**Joint Operations Joint Center for Lessons Learned Bulletin Volume II, Issue 1, 1999**

The original document contains color images.
From the Staff

The important lessons learned for all personnel to know are in the field with you, not with us. The JCLL has the mission and the means to share those lessons with the rest of the joint community. If you or your unit have a “lesson” that could help others do it right the first time, then send it to us. Don’t wait until you have a polished article. The JCLL can take care of the editing, format, and layout. We want the raw material that can be packaged and then shared with everyone. Please take the time to put your good ideas on paper and get them to the JCLL. We will acknowledge receipt and then work with you to put your material in a publishable form with you as the author.

We want your e-mail address, please send your command e-mail address to us at jcll@jwfc.jfcom.mil. Our future plans call for electronic dissemination of various material.

REMEMBER!!!
TIMELY SUBMISSION OF INTERIM REPORTS, AFTER-ACTION REPORTS, AND LESSONS LEARNED RESULTS IN MORE TIMELY, QUALITY PRODUCTS AND ANALYSIS FROM THE JCLL STAFF.

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Cover photos courtesy of defense Visual Information center
As the new commander of the United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, let me assure you we will make every effort to provide the kind of support you need in the field to accomplish your job. If you have lessons you would like to share, feel free to submit your article to the JCLL. If you have a good idea on how to do things better, please let us know either through the feedback form at the end of this bulletin or through other correspondence. Finally, we have included the results of a survey we posted on our web page soliciting how we can better support you.

WILLIAM S. WALLACE
Major General, US Army
Commander, JFCOM JWFC
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The Joint Center for Lessons Learned continues to grow and expand its role in joint after-action and lessons learned activities. We have improved past products and services, implemented recent initiatives, and are exploring new ones. Our NIPRNET and SIPRNET web sites have been improved and re-designed during the past year and the content updated. With the publishing of the recent issue of the *JCLL Bulletin*, the bulletin’s format has been set and its publishing increased from semi-annually to quarterly.

Four previous initiatives of the JCLL were implemented during the past year. First, the JCLL provided lessons learned support during five exercises as part of the JWFC After-Action Cell. JCLL teams developed post-exercise draft Joint After-Action Reports for TEMPO BRAVE 99, AGILE LION 99, TANDUM THRUST 99, COBRA GOLD 99, and RSOI 99. Second, a lessons learned Help Desk providing online NIPRNET/SIPRNET and telephonic support became operational in May and is available for both the Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS) and for the Windows-based Joint Instructional Input Program (WinJIIP). The third initiative was to establish a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) and the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC). This mutually beneficial agreement commits the JCLL to providing lessons learned research and support to the college. Conversely, the college allows JCLL access to joint seminars and student research papers for use in the Bulletin and as a means to maintain the most current Joint operational perspective. Finally, the JCLL provided lessons learned support to three real-world contingency operations (RWCO). As part of the JWFC After-Action team, members of the JCLL provided short-term lessons learned support to USSOUTHCOM Headquarters during HURRICANE MITCH and the planning for Operation SUSTAIN HOPE. The JCLL also provided online/telephonic lessons learned assistance to JTF NOBLE ANVIL, as well as on-site after-action activity support to Headquarters USEUCOM and JTF NOBLE ANVIL during the SECDEF directed ALLIED FORCE/NOBLE ANVIL “Quick Look.” JCLL continues to work with USEUCOM J37 to develop the joint after-action report for the operations and build an archive of Operation NOBLE ANVIL lessons learned information.

During the next few months the JCLL will be involved in the development and implementation of as many as six lessons learned-related initiatives. Initiatives include: increased support to real-world contingency operations, the development of a web browser observation input tool, the development of a lessons learned analysis tool, the establishment of an Operation NOBLE ANVIL online repository, and the simplification of the JAARS electronic submission procedures. In addition to the development and implementation of these initiatives, JCLL will be working to resolve issues in three areas: the formal delineation of Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command joint lesson learned system responsibilities, the role of the JCLL in the new Joint Forces Command, and the “re-engineering” of the Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS).

We encourage those of you who may have suggestions and recommendations concerning any of the above products, services, initiatives, or issues to contact the JCLL staff. We continue to strive to improve the joint lessons learned system, but solicit and need your help to make it a viable system.
JCLL Database Summary

The purpose of this summary is to assist the joint community in searching the JCLL database for significant and relevant information. It is a summary of the contents of the JCLL’s Lessons Learned Database, which currently contains 1649 reports. Of these, 1266 are linked to Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Version 3.0 tasks. The other 383 are Summary Reports, which do not require linkage, or are linked to tasks at the tactical (TA) level. All of these reports are available on the JCLL web page (jcll.jwfc.acom.smil.mil) for download. The following chart shows a summary of the linked reports compared to the functional areas of the UJTL. There are 606 OP level entries, 465 ST level entries, and 601 SN level entries. Remember, many of the reports are linked to more than one task. As with past database updates, the most prevalent functional area among linked reports is OP 5, Exercise Operational Command and Control.

Since November of 1998 the reports placed in the JCLL database have been linked to a diverse and large number of UJTL tasks. Over 160 UJTL tasks are linked to the topics in these “newest” reports. The following text box lists the ten most frequently linked tasks. Use the information to aid you in searching the JCLL database.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Task</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ST 5.1.2</td>
<td>Manage Theater C4 Systems for Communicating Strategic Orders and Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN 3.4.9</td>
<td>Support Personnel Recovery Worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST 5.3.4</td>
<td>Prepare and Coordinate Theater Strategy, Campaign Plans or Operation Plans, and Orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST 6.2.7</td>
<td>Conduct Personnel Recovery in AOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST 6.2.8</td>
<td>Establish NBC Defense in Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP 4.4.5</td>
<td>Train Joint Forces and Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP 5.1.1</td>
<td>Communicate Operational Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP 5.1.2</td>
<td>Manage Means of Communicating Operational Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP 6.2.8</td>
<td>Establish NBC Protection in Theater of Operations/JOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP 6.2.9</td>
<td>Coordinate and Conduct Personnel Recovery</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
To say that the nature of intelligence support to US joint military operations has changed over recent years is an understatement. The growth of mission diversity routinely faced by joint military staffs and changing mission priorities has provided intelligence staffs with significant challenges. The purpose of this article is to identify and very briefly explore a few of the major challenges—specifically as they relate to intelligence operations at the joint task force (JTF) level. This is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion, but rather a “stage setter” for a more detailed discussion in a series of follow-on articles.

Although it will discuss some basic elements of intelligence operations, it is important to note that this article is not intended as an intelligence primer. Secondly, many of the points contained herein translate directly to intelligence support to combined military operations. However, the focus is on joint rather than combined or coalition operations.

According to Joint Publication 2-0, *Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, the mission of intelligence organizations supporting Joint US military operations is to “...provide insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and help JFCs clearly define the desired end state and when that end state has been achieved.” In the recent past these words would have been generally interpreted to mean a razor honing of our intelligence analysis of the military forces and capabilities of the Soviet Union. During the post WWII cold war era our fixation on Soviet military capabilities and intentions heavily influenced the molding of our own intelligence capabilities and processes. This legacy continues to influence our ability to adjust to the changing dynamics of operational requirements. In the case of JTF operations, these requirements can be stated in terms of:

**The Mission:** Provide intelligence support to a joint task force assigned to conduct a counterterrorism operation, or peacekeeping operation, or a noncombatant evacuation operation generated by severe national turmoil, or disaster relief to a hurricane devastated nation.

**The Task:** Provide intelligence support to the range of operations shown above—plus maintain a high degree of proficiency to execute your primary intelligence mission in support of wartime operations.

**The Challenge:** Achieve mission success in all of the above in a highly effective and efficient manner.

**The question:** HOW?

The above is somewhat of an over simplification, but it serves to highlight the expanded scope of requirements for intelligence support at the JTF level.

In looking at JTF intelligence operations across the range of military missions, it is important to distinguish between the intelligence process or “cycle” as it is referred to in JP 2-01 (fig 1) and the content contained within that cycle. While the basic components of the intelligence cycle are applicable across the mission continuum, the actual dynamics contained within each of these five areas may differ dramatically. If fact, these variances when contrasted against classic support to warfighting operations in some cases are so great that there may not be a recognition of an intelligence support requirement at all. For example, in the case of a Humanitarian Assistance mission there is no classic “trigger pulling” opposition force (OPFOR). As a result, there may be a tendency on the part of the intelligence staff members to be uncertain regarding their role in support of operational planning and execution. In fact, for several JTF level exercises focused on military operations other than war (MOOTW) during the 1996-99 timeframe the JTF intelligence staffs did not prepare an intelligence input (annex B) to the operations order. In one case the only entry under annex B was “not required.”
Operationally, practically, and doctrinally, such a decision is not a viable option. Despite the presence or absence of a thinking adversary, the intelligence staff has the responsibility to provide a thorough intelligence preparation of the assigned operations area (e.g., joint operations area, etc.). Even in a benign threat situation such as humanitarian assistance, the intelligence staff owes the commander an ongoing assessment of significant operations area features and events (e.g., terrain analysis, pertinent demographic considerations, etc.) and an operational vigilance regarding potential emerging threats. In addition, regardless of the mission type, there are a wide variety of significant support actions required of the intelligence staff.

For example, every mission has centers of gravity which, if effectively influenced, will aid in achieving mission objectives. Also, the multiphased nature of JTF missions requires the identification and understanding of measures of effectiveness to assist in phase and mission transition planning. While these terms and their application to a warfighting mission are well understood, their value to operational planning in other mission areas often eludes intelligence staff members.

There are a number of possible causes for the situation described above, not the least of which is the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. The transition of US military intelligence support to joint military operations has undergone major expansion and transition since the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. Without the powerful nemesis that the USSR represented, other tasks and missions were found to replace the operating “void” created by the absence of a single, world-class threat found in the form of the Warsaw Pact alliance.

One of the major challenges faced in operating in such an environment is found in the legacy of cold war intelligence operations. For several decades US military intelligence analysis was “grown” in the light of the strategic Soviet threat. As a result, the US military intelligence analysts were steeped in the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat profile and its associated strict templating. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the “more but smaller” threat picture, there is a requirement to adjust the focus and tailoring of new intelligence analysts. In-depth study and training on the highly structured Soviet military model resulted in heavy analytical reliance on “templating” the threat as a means of analyzing the situation and projecting the threat,
to include course of action probabilities, identification of centers of gravity, and conceptualizing/analyzing the adversary’s decision cycle. Major planning efforts consisted of refining the previous version of OPLANs, CONPLANs, etc. As a result, US military intelligence analysts became accustomed to dealing with analysis that involved a significant degree of templating as part of the problem solving methodology. That has changed significantly. Now intelligence analysts deployed as an element of a JTF staff are more likely to face a broader array of unknowns than their cold war era counterparts. Generally, they do not deploy with a comprehensive suite of electronic databases focused on providing near instantaneous responses to analyst queries. In fact, depending on the joint operations area (JOA) assigned, they may have relatively sparse databases from which to draw background data. Even the probability of support through reachback tasking to the supporting theater and national intelligence organizations is less likely to be able to provide the requested information, or to provide it in a timely manner. This shortfall may be at least partially offset through the interface with host nation sources or other (somewhat nontraditional) sources such as local nongovernment organizations (NGOs) or private volunteer organizations (PVOs) who generally have better access and awareness on many issues of potential intelligence value than do JTF staff members.

How do we begin to address the myriad of challenges to providing both effective and efficient intelligence support to JTF operations? This article has only scratched the surface on a very complex issue. However, when addressing any or all of these challenges, the center of any approach is the intelligence analyst. There is a need for creative thinkers—individuals who are not only consummate experts regarding the application of intelligence capabilities in support of combat operations, but who can also think “outside the box.” That is to say, individuals who can interpolate principles of intelligence support to the warfighter and apply them to other mission sets; analysts who are adept at the identification and application of asynchronous intelligence concepts. This is especially critical in the identification and influencing of centers of gravity, understanding the value of this effort to operational planners, how some centers of gravity are transient or transitional in nature, and how changing the operating parameters (changing missions or changing phases of an operation) may alter the friendly or adversary centers of gravity.

The strategic challenges generated by just the few points mentioned in this article are truly mammoth. For example, when considering the points mentioned above, how do you develop (much less sustain and employ) the breadth and depth of intelligence capabilities to support not only the relatively slow and methodical road to war in a major regional conflict, but also the lightening fast, precision application to a short fuse mission such as counterterrorism or consequence management? How do you equip to employ intelligence support for the hammer-fisted application of full-scale combat, but also the featherlight, culturally sensitive support for a humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operation? In each of these cases the intelligence support provided uses the same five-step intelligence cycle. However, the dynamics and substantive content resident within each differs greatly. Even many of the basic associated assumptions are potentially different. For example, in support to combat operations, there are relatively few constraints on the employment of intelligence assets other than those imposed by system or combat limitations. However, in other mission areas (i.e. humanitarian assistance or disaster relief) there are often critical constraints imposed by the host nation, which is often hesitant to have foreign intelligence gathering conducted on its sovereign territory.

The challenges and considerations identified and implied above are immense and continue to emerge. Like the challenges, the answers are also numerous. Some are here while others are just emerging, or are yet to be identified. For the short term, the continuing development of joint doctrine (such as JP 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures) and the substantive revisions of existing documents (such as the Universal Joint Task List version 4.0) will provide at least the baseline guidance for intelligence staffs operating across the diverse range of military operations. Finally, real-world operations such as PROVIDE HOPE, PROVIDE COMFORT, and NOBLE ANVIL will continue to provide invaluable firsthand lessons and training on how (and how not) to conduct JTF intelligence operations.
JCLL SEARCH OF THE JOINT LESSONS LEARNED DATABASES

The Joint Center for Lessons Learned has the ability to search lessons learned databases for significant information relevant to a given topic. This information is usually requested by members of the joint community. A search can result in finding numerous lessons learned reports (formerly called JULLs) which the JCLL analyzes for inclusion in a written report. The JCLL then gives the finished research product to the requesting agency. The following is an example of such a finished product. Because of space limitations only four of the reports listed below are included in this bulletin article. All of the lessons learned reports listed in this analysis product can be accessed on the JCLL SIPRNET web page (jcll.jufc.acom.smil.mil). This article also includes a short spreadsheet which lists classified lessons learned applicable to the research topic. The numbers in bold print indicate that those reports are included in enclosed text boxes.

JCLL Analysis for “Standing Up” a Joint Task Force

Robert Murphy
Analyst, Joint Center for Lessons Learned

Search Characteristics

To help “Stand Up” a new Joint Task Force, the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) conducted a search of the Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS) current and Remedial Action Program (RAP) databases. More specifically, the search of the data base used Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs) OP 5.5 – Organize a Joint Force Headquarters and OP 5.5.1 – Develop a Joint Force Command and Control Structure as search criteria. The current data base revealed 89 “hits” but the RAP data base revealed zero hits. Of the 89 “hits” from the current data base search, seventeen were classified. These seventeen classified observations/lessons learned will not be included in this report. However, their title and number will be listed and these items can be made available if desired. The remaining 72 items are categorized into three areas:

1) Organization, Manning, Command and Control (33 items)
2) Liaison Structure (12 items)
3) Other Supporting Observations/Lessons Learned (27 items)
Four observations/lessons learned (# 90335-63780, 92549-58179, 00070-06099, and 00070-06102) highlight staff selection and augmentation. These items emphasize the importance of having qualified joint staff officers and having them arrive early enough to integrate into the staff. Another three items (# 90350-89863, 90432-76953, 90353-29118) emphasize the importance of the depth of the staff.

JULLS LONG REPORT


2. (U) Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY conducted by USACOM on 09/19/94.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: DTTP (DOC, TAC, TECH, PR), JTF (JOINT TASK FORCE), MANPOWER & PERSONNEL, MOUNTAIN, RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), STAFF FUNCTIONS, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

4. (U) TITLE: Observation - JTF Staff Augmentee Selection and Assignment.

5. (U) OBSERVATION: JTF augmentees do not adequately serve the operational needs of the JTF commander unless they have the requisite skills to perform at the JTF staff level. They also are not fully productive unless they arrive in time to fully integrate into the staff prior to deployment and are sufficiently equipped to function to capacity. Most augmentees provided to JTF-1 90 were more junior in grade and experience than the manning document requested, many had received less than 24 hours notice prior to deployment and were not prepared to go overseas, most were newly arrived at their commands with little knowledge of their command mission or functions, which gave them little other than their time and effort to contribute to the JTF.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: The 240 members of the 10th Mountain Division staff were augmented by over 400 service members in the JTF-190 staff. Although soldier readiness checks ensured augmentees were personally deployable, the staff sections could not keep pace logistically with the large growth of personnel. There was an inadequate amount of facilities, cots and water to support the increased numbers of the staff. Augmentees did not have organic vehicle support to support their movement. These factors eventually caused a feeling that augmentees were not fully members of the JTF team. The personnel assignment system which supports JTF staffing must be overhauled to ensure that augmentees contribute fully to the JTF staff. In most cases, this will require the designation of personnel with certain skills or levels of experience, particularly those with priorjoint or JTF experience. Such officers and NCOs may well have to be placed on a type of readiness posture to support their rapid deployment.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: None.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: JTF staff augmentees must be selected and assigned based upon more than table of organization and line number description and must in all cases be provided in a timely manner, otherwise they become a burden on the JTF rather than assets.

9. (U) COMMENTS (92549-58179): None.

(U) TASKS:
- OP 5.5.6 Establish or Participate in Task Forces
- (U) SUBJECT: PERSONNEL
- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: DOCTRINE
- (U) Action managed by: CJCS FI action worked by: JWFC, RAP number:0829.
- (U) DISPOSITION: FOLD INTO 62737-84871 SG 95-2
Several observations/lessons learned highlight actions that enhance joint operations by either co-locating people, units, components or staffs, or by establishing centers, committees, or cells. Examples include: a) Air operations were enhanced by co-locating the Joint Force Air Coordinator (JFAC) with the J3 in the JTF operations center (# 60947-51648). b) Special operations were enhanced by co-locating the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) with the JTF (# 22835-01132). It is also difficult to predict the challenges that a JTF will face during an operation. However, one technique that has worked in the past is forming centers, committees, and cells to handle specific problems. Five observations highlight this concept. These include:

- Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) (# 21630-81968)
- Joint Information Coordination Committee (JICC) (# 81336-85291)
- Joint Force Information Warfare Commander concept (JFIWC)(# 62738-20199)
- Airlift Planning Cell (# 82935-21723)
- Friendly Force Coordination Center (F2C2) (# 12331-81086)

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2. (U) FTX JTFEX 97-2 conducted by USACOM on 03/22/97.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: JTFEX 97-2, FTX (FIELD TRAINING EXER).
4. (U) TITLE: Observation - Command and Control Warfare (C2W).
5. (U) OBSERVATION: CJTF 950 (Second Feet) chose to organize C2W under a component commander vice under the JTF commander's J-3 which is the traditional doctrinal approach described in Joint Pub 3-13. 
6. (U) DISCUSSION: As illustrated in Joint Pub 3-13. 1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, page IV-3, C2W operations are normally organized under the C2W officer, who oversees a staff of personnel that plan and coordinate the C2W campaign for the JTF commander. The C2W officer normally reports to the JTF J-3. Alternatively, Second Fleet believes C2W operations should be organized directly under a Joint Force Information Warfare Commander (JFIWC). Second Fleet believes the JFIWC concept provides greater leverage for controlling Information Operations when a C2W commander can directly coordinate with other component commanders and address the Joint task Force commander as his C2W strategist vice a J-3 intermediary. A C2W commander’s ability to directly coordinate with other component commanders streamlines the C2W targeting effort and provides for the efficient allocation of resources against C2W targets. The use of the JFIWC concept may be a more effective method for orchestrating and executing C2W operations vice the traditional doctrinal approach described in Joint Pub 3-13 1.
7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: None.
8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: The Joint Staff J-3 and J-7 review and comment on the viability of Second Fleet’s C2W doctrinal concept for inclusion into emerging Joint Pub 3-13, Information Operations.
9. (U) COMMENTS (62738-20199): This action taken for action by the Joint Staff under SJS 97-02441, dated 10 June 97. Suspense is 11 September. POC: J-3 in conjunction with J-7.
- (U) TASKS: OP 5.5.1 Develop a Joint Force Command and Control Structure
- (U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS
- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: DOCTRINE
- (U) DISPOSITION: Noted Item SG 98-1.
Several items concentrated on command and control. One observation (# 51548-30230) highlights the challenge of command relationships inherent to combined operations. Four others (# 32645-29716, 90334-39956, 82855-74932, 81625-29400) directly discuss command relationships with their components. Two additional observations emphasize the importance of a simple and clear command and control structure.

**Liaison Structure**

All observations/lessons learned in this category stress the importance of liaison officers. Nearly all insist on “LNO Cells” capable of conducting 24-hour operations. No more one man LNOs. Additionally, nearly all items state the LNO team must: have sufficient rank to influence the decision making process, be knowledgeable of their unit/service, and have the experience and ability to do the job. One observation/lessons learned (# 00349-63210) identifies some procedures for LNOs. Two other items emphasize that a staff section (more likely the J-3) should have overall cognizance of LNO activities. The Matador 98 Assessment – OP 5.5.2 (# 00070-06100) highlights most topics discussed in each of the other observations in this section.

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**JULLS LONG REPORT**

1. **(U) JULLS NUMBER: 00349-63210 (00924), submitted by COMPHIBGRUTWO, MAJ ANDERSON, 680-8676, (804)464-8676.**
2. **(U) NLX ELIGIBLE RECEIVER 92-1 conducted by JS ASSESSMENT on 08/28/92.**
3. **(U) KEYWORDS: CPX (COMMAND POST EXER), FTX (FIELD TRAINING EXER), NIEX (NO NOTE INTER EXER), USA (US ARMY), USAF (US AIR FORCE), USN (US NAVY), USMC (US MARINE CORPS), DOD (DEPARTMENT OF DEF), MILITARY SERVICE HQ, JCS (JOINT CHIEFS OF STF), COMBINED UNIFIED COMMAND, SPECIFIED COMMAND, OTHER AGENCIES, LIAISON, OPERATIONS, NEO (NONCOMBATANT EVAC), JOINT PLANNING, ELIGIBLE RECEIVER 92-1, C2 (COMMAND AND CONTROL), OPDERS/GUIDANCE, WWMCCS (WW MIL C2 SYS), INTELLIGENCE, MC&G (MAPPING, CHARTING,), COMMUNICATIONS, TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS, INTEROPERABILITY, DTTP (DOC, TAC, TECH, FR), SOP (STANDING OP PROC).**
4. **(U) TITLE: Observation - LIAISON OFFICER PROCEDURES FOR JOINT EXERCISES.**
5. **(U) OBSERVATION: Liaison officers must be prepared to support the joint command in any eventuality.**
6. **(U) DISCUSSION: During Exercise Eligible Receiver 92, Liaison Officers were exchanged. Supporting units provided LNOs from the supported and supporting unit. The exercise was a joint crisis management exercise.**
7. **(U) LESSON LEARNED: None.**
8. **(U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Units should develop a LNO SOP that provides the command’s expectations for the LNO. This SOP should also provide a checklist for the LNO to follow prior to departing the command. A Liaison Officer will not be prepared to answer every question or be prepared for every eventuality. In order to provide required services, however, the LNO can come armed with materials that will allow him to properly operate.**
   a. **(U) The LNO should be selected on the basis of his experience and ability.**
   b. **(U) A meeting should be scheduled with the Commander to determine his mission intent and objectives.**
   c. **(U) The LNO should meet with staff section heads to collect inputs on any problem areas they might have.**
   d. **(U) Materials should be selected carefully. The gaining command may not have service specific MC&G products which should brought by the supporting LNO. Telephone listings, frequency plans, service unique publications, command SOP’S, etc. should also brought by the LNO.**
   e. **(U) If possible, the LNO should be familiar with the gaining command’s organization and functions.**
   f. **(U) If the LNO is a Naval Officer on an Amphibious Staff, he should be prepared to answer questions regarding the Marine Corps.**
   g. **(U) As the LNO performs his duties, he should also establish coordination with other service LNO’S. If this is accomplished, the LNO is better prepared to provide the supporting command with a comprehensive picture of what is going on.**
   h. **(U) In a joint environment, there is a heavy reliance on WWMCCS teleconferencing. The LNO should be familiar with teleconferencing procedures.**
   - **(U) COMMENTS: Single Agency Item.**
   - **(U) TASKS:**
     - OP 5.5.2 Develop Joint Force Liaison Structure
     - **(U) SUBJECT: OPERATIONS**
     - **(U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP**
Other Supporting Observations/ Lessons Learned

This section primarily contains items that stand alone. However, there are a few items that fall into sub-groups. Four items (# 20456-93532, 60118-82900, 72829-35910, 72848-64157) discuss mission assumption and criteria for assuming a Joint Operations Area (JOA). These items highlight that sufficient forces need to be in position prior to mission assumption, and the issues and risks associated with mission assumption need to be discussed in course of action (COA) analysis of the war gaming process.

Several items discuss staff specific areas. For example, two items (# 51538-96903 and 82937-63939) discuss J1 administrative procedures and administrative functions. One item (# 40345-94089) discusses the standardization of intelligence information. Several items discuss planning. These include:

- Airlift Planning (# 61526-69291)
- Combined Seaport Coordination (# 62724-29360)
- USMC Cargo Movement Requirements (# 62723-89665)
- Operations Center Scheduling (# 83034-06226)
- JOPES (Joint Operations Planning and Execution System) (# 90249-33654)

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 40345-94089 (01215), submitted by I MEF(FWD) G-2, Lt Col Shelton, 365-9148, 760)725-9148.
2. (U) Operation DESERT THUNDER conducted by USCINCENT on 04/04/98.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: DESERT THUNDER, RWO (REAL WORLD OPS), DOD (DEPARTMENT OF DEF), SPECIFIED COMMAND, SAC (STRATEGIC AIR CMD), JTF (JOINT TASK FORCE), INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, LIASION, ORDERS/GUIDANCE, INTELLIGENCE, SIGINT (SIGNALS INTEL), RECONNAISSANCE, COLLECTION MANAGEMENT, OPERATIONAL TASKS, EW (ELECTRONIC WARFARE), COMMUNICATIONS, ADP/COMPUTERS, HARDWARE, SOFTWARE, OPLAN, INTEROPERABILITY, DTTP (DOC, TAC, TECH, PR), SPECIAL ITEMS, JSTARS (JT SURV TGT ARS), EQUIPMENT TYPE, U-2 AIRCRAFT, SOP (STND OP PROCEDURE), RFI (RADIO FREQ FNTER), E-8 JSTARS AIRCRAFT, OP 2, OP 5.5.
4. (U) TITLE: Observation - Standardization of intel information handling procedures.
5. (U) OBSERVATION: There is inconsistency in the establishment of JTF intelligence organizations and intelligence information handling processes.
6. (U) DISCUSSION: Each JTF, at activation, brings distinct strengths and weaknesses, based upon its parent command service doctrine, previous JTF experiences, OPLAN responsibilities and the diversity of its recent operations. Each JTF will also have different requirements expected of it based upon METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available). Nevertheless, there is a need to establish a standing set of joint standards for the activation of the intelligence function within a JTF/Coalition Task Force (CTF). This joint intel standing operating procedure (SOP) would address, among other things:
   a. (U) The establishment of a Request for Information (RFI)/Production Requirement (PR) management process.
   b. (U) A collection management and prioritization process.
   c. (U) Guidance on the incorporation of foreign military organizations into JTF/CTFs and foreign disclosure management.
   d. (U) Systems and architecture standards (both hardware and software) to include planning for the dissemination of near-real time and real-time (JSTARS, U2, etc.) intel to US forces at the level at which it is most needed (components or subordinate organizations).
   e. (U) Establishing the architecture to pass intel information to non-US elements of the JTF/CTF.
   f. (U) Task Force Counter-intelligence Coordinating Authority (TFCICA) policy and procedures.
   g. (U) Standards to facilitate interoperability between the different service SIGINT capabilities.
   h. (U) A checklist of items to be considered and actions to be taken at the establishment of the JTF/CTF.
   i. (U) Recommended locations, connectivity planning and functioning for both US and foreign functional liaison elements. The above represents just a fraction of what needs to be covered in this joint SOP. The point is that this must be applicable to any JTF, in any CINC's theater, at any time, and must be updated annually, at a minimum.
7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: None.
8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: Establish a committee at the joint doctrine level to develop a template to be used in the activation of a JTF/CTF's intelligence directorate.
9. (U) COMMENTS (40345-94089): None.
   - (U) TASKS:
     - OP 2 Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance OP 5.5 Organize a Joint Force Headquarters
     - (U) SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE
     - (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP
Conclusion

The information in this summary is a result of the search of the JCLL JULLS database for information relevant to forming a JTF. Various observations/lessons learned from this report should aid in “Standing Up” a Joint Task Force. Each item gives a unique view of past situations which offer the new JTF staff the opportunity to avoid past mistakes and ensure a successful operation.

Below is a list of 17 classified reports not included in this analysis:

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<td>Global Archer 97-4</td>
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U.S. Armed Forces Support of Foreign Disaster Relief

Mel Schaller
Analyst, Joint Center for Lessons Learned

Throughout history U.S. military forces have been primarily focused on warfighting—it is the mission in which they have traditionally excelled and effectively trained for over two hundred years. Recently this focus has expanded to include a complex group collectively known as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The ever-changing international environment has made DoD participation in these operations a critical part of supporting U.S. national interests. MOOTW encompasses the use of military forces over a broad range of operations short of war. It focuses on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities (foreign and domestic) in response to civil crises. Joint task force (JTF) support of foreign civil authorities in the form of humanitarian assistance (HA), specifically the diverse planning considerations of a foreign disaster relief mission, is the focus of this article.

Aerial view of some of the destruction caused by Hurricane Mitch in Honduras
DoD Photo: TSGT Thomas Cook, Soto Cano Air Base
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 94, defines a foreign disaster as, “An act of nature (such as flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic) or an act of man (such as riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic) which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States’ foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or to an international organization.” From floods in Bangladesh, to erupting volcanoes in the Philippines, to starvation in Somalia, U.S. forces have found themselves providing foreign disaster relief throughout the world. JP 1-02 states that foreign disaster relief is, “Prompt aid which can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. (Normally, it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicines, beds and bedding, temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel, medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services.)”

Doctrine states that components of the Department of Defense will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after the Department of State (DOS) determines that the U.S. will provide foreign disaster relief. The DOS will send a request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The request indicates:

- The country (s), international organizations, and/or individuals needing help
- The form of the assistance
- The types and amounts of materiel and services
- The amount of funds allocated to the DoD
- Any other required information

Subject to any overriding military mission, the Department of Defense is required to respond rapidly to this request. This type of a mission could be joint, multinational, interagency (involving US Government (DOS, DOT, etc.)) and non-government organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), regional organizations, or international organizations (IOs), or all of them.

Every military operation should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective is the focus of the effort and should have a clear answer to the question “Why are we doing this?” In the case of humanitarian assistance/foreign disaster relief, the overall objective is to reduce human suffering by alleviating the effects of a natural or manmade disaster. As a part of international goodwill, this is accomplished in the context of U.S. national interests. The forces must understand what constitutes success and what circumstances may cause the mission to be terminated before success is achieved. Defining this success or end state may be extremely difficult in any HA/DR mission, but it is important to keep everyone focused on a clear objective. If the United States’ political guidance does not specifically address the desired military end state, it is up to the commander to thoroughly analyze the mission and the threat in order to translate political guidance into appropriate military objectives. Likewise, the military objective
may change during the operation for any number of reasons. Political and military leaders may gain a better understanding of the situation, forces may be needed for other missions elsewhere, or the current situation might change drastically and suddenly. In that case, the commander must be willing and able to adjust the military objectives or risk failure of reaching the political objectives.

In other words, the commander must be willing to change and adapt in a dynamic environment. Uncertainty is the major consideration in the planning and execution of foreign disaster relief operations. Every situation is unique to the type of disaster. There is no standard foreign disaster relief operation. Each one is conducted in a particular setting based on variables such as geography, climate, culture, and resources. These “physical features” are further complicated by an ever-changing operational environment. In general, there are three such environments in which foreign disaster relief operations may be conducted. They are:

Permissive-The operation has overall popular support and there is minimal threat to the operation’s forces.

Uncertain-The host nation does not have control of the people or territory in which the operation takes place.

Hostile-The operational area may be experiencing hostilities, from civil disorder, to terrorist activity, to combat. In this situation force protection becomes a primary concern.

The floods following Hurricane Mitch washed out many roads and knocked down bridges like this one near Yoro, Honduras.
DoD Photo by: TSGT Thomas Cook, Soto Cano Air Base
In addition to the physical and operational environment, the forces may also be affected by the rules of engagement (ROE). The ROE may be used to control the use of force in three main areas: force protection, mission accomplishment, and armed conflict. They provide guidance regarding the use of force, but do not limit the ability to use all necessary means available for self-defense. ROE must be unambiguous and clearly written so everyone will know the designated limits but also that they will not be prosecuted while acting in self-defense. These rules do not limit a commander’s inherent authority and obligation to take appropriate action in self-defense of U.S. Forces in the area of the foreign disaster relief operation. The major determinant and influence of ROE is the operational environment. If ROE are not clearly stated, agreed upon, and understood, the commander will never be able to properly define mission objectives and reach the desired end state. A key concept is that the mission must always drive the ROE, not vice-versa. The dynamic environment of any operation may result in changes to the rules of engagement, which will

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**The JCLL databases**

The JCLL databases contain many lessons learned reports which show the complexity of planning and executing foreign and/or domestic disaster relief missions. The following is a partial list of those reports. All of the lessons learned reports listed here can be accessed on the JCLL SIPRNET web page http://jcll.jwfc.acom.smil.mil

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In addition to the physical and operational environment, the forces may also be affected by the rules of engagement (ROE). The ROE may be used to control the use of force in three main areas: force protection, mission accomplishment, and armed conflict. They provide guidance regarding the use of force, but do not limit the ability to use all necessary means available for self-defense. ROE must be unambiguous and clearly written so everyone will know the designated limits but also that they will not be prosecuted while acting in self-defense. These rules do not limit a commander’s inherent authority and obligation to take appropriate action in self-defense of U.S. Forces in the area of the foreign disaster relief operation. The major determinant and influence of ROE is the operational environment. If ROE are not clearly stated, agreed upon, and understood, the commander will never be able to properly define mission objectives and reach the desired end state. A key concept is that the mission must always drive the ROE, not vice-versa. The dynamic environment of any operation may result in changes to the rules of engagement, which will
have a direct impact on the ability to achieve mission success.

Achieving mission success in a foreign disaster relief operation is also dependent on how well the joint military organization collaborates with non-military agencies of the U.S Government (USG), NGOs, PVOs, and IOs. This collaboration is known as the interagency process. In order to be successful, military operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies, even if they have conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making processes. Unfortunately, there is no overall “Interagency Command” to ensure that all these organizations work together toward providing the prompt aid which will alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. In the case of non-military USG departments and agencies, the goals may be the same as the military organization but the differences in processes and cultures may still require compromises. In some cases the NGOs and PVOs present the military commander with even more challenges. Since they are specialized and have strict accountability to their own authorities, they usually never accept tasking from anyone outside of their organization. Few will readily compromise or coordinate with others unless their organization needs to cooperate, or there is a quid pro quo. Some may have policies that are diametrically opposed to military and government agencies, or even to each other. Regional organizations (such as NATO, Organization of African Unity, and Organization of American States) and IOs (such as the United Nations and International Red Cross/Red Crescent) also bring their own goals and procedures to the operation. However, each of the above brings its own expertise and resources to the effort. This diversity can be the strength of interagency operations. The military commander must recognize each organization’s strengths and weaknesses, and focus on the strengths to meet the goals of the operation.

The missions facing today’s joint forces are increasingly challenging and complicated by the growing importance of Military Operations Other Than War. Planning and executing these MOOTW missions require new and diverse resources and skills. Ever changing objectives, physical and operational environments, and a list of “players a mile long” constantly confront joint force commanders. Success in the foreign disaster relief mission often depends on the ability to “read” the situation and control all the variables. Failure often results from not recognizing the variables and losing control of the situation.

REFERENCES:

Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,” 9 Oct 96
Army Lessons Learned and Successful TTPs for Hurricane Mitch Humanitarian Assistance: JTF Commander’s Initial Impressions

CPT Leonel Nascimento, USA Military Analyst, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

Hurricane Mitch, which struck Central America in late October 1998, was the Atlantic basin’s fourth strongest hurricane in recorded history with sustained winds of 180 mph. To augment the pre-existing joint task force (JTF) operating in Honduras, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) formed a separate JTF in mid-November 1998, to facilitate host nation long-term recovery efforts within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Led by an Army assistant division commander (ADC), this new JTF consisted of three task forces (TF), each responsible for humanitarian assistance (HA) operations in one of the countries in the JOA. The TF commanders in the three countries were from different services - Army, Air Force, and Marines.

The JTF faced many significant challenges from the very beginning. The total JOA spanned 100,357 square miles. The destruction in the region included 2,860 dead, over a thousand missing, and 1.04 million displaced people, as well as 172 damaged bridges. Since the US had almost no military presence in any of the three countries in the JOA, the new JTF had to overcome problems in medical, logistical, engineering, aviation, and humanitarian assistance operations that the pre-existing JTF did not face. The JTF also planned and coordinated for each of the port, medical, base operations, airfield, and other support facilities that it occupied. Additionally, most of the personnel and units assigned to assist in the JOA came from the continental US (CONUS) and had little expertise or knowledge in the region. The JTF staff was organized around a CONUS Corps Support Group (CSG) headquarters, which had to quickly deploy, establish its base of operations, and begin support of arriving units. In addition to the many challenges the JTF faced, it also had some unique opportunities, such as improving US-Nicaraguan relations through humanitarian assistance operations in Nicaragua, where no American troops have operated in decades.

Though this was a joint operation, many of the lessons learned derived from this operation are applicable to the Army. In fact, the Army provided over 70% of the personnel in the JTF force structure. This article provides some of the JTF commander’s initial impressions on army lessons learned and successful tactics, techniques, and procedures in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch.

1. **A headquarters with responsibility for humanitarian assistance must have experts early in the operation to conduct the mission analysis and initial planning.** The initial assessment laid the groundwork for the entire operation. The JTF commander emphasized that “success was set up during the first three weeks of the operation.” To assist in the analysis and planning, USSOUTHCOM provided the JTF with a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC), a nucleus of 20-25 planners to support contingency operations. Previously used in exercises only, this organization
supported a contingency operation for the first time in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. DJTFAC members had regional and country expertise. Of all the experts on hand, however, the doctor and the engineer were the two most essential to the success of the humanitarian assistance mission. They were responsible for assessing the medical and engineering requirements, the main efforts in the operation.

2. **Use the experts to plan all phases of the operation, to include the redeployment.** The DJTFAC was available to the commander for 30 days. Five days before releasing them from the operation, the commander directed them to plan the redeployment. Because of the tremendous effort required to work three simultaneous port operations in three different countries, as was the case during the initial deployment, the JTF adopted a step-down method to the redeployment. Based on an assessment of the damage in each of the three countries, the country with the least damage was accorded 30 days for operations, while the worst damaged was accorded the most days at 50. This allowed the JTF to focus on each redeployment separately.

3. **The commander must establish guiding principles for the operation that supports his vision for the desired end-state.** In the operations order brief, the JTF specified its end-state as follows: JTF “will have assisted Host Nation (HN) efforts to reinstate ground connectivity, rehabilitate critical facilities and infrastructure, ensuring the HN’s ability to return to pre-Mitch conditions and continue long term recovery and development. Requirements will have been identified for long-term recovery ensuring HNs are capable of preventing major outbreak of disease, and continuing commercial/economic progress. Success will be defined as a smooth transition of the JOA to <another USSOUTHCOM JTF> without major incident, injury or damaged equipment, and safely redeployed to home station.” Although each unit, such as Civil Affairs, Medical, and Engineering, sought to gain more of the JTF’s resources to maximize their own contributions, the commander had to adopt a “dropback field of view,” to see the big picture and set priorities to support the JTF’s end state. To do this, the commander developed guiding principles, loosely grouped under force protection and coordination/cooperation, to help his staff and subordinate leaders exercise initiative in support of the desired end-state (see paragraph 3 supplement for the JTF Commander’s guiding principles).
Paragraph 3 Supplement

The JTF Commander provided the following guiding principles for his 0-6 commanders during humanitarian assistance operations in Central America after Hurricane Mitch:

**Force protection is the key driver and must be defined up front.** Establish a force protection working group to monitor all aspects of the operation.

* Control the environment. Get situationally aware and decide the most dangerous events/activities surrounding the work routine. Establish control measures to minimize exposure to risk.

* Do not operate on the margins. After transition from the crisis phase to the rehabilitation phase, all operations, to include movement by air or ground must be deliberately planned and executed. The JTF is here to add stability not calamity or chaos.

* Publish General Order # 1. Establish basic guidelines that are common to all service members, such as, no alcohol, and standing rules of engagement. Additionally, provide guidelines that are usually situationally dependent, within the operating environment, such as conducting operations only during daylight, imposing curfew from dusk to dawn, and traveling with a minimum of two vehicles with armed security and communications.

* No independent operators. Be consistent and execute the plan. Coordinate with various agencies, and at various levels to include embassies, host nation ministries, media and local officials to ensure the JTF projects are in concert with host nation priorities and within the bounds of US foreign policy. Give clear, up-front guidance to internal elements, such as public affairs operations, joint information bureau (JIB) and civil affairs, to ensure that their messages and themes are not contradictory to those of the commander.

* Integrate host nation military at every juncture. Working with the host nation military will be a unique experience and provide a lasting bond common to all soldiers. Having host nation military working along side will improve situational awareness and provide better all around security.

**Coordination/Cooperation**

* Do not turn away help. Organizations from all services and directions have come to support humanitarian assistance Operations. Through proper coordination, the JTF can open many doors and accelerate the participation of these units in HA operations. However, numerous government activities, military agencies, civilian entities, Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO)/Non-governmental Organizations (NGO)/International Organizations (IO) will also attempt to slide into the joint operations area unannounced. These agencies have their own agenda, but nevertheless, must come under the control of the commander. The JTF must ensure that they understand the commander’s intent and concept of operations and that they are aware of force protection issues.

* Do not re-create in-place systems. Maintain contacts and links with the US elements within the host country or theater of operations. Certainly the embassies are key, but, in this case, an in-place JTF located in Honduras provides the primary link for logistics flow and US Army, South (USARSO), located in Panama, provides the link for contracting, initial civil-military humanitarian support, port operations and services which require transportation into our JOA. Use these commands and the services to the JTF’s benefit. These commands have a long-term relationship to maintain and a continued presence after our JTF has departed.

* All visitors are VIPs. Visitors to the area have a strong impact on the outcome of the existing operations and will most likely influence the future of overall operations and US presence in the theater. Congressmen, senators, Department of Defense officials and senior government leadership will most certainly develop long-term foreign policy direction and funding, based on the impressions during their visit.

* Learn the capabilities of the other services. This will help in building a cohesive team, optimizing capabilities and putting the talents of others to use more efficiently. Find and put all of the JTF’s Spanish speakers to good use.

* Make a meaningful contribution. Be a good neighbor; get out to see the projects and work sites. Respect the people and their country. Gain cultural perspective... a lasting memento. If the environment is restrictive, then organize tours.
4. **The commander must have fast and efficient transportation.** The area of operations consisted of three countries, spanning 100,357 square miles. To coordinate with the national level ministers and the US ambassadors in the host nations, the commander needed transportation to move him quickly to the necessary meetings. Choosing a Salvadoran air base as the location of his headquarters, the JTF commander had access to both the helicopters under his operational command, as well as fixed-wing aircraft from US Army South.

5. **Unit commanders lead their forward-deployed elements in support of humanitarian assistance mission.** Subordinate unit leaders or staff officers often led units that deployed only forward elements to assist with the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Commanders need to take the same approach to humanitarian assistance missions as they would their wartime contingency missions. Consequently, they should lead their forward-deployed elements. In fact, unit commanders should view the humanitarian assistance operation as their real-world contingency operation, requiring their unique commander’s perspective, higher level of maturity, and greater knowledge and understanding of the political-military environment.

6. **Leaders’ recon in the area of operations is essential.** A leaders’ recon of the area of operations, early in the planning phase, provides unit commanders with essential information to tailor their units for the mission. The size of the party should be small (less than five) to avoid placing a strain on the available host nation support, which is probably limited during the early stages of a disaster relief operation. The recon element should consist of at least one officer to grasp the “big picture,” and one noncommissioned officer to view soldier support issues that arise from the mission.

7. **Supporting headquarters staff element must come from a pre-existing Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) unit.** Because the JTF is organized on an ad hoc basis, there is a great impulse to assemble the supporting headquarters element in the same fashion. This is a mistake because ad hoc staff lacks cohesion and standard operating procedures (SOP). Conversely, a TO&E unit that is tasked to “deploy and support a headquarters element” will not only furnish all the required key personnel, but also deploy with the needed support equipment, facilities, and staff SOPs.

8. **Synchronize the deployment of personnel with the arrival of their equipment during the deployment phase.** Many soldiers arrived in the area of operations prior to the arrival of their equipment. This negated training time at home station and slowed humanitarian assistance operations. Units could have spent their time more effectively at home station conducting pre-deployment training in areas such as country orientation (with the focus of providing situational and cultural awareness), force protection, and combat lifesaver training. Moreover, without the proper tools, these soldiers could not effectively conduct their humanitarian assistance mission. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) process is just as applicable in humanitarian assistance operations as in wartime operations. The JTF must synchronize personnel and equipment flow to build humanitarian assistance capability as surely as a combat unit must build its “combat power” in a wartime contingency deployment.

9. **Deploy an advance party with adequate equipment and supplies to receive and support the unit’s main body in an austere environment.** During the deployment into theater, units arrived into the area of operations without adequate equipment and rations. In fact, many units arrived without adequate shelter, equipment, food, and water, which had been placed aboard ship for transportation into the newly formed joint task force headquarters operating in an austere environment.
10. **Train and certify as many combat lifesavers as possible.** Combat lifesavers were essential to the execution of the disaster relief operation, especially during the initial phases of the operation, when limited medical assets were available. Units should focus on combat lifesaver training during pre-deployment preparation. Train all available deploying unit personnel as intensely as possible. Coordinate with nondeploying medical units at home station to conduct the training.

11. **Emphasize the information operation (IO) campaign as an essential element of the humanitarian assistance mission.** Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations offer unique opportunities to build trust and friendship between the US and the host nation. This was especially true in Nicaragua, a country that the US has had minimal cooperation with for many years. A well thought-out and synchronized IO campaign, coordinated by a Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) Forward Support Team (FST) from the outset of the operation, would have brought about a much more positive host nation perception of the US military. Additionally, the IO effort would have strengthened the US and host nation bond by cultivating deeper trust and friendship.

12. **Conduct detailed planning for contracting support and resource funding.** When units arrived in theater, they experienced difficulty purchasing some required items since resource funding was incomplete. In addition, units could not access home station financial support. Moreover, contracting officers were not immediately available to assist units in ordering and contracting required supplies.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are often joint operations. However, due to the Army’s extensive role in supporting these operations, many of the lessons learned are applicable to the Army in the areas of medical, logistical, aviation, engineering, and base support operations. Lessons learned from Hurricane Mitch will significantly increase the Army’s knowledge on how to better plan, prepare, and execute future humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. CALL is continuing to work with units involved in the relief operation to collect more information in the form of after-action reports, operational documents, and articles.
Results of JCLL Survey

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In late August the Joint Center for Lessons Learned mailed a survey to about 170 commands. Shortly afterwards the survey was placed on our NIPRNET and SIPRNET web sites. This survey was intended to accomplish several things: 1) serve as a research tool, 2) educate commands about our products, services and website, and 3) market the JCLL.

The results of the survey follow:

a. **Who, by job title or section, is responsible for lessons learned at your command?** The majority of the respondents indicated that some level of the J/G/N 3 shop was responsible for lessons learned. Several commands indicated either vacant billets or no one in particular.

b. **What type of lessons learned training or experience has this person had?** Most answers indicated it was OJT.

c. **Does your organization have access to SIPRNET?** Approximately 85% of respondents have access to the SIPRNET.

d. **Have you visited the JCLL SIPRNET web site?** Fifty three percent of replies indicated that the users had visited the JCLL SIPRNET web site.

e. **Have you used the lessons learned SIPRNET search engine?** Fifty three percent of responses indicated they have used the SIPRNET search engine.

f. **Is there any additional information or links that you would like to see on the JCLL SIPRNET web site?** Most survey responses left this question blank, some indicated that we had sufficient/good links, one survey indicated that our links were out of date and inaccurate.

g. **On average how many times do you access the current lessons learned database per month, and by whom?** Most responses showed a very low usage rate and that the database was accessed by exercise action officers and senior non-commissioned officers.

h. **Would you like to have the current lessons learned database provided to you in a classified quarterly mailing or would you prefer to download the file monthly from the JCLL SIPRNET site?** (Current zipped size is 1.4M) Those commands that do not have access to SIPRNET desire the classified quarterly mailings (15%).

i. **When your command prepares for an exercise, is lesson learned collection considered in the planning for the exercise?** Eighty eight percent of responses indicated that they consider lessons learned collection when preparing for an exercise.

j. **How are lessons learned collected at your command?** Most responses indicated that staff elements would forward their inputs to a lessons learned POC for collection and submission.

k. **What software do you use?** There were 10 different responses to this question, 4 different versions of WinJIIP/NIIP, 2 JEMP versions, Word, and ULLOS (USAREUR Lesson Learned Operating System).

l. **Does your software offer adequate help?** Most responses indicated yes, it was not dependent on the type of software.
m. **Would your command submit more lessons learned if free text reports (using Word, WordPerfect, etc) could be submitted?** 69% of commands said that they would submit more lessons learned if free text reports could be submitted.

n. **Do you have any recommended changes to the instruction governing the Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS), CJCSI 3150.25 Joint After-Action Reporting System?** Most responded that there were no changes needed, two respondents said make it more user friendly.

o. **Do you think some type of formal unit or individual training should be conducted on the JAARS and what kind of training should be accomplished?** Sixty Four percent of responses indicated no/no preference to this question. Thirty six percent of responses thought some form of training would be appropriate. One survey indicated that a formal JCLL visit would be nice, and one thought a self-paced tutorial (on all aspects of JEMP not just the lessons learned software) on the SIPRNET site would be sufficient.

p. **If you could change one thing about the JAAR system what would you change?** Answers ranged from making the system unclassified, having senior leadership place more emphasis on the process, to making the software more user friendly.

q. **Are you familiar with the Chairman’s Remedial Action Program as described in CJCSI 3150.1 “CJCS Remedial Action Program”?** Seventy five percent of surveys indicated yes.

r. **Does your command have a formal Remedial Action Program?** No-47%, YES-29%, No Response-23%

s. **Are remedial action program validation requirements considered as exercise objectives when an exercise is designed?** Those commands that indicated they had a RAP process indicated they did consider RAP validation in exercise design.

t. **Would your command be interested in a conference/VTC regarding military lessons learned systems?** Seventy one percent of surveys indicated they would like to participate in some type of discussion.

u. **Additional comments** - one survey wanted more emphasis on after-action issues and results.

JCLL would like to thank all those who took the time to respond to the survey. We also encourage all those involved with lessons learned to participate in future JCLL surveys.
WE WANT YOUR FEEDBACK! Your comments will assist in the development of future Joint Center for Lessons Learned publications. There are numerous methods in which you can submit your comments:

1) fill out and mail the below form to:
   USJFCOM JWFC
   Attn: Joint Center for Lessons Learned
   116 Lakeview Pkwy
   Suffolk, VA 23435-2697
2) fill out the survey in the online bulletin at http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/ltdaccess/protected/jcll/

Please answer each of the following questions

1. Was the depth of material in this Bulletin sufficient to assist you in your current position? YES NO, tell us how you think we could improve this. Please include your position in your response.

2. Tell us any subjects you would like to see covered in future Bulletins.

3. We make changes to our on-line version of the Bulletin as we receive feedback and additional information. Would you like to be notified electronically of these changes? NO YES, my E-mail address is: _______________________

4. Do you want to see referenced Lessons Learned in the Bulletin? YES NO

COMMENTS: please place any comments you may have on the back of this page

Optional information:

Name: ___________________________ Command: ______________________

Address: ______________________________________________________

Telephone: ________________ Fax: ___________ E-mail ____________