Since the 11 September terrorist attacks, the Bush administration has made it abundantly clear that it is not willing to accept the status quo in Iraq. It has vigorously asserted that Saddam Hussein’s continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and his past links to terrorism could make his regime the next target in the “war on terrorism.” At the same time, virtually all Nato allies and every one of America’s regional strategic partners have disagreed with the use of military force either to compel Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions or to topple Saddam’s regime. The result is a growing divergence between the United States and its European allies and Middle Eastern partners at a time when, more than ever, the willing assistance of these states is needed if counterterrorism against al-Qa’ida is to succeed.

Unfortunately, as the rhetoric has grown more heated, pundits on each side have emphasized the dangers of their rivals’ preferred strategy while whitewashing the shortcomings of their own. Hence Americans have increasingly been led to view the Europeans as “free-riders” and to pay little heed to the concerns of Arab states for regional stability. Europeans in turn complain of American unilateralism and hegemonic ambitions, ignoring in the case of Iraq how their own policies have shaped the growing tendency of the United States toward self-reliance. Meanwhile, the Arab governments, whose support for military action against Iraq has been less than enthusiastic since the end of the Gulf War, find their own national agendas increasingly co-opted by popular outrage over the
**Give Peace a Chance: First, Try Coercive Diplomacy**

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**Same as Report (SAR)**

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Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fueled by a perception that the United States deliberately chooses not to restrain its Israeli “puppet.”

There is a way, however, to break the impasse between the United States and a number of key states whose cooperation is critical not only for potential military operations against Iraq but also for the broader war on terrorism. It would involve delinking the Iraqi question from the war on terrorism and undertaking a new diplomatic offensive to compel Iraqi compliance with existing Security Council resolutions. This approach would avoid reducing Washington's choice to the two unsatisfactory extremes of unilateral action against Saddam or an outright abandonment of the leverage gained by the Gulf War coalition.

Such an approach would not be the first time the United States used coercive diplomacy as a means of bringing about allied consensus on Iraq: “Although the strategy of coercive diplomacy had little chance of success [in 1990–91], the attempt to employ it in the hope of avoiding war was necessary for building and maintaining international and domestic support for the objective of liberating Kuwait. Ironically, the failure of coercive diplomacy was necessary to gain support for war when war became the last resort.”

Coercive diplomacy against Iraq in late 2002 represents an opportunity to change the rules of the game. There are reasons to hope that the approach would succeed; yet even if it is doomed to failure, by making the attempt the United States would demonstrate that the Iraqi regime’s belligerent and intransigent attitude, not American warmongering, is the root of the conflict. Nothing is likely to make American military action, if that is ultimately required, popular, but giving diplomacy a final chance might make it possible for key allies and regional partners to support it.

The first section below addresses the strategic objectives of the United States concerning Iraq and identifies a number of specific reasons why Washington cannot indefinitely accept the status quo. The argument then turns to why coercive diplomacy should be the principal means for pursuing American strategic priorities in Iraq, laying out the case for postponing unilateral use of force and assessing coercive diplomacy's strengths and weaknesses as a tool for accomplishing U.S. objectives. The third section tackles the central issue—can Saddam's regime be coerced?—by studying several cases in which the United States used coercive diplomacy against Iraq during the 1990s. The fourth section derives a framework that might make success possible or, failing that, from which Iraq would derive no significant benefits should coercive diplomacy fail and war become a necessity.
THE STATUS QUO IS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE
There is strong international agreement that the present state of affairs in Iraq is not acceptable, but when the discussion turns to alternatives this consensus quickly breaks down. On the one hand, the United States argues that so long as Saddam Hussein or his designated heirs remain in power, Iraq will be a source of regional instability and a danger to not only its neighbors but the American people as well. On the other hand, virtually all European allies of the United States, as well as Iraq’s Arab neighbors, maintain that Saddam’s regime has been contained and weakened to the point that it no longer threatens security. Far greater concerns, from their perspectives, are flawed American policy making and military heavy-handedness, which increase the chance that moderate regimes, like Saudi Arabia, will fall victim to popular discontent.

Nevertheless, in the “post-9/11” era, with the vulnerability of the American homeland more clearly perceived, the Iraqi threat can no longer be defined solely by Saddam’s ability to challenge the regional order. Instead, the union of Iraq’s continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, past links to terrorism (including an assassination attempt on a former American president), and a decade’s worth of belligerence toward the United States has made Saddam’s regime a direct threat to the American people. For this reason the long-term American objective in Iraq must be regime change.

Yet as desirable as toppling Saddam’s regime is, it remains easier said than done. There are three options for removing the Ba'athists from power—a military coup, an American-backed insurgency, or an American invasion—and each has its drawbacks. While there is no quick or easy way to topple Saddam’s regime, there are compelling reasons for not delaying action longer than is absolutely necessary. As daunting as the task of regime change may seem, however, it is certainly not as bad as the eventual probable alternative, a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein.

Deterring Saddam poses particular challenges, largely because he cares so little about the suffering of the Iraqi people. Combined with Saddam’s history of reckless foreign policy behavior when he perceives an advantage over his rivals, this creates the potential for a dangerous game of brinkmanship involving Iraq, Israel, and the United States. Given an atomic arsenal, it is a virtual certainty that Saddam would sooner or later brandish such weapons in an attempt to reassert Iraqi regional hegemony. As in the past, he would almost certainly misread his adversaries, underestimate the risks involved, and once more sweep the entire region into a bloody war—this time between nuclear powers.

Another reason for bringing about a regime change is the cost of maintaining the current policy of containment. It can be measured in three ways. First, the Cato Institute estimates that over eighty billion dollars are being spent annually
to make the southern Gulf states de facto protectorates. In view of the fact that the United States receives less than a quarter of its oil from the region, these expenses go largely toward safeguarding its allies’ access to Gulf oil. Some of those allies helped finance DESERT STORM but have made little or no effort to share the burden of containing Saddam since that time.

Second, containment continues to cost Iraqi lives, due to the deprivations imposed upon that country by economic sanctions, but more so by Saddam’s misallocation of Iraq’s income. The UN estimates that during the early and mid-1990s, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis died from malnutrition and disease. After Saddam’s 1996 acceptance of Security Council Resolution (SCR) 986, the “oil for food” program, the mortality rate should have decreased significantly; notwithstanding, an August 1999 UNICEF report estimated that some ninety thousand Iraqis, mostly infants and the elderly, had died during the preceding year from malnutrition. By 1999, Iraq’s income from oil exports had returned to pre-1990 levels, demonstrating that Saddam continues to play upon the civilized world’s compassion for the helpless Iraqi people in a callous effort to get the sanctions removed.

The third, and least tangible, cost of containment is measured in the spread of anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East, including moderate Arab states that have historically been the closest regional partners of the United States. The roots of this anti-American sentiment are difficult to trace, but in general it stems from the perception that the United States is hypocritical and greedy. Not surprisingly, anti-Americanism has been further fueled by the dramatic escalation in fighting in 2002 between the Israelis and Palestinians. The net result is that, even if the Bush administration wanted to maintain indefinitely the policy of containing Iraq, it appears increasingly doubtful that key Arab states will continue to provide the necessary host-nation support.

To date, the Bush administration has vigorously threatened military action, unilaterally if necessary, in hopes of motivating elements within Saddam’s regime to revolt and bring an end to Iraq’s isolation and suffering. Unfortunately, Saddam appears none the weaker for this ominous rhetoric; instead, the U.S. position vis-à-vis its allies and regional partners has suffered.

WHY ATTEMPT COERCIVE DIPLOMACY?
An argument can be made for postponing unilateral action in favor of attempting to accomplish the U.S. objectives in Iraq, on grounds of the geopolitical realities presently confronting the United States and of the advantages of the coercive-diplomacy approach itself.
The Right Cause but the Wrong Time

There are several strong reasons to forgo unilateral action against Saddam’s regime at present. These include the status of operations against al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, the effects upon regional stability of the dramatic escalation in violence between the Israelis and Palestinians, the nature of the Pentagon’s preferred strategy for removing Saddam’s regime, and the limits upon the Pentagon’s ability to conduct operations against Iraq in the short term. Individually, none of these factors precludes immediate action. However, in combination they build a strong case for alternatives to the unilateral use of force until more favorable conditions arise.

“Remember 9/11.” The United States is currently committed to the task of destroying al-Qa’ida and the remnants of the Taliban. While by no means a major theater war, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM remains a significant military commitment. To date American forces have made good progress in their efforts to prevent the Taliban from challenging Afghanistan’s new government, but as the commander of Central Command, General Tommy Franks, points out, the Taliban is far from destroyed. Still, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM has made promising strides toward its principal objective—hindering al-Qa’ida’s ability to recruit and train would-be terrorists in its former Afghan sanctuary. Simultaneously, a host of smaller military and law enforcement operations at the local level around the globe appear to have degraded al-Qa’ida’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks, at least temporarily, by forcing its members into “survival mode.” Recent arrests in Pakistan and efforts against the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines are examples of this cooperation.

Despite these successes, a year after the “9/11” attacks the United States is just beginning to penetrate al-Qa’ida’s shadowy underworld, and there is still a long way to go. The utility of U.S. military ventures must therefore be weighed against their impact upon the global war on terrorism. This is not to say that the war on terrorism should in all cases prevail; clearly there are potentialities that could dictate temporarily setting it aside. Evidence of Iraq’s imminent acquisition of an atomic bomb would certainly be one, but an Iraqi nuclear capability does not appear to be an immediate danger.

Given the extent to which the worldwide struggle against al-Qa’ida depends upon the cooperation of allied governments, now is not the time to undertake a campaign in Iraq, if doing so would likely jeopardize relations with key allies and strategic partners. Hence it would seem that unilateral action in Iraq should be the last resort, not the first.

Jerusalem before Baghdad. The vigor with which Arab nations have urged the United States to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has enormously
constrained American freedom of action. The Arab League’s adoption in March 2002 of a Saudi peace plan, and subsequent overtures by Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, demonstrate that the Arab states want desperately to end the violence in Israel and the occupied territories. They are motivated partly by fear of their own populations’ growing discontent and, in some cases, by a need to deflect attention from their own links to terrorism and Islamic extremism. Nevertheless, the unanimous declarations on the final day of the Arab League summit signaling support for Iraqi attempts to mend fences with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and firm opposition to any American use of force against Saddam’s regime, indicate that the U.S. position on Iraq has lost a great deal of ground within the Arab world.

Those in favor of unilateral U.S. action question the relevance of such gestures, pointing out that, historically, pan-Arab rhetoric has not been backed up by action. Additionally, they cite Vice President Richard Cheney’s claims that there is no rift between the United States and its Arab partners; in March he warned viewers of NBC’s Meet the Press not to believe everything they read in the newspaper. However, Bush administration claims of satisfaction with the level of support received from Arab states have met with considerable skepticism. The vice president may indeed have found a sympathetic ear in several Arab capitals, but there is little visible evidence of it. In any case, private admissions of sympathy are a long way from the public expressions of support needed for the United States to pursue the destruction of Saddam’s regime.

Now is not the best time to declare, in effect, that the Arab states are either with the United States or against it in the war on terrorism by making Iraq the next target in that struggle. Their support is essential to prosecuting operations against al-Qa’ida and other terrorist organizations. Furthermore, with the right motivation Iraq’s neighbors could turn against Saddam for their own reasons, as they have in the past. Arab governments have no love for Saddam; their recent pro-Iraqi rhetoric is just that—pro-Iraqi, not pro-Saddam. Their overarching concerns in this connection are for regional stability and for the welfare of the Iraqi people; it is still possible to gain the genuine support of moderate Arab states if the United States demonstrates that it shares these concerns. Coercive diplomacy is more likely to do so than unilateral action.

The real challenge for the United States remains convincing its Arab partners that there is no link between the Iraqi and Palestinian questions. The United States needs to disconnect the war against terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Iraqi question. A key step would be recognition that the issue with Iraq is not state sponsorship of terrorism (recent evidence of which has proven difficult to find) but the regime’s aggressive strategic agenda and its noncompliance with Security Council demands.
No Margin for Error. Presumably, if force is used against Iraq, an invasion to occupy the entire country would be the last resort. Theoretically, the primary objective of regime change can be achieved short of major war. Nevertheless, the Pentagon is likely to err on the side of caution, advocating a punishing air campaign followed by a vigorous ground offensive designed to overthrow swiftly the Ba’thist regime while simultaneously denying Saddam the opportunity to put into play a “doomsday” scenario. Clearly this would be a daunting task.

Truly unilateral American military action does not seem feasible at this time, for reasons stemming from the nature of a large military campaign in Iraq. The support of key regional partners and European allies would be critical; a conventional military campaign, even if overwhelmingly carried out by American forces (as during Operation DESERT STORM), would require access to bases and facilities around the globe. Yet, the future of American military forces in Saudi Arabia remains in doubt, and even staunch allies like Kuwait have balked at the notion of a DESERT STORM II.

Predictably, the growing preference for a conventional strategy has come at the expense of pro-opposition sectors of the administration. The balance has tipped in favor of the conventional option because of wariness among senior State Department officials and the Joint Chiefs of Staff about relying upon the weak and fractured Iraqi opposition. As analysts point out, the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and its constituent organizations bear little resemblance to the Afghan Northern Alliance, just as Saddam’s regime shares few similarities with the Taliban. Because of these disparities, any American military operation in Iraq will have to be on a much larger scale than the war in Afghanistan. If the Bush administration ultimately chooses to employ military force to remove Saddam from power, it will first need to build up its forces in the region significantly. During the harsh Persian Gulf summer, with no major buildup of American forces initiated, the Bush administration effectively accepted postponement of major military action until November 2002 at the earliest, after which the weather would be more favorable.

To succeed, the Pentagon’s strategy must meet three conditions. First, the likelihood of various Iraqi preemptive actions must be provided for. Saddam is unlikely to repeat his error of 1990 and idly permit an American military buildup for invasion, particularly when such an invasion’s stated purpose is the destruction of his regime. The inability of the Iraqi armed forces to challenge American forces lends credence to fears that such preemption will be asymmetric in nature, possibly taking the form of state-sponsored terrorism employing chemical or biological weapons. Because of the danger of preemption, the second condition for success demands that the United States be able to assemble its forces quickly; a five-month preparation like Operation DESERT SHIELD is not
an option. Most experts estimate an invasion would require roughly 250,000 personnel, possibly organized into an Army heavy armored corps, a reinforced Marine expeditionary force, and a mix of Air Force expeditionary forces and aircraft carrier battle groups, depending upon basing options.\textsuperscript{21} Third, the United States must have the willpower to target elements of the Iraqi regime that enable Saddam to remain in power. Because such forces and facilities are likely to have been placed in residential areas, this means accepting the possibility of significant collateral damage and civilian casualties.

Such a campaign cannot be hastily thrown together. Detailed planning, particularly in the phasing of force deployments, must be conducted with host nations, and well in advance if a shortened operational time line is to be achieved.\textsuperscript{22} Similarly, host-nation support is essential for protection against Iraqi preemptive action or local discontent. Furthermore, both the American people and the governments of allies and regional partners must be steeled for the challenges that lie ahead—the former in terms of American servicemen killed in action, the latter in terms of Iraqi civilians caught in the crossfire.\textsuperscript{23}

**IN THE MEANETIME: THE CASE FOR COERCIVE DIPLOMACY**

Because of common misperceptions, let us make clear what coercive diplomacy is not. It is neither a “silver bullet” that will solve “on the cheap” all U.S. problems with Iraq nor an ill-conceived gimmick that implicitly rewards Saddam’s regime for its recalcitrance. Coercive diplomacy of necessity relies heavily upon the credible threat of punishment, but it does not compromise military operations. Furthermore, the target of coercive diplomacy is not necessarily Saddam Hussein, who may be personally immune to coercion at this point. Rather, the target is the regime as a whole—the aim being to demoralize the political elite so as to make it likely to overthrow Saddam or compel his accession to American demands.

*What Is Coercive Diplomacy?*

Coercive diplomacy seeks to “back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible enough to persuade him to comply with the demand.”\textsuperscript{24} A shortcoming of this definition is the tendency to confuse it with the broader concept of “compellance.”\textsuperscript{25} Because force can be used to achieve either offensive (aggressive) or defensive (status quo) agendas, it is important to distinguish between the two. Coercive diplomacy is defensive in nature; it is an effort “to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he has already embarked upon.” Equivalent methods for offensive purposes are better described as “blackmail strategies.”\textsuperscript{26}
Policy makers attempting to pursue coercive diplomacy must make four basic choices, according to the particular circumstances: what demands to make of the adversary; whether or not to instill a sense of urgency in the adversary, and if so, how best to do it; whether to threaten overtly some form of punishment for noncompliance, and if so, how best to convey that threat; and whether to rely solely upon the threat of punishment to induce compliance or to offer positive incentives as well. The answers selected define the shape the strategy will assume.

Broadly speaking, there are four variants of coercive diplomacy. First, there is the ultimatum—a specific demand, a time limit for compliance, and a credible threat of punishment in the event of noncompliance. A state may choose to make the ultimatum “tacit,” by omitting either the time limit or the threat of punishment (but not both). This method relies upon ambiguity to instill fear in its adversary (although this can backfire due to misunderstanding of the adversary’s perceptions).

There are a variety of dangers in making an ultimatum, and most of them apply to Iraq. A poorly timed ultimatum can cause significant political backlash or provoke preemptive military action. An ultimatum that is a bluff might be called, forcing the “coercing” state either to initiate military action or back down. Finally, an adversary may respond with conditional or partial acceptance, prompting calls for negotiations or third-party mediation. For all these reasons, ultimatums are not to be issued lightly, but some form of ultimatum is likely to be part of any effort to apply coercive diplomacy against Iraq.

The second variant of coercive diplomacy is the try and see approach—a specific demand is made with neither a time limit nor a stated threat. Instead, the coercing state engages in some form of demonstration in hopes that this alone will persuade compliance. Because Saddam habitually ignores demands not backed by imminent and credible force, this method seems infeasible with Iraq.

The third variant of coercive diplomacy has been called a gradual turning of the screw. The coercing state sets forth specific demands but does not define a time limit for compliance. The coercing power hints that if its demands are not met, it will step up the pressure incrementally until they are. The key to this approach is the concept of “escalation dominance,” the ability to increase the costs of noncompliance while rendering impotent the opponent’s ability either to sidestep those costs or counterescalate. The turning-of-the-screw approach may be suitable against Iraq, provided that the United States is willing to take the
steps necessary to achieve escalation dominance and, if compliance does not occur by a certain point, issue an ultimatum.

The fourth variant of coercive diplomacy is the carrot and stick approach. Whereas the three variants above rely solely upon threats, this method requires receptivity to alternative methods. Not surprisingly, coercive diplomacy based solely upon threats requires a formidable stick, and it is often difficult to convey to an adversary the severity of possible consequences. Hence positive incentives for compliance may reduce the natural reluctance on the part of the adversary to comply. However, positive inducements and reassurances must be credible and truly attractive. In addition, because the target state could renege, it is essential that any inducements offered be either revocable or limited. “Carrots” would almost certainly play a role in coercive diplomacy against Iraq. The form they might take and whom within the Iraqi regime they would be intended to encourage will be discussed below.

Further, coercive diplomacy depends greatly upon context. Eight contextual dynamics that have an effect upon the application of coercive diplomacy in given scenarios have been outlined in the literature. These include the nature of the adversary’s provocation and the difficulties inherent in any attempt to stop or undo that provocation; the magnitude of asymmetries in motivation between the two sides; the images of the consequences of war on each side; the level of need (on the part of the coercing power) to resolve the issue by some specific date; the unilateral or coalition character of the effort; the presence or absence of strong political leadership on each side; the degree to which the adversary is isolated; and the coercing power’s preferred postcrisis relationship with the adversary.  

Advantages and Disadvantages

One of the fundamental objectives of any American attempt to employ coercive diplomacy against Iraq would be to tilt global public relations back in its favor by demonstrating that its immediate objective is the unconditional implementation of SCR 687, which defined the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire in 1991 but has not yet been fully implemented. This tactic would place the burden of shame for noncompliance back where it belongs, on Saddam’s regime. However, there are costs involved. For example, implementing SCR 687 would not necessarily achieve the overarching U.S. strategic objective in Iraq, the end of that state’s aggressive agenda. It would temporarily constrain Iraq’s capacity for aggression, but the root cause of the Iraqi state’s expansionism—Saddam Hussein himself—might remain. By the terms of SCR 687, once declared in compliance with the cease-fire obligations, Iraq would no longer be subject to UN monitoring; Saddam might then rebuild his capacity for aggression, unchallenged legally by the international community.
In addition, if the United States is to cloak itself in international legitimacy, the administration would do best to limit its demands to those mandated by the Security Council. This means that it would be limited to enforcing existing resolutions, perhaps with modifications to strengthen the international community’s ability to constrain future Iraqi aggression. Within these narrow confines it would be very difficult to pursue a regime change in Iraq, and the prospect of being forced to live with Saddam indefinitely is unappealing, given his propensity to treachery and deceit. However, there is a silver lining—the chances that he would agree to Security Council demands are low, and the likelihood of his actually making good on such an agreement is even lower. If the United States could obtain an indefinite mandate for immediate recourse to military force in the event of Iraqi noncompliance, the sacrifices necessary for international legitimacy would become more acceptable. Securing an open-ended mandate would be challenging but not impossible.

A further advantage of coercive diplomacy is its tendency to bolster the individual and collective resolve of policy makers by attaching their reputations to success. With their prestige on the line, leaders and governments are likely to be less ready to accept noncompliance or consider disengagement than generally was the case in the latter half of the 1990s. There is little reason to question the resolve of the Bush administration or of its British allies, but the behavior of other key states toward Iraq does not inspire similar confidence.

A final difficulty of applying coercive diplomacy is that the adversary’s perception is important to success or failure. In general, three notions must dominate an adversary’s thinking if coercive diplomacy is to be successful. First, the opponent must be convinced that a significant asymmetry of motivation in favor of the coercing power exists. Second, the adversary must be persuaded that there is little time in which to comply with the demands upon it. Third, the adversary must be in no doubt that the coercing power would follow through on its threats and that the consequences would be unacceptably severe.

**CAN SADDAM’S REGIME BE COERCED?**

To a certain degree, Saddam’s regime, like any other, can be coerced. However, recent history shows that it is far from easy to influence Saddam Hussein’s mental calculus in such a manner.

**Inside the Republic of Fear**

A single, overarching consideration drives Iraqi foreign policy—Saddam’s quest to remain in power, with his dignity (at least in his own eyes) intact. Any distinction between his personal will and that of the Iraqi state is an exercise in
semantics. Therefore, if one seeks to coerce Saddam’s regime, it is important to understand his psychological profile and the system it has led him to create.

Saddam Hussein is not irrational. Rather, as a psychologist argued in 1990, his record “reveals a judicious political calculator[,]...by no means irrational...but dangerous to the extreme.” His outlook is dominated by a messianic vision of himself as “the great struggler” pursuing Iraq’s “revolutionary destiny.” In pursuit of this dream he is not constrained by conscience; “his only loyalty is to Saddam Hussein.” Thus, “commitments and loyalty are matters of circumstance, and circumstances change.” His willingness to use whatever force he deems necessary, including extreme brutality, even weapons of mass destruction, is part of an elaborate facade, the psychologist believed, masking a deep underlying insecurity driven by “a strong paranoid orientation.” This conspiratorial mindset enables Saddam to believe himself surrounded by enemies and to overlook the extent to which he created them. “It is this political personality constellation—messianic ambition for unlimited power, absence of conscience, unconstrained aggression, and a paranoid outlook—that makes Saddam so dangerous. Conceptualized as malignant narcissism, this is the personality configuration of the destructive charismatic who unifies and rallies his downtrodden supporters by blaming outside enemies.”

Though “psychologically in touch with reality,” Saddam is often out of touch with it politically. His “narrow and distorted” outlook stems from his slight understanding of the world beyond Iraq and his tendency to surround himself with sycophants. Despite a propensity for shrouding his actions in religious rhetoric, the psychologist concluded, Saddam has no desire to be a martyr.

The system Saddam Hussein has created is dominated by a single, precarious social premise—the preferential treatment of certain Sunni Arab tribes at the expense of the larger Shi’ite and Kurdish populations. Because these Sunni tribes could do his regime great harm, Saddam goes to tremendous lengths to satisfy them. Prior to the Gulf War, this was not difficult, given Iraq’s affluence. In its aftermath, supporting living standards of the elite proved increasingly challenging until Saddam agreed to the UN “oil for food” program.

Saddam employs a variety of tactics to ward off potential competitors. First, he relies heavily upon nepotism. Second, he has created one of the most sinister and repressive police states in the world, with a multiplicity of security organs so as to ensure no single individual or organization becomes a threat to his primacy. Third, the state-run media has generated a cult of personality around Saddam, portraying him as the savior of the Iraqi people. Fourth, echoing

It would seem that unilateral action in Iraq should be the last resort, not the first.
Saddam's own conspiracy theories, the regime vigorously vilifies America and Israel, branding them as the true sources of the country's suffering. This propaganda has arguably been more successful among non-Iraqis than with the Iraqi people themselves, as evidenced by Saddam's growing stature among the broader Arab and Palestinian publics.

**The Successes and Failures of the 1990s**

Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the United States has been almost continuously obliged to induce Saddam to stop or undo one form of undesirable behavior or another.

**The Occupation of Kuwait (1990–91).** War with Iraq was by no means inevitable in August 1990. The international community's pressure upon Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait evolved gradually: on 2 August, SCR 660 demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal; four days later SCR 661 froze Iraqi assets and put in place comprehensive economic sanctions until such time as Iraq withdrew; finally, SCR 678 of 29 November issued an ultimatum, demanding that Iraq withdraw no later than 15 January 1991 and authorizing after that date “all means necessary” to compel compliance. Nearly every variation of coercive diplomacy was attempted, starting with the try-and-see method, then the gradual turning of the screw, and finally an ultimatum. Only the carrot-and-stick approach was never tried, largely because of an international consensus that, as President George Bush declared, there should be “no reward for aggression” and “appeasement does not work.”

Saddam's refusal to withdraw his forces before the 15 January deadline came as a surprise to many. A rational leader, it seemed, should have realized the precariousness of the situation and the risks of war, and bowed before the weight of international opinion. Yet Saddam was convinced that he should stand up to the United States and that Iraqi victory was by no means impossible.

Saddam's beliefs were not inherently irrational. First, he did not perceive U.S. motivation for liberating Kuwait as greater than his own for keeping it. If there was a differential in motivation, he believed, it worked in Iraq's favor. This perception was in part rooted in his messianic self-image, which told him that Kuwait was Iraq's just reward for defending the Arab world against Ayatollah Khomeini's militant Shi'ites during the 1980s. At the same time, Saddam doubted U.S. resolve; he believed that America would not risk a major war to restore Kuwait's independence.

In any case, Saddam did not envision war with the United States as unwinnable. He was confident his forces could turn the Saudi-Kuwaiti border into a modern-day Flanders field, where American soldiers and Marines would die
by the thousands, and with them the will to fight of the supposedly irresolute American public.\(^47\)

A third reason why Saddam failed to withdraw was his sense of pride, informed by cultural factors unique to the Arab world. “In the Arab world, having the courage to fight a superior foe can bring political victory, even through a military defeat.” Hence, “intoxicated by the elixir of power and the acclaim of the Palestinians and the radical Arab masses, Saddam may well have been on a euphoric high and optimistically overestimated his chances for success.”\(^48\) Additionally, the dispute became highly personal to Saddam, a zero-sum struggle against an international conspiracy led by his hated rival, George Bush. These perceptions rendered ineffective what might have been thought a credible five-month attempt at coercive diplomacy.

**UN Weapons Inspectors and the Southern No-Fly Zone (1993).** In the weeks after the Gulf War, SCR 687 and 688 were adopted. The former spelled out the conditions imposed upon Iraq as a defeated power, while the latter demanded that Saddam’s regime stop its brutal repression of Iraqi civilians. Baghdad at first acquiesced to UN weapons inspections; Iraqi weakness prevented defiance, and Saddam believed that token admissions and declarations would lead the inspectors to declare Iraq in compliance.\(^49\) However, the inspectors remained in Iraq long beyond the time period originally envisioned, and the regime systematically changed its tactics from passive noncooperation to outright interference.

In early January 1993 the situation came to a head. Iraq refused to permit the inspectors access to two suspected nuclear facilities; additionally, Iraqi radar began tracking aircraft enforcing the southern no-fly zone. In response, on 13 January French, British, and American aircraft struck military targets in southern Iraq. The strikes brought a swift end to Iraq’s interference with the no-fly zone, but the impasse over inspections continued. In an effort to convince Saddam that it meant business, on 17 January the Bush administration launched cruise missile attacks against the facilities the inspectors had been prevented from reaching. Two days later Iraq agreed to cooperate with the inspectors, and the crisis came to an end. The Iraqis had been successfully, if temporarily, coerced into adhering to their obligations under SCR 687.

Nonetheless, there was widespread condemnation of the cruise missile attack, which had caused the deaths of several Iraqi civilians. The French and Russians accused the United States of exceeding the scope of Security Council resolutions. Middle Eastern governments criticized the U.S. “policy of military escalation” and asked Washington to refrain from such attacks in the future, in order to forestall “erosion of favorable Arab public opinion.”\(^50\) Iraq had failed in its
attempt to defy the Security Council, but it had uncovered fragility within the once-strong anti-Iraq coalition.

*Saber Rattling on the Kuwaiti Border (1994).* On 5 October 1994, Iraq deployed two Republican Guard divisions along the Kuwaiti border, apparently to test the U.S. reaction. The United States threatened preemptive strikes unless the Iraqi forces withdrew. To convey a sense of urgency and increase already-substantial American combat power within the region, an aircraft carrier battle group and a Marine expeditionary unit were ordered into the Persian Gulf, and an Army mechanized brigade was deployed to Kuwait. Saddam withdrew his forces on 10 October. Five days later, Security Council Resolution 949 was adopted, establishing a “no-drive” zone along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border in order to prevent Saddam from threatening Kuwait in the future.  

Saddam’s motivation for the buildup had been twofold. First, at a time when his popularity in his Sunni power base was shrinking due to the privations caused by UN-imposed sanctions, he sought to demonstrate that his capacity to defy the United States was undiminished. Second, he wanted to test American resolve; had it been found wanting, he would, according to reports later obtained from high-ranking Iraqi defectors, have invaded again. The speed and size of the American buildup apparently impressed Saddam, and his rapid back-down dealt his prestige a significant blow.

However, this was not a clear-cut victory for the United States, which, as in 1993, was again roundly berated by its regional partners for having “overacted.” Domestically, the Clinton administration was at least mildly criticized for incurring the cost of transporting thousands of American personnel to the region on short notice and then not inflicting any punishment on Saddam’s regime for its provocative behavior. In fact, the administration had considered strikes against Iraqi forces but, remembering the outcry of January 1993, had concluded that the political costs would have been too high.

*The Invasion of the Kurdish Safe Haven (1996).* Immediately after the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi Kurds rose in rebellion, taking advantage of the presumed weakness of the security forces to establish a Kurdish state in the northern part of the country. It was a miscalculation; the Iraqi army promptly crushed the uprising, reportedly killing thousands of Kurds. In April 1991 the United Nations established a protected Kurdish area north of the thirty-sixth parallel. On 29 August 1996 Iraqi forces invaded that haven to root out an umbrella group serving as the international voice of the Iraqi opposition. The move was not as daring as it appeared; Saddam had received evidence of American indifference to events in the Kurds’ territory. The Clinton administration had decided in March 1995 to withdraw promised support for a planned Iraqi opposition offensive, and it had
displayed indifference to escalations of Kurdish infighting. Saddam, for his part, had been emboldened by weathering a series of internal crises during 1995 and early 1996. Sensing an opportunity to enhance further his now-burgeoning domestic prestige by invading what was widely perceived as an American protectorate, Saddam quickly seized upon it.

Confronted with what amounted to a fait accompli and enjoying no support from its allies, the United States had few options. Because Turkey—engaged in its own struggle against Kurdish separatism—was unwilling to allow its bases to be used in support of the Iraqi Kurds, the ability of the U.S. military to attack Saddam’s forces in the safe haven was severely constrained. A similar rejection of force by several key Arab partners, including the Saudis, who forbade the use of their bases, further restricted the options available. In the end, the American response to the Iraqi incursion was limited to extending the southern no-fly zone northward from the thirty-second to the thirty-third parallel, and to delivering another series of cruise missile attacks. Fear of collateral damage drove target selection, which settled on air defense sites, the loss of which was of little consequence to the regime.

Nonetheless, Saddam withdrew his forces from the Kurdish haven, and with a speed that remains puzzling. Perhaps he believed that he had accomplished his principal objectives of neutralizing the opposition and bolstering his prestige at home, with the added achievement of driving a wedge between the United States and its European allies and Arab partners. Indeed, Saddam’s 1996 invasion of the Kurdish safe haven has been called his “official comeback.” If it accomplished nothing else, it convinced the already vacillating Arab and European states that Saddam was not going away any time soon.

Accordingly, they faced a choice—to make amends with Saddam and work with him, or continue to back what they increasingly saw as a flawed strategy, managed by a now-preoccupied Clinton administration. Not surprisingly, given the economic stakes involved, the majority chose the former option. In the Security Council, understandings worked out with Saddam’s regime by Russia, France, and China threatened to undermine the UN weapons inspection process. Seeing profits to be made if the sanctions were lifted, these countries lobbied for an end to inspections, despite convincing evidence of continued Iraqi deceit.

Termination of UN Weapons Inspections (1997–98). This collapse of the consensus in support of inspections encouraged the Iraqi regime to risk further defiance of the inspectors. Refusals and obstructions escalated significantly in October 1997, when Iraq declared that seven American inspectors would be expelled and threatened to shoot down U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. An American
military buildup and a threat of preemptive strikes caused Saddam to back down, but two months later he precipitated another crisis by declaring his numerous presidential palaces off limits to inspections. The UN secretary-general stepped in at the eleventh hour to avert American air strikes, brokering a compromise that so relaxed the rules for inspections that the independence and integrity of the disarmament process were severely undermined. In August 1998 Iraq announced its intention to prohibit inspections altogether, a threat it made good two months later. In November, confronted by the imminent prospect of major American and British air strikes with the unanimous support of the Security Council, Saddam again backed down. Again the inspectors returned to Iraq, only to be thwarted and obliged to leave once more.

Stung by domestic criticism of its Iraq policy, the Clinton administration responded in December 1998 with Operation DESERT FOX, an intense four-day bombing campaign against the Iraqi regime’s intelligence and security forces, air defense systems, command and control sites, and selected production sites of weapons of mass destruction. Gratifying as the campaign may have been, it was too little, too late; the damage to the inspections program had already been done, and the strikes gave Saddam no new reason to cooperate. The inspectors have not at this writing returned to Iraq.

Certain positive developments did, however, result from the strikes. They seem to have caused turmoil within the regime, including a series of uprisings and possibly a coup attempt. This development, though it amounted to little at the time, may represent hope for the future—that even a failed U.S. attempt to coerce Saddam might convince internal elements to put an end to the suffering caused by his regime. 57

Saddam’s Pressure Points: The Lessons of the 1990s
American policy makers in the 1990s understood the location of Saddam Hussein’s “center of gravity” but found no effective way to attack it. 58 Doing so would have required the prior accomplishment of two intermediate objectives: creating the incentive within Saddam’s power base to end his rule, and threatening Saddam’s ability to maintain his hold. The sanctions were intended to accomplish the first of these objectives, by creating discontent, but Saddam’s willingness to maintain the preferential treatment of the elites, at whatever expense to the rest of the population, undermined their effectiveness. The second objective could be accomplished only by either destroying the regime’s security forces militarily or conspiring with high-ranking figures to accomplish the
overthrow of Saddam. Both methods were attempted: the former proved difficult because Saddam habitually based his security forces in residential areas, to discourage strikes; the latter ended in utter failure when Iraqi intelligence uncovered a CIA-sponsored plot in 1996. Nonetheless, during Desert Fox the United States accepted a risk of collateral damage and targeted the regime’s security forces, with favorable results—albeit modest and short-lived.

Though American policy countered reasonably well Saddam’s heavier-handed efforts to thwart containment, it had a difficult time “containing” the divergent goals of certain allies and strategic partners. That difficulty points to a U.S. center of gravity—the need for coalition—which Saddam should be expected to target. Not surprisingly, it has proven easier for him to lure coalition members away (with promises of financial gain) than it has for the United States to drive a wedge between Saddam and his domestic power base. The perspectives of the United States and its allies have differed from the outset. During the 1990 Gulf crisis and the ensuing war, for instance, there was little enthusiasm among the Arab states for deposing Saddam. Thus, these same states now disdain an American strategy designed to isolate Iraq indefinitely until the regime collapses, particularly when it punishes the helpless Iraqi populace for the sins of its dictator.

Finally, beginning with the George H. W. Bush administration, American policy makers have been unable to reconcile policy with objectives over the long term. Simply put, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the overarching U.S. objective has been to rid the region of the threat of Iraqi aggression. The liberation of Kuwait and the imposition of SCR 687 contributed to this objective in only a single instance; nothing has yet removed the source of the problem, Saddam Hussein. Consequently, the United States has found itself forced to adopt short-term instruments, like weapons inspections, sanctions, a large American military presence, and support of dissident elements in hopes of inhibiting the Iraqi regime until the arrival of the post-Saddam era.

A FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESS
According to a Canadian diplomat, there is broad agreement within the UN that “Saddam may have played his cards wrong. Overall, patience with Iraq has pretty much run out.”60 This is particularly true in the Security Council, where during the last year the Chinese and French delegations reportedly have joined the United States and Britain to press for unconditional Iraqi compliance with SCR 687. Only Russia remains undecided, largely due to its financial ties to Baghdad, which involves over eight billion dollars in unpaid loans; a senior Iraqi official has warned that if sanctions continue, “Russian businessmen will be the first to be affected.”61 However, rather than intimidating the Russian government, this
imprudent Iraqi threat appears to have augmented Moscow’s growing “post-9/11”
ties with the United States. At the end of March 2002 Russian and American dip-
lomats resolved a year-long standoff over “smart sanctions”—sanctions designed
to have more impact upon the regime and less on the general Iraqi population—by
permitting the passage of SCR 1409 in May. Though at first glance SCR 1409’s
adoption of smart sanctions might appear a victory for Saddam, in truth it is at
best a Pyrrhic one; for, with its passage, the United States has shifted the bur-
den for the Iraqi people’s suffering away from the UN and onto Saddam, thus
effectively depriving Baghdad of its favorite ploy for rallying international
support.

With this development, it is now possible for the United States to employ co-
ercive diplomacy to once and for all bring about Iraqi compliance with SCR 687.
For such an effort, the gradual turning-of-the-screw approach is most appropri-
ate, with smart sanctions serving as a form of carrot (to engender not only allied
cooperation, but also possibly the support of opposition within the Iraqi re-
gime). To this end the United States must clearly convey to the Security Coun-
cil’s permanent members, its European allies, and regional partners that it
cannot accept the possibility of an Iraqi atomic bomb, the likelihood of which
grows as time passes; that it will not see the provisions of SCR 687 watered
down; and that Iraqi compliance with all existing Security Council resolutions
must be full and unconditional. Simultaneously, the United States must stress
that this effort is not part of the broader war on terrorism but is entirely an at-
temt to prevent Saddam Hussein from further destabilizing an already precari-
ous regional situation.

With its objectives established, a strategy based upon coercive diplomacy
would then turn to creating a sense of urgency; vigorous pursuit of a four-to-
six-month window (expiring no later than 1 March 2003) for restarting UN
weapon inspections would serve that purpose. Such a time line is not unrealistic;
the first UN inspection mission, in 1991, was on site within three months. The
next judgment would be whether the threat of punishment for noncompliance
should be made explicit or left ambiguous. Clearly the United States need not in-
definitely restrain itself should Iraq continue to refuse to cooperate. The point of
coercive diplomacy would be to keep escalation in tension gradual and mea-
sured, so as to maintain international support and forestall situations requiring
a large and inopportune military commitment. With the pattern established by
the Security Council in the months preceding Operation DESERT STORM serving
as a model, host-nation support for land-based forces is likely to be forthcoming
if Iraq disregards a determined international consensus.

Of course, as the United States pressed a coercive-diplomacy strategy,
Saddam Hussein would vigorously attempt to counter it. He would presumably
try to tie up proceedings in endless negotiations over trivial matters. Failing that, Saddam would likely promise cooperation with some form of inspection—promises that would be as disingenuous as the promises made throughout the 1990s. Saddam also might decide to take some form of preemptive action; the counter to this prospect is not only a rapid buildup of forces sufficient to respond quickly if Iraqi preemption occurs or preparations for it are discovered, but also an increased emphasis upon homeland security geared toward thwarting a potential wave of Iraqi state-sponsored terrorism.

Essentially, coercive diplomacy would offer Saddam one final chance, failing which the United States would be free to pursue its primary objective of regime change, with the authorization of the Security Council. If by postponing unilateral action and attempting coercive diplomacy a regional consensus can be restored, the moral burden can finally be shifted away from America and its allies and partners and back to where it belongs—on Saddam's regime. The United States would reap substantial benefit, for if coercive diplomacy fails to produce an international consensus, the administration can always return to a unilateralist approach in time to conduct an invasion sometime after 1 March 2003, while the weather is still favorable for sustained military operations. Thus the United States has a great deal to win and nothing to lose by attempting coercive diplomacy.

NOTES
5. For a wealth of sources on Iraq’s clandestine weapons programs, see the Nuclear Control Institute’s Website on Iraq, http://www.nci.org/sadb.htm (3 April 2002).


8. Saddam was bitterly opposed to SCR 986 when it was first approved in 1995. See David Wurmser, Tyranny’s Ally (Washington, D.C.: America Enterprise Institute Press, 1999), pp. 17–20; and Patrick Clawson, “Oil for Food or the End of Sanctions?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy Watch (February 1998).


21. All told, between four to six divisions would likely be involved, and upward of a thousand aircraft. See Kenneth M. Pollack, “Next Stop Baghdad,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002. For regional basing options, see William D. O’Malley, Evaluating Possible Airfield Deployment Options: Middle East Contingencies (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001).

23. For Marine Corps tactical innovations that might decrease the casualty rate among attacking forces from the historical 30–40 percent to less than 20 percent, see Marine Corps Warfighting Lab Home Page, http://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/frames.html (18 April 2002).


25. For compellance, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1966).


27. Ibid., p. 7.


31. Ibid., p. 8.

32. Ibid.


34. George, Forceful Persuasion, pp. 69–71.

35. On the prospects for winning a global public relations battle, see Robin Wright, “America’s Iraq Policy: How Did It Come to This?” Washington Quarterly, Summer 1998.


37. George, Bridging the Gap, p. 81.


39. Ibid.


43. Among Iraqis there seems to be a widespread belief that if the United States really wanted to get rid of Saddam, it could easily do so. Robert Baer, “Wilderness of Lies,” Vanity Fair, February 2002, p. 120.


47. For congressional testimony on the subject, see Congressional Record, 102d Congress, 1st sess., 10–12 January 1991, available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/r102/r102.html (19 April 2002).


51. Ibid., p. 55.


54. These included: a Kurdish offensive in March 1995; a failed coup by members of the al-Dulaymi tribe, followed by riots that eventually developed into a significant revolt in May and June 1995; and the defection in August 1995 of Saddam’s son-in-law, General Hussein Kamel al-Majid, who subsequently provided a wealth of information regarding Iraqi violations of SCR 687 to the CIA. Wurmser, *Tyranny’s Ally*, pp. 17–25; and Cockburn and Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes*, pp. 191–230.

55. Wright, “America’s Iraq Policy.”


57. For the potential for turmoil between the military and other elements of Saddam’s regime, see Andrew Parasiliti and Sinan Antoon, “Friends in Need, Foes to Heed: The Iraqi Military in Politics,” *Middle East Policy*, October 2000.

58. For the Clausewitzian concept of “centers of gravity,” see Dr. Joe Strange, *Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities* (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Command and Staff College Foundation, 1996).

59. Wright, “America’s Iraq Policy.”


63. SCR 687 was adopted on 3 April 1991. On 19 April the Security Council created UNSCOM. From 30 June to 7 July 1991, UNSCOM conducted its first ballistic missile inspection/destruction mission in Iraq. UNSCOM’s successor, the UN Monitoring and Verification Committee (UNMOVIC), reportedly has about 230 inspectors from dozens of countries training or prepared to work in Iraq. Crossette, “Iraqis Will Face Blunt Terms.”