Dueling Doctrines for the Twenty-First Century: Operational Maneuver from the Sea in a Joint Vision 2010 Environment

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DUELING DOCTRINES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA IN A JOINT VISION 2010 ENVIRONMENT

Major Bradley H. Shumaker
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED WARFIGHTING
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Marine Corps War College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, 22134-5067

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Dueling Doctrines for the Twenty-first Century: Operational Maneuver from the Sea in a Joint Vision 2010 Environment.

Author: Major Bradley Hampton Shumaker

Thesis: OMFTS, with its focus on maneuver warfare, supported by an infusion of technological enhancements, does provide a new operational concept to the Marine Corps. JV 2010 does not provide a new operational concept. Failure to link operational concepts together will cause interservice operability problems.

Background: The realization that all military services must be able to fight current and future wars "as a joint team" has resulted in the services and Joint Staff conducting experimentation to develop new equipment and doctrine for future wars. The Marine Corps is developing a concept it hopes to use as future doctrine titled "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" (OMFTS). This concept relies on using the sea as maneuver space to land forces in areas lightly or undefended by adversaries. The Marines will employ forces that are capable of deploying quickly, capable of beginning their movement from ships that are located over the horizon, able to move quickly over land, and able to command and control their forces and fires from hundreds of miles away. Marines are focussing their forces and doctrine on the growing populations of the world living in the littoral regions.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has published his own doctrine to guide all the services efforts at future warfighting development. Published by past CJCS, General Shallikashvili, "Joint Vision 2010" relies on technological enhancements of current warfighting fundamentals to create new tenets (referred to as new operational concepts in JV 2010). The tenets of JV 2010 are operational maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. JV 2010 states that the synergistic effect of these four tenets will provide "full spectrum dominance."

While OMFTS and JV 2010 generally support one another, JV 2010's broad guidance and focus on technology to create new doctrine could be problematic in the future for the employment of both concepts. As the senior agent for military doctrine, the Joint Staff must ensure that they do not fall behind in concept development. The Marines are aggressively working on OMFTS. The Joint Staff must provide timely guidance to the Marines, as well as the other services. Failure to provide guiding doctrine to the services will result in the military's inability to work fight effectively in a joint environment. The Marine Corps has the lead on a service doctrine that will allow it to fight effectively in the twenty-first century.

Conclusion: OMFTS provides the Marines an operational concept capable of preparing them for future warfighting. JV 2010 does not provide an operational concept to guide the services in their preparation for future wars. The Joint Staff must provide the services a joint doctrine that is based on an operational concept rather than on technological enhancements.
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"Operational Maneuver From The Sea" (OMFTS) and "Joint Vision 2010" (JV 2010) are the United States Marine Corps' and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's concepts for the development of doctrine for the 21st century. The 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak describes what OMFTS is and why OMFTS was developed in his cover letter to OMFTS. Gen. Krulak states:

In the White Papers ... From the Sea and Forward ... From the Sea, the Navy and Marine Corps presented a common vision for a future in which skillfully handled naval forces would enable the United States to exert its influence in the littoral regions of the world. Building upon the foundation laid by those papers, Operational Maneuver from the Sea deals explicitly with the full spectrum of challenges that we will have to face, the dangers and opportunities created by new technologies, and the very exciting prospect of adapting the tradition of maneuver warfare, not merely to amphibious operations, but to all aspects of warfare in, and around, coastal waters.¹

The Marine Corps, through OMFTS, is attempting to build a faster and more lethal organization, while it remains the same size or decreases in personnel.

The previous Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, described what the purpose of JV 2010 is and why JV 2010 was developed in his cover letter to JV 2010. Shalikashvili stated:

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow. Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally based template for the evolution of Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for Service and Unified Command visions.²

The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the former Chairman, recognizes the fiscal limitations to a large post-Cold War military and the requirement for
maximizing the use of the military as whole. Both concept papers address the need for
change and both rely upon similar tenets.

The Marine Corps' OMFTS is built upon six tenets. These beliefs are centered on the
Corps' doctrine of maneuver warfare. The tenets are: Focus on an operational objective, use
the sea as maneuver space, generate overwhelming tempo and momentum, pit strength
against weakness, emphasize intelligence, deception, and flexibility, and integrate all
organic, joint, and combined assets. These tenets describe capabilities to protect Marines or
capabilities to direct at an enemy.

The tenets of JV 2010 rely upon technological enhancements of current warfighting
fundamentals to create new tenets (referred to as new operational concepts in JV 2010). The
tenets of JV 2010 are: Operational maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional
protection, and focused logistics. JV 2010 states that the synergistic effect of these four
tenets will provide "full spectrum dominance." JV 2010 does not describe how the United
States will fight as much as it states what capabilities the U. S. military should achieve.

JV 2010 does not provide an operational concept for the United States military to
follow in a joint environment. Lack of a "guiding concept" has allowed each of the services
to pursue its own direction for future warfighting. Even the more current "Concept for
Future Joint Operations" lacks unifying guidance for future joint warfighting. "... Concepts
for Future Joint Operations" discusses the purpose of the JV 2010 implementation process
which:

...consists of two primary efforts. First, it will provide common direction-the defense
community will incorporate JV 2010 as strategic guidance. Second, JV 2010 will
also guide the development and assessment of future joint warfighting concepts and
lead to fielding those operational capabilities needed to conduct joint military
operations in 2010.³
The two primary efforts are very broad. They have been interpreted differently by each of the services. This has resulted in the pursuit of different concepts and operational capabilities by each service. JV 2010, as originally written, had many holes and appeared to be an attempt to catch up with the Army and Marine Corps' efforts at looking to the future. Documents such as the Joint Staff’s "Concepts for Future Joint Warfighting" are an example of the efforts being taken to fill in the holes and possibly get in front of the four services.

The Marine Corps and the Joint Staff have taken steps to prepare for future warfare. The focus of people, time, and money in both organizations is a positive step. However, OMFTS paints a picture of how the Marine Corps sees itself fighting future wars, whereas JV 2010 fails to provide the services a unifying concept for future warfighting. General Shalikashvili’s "operational template," from JV 2010, looks like an empty canvas. OMFTS, with its focus on maneuver warfare, supported by an infusion of technological enhancements does provide a new operational concept to the Marine Corps. JV 2010 does not provide a new operational concept. JV2010's failure to provide the services an operational concept will cause interservice operability problems.

FROM CONCEPTS TO DOCTRINE

To analyze the effectiveness of OMFTS and JV 2010 several questions will be answered. These questions fall into two categories. The first category of questions concerns compatibility - how the two concepts may work, or not work together. The second category of questions focuses on what are the intended effects of these two concepts and how will they
impact commanders and units. The two categories analyze the weaknesses of the concepts, but assumes that both concepts are viable.

The two categories are further broken down into five questions for analysis. The compatibility of OMFTS and JV 2010 are analyzed by asking three questions. First, do OMFTS and JV 2010 complement each other? Second, what are the problems between the two? Third, do they pose any problems for employment in the future? To analyze the intended effects of the two concepts, the first question asks what are the preferred outcomes of the JV 2010 and OMFTS. The final question asks how do OMFTS and JV 2010 affect commanders and units.

**Complementary Elements**

The tenets of OMFTS and JV 2010 are "generally" complementary of each other. As stated before, OMFTS focuses primarily on actions taken for Marines and actions taken against an. enemy. JV 2010 primarily discusses desired capabilities. Where the tenets of each differ, they are "generally" pulled together through supporting concept papers such as the Marine's Advanced Expeditionary Fire Support" and "Seabased Logistics" or the Joint Staff’s "Concept for Future Joint Operations." The Marines and the Joint Staff are attempting to coordinate their efforts. Compared to the Joint Staff, the Marines have focused more time and effort on addressing the future. This has caused the Joint Staff to make periodic leaps in its efforts to keep up, let alone to lead the development of the military's future development.

OMFTS and JV 2010 both list maneuver in their tenets. The Marines discuss the sea as maneuver space. The Joint Staff discusses dominant maneuver where many different
types of forces are used to attack multiple targets at once. Both concepts call for maneuvering around enemy strengths.

The five remaining tenets of OMFTS and three remaining tenets of JV 2010 do not match up as closely as maneuver. Where a tenet is addressed in one primary concept paper, but not the other, the tenet not stated is discussed in a supporting concept paper. For example, JV 2010 lists "focused logistics" as one of its tenets. While OMFTS does not list this as a tenet, the Marine Corps has devoted a supporting concept paper to OMFTS, titled "Seabased Logistics."

There are two possible problems with this approach of chasing each other's concepts. One possible problem is that time and effort may be wasted in an attempt to synchronize one staff’s concept with the other. There may be either little, or a great amount of difference between the two when executed. Another problem could be a doctrine that attempts to define every detail of service and joint warfighting. In this attempt to cover every potential possibility, doctrine becomes prescriptive rather than descriptive. "Generally complementing" tenets will not provide the level of interoperability needed for fighting future wars although service capabilities may be similar.

**Holes Between OMFTS and JV 2010**

While there is a general fit between OMFTS and JV 2010, there are places in the two future oriented concepts where holes exist. Most important is the fact that JV 2010 does not direct the Marine Corps to design OMFTS with any special objectives in mind. This can be viewed as good or bad. From the Marine perspective, broad guidance allows the Corps room
Another hole between the two concepts is the tenet "full dimensional protection," identified in JV 2010. Full dimensional protection is at best wrapped into numerous portions of OMFTS supporting concepts. The Marine Corps does not adequately cover this. While the Corps is focusing on limiting troops ashore (where casualties are most likely to occur) and increasing their inclusion of information operations; overall the Corps intends to get lighter - in terms of protection.

Another hole between OMFTS and JV 2010 is what this author refers to as "the nature of the doctrines." OMFTS is an all encompassing doctrine that focuses on a thinking enemy. OMFTS does not presuppose a doctrine that is based on technology alone. Full spectrum dominance, from JV 2010, is the centerpiece of a doctrine based on the success of U.S. technology against an enemy that can not avoid the effects of the technology. JV 2010 depends on an enemy who can not avoid our precision weapons or who can not break through our full dimensional protection of troops and equipment to cause U. S. casualties. The ability of U. S. forces to accomplish these is doubtful. Recognizing these problems will aid in resolving the holes between and within the two doctrines.

**Fixing the Problems.** Each of the problems addressed above can be resolved by acknowledging the problem now and devoting staff efforts and command attention to each. JV 2010 must be the lead concept that guides all services' efforts in developing their own future oriented concepts. The Joint Staff must ensure that there is some redundancy between services. More importantly, the Joint Staff must designate critical equipment, doctrine, and
capabilities, assigning these for further development to a service. In order for the Marine Corps to receive the benefits of full dimensional protection while executing OMFTS, the Marines must be supported by other service capabilities. Full dimensional protection may become an albatross around the neck of the military when it sustains any casualties. Tempering this name may be one way of preventing fratricide caused by western news organizations. Finally, full spectrum dominance is based on four current capabilities. Technology is expected to exponentially enhance these capabilities. Alternate means of achieving full spectrum dominance must be developed. This could be as simple as using overwhelming force to attack an enemy throughout his depth with all types of units, not just munitions. A possibility could be the use of our mobile ground forces, in combination with existing high technology weapons, and command and control platforms.

**Identifying Success.** The Marine Corps and the Joint Staff have achieved two successes through their research on future wars. The first success is the testing and experimentation that is taking place with OMFTS and JV 2010. The Marine Corps has formed the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab that conducts concept driven testing of OMFTS and supporting Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. The Joint Warfighting Center and United States of America Command (USACOM) test and develop JV 2010. Testing and experimenting allows both the Marines and Joint Staff to learn valuable lessons prior to devoting larger sums of money to hardware and organizations.

The second success involves the use of technology in support of both concepts. Technology is widely used in both future based concepts. The Marines and the Joint Staff recognize that an enemy may also gain from the employment of high technology weapons.
Both are working to maintain technological superiority. OMFTS and JV 2010 experimentation has focused both on offensive and defensive support. The lessons learned from these experiments will maximize the limited funds available for high technology weapons.

Ensuring that these successes are taken advantage of will be critical to the future success of OMFTS and JV 2010. The Marines and Joint Staff must make sure that funding is set aside to continue experimenting and testing. However, support for experimenting and testing must not be traded for current expenses. Another key to the success of OMFTS is continued funding of Navy elements of OMFTS — namely the purchase of projected amphibious platforms, communications suites, and fire support systems. While new and expanded uses of technological enhancements is important, the government must also limit the transfer of technologies that are important to defense and defense related industries. Implementing a thoroughly tested OMFTS and JV 2010 will be challenging.

**Problems ahead: OMFTS and JV 2010 in the 21st Century**

Two questions that remain to be addressed by the authors of OMFTS and JV 2010 are will OMFTS and JV 2010 be effective against a low-tech enemy. Or will they be effective against a government led by dictator or a leader supported strongly by the electorate? The second question is whether OMFTS or JV 2010 are really new concepts. The low tech enemy and enemy with a leader in complete control of his country may have some advantage over an American force. An American force that is supported at home by a public that questions U. S. casualties or methods of attack may limit the use of OMFTS or JV 2010.
The first potential disadvantage concerns a low-tech enemy. Will information warfare and high technology weapons work against a nation that does not possess a modern technology based infrastructure? Will a military that counts on crippling an enemy before troops are employed on the ground be able to identify sufficient targets in countries that have minimal infrastructure? Closely associated with these questions is the question of a government led by a strongman. Will OMFTS and JV 2010 be effective against a country that is willing, or compelled, to accept casualties while husbanding their most valuable weapons? Modern examples of this would be Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. OMFTS and JV 2010 may lead America to a smaller, more agile force that is not capable of dealing with smaller conflicts that bounce between Humanitarian Assistance missions and mid-intensity conflict.

The final question concerning OMFTS and JV 2010 is do they really present new operational concepts that will lead the nation's Marine Corps and other services into the 21st century? OMFTS does provide a new operational concept to the Marine Corps, but the Marines will need to determine the relevance of Maneuver Warfare in the post 2010 period. JV 2010 does not provide a new operational concept. The concept does nothing more than provide bells and whistles to hallow joint doctrine.

**Preferable Outcomes**

The Marines and the Joint Staff must determine what OMFTS and JV 2010 should guide their organizations to accomplish. The development of military units that are capable of being deployed, on short notice, anywhere around the world should be one of these outcomes. This must include the purchase of aviation assets in sufficient numbers to move
and support such units. A second outcome must be the ability to achieve information dominance over all potential aggressors. This includes aggressors that do not rely on the use of technology similar to that possessed by the United States. A third outcome must be the sustainment of forces employed far from the U. S. without reliance on host nation support. Finally, Marines and joint forces must be able to use OMFTS and JV 2010 in support of missions that cover the spectrum of conflict, from Military Operations Other Than War to sustained land campaigns (Sustained land campaigns are primarily a Army mission, with Marine units supporting where capable). Executing these two doctrines simultaneously will require special capabilities of commanders and units.

**Commander and Unit Requirements**

OMFTS and JV 2010 imply that commanders and units will require special skills for successful mission execution. Commanders will be required to make rapid decisions, using recognitional decision making skills rather than reliance on staffs. Information superiority will provide opportunities for great success if acted upon quickly. Information superiority, employed at the lowest echelons, will lead to greater decentralized execution and possibly flatter chains of command.

Units will be required to be strategically and operationally mobile, tactically faster, and capable of communicating to commands and databases far away. As previously mentioned strategic mobility will be critical to the success of JV 2010. Operational mobility will be critical to OMFTS. Both concepts rely upon placing friendly units rapidly into positions that allow the attack of enemy centers of gravity, preferably before the enemy can react to a force. Purchasing new equipment, employing current units differently or a
combination of the two can develop this capability. Tactical units will need to be able to move quickly once employed. This may be achieved by lighter equipment and by faster vehicles. Finally, both concepts require that all units, even squads and teams, be capable of communicating long distances. The requirement for new and lighter communications equipment will allow units to control large volumes of fire and to access practically any information from any data base.

RETAINING THE LESSONS

The Marine Corps and the Joint Staff have dedicated time, money, and units for testing the concepts and technology being developed for use in OMFTS and JV 2010. This research must continue in order for these two concepts to become working doctrine. While OMFTS and JV 2010 generally support one another, JV 2010's broad guidance and focus on technology to create new doctrine could be problematic in the future for the employment of both concepts. The Marines and Joint Staff must insure that the two concepts support each other.

The problems that do exist between OMFTS and JV 2010 can be fixed prior to fielding the two concepts as doctrine in the 2010 time frame. The Joint Staff must make sure that they do not fall behind in concept development. The Marines are aggressively working on OMFTS. The Joint Staff must provide timely guidance to the Marines, as well as the other services, to prevent money being wasted on testing in a direction that doesn't support the Chairman's vision of future warfare.
Determining new organizational structures for personnel and equipment will be critical to implementing new doctrine. Associated skills and capabilities for all personnel and units will also be critical and possibly painful as some skills are phased out while new skills are rushed to the forefront of the military.

The Marines and the Joint Staff have taken a step in the right direction - a direction that could lead to significant gains in capabilities and doctrine. Operational Maneuver From the Sea and Joint Vision 2010 will lead the services into the 21st century. Whether these two concepts develop into new and significantly better doctrines will depend on the ability of the Marine Corps and the Joint Staff to critically look at what they have accomplished and what they may accomplish in the near future. Failure to think through the purpose of these concepts and developing them so they complement each other will result in a hollow doctrine based solely on technology.
NOTES

1 Headquarters United States Marine Corps, "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Navy, 4 January 1996), forward.
2 Joint Chief of Staff, "Joint Vision 2010" (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense), forward.
4 The Marine Corps has compiled and published these papers in one book titled United States Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts for the 21st Century. This book contains the concept paper for OMFTS and the 11 supporting concept papers for OMFTS. These 12 papers span a period of approximately 2 years from the signing of OMFTS to signing of "A Concept for Information Operations."
5 Joint doctrine defines maneuver as "Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage… in order to accomplish the mission. JV 2010 states, "Through a combination of asymmetric leverage, achieved by our positional advantages, as well as decisive speed and tempo, dominant maneuver allows us to apply decisive force to attack centers of gravity at all levels of war and compels an adversary to either react from a position of disadvantage or quit... But where maneuver seeks to position traditional maneuver forces to mass firepower, dominant maneuver seeks to position an array of air, land, sea, and space capabilities to mass a broader range of effects." Taken from "Concept for Future Joint Operations."
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