigned a PID identical to that of the supported plan. In some cases, however, a command is required to perform essentially the same actions to support two or more supported commander’s plans. In these situations, the supporting commander may prepare a single, omnibus plan rather than multiple supporting plans that restate identical material. The supporting plan summary lists the plans it supports, and the supporting plan PID is assigned without regard to the PIDs of the plans it supports.

c. Employment plans normally are the responsibility of the commander who will direct the forces when the plan is converted into an OPORD and executed. In many cases, however, the politico-military situation cannot be clearly predicted, so detailed employment planning may be delayed until circumstances require it.

d. Supporting plans, when required by the supported commander, are submitted by the supporting command or agency within 60 days after CJCS approval of the supported plan. Information in the supported plan need not be repeated in the supporting plan unless the supported commander so directs. In the absence of Joint Staff instructions to the contrary, the supported commander will review and approve supporting plans. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be asked to resolve issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff, on behalf of the Chairman, may review any supporting plan.

**SECTION C. MULTINATIONAL PLANNING**

11. **Multinational Integration**

a. Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in national and international channels. Collective security goals, strategies, and combined OPLANS are developed in accordance with individual treaty or alliance procedures. Deliberate joint operation planning for multinational operations is performed through national channels, in accordance with US doctrine and procedures. Therefore, much of the information and guidance provided for joint operations is conceptually applicable to alliance and coalition multinational problems as well. The fundamental issues are much the same for both situations (see Figure III-7).

b. Through national planning channels, HNS and contingency mutual support agreements are developed to facilitate joint operations. Coordination of these separate planning channels is accomplished at the national level through established coalition bodies, and at the theater and operational levels by combatant commanders or other subordinate joint US commands, who are charged within both channels for operational planning matters.

12. **Strategic Integration of Campaign Plans**

a. In support of each treaty or alliance, a hierarchical organization of bilateral or multinational bodies is established to define objectives and strategy and to coordinate strategic direction for planning and executing multinational operations. Generally, this organization parallels the US organization for national security, and the NCA and their senior military and civilian staffs participate in appropriate bodies of the alliance or treaty organization.
b. Through dual involvement in the national and international security processes, US leadership provides the means to integrate national and theater strategic planning with that of the treaty or alliance organizations. Within the alliance or treaty structure, US participants ensure that objectives and strategy complement US interests and are compatible with US capabilities. Within the US national structure, US participants ensure that alliance or treaty commitments are reflected in NMS and are adequately addressed in strategic direction for joint operation planning.

13. Theater Integration

a. Joint operation planning is integrated with alliance or coalition planning at the theater or operational level by the commander of US national forces dedicated to the alliance or coalition military organization. Normally, this will be the combatant commander or the commander of the subunified command or JTF responsible for the geographic area within which multinational operations are planned and executed. These commanders function within the US chain of command and that of multinational organizations. Within alliance
or coalition organizations, they command or support the designated commander of multinational forces and plan, as appropriate, for multinational employment in accordance with strategic direction and guidance emanating from treaty or alliance leadership. Within the US chain of command, they command joint US forces and prepare joint OPLANs in response to taskings from the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Taskings include developing joint OPLANs to support each treaty or alliance commitment within the operational area and planning for unilateral US contingencies within the same area. In this dual capacity within the US and alliance or coalition chains of command, the US commander coordinates alliance or coalition planning with joint operation planning.

14. Bilateral Campaign Planning

When directed by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, designated US commanders participate directly with the armed forces of other nations in preparing bilateral plans. Bilateral operation planning involves the preparation of combined, mutually developed and approved plans governing the employment of forces of two nations for a common contingency. Bilateral planning may be accomplished within the framework of a treaty or alliance or in the absence of such formalities. The NCA and Chairman provide guidance for bilateral planning.

For additional information on multinational planning, see JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, Chapter II.

SECTION D. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

15. Interagency Coordination

Campaign plans should lay out to the greatest degree possible what the combatant commander desires as the entry and exit conditions for the other United States Government (USG) agencies during the operation. It should be noted that interagency participation could be involved at the earliest phases of the operation starting with FDOs. Linking the interagency actions with the phases of the operation would help in the scheduling and coordination of effort. Crucially important to the plan is the orderly flow of operations to the desired end state and an efficient end of direct US military involvement. During deliberate interagency planning, heavy combatant commander involvement, participation, and coordination will be a key to success.

For additional information on interagency coordination, see Chapter II of JP 3-08, Vol I, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, and CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance), Annex V, “Interagency Coordination.”
CHAPTER IV  
CRISIS ACTION PLANNING DURING CAMPAIGN  
PLAN DEVELOPMENT

“Campaign planning can begin before or during deliberate planning, but is not completed until crisis action planning.”

JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

1. General

a. While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there are always situations arising in the present that might require US military response. Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in deliberate planning, though it is unlikely they would be identical, and sometimes they will be completely unanticipated. Usually, the time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, a feasible COA must be developed and approved, and timely identification of resources accomplished to ready forces, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies for movement and employment of US military force.

b. Within the context of joint operation planning and execution, a crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests. It develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

c. Crisis Action Planning (CAP) Overview. In such crisis or time-sensitive situations, the JPEC uses CAP procedures, prescribed in CICSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), and CICSM 3122.02A, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution, Volume III.

US forces evacuate American citizens from Freetown, Sierra Leone (1996).
• In a crisis, the situation is dynamic, with the body of knowledge growing hour by hour from the latest intelligence reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to the time available, to communications that are rapid and effective, and to the use of previous planning, whenever possible. The principal players need to know what others are doing. All players need to know what is expected of them.

• CAP procedures are used by the JPEC to plan for and execute deployment and employment of US military forces in time-sensitive situations. This ensures:

  • Logical procedures are followed, from recognizing the problem, to preparing and executing the OPORD;

  • Exchange of information about the situation, its analysis, and alternative military responses is rapid and effective;

  • Military COAs are prepared for consideration by the NCA in a timely fashion; and

  • Decisions of the NCA are rapidly relayed to the combatant commander.

• The system is divided into six separate phases.

  • The procedures begin when the situation develops. The geographic combatant commander recognizes the potential significance of the situation and provides an assessment report to the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

  • The NCA assess the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military implications of the situation. When warranted, the NCA may decide that a possible military response should be prepared.

        • Upon receipt of a Warning Order, the combatant commander develops COAs in response to the situation. The Commander’s Estimate with recommended COA is transmitted to the NCA.

        • The NCA select the COA, released by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an Alert Order.

        • The combatant commander prepares the detailed OPORD to support the selected COA.

        • At the direction of the NCA, the combatant commander executes the OPORD.

  • The CAP process permits the steps to be done sequentially or in parallel. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis.

  d. Military Option. Military planners facing time-sensitive planning requirements must understand that the NCA are considering diplomatic, informational, economic, and military options. The military option may initially be the least desirable option, and a decision to execute it may be made only after other, less severe options have been judged unsuitable. In reaching a decision to develop a military solution, the NCA may consider the possible range of FDOs, to include military FDOs. Ultimate responsibility and authority in a crisis rest with the NCA, who must approve a COA and authorize the major actions to be taken, including the deployment, employment, or redeployment of forces.
See Appendix A, “Flexible Deterrent Options,” for a detailed discussion on FDOs.

e. Characteristics. Several characteristics of a crisis can be given. It may occur with little or no warning. It is fast breaking and requires accelerated decisionmaking, and sometimes a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. Whatever the nature or perceived magnitude of the situation, a commitment of assets and US military forces is being considered as a solution. In the US defense establishment, the use of military force requires a decision by the NCA.

f. Available Guidelines. The procedures in CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), are used to outline a military response in a crisis. The six phases of CAP follow a logical sequence of events that lead to the timely preparation of a COA for a military response. The procedures describe the flow of information from the combatant commander, and the integration of CJCS military advice in the analysis of military options. Additionally, it addresses the decisionmaking process by which the NCA begin detailed military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute the military option. It also outlines the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the eventual OPORD.

2. Crisis Action Procedures

a. Since each crisis is unique, it is not reasonable to expect to use a rigid set of rules in response to every situation. However, CAP entails a coordinated process that includes people, procedures, communications, and ADP hardware and software, and that produces a detailed plan to best accomplish the military mission to meet national security objectives.

b. CAP procedures give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders a process for getting vital decisionmaking information up the chain of command to the NCA. CAP allows the NCA to communicate their decisions accurately through the Chairman down the chain of command to the combatant commander, subordinate and supporting commanders, the Services, and supporting defense agencies.
Furthermore, it permits the key players in the JPEC to exchange essential deployment data rapidly and accurately.

- CAP provides an ability to develop an adequate and transportation-feasible military response during a time-constrained planning period.

- JOPES ADP offers the JPEC the capability to monitor strategic movement during execution of the plan.

- CAP accommodates the need for different degrees of detail, given the different amounts of time available for planning among the various command levels.

- It describes actions to be performed by the JPEC from the beginning of a crisis either through the commitment of US military forces or to the point where the need for military force ends and military activity is canceled.

3. **Crisis Action Planning Phases**

   a. **General.** CAP procedures are categorized into six phases (see Figure IV-1) — situation development, crisis assessment, course of action development, course of action selection, execution planning, and execution. Each phase of CAP begins with an event, such as the receipt of a report or order, and ends with a decision or resolution of the crisis. When the process moves into a new phase, the primary responsibility for taking action shifts between the NCA and the supported combatant commander.

   - Before beginning a full examination of CAP, it is important to understand that the time-sensitivity of certain critical situations may require such a rapid response that the normal procedural sequence may be significantly altered, i.e., CAP phases may be compressed, repeated, carried out concurrently, or even eliminated. While there are detailed procedures to be followed in the process, circumstances may dictate that they be abbreviated; that is, decisions may be reached in conference and initially communicated orally.

   - The amount of time spent in each phase is not fixed and depends on the tasks to be done and the time available. Within the CAP sequence of events, there are several points where decisions must be made for planning to continue, further actions are placed on "hold," or planning reverts to a previous phase. Following each major decision reached by the NCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a formal order implementing that decision.

   b. **Phase I — Situation Development (see Figure IV-2).** As a matter of routine, organizations of the USG monitor the world situation. In the course of that monitoring, an event may occur that has possible security implications for the United States or its interests. Monitoring organizations or the supported combatant commander may recognize the event, analyze it to determine whether US interests are threatened, and report it to the NMCC.

   - **Initiation.** CAP procedures generally begin once the event is reported to the NMCC. The situation development phase contains four related activities — the day-to-day situation is monitored; an event occurs; the event is recognized as a problem; and the event is reported.

   - Situation monitoring is the continuous review and analysis of events occurring worldwide. Many available resources are used, ranging from strategic intelligence sources to routine observations by a member of the military attaché staff, to television news broadcasts. So diverse
Figure IV-1. Crisis Action Planning Documents
are the sources of observation that the report could come up through the chain of command from observer to supervisor, to senior military officer, to component command, to unified command watch officer.

- An event is an occurrence assessed as out of the ordinary and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on US national interests and national security.

- The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation.

- Regardless of the source, the focal point for reporting information crucial to the national security is the NMCC. Events may be reported initially to the NMCC by any means available, but the two most common means are the critical information message (CRITIC) and the operational report (OPREP)-3 PINNACLE. Receipt of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE (reporting an event or incident of possible national interest) at the NMCC from a combatant commander is a likely way for CAP to be initiated.

**Actions Taken During Situation Development.** In Phase I, the focus is
generally on the combatant commander who is responsible for the US military action that may be taken within a theater. The major occurrences in the combatant command include the following:

- Observation of an event with potential national security implications;

- An assessment by the combatant commander that the potential implications of the situation warrant higher-echelon awareness;

- Report to the NMCC by CRITIC or OPREP-3 PINNACLE;

- By the publication of the OPREP-3 PINNACLE or a combatant commander’s assessment, the combatant commander provides the NCA with an assessment of action being considered or actions already taken. This is an important step and would be crucial to the combatant commander’s influencing future decisions in a fast-breaking crisis.

• The Joint Staff monitors the situation, requests a report from the supported combatant commander, evaluates the combatant commander’s actions being taken under the ROE, orders additional intelligence gathering, if necessary, and advises the NCA as the situation develops.

• If possible, other members of the JPEC collect information on the situation and develop an accurate picture of the crisis.

• Exchange of Reports During Phase I. The initial report of the event, which any individual can make, must be timely and accurate. The CRITIC report or OPREP-3 PINNACLE are normally used. They can be issued orally with a record copy to follow. Any commander may issue OPREP-3 PINNACLE (general) to report any incident or event where national-level interest is indicated. A combatant commander may issue OPREP-3 PINNACLE or a combatant commander’s assessment to report a developing or potential crisis. If the combatant commander does not make the initial report of an event, the NMCC will make every effort to establish communications with the combatant commander and request a report. In this instance, the combatant commander will normally send an OPREP-3 PINNACLE or a combatant commander’s assessment that includes the following:

  - Information on the current situation;

  - Action being taken within the constraints of the current ROE;

  - Forces readily available;

  - Expected time for earliest commitment of forces;

  - Major constraints on the employment of forces;

  - Succinct discussion of various COAs under consideration or recommended by the commander on how to resolve the situation, as appropriate.

• ADP Support. During this phase the combatant commander’s staff reviews applicable contingency plans. The JOPES database holds all the files for current complete plans, and the combatant commander reviews plans through access to GCCS. If circumstances warrant, a GCCS teleconference (TLCF) may be established to allow a rapid exchange of information.

• Conclusion of Phase I. The situation development phase ends when the event is reported and the combatant
commander’s assessment is submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA through the NMCC.

c. **Phase II — Crisis Assessment** (see Figure IV-3).

- The NCA and JCS analyze the situation to determine whether a military option should be prepared to deal with the evolving problem. Increased information gathering and review of available options by the NCA characterize this phase.

- This phase begins with the receipt of the combatant commander’s report and assessment of the event. The commander has categorized the event as a problem of potential national concern. The detail and frequency of reporting increases in order to give the JCS information that is needed to evaluate developments and allows them to offer sound military advice to the NCA.

- **Actions Taken During Crisis Assessment.** The focus of Phase II is on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the JCS and the NCA.

  - The NCA identify the national interests at stake; the national objectives related to those interests; and possible diplomatic, political, economic, and military options to achieve the objectives.

  - The NCA decide that a crisis exists and that the supported combatant commander will develop military COAs to resolve the crisis.

  - The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses the situation from the military point of view including operations, logistics, and C2 implications, and reviews current strategy and existing OPLAN data in JOPES.

  - The Joint Staff reviews and evaluates reports from the combatant commander. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may recommend to the NCA that orders be published to prepare to deploy or to deploy forces, and may establish or direct the establishment of a crisis GCCS TLCF

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**Figure IV-3. Crisis Action Planning Phase II**

- Increased reporting
- **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and/or National Command Authorities (NCA) evaluation**
- NCA crisis decision
if the combatant commander has not already done so.

- Having reported the event and offered an assessment of the situation in Phase I, the commander continues to issue status reports, assesses the disposition of assigned and available forces, and takes appropriate military action under current ROE.

- The other members of the JPEC continue to monitor the situation.

- The Services may improve readiness and sustainability of forces that could be used and identify possible Reserve components; USTRANSCOM improves the disposition and readiness of strategic lift assets, etc.

- Because crisis action procedures are flexible, the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the latitude to either remain in this phase, increase reporting, and gather additional information for study; return to Phase I and continue to monitor the situation without further planning action; or progress to the next phase of CAP.

- **Crisis Response Organizations.** During the crisis assessment phase, special teams are assembled at all levels where the problem and its resolution are being developed. These teams vary in size and composition, as well as in name. They may be called crisis action teams, crisis response cells, battle staffs, emergency response teams, operations action groups, or operation planning groups. Specially constituted crisis action organizations generally include representatives from all command staff divisions and may include representatives from a wide range of involved organizations.

- **Exchange of Reports During Phase II.** At any time during CAP, the NCA may find it desirable to prepare selected units for possible military action. They increase unit readiness by designating alert conditions or ordering a specified deployability posture to reduce the response time of selected forces. Increased readiness actions may be taken during any phase. Deployment preparation orders and deployment orders are used to increase or decrease deployability posture, deploy or redeploy...
forces, establish or disestablish JTFs and their headquarters, or signal US intent to undertake or terminate action. Changing the deployment posture of a unit is a strong statement that the United States is beginning action to conduct military operations. This is but one example of a possible FDO. Both orders are issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The stage of a unit’s readiness is defined by the deployability posture.

- The deployment preparation order and the deployment order are addressed to all combatant commanders and the National Security Agency/Central Security Service. The Secretary of State, the White House Situation Room, and appropriate others receive copies.

- The format for both of these orders is in CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), Enclosure M, and they include all necessary information to deploy the forces, if it is not already given in other planning guidance documents from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The order takes the following overall outline.

  - Clear statement that it is a deployment preparation or deployment order issued under the authorization of the Secretary of Defense.
  - Situation.
  - Mission.
  - Execution.
  - Administration and logistics.
  - Command and signal.

- Note that, while these orders are designed to increase deployability posture, positioning forces or taking preparatory actions may signal US intent to conduct military operations. This may not be the desired message. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA may consider the requirements for operations security and surprise, and balance them against the need to notify selected Armed Forces for possible action.

- **ADP Support.** A GCCS TLCF should be established between crisis participants.

- **Conclusion of Phase II.** The crisis assessment phase ends with the decision by the NCA to have military options developed for their consideration. These are added to the full range of possible US response options. The NCA decision may also include specific guidance on COAs to be developed. For this reason, the combatant commander’s initial assessment has great influence. That assessment is an early, professional recommendation from the scene; lack of time may make the commander’s assessment the only alternative considered. If not provided by the NCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should query the NCA regarding termination criteria so that NCA termination guidance can be provided in the warning order to facilitate the supported combatant commander’s backward-planning process.

d. **Phase III — Course of Action Development (see Figure IV-4).**

- Following the decision of the NCA to develop military options, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publishes a
Crisis Action Planning During Campaign Plan Development

warning order directing the development of COAs in response to the situation. The COA development phase shifts emphasis to the supported combatant commander, who develops and submits recommended COAs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NCA. The combatant commander includes the COAs in the commander’s estimate, an abbreviated version of the type of information in the commander’s estimate prepared during the concept development phase of deliberate planning.

- Phase III technically begins when the NCA decide to develop possible military solutions to the crisis. The military response may be only one of many available options open to the NCA. In fact, the initial reluctance to use military forces may substantially alter the situation and thus limit the available military options when a decision to use military force is finally made.

- Actions Taken During COA Development
  - The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publishes a warning order to give initial guidance to the JPEC and requests that the combatant commander respond with a recommended COA to meet the situation.
  - The supported commander develops COAs; this involves the subordinate and
supporting commanders. With the evaluation request message, the combatant commander assigns those commands the task of identifying the forces and resources for the COAs being considered. If time and security considerations permit, subordinate evaluation of tentative COAs is valuable. Existing OPLANs and CONPLANs may prove useful in the rapid development of the COAs. The databases that outline the flow of forces and sustainment can be made available to the JPEC by the supported commander.

- The subordinate and supporting commanders respond to the combatant commander with an evaluation response message. Alternative COAs are evaluated and forces are identified to support the operation. Existing plans in the JOPES database can be used. A force list for this operation can be created in the JOPES database. Sustainment planning begins with coordination between the Service headquarters and the theater components. To that end, COA development should also address the availability of logistic support and the physical infrastructure, including HNS and inter-Service support agreement in the operational area. The Services monitor deployment planning and force readiness.

- Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM reviews the proposed COAs for supportability and prepares deployment estimates for each COA to send to the supported commander. As time permits, and as directed by the supported commander, JOPES data are used to develop a preliminary force deployment estimate and closure profile.

- Exchange of Reports During Phase III. Several orders or messages may be published during this phase. Following the decision of the NCA to plan a military response, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally authorizes the release of a warning order. If it contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, SecDef approval is required. The warning order is equated to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process; an example is illustrated in CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), Enclosure I. This message should:
Crisis Action Planning During Campaign Plan Development

- Describe the situation;
- Establish command relationships;
- State mission, objectives, and assumptions;
- Refer to applicable OPLANs and CONPLANs;
- Allocate forces and transportation assets or request that the combatant commander identify resource requirements;
- Establish a tentative unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins (C-day) and the specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence (L-hour) or solicit the combatant commander’s recommendation;
- Identify the anticipated unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence (D-day) for planning purposes; and
- Discuss guidance for administrative, logistic, public affairs, civil affairs, and command, control, and communications subjects.

- The warning order will stipulate that the combatant commander develop COAs for review and approval by the NCA. In a quickly evolving crisis, the initial warning order could be communicated by a telephone conference with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept advised. Messages referring to this initial order transmit additional information and guidance. The order may also discuss and focus the combatant commander’s attention toward COAs that have already been identified or considered by the JCS and NCA. However, the combatant commander has flexibility and authority to determine how to carry out the assigned tasks. If the NCA have already selected a COA, they may issue direction to begin execution planning (Phase V).

- The basic OPREP-1 describes the formats of four messages exchanged in this phase: commander’s evaluation request, subordinate and/or supporting commanders’ evaluation response, USTRANSCOM’s deployment estimate, and the commander’s estimate. The recommended format is flexible; listed sections can be omitted or other paragraphs can be added to meet the situation.

- If time permits, the combatant commander issues a commander’s evaluation request in OPREP-1 format to subordinate and supporting commanders. This communicates necessary planning guidance and assigns to members of the JPEC the task of evaluating the proposed COA, submitting force and support requirements, or supporting the combatant commander’s recommended COA. This communication includes the following:
  - Operation description — cites reference;
  - Narrative — describes mission task, situation, factors affecting possible COAs, adversary capabilities, concept of operations, operational constraints;
  - Objective — amplifies guidance for developing COA evaluations;
  - Remarks — describe the OPLAN file used and its location in the JOPES database.

- The subordinate and supporting commanders reply with a component’s
COA evaluation response message. The format is similar to the OPREP-1 reports already discussed: description, narrative, objective, and remarks.

- In addition, if time permits, USTRANSCOM sends the preliminary deployment estimate to the supported commander. It is in OPREP-1 format and may include the following:
  - Operation description;
  - Narrative — description of the closure estimate in days or hours for each COA;
  - Remarks — identification of planning factors used in the simulation.

- The final product of Phase III is the commander’s estimate prepared by the combatant commander. Its purpose is to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information for the NCA to consider in their selection of a military COA. It is the commander’s analysis of the COAs that were considered. Message content varies depending on the situation, but essentially it is an abbreviation of the combatant commander’s total staff work and may have been developed in a matter of hours. The format is located in CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures), Enclosure J; it should contain the following:
  - Operation description — cite references, description of military operations;
  - Narrative — five paragraphs described in CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures): mission, situation and COAs, analysis of opposing COAs (adversary capabilities), comparison of own COAs, and recommendation;
  - Objective — identify operational objective, object of reporting the information;
  - Remarks — planning factors, file within JOPES where force list may be found, etc.

- ADP Support. The time available to the combatant commander is a most critical resource during Phase III. Large volumes of planning data must be transferred accurately and rapidly among JPEC participants. The GCCS and the JOPES deployment database maintained by the Joint Staff are the primary means for exchanging detailed planning information. The planning tasks to develop tentative COAs, evaluate the adequacy of each COA, create force lists and support packages, estimate transportation feasibility of each COA, and begin to prepare deployment estimates for the recommended COA, require much time. Fortunately, there is ADP support to help the crisis action planner take advantage of previous planning efforts that are already in the JOPES database, or to rapidly develop a plan from scratch.

- Develop Tentative COAs. An existing OPLAN may have been developed that can be modified to fit the situation. An existing CONPLAN may be available that can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved concept of operations. Both of these formats are stored in the JOPES database and are available for planner review. For situations that have not been considered by prior planning, a no operation plan available or prepared (NOPLAN) situation is said to exist; timely creation of a concept of operations and the time-
phasing of forces and support are required.

**Determine Adequacy of Each Proposed COA.** An objective, comprehensive evaluation of proposed COAs is difficult even without time constraints. See previous discussion in Chapter III, “Deliberate Campaign Plan Development,” on methods to evaluate COAs. Some combatant commands are developing computer simulations to assist in measuring sensitivity of COAs to key parameters.

**Develop Force Lists and Support Packages.** Using the force modules in JOPES, the planner can rapidly build an effective combat force, add support forces, and calculate sustainment. Using force modules from current OPLANs reduces the planning time, because these force modules are already “sourced” with actual Army and Air Force units and some Sea Service units.

**Prepare Deployment Estimates.** The USTRANSCOM components begin to build the deployment estimates from information exchanged through the GCCS. USTRANSCOM integrates the deployment estimates and furnishes a consolidated deployment estimate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commander via GCCS and OPREP-1 message.

**Conclusion of Phase III.** COA development concludes with the release of the combatant commander’s estimate. Emphasis once again shifts to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NCA for the selection of a COA.

e. Phase IV — Course of Action Selection (see Figure IV-5).

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**CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE IV**

**Course of Action (COA) Selection**

- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) presents refined and/or prioritized COAs to the National Command Authorities (NCA)

- NCA select COA

CJCS Alert or Planning Order

Figure IV-5. Crisis Action Planning Phase IV
**General.** In this phase the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the JCS, reviews and analyzes the commander’s estimate and deployment estimates and, ultimately, presents COAs in order of priority to the NCA for their decision.

Phase IV of CAP begins when the recommended COAs are presented to the NCA. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has received the commander’s estimate from the combatant commander. The Joint Staff has evaluated the recommendation; the COAs may have been refined or revised, or new COAs may have been developed in light of a changing situation. In fact, when there is no clearly superior COA, a ranked list of recommendations may have to be given to the NCA.

**Actions Taken During COA Selection.** The focus of activity is with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NCA.

- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as principal military advisor to the NCA, evaluating the COAs recommended by the combatant commander in consultation with the other members of the JCS. Depending on the recommendation to the NCA, the Chairman may choose to issue guidance to the combatant commander and the JPEC with a planning order; this is used to speed up the execution planning and does not replace formal NCA approval of a COA.

- The NCA select a COA and direct that execution planning begin. On receipt of an NCA decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an alert order to the supported combatant commander advising the commander of the selected COA and reconfirmed termination criteria.

With the authority of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman may issue a deployment preparation order or deployment order.

- The combatant commander and the other members of the JPEC are continuing deployment and employment planning with the knowledge they have of the pending decision.

**Exchange of Reports During Phase IV.** Depending on the situation, either of two communications may be exchanged in this phase. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues the planning order before the NCA make a decision. The intent is to expedite execution planning and permit flexibility in responding to fast-breaking events as the crisis develops. It may be issued orally, by GCCS intercomputer message, or by Defense Message System (DMS) to the combatant commander with copies to all members of the JPEC. It is conceivable that the planning order could be the first record communication between the Chairman and the JPEC on the crisis. In this situation, vital planning information would be exchanged now. However, it is desirable to use this message merely to update CJCS guidance that has been given earlier. The contents of the planning order may vary depending on the situation, but it should:

- Identify forces and resources for planning;
- Define the objective, tasks, constraints, and termination criteria;
- Contain further planning guidance by the JCS; and
- Establish a deadline for submitting the OPORD.
Crisis Action Planning During Campaign Plan Development

- CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures)* outlines an example of a planning order that illustrates a standardized format patterned after the OPREP-1 message. The example includes a multi-section narrative detailing situation, mission, details about the COA to be executed, resources allocated, and guidance for administration, logistics, psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs, etc.

- On receiving the NCA decision on the COA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publishes an alert order. The order is a record communication that the NCA have approved the detailed development of a military solution to the crisis. The contents of an alert order may vary, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published, but it should always contain the termination criteria established by the NCA. The contents are similar in format to the planning order, except that the operation description clearly states that the message is an alert order, and execution planning, based on the selected COA, has been authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

- Conclusion of Phase IV. This phase ends with the NCA selection of a COA and the decision to begin execution planning. The alert order promulgates that decision.

  f. Phase V — Execution Planning (see Figure IV-6).

- In the execution-planning phase, the supported combatant commander transforms the NCA-selected COA into an OPORD. Phase V is similar in function to the plan development phase of the deliberate planning process. In this phase, the necessary detailed planning is performed to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. The actual forces, sustainment, and strategic transportation resources are identified, and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format.

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**CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASE V**

**Execution Planning**

- **Combatant commander and/or commander, joint task force operation order developed**
- **Time-phased force and deployment data refined**
- **Force preparation**

*Figure IV-6. Crisis Action Planning Phase V*
Chapter IV

- The NCA select the military COA that will be further developed. **Execution planning begins when the combatant commander and members of the JPEC receive the planning order or the alert order.** The execution planning stage encompasses three major tasks: execution planning, force preparation, and deployability posture reporting.

  **Execution Planning.** The OPORD is developed by modifying an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing CONPLAN, or developing an OPORD from scratch when a NOPLAN situation exists. Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning. JPEC actions are the same whether an alert order or planning order initiates execution planning.

  **Force preparation focuses on the actual units designated to participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment.** The deployability posture categories include the status of troops and equipment, the unit availability to deploy, positioning of units on strategic lift, and the positioning of transportation support units at intermediate and debarkation ports, etc. The deployment posture is changed by SecDef direction.

  **Deployability Posture Reporting.** After receiving the CJCS alert order, commanders issue situation reports to report early attainment of, or deviations from, a specified deployability posture. Newly identified forces report the time that they anticipate attaining the directed deployability posture.

- Emphasis during this phase, particularly during the task of execution planning, rests with the combatant commander and subordinate and supporting commanders. They review the planning or alert order to get the latest guidance on forces, timing, constraints, etc. In particular, the combatant commander reevaluates the COA selected by the NCA in terms of the reconfirmed termination criteria. They update and adjust planning done in Phase III, “COA Development,” for any new force and sustainment requirements and source forces and lift resources. All members of the JPEC act to identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations.

- The combatant commander should bring any shortfalls or operational limitations to the attention of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA before entering the next phase. The Services and the combatant commander’s component commanders are sourcing the forces identified for planning. Planning concentrates on the earliest deploying units. **Execution planning results in the preparation of the OPORD by the combatant commander.** The subordinate and supporting commanders prepare supporting OPORDs.

- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitors the development of the combatant commander’s OPORD in JOPES and resolves shortfalls that are presented. The Chairman also reviews the final product for adequacy and feasibility and gives military advice to the NCA on the status of the situation.

- USTRANSCOM furnishes effective air, land, and sea transportation to support the approved COA or OPORD by applying transportation assets against the transportation requirements identified by the supported commander. Air and sea channels for movement of non-unit sustainment and personnel are established, and schedules for air and
Crisis Action Planning During Campaign Plan Development

Sea are created. Concentration is on the initial increment of movements, i.e., 7 days by air- and 30 days by sea-lift.

- **Exchange of Reports During Phase V.**
  The planning and/or alert order is sent to the combatant commander as action addressee and also forwarded to subordinate commanders for their planning guidance. In addition, two important communications are exchanged in this phase.

  - The supported commander publishes a **TPFDD letter of instruction (LOI)** that furnishes procedures for deployment, replacement, and redeployment of forces. The LOI gives instructions and direction to the components, supporting commands, and other members of the JPEC concerning lift allocation, reporting and validation requirements, and management of TPFDD data in general.

  - The OPORD is the product of the execution-planning phase. The supported commander’s OPORD is published with a major force list, instructions for the conduct of operations in the objective area, and the logistic and administrative plans for support of the operation. All members of the JPEC enter movement data and schedules into the JOPES database for access. Subordinate and supporting commands develop supporting OPORDs as required by the combatant commander. They transmit copies of their completed OPORDs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review for adequacy and feasibility. If an OPORD is contrary to the guidance contained in the CJCS alert order, or if circumstances change requiring an adjustment in the OPORD, the Chairman informs the combatant commander of the differences.

- **ADP Support.** GCCS and JOPES ADP take on greater significance during this phase of the crisis. JPEC participants continue to use GCCS for communicating among themselves; GCCS allows rapid, accurate, and secure data transfer and

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CJCSM 3122.02A, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution, Volume III, contains details on preparing a **TPFDD LOI**.
offers access for file updating. The JPEC uses JOPES procedures and guidance furnished in the TPFDD LOI to build and refine the TPFDD. When planning participants do not have access to the JOPES computer files, they can use secure voice systems, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network, or DMS communications to exchange essential force and deployment data.

- **Conclusion of Phase V.** The phase ends when the NCA decide to execute the OPORD, place it on hold, or cancel it pending resolution by some other means.

- **Phase Timing.** The procedures in the preceding discussion have been described as occurring sequentially. During a crisis they may, in fact, be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. For example, the combatant commander’s assessment in Phase I may serve as the recommended COA in the commander’s estimate that is normally developed in Phase III. In some situations, no formal CJCS warning order is issued, and the first record communication that the supported combatant commander receives is the CJCS planning order or alert order containing the COA to be used for execution planning. It is also possible that an NCA decision to commit forces may be made shortly after an event occurs, thereby significantly compressing Phases II through V. No definitive length of time can be associated with any particular phase. **Severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally,** including the decision to commit forces. In actual practice, much coordination is done over secure telephone throughout the JPEC during the entire CAP process.

g. **Phase VI — Execution (see Figure IV-7).**

- **The execution phase starts with the NCA decision to choose the military option to respond to the crisis and execute the OPORD.** The Secretary of Defense will authorize the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue an execute order that directs the supported combatant commander to carry out the OPORD. The commander then executes the OPORD and directs subordinate and supporting commanders to execute their supporting OPORDs.

- **Execute Order.** The execute order is a record communication that may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. During execution, the supported and supporting commanders, Services, and defense agencies update information in the JOPES deployment database. USTRANSCOM monitors and coordinates the deployment per the supported commander’s force and sustainment priorities. Members of the JPEC report movement of forces in the deployment database.

- **Actions Taken During the Execution Phase.** During the execution phase, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical and intelligence considerations, force and non-unit cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and port of embarkation and port of debarkation (POD) capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities are required. The JOPES deployment database contains the following information, at a minimum, at the time of OPORD execution.
Sourced combat, combat support, and combat service support requirements for assigned and augmentation forces.

Integrated critical resupply requirements identified by supply category, POD, and latest arrival date at POD.

Integrated non-unit personnel filler and casualty replacements by numbers and day.

Practical considerations require that planning concentrate on the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of surface movement. Major changes to deployment plans with effective dates more than about 7 days or so in the future will have very little impact on the scheduling process; however, changes with effective dates of 7 days or less may adversely affect the timely development of the airlift flow schedule. Adding requirements within those management windows may cause delays in other scheduled movements.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publishes the CJCS execute order that defines D-day and the resource allocation and directs execution of the OPORD. Throughout execution, the staff monitors movements, assesses achievement of tasks, and resolves shortfalls as necessary. The Chairman should monitor the situation for potential changes in the applicability of current termination criteria and communicate them to all concerned parties.
• The combatant commander executes the order and transmits his or her own guidance to subordinates and supporting commanders. The combatant commander also monitors, assesses, and reports achievement of objectives; ensures that data are updated in the JOPES database; and re-plans, re-deploys, or terminates operations as necessary, in compliance with NCA-directed termination criteria.

• The subordinate and supporting commanders execute their combatant commander-directed OPORDs, revalidate the sourcing and scheduling of units, report movement of organic lift, and report deployment movements on the JOPES database. These commanders conduct the operation as directed and fulfill their responsibilities to sustain their Service forces in the combat theater. USTRANSCOM components validate transportation movement planned for the first increment, adjust deployment flow and reschedule as required, and continue to develop transportation schedules for subsequent increments. Both statuses of movements and future movement schedules are entered in the JOPES database.

• **Exchange of Reports During Phase VI.** Two communications are exchanged in this phase: (1) **the CJCS execute order**, addressed to the supported combatant commander with copies to the other members of the JPEC; and (2) **the commander’s execute order**, addressed to subordinates and supporting commanders.

• The **CJCS execute order is the authorization by the NCA to execute the military operation**, i.e., the NCA-selected COA detailed in the supported combatant commander’s OPORD. **Ideally, the execution will follow the procedures outlined in the preceding phases of CAP.** Information will have been exchanged in OPREP-1 supported combatant commander assessment reports and estimates. Guidance will have been received via the CJCS-published warning and planning orders, preparation will have been permitted using the deployment preparation and/or deployment orders, and formal NCA direction will have been received in the SecDef-authorized alert order. Following these procedures, the most current guidance will have been given, periodic updates will have been received, and modifications reflecting changing conditions will have been issued as necessary. This is the preferred exchange of information.

• **In a fast-developing crisis the CJCS execute order may be the first record communication generated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The record communication may be preceded by a voice announcement. The issuance of the execute order is timesensitive. The format may differ depending on the amount of previous record correspondence and applicability of prior guidance. **Annex N to CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures) contains the format for the CJCS execute order.** Information already communicated in the warning, planning, or alert orders is not repeated. Under these conditions, the execute order need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. The broad outline of information that has already passed to the JPEC in the preceding warning, planning, or alert orders includes the following:

  • Authority;
The supported combatant commander’s execute order follows the receipt of the CJCS message. It may give the detailed planning guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance that the CJCS execute order does not cover.

- Situation;
- Mission — a refined statement of tasks and purpose;
- Execution — COA, allocation of combat forces, coordinating instructions, C-day and D-day, expected duration, PSYOP guidance, deployability status, operations security, deception guidance, etc;
- Administration and logistics — allocation of strategic lift, load planning, logistics factors, public affairs guidance, etc;
- Command and signal — communications guidance, command relationships, and signal.

- ADP Support. During execution the rapid exchange of information is necessary to allow a timely response to changing situations. GCCS permits communication of deployment schedules and rapid information update, and gives the JPEC the ability to monitor and report resource movement.
- Conclusion of Phase VI. The execution phase continues until the operation is completed or canceled.
APPENDIX A
FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

“Efforts to deter an adversary — be it an aggressor nation, terrorist group or criminal organization — can become the leading edge of crisis response. . . . Deterrence in crisis generally involves demonstrating the United States’ commitment to a particular country or interest by enhancing our warfighting capability in the theater.”

A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, December 2000

1. General

FDOs are intended to facilitate early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to send the right signal during a crisis. These options should include limited military forces and preplanned requests for economic, political, and informational actions gauged to particular military actions. FDOs use all instruments of national power to influence another nations’ actions.

2. Description of Deterrent Actions

Deterrence can be described as the prevention of action by fear of the consequences. As such, FDOs are deterrent-oriented response options that are requested and may be initiated based on evaluation of indicators of heightened regional tensions. FDOs serve two basic purposes. First, they assist in bringing an issue to early resolution before armed conflict by sending an appropriate message to belligerent parties. Second, they position US forces in a manner that facilitates implementation of campaign plans in the event that hostilities are unavoidable. They also facilitate an early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that are carefully tailored to avoid the classic response of too much, too soon, or too little, too late. They are initiated before and after unambiguous warning. Although they are intended to not place US forces in jeopardy if deterrence fails, it goes without saying that risk analysis should be an inherent step in determining which FDO to use, and how and when that FDO should be used. FDOs have the advantage of rapid de-escalation if the situation precipitating the FDO changes. Implementation of a particular FDO is directed by the NCA and there are no hard and fast rules regarding implementation indicators. The use of FDOs is consistent with US national security strategy, i.e., the instruments of national power are normally used in combination with one another. They can be used individually, in packages, sequentially, or concurrently. FDOs are primarily designed to be used in groups that maximize integrated results from all the political, informational, economic, and military instruments of national power. It is imperative that extensive, continuous coordination occurs with interagency and multinational partners in order to maximize the impact of FDOs.

3. Value of FDOs and Their Objectives

a. The value of an FDO is subjectively measured by its ability to influence events, especially adversary decisionmaking, and to prepare for future operations should adversaries remain undeterred. Key objectives are as follows:

- Deter aggression through communication of strength of US commitment to treaty
Appendix A

Confront the adversary with unacceptable costs of their possible aggression.

Isolate the adversary from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary coalition.

Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the AOR, especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, PSYOP, and force protection assets without precipitating armed response from the adversary.

b. FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis. Military FDOs are intended to be used in concert with political, economic, and informational options to give the NCA a wide array of deterrent options integrating all instruments of national power. All regional OPLANs have FDOs, and combatant commanders are tasked by the JSCP to plan requests for appropriate political, economic, and informational options. Examples of FDOs from all four instruments of national power are listed at the end of this appendix in Figures A-1 through A-4.

Increasing exercise activities is one example of a military flexible deterrent option available to a combatant commander.
**EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED POLITICAL FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS**

- Alert and introduce special teams
  - Public diplomacy
  - Mobile training team
  - Communications
- Reduce international diplomatic ties
- Increase cultural group pressure
- Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures
- Promote democratic elections
- Identify clearly the steps to peaceful resolution
- Restrict activities of diplomats
- Restrict letters of diplomatic protest
- Prepare to withdraw US embassy personnel
- Reduce national embassy personnel
- Take actions to gain support of allies and friends
- Pursue measures to increase regional support
- Use the United Nations or other international institutions to gain support
- Develop or work within an existing coalition
- Show international resolve

Figure A-1. Examples of Requested Political Flexible Deterrent Options

**EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED INFORMATIONAL FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS**

- Heighten public awareness of the problem and potential for conflict through press statements
- Gain popular support
- Gain Congressional support
- Take measures to increase public support in the region and within the international community
- Maintain open dialogue with the press
- Promote US policy objectives through public policy statements
- Heighten informational efforts:
  - quickly;
  - honestly; and
  - within security constraints imposed by the crisis
- Take steps to gain and maintain public confidence
- Keep selected issues as lead stories
- Impose sanctions on command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) technology transfer
- Protect friendly C4I assets

Figure A-2. Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options
### EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED ECONOMIC FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

- Freeze monetary assets in the United States
- Seize real property in the United States
- Freeze international assets where possible
- Embargo goods and services
- Enact trade sanctions
- Cancel US funded programs
- Encourage corporations to restrict transactions
- Reduce security assistance programs
- Heighten informational efforts directed at:
  - financial institutions, questioning the soundness of continuing actions with the opponents’ businesses; and
  - reducing or eliminating corporate transactions

*Figure A-3. Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options*

### EXAMPLES OF REQUESTED MILITARY FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

- Increase readiness of in-place forces
- Upgrade alert status
- Increase strategic reconnaissance
- Increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection efforts
- Initiate or increase show of force actions
- Employ electronic measures
- Conduct aircraft flyovers
- Increase exercise activities, gain popular support
- Gain Congressional support
- Take measures to increase public support
- Maintain an open dialogue with the press
- Promote US policy objectives through public policy statements
- Heighten informational efforts:
  - quickly;
  - honestly; and
  - within security constraints imposed by the crisis
- Keep selected issues as lead stories
- Impose sanctions on command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) technology transfer
- Protect friendly C4I assets
- Interrupt satellite loan link

*Figure A-4. Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options*
1. Lines of Operations.

Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the joint force in time and space in relation to the adversary. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. In geographic terms, lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead ultimately to control of the objective or defeat of an adversary force.

a. A campaign or major operation may have single or multiple lines of operations. A single line of operations has the advantage of concentrating forces and simplifying planning. Multiple lines of operations, on the other hand, increase flexibility and create opportunities for success. Multiple lines of operations also make it difficult for an opponent to determine the objectives of the campaign or major operation, forcing the adversary to disperse resources to defend against multiple threats. The decision to operate on multiple lines will depend to a great extent on the availability of resources.

b. Lines of operations may be either interior or exterior. In campaign planning, the relevance of interior and exterior lines depends on the relationship of time and distance between the opposing forces. Although an adversary force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force, that advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher operational tempo. Conversely, if a smaller force maneuvers to a position between larger but less agile adversary forces, the friendly force may be able to defeat them in detail before they can react effectively.

2. Operational Reach.

The concept of operational reach, defined as the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities, is inexorably tied to the concept of lines of operations (see Figure B-1). The geography surrounding and separating the opponents influences reach. Locating forces, reserves, bases, pre-positioned equipment sets, and logistics forward extends operational reach. Additionally, it is also affected by increasing the range of weapons, and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of LOCs and throughput capability. Some combat capabilities, such as space and information operations, are not necessarily limited by operational reach. Nevertheless, for any given campaign or major operation, there is a finite range beyond which predominant elements of the joint force can not prudently operate or maintain effective operations.


a. Basing in the broadest sense is an indispensable part of operational art, since it is tied to the concept of lines of operations...
and directly affects operational reach. It also directly influences the combat reach that the joint force is capable of generating because of its impact on such critical factors as sortie or resupply rates. In particular, the arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from adversary action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with ever increasing power and ferocity.

b. Basing is often directly affected by political and diplomatic considerations and, as such, can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact. US force basing options span the spectrum from permanently based forces to temporary sea basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea basing) are typically selected to be within operational reach of the opponent. To that end, theater assessments must determine whether sufficient infrastructure is in place or can be fabricated to support the operational and sustaining requirements of deployed forces, and where they can be assured of some degree of security from adversary attacks. Determining where to locate bases poses certain challenges for campaign planners. Recognizing the critical role basing plays during force projection,
potential opponents may try to develop strategies designed to prevent the build up and sustainment of forces in theater, a so-called “anti-access strategy.” The campaign planner must determine how to mitigate the efforts of the opponent to deny access to the theater and its infrastructure.

Access to the theater infrastructure must be addressed in campaign plans.
NOTE: JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, pages I-10 to I-20 and II-18 to II-21, describe how campaign logic and principles fit into OPLAN format and the JOPES process. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures)*, further explains the process including models of planning messages and estimates, and CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance)*, provides the formats for OPLANs and CONPLANs.

### Key Aspects of a Campaign Plan

Clear, concise articulation of key aspects of a campaign plan is essential to ensure that all applicable parties are aware of needed information. The following format may be useful for briefing the campaign plan to selected individuals.

- **Mission**
- **Strategic and military end states**
- **Assumptions**
- **Friendly strategic and operational COGs**
- **Friendly vulnerabilities**
- **Adversary strategic and operational COGs**
- **Adversary capabilities and COAs**
- **Strategic concept (tasks and objectives by phase)**
- **Component tasks by phase**
- **Theater geographic organization**
- **Command relationships**
- **Sustainment concept**
- **Issues for the NCA**
THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN:  (Number or Code Name)

USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . .

( ) References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan).

1. ( ) Situation. (This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses (see national intelligence estimate, any allied sources, and strategic and commanders’ estimates)).

   a. ( ) General. (This section describes the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the campaign plan. It should summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict. Identify primary antagonists. State US policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties. Outline political decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy goals and conduct effective US military operations to attain US military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity as depicted below.)

      (1) ( ) Environment of Conflict. (Provides a summary of the national and/or multinational strategic context (JSCP, UCP).)

      (2) ( ) Policy Goals. (This section relates the strategic guidance, end state, and termination objectives to the theater situation and requirements in its global, regional, and space dimensions, interests, intentions/criteria for termination.)

         (a) ( ) US/Multinational Policy Goals. (Identifies the national security, multinational or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the combatant command.)

         (b) ( ) Desired End State. (Describe the desired strategic end state and relate the military end state to the strategic end state.)

      (3) ( ) Non-US National Political Decisions.

      (4) ( ) Constraints/Restraints/Limitations. (List actions that are prohibited or required by higher or multinational authority (ROE, law of armed conflict, termination criteria, etc.))

   b. ( ) Area of Concern.
(1) ( ) Area of Responsibility. (Describe the combatant commander’s area of responsibility. A map may be used as an attachment to graphically depict the area.)

(2) ( ) Area of Interest. (Describe the general area of interest covered by the combatant commander’s Strategic Concept and/or Basic Plan. This description should address all air, ground, and sea areas that directly affect the campaign.)

(3) ( ) Joint Operations Area. (Describe the specific areas covered in each option contained in the combatant commander’s Strategic or basic plan. Maps or overlays may be included as an attachment.)

c. ( ) Deterrent Options. (Delineate FDOs desired to include those categories specified in the current JSCP. Specific units and resources must be prioritized in terms of LAD relative to C-day. Include possible diplomatic, informational, or economic deterrent options accomplished by non-DOD agencies that would support US mission accomplishment.

See Appendix C for examples of FDOs.

d. ( ) Risk.

e. ( ) Adversary Forces. (Identify the opposing forces expected upon execution and appraise their general capabilities. Refer readers to Annex B (Intelligence) for details. However, this section should provide the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat. In a campaign plan, it is imperative to identify the adversary’s strategic and operational centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities as depicted below.)

(1) Centers of Gravity.

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(2) Adversary strategic and operational critical vulnerabilities.

(3) Adversary Courses of Action.

(a) General.

(b) Adversary’s Desired End State.

(c) Adversary’s Strategic Objectives.

(d) Adversary’s Operational Objectives.

(e) Adversary Concept of Operations.

(4) Adversary Logistics and Sustainment.
(5) Other Adversary Forces/Capabilities.

(6) Adversary Reserve Mobilization.

f. Friendly Forces.

   (1) **Centers of Gravity.** (This section should identify friendly centers of gravity, both strategic and operational; this provides focus to force protection efforts.)

      (a) **Strategic.**

      (b) **Operational.**

   (2) **Multinational Forces.**

   (3) **Supporting Commands and Agencies.** (Describe the operations of unassigned forces, other than those tasked to support this campaign plan, that could have a direct and significant influence on the operations in the campaign plan. Also list the specific tasks of friendly forces, commands, or government agencies that would directly support execution of the campaign plan. For example, USTRANSCOM, USSPACECOM, Defense Intelligence Agency, and so forth.)

g. **Assumptions.** (List all reasonable assumptions for all participants contained in the JSCP or other tasking on which the campaign plan is based. State expected conditions over which the combatant commander has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevant to the development of the plan and supporting plans, and assumptions to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions that, if they do not occur as expected, would invalidate the plan or its concept of operations. Specify the mobility (air and sea lift), the degree of mobilization assumed, i.e., total, full, partial, selective, or none.)

   (1) () Threat Warning/Timeline.

   (2) () Pre-positioning and Regional Access.

      (a) () International Support and Assistance.

   (3) () In-Place Forces.

   (4) () Strategic Assumptions.

      (a) () Nuclear Weapons Employment.

   (5) () **Legal Considerations.** (List those significant legal considerations on which the campaign plan is based.)

      (a) () International Law.
Theater Campaign Plan Format

(b) ( ) US Domestic Law.

(c) ( ) Law of Armed Conflict.

2. ( ) **Mission.** (State concisely the key strategic task(s) the combatant commander has to accomplish. This statement should address: who, what, when, where, and why.)

3. ( ) **Execution.** Annex C (Operations)

   a. **Concept of Operations.** (The appropriate strategic concept(s) can be taken from the theater strategy and developed into a strategic concept of operation for the theater campaign plan. The concept should be stated in terms of who, what, where and how. It also contains the combatant commander’s strategic vision, intent and design in the strategic concept of operation for force projection operations, including mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment and redeployment of all participating forces, activities and agencies.)

      (1) ( ) **Commander’s Intent.** (This should describe the combatant commander’s overall intent, and intent by phase. It may also include how the posture of forces at the end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the combatant commander’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent. The commander’s intent, though, is not a summary of the concept of the operations.)

         (a) ( ) **End State.** (See Chapter II for details on determining the end state.)

         (b) ( ) Campaign Objectives.

      (2) ( ) **General.** (Base the concept of operations on the commander’s estimate of the situation. The estimate states how the commander plans to accomplish the mission, including the forces involved; the phasing of operations; the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted; and the interrelated or cross-Service support. The commander’s estimate should include a statement concerning the perceived need for Reserve force mobilization based on plan force deployment timing and Reserve force size requirements. The concept of operations should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict to provide supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for preparing adequate supporting plans. To the extent possible, the campaign plan concept should incorporate the following operational concepts:

         Combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus.

         Orientation on the adversary’s strategic and operational centers of gravity.

         Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.

         Phasing of operations, to include the commander’s intent for each phase.)

         (a) **Phase I:**
1. Combatant Commander’s Intent.

2. Timing.

3. Objectives.

4. Risk.

5. Execution.

   a. Land Forces.
   b. Air Forces.
   c. Naval Forces.
   d. Marine Corps Forces.
   e. Space Forces.
   f. Special Operations Forces.
      (a) Joint PSYOP task force (JPOTF).

7. Operational Fires
   (b) Phases II (last). (Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3b above for each subsequent phase based on expected sequencing, changes, or new opportunities.)

   b. ( ) Tasks. (List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting commands in separate subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed either in future planning for the operation or on execution of the OPORD. The task assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform to fulfill the concept of operations, including operational and tactical deception. If the actions cannot stand alone without exposing the deception, they must be published separately to receive special handling.)

COMUSARXXXX.
COMUSNAVXXXX.
COMUSMARXXXX.
COMUSXXXAF.
COMSOCXXXX.
Theater Campaign Plan Format

Commander, JPOTF

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. (List instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are required for proper coordination of the campaign’s phases. Explain terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments.)

4. ( ) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. ( ) Concept of Support. (This should provide broad guidance for the theater strategic sustainment concept for the campaign with information and instructions applicable to the campaign broken down by phases. It should cover functional areas of logistics, personnel policies, and administration.)

b. ( ) Logistics. (This paragraph should address sustainment priorities and resources; base development and other civil engineering requirement; HNS; and inter-Service responsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of major logistic items for each option and phase of the concept. Note: Logistic phases must complement the campaign’s operational phases. Identify strategic and theater ports for resupply. Outline transportation policies, guidance, and procedures for all options and phases.)

c. ( ) General Guidance.

d. ( ) Personnel. (Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement and rotation policies, and required individual augmentation to command headquarters and other operational requirements.)

e. ( ) Public Affairs. Refer to Annex F.

f. ( ) Civil Affairs. Refer to Annex G.

g. ( ) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. Refer to Annex H.

h. ( ) Geospatial Information and Services. Refer to Annex M.

i. ( ) Medical Services. Refer to Annex Q. (Identify planning requirements and subordinate taskings for hospitalization and evacuation. Address critical medical supplies and resources. Assign tasks for establishing joint medical assumptions and include them in a subparagraph.)

5. ( ) COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. ( ) Command.
Appendix C

(1) Command Relationships. (State the organizational structure expected to exist during campaign plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major command and control organizations and the time of expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements and memorandums of understanding used and those that require development.)

(2) Command Posts. (List the designations and locations of each major headquarters involved in execution of the campaign. When headquarters are to be deployed or the plan provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the location and time of opening and closing each headquarters.)

(3) Succession to Command. (Designate in order of succession the commanders responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific applicable circumstances.)

b. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems. (Provide a general statement concerning the scope of C4 systems and procedures required to support the campaign. Highlight any C4 systems or procedures requiring special emphasis.) Refer to Annex K.

s/
/
Rank/Service
Commander in Chief

Annexes: As per CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance)

A — Task Organization
B — Intelligence
C — Operations
D — Logistics
E — Personnel
F — Public Affairs
G — Civil Affairs
H — Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
J — Command Relationships
K — Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
L — Environmental Considerations
M — Geospatial Information and Services
N — Space Operations
P — Host-Nation Support
Q — Medical Services
R — Reports
S — Special Technical Operations
T — Consequence Management
U — Notional Campaign Plan Decision Guide
V — Interagency Coordination
X — Execution Checklist
Z — Distribution
The development of JP 5-00.1 is based upon the following primary references.


2. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*.

3. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.


5. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.


7. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.


10. JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I*.


15. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.


17. JP 6-0, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations*.

18. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning, Policies, and Procedures)*.

20. CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance)*.


22. AFSC Publication 1, *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide*.


24. AFDD 2-1, *Air Warfare*.

25. AFDD 2-1.2, *Strategic Attack*.

26. FMFM 1-1, *Campaigning*.

27. FM 100-5, *Operations*.


29. FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*.

30. MCDP 1-1, *Strategy*.

31. MCDP 5, *Planning*.

32. NDP 1, *Naval Warfare*.
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Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is HQ Department of the Army (DAMO-SSP). The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

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a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

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   INFO:     JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//
             USCINCJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JW100//

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## GLOSSARY

**PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>automated data processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>crisis action planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-day</td>
<td>unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>center of gravity</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan in concept format</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRITIC</td>
<td>critical intelligence communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-day</td>
<td>unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMS</td>
<td>Defense Message System</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDO</td>
<td>flexible deterrent option</td>
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<td>FUNCPLAN</td>
<td>functional plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCCS</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADS</td>
<td>integrated air defense system</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-5</td>
<td>Plans Directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-7</td>
<td>Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIPB</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JPEC</td>
<td>Joint Planning and Execution Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPOTF</td>
<td>joint psychological operations task force</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOI</td>
<td>letter of instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>military operations other than war</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>major theater war</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>nuclear, biological, and chemical</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<td>NMCC</td>
<td>National Military Command Center</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>national military strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOPLAN</td>
<td>no operation plan available or prepared</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>national security strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
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<td>OREP</td>
<td>operational report</td>
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<tr>
<td>PID</td>
<td>plan identification number</td>
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<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>port of debarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLCF</td>
<td>teleconference (WIN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSPACECOM</td>
<td>United States Space Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. See also campaign; campaign plan (JP 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02)

CINC's Strategic Concept. Final document produced in step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC’s strategic concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC’s decision and planning guidance for accomplishing Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an operation plan or operation plan in concept format. Also called CSC. (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers
necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

**combatant commander.** A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. See also combatant command. Also called CINC. (JP 1-02)

**combined.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies.) See also joint. (JP 1-02)

**command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

**commander’s estimate of the situation.** A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken in order to accomplish the mission. A commander’s estimate that considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (JP 1-02)

**commander’s intent.** A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state that serves as the initial impetus for the planning process. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**concept plan.** An operation plan in concept format. Also called CONPLAN. (JP 1-02)

**contingency plan.** A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of the command. See also joint operation planning. (JP 1-02)

**course of action.** 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. Also called COA. (JP 1-02)

**course of action development.** The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System within the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander’s estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and supporting data bases. See also course of action; crisis action planning. (JP 1-02)
**crisis action planning.** 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (JP 1-02)

**culminating point.** The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (JP 1-02)

**decisive point.** A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. (JP 1-02)

**deliberate planning.** 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

**deterrent options.** A course of action, developed on the best economic, diplomatic, political, and military judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated operations. (In constructing an operation plan, a range of options should be presented to effect deterrence. Each option requiring deployment of forces should be a separate force module.) (JP 1-02)

**end state.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 1-02)

**estimate.** 1. An analysis of a foreign situation, development, or trend that identifies its major elements, interprets the significance, and appraises the future possibilities and the prospective results of the various actions that might be taken. 2. An appraisal of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential courses of action of a foreign nation or combination of nations in consequence of a specific national plan, policy, decision, or contemplated course of action. 3. An analysis of an actual or contemplated clandestine operation in relation to the situation in which it is or would be conducted in order to identify and appraise such factors as available and needed assets and potential obstacles, accomplishments, and consequences. (JP 1-02)
execute order. 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. Also called EXORD. (JP 1-02)

execution planning. The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System crisis action planning process that provides for the translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other National Command Authorities-approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning. See also Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. Also called EP. (JP 1-02)

final plan. A plan for which drafts have been coordinated and approved and which has been signed by or on behalf of a competent authority. See also operation plan. (JP 1-02)

functional plans. Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the combatant commander (CINC), or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of CINC-initiated plans is not normally required. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

information warfare. Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW. See also information operations; operation. (JP 1-02)

initial draft plan. A plan which has been drafted and coordinated by the originating headquarters, and is ready for external coordination with other military headquarters. It cannot be directly implemented by the issuing commander, but it may form the basis for an operation order issued by the commander in the event of an emergency. See also final plan; operation plan. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)
**interdiction.** An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (JP 1-02)

**joint.** Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

**joint operation planning.** Planning for contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility or joint operations area of the command. Planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, campaign plans, and operation orders (other than the Single Integrated Operational Plan) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint operation planning is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance, strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy, and emerging crises. As such, joint operation planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning, and redeployment planning procedures. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures. See also contingency plan; execution planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (JP 1-02)

**Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.** A system that provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and combatant command-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. See also joint operation planning. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint planning and execution community.** Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. It usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), unified commands (and their certain Service component commands), subunified commands, transportation component commands, joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JPEC. (JP 1-02)

**Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.** The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish task and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the National Command Authorities. Also
Joint Strategic Planning System. The primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out the statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS. (JP 1-02)

Maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces on the battlespace through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02)

Military objective. A derived set of military actions to be taken to implement National Command Authorities guidance in support of national objectives. A military objective defines the results to be achieved by the military and assigns tasks to commanders. See also national objectives. (JP 1-02)

Multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. See also coalition. (JP 1-02)

National military strategy. The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. Also called NMS. (JP 1-02)

National objectives. The aims, derived from national goals and interests, toward which a national policy or strategy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied. See also military objective. (JP 1-02)

National policy. A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (JP 1-02)

National security strategy. The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also
called national strategy or grand strategy. (JP 1-02)

**operation.** 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

**operational art.** The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. (JP 1-02)

**operational design.** The key considerations used as a framework in the course of planning for a campaign or major operation. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic level of war, tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

**operational reach.** The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 1-02)

**operation order.** A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (JP 1-02)

**operation plan.** Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operational Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN— An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC’s Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN — An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s
Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD — A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. Also called CONPLAN. See also operation order. (JP 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

specified command. A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

strategic concept. The course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the military, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures which stem from it. (JP 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See also operational level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who
receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. See also joint operation planning.  (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. See also supported commander; supporting plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. See also operational level of war; strategic level of war. (JP 1-02)

theater. The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)

theater of operations. A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. Also called TO. See also theater of war. (JP 1-02)

theater of war. Defined by the National Command Authorities or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. See also theater of operations. (JP 1-02)

theater strategic environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences in the theater that describes the diplomatic-military situation, affect the employment of military forces, and affect the decisions of the operational chain of command. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

theater strategy. The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. See also national military strategy; national security strategy. (JP 1-02)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, that is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

warning order. 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. 2. A crisis
action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander’s estimate be submitted. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. (JP 1-02)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 5** is in the **Plans** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1** Project Proposal
- Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2** Program Directive
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCs
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3** Two Drafts
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4** CJCS Approval
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCs
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

**STEP #5** Assessments/Revision
- The CINCs receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director, J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised

**ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY**

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staff for filling extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

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Assessments/Revision

Program Directive

Two Drafts