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JCOA Mission Statement:

As directed, JCOA conducts active collection, analysis, and dissemination of joint lessons learned and best practices across the full spectrum of military operations in order to integrate DOTMLPF-P recommendations and improve the warfighting capabilities of the joint force.

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Message From the Director

BG Anthony G. Crutchfield, USA
Director, JCOA

There are several themes prevalent in this edition of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Journal. The first major theme deals with the Kurdish tribes and their strategic significance in Iraq and the surrounding nations; the second theme discusses stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) in domestic and foreign arenas; and the third looks at the area of consequence management capability, including a tool developed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to assist in the decision making process for planning and execution.

The Kurdish Question and the United States National Interest, by Mr. Nick Asisian, looks at the regional importance of the Kurdish Regional Government and the role it plays in the balance of power. This is followed by Saddam and the Tribes, which is a study produced by the Institute for Defense Analyses under contract from JCOA as part of the Iraqi Perspective Project. In it Ms. Elizabeth Nathan and Mr. Kevin Woods explore the complex relationship of Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish tribes from 1979 - 2003. This study is based on analysis of thousands of captured Iraqi documents.

The importance of stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) cannot be minimized as we transition from foreign combat operations to nation building. CDR Hallett’s article, Sample S&R lessons Identified and Lessons Learned, presents a bibliographic reference essay broken down into specific areas and based upon NATO lessons. His article flows directly into Adjusting to S&R Operations, which examines historical lessons from several interventions in recent years. Mr. Robert Hoekstra and Mr. Charles Tucker, Jr., present ideas on how to best implement the requirements of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 within a whole-of-government approach to S&R. They provide specific recommendations for both civilian and military organizations.

COL Eric Jenkins, USAR (ret), looks at Establishing a Domestic Response Capability in Conjunction with Reconstruction. His blueprint for developing an emergency response capability is based on 30-plus years of experience as a Federal Coordinating Officer with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and his involvement with six disaster declarations. At the time of writing this article, COL Jenkins was the JCOA Liaison Officer to the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

In Building Consequence Management Capability and Expertise in Bahrain, CPT Perkins, PhD. and Major Lewis present a comprehensive defense program in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) passive defense. The article is based on and discusses lessons learned during training exercises in Bahrain under the United States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) Cooperative Defense Program.

The final article is also related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management (CM) capability, specifically the use of the CM Decision Support Tool (DST) developed by the DTRA. Ms. Jessica Iannotti tells what the DST is, and how to use it to support strategic and operational level planning and operations decision making for both domestic and foreign CM.

Also included in the back of the Journal is a listing of all products available from the JCOA website. These are studies and products either developed by JCOA or produced under sponsorship and collaboration with JCOA. One new feature also presented in the back of the Journal is a listing of all the previously published JCOA Journals with an index of articles from each Journal. This listing is planned to be updated and published on a yearly basis.

Anthony G. Crutchfield
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis
Change is essential if an organization is to remain successful, and the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) is no exception. In response to recent Commander US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) guidance, and a projected shift in US operational focus, JCOA is adjusting in two primary ways: first, our role in joint lessons learned integration across the Department of Defense (DOD) is expanding; and second, a slight shift in the priority for combatant command (COCOM) support.

JCOA’s mission is to collect, analyze, and integrate lessons across the DOD. The third step in the process is the most challenging. We cannot force change, but we can make sure our analyses are relevant and substantiated so that others will find them useful. As part of our integration mission, we will now help facilitate the “change agents” across the DOD lessons process, specifically in regards to joint lessons originating from Service lessons learned; we remain focused on integration opportunities and work to reduce duplication of effort. JCOA’s role is expanding to be the proponent for joint lessons across DOD, serving as a distribution hub while seeking increased opportunities to integrate.

For the last six-plus years, as with many lessons learned organizations, JCOA has been focused primarily on Iraq with a recent swing towards Afghanistan. As the US becomes more involved in complex global operations our involvement in different parts of the world must follow suit. Recent guidance from our USJFCOM Commander directed a more forward looking approach, exploring opportunities with other COCOMs such as US Pacific Command (USPACOM) and US Africa Command (USAFRICOM). Both USPACOM and USAFRICOM are the potential future hotbeds of US support. He described USPACOM as the “ocean of the future.” Look for a slight change in priorities, but support to USCENTCOM (specifically Afghanistan) will remain our top priority.

Since inception, JCOA has never had as many diverse projects occurring at the same time. We continue to stay involved in the study of the civilian casualty issue. Having completed Phases I and II, we now have two analysts supporting a new comprehensive study of civilian casualties led by Ms. Sarah Sewall, a professor at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. Ms. Sewall is currently on sabbatical to conduct research on this study. The team just completed an intense two-week collection effort in Afghanistan and has returned to build the analysis product. In addition, several months ago GEN Odierno asked us to collect and study the transition to stability operations in Iraq. Phase I of this study is in the final stages of being completed. Another study, on Haiti humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, has completed the data collection phase and the final briefing is due out the end of April, with other products to follow later this summer. Finally, in support of USJFCOM J9, we are in the process of producing a baseline assessment study for an experiment on countering weapons of mass destruction. This effort is coming to a close as well.

One final note, JCOA will be getting a new Director this summer, BG John (Mike) Murray. He is currently assigned as the Deputy Commanding General (M), 1st Cavalry Division. BG Crutchfield’s departure date and assignment are still unannounced, but we suspect he will be leaving around the July time frame.

“The old saying ‘live and learn’ must be reversed in war, for there we ‘learn and live’; otherwise, we die.”  US War Department, 1945

Mr. Bruce Beville
Deputy Director JCOA
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The Kurdish Question and the United States National Interest

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“Power moves the world for good or for ill, and no nation will give its power.” Richard Nixon, The Real War

Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide a better understanding of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), its importance in the regional balance of power, and how it could affect or influence the United States’ (US) national security and regional interest. In order to provide a clear understanding of the KRG and how it could affect the US mid and long term national security interest, I have provided historical, regional, geopolitical, and economic analysis of the KRG, the Government of Iraq (GOI), and other countries in the region and their interests.

Currently, we may underestimate the importance of KRG and the Kurdish influence in the regional balance of power while having a “friendly” government in Baghdad. This is because the Iraqi government’s progress has been viewed as the main focus of our national interest in the region. However, the US-Iraqi honeymoon may be over in 2012 when the United States forces withdraw from Iraq.

The time after the withdrawal of US forces will be critical for the US because it could lose influence over important elements of GOI and KRG in Iraq’s complex geopolitical structure, in which the US has invested much in both blood and money.

The future of the Iraqi government is unclear and there are four possible scenarios for Iraq’s future status. The best possible option is the full democratization of Iraq as a secular and democratic state that has strong economic and philosophical ties with the West, and that it becomes recognized as an equal partner of the West on the world stage. This scenario is very unlikely due to Iraq’s current socio-political, economic, and religious status. However, the three other less attractive scenarios are possible.

The second scenario is a military coup with the resulting government. This government may keep close ties with the United States, or it could do the opposite by improving its relations with domestic power bases and other regional forces that are more or less anti-Western in nature. A third possibility, Iraq adopts the Iranian socio-political and economic path. On the one hand, a Shia-led government will adopt Sharia as a legal code, and on the other hand it will adopt a modern parliamentary system with limited freedom and capacity for political engagement with different political groups. The fourth possibility, the domestic and regional interests of Iraq may turn the country into a second Lebanon or Somalia, a country with a weak central government with many competing and opposing decision-making centers.

Except for the democratization option, the other options are not promising for the United States regional policy. Consequently, the US will lose serious ground with the GOI, with the KRG not far behind. The KRG is by far the weakest player, both domestically or regionally, and the future of Kurdish people hangs in the balance.

In other words, the future position of the United States with the GOI and the KRG may greatly influence the future regional balance of power. Therefore, it is important to understand the KRG’s future and US national interests. Ironically, US interests and KRG interests are complementary. The US needs sustainable regional influence and the KRG needs security.

Background

“Mad world! Mad kings! Mad composition.” Shakespeare, King John

The post-WWI Middle East was built on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurds were one of the largest ethnic groups that received neither recognition nor a homeland. For centuries, the Kurdish population of the Ottoman and the Iranian Empires had no national aspirations or national self-consciousness. In that period of time, they were fighting for the highest bidder of their
services, whether the Iranians or the Ottomans. Further, the socio-economic structure of the Kurdish population in the Ottoman and Iranian Empires did not allow them to have a wider understanding of nationhood like their neighboring ethnic groups such as Assyrians, Armenians, Georgians, Arabs, and Greeks.

Another reason for the postponement of the formation of a Kurdish identity was the tribal structure of the Kurdish people. The Kurdish tribes were either fighting with each other, against the central government (one Kurdish tribe took the central government’s side and fought against the other Kurdish tribe which was against the central government), or they were hired guns against rival neighboring states. That is to say the Iranians and Ottomans each used the Kurds to settle scores against each other in their frontier areas.

Unlike the other Ottoman subjects (Christians) who had been greatly influenced by the European enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries, Kurdish intellectuals were completely isolated and made no effort to familiarize themselves with the progress made in Europe. Consequently, the Kurdish population of Iran and the Ottoman Empires were culturally backward. They had no modern schooling, no national language, nor any desire to imitate their neighbors, such as Assyrians, Armenians, Georgians, Arabs, and Greeks. The Kurdish awakening and demand for statehood began right after WWI when allied forces promised Kurds statehood in South-Eastern Anatolia. This promise was not fulfilled for two important reasons.

First, there was the economic promise of oil in northern Iraq. The second reason was the rise of a new power in Russia with the ideological strength and ability to threaten the British Empire’s interest in the Middle East and British India. Consequently, the British Imperial administrators decided to turn back to their 19th century policies instead of the nation building process. They decided to only help rebuild those countries that had a national coherence, minimal tribal influence, strong leadership, and the willingness to use force against leftist intellectuals seeking to establish a Soviet-style political system in their countries.

Consequently, Kurds and some other smaller ethnic groups were left out of the nation-building process. Great Britain gave priority to rebuilding Turkey and Iran as major powers able to contain Soviet influence. Another pillar of British regional policy, was building up the countries of Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia under British influence to fully contain and control Russian-Soviet influence.

Great Britain set up Afghanistan as an effective buffer zone between Soviet Central Asia (Russian Empire) and British India by granting Afghanistan full independence. Note: Afghanistan was dependent on British India through formation of Afghanistan’s foreign policy. The full independence of Afghanistan was declared in 1919.

**Kurdish Nationalism: Myth or Reality?**

"An old man, broken with the storms of state
Is come to lay his weary bones among ye;
Give him a little earth for Charity."

*Shakespeare, Henry VIII*

The Iraqi Kurdish population was always in turmoil either under British or the Iraqi-Arab rule. At the same time, bad habits of the past made life miserable for the majority of Kurds. Because they did not have a unified voice, they were not able to have a united platform to talk to the central government. And more importantly, because of Kurdish tribalism, internal competition for available resources, and the hiring of Kurdish factions as proxies in the regional balance of power, the best part of Kurdish modern history was filled with internal conflicts, or proxy wars.

In reality, Kurdish nationalism was based on a series of emotional reactions toward countries that have major Kurdish populations. Kurdish intellectuals and political leaders were not able to define Kurdish national interests. Consequently, they turned from one regional power to another. This policy was not fruitful and did not produce any tangible solution for Kurdish unity in the regional level.

The Kurdish factor was one of the biggest elements of Iranian-Iraqi border clashes in the last 50 years. The Iraqi Kurdish political entities sought help from Iran to fight against the Iraqi central government. The Iranian Kurds would ask the Iraqi government to assist them against the Iranian government and, hence forth, this led to a series of unending proxy wars that saw the Kurds as the main players from both sides of the border.

These cross border conflicts did not produce a solution for the absence of Kurdish unity or nationalism.
In contrast, most of the Kurdish areas on both sides of the border were destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people became internally displaced people (IDP), and tens of thousands were killed either by the armed forces of the central governments or by Kurdish factional strife.

There are historical examples of how so-called Kurdish politicians behaved irresponsibly. For instance, during the 1973 war with the Iraqi central government, Kurdish rebels under the leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani and with the direct assistance of Iran tried to overthrow the Iraqi government. The Kurdish rebels were very close to achieving their goal. However, the two big powers in the region had a different idea. The Iranian King, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and the Iraqi Vice President, Saddam Hussein, signed a memorandum of understanding in Algeria to end their hostilities and, consequently, the Shah of Iran abandoned the Kurds leaving them to face the Iraqi Army alone. The consequences of this war were disastrous for the Iraqi-Kurdish population. Many people were savagely slaughtered by Iraqi forces, and many others took refuge in Iranian border towns (author is an eye witness of this tragedy). Most importantly, no solution to the Kurdish demand for autonomy in any shape or form was found.

Such a sloppy, self-centric, poorly planned and executed national agenda, that served few people and damaged the rest of the community, cannot be viewed as a genuine symbol of Kurdish nationalism.

Turkey’s Kurdish population was not involved in cross border conflicts with Iraq or Iran, but did have their own share of fighting against the Turkish central government. The irony of this situation is that the Kurdish population in Turkey has produced a better understanding of Kurdish nationalism than in Iraqi or Iranian Kurdistan.

KURDS: Iran-Iraq War and First Gulf War

In addition to the 1973 incident, the Kurdish politicians have made one blunder after another. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the Kurdish leaders followed the same old path that led to failure. They continued to fight on both sides of the Iran-Iraq border. Both the Iranian and Iraqi governments had purely military goals toward the Kurds. They were both using economy-of-force operations in order to focus their operations on the main battle area in the South. Consequently, both countries were forced to keep at least one full division in the region to secure their heavily populated Kurdish areas. The consequences for innocent Kurdish men and women were disastrous. The Iraqis gassed the Kurdish population in Halabchah, killing 5,000 civilians because of their actions in helping the Iranian forces.

Across the border Iranian forces also conducted massacres against the Kurds. One of the most famous attacks took place in the village of Ghalatan. There the Iranian forces led by Mullah Hassani, Imam from the city of Ormieh, massacred uncounted numbers of people of all ages. During eight years of war between them, the Iranian and Iraqi forces killed tens of thousands of Kurds.

After the First Gulf War, Kurdish leaders again thought that their moment had arrived to put up a good fight against the Iraqi central government. They believed that the Iraqi Army was demoralized after their heavy losses in Kuwait, that US Forces would remain in Kuwait and southern Iraq, and that the US psychological operations (PSYOP) and irregular warfare (IW) operations against the Iraqi government had given them all the reasons they needed to revolt against the Iraqi central government. However, they did not reckon with the bitter realities of the international politics and the balance of power in the region that would not allow the US to forcefully intervene in either northern or southern Iraq. It was here that the revolts of both the Kurds and the Shias were brutally suppressed. The Coalition forces Northern and Southern No Fly Zones did create some security on the ground for both Shias and Kurds. In the case of the Kurds, however, the Kurdish factions again began a lengthy fight against each other once they felt secure from Saddam’s harassment.

2003: A New Opportunity for Iraqi Kurdistan

“I do love My Country’s good with a respect more tender, More holy and profound, than mine own life,...” Shakespeare, Coriolanus

The fall of Saddam Hussein and the vacuum of power that followed was the best opportunity for the Kurdish political leadership to pull their act together and produce a real program for the future. The creation of a
The KRG and the Kurdish population in Kirkuk and Ninawa effectively control all transportation, oil, and gas pipelines that go to Turkey (See Figure 1). They have reasonable control of the Syrian railroad and other transportation means between both countries.

Both the Turkish and Syrian railroads are connected to the Iraqi railroad system through Kurdish territory. This gives Iraqi Kurdistan a great advantage to deal with the governments of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. (See Figures 2-3). In addition, the Iranian News Agency (IRNA) has mentioned that Iran has interest in having a link to the Iraqi railroad system. The IRNA has reported that the “short-term plan envisages a 60 km-long railroad between the cities of Khorramshahr in Iran and the southern Iraqi port of Basra. Another long-term project calls for a railroad to be constructed from the western Iranian city of Kermanshah to the Iraqi province of Diyala.”

Iran is connected to the Turkish railroad system. At the same time, the Iranian railroad is also connected to the autonomous Republic of Nakhijevan (Azerbaijan). In the east it has been connected to the Old Soviet railroad through Turkmenistan (see Figure 4). Recently, Iran has signed separate memorandums with the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia in order to link the Iranian railroad to both those countries’ rail systems. In the south, Iran is trying to connect its railroad to the port of Basrah in Iraq.

Iran also seeks to connect their railroad network in the north from the Iranian province of Kermanshah to the central Iraqi province of Diyala through the Khanagehein Point of Entry in Diyala. If this scenario takes place and the Kurds annex Khanagehein, then the KRG will control what is the prominent transportation hub of the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia. This would be the greatest geopolitical and geo-economic achievement of the KRG and Kurdish political leaders in the last 100 years, even without having declared statehood.

The reason behind this optimistic evaluation is the fact that Iran, the Central Asian Republics, the Caucasus Republics, and even China are interested in having a direct rail link to the Eastern
Mediterranean. This railroad would provide significant business and economic opportunities for all the regional players. The strategic significance of Kurdistan is further increased when you consider the tremendous oil reserves available for export, and their ability to destabilize the other countries through its demographics.

Figure 4 - Iranian Railroad System

The Expansion of the KRG, Conflicts of Interest, and the Position of Iraq’s Central Government and the Neighboring Countries

“The path is smooth that leadeth on to danger.”
Shakespeare, Venus and Adonis

Despite the KRG’s geopolitical and geoeconomic importance, and its demographic advantages in the neighboring countries, the KRG has serious problems that will have to be dealt with sooner or later.

The most important issues for the KRG are their lack of regional allies and strategic depth. It was the lack of regional support for the KRG that forced Kurdish leadership to search for allies in other parts of the world, such as the US and the European Union (EU) countries. The KRG’s policy of relying on the US and EU countries actually works against their regional standing because the other surrounding states consider the KRG as a puppet and proxy of the West. Together with the lack of regional sympathy toward Kurdish unification, their neighbors have serious doubts about the KRG’s capability to survive on its own after the US withdrawal.

There is no doubt that the Iraqi government and their regional allies (Turkey, Iran, and to some extent Syria) will try either to decrease the KRG’s power to near nothing or to dismantle the KRG all together. Thomas Hobbs described this situation in his very well known book Leviathan as follows: “if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies and … endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.”

The Kurds know quite well the security dilemma that the KRG will face after the US withdrawal. The Kurdish political leadership is mindful of their weaknesses. In the last few years, they have shown flexibility and political skills in avoiding conflict with the Iraqi central government and their neighboring countries.

On the domestic front, the KRG leadership have gone against their historical approach as they try hard to restrain their fellow Kurds from any emotional and aggressive moves regarding Kirkuk’s future status. They have downplayed both the numerous postponements of the referendum on Kirkuk, which has been postponed numerous times, and the lack of a definite date for it to be held.

At the regional level, the KRG leadership clearly understands that antagonizing Turkey and Iran would not be a good move since the KRG heavily depends on those countries for goodwill, open borders, and investments. Despite its deep desire for unification, the KRG realizes that Iran and Turkey have control over “historically” held Kurdish lands and these countries treat local Kurds very poorly. However, the KRG clearly understands that a war against either of these powerful countries is both unwinnable, and political and strategic suicide.

Therefore, the KRG leadership has actively participated in neutralizing Kurdish groups that oppose Turkish and Iranian rule in Kurdish areas. In Iran, they actively participate in neutralizing the Kumlah, the Party
for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), and other Kurdish groups that are active along the Iran-KRG border. Additionally, the Kurdish leaders to include Mr. Talibani, President of Iraq, spoke against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) fighters who have waged a bloody campaign against the Turkish rule in Eastern Anatolia.

The KRG, as a political and military entity, does not have strategic depth. They have control over a relatively very small area without room to maneuver against an invading army. Consequently, an invading army would be able to occupy KRG territory in a relatively short period of time. Like many other times in history, the Kurdish fighters have waged guerilla warfare against invading armies, but they never successfully defeated any of those armies regardless of their size or power.

**The Triangle of Conflict-Territorial Claims (Domestic Conflict)**

“The great leaders have always stage-managed their effects.” *Charles DeGaulle, The Edge of the Sword, 1960*

Since 2003, there have been significant demographic changes in Iraq, especially among the Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds. After the collapse of the previous Iraqi regime, the political power and leadership of Iraqi Sunnis was significantly reduced. The activities of Al Qaeda and Iraqi Sunni nationalist groups against the US forces, as well as the Shias and Kurds, further reduced their political power. In addition, the land grabs by the Kurds in the north, and by Shia groups in the south and Baghdad, significantly weakened the Sunni position in Iraqi politics, economics, and even demographics.

Kurds forced their way into Ninawa, Kirkuk, Salah Adin, and Diyala provinces. However, they did not use the same ruthless tactics that Shias used to homogenize the southern Iraqi and Baghdad populations. Instead, they brought in Kurdish displaced persons into these regions. Then they offered financial compensation for non-Kurds to leave Kirkuk. These moves were well received in the area and achieved some success. However, actions taken by some Kurds heightened the conflict with the different ethnic and religious groups in the region. As a result, the Kurds were not able to obtain a clear cut victory in any of the areas that they claim as their own.

Since 2008, another trend has developed. The Sunni and Shia Arabs have an unwritten agreement to unify their efforts to disallow any serious alteration of territorial boundaries that could favor the KRG in Northern Iraq.

Despite their differences, the Sunnis and Shias have worked together as fellow Arabs to expand their territorial boundaries in northern Iraq at the expense of the Kurds. The pragmatic Iraqi Sunni politicians clearly understood that they could not return to the pre-2003 status quo. So they concluded that they would have to try to work within the Iraqi political system for a mutually acceptable solution for both Sunnis and Shias. However, this does not mean that they will give up an opportunity to expand their regional influence. Sunnis have lost tremendously in Baghdad and the South, but they have a very good chance to strengthen their position in the Iraqi power structure in important and strategic areas in northern Iraq. The Shias clearly understand that while they cannot be rid of the Sunni Arab population, they can accept Sunni dominance in some parts of the north in order to contain Kurdish expansion. Sunni and Shia Arabs have also forged an unwritten agreement to collaborate with the Turkmen to oppose Kurdish demands.

Because of their relatively small numbers, the Turkmen’s position is not a large factor in the regional politics. Much of their importance comes from the active support they receive from Turkey. Arabs and Turkmen have both the Iraqi and Turkish governments supporting their effort to contain Kurds at any cost. Consequently, this anti-Kurdish coalition could cause another major eruption in the area, creating a serious problem for the KRG and Coalition forces.

The territorial conflict in northern Iraq will tacitly unify Iraqi Arabs (without consideration of religious factors) under the banner of Arab nationalism against Kurdish nationalism. However, one can also argue the opposite. The Sunnis’ participation in an anti-Kurdish coalition could be a strategically unwise move damaging the Sunnis’ interest as well. The KRG acts as the guarantor of the Sunnis’ existence and, in some sense, enforces Sunni efforts to reap some real benefit from Shia central government. The Kurds in general, and the KRG in particular, act as the buffer zone between Sunni and Shia Arab communities. The diminishing of Kurdish influence could bring another deadly conflict between Sunni and Shia Arabs that could have
far reaching influence in the future of regional and international balance of power, as well.

The Polygon of Conflict-Territorial Claims (Regional Conflict)

“Then, everything includes itself in power, Power into will, will into appetite; And appetite, a universal wolf So doubly seconded will and power, Must make perforce a universal prey, And at least eat up himself.”
Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida

In addition to the internal conflicts between rival groups within the Iraqi borders, the question of Kurdish unification has a regional dimension as well. Turkey, Iran, and Syria all have significant Kurdish populations who are also in favor of the creation of an autonomous Kurdish government within those countries, which will eventually unify all the Kurds into an independent Kurdistan.

Turkey, Iran, and Syria will accept neither of these options. Each of these counties have been built based on the specific racial, linguistic, and traditional world views of the dominant ethnic groups — namely, Arabs, Turks, and Persians. The issue of Kurdish unification is something that the leadership of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey have not been able to solve for more than a century.

Turkey has denied for a long time the existence of an ethnic Kurd population in eastern Turkey all together. Kurdish demands have received brutal military responses from the Turkish authorities. The Turkish authorities have also tried very hard to change the ethnic nature of inhabitants of the Eastern Anatolian population to one more in line with Turkish ethnic characteristics.

Turkish authorities claim that the people of the Eastern Anatolian population are “Mountainous Turks” who have nothing to do with the neighboring countries’ so-called Kurdish population. However, despite the Turkish propaganda and political manipulation, the “Mountainous Turks” story does not agree with the anthropological evidence. Besides that, the local Kurdish population never bought into it anyway.

Iran is also guilty of using the same brutal military tactics to silence its Kurdish population. Furthermore, Iranians have used a cultural affinity model to convince Kurds that they are a shareholder in Iran. Iranians used the common ancestry of the Kurdish and Persian people as Indo-Europeans, or Aryans, to support their argument. The irony of this argument is that it’s more factual than the Turkish story. Although it is propaganda, it is based on a common religion in the pre-Islamic era, and shared linguistic and cultural characteristics. The other issue that distinguishes Iran from the other countries with Kurdish minorities is that Iranian Kurds do enjoy some limited cultural freedom that the others do not. Iranian Kurds also have limited freedom to publish Kurdish books and journals.

The Iraqi and Syrian authorities have also used very repressive methods to deal with their Kurdish population. It does not need to be described in this paper since it is very-well documented in the public domain.

All four countries use an old, and very effective, tool in the fight against the Kurdish demands for autonomy. They use Islam as a political tool to convince their Kurdish citizens to be happy with the status quo. Iranian, Turkish, Syrian, and Iraqi authorities emphasize to their Kurdish citizens that Islam is a cosmopolitan religion which does not recognize race and linguistic differences among Muslim “Ummah.” Therefore, based on the Sharia, there are no differences or prejudices among Muslims. But behind the scene, what these countries really mean is a good Kurd is one who accepts the authorities’ rule and assimilates within the dominant culture. In other words, the authorities serve their own interest by pushing for an unspoken forced assimilation under the banner of religion, without any pre-conditions.

For instance, the former Prime Minister of Turkey, Necmedian Erbakan, who was the first Islamist Prime Minister in the Turkish Republic, declared that the Kurdish question of unity can be solved in the framework of the Islamic brotherhood. He delivered a speech in Eastern Turkey near Bingol in which he criticized Ataturk and other previous Turkish leaders who put Turkish nationalism before Islamic brotherhood. Furthermore, he considered the rise of Kurdish nationalism a direct reaction to the Turkish governing authority’s ignorance of Islam and its universality. Mr. Erbakan expressed his thoughts in the following excerpt:

“[They] abolished the ‘Bi’smillahi ar-rahmani ar-rahim’ (In the name of Allah the most gracious, the
most merciful) at the schools and replaced it with ‘I am Turkish, I am right, I am industrious’. If you say this, then a Muslim child of Kurdish origin gained the right to say ‘Really? And I am Kurdish, I am more right, I am more industrious’. And thus you have alienated the people of this country from each other.”

However, the speech that continued this quote cost Erbakan his job and he was forcibly removed from his office by the Turkish military general staff.

Another example came from the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini. He rejected the cultural, ethnic, and denominational differences among Muslims and declared all of them Muslims regardless of their background. In one of his interviews aired on Iranian radio, he mentioned that:

“sometimes the word minorities is used to refer to people such as Kurds, Lurs, Turks, Persians, Baluchis, and such. These people should not be called minorities, because this term assumes that there is a difference between these brothers. In Islam, such a difference has no place at all. There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages… It is very probable that such problems have been created by those who do not wish Muslim countries to be united… They create the issues of nationalism… and such-isms which are contrary to Islamic doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam and Islamic philosophy.”

However, to the Kurds this does not make any sense because of the way Turkey, Iraq, and Syria have brutally treated their minority Kurdish Muslim brothers.

The US-led coalition war against Saddam Hussein was a turning point in the history of the modern Middle East and in the life of millions of Kurds in the region. The postwar Iraq opened Pandora’s box, “releasing spirits” with which no one wanted to deal. For instance, the government of Turkey refused to participate in the US-led operations against Iraq because of the implications for the Kurdish problem.

Ankara considered the rise of any kind of Kurdish entity in postwar Iraq as a serious issue undermining the Turkish dominance of Eastern Anatolia. Therefore, Turkey did not take part in the invasion and did not even allow US forces to use their territory to attack Iraq. The fall of the previous Iraqi government and creation of the KRG was also a serious challenge to the other countries in the region.

Since then, the KRG has become a headache that none of these countries were ready to deal with. In Iran, Turkey, Syria, and postwar Iraq, a very cautious Kurdish policy is required. They correctly understand that the presence of US forces in Iraq is a major guarantor of the KRG. They all have tried to ensure that the KRG will not be a separate entity in Iraq, nor will it have any internationally recognized borders. Turkey and Iran have decided to forge economic ties with the KRG, as long as KRG’s leaders remember that the KRG is at the mercy of Iran and Turkey. If the two countries decide to close their borders, it will be very difficult for the KRG to survive on its own, especially when the US forces leave Iraq, which will happen sooner or later.

In the last few years there has been a business boom between the KRG, Iran, and Turkey. Turkish and Iranian products and investments are virtually everywhere. At the same time, the KRG has paid a very heavy price for Turkish and Iranian goodwill. Both countries pushed the KRG to force Kurdish rebel groups out of the area. The KRG basically became a client state to both Turkey and Iran, helping to contain the activities of Kurdish rebels in Iran and Turkey.

Another strategy that is being employed by both Turkey and Iran is a serious information operation in order to weaken Kurdish nationalism among their Kurdish citizens. Iranians and Turks are hoping to create a break between the KRG and their own Kurdish population. Their method is to tell their Kurdish citizens that the KRG is an unreliable entity that cannot even protect itself — let alone protect its Kurdish brothers on either side of the border.

Besides some of the tactical success against their own indigenous Kurdish rebels, the surrounding regional powers, not to mention the Iraqi government as well, are waiting for the right time and place to take action. They all have decided to patiently watch how the political and social processes within Iraq develop and what would be their best course of action for the future.

At the regional level, Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq are not giving up their hope that, given the chance, they can take military action against the KRG. For now, the US military’s presence in Iraq is a major factor preventing them from using military force against the KRG. So they have decided to maintain a cordial relationship with the KRG in order to not give the US any reason to prolong its presence in the region out of possible humanitarian concerns. However, the situation may well change very quickly after 2012.
If a decision to take military action against the KRG is made, the neighboring countries prefer the Iraqi military to assume the duty of pacifying this regional threat for the general good of all concerned and to re-establish the post-2003 status quo. The most likely course of action the neighboring countries would take against the KRG would be to close their borders, cut any land and air communication with KRG, sever all economic and investment ties, and cut the water supply from Turkey. The area the KRG controls has no sustainable economic structure and its economy could face serious problems if they were cut off. The KRG is more or less dependent on the goodwill and economic assistance of neighboring countries. They cannot sustain themselves under intensive pressure for a long period of time. It is estimated that the KRG could last only one or two months. The surrounding regional powers tactic would be to force the Kurds to beg for their survival. The price for protecting the population from hunger and the Iraqi army’s military action would be the complete dismantling of the KRG status by its own Kurdish leaders, forcing the Kurdish political leaders and population to choose between bread or freedom.

The United States Regional Interest and KRG

“You are either in favor of evil or you are in favor of good. You are either on the side of the oppressed or on the side of the oppressor. You cannot be neutral.”

The status of the KRG after the withdrawal of US forces in 2012 is something the US government and military must take seriously. The KRG has many problems which will leave the Kurds facing serious challenges after the US military hands over control of its last military base to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF). When this occurs, the US will face two different dilemmas. First, how to deal with the humanitarian responsibility to make sure atrocities do not occur against the people who have helped the US forces since 1991; second, how to support the KRG in becoming a viable entity within Iraq, which is in the US national interest.

In the past, the US faced similar problems and, unfortunately, was not able to provide the necessary protection for the people who helped them during very difficult times. The best example of this lack of consistency was in the Vietnam War when the US left behind the South Vietnamese “Montagnard,” the Hmong, to the mercy of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese army. It is not clear what happened to these people, but it is obvious that the new regime did not look at them favorably. Many Hmong became refugees and some were able to be resettled in the US and Canada. Of those who remained, it is probable that many of them perished.

A similar situation could occur in Iraq. The Kurdish situation could deteriorate if we leave Iraq without any serious guarantees from the Iraqi government and other regional powers to respect the KRG’s governing status, and to protect of the Kurdish population in northern Iraq.

In addition to the humanitarian responsibilities of the US toward the Iraqi Kurds, the US also has a geopolitical interest to protect the KRG. The KRG has a very unique geopolitical situation. The KRG by itself is not able to resist any long term pressure from the Iraqi government or other countries in the region. However, some well-designed guarantees between the US and all interested parties, along with a possible small US contingency force, would ensure a positive balance of power in Iraq and the rest of the region.

Stabilization in the region is very important because in the next 20 to 30 years, northern Iraq will become the economic and political heart of the Middle East. With that said, there are three different issues that should be taken into consideration.

First, the railroad system that connects the Eastern Mediterranean to Iran, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia, and China basically ties together the Eurasian heartland. This railroad passes through Northern Iraq where the Kurds are the major ethnic group. They also have a lot of control over the Iraqi, Syrian, and Turkish railroad systems. All these countries have railroads tracks that are passing through territories that are heavily populated by Kurdish people.

Therefore, the control of railroad networks becomes a serious geopolitical consideration for all the interested countries, to include the United States. Based on this premise, it would be in the best interest of the US to have an active presence in northern Iraq and on the Middle Eastern chessboard.

The US presence and influence in this local area would come from Kurdish representation. The Kurds in general, and the KRG in particular, must represent US interests in the region and throughout this critical
area. Therefore, strong ties with the Kurds would help establish them as viable players in the region, and also help the US to extend its regional influence. Also, having some influence over the railroad system that has the possibility of becoming one of the most important parts of the global economy is very important.

Kurdish control of this railroad would help the US to have more influence over the behavior of many of the countries in the region, regardless of their status of relations with the US (friends or foes). It is worth mentioning that in the world of global politics there is no such a thing as an eternal friendship because all nations are really promoting their own national interest.

Second, friendship with the KRG improves the US ability to secure the flow of oil and gas into the international market. A very important and strategic pipeline goes through Northern Iraq and delivers Iraqi oil and gas to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. This pipeline will deliver millions of tons of oil and gas annually to the international market and passes through a Kurdish dominated area.

The last important geopolitical fact about the Kurds is that they have a huge presence in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. This demographic advantage will also help to shape US interests in the region. The Kurdish presence can be used in many different forms and shapes in order to make sure the regional powers will support US regional interests and policies.

I believe these three factors are enough to provide a better understanding of the bigger picture regarding Kurdish regional influence and its importance for US regional interests in the Middle East. Basically, the Kurdish-US relationship is a long journey. In the past, the US and Kurds did not have the ability to make deals with each other directly when the Kurds did not have a political presence. It is important to understand that the US has a partner, the KRG, providing the US with the capabilities to have economic, political, and military influence in the region. The Kurdish-US relationship is in the testing phase, and both sides are still in the learning mode.

**Conclusion**

Dealing with the KRG and the issue of Kurdish unity will continue to be a challenge for the future. This challenge could be viewed as a unique opportunity to stabilize the region, or it might be considered as a serious geopolitical headache that will destabilize the balance of power in the wider Middle East. Nevertheless, the 2003 Iraq war will have lasting influence on the future of the Middle East. There are many different opinions about how this region will manage conflicts and problems after the US forces departure from Iraq. However, one should not forget that Iraq still lives in a vacuum of power, and no one really can forecast the short or long term Iraqi political behavior while so many different forces are in play. The groups which developed during the vacuum of power will never give up their power (political, economic, or military) very easily. Therefore, it is naïve to believe that the Iraqi government will recognize the KRG as an entity and form a relationship based on mutual respect and limited federalism.

The idea of federalism is a Western concept and, in the Middle East, the political elite understand federalism differently. They consider federalism the equivalent of the separation and dismantling of the dominant ethnic group’s pride, ego, and capability of governing the country. Additionally, the Kurdish point of view will be to keep its hard earned limited autonomy. We could witness an unwelcome war that significantly influences the regional balance of power and creates a catastrophic humanitarian crisis all over the area.

The picture that has been drawn here is both pessimistic and speculative, but we must prepare for the worst. There are two different issues that must be considered within this situation. The first issue to consider is the humanitarian crisis; and the second is our national interest. The humanitarian crisis will occur if the Iraqi government and other neighboring countries decide to put immense pressure on the KRG and Kurdish population in order to weaken or dismantle the KRG and re-establish a new balance of power without the Kurds. If one looks objectively into the situation, it would appear that it is in the US national interest to protect the KRG’s existence since we have no idea who will lead and control Iraq after 2012, and how much they will favor us or how much they will oppose us. The KRG’s significant geoeconomic and geopolitical importance should be taken into consideration in order to arrive at an educated and well-thought out policy toward the KRG and the rest of Iraq.

The bottom line is that the KRG needs security and the US needs a sustainable regional influence to support its interests in the region. So, working with
the KRG might provide the capabilities the US needs to influence the regional political process and guarantee the free flow of oil, thereby protecting long-term regional stability.

**About The Author**

Mr. Njdeh “Nick” Asisian was born in an Armenian family in Kermanshah, Iran. He served two years as a conscript in the Iranian Army in the early 1980s. He immigrated to the United States in October 1988 and became a naturalized US citizen. He currently works for the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) as a PMESII Analyst and Chief Research Analyst. Prior to that, he worked for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. He earned a BA in International Relations from the University of California Santa Barbara, and a Master of Arts Degree in East European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies from the University of Kansas. He is also pursuing a Ph.D. in International Law and Diplomacy.

**Disclaimer:** Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US government or BCTP.

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**Endnotes:**


2. The sacred text of Islam, the Qur’an, uses the term, Ummah, to refer to the community of believers. The term is used to describe individual communities, both great and small, of faithful Muslims, and to refer to the world-wide community of believers—in the latter sense of the term, it is synonymous with dar al-Islam, or “The House of Islam,” which refers to the world Islamic community. Online. Internet. 3 Jun. 2009. Available: http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/UMMAH.HTM


Executive Summary

By introducing new primary source documents, this paper explores the complex relationship between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the tribes that lived under it between 1979 and 2003. The Iraqi documents, placed in the context of an open source literature survey, tell an important story that helps explain the tribal role in Iraq’s current socio-political environment.

During the early years of Saddam’s reign, he consistently encouraged measures that marginalized the tribes. The Ba’ath party viewed tribes as an obstacle to pan-Arab nationalism and worked to minimize the tribal sheikhs’ authority and influence. But Saddam’s relationship with the tribes fundamentally changed after he lost control of all but one province during the post-Gulf War rebellion. Following the 1991 uprisings, his regime became even more powerful as it tightened control over the nation. In doing so, the party changed the manner in which it dealt with the tribes, rejecting fundamental principles of Ba’ath philosophy in order to solidify political support.

In the wake of the Ba’ath party’s massive security breakdown, Saddam responded by incorporating a new version of tribalism into Ba’ath political ideology. The neo-tribal shift reversed long-standing policies that had relegated tribes to a lesser role in the governance of Iraq. Recognizing that tribal loyalty was essential for solidifying the power of his regime, Saddam aggressively engaged the tribes and provided substantial economic benefits to those who would support him. Willing to use any means necessary to augment regime security, Saddam’s goal was to prevent a repetition of the 1991 uprisings; consequently, his adherence to strict interpretation of Ba’athist philosophy faltered.

Collaboration between tribe and state resulted in cooperative security arrangements and a comprehensive intelligence network that protected both rural and urban areas of Iraq. Other regime directives, such as forced migration patterns, challenged the collaborative relationship and from this emerged a set of favored tribes that were integral to supporting the regime’s broad strategic goals. For every favored tribe, however, there were several others angling for position, a result that Saddam embraced and encouraged with his patronage policies.

What emerged from this dynamic was a complicated set of norms that dictated how government would function and, consequently, how society would respond. By failing to recognize and leverage the patronage system, the Coalition Provisional Authority broke down the long-standing fabric of Iraqi society. With no incentive to offer, the sheikhs steadily lost power over the would-be troublemakers in their tribes and communities. Four years after Saddam’s fall, the United States is only just beginning to understand the complexities of tribal culture and the myriad ways in which tribal leadership can affect the success or failure of military, economic, and humanitarian operations in Iraq.

Figure 1. Geographic distributions of ethnic groups and major tribes in Iraq
Introduction

Since [the Shi’a intifada], tribalism has become, alongside Arabism, the glory that was pre-Islamic Mesopotamia, and Islam, a major ingredient of the Ba’ath manufactured Iraqi identity. —Amatzia Baram

When the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) cut off the patronage system in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, it not only lost the cooperation of the tribes, but it also inadvertently caused the sheikhs to lose control over the young men in their communities. After a particularly troubling conversation with an Iraqi sheikh, Ahmed Hashim (a military advisor working for the CPA) concluded: “Indeed, on many occasions sheikhs told me that they have no authority or rewards with which they can exercise control over the young men. Saddam had provided them with the wherewithal to exert their authority. They expected us to do the same.”

By failing to recognize and leverage the patronage system, the CPA broke down the long-standing economic fabric of Iraqi society. With no incentives to offer, the sheikhs steadily lost power over the would-be troublemakers (which increased in number after the Army was disbanded) in their tribes and communities. John Agresto, senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education said this of Iraq:

It was a culture of corruption, where for at least the last three decades nothing was done without a pay-off...Any civic sense, any initiative, and independence of spirit and willingness to fight for one’s self or country was totally beaten down by the cultures of fear, suspicion, corruption, and...the cultures of dependency and privilege.

Agresto’s commentary is eerily reminiscent of General Aylmer Haldane’s insight nearly a century earlier. Haldane, a British commander who administered the occupation of Iraq during the 1920s, made many of the same observations in his memoirs. In a letter to Haldane, Ibn Saud (who would go on to become King of Saudi Arabia) described the peculiarities of the tribal element in Iraq and explained why attempts at cooperation would likely be futile:

As regards the tribal leaders and notables of Iraq from whom you want the improvement of the country, they do not wish that the people of Iraq be quiet, and that there should be law and order in the land. It is impossible to change their nature, as this has been their policy of old and continues so today. Their whole idea in life is to stir up the people in order to gain profit from the Government. It may be accepted as an incontrovertible fact that it will be impossible to manage the people of that country except by strong measures and military force. Never forget that the feelings which animate them are expressed in the saying, “He who even dips his pen in an inkstand on behalf of a Christian, the man becomes a Kaﬁr.”
Little has changed in Iraq’s tribal context since the 1920s. Lacking the kind of cultural insight Ibn Saud shared with Haldane, the CPA unknowingly and unwittingly sabotaged itself during the early stages of occupation due to a critical intellectual void in socio-political understanding.

“Saddam and the Tribes” discusses the historical significance of the tribal element in Iraqi society by exploring the complex relationship between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the tribes that lived under it between 1979 and 2003. It begins with a description of the regime’s repressive policies in the 1980s and the destructive effect of Saddam’s governance on state-tribal relations. It goes on to share lessons learned following the 1991 Shi’a uprisings and the regime’s adaptation to the perception of widespread popular unrest. Finally, it details the eventual strategy reversal in the mid-90s to the implementation of a quid pro quo policy of co-option.

The author seeks to fill a void in the open-source literature by sharing new primary source documents carefully placed in the context of the larger story. This paper examines the diverse methods of central governance, ranging from oppressive tactics to semi-representative institutions, that can be applied to Iraq’s tribal societies. It raises questions on the implications for US policy in Iraq, while offering a new outlook on the way ahead.

Other scholars, notably Amatzia Baram, have spent decades studying Iraqi politics and society, publishing in-depth analyses of many issues touched upon here. In contrast, this paper is not intended to be an anthropological or sociological study of Iraqi tribes, nor is it an extensive survey of the thousands of tribes in Iraq. Specific tribes are mentioned by name as examples of the regime’s broader national policies, but this does not indicate that they were the only affected groups. Instead, they are representative of the regime’s wide spectrum of authority over a variety of different groups.

There are differing views on when exactly the Ba’ath party began to promote neo-tribalist policies. Much of the scholarly research concerning the role of tribes in Iraq before 1991 suggests that Saddam’s early tribal policies were wrapped up in the Ba’ath party’s larger pan-Arab aspirations. According to Muhsin J. al-Musawi, “While emphasizing a common history for all Iraqis, rooted in Mesopotamia, older than any race and religion, [Saddam] began to rephrase leftist terminology to fit into a growing nationalist register of a Pan-Arabist background subsumed into a personality cult which was to displace every other and which stood unchallenged thereafter until 1991.”

Ba’ath tribal policy was indeed grounded in pragmatism between 1968 and 1979. Still, tribes were undoubtedly seen as an impediment to both political reform and economic modernization in Iraq. The war with Iran following the Shi’a Revolution shaped Iraqi policy during the 1980s, renewing interest in Islamism that overshadowed tribal policy through the end of the decade. Not until 1991 did Saddam launch a comprehensive program to manage and manipulate the numerous smaller tribes across Iraq in an organized, bureaucratic manner.

Adopting this policy represented the ultimate pragmatism for the regime, so much in fact that Saddam was willing to contradict Ba’ath ideology to stabilize and preserve his power. A March
1991 meeting between Saddam and a major delegate of tribal chieftains was a symbolic turning point in the burgeoning relationship between state and tribe in post-Gulf War Iraq. It was during this time, post-1991, that a second, even stronger, wave of neo-tribalism swept across Iraq—that is the primary focus of this paper.

**Iraqi Tribes: Structure and Function**

Tribes, defined as “autonomous, genealogically structured group[s] in which the rights of the individuals are largely determined by their membership in corporate descent groups,” have the potential to unify or divide Iraqis more than any other social phenomenon in the Middle East. However, the lines drawn between groups are often difficult for an outside observer to decipher. Tribalism runs deeper than religion in some parts of Iraq—kinship can overcome even the most intense sectarian differences. Consequently, an Iraqi leader must contend with the tribes not only as a distinct social structure, but also as a way of thinking among the people, whether urban or rural.

The process of urbanization in Iraq during the past 35 years has left many Iraqis physically isolated from their rural tribal units. However, even city dwellers remain loyal to their traditional roots. Many can trace their ancestry back hundreds or thousands of years. Figure 2, a graphic representation of the Al-Bu’ajji family tree, illustrates how complex tribal genealogies can become over generations.

The tribe itself is a group bound by ancestry and geography who share a common political identity. Tribal units are led by sheikhs, traditionally appointed by a council of elders. The origin of the sheikh’s authority, explains cultural anthropologist Montgomery McFate, “is not necessarily based on birth, but on his ability to satisfy the political, economic, and security interests of his tribal members.” Responsible for protecting his people and providing for their well-being, a sheikh’s influence extends to legal matters, marriages, and disputes with other tribes. Each level of organization—from house to clan to tribe—usually has a sheikh at its head, meaning that each sheikh has a varying level of authority based on his position in the hierarchy.

The history of successive governments in dealing with the Iraqi tribes has undergone many evolutions, with numerous attempts to destroy their power followed by attempts to harness and join that power to governmental authority. Sometimes both approaches were practiced simultaneously. While Saddam seemingly followed the Ba’ath ideology that considered tribalism a detriment to Arab unity and socialist programs, he learned a lesson from the failure of the first Ba’ath regime in 1963: it was a mistake to depend on political institutions and party loyalty alone. He was advised to depend on his own tribe, which he eventually did.

Although the prevailing view of Saddam’s policies is that he began rehabilitating the tribal system only after the 1991 Gulf War defeat, in reality the Ba’ath hierarchy began its neo-tribal policies soon after it took power in 1968.
Saddam’s cultivation of Shi’a tribes of the south, especially incorporating them into the Republican Guard, paid big dividends in the 1991 Shi’a revolt. It was classic Saddam policy: limiting the tribes’ power when he saw potential for a threat and enlisting them when he needed help confronting other threats.

With the exception of some Marsh Arab tribes, most Shi’a tribes took no part in the Shi’a revolt; some even supported the Iraqi Army. Subsidies, largesse to loyal sheikhs, and a variety of governmental perks, combined with brutal repression of dissidents, kept the tribes quiet. Psychologically, Saddam also counted on traditional Bedouin values as a favorable factor in his battle against the Americans. He believed that emphasizing courage and shame would keep the Army units cohesive. Saddam’s focus on tribes and militias can be attributed to an old Arab belief that it is more honorable to be part of a militia or special unit than of a conventional army. There is no doubt, however, that Saddam’s emphasis on winning tribal allegiances took on a new urgency after the Gulf War defeat in 1991.

Historical Impact of the Ba’ath on Tribal Identity

Historically, tribes have been “an expression of the innate impulse for protection through unity.” In the absence of strong central governance, the sheikh filled the void as the primary ruler, protector, and promoter of tribal interests. While the territorial boundaries have shifted over the years, Figure 3 represents a historical picture of tribal leagues and principalities in Iraq. Erosion of the tribal identity began under the Ottomans and continued throughout the British invasion (1914–18) when the Sunni and Shi’a joined politically to resist the western occupation. During the 1920s, burgeoning cities resulted in the birth of the Iraqi national community, triggering a further decline in tribal influence.

Led by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar (both schoolteachers from Damascus), the modern pan-Arab nationalist movement gained political momentum in the 1940s, though its ideological roots date back to the nineteenth century. As founders of the Ba’ath party, the two promoted the tenets of unity, freedom, and socialism, while proclaiming their determination to unite all Arabs under a single banner. Early on, the Ba’ath party viewed the tribes as an obstacle to pan-Arab nationalism and worked to minimize the sheikhs’ authority and influence. Indeed, tribes have historically threatened the power of national governments in the Middle East, existing in structural opposition to the state. During the 1970s, Saddam encouraged measures that intentionally marginalized the tribes, such as the Revolutionary Command Council decree that forbade the use of tribal family names.

Saddam recognized the extraordinary obstacles that were sowing discord in the Arab world and applied those lessons to the unique problems facing Iraq. Like many of his contemporaries, Saddam faced myriad challenges:

He must cope with an unfulfilled Arab nationalist and Islamic agenda, rivals at home and abroad, a largely uneducated people whose political culture has made them prone to demagoguery, and an army better versed in coup-making than in fighting wars.

These factors combined to create a volatile, impassioned public that Saddam constantly fought to rein in.

Throughout the 1980s, the regime continued to see tribes as an impediment to the party’s control of various regions. Particularly in the southern marsh areas, the relationship between Iraqi tribes and their Iranian counterparts during the Iran-Iraq War was troublesome for Saddam. He closely monitored that connection due to the perceived threat of collaboration.

In early March 1984, the Maysan Governorate Security Committee (a local governing body) presented a detailed study of the Al-Ahwar region to the Office of the Ba’ath party. The report listed the tribes in the border region, focusing on those with extensive links to the Iranian regime. From this report, it was clear that the Iraqi regime viewed tribes in the southern region as a dangerous liability:

The village inhabitants of Al-Huwayzah marsh are connected by common tribal connections from ancient times between the Iraqi side and the Iranian side...The marsh inhabitants on the Iranian side are proficient in Arabic and Persian languages...which facilitates their exploitation by the Iranian authority to perform sabotage and spying actions.

The Ba’ath Party, the first Arab political party with pan-Arab goals, was characterized by three major principles:

* Arab nationalism
* Freedom from foreign rule
* Establishment of a single Arab state

Source: Devlin, 1,396

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Furthermore, the report detailed the deportation program that many inhabitants of the marshes were subjected to under Saddam’s regime during the mid-1980s. The deportation policy acknowledged tribal affiliations and openly attempted to impose geographical divisions to dilute tribal power. The orders below, issued by Maysan Governor Karim Hasan Rida, aimed at guiding the process:

- Disperse and distribute large families.
- The suggested villages to which they will be deported must be covered by party and security.
- Deported persons must not be [relocated] in one village, but should be distributed among a number of security-covered villages.30

The Ba’ath party did all of these things with the stated purpose of “working to increase the citizenship spirit in them and saving the families that can be saved from delinquency.”31 The marsh deportation policy highlights the regime’s paranoia about the tribes (particularly Shi’a elements) during the 1980s. It serves as profound evidence that Saddam’s policy toward the tribes throughout this period was not collaboration, but subjugation.

While party leaders offered some covert support to the tribes, the Ba’athists were determined to maintain their image of a secular, socialist ruling class. The Ba’ath ideologues in power believed that tribalism represented a primitive social structure that would crumble in the face of Arab socialist unity. Consequently, they gave the tribes little credit as an institutional power.

According to an Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) memo, a group of al-Da’wa32 party members attacked Saddam’s convoy in Al-Dujayl on 8 July 1982.33 The unsuccessful assassination attempt further solidified Saddam’s contempt for the tribes and prompted a brutal crackdown on the group suspected of perpetrating the attack.34 Not only did Saddam sign execution orders for the 148 suspected collaborators, but he also ordered the IIS to detain the suspects’ innocent families. Waddah Al-Sheikh, head of the Investigation and Interrogation Directorate, issued the following instructions:

- Transfer all women, children, and old men to Al-Muthanna Governorate detention facility (440 persons total).
- Keep in detention all individuals capable of carrying weapons, even if someone is not involved in the assassination attempt, and he is not affiliated with the Al-Da’wa party, but his brother, cousin, or relative is.
- Take the statements of the [family] members in order to refer them to the Revolutionary Court to sentence them to death. There are 148 detainees; 46 of them were already executed and only 102 remain.35

By punishing the relatives and family members of the accused, Saddam preemptively sought to wipe out potential opposition to his reign. In meting out justice to the perpetrators of the attack, Saddam tapped into the culture of familial loyalty that runs deep through Iraqi society and successfully eliminated the immediate threat. Furthermore, he sowed seeds of suspicion and resentment within the tribes opposing him, ensuring that no tribe could be cohesive enough to present a formidable challenge to the regime.36

The year 1991 marked the first overt attempts to integrate the tribes into the Ba’ath party. After the first Gulf War (OPERATION DESERT STORM), the party was devastated as the rebellion exposed the vulnerability of the regime’s security apparatus. Finally, Saddam began to understand that antagonizing the tribes was a self-defeating tactic. By uniting the rural population under tribal social structures, he managed to successfully aggregate them into easily-controlled units. Within several years, this strategy ballooned into full scale co-option.

Changes began in all facets of government. In the military, the open disclosure of officers’ tribal affiliations had been unheard of previously, but by 1993 Saddam was questioning soldiers on their tribal roots.37 Pitting the tribes against each other through economic manipulation became routine. Saddam soon discovered that the tribes were willing to give up much of their autonomy in exchange for essential services, money, and weaponry. Friendly tribes signed loyalty oaths and agreed to turn in “infiltrators,” “traitors,” “saboteurs,” and “deserters.” Indeed, the regime relied on loyal tribes to act as its eyes and ears.

Clearly, Saddam’s goal was to prevent a repetition of the 1991 uprisings, and he would use any means necessary to augment the regime’s security. However, this was not a revival of tribalism in its purest form. On the contrary, McFate describes the Ba’athist re-tribalization of Iraqi society as “a gross perversion of the original system.”38 As he felt increasingly threatened, Saddam’s adherence to strict interpretation of Ba’athist philosophy faltered. In the end, Saddam Hussein’s legacy may accurately be defined as “the man who turned the Iraqi Ba’ath system into tyranny.”39
The 1991 Uprisings: A Warning Call for Change

The 1991 uprisings represented a Shi’a protest against Sunni domination, a revolt against Ba’athist secularism, and a rebellion against the economic neglect of the southern regions. Bad blood between the regime and certain tribes contributed to the popular unrest, aggravating the already tense security situation in Iraq. The rebellion, referred to in Iraqi documents as the Shi’a intifada, or “the page of treason and treachery,” cemented the regime’s obsessive concern with internal security. Saddam’s response to the widespread transgressions was characteristically ruthless. The Ba’ath military and political forces killed tens of thousands before Saddam finally regained control of the countryside, marking the uprisings as one of the bloodiest periods in the Ba’ath era.

Surprisingly, the uprisings had more of an impact on government policy than any other incident during the 1990s, including the failed invasion of Kuwait. Saddam’s brutal tactics quelled the rebellion, but the incident had a lasting impact on him. Moreover, it resulted in a new form of Ba’athism that incorporated tribalism into its governing principles. In February 1992, Saddam expressed his new outlook during a meeting with several military commanders:

Regarding the tribes, we are facing a new reality...We need to develop and enhance the potential events to meet our needs. We need to enhance the people. We need to raise the confidence level in people, to make them useful and not sidelined...So what is the answer? We need to make people feel that they are our people and therefore these people will fulfill their duties without receiving any instructions from us.40

The tribes were arguably the single most powerful entities with which the regime could ally itself. In particular, the Dulaymi, Jburri, Ubaydi, and Shammar tribes were well-positioned to benefit most from regime support.41 Through a process Faleh Jabar defines as étatist tribalism, Saddam incorporated tribal lineages and symbolic culture into the fabric of the state to augment the power of the Ba’ath ruling class.42 Furthermore, he developed administrative systems for tracking the loyalty status of tribes. Figure 4 is an example of the detailed bureaucratic records maintained by the regime. It explicitly identifies the post-1991 shift in Ba’ath tribal policy. Not only did Saddam document clan names, number of members, and geographic locations, he also noted changes in the rank and status of each clan. A de facto metric for regime loyalty, these forms reflected the extent of regime support that each tribe would receive. This policy had the effect of nurturing tribal elements, which the regime could later co-opt for institutional purposes.

Figure 4. Ba’ath Party tribal tracking form43

Indeed, this was not the first time the Ba’athists compromised their principles to increase their power base. Back in the early days of the revolution, party members brushed aside the idea of socialism, a central principle of party ideology, in order to secure American aid to counteract diminishing Soviet contributions to the regime.44 (“Unity, Freedom, and Socialism” had been the official slogan on all party publications during the previous decade.) Instead of adhering to neo-Marxist ideology that characterized the Arab revolutionaries of the period, the regime then embraced economic growth and industrialization.45 This willful disregard of principle and purpose underlines the historical resolve of the Ba’ath to adapt, rather than fold, when significantly threatened. Furthermore, it suggests that maintaining internal power and control was at the forefront of Saddam’s agenda, more so than faithfully adhering to any particular ideological agenda.
The Emergence of Neo-Tribalism

The 1991 uprisings prompted Saddam to develop new tribal policies to adapt to changing political conditions. No longer relying simply on tactics of brutality or quiet coercion, Saddam openly nurtured and supported tribalism. However, it was a new version of tribalism, developed and polished to suit the needs of his fragile regime. Saddam’s plan rested on four key tenets:

- All the clans’ leaders should adopt an organizational structure based on the state’s directives, so they can perform their responsibilities within the legal framework. This will enhance the role of the clan’s leader within his society.

- Putting an end to all the clan differences and disputes in accordance to the law. This will strengthen the positions of the state officials and the clan leaders as well.

- Creating a competitive spirit among the various clans in the security, social, and economic fields. This will generate a high economic return to the state and would entice the State to support the clan that performs best.

- Exploit any clan that is spread over the neighboring regions through the clan’s leaders’ efforts to contain them. This will lead to a more prosperous life.46

A close relationship between Saddam and the tribal chiefs characterized neo-tribalism. Although for many Ba’athists this was an unprecedented shift of ideological priorities, Saddam believed that the Ba’ath was the Tribe of all the tribes and as head of the Ba’ath party, he would be the Sheikh of all sheikhs. Co-opting the sheikhs represented a key component of his new strategy. An example of this reversal was Saddam’s decision in 1991 to institute a tribal oath of allegiance. The oath offered tribes the opportunity to declare loyalty to Saddam, the Arab nation, and Islam in one step. The following is an excerpt from an official Ba’ath “Agreement of Loyalty and Sacrifice” from the Dulaymi tribe:

We promise his eminence, may Allah hold him dear, that we will stand behind his notable leadership as he confronts the American and Zionist tyrannical enemy and that we will remain as drawn swords in his generous right hand as we defend our great Iraq and the glorious Arab nation.47

The oath was merely the first step in a radical reversal of policy. The regime urged tribes to send letters of support for Saddam, and the mail flowed in steadily. Communication and consultation between Saddam and the sheikhs increased, as did the publicity surrounding these meetings. The relationship was built on a quid pro quo: Saddam gave the tribes a degree of legal autonomy in return for the sheikhs’ full political support. Saddam also relied on the sheikhs to maintain order within their tribes, and gave them the freedom to impose their own punishment and reward systems.

At times, tribalism seemed to pose a threat to Saddam’s goal of pan-Arab unity. Here, a sheikh presented the alternative view of Saddam’s tribal policy:

Rather than encouraging the unity of the [Iraqi] people, these inclinations are sowing…the seeds of division…inciting one part of it against the other…providing protection…annulling the law and deprecating legal justice.48

In response, others would argue that Saddam “presented the tribal principle as a bridge that transcends the Sunni-Shi’a divide in Iraqi society.”49

To combat potential schisms, Saddam developed symbols of unity that overlapped tribal and governmental spheres of influence. For example, several of the tribes incorporated Saddam’s image into their banners. Furthermore, Saddam used rhetoric to combat the threat of Iraqi patriotic divisions. In the end, he skillfully intertwined the tenets of Ba’athist ideology with those of traditional tribalism, thus indoctrinating the population with a sense of dual loyalties, with equal emphasis on government and tribe.

Autonomy vs. Accountability: Saddam’s Parallel Legal System

Despite the inherent risks associated with tribal independence, Saddam made it state policy to give tribes a fair level of autonomy when conducting their own legal affairs. That flexibility caused problems at times, particularly when the sheikhs meted out harsh punishments for criminal offenses. The murder of Hussein Kamil is a tragic example of government-sanctioned vigilante justice.

Kamil was the nephew of General Ali Hasan al-Majid (Chemical Ali) and a close confidant of Saddam Hussein’s. After marrying one of Saddam’s daughters, he was promoted to a cabinet-level position as direc-

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tor of the Military Industrial Commission. When he defected to Jordan in early August 1995, Kamil took with him some of the regime’s most precious secrets on Iraq’s defense establishment and weapons development plans, which he readily shared with US intelligence agencies.

Saddam was convinced that Kamil gave away sensitive political and economic information, prolonging the international sanctions against Iraq and prompting a series of US military maneuvers in the Gulf. According to an IIS memo written several days after Kamil’s defection:

The period in which he escaped has coincided with the following:

1. America’s pressure to achieve an agreement between Kurds and stopping intranisgence among themselves and coordinating with them to attack Iraqi military formations.
2. American military exercises with Jordan near the Iraq border.
3. American military exercises in Kuwait.

The same memo went on to declare that “At the early part of 1995, American intelligence and the US Congress received information that Mr. President the Commander [Saddam Hussein] will remain in power for 6–8 months if economic sanctions remained.”

Lastly, the intelligence memo sums up the regime’s conspiracy theory behind Kamil’s defection:

Following the criminal escape of Hussein Kamil, the Secretary of Defense William Perry announced on 15/8/1995 that he invites the Iraqi opposition to stand behind Hussein Kamil as he represents an alternative to Mr. President, the Commander, God forbid, as he is a strong Sunni man and is capable of maintaining order.

It seems that this memo uncovers the real reason behind Kamil’s betrayal (or at least what the regime thought was the real reason): Kamil’s quest to replace Saddam as President of Iraq. Given Saddam’s reputation for eliminating those who would challenge him, Kamil’s transgression was undoubtedly unforgivable.

On behalf of his tribe, General al-Majid condemned Kamil’s betrayal in the starkest of terms:

This small family [of al-Majids] in Iraq denounces Hussein Kamil’s cowardly act and strongly rejects the treason which he has committed and which can only be cleansed by inflicting punishment on him in accordance with the Law of God…His family has unanimously decided to permit with impunity the spilling of [his] blood.

Given the certainty of brutal retaliation, it is difficult to fathom why Kamil and his family returned to Iraq in February 1996. Saddam gave him an official pardon, but that did not protect Kamil from the tribe’s murderous revenge. General al-Majid wrote to Saddam, explaining his rationale for ignoring the pardon: “We have cut off the treacherous branch from our noble family tree. Your amnesty does not obliterate the right of our family to impose the necessary punishment.”

The official General Security Directorate (GSD) incident report showed that government officials were on the scene when the murder occurred, but were ordered not to intervene. In his written statement, Brigadier General Ajil Hazza’ Salim (head of security) stated:

Major Ra’id from the Bayya’ Directorate called me and said he went with a force to the accident location and saw a house surrounded by civilians exchanging fire with people inside the house...he noticed the presence of Mr. Ali Hasan al-Majid, Uday and Quay [Saddam’s sons], and Rukan [director of the Office of Tribal Affairs] and others. And that he was informed by Mr. Zuhayr from the Special Security Organization to withdraw, for it was a tribal matter involving the traitor Hussein Kamil, and they excluded the official authorities from interfering.

The government record shows that Saddam looked the other way, allowing tribal justice to trump the official Ba’ath pardon. The story of Hussein Kamil’s defection clearly underlines how the tribes’ legal autonomy had pragmatic benefits for the regime. In addition, it reinforced Saddam’s paranoia and prompted him to seek new ways of strengthening his grip on the nation.

Saddam understood that he needed to cultivate a particularly special relationship with the tribal sheikhs to sustain this parallel legal system. Furthermore, he used it as an opportunity to reward the loyalty of certain individuals. Saddam honored Sheikh Jasim Mizhir Al-Samarmad, leader of the Al-Zubayd tribe, for helping the Iraqi Army during the ‘91 uprisings. He repaid Sheikh Al-Samarmad by releasing one of his relatives, Amir ‘Abd-al-Karim Al-Zubaydi, who was serving a 15-year prison term for a bribery conviction.
The Iraqi Intelligence Court had sentenced ‘Abd-al-Karim in connection with a scandal involving the Ministry of Oil. His assets confiscated and facing more than a decade in jail, ‘Abd-al-Karim did not try to appeal his conviction through traditional judicial channels. Instead, he turned inward to his tribe for support. The following is a passage from a letter written on his behalf by Sheikh al-Samramad to Saddam:

We praise God for honoring us and our clan, a clan that has a glorious history in defending our nation’s dignity and honor through its position during the Iran-Iraq War and the first Gulf War, a clan that was honored by your highness…The convicted [Amir ‘Abd-al-Karim al-Zubaydi] had an honorable history of serving the government and the Party that I as a clan leader, and his family, are proud of. Through his work, which is attested to by government entities and the Military Industrial Establishments and by the many appreciation letters he received for supplying materials used in the military industry, materials that were difficult to obtain during the difficult circumstances; his contribution in building public and party organizations, as well as his efforts in bringing essential materials that were banned, under the name of Kuwait. I can’t find compassion besides God’s, except to plead your fatherly love and gracious forgiveness, hoping that goodness will be written by your gracious hands, in honor of…his family.57

Several days later, a telegram from Saddam’s office was delivered to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, marked Secret and Urgent. The telegram stated that a decision had been made to relieve Mr. Amir ‘Abd-al-Karim al-Zubaydi of the remainder of his sentence. Legal exceptions such as this were common under Saddam’s regime and personal relationships were key to favorable results.

Birth of the Patronage System in Iraq

Saddam’s version of Ba’athism strayed from its origins after 1991, as he skillfully manipulated its traditional ideology to secure his hold on the country. According to Baram, “Whenever a tenet of party faith became a burden, it was jettisoned unceremoniously.”58 During this period, the Ba’ath party continued to develop an opportunistic approach to managing the tribes in order to quell their influence and power.

Saddam structured the Office of Tribal Affairs so that the regime fully subjugated powerful tribal sheikhs. Economically and politically, Saddam’s whims largely determined their fates. Throughout the latter part of the Hussein regime, “the Sunni network was held together by a web of patronage, perks, and favors that filtered down from the presidential palace to the tribal sheik to the ‘tribesman in the field.”59

The challenge of retaining loyalty after the rebellion was to create a system of incentives and manipulation that would provide enough reward and autonomy to the tribes so they would offer the regime loyalty and security without becoming too powerful. Here, Saddam took the advice of a senior military commander who recommended, “We need to take care of them but in a way that we do not give them power or control…we need to manage it in a way that would help us.”60

The rewards for cooperating with Saddam were plentiful and included land, money, power, prestige, weapons, and legal autonomy. Sheikhs had to give little in return, and generally their support was abstract. The following passage comes from a 1995 Iraqi study on historical clan responsibilities. During war, the regime expected a tribal sheik to play a major role in six areas:

- Energizing and enlightening his clan of the national duty by reminding them of the roles their great ancestors had played in such situations and urging them to look at them as their idols of honor and glory.
- Supporting the state through stressing the importance of strengthening security and stability, and rejecting deviant situations such as desertion and sheltering fugitives.
- Observing and chasing the weak elements who have little or no allegiance to the state and urging them to fight such elements in every way possible in order to minimize the danger they might inflict.
- Identifying the distinguished stances taken by members of the clan and recognizing them.
- Preparing the clan to face general mobilization and placing the clan’s capabilities at the service of the State.
- Recognizing that allegiance springs from high morals and adherence to the values the clan adopts during national crises.61

The study indicates that tribes contributed to regime security through political support and symbolic gestures of loyalty, as well as through some more concrete measures like policing and providing security in rural areas.
There was no such thing as an equitable distribution of resources in Iraq; Saddam’s budgetary allocations rested predominantly on favorable ties to the regime. The well-being of the tribes depended on a steady flow of government support, and Saddam used this leverage to his advantage. The sheikhs controlled the members of their tribes through a complex blend of authoritarianism and incentives. Saddam provided tribal leaders with material wealth, resources, and weaponry to distribute as they deemed appropriate. The sheikh’s decisions determined their tribespeoples’ well-being and stature in relation to other tribes within the community. However, Saddam held the purse strings—the sheikhs, despite their limited autonomy, were considered indirect tools of regime power.

Saddam maintained that power by establishing three internal levers of control. First, he relied upon the income from oil resources to generate revenue that funded basic services and the development of modern infrastructure. Second, he built redundant layers into the structure of his security services and intelligence agencies to evoke suspicion among the populace and enforce loyalty to the regime. Finally, he shaped Iraq’s society based on the principles of neo-patrimonialism and patronage, paying off groups that supported the regime and punishing those that would not agree to play by his rules. As hostilities raged in Kuwait and the international community united against Iraq, Saddam saw an opportunity to promote a new adaptation of Iraqi patriotism.

Tribal dependence on material allocations from the regime under sanctions undoubtedly benefited Saddam. Tight monitoring of the illicit market ensured that cross-border trade, upon which sheikhs had once profited, would remain restricted to what Baghdad approved. The tribes understood their vulnerabilities and did not hesitate to work with the regime to secure special privileges and rewards. An Iraqi study on tribal obligations showed that sheikhs openly acknowledged their indebtedness to Saddam. Each sheikh was to...face his historical responsibilities and rise to a level where he would execute his tasks with wisdom and thorough planning; especially when the Revolution had afforded the clans with generous donations, and gave them leading roles in the Party and the Government that were similar to those of our comrades. They aligned their social mores with the state’s strategic policies on all fronts...

Maintaining good relations with the central government was a survival tactic for the tribes. There was no shopping around for which faction would best reward loyalty—there was only Baghdad and the Ba’ath Party. Both sides were acting pragmatically at the time: Saddam sought regime security, the tribes sought material security, and so long as each could provide the other with what it wanted, the support was mutual.

Social Stratification and Class Division

Saddam deliberately nurtured class divisions among the Iraqi tribes to ensure that the loyalty of the majority was to him alone. The measures he took to encourage this allegiance fostered suspicion among the tribes and forced tribal leaders to compete for benefits. Social stratification, complete with Islamic undertones, became a central feature of Saddam’s rule.

By forcing tribes to compete for resources, Saddam exacerbated the rivalries and cleavages within Iraqi society. Practically speaking, he divided the tribes, ranked them A, B, or C according to status, and then decided which among them deserved his favor. The following passage represents a typical written correspondence between tribal sheikhs and Saddam’s Office of Tribal Affairs. In this case, Sheikh Zaydan Khalaf Al Awwad al-Jabiri, chief of a Dulaymi tribe within Al Anbar province (typically favored by Saddam’s Sunni government), requested to have his tribe upgraded from B-list to A-list. Like an American college applicant, he even included letters of recommendation and a mention of his legacy status. He wrote:
I would like to request...that you would bestow upon me your brotherly and generous kindness so that you may approve my confirmation as president...to the tribe rank (A)...This request is because our tribe is independent from other tribes and number approximately 15,000 with 2,000 members capable of carrying arms. Also, because I'm the son of Sheikh Khalaf Awaad Shallah, who was appointed during the initial confirmation of sheikhs in Al Anbar province...Enclosed [are twelve letters of support] by sheikhs of [A-list] tribes in the neighboring area...It gives me great pleasure to reiterate my loyalty and support to your wise leadership with our promise to Allah and the leader that we will remain loyal and faithful soldiers...I depend on your generosity and orders.71

A month later, he received word that his application had been successful after a thorough committee review found that he had supported the regime during the uprisings.

Saddam also co-opted ethnic rivalries and class divisions to further solidify his hold on power. He refined his tactics in 1995, as he began to realize his support for certain tribes was destabilizing the regime. Rather than recruiting bodyguards and military officers from the strongest and most influential tribes, Saddam shied away from those who were strong enough to collaborate against the regime. Instead, he shifted his focus to supporting tribes that were not powerful enough to threaten his rule.

By 1996, for example, Saddam’s relationship with the Jubbus, Ubaydis, and Dulaymis had deteriorated. Saddam quietly coaxed them into cooperation, but diversified his base of support to counteract their evident hostility. In doing so, he not only increased the number of his supporters, but also created a substantial counterweight to the most favored tribes. Due largely to Saddam’s reinvention of tribalism in the 1990s, Iraqi society grew to accept the social hierarchy and resulting stratification among ethnic groups.72

Arming the Tribes

Saddam grappled with the issue of arming the tribes early on. Even when friendly sheikhs volunteered their men to fight, he remained wary of losing control over this crucial aspect of the regime’s power.73 Saddam’s loss of control after Operation Desert Storm shaped his views about the importance of a strong internal security apparatus. The uprisings also prompted him to change his global risk assessment, with the United States’ distant rumblings taking a backseat to more pressing internal security concerns.

Above all, Saddam aimed at maximizing Iraq’s defenses, but he was afraid to relinquish control to those who might later turn against him. In matters of national defense, internal security trumped all other planning factors:

Despite the Iraqi leader’s determination from the earliest days of the Ba’ath seizure of power to build armed forces with powerful combat capabilities, the evidence clearly shows that their war-fighting prowess was not considered as important as achieving political control over them.74

Saddam’s approach to arming the tribes reflected this outlook on military power. He cared less about the tribes’ military effectiveness (despite their potential) than about cementing his own position.

This policy was out of touch with reality, particularly as Coalition troops closed in on Baghdad. On 29 March 2003, Saddam issued a memorandum to the Revolutionary Command Council that explicitly rejected tribal leaders’ requests for anti Armor weapons and medium machine guns. Saddam explained his refusal:

These weapons are available to the party and the armed forces, and they do exist in the hands of the tribe’s children, under the control of the Party... wherever exists a military formation. They are now engaging the enemy in the south and in the Middle Euphrates. Therefore, inform them that each sector has its own responsibilities and that tribal leaders or their representative can coordinate with their nearest party offices, with army units, with Fedayeen Saddam, or with national security agencies to create joint combat units and organize joint defenses in Iraqi cities and the countryside. Also, tribes can carry out reconnaissance activities, considering that tribes are usually spread out in regions they occupy. This way, joint units will attack the enemy and defeat him. Those representing tribes and other relevant units would be carrying their light weapons. And those who belong to the official and party establishments, mentioned above, will include fighters who carry anti-tank missiles or medium or higher-power machine guns...This way, the objective will be met without scattering medium-range weapons, missile launchers and guns outside the groups that own them originally... So distribute these instructions to sheikhs and to the Party, and work within these guidelines.75
Saddam’s idea of “jointness” involved a great deal of compartmentalization. By arming the tribes with light weapons but refusing to supply them with heavier arms, Saddam displayed his willingness to provide limited benefits that would support his security agenda without jeopardizing his control of the country.

**Summary of Analysis and Implications**

“Once a tribal leader flips, attacks on American forces in that area stop almost overnight. [Sheiks] are ruthless characters...that doesn’t mean they can’t be reliable partners.”

—COL Sean McFarland, Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division

There are signs of forward momentum in Iraq, as provincial reconstruction teams chip away at the lingering cloud of fear and mistrust that has stymied cooperation between tribes and the Coalition. American strategic interests aside, Iraqi sheikhs have strong external motivators that may eventually compel them into an alliance with US Forces: both Sunni and Shi’a tribes have a vested interest in ridding their neighborhoods of al-Qaeda elements that threaten their traditional powers. Still, the question oft repeated among civilian analysts and deployed military officers is: Can we recover from the missed opportunities of 2003 or is it too late to remedy past transgressions?

William S. McCallister, a former special operations officer currently serving as tribal engagement representative for the II Marine Expeditionary Force in Al Anbar province, believes the way forward will be fraught with difficulty. Without a doubt, a nuanced understanding of the tribal system will play a decisive role in a positive outcome for the United States: “Dealing with a traditionally networked tribal society may well require a ‘carrot and stick’ approach. But properly presenting the carrot to deserving individuals and wielding the stick to punish the guilty requires a deep understanding of the society and its culture to be effective.”

It took Saddam decades to figure out a pragmatic scheme for managing tribal elements within Iraq’s borders. He invested an extraordinary amount of time and resources in studying the tribes, commissioning numerous government studies that meticulously detailed the power structures, locations, and political dynamics of each and every tribe in Iraq.

This extensive preparation allowed Saddam to tailor his tribal policies to fit regional and local requirements, ensuring the regime could reap the maximum benefit from collaboration while minimizing the likelihood of betrayal by any one group. Still, this segment of the population remained an unwieldy, unpredictable element of Iraqi society, a constant source of worry for Saddam and the Ba’ath regime.

Collaboration between tribe and state resulted in cooperative security arrangements and a comprehensive intelligence network that protected both rural and urban areas. Other regime directives, such as forced migration patterns, challenged the collaborative relationship and from this emerged a set of favored tribes that were integral to supporting the regime’s broad strategic goals. For every favored tribe, however, there were several others angling for position—a dynamic that Saddam embraced and encouraged with his patronage policies.

As this paper illustrates, the historical relationship between tribes and the state was fraught with intimidation, violence, and frequent alliance shifting. In both economic and political spheres, the power struggle dictated many facets of Iraqi life. What emerged was a complicated set of norms that determined how government would function, and consequently, how society would respond. The tribal landscape in Iraq has been in a state of flux ever since the Coalition invasion in 2003. It would be inaccurate to suggest there was a single path the United States could have taken that would have capitalized on the strengths of the tribal communities in Iraq while avoiding all (or even most) of the pitfalls.

Since turning back time is not an option, the only choice may be to move forward armed with the cultural knowledge and nascent local relationships that were absent during the early weeks, months, and years of the occupation. At this late stage, these tools may give the Coalition a final chance to propel Iraq into the next phase of security, stability, and democratic development. Given the lingering and debilitating effects of Saddam’s rule, it will undoubtedly take longer than expected to reach critical milestones. Though Iraq’s future remains uncertain, one thing is assured: success or failure depends on the tribes.

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Minerva Initiative and the establishment of the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC). The CRRC was created to enable research using records captured during combat operations from countries, organizations, and individuals, now or once hostile to the United States. It aims to fulfill the Secretary of Defense’s intent to enable research into captured records with “complete openness and rigid adherence to academic freedom and integrity.” The CRRC will thereby increase intellectual capital in subjects that will inform policymaking by making this unique primary source material available to a wide range of academic disciplines in order to improve understanding of factors related to international relations, counterterrorism, conventional, and unconventional warfare.

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The Joint Advanced Warfighting Program was established at IDA to serve as a catalyst for stimulating innovation and breakthrough change. It is co-sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command. JAWP’s staff includes military personnel on joint assignments from each Service and civilian specialists from IDA. JAWP is located in Alexandria, Virginia, and maintains an office in Norfolk, Virginia, to facilitate coordination with USJFCOM.

This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of IDA or the sponsors of JAWP. Our intent is to stimulate ideas, discussion, and, ultimately, the discovery and innovation that must fuel successful transformation.

Endnotes:

1 References to Harmony documents in the text and footnotes indicate that the source is derived from the US Department of Defense’s Harmony database, an electronic government repository for captured documents. All documents referring to Harmony carry the handling instruction For Official Use Only.

2 The Shi’a and Kurdish uprisings following Operation DESERT STORM are referred to throughout the paper as a single rebellion against the Ba’ath regime. These events are referenced in Iraqi documents as “the page of treason and treachery” and “the Shi’a intifada.”

3 Figure largely drawn from Brian Katulis, Lawrence J. Korb, and Peter Juul, Strategic Reset: Reclaiming Control of US Security in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, June 2007), 30. See Appendix C for brief descriptions of Iraq’s tribes and tribal confederations.


8 In Muslim societies, kafir is a derogatory term used to describe an infidel or non-believer.

9 Harmony document folder ISGF-2004-B00023 – Historical summary and genealogy of assorted Iraqi tribes, 1 November 2004. Saddam recognized the need to develop coercive mechanisms that stretched beyond the threat of physical violence. Part of his strategy was to create “invented traditions” that bolstered his status as the ruler of Iraq and future heir to the pan-Arab throne. To this end, he published historical narratives detailing his early life and rise to power, in addition to producing a detailed personal genealogy tracing his lineage to the Prophet’s cousin Ali Ibn Abi Talib; see al-Musawi, Reading Iraq, 83. See also Appendix D for a detailed view of Saddam’s genealogy. Tribes took their cues from Saddam, producing genealogical information, like the example of Figure 2, to elevate their status in the Ba’ath political hierarchy.


11 Montgomery McFate, “The ‘Memory of War’: Tribal Warfare and Legitimacy in Iraq” (July 2007 draft to be published in a collection by Naval War College), 6.


of Islam. See Rodger Shanahan, “The Islamic Da’wa Party: Past Development and Future Prospects,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 8 (June 2004). Members of the party’s militant wing carried out multiple assassination attempts against the Ba’athist regime in Iraq between 1982-96. While the party itself was responsible for these activities, Saddam targeted the tribes for punishment instead. Clearly, his purpose was to intimidate the populace and discourage support for the al-Dawa party.


34 The accused individuals were allegedly affiliated with a common tribal group.


36 Saddam’s use of collective punishment was a particularly effective method of subjugating the larger, more powerful tribes. See Hosham Dawod, “The ‘State-ization’ of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: The Case of Iraq,” p. 121 in *Totalitarianism and Tribalism: The Ba’th Regime and Tribes*, Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawod eds (London: Saqi Books, 2003). Dawod states that the effectiveness of the tribe in Iraqi political affairs depended on internal relations among members of the tribe. Consequently, Saddam understood he could wield a tremendous amount of power by manifesting dissent, then exploiting the fissures amongst tribesmen.


38 McFate, “Memory of War,” 6.

39 Devlin, “The Baath Party.”


45 Rubin, “Pan-Arab Nationalism,” 541.


consequence of increasing armed con
of weaponry into tribal populations had the unintended
It appears that Saddam’s fears were warranted. The in
70 Al-Khafaji, “State Terror.”
72 Al-Khafaji, “State Terror.”
73 It appears that Saddam’s fears were warranted. The influx of weaponry into tribal populations had the unintended consequence of increasing armed conflict between tribes, thus destabilizing the traditional balance of power. See McFate, “Memory of War,” 6.
74 Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 3.
75 Harmony document folder ISGQ-2004-00088446 (FOUO) – Memorandum from Saddam to the Revolutionary Command Council on the decision to arm the tribes, 29 March 2003.
78 Personal collection of embedded journalist Nate Braden, March 2007. Used with permission.

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McFate, Montgomery. “The ‘Memory of War’: Tribal Warfare and Legitimacy in Iraq,” July 2007 draft to be published by Naval War College.


**Major Confederation and Tribal Groups in Iraq**

The following is largely drawn from a 2007 Congressional Research Service Report.1 It is provided here for additional background material on the political activities, social dynamics, and geographic locations of the largest tribes in Iraq, offering an historical context for the rivalries and alliances between different groups.
al-Shammari
The Shammar claim to be Iraq’s largest tribal confederation, with more than 1.5 million people. Like other big confederations, it has tended to be unified only when threatened from the outside, as in wartime. Shammar member tribes include the Toqa (historically settled in central Iraq) and the Jarba (centered in the north). Shammar tribes cover vast territories, from south of Baghdad to the Syrian border in the northwest. They include Sunni and Shi’a groups, and their reach extends from Yemen to the United Arab Emirates.

al-Dulaymi
The Dulaym belong to a large group of tribes of Zubaydi origin and are connected to the Jannabiyn, Ubayd, and other confederations. They claim to have originally migrated from Central Arabia. (Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Wilayat, issued by the Arab Bureau, Baghdad, July 1918.) Many prominent Iraqis carry the last name “Dulaym,” signaling their membership to this road tribal confederation. Many Dulaymi tribes and leaders were among the most important in supporting Saddam during his rule. Dulaym tribes reside mostly in the western province of Al Anbar, around Ramadi. The Dulaym reportedly orchestrated a failed coup attempt against Saddam in July 1992.

al-Jibur
The Jibur are one of the largest tribes and are scattered along the rivers as far north as Mosul and Khabur. (Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Wilayat, issued by the Arab Bureau, Baghdad, July 1918.) They claim to have come from Khabur. The Jiburi tribe includes both Sunni and Shi’a branches. Their relationship with Saddam Hussein was more complex. In the 1980s, Saddam gave money and powerful jobs to Jiburi tribal leaders; in exchange, they recruited thousands of men from their tribe to fight against Iran. But the relationship fell apart after a group of prominent Jiburis reportedly plotted to assassinate Saddam in 1990. He purged the tribe’s leaders. Jiburi leaders now cooperate with US forces, notably in helping rule the northern city of Mosul.

al-Tikriti
Well-known members of the al-Tikriti tribe include Saddam Hussein and the late General Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr. Saddam Hussein came from a section of the Albu Nasir Tribe, the group of tribes usually called al-Takarita (or the Tikritis). The Albu Nasir tribe is believed to have more than 350,000 young men. In July 2003, Abdullah Mahmoud al-Khattab, leader of Saddam’s section of the tribe, was gunned down in Tikrit a few weeks after he publicly disavowed Saddam.

al-Khaza’il
The al-Khaza’il are an important tribe from Najd and are divided into Al Shallal and the Al Salaman. A considerable number of them are known to have been nomadic. The Khaza’il proper, apart from tribes of different origin that may still be reckoned in the confederation, are all of one family and named after their respective ancestors in the sheikhly house. Khaza’il tribes can be found in Baghdad area.

al-Hushaim
The Banu Hushaim are one of the tribal confederations along the Euphrates. They are mostly of Shammar origin and are believed to have settled in Iraq a long time ago. Historically, the Banu Hushaim were small independent tribes not connected to one another, though for many generations formed a single political unit.

al-Aqrah
This is a group of tribes of Shammar origin known to have been independent and acknowledging no paramount chief, but instead form a loose confederation. They lie along the Shatt al Dagharah [river] to about a few miles from Shatt al Hillah. The group consists of both cultivators and sheep breeders.

al-Zubaydi
The al-Zubayd are believed to have migrated from Yemen. They came from the south probably in the late seventh century, and like all early migrants are scattered. They have a wide kinship. The Dulaymi, Jiburi, and Ubaydi are of Zubaydi stock.

al-Ubaydi
This Sunni Arab tribe migrated into Iraq in the sixth century A.D. and settled on the river bank of the Tigris, between Mosul and Baghdad. During Saddam’s era, the Ubayd’s played a major role in staffing the state security apparatus.


2 Tribal confederations are larger groups made up of smaller member tribes.
Saddam Hussein’s Family Tree


Figure 6. Colonel John Charlton, Special Forces Commander, with his Iraqi counterpart, Brigadier General Abdullah (1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division) meeting with Albu Fahad tribe in Ramadi, March 2007

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Sample Stabilization and Reconstruction Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned: A bibliographic essay

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NATO ACT Staff

Within the emerging North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) doctrine, the local population, not the enemy within and around that population, is the primary object of focus. COIN serves as a campaign theme, a sort of filter through which the activities of the offense, defence, stabilization, and enabling are viewed. Success in COIN requires a comprehensive approach, that is, involvement by the full spectrum of civil and military instruments. Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) are a crucial part of this comprehensive approach.

From the NATO Comprehensive Approach perspective, S&R is primarily a civilian dimension responsibility. However, military support to S&R, especially in the early phases of NATO engagement, is also necessary. The aim of these S&R activities is to create incentives to support the NATO presence, both civilian and military, on the part of the local population. As the civilian (both internationally and locally led) S&R activities improve their standard of living, the hope is that they will be inspired to provide support for the emerging local security and governance institutions, thus making it possible for NATO to withdraw its support and redeploy.

The NATO Lessons Learned capability is one mechanism for better understanding the nature of S&R in COIN operations. Although, in spite of the NATO lessons learned (LL) policy, national sharing of lessons identified (LI) and LL with NATO remains suboptimal; the nations have produced many observations, lessons identified, and lessons learned that are available to NATO via open sources. Many similar themes uniting LI and subsequent recommended remedial actions concerning S&R activities in a COIN environment have emerged. These include:

1. Increased resourcing of reconstruction activities is required. The current aid based approach has failed to adequately enable the people to acquire desired facilities and services.

2. Enhanced civil-military coordination is required.

3. Increasing the size and effectiveness of the local national security forces, both military and police, is vital for success in contemporary COIN operations.

This bibliographic essay will examine several examples of S&R related LI and LL reports in order to provide a picture of the current S&R LL state of play, and point out some areas where NATO could add value to national S&R efforts as seen through the COIN optic. Topics will include provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), training, exercises, security force development, combating corruption, and encouraging economic development. We begin with a look at a recent major report.

Comprehensive Reports

A recent report, *Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer: The Metrics of the Afghan War*, Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, with the assistance of Nicholas B. Greenough, January 12, 2010 [http://csis.org/publication/afghan-metrics](http://csis.org/publication/afghan-metrics) is an extremely comprehensive critique of international efforts in Afghanistan, with a focus on the last two years. The author is a former member of the NATO International Military Staff. He lists six topics for addressing the six centers of gravity of the war:

- Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.
- Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.
- Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
- Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.
- Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and international community efforts.
Dealing with the sixth center of gravity, outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission, with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan. (Cordesman Pg 116)

This report emphasizes four issues of special interest for NATO: the need for properly resourcing the ISAF effort, on both the military and civilian sides; increasing district and provincial Afghan government capability; building up the ANSF; and enhancing civil-military cooperation.

The conclusions of the report resonate with lessons identified already contained in the NATO LL Database (https://lldb.jallc.nato.int/lldb/). These include lessons identified on the negative effects of national caveats, experiences gained from NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) and NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), and the lessons identified from the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC) Fusion Centre–Civil Military Overview (CFC–CMO) experiment as a means of enhancing civil-military interaction.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Provincial reconstruction teams have proven an especially effective mechanism for providing military support to S&R by enabling the military to provide housing, transportation, and security services for civilian actors as they engage with the host nation personnel.

The Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 2008 (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/PRT_Report.pdf) report on PRTs called for better resourcing of the civilian efforts, improved training (including a recommendation that all US PRT staff assigned to coalition PRTs attend the NATO PRT course at the NATO School), development of a strategy for PRTs, and provision of clearer guidance on the political mandate and direction and articulation of how they support the national development efforts.

The report provides an excellent list of the whole of government PRTs requirements to effectively execute S&R activities at the operational level:

- giving policy guidance and setting requirements;
- hiring and selecting the people with the appropriate mix of skills for deployment within a PRT, as well as sustaining those professionals with viable career tracks;
- training and equipping the people sent into harm’s way;
- ensuring that experience in the field is incorporated as lessons learned; and
- formulating appropriate integrated strategies and plans for their operations.” (Agency Stovepipes Vs Strategic Agility, pg 38)

A major conclusion of the report is that increasing the capability of the civilian elements of national power to provide S&R activities is essential.

The report contains a list of considerations for development of further guidance on military support to S&R on page 57. The report also contains a survey of PRT personnel that provides excellent insight into the PRT staff perspective on the major issues, like training, staffing, and resourcing.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, an Interagency Assessment, June 2006, US Agency for International Development (USAID), (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf) by the Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction Department of Defense, Joint Center for Operational Analysis/U.S. Joint Forces Command, USAID, and Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, raises many of the same issues as the Agency Stovepipes Vs Strategic Agility report. It also contains an outstanding bibliography and copy of the questionnaire used in generating the report.

Reports that have focused on single issues in S&R also provide valuable insights into PRT LL. For example, Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 – Practices and Lessons from Afghanistan, May 2009 (http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2760.pdf), by the Swedish Defence Research Agency describes how the use of Gender Advisors at PRTs can dramatically improve mission effectiveness by enhancing outreach.
to local women. It also provides some practical tips for PRT staffs on how to better engage with local female policy makers.

**Governance**

Some LL products provide insight into practical steps that PRT staffers can take to cultivate local government capability. The *Small Wars Journal* article, *New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams* (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/130-hallett.pdf), discusses how improved governance capabilities of the Afghans make new sets and types of PRT activities both possible and necessary. As a contribution to what could be considered a nascent interagency knowledge base development, this article describes some lessons identified when the “training wheels” are removed from PRT support for the government of Afghanistan actors. This includes a description of using project cooperation as governance training, and the utility of linking projects to other activities to ensure mutual support, both in terms of funding and personnel. In addition, several lessons described in the article indicate that “focused interaction” as opposed to mentoring, can generate beneficial training effects. Close cooperation in the daily work of meetings, report writing, quality assurance and quality control, developing sample economic development plans, and holding office hours can improve local governance capacity perhaps better than training sessions on the same subjects.

**Training**

The Canadian Presentation *Education and Training for Whole of Government Operations: Comparing the Canadian Forces [CF] and Other Government Departments* from the Comparative International Education Society of Canada 2009 Conference, Carlton University, Ottawa, ON summarizes results of the report entitled: *Learning Together: Lessons on CF Skill Sets for Multinational, Interagency Operations*. The research project stemmed from the Chief of Review Services (CRS) evaluation of the PRT in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The research was conducted by the Canadian Defence Academy Lessons Learned Research Team led by Dr Grazia Scoppio with team members Maj Ray Idzenga and Ms Sharon Miklas. The report makes 23 major recommendations. Number 22 is of special note to a NATO audience: “North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) brings together different cultures to work as one team to achieve a shared goal under a single command structure. This is achieved through a consensus-based approach to governance, a common lexicon, common standards, a structured training and education system, and a common lessons learned process. The NATO model could provide the basis for a framework for Whole of Government education and training, governance, delivery, standards, and lessons learned.” (Scoppio, 22) This demonstrates some belief on the part of the nations that it is appropriate and necessary that NATO provide standards, perhaps in the form of a training guidance text, or eventually in a Standardization Agreement (STANAG) for S&R related training.

The need to develop a civilian expeditionary S&R support capability is frequently seen in recommended remedial action. For example, in *Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Helmand – Within the Context of Counterinsurgency*, by Research Fellow Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Faculty of Strategy and Military Operations, Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College discusses the need for a more robust civilian advisory capability. He argues for the development of, “A system or team of people to create a flexible domestic ‘standby’ capacity for civilian advisors who can be deployed when the need is identified at the tactical level. There seems to be a great need for a team of people capable of working in post-conflict environments, working close to the military, facilitating governance, capacity building, supporting rule of law, and making development possible.” (Thruelsen pg 6 available at http://forsvaret.dk/FAK/Publikationer/Rapporter/Documents/Implementing%20the%20Comprehensive%20Approach%20in%20Helmand.pdf) Creation of these civilian capabilities by National governments is essential for execution of a comprehensive approach in complex operations.1

**Exercises**

Another frequently seen recommended remedial action based on operational lessons identified is to improve civil-military training. This included blended civilian and military staff pre-deployment training, as well as increasing the effectiveness of training provided in multinational exercises.

Lessons learned from the VIKING series of exercises, which is led by the Swedish Armed Forces, focuses on civil-military cooperation in complex operations, indicate the utility of this sort of training. VIKING
is significant for the intimate involvement of civilian dimension actors throughout all phases of the exercise – civilian dimension actors are not merely included at the last minute to serve as members of the “white cell,” but instead are intimately involved in exercise design, planning, and execution. The exercise is designed to meet civilian dimension, military and civil-military training objectives, and is thus especially useful as a model for training to improve civil-military interaction. Several LL and LI were entered into the NATO LL Database on the utility of blended training prior to and during the exercise itself based on the implementation of recommendations from VIKING 05 during VIKING 08.

Building Local National Security Forces

Anthony Cordesman’s *Shaping Afghan National Security Forces*, 2009 [http://csis.org/files/publication/091208_ANSF.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/091208_ANSF.pdf) discusses some mistakes committed by the US and ISAF in the past eight years as they have attempted to develop Afghan National Security Forces, and makes recommendations about how to shape the ANSF appropriately so that they can fulfill their obligation to provide a secure environment for the Afghan people. ISAF’s recent efforts to increase the pay and provide pensions for Afghan National Army personnel is an important step in development of the force and developing support for the central government because the provision of a pension creates incentives for retired military personnel to support the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The development of local security forces is not a new S&R task. John P. Cann, in his *Counterinsurgency in Africa, the Portuguese Way of War 1961-1974*, (Hailer, St. Petersburg, 2005), describes how the Portuguese successfully developed local national security forces to wage counterinsurgency (see especially chapter 5) and perform development related functions, like improving health care access, communication linkages, and education (see chapter 8). The book provides excellent examples of both on how developing local security capability can manage an insurgency, and how insurgents can achieve their objectives by attacking the political will of intervening powers.

Stabilization and Reconstruction in a Whole of Government approach

Stabilization and reconstruction related lessons have of course emerged from operations other than those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Joint Center for Operational Analysis recently completed a *Haiti Stabilization Initiative Case Study 2009*. According to Mr. Hugh Barker, “This study documents the lessons learned and captures the best practices of the ‘comprehensive approach’ implementation of the United States’ Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI).” Some lessons learned include “whole of government’ planning is required...” and “Funding structures should incentivize the ‘whole of government’ approach.” Additional information on this stabilization study can be acquired by contacting jcoa.ed@jcom.mil. This study reinforces the importance of adequately resourcing stabilization activities. Attempting to save money by underfunding stabilization activities is a false economy – inadequate stabilization activities disappoint local actors and decrease the tendency to cooperate with anti-government forces, and thus increases overall costs.

Reconstruction Activities

As pointed out in the *Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer: The Metrics of the Afghan War*, page 18, traditional aid activities have in many cases failed to deliver the sufficient and sustained gains in the standard of living for the population. (See also Michael Maren’s *Road to Hell*, The Free Press, New York, 1997, and Robert Calderisi’s *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006.)

This is not to say that no progress in improving the standard of living has been made in places like Afghanistan, only that the efforts have been extremely inefficient and are insufficient to provide the necessary success in the S&R component of a major COIN operation. A more creative methodology to reconstruction is therefore required. This has two parts: a reconsideration of the conceptual underpinnings of civilian S&R activity, and a change in the funding approach.

New conceptual approach. The national lessons identified indicate NATO is correct to continue efforts to improve mutual understanding with civilian dimension partners. A part of this, effective S&R within COIN
may require re-examination of the utility of the concept of “humanitarian actors” or the “humanitarian space.” Service provision that is not linked to support for the rule of law, based on respect for international human rights norms and support of the local and national government enabling the rule of law, is counterproductive and harms the local population. External actors service provision reduces the pressure on insurgent organizations to provide those services, and thus further reduces incentives for local actors to oppose insurgent brutality. If the aid organizations are providing medical care and basic food this reduces the incentive to oppose the rule by the insurgent shadow government. The aid organizations in effect conceal the incompetence of the insurgent shadow government by making available services that government has neither the capability nor will to provide.

New funding approach. Although this requires further research, a shift to a venture capital approach, in which external funding is made available to local entrepreneurs to create businesses to provide goods and services to the local population to meet their own needs in ways that are environmentally and culturally appropriate, may offer a better chance to create the rapid increases in standards of living necessary to create incentives for the population to support the local government institutions, not the insurgents. Contemplating how long it would have taken for much of the world to gain access to cell phones if they had been provided through the traditional aid based process, or how many goods and services people in developed countries receive from non-profit organizations, illuminates the need to reconsider the aid approach to S&R.

Such a shift would have two major advantages. First, it would reduce the amount of aid funding that makes its way back to developed countries in the form of external contractor pay. Second, by providing start up capital, it could foster development of local businesses to provide the services in the long term – the businesses created will only survive if they provide services the local people desire, in a way that meets their needs. This market discipline will create more sustainable projects than attempts to provide long term funding from the central government or international aid organizations. Small scale renewable energy projects, including micro-hydro, solar, and wind serve as an example of how for profit businesses can effectively provide services, and make, through a distributed, bottom up approach, significant contributions to nationwide provision of electricity. See “Distributed power in Afghanistan: The Padisaw micro-hydro project” in Renewable Energy 34 (2009) 2847–2851.

Combating Corruption

Corruption is a major source of friction in most S&R activities, and must be better addressed in ways that are appropriate for the local area. The objective should be not to eliminate corruption, but to reduce corruption to the level such that the local people consider the government representatives, especially police forces, as adding value to their lives instead of as parasitical rent seekers. In many places, like Afghanistan, it may mean that the standard for acceptable corruption in Afghanistan differs from the standard applied in NATO member’s own countries. The article “Combating Corruption” in the Armed Forces Journal, November 2009, http://www.afji.com/2009/11/4266630/) offers a recommended remedial action based on the military supporting creation of a large group of local nationals, armed with off the shelf recording equipment, to monitor interactions between citizens and government officials. The prospect of being recorded demanding bribes will act as a disincentive to such behaviour. This approach is based not on developing a competent, fully functioning criminal justice system (which is difficult, takes a long time, and is itself subject to corruption), but on empowering local people to form “clean teams” to monitor and report on corrupt behaviour by local government actors, like police and bureaucrats.

The advantage of this approach is that while supporting the development of a criminal justice system, it does not require that such a non-corrupt criminal justice system exists in order to discourage corrupt behaviour. See also “A Zero Contribution” in The Economist, January 30th 2010, pg 48, which describes how an NGO called 5th Pillar uses fake zero rupee notes as a way to combat corruption.

Conclusion

More effective S&R activities, by creating positive incentives on the part of the local population to support NATO and the local government institutions, are a vital ingredient in improving our ability to accomplish our objectives in operations like those in Afghanistan. Therefore, improving the effectiveness of S&R is a high priority. The recommended remedial actions here, if implemented, will significantly improve national and
NATO S&R capabilities. Further analysis of the root causes and collection and sharing of good practices from the nations on addressing those root causes, has the potential to provide fairly rapid improvements in our ability to execute in the field.

**Major Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned**

1. Combined training with all actors involved in S&R is extremely useful in improving the efficiency of S&R related activities. From the military perspective, the combined training improves the efficiency of military support to S&R related activities. From the civilian dimension perspective, the combined training enhances S&R efforts. Recommended Remedial Action: build on the model provided by Exercise VIKING for this sort of combined training. ACT’s CIMIC Fusion Centre has also demonstrated its utility as a way to improve military support to S&R.

2. Comprehensive planning is necessary, involving “whole of government” or interagency actors from the earliest stages of engagement. Recommended remedial action: incorporate “whole of government” considerations into national and NATO planning doctrine.

3. Lessons identified and lessons learned sharing remains inadequate. Recommended remedial action: NATO could add value to national COIN efforts by dedicating more resources to collecting the S&R LI, LL, and good practices from the nations in order to share them. This sharing is a core function of NATO. ACT, as part of its increased think tank functionality, could, if properly resourced, take on more of this role, perhaps as an expanded part of the CIMIC Fusion Centre-Civil Military Overview. NATO should be publishing reports on S&R successes, both as an aid to practitioners in the field and as part of a strategic communication effort. For example, ACT could develop a core staff to collect good practices on issues like water treatment, reforestation, sanitation systems, appropriate construction techniques, renewable energy, microfinance, education, animal husbandry, etc., to provide the nations with a quick reference on what sort of projects work in Afghanistan, so that they can apply their elements of the comprehensive approach better. This should include a methodology for project evaluation, even if this is simply a review of other evaluations from the nations to determine what are successful and what are not.

4. Lack of standards and methodologies for training local forces. Recommended remedial action: as part of the effort to develop a concept for the military contribution to security force assistance, NATO should develop standards and methodologies for training local forces.

5. S&R tasks are inadequately resourced. A huge gap between state goals and the provision of resources by the nations necessary to achieve those goals persists. Recommended Remedial action: provide adequate resourcing to accomplish NATO and national strategic objectives.

The current state of play of S&R lessons learned, in which S&R lessons identified are repeatedly identified by many different nations, and in some cases by the same nation, indicates that the LL process is not being appropriately utilized. The alliance is collectively re-generating the same lessons identified, but seldom implementing the recommended remedial actions. Our challenge now is not so much to diagnose the problems we are facing, but to implement cures.

**About the Author:**

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**Endnotes:**

1. See also page 47-48 of the *Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility* report.

Adjusting to Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

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Drawing on the lessons learned from coalition interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, by mid-2004, a consensus developed within the executive branch, Congress, and among independent experts that the US Government required a more robust capacity to prevent conflict (when possible) and (when necessary) to manage “Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations [SRO] in countries emerging from conflict or civil strife.”1

In July 2004, Congress authorized the reprogramming of funds to create the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). In December 2005, President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Stabilization and Reconstruction,” to respond to the continuing need to strengthen whole-of-government planning and response to crises abroad. The goal of NSPD 44 was to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance. To accomplish this, NSPD 44 empowered the Secretary of State to lead and coordinate the US response across all agencies involved, and to work with the Secretary of Defense to harmonize civilian and military activities.2 Notwithstanding this mandate, funding initially appropriated to fund S/CRS was woefully inadequate.

History did not prove kind to the decision to underfund S/CRS. Therefore, in response to the lack of systemic SRO coordination in Afghanistan and Iraq, in October 2008, with broad bipartisan support, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (Title 16 of Public Law 110–417). The law charged the State Department with leading the interagency effort to significantly improve the ability of the United States to respond to conflict, and to create a civilian counterpart to the US military that is ready and able to assist countries in the transition from conflict and instability. To pay for these efforts, in fiscal year (FY) 2009, S/CRS received about $45 million for its Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI). The President’s proposed FY 2010 budget (released May 7, 2009) sought $323.3 million for the CSI to build US civilian capacity for SRO efforts. A cornerstone of this strategy is the development of a Civilian Response Corps (CRC).

S/CRS is currently composed of an 88-member interagency staff, including 11 active members of the CRC. However, it has begun hiring additional personnel, and if the 2010 budget is passed, the CRC initiative will be expanded to establish a permanent government-wide civilian SRO response capacity. In fact, the President’s budget request supports the recruitment, development, training, and equipping of a 4,250-person CRC composed of 250 active component members, 2,000 standby component members, and 2,000 reserve component members. Furthermore, the CRC will span seven Federal departments and an agency (State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and US Agency for International Development [USAID]) and, with its reserve component, will also allow the government to tap the expertise of state and local governments, as well as the private sector. As S/CRS begins to grow the CRC, we are presented with a unique opportunity to help meet the needs of future complex operations. In this regard, the lessons learned from previous SRO engagements, as well as from other government and international agencies, can provide important clues to help make State’s efforts in this regard more productive.

Background

Federal Government engagement in complex interagency SROs ranges from tsunami relief to nation-building and counterinsurgency. It is not a new phenomenon. What is new is the number of failed/failing states, transnational terrorists, and manmade/environmental ecological disasters with which the government has recently had to contend. There appears to be no end in sight; in the foreseeable future, complex interagency SROs will remain a staple of US foreign interventions.3 That said, a fair assessment of recent
efforts clearly demonstrates that the United States has not been executing SROs with aplomb. NSPD 44 and its progeny recognize this fact and highlight the importance of creating an effective coordinating mechanism to oversee the interagency process in future complex operations.

Broadly speaking, contemporary interagency SROs typically involve at least one of the following types of foreign engagement or intervention:

❖ traditional combat
❖ counterterrorism
❖ peacemaking/peacekeeping
❖ counterinsurgency/nation building
❖ monetary development assistance
❖ disaster relief.

While not exhaustive, this list illustrates the wide variation in levels of conflict, purpose, duration, and demand (on monetary, capital, and human resources) for which the United States must prepare as it contemplates engaging in future complex interagency SROs. Furthermore, the difficulty in preparing for such exigencies is exacerbated by the fact that more than one of these factors will be playing out at a time. Although SROs could be made incrementally more efficient by better training in and execution of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) involved in each of these areas of engagement, exponential increases in overall SRO effectiveness would be obtained by simply improving the coordination of US interagency efforts, as well as by establishing an interagency institution able to balance conflicting priorities.

**SRO Overview**

Many of the organizational structures, tools, and doctrines that inform the way the United States currently engages in SROs were developed following World War II. This has led some observers to opine that US engagement in SROs—as well as the development of doctrine and TTPs used in such operations—was either an aberration of Cold War politics or a temporary anomaly of the post–Cold War security scene. This, in turn, has led some critics to argue that SROs were being overemphasized within the government in general, and within the US military in particular—that is, the United States has been focusing on SROs and international capacity-building (“nationbuilding”) at the expense of the military’s supposed “core mission” of traditional combat. However, NSPD 44 and its military corollary, Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 3000.05, have now weighed in on these arguments and emphasized that SRO is a core mission of the US interagency and military. In this regard, it is instructive that notwithstanding the aforementioned criticisms, the government and military have been engaging in complex interagency SROs since well before the advent of the Cold War; the number and tempo of such operations have steadily increased; and the need for institutionalized interagency coordination is greater than it has ever been.

In this regard, we must consider that as early as 1868, the US Navy transported doctors, nurses, and supplies to areas affected by a tsunami in Chile. Civil-military involvement in similar humanitarian relief operations (HUMRO) has continued ever since. While the overall incidence of the United States providing disaster relief in complex environments has grown in recent years, it has not been the result of ad hoc decisionmaking. For more than 140 years, policymakers have routinely mandated that to further US national interests, the government and military must engage in SROs. Policymakers have likewise indicated that coordinated interagency military assistance to foreign populations affected by disasters (of human or natural origin) is vital to peace, security, and stability in today’s world.

US civil-military operations (CMO) have also had a rich and sustained history. In fact, the military’s engagement in CMO can be traced to the earliest days of the American Revolution. CMO continued throughout the Mexican-American War (1846–1848) and was instrumental in numerous interventions in the Caribbean and Latin America in the early 20th century. Furthermore, in 1943, the military recognized the necessity of institutionalizing CMO capacity when it created the US Army Civil Affairs Division to train officers for postwar reconstruction and other nationbuilding operations. The importance of CMO for strategic interests cannot be overstated. Simply put, since at least the end of World War II, CMO have ensured that the international community would not experience a repetition of the war-peace-war scenarios of earlier decades.

US counterinsurgency operations are also nothing new. They predate the Philippine War (1899–1902), continued through Vietnam, and culminated in operations
in Latin America in the 1960s and 1980s. Now they find their resurgence in Afghanistan and Iraq, but with a twist: they are often conducted concurrently with HUMRO assistance, counterinsurgency operations, and CMO efforts. They are also often conducted alongside more combat and/or counterterrorism operations. The phenomenon of US and coalition agencies engaging in SROs while simultaneously conducting more combat operations has substantially complicated the “battlespace.” This, in turn, has led to renewed calls for the creation of more robust mission deconfliction mechanisms and interagency coordination.

The battlespace has been further complicated by the fact that US-led interagency SROs routinely take place alongside internationally funded development assistance programs. Thus, interagency personnel conducting SROs often bump into an overlapping myriad of civilian monetary agencies. The fact that these agencies routinely acquire, administer, and distribute funds “on the ground” can greatly complicate unity of effort.

There has also been an explosion in the number of international organizations acting in the battlespace. For example, United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking missions have become ubiquitous in the security environment, thus emphasizing the need for not only national, but also internationally coordinated, responses to SROs.

Need for Coordination

Following World War II, the proliferation of civilian agencies involved in SROs (including the International Cooperation Agency, Development Loan Fund, and Department of Agriculture’s Food for Peace program) led to an ever-increasing need for civilian interagency cooperation and coordination. In 1961, this culminated in the creation of USAID. A noteworthy feature of USAID was that it was supposed to have enhanced the coordination of civilian agency efforts regarding the distribution of international aid. However, because the agency was made independent of State, it often worked at cross purposes with the political guidance being formulated within State. That, in turn, led to disconnections between policy formulations and the money needed to fund them. Although numerous attempts to restructure USAID’s distribution methods have been undertaken, to date no major coordination reform efforts have succeeded. Thus, State and USAID find that they are often singing off of distinctly separate sheets of music with regard to SROs.

In the meantime, the creation of numerous, often overlapping international aid agencies (including the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization) has led to an ever-increasing need for whole-of-government/unity-of-effort coordination. In fact, lessons learned from recent SROs highlight the fact that in order to be effective, national and multinational development assistance agencies must coordinate with one another, as well as with coalition militaries, to ensure that reconstruction aid is administered through a rational strategy designed to achieve agreed-upon outcomes. Lessons learned similarly demonstrate that if international aid is not coordinated, single sector development measures will often impede measurable economic growth. This can—and has—worked to the detriment of SRO endstates. Thus, whole-of-government/unity-of-effort stabilization and reconstruction measures must focus on coordinating opportunities for growth, while minimizing naturally resulting income divergences between subgroups within a population. Unfortunately, such coordination is usually lacking even now.

Compounding these problems is the fact that there is virtually no coordination with or among the plethora of privately funded international and transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGO) found in the modern SRO battlespace. Admittedly, NGOs are notoriously independent. However, they fulfill a vital role in SROs by providing critical engagement and capacity-building capabilities often lacking in the government or military. Furthermore, NGOs typically furnish long-term continuity because they are often found working in countries well before the arrival of the “SRO international community,” and will usually remain long after an SRO endstate has been declared. Further still, many NGOs are administratively efficient. Thus, the international community could learn much from NGOs. For instance, by establishing clear and largely nonconfrontational methods of operation that are widely accepted by assistance-receiving populations, many NGOs are able to gain entry into countries more quickly and less expensively than governmental organizations. Therefore, greater coordination and cooperation between government and NGO communities would make attainment of SRO objectives more efficient and effective.
With specific regard to the US military, joint doctrine has moved away from the concept of the sequential battlefield (where combat/counterterrorism operations come first and nationbuilding comes last) to a more nuanced, complex, high-tempo, and multilayered environment. This has increased the feeling that there should be more coordination between civil-military SRO actors. However, much remains to be done even within the military community itself. In this regard, recent SROs have clearly demonstrated that there must be far greater internal coordination of means and methods within the military, particularly with regard to the US military’s engagement in kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Most acutely, the US military must harmonize its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. At the same time, the military’s external coordination with other US agencies, as well as with the international community and other SRO actors, must be enhanced. Until then, complex SROs such as Afghanistan are unlikely to succeed.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

Until recently, the US institutional commitment toward the adoption of effective SRO coordination mechanisms has largely been aspirational. Despite this, certain ad hoc mechanisms have been implemented. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan are the clearest example.16 PRTs are the primary mechanisms through which the international community delivers assistance at the provincial and district level in Afghanistan. As noted by USAID, “As a result of their provincial focus and civilian and military resources, PRTs have a unique mandate to improve security, support good governance, and enhance provincial development. The combination of international civilian and military resources... allows the PRT to have wide latitude to implement their mandate.”17

The United States first implemented PRTs in 2002 as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. They initially met with little success. In part, this was because they were imperfectly realized, haphazardly implemented, and inadequately resourced. They were also not doctrinally integrated with US coalition partners. In fact, the International Security Assistance Force did not integrate them into its operational plan until 2006. Since then, success has been mixed and somewhat difficult to gauge. In part, this stems from the loss of momentum and harm done in the battlespace due to previous uncoordinated actions. Despite this, indications are that since 2006, cooperation and coordination in Afghanistan have increased among the various multinational agencies involved and that this coordination has been paying dividends. And yet we still find ourselves struggling to adequately define their mission and doctrine, let alone appropriately resource them. This undoubtedly helps explain the predicament in which we find ourselves. Therefore, one lesson that should be internalized from our experience in Afghanistan is that for optimal effectiveness, coordinated response mechanisms utilized during conflicts, natural disasters, and political crises need to be institutionally recognized, doctrinally supported, adequately staffed, sufficiently trained, and appropriately resourced. Simply put, to be effective, SRO coordination mechanisms cannot be an afterthought. Another lesson learned in Afghanistan relates to response time, strategic communications, and sustainability. On the one hand, quick responses to conflicts, natural disasters, and political crisis undoubtedly help minimize destabilizing effects from them. They also demonstrate willingness on the part of the international community to help. However, premature, uncoordinated, ill-executed, and poorly articulated international SRO responses may also backfire since they can unreasonably raise local expectations (which cannot possibly be met) and lead to the opinion that the international community may have the wherewithal to help, but not the inclination. In Afghanistan, for example, local uncertainty about coalition intentions arose after Afghans observed six years of largely post hoc, uncoordinated, and ineffective PRT executions. Uncertainty increased after Afghans observed the often capricious and largely “international-centric” nature of PRT resourcing.18 And uncertainties were exacerbated when Afghans continually heard about an amorphous endstate (when the international community could go home) rather than about true coalition intentions. Such actions made dealing with local leaders more difficult. Simply put, clear institutional mechanisms and parameters must be established—and articulated—before initializing SROs.

**Recommendations for the CRC**

The issuance of NSPD 44, which designated State as the lead in SRO efforts, combined with the provision of initial funding to begin implementing the directive, has led the department to begin marshalling the resources to accomplish its mission. Unfortunately, State has
virtually no institutional capacity to help it undertake such a task. Despite this, S/CRS has been directed to immediately begin developing, recruiting, training, and equipping a CRC. As S/CRS initializes its development plans, it should be mindful of its institutional limitations and take into account the lessons learned from previous SROs.

Assuming S/CRS receives all the FY 2010 resources sought in the President’s budget, it will still be comparatively ill resourced and positioned to replicate the institutional capacity levels and functional expertise found in other agencies (for example, USAID and DOD). This could be a problem, especially over the next year or so, when S/CRS will be establishing its doctrine, TTPs, and other methods of operation. The bottom line is that a freshman staff of 100 or so CRC officers, spread across seven Federal departments and an agency, cannot be expected to independently develop a significant SRO hands-on capability. Because of this, S/CRS should primarily focus on its coordinating mission. Even to do that, however, it will need to reach out to other agencies for assistance. In this regard, we offer the following recommendations.

The primary nature of the S/CRS intragovernmental coordinating role will undoubtedly dictate that it hires experts in Federal governance. Thus, it will either need to accept intragovernmental transfers, or hire former US Government employees with relevant governance experience. Considering the historical nature of Federal employment, however, it is unlikely that many of these government employees will have significant nongovernmental work experience and/or technical subject matter expertise. Furthermore, unless it intends to hire military retirees, most US Government employees will have limited deployment experience.19 Given its funding and staffing constraints, S/CRS should not try to develop such experience. Instead, it should work with its employees, as well as with other Federal agencies, and civil and academic institutions to develop staffing models that will allow it to excel in its managerial and coordination roles.

When contemplating the development of its overarch- ing mission, S/CRS should resist the temptation to reinvent “solutions,” particularly with regard to complex SRO implementation. Instead, it should focus on (re)evaluating resources and lessons learned already on hand. As noted, there are numerous sources of expertise/experience available, and S/CRS would be well served to access them. Assuming it did so, in addition to its managerial and coordination roles, S/CRS could also become an SRO best practices clearinghouse for the rest of the interagency community.

By virtue of its position within State, S/CRS is not only uniquely situated to access other agencies, but is also uniquely qualified to coordinate with foreign governmental institutions, international organizations, and NGOs. It should immediately take advantage of that and begin developing the international networks necessary to help it effectively carry out its coordination role.

S/CRS does not possess significant planning or training expertise. Therefore, it should immediately begin working with civil and academic institutions—and with DOD/coalition military partners—to develop scenario-driven training and exercise modules, as well as standard operations plans for execution during the most likely types of contingencies.

In regard to its coordination role, S/CRS should consider modeling its interagency managerial and coordinating structures on organizational structures already developed and proven reliable, such as those utilized by the interagency community during domestic emergency response situations. Off-the-shelf coordinating structures that could be adopted, modified, and replicated include the Incident Command System and National Incident Management System. Both have proven adaptive for a wide variety of organizations, and both have been effective in interagency disaster response scenarios. In addition, replicating such nonhierarchical, multi-organizational coordinating structures could foster flexibility and enhance interest in managing operational, logistical, and informational mission needs. Moreover, adoption of such civilian structures (versus replication of quasi-military structures) would provide a nonthreatening framework (particularly for NGOs and international organizations) and could reduce tensions in complex operations. In short, it would enhance the ability of diverse actors to work together, as well as to work with the interagency community.

S/CRS should work with DOD to help it restructure its SRO doctrine and organizational structures. Simply put, SROs need to be more accessible to civilian partners. Current military doctrine/structures are often viewed as antithetical to such relationships. Structures that enhance civilian accessibility and reflect local
population input and needs are critical to optimum interagency mission accomplishment.

Because it lacks logistical capacity, it is clear that S/CRS will seldom be the first on-scene US agency involved in SRO efforts. Thus, it should not attempt to become a global emergency first responder. Instead, it should understand that this function will continue to fall to the military. In this regard, to improve coordination and develop a common understanding of operational methodologies, S/CRS should work, train, and exercise with military Civil Affairs and National Guard units. That should help it to leverage its organizational expertise and foster better working relationships with the military.

S/CRS should also make it a priority to engage/train with foreign governmental agencies and militaries. Such engagements should concentrate on harmonizing national policies and encouraging unity of effort during SROs.

Provision of services during most SRO contingency operations primarily involves interactions with local, as opposed to national level, officials. In preparing for such contingencies, therefore, S/CRS should access the expertise of domestic and foreign police forces, school systems, state licensing agencies, bar associations, and other state and local entities.

With regard to the CRC, S/CRS should work with Reserve and National Guard personnel specialists to help it develop a reserve capacity that could realistically be called upon to deploy during times of increased demand. Simply put, if S/CRS wants to develop a deployable reserve capacity, it should model it after the world-class Reserve and National Guard units already in its midst.

S/CRS should consider utilizing private contractors to augment the CRC. Advantages to using contractors (versus Reservists) include minimizing recruitment, education, and retention costs; obtaining comparatively inexpensive access to personnel with experience that is in low demand (and thus supply) in the government but is readily available in the public sector (for example, business managers, agriculture experts, and so forth); and obtaining private sector buy-in and political support.

S/CRS should immediately undertake efforts to coordinate monetary relief planning and assistance policies with USAID and international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund. S/CRS must also work with Federal and international partners to increase flexibility regarding the distribution of aid funds. Moreover, it should advocate for a revision of the Foreign Assistance Act so as to obtain discretion in spending, as well as to promote more vertical integration with USAID.

**Recommendations for the Military**

While S/CRS faces core capacity challenges, the same may be said of DOD. In particular, lessons learned from recent operations clearly demonstrate that a number of military organizations lack the internal capacity, institutional desire, and/or coordinating mechanisms to adequately execute the functions required of them during SROs. Given probable limitations on future funding and staffing for S/CRS, DOD organizations cannot expect to pass a large number of unwanted tasks to State. Therefore, notwithstanding what has been said above, S/CRS and DOD must be prepared to develop additional nontraditional, SRO-relevant expertise. In this regard, we must consider that combat operations are a core competency of the military. They are also a functional area that no other Federal agency has the capability to implement. Many future complex SRO interventions will have significant requirements for combatant utilization. This is particularly true vis-à-vis counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and peacemaking/peacekeeping operations. Therefore, DOD must continue focusing on organizing, training, and equipping for its combat-related mission.

The Services cannot forsake their obligation to become as proficient in conducting stability operations as they are in combat operations.

Thus, notwithstanding the pushback that they may receive from certain Service-centric, combat-centric “traditionalists,” each Service must develop full-spectrum SRO capabilities.20

The Services must understand that during SROs, their actions cannot be conducted independently of one another or of the US Government interagency decision-making process. Additionally, their actions may not be undertaken without adequate attention to the nonkinetic
aspects of SROs. Simply put, in the past, when nonkinetic stabilization and reconstruction efforts have been placed under the operational control of the military, interagency civil engagement and reconstruction priorities have often been left unrealized. For this reason, in future SROs, as soon as security allows, it will be vital to prioritize and institutionalize State Department input into DOD decisionmaking.

Although information and intelligence operations are beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that both areas need to be reevaluated in light of the changing relationships fostered by NSPD 44. Moreover, SRO informational/intelligence doctrine should be refocused to include greater emphasis on political-military areas of concern. Since DOD is vested with these missions, it will need to develop significantly improved methods to disseminate information and intelligence to interagency and coalition partners, as well as to local national and nongovernmental agencies.

State and S/CRS have virtually no security and/or logistical support capabilities. DOD does. Clearly, these matters will continue to call for close coordination. One area requiring immediate attention will be the implementation of interagency cost control mechanisms. In particular, cost reduction strategies need to be implemented vis-à-vis the delivery of supplies and personnel to SROs.

In December 2007, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report that noted:

S/CRS is developing a framework for planning and coordinating US reconstruction and stabilization operations. . . . [A] guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations is still in progress. We cannot determine how effective the framework will be because it has not been fully applied to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In addition, guidance on agencies’ roles and responsibilities is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. . . . S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the framework by addressing some interagency concerns and providing training to interagency partners. However, differences in the planning capacities and procedures of civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination.

Over two years after the issuance of this report, many of the underlying GAO findings remain unaddressed: planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations is still in progress, guidance on roles and responsibilities is still unclear and inconsistent, some interagency partners continue to show limited support for S/CRS, and differences in the planning capacities and procedures of civilian agencies and the military continue to pose obstacles to effective coordination.

Whether S/CRS can effectively transform interagency stabilization and reconstruction coordination processes remains to be seen. In large part, however, its success will depend on the willingness of its interagency partners, particularly DOD, to assist it. To date, progress in this regard has not been encouraging, but the near future will present many opportunities where the development of those relationships and cooperation will be essential.

Endnotes:

1 See, for example, Clark A. Murdock, ed., Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era (Phase I Report) (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 9:

Complex US contingency operations over the past decade, from Somalia to Iraq, have demonstrated the necessity for a unity of effort not only from the armed forces but also from across the US government and an international coalition. In most cases, however, such unity of effort has proved elusive, sometimes with disastrous results. The US national security apparatus requires significant new investments in this area. Otherwise, the United States’ ability to conduct successful political-military contingency operations will continue to be fundamentally impaired.

See also Phase II Report, July 2005. Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 2007), ii, notes that “At the strategic level, unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with nongovernmental organizations, international governmental organizations, the private sector, and among nations in any alliance or coalition.”

2 Under National Security Presidential Directive 44, the role of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is to coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, develop detailed contingency plans for integrated US reconstruction and stabilization efforts, and coordinate preventative strategies with foreign countries, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities.
For example, over the past 8 years, the situation in Afghanistan has sometimes involved the simultaneous application of all of these types of engagement. However, unity of effort in the execution of these actions has routinely been lacking. In this regard, combat operations (such as civilian casualty-prone counterterrorism engagements in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces) have routinely adversely affected coalition interagency priorities by impeding the development of effective governance mechanisms and infrastructure necessary to complete counterinsurgency operations and/or nationbuilding. In situations such as those transpiring in Afghanistan, there must be a coordinated and institutionalized recognition that counterinsurgency operations are a prerequisite to nationbuilding, and nationbuilding is the prerequisite to an effective endstate.

6 See Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 6, 2006), 85: “The QDR recommends the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. It would help Federal Departments and Agencies better align their strategy, budget and planning functions with national objectives.”


8 According to Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” it:

is DoD policy that: (a) Stability operations are a core US military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. The Department of Defense shall be prepared to: (1) Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations. . . (2) Support stability operations activities led by other [US Government] agencies . . foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations. . . (3) Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance.

9 Section 3 of DODI 3000.05 defines stability operations as “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”


11 Joint Publication 3–57, Civil Military Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 8, 2008), defines civil-military operations (CMO) as the:

activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations are nested in support of the overall US objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur throughout the range of military operations. CMO is the responsibility of the command and will be executed by all members of the command. It is not the sole purview of the [Civil Affairs] team. CMO are conducted across the range of military operations.


During the relatively short history of the United States, military forces have fought only eleven wars considered conventional. From the American Revolution through Operation Iraqi Freedom, these wars represented significant or perceived threats to national security interests, where the political risk to the nation was always grave. These were the wars for which the military traditionally prepared; these were the wars that endangered America’s very way of life. Of the hundreds of other military operations conducted in those intervening years, most are now considered stability operations, where the majority of effort consisted of stability tasks. Contrary to popular belief, the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat [emphasis added].


15 A 1999 reorganization of foreign affairs agencies led to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) being placed under the general purview of the Department of State. However, it remains a distinctly separate agency from State.

PRTs are a means of coordinating interagency diplomatic, economic, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency efforts among various US agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are intended to be interim structures; after a PRT has achieved its goal of improving stability, it may be dismantled to allow traditional development efforts to occur. In Afghanistan, the first PRTs were created in 2002 with the mission of facilitating security and reconstruction by helping the central government extend its authority to the provinces. Since then, PRTs have expanded their purpose to include strengthening local governance and community development. In Iraq, PRTs were initiated in 2005 with the mission to increase the capacity of provincial and local governments to govern effectively and, for newer embedded PRTs (ePRT), to support moderates and assist in the military’s counterinsurgency efforts. To accomplish their missions, PRTs engage in and fund a variety of activities, such as developing the capacity of local governments through engagement with local stakeholders; promoting budget execution, business development, agriculture, public health initiatives, and governance; and supporting the delivery of basic social services.


Although there are significant variations, PRTs are typically commanded by military officers and staffed with “internationals.” This feeds local concerns about the relative priority of noncoalition objectives—in other words, that the internationals do not adequately understand and/or effectuate local needs. Greater coordination and communication could help ameliorate such concerns.

Thus, even assuming that it wished to, it is highly unlikely that S/CRS could ever obtain the resources necessary to develop a fully staffed group of hands-on “journeymen” nation builders.

For example, CMO capability needs to be greatly expanded and institutionalized within each of the Services and the National Guard. Notwithstanding current doctrine, lessons learned during recent SROs clearly validate the point that Civil Affairs—a functional area within CMO—should not remain the functional responsibility primarily of the Army Reserve. In addition, DOD needs to refocus its joint doctrine to emphasize the strategic nature (versus tactical expediency) of CMO. Furthermore, CMO curriculum and training needs to be greatly expanded, as well as accomplished in conjunction with interagency partners (especially S/CRS). In particular, interagency CMO training needs to include far greater emphasis on interagency processes, fiscal and human rights law, language and communication skills, and regional, historical, cultural studies.

As regarding the use of information/intelligence in supporting SROs, see Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: ODNI, August 2009), Mission Objective 6.


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Establishing a Domestic Emergency Response Capability in Conjunction with Reconstruction

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Introduction

In the early stages of reconstruction, it is sometimes difficult to realize that in addition to the many other shortcomings and voids in the affected country’s government, there is a requirement for the new government to be able to respond effectively to natural and man-made disasters. If a thorough risk analysis were to be conducted, every country could identify natural hazards that pose a significant threat to the citizens. Further analysis may identify man-made hazards as well. Examples include: Earthquakes, flooding, severe winds (e.g., tornados and hurricane/cyclones), tsunamis, forest/grassland fires, pandemic disease, drought, and so forth. Man-made hazards exist from chemical plants and storage facilities, dam/levee failures, train derailments, nuclear facility accidents, explosions, and other hazards.

To be organized, equipped, manned, and trained to respond comprehensively to disasters is an essential need. The capability to protect the nation’s citizens is essential to the current government to underscore their legitimacy and ability to govern effectively. Failure is unacceptable not only to the citizenry but to the international community and foreign investors as well.

To establish an emergency management capability from scratch, it would normally be best not to immediately stand up an organization and then try to figure out how it would work. It would be best, in most cases, to establish a select commission under the aegis of the prime minister/president; this commission would then conduct the risk and needs analyses necessary to provide the insights for the development of an organizational concept for a government agency that fully addresses the potential disasters that may impact the nation. It should consist of representation from those government agencies that would be primary players in any disaster response. As a minimum, there should be representation from the military, law enforcement, health, Red Cross or equivalent, public works, agriculture, environmental, communications, transportation, acquisition, energy, and public affairs agencies. The commission should be led by a person with status and support of the prime minister/president, and the person would likely be one who is projected as the potential lead for the proposed organization. Because the representatives from the organizations that may be called upon to assist in a major disaster response are participants in the development process, their level of ownership in the concept is improved and their willingness to support future disaster response efforts will likely be enhanced.

Findings of the Commission

Upon completion of the commission’s study and analysis, the information and a request for creation of an emergency management/disaster response agency should be presented to the legislative branch. The agency will require resourcing in terms of manpower, funding, and legislative authority to conduct operations. Legislation must be adopted to: (1) authorize the agency and approve an organizational structure, (2) provide for a mechanism for emergency funding, (3) provide a threshold for national vis-a-vis local response, (4) establish eligible disaster costs, (5) establish a mechanism for integration of international response resources, (6) establish the responsibilities of other government agencies to support disaster response, and (7) provide a mechanism to develop counterpart emergency management capability at the state/province and local level to facilitate a national and local integration of the emergency response. In its findings, the commission should include their version of the legislation to be adopted by the legislature. Although there may be some tweaking and political jockeying, the commission can effectively write the legislation and establish the framework for the emergency management agency, and then encourage the authorities that will be required to make the agency effective.
Creating an Emergency Management Organization

There are a number of effective emergency management organizations established in the world community. The United States (US) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), housed within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is probably the most robust and utilizes a tried and tested disaster operations management organizational concept. This capability is the Incident Command System (ICS) developed through many years of experience by the US Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service. Their operational concepts and organizational structure were adopted by FEMA and a nation-wide integrated emergency management system was initiated by the publication of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP), superseded by the National Response Framework (NRF) in 2008. The beauty of ICS is that it is very adaptable from small up to very large incidents. Therefore, as a concept, it is useful in any setting. These documents can be accessed on-line at http://www.dhs.gov or http://www.fema.gov. Legislation authorizing disaster response and disaster funding is found in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (as amended). FEMA’s regulations can be found in Title 44 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations).

As an organization, FEMA is functionally organized for a “peacetime” and a “wartime” mission – “peacetime” being times of no disasters, and “wartime” being those times when the agency is actively engaged in disaster response operations. It is important to look at organizing for both functions. The primary reason for this is that disasters can be less disastrous through “peacetime” training, education, planning, exercises, and mitigation programs. FEMA has organized under four broad areas of emphasis: preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. FEMA also houses the National Fire Center and the National Fire Academy, but we will focus here on preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. This functional distribution of work in an emergency management organization would be recommended in all agencies created as part of a reconstruction process.

Preparedness: Preparedness includes staff work to prepare the entire emergency management community as a whole to become an effective, integrated response system. Preparedness provides the technical assistance, training, and funding to organizations below the national level. Those levels may be regional, state/provincial, and city. By assisting and coordinating emergency response planning (NRF) training and doctrine (ICS) down to the local level through the state/provincial level, all layers of emergency management are working from the same playbook (NIMS) and integrated plans that clearly define response responsibility for each layer of government. Because emergency management preparedness competes with other local funding requirements, the national legislature must provide the emergency management agency with adequate funding to support the development of a state/provincial and local community emergency preparedness capability. This creates the infrastructure upon which a disaster response capability can be built.

In addition to the development of doctrine, manuals, field operating guides, etc., the preparedness function also assists in developing and exporting training, and in encouraging participation in exercises to develop intergovernmental and interagency knowledge for improving their ability to respond as part of an integrated response. Testing and exercising plans and procedures is an essential element of building response effectiveness.

Mitigation: Mitigation programs work toward desired end-state of a full-spectrum emergency management system. Early on, the development of a capability to respond to disasters at the state, provincial, and local level must be the primary focus. However, when establishing the initial legislation and organizational structure for the agency, mitigation should be included. Mitigation programs are those aimed at identifying risks to potential or probable hazards, and developing strategies for minimizing inappropriate addition of homes, businesses, and infrastructure to those already in the identified risk areas. Not adding to the problem is a strong contributor to long term management of a nation’s risk to disasters. With time, attention may be paid to reducing the risk to existing development through acquiring and removing properties at risk from the danger zones, or using engineering solutions (such as levees, dams, watercourse modifications, seismic design retrofitting, and other solutions) to remove, alter, or reduce the risk. As discussed, however, the implementation of mitigation programs requires substantial financial investment and may be out of reach in fledgling emergency management organizations. It should be developed carefully as a key part of a longer term strategy.
**Response:** Response to disasters requires careful planning and integration of response organizations to achieve effective results. All disasters, natural or man-caused, require a base level of emergency response and assets. In the US National Response Framework, these emergency response functions have been identified and each has been built into the response organization. The scope of the involvement would be dependent on the magnitude and type of response. The NRF identifies 15 of these emergency support functions, or ESF. For approximately 30 years FEMA operated with 12 ESFs under the superseded Federal Response Plan. Only with the National Response Plan and its successor – the NRF – were the three additional ESFs included. The three added ESFs are Security, Long-term Recovery, and Public Affairs. The original 12 included: Transportation, Communications, Public Works, Fire, Information/Planning, Mass Care, Acquisition, Medical, Urban Search and Rescue, Environment, Agriculture, and Energy. At provincial and local levels, ESFs mirroring the national level ESFs are identified, trained, and exercised in conjunction with their higher and lower echelons to allow for an effectively integrated response. This planning, training, and exercising is coordinated and led by the national emergency management organization through the NRF and NIMS type of doctrine.

**Recovery:** The response is only the beginning of the effort. As the disaster passes and immediate needs have been addressed, the response transitions to a long-term recovery. Damaged infrastructure must be repaired, debris removed, housing stock repaired or replaced, businesses restarted, and services restored to assist the affected areas in recovering from the devastation, and then becoming a viable community once again. Experience has shown that although this is primarily a local effort, funds and technical expertise are required to supplement the local recovery. Once the initial response is completed, and the news coverage diminishes, the heavy lifting required by the reconstruction sets in. Success, however, is every bit as important to the strength of the state and the image of an effective state government as the response. If poorly handled, a blighted, slow to recover area would present an opportune target for reemergence of insurgent groups and fertile territory for the recruitment of new members.

**Establishing a Local Emergency Management Capability**

The primary components for establishing a local emergency management authority are already in place in most local communities of any size. The majority of agencies are first responder organizations (i.e., police, fire, search and rescue, local Red Cross or equivalent, and hospitals/emergency medical personnel). A decision must be made at the local level, usually by the mayor or comparable leadership position, as to who the lead official will be. Commonly, it is the fire chief or police chief since they already have substantial training and can make an easier transition in assuming the emergency management responsibilities. The office or person designated must be a leader, be respected by other agency heads, and be trained in disaster response operations. This person will be the one designated to coordinate support to the incident commander, who is the first responder to the disaster scene.

Having been designated the emergency management lead for the community, this official must create the local response organization, develop the plans for implementation of response, and ensure the training and exercising of responders and supporting cast.

The creation of a sound emergency response plan is critical to the success. The plan will lay out the emergency response authorities, responsibilities of key response organizations, and create an ICS organizational framework to bind the components together into an organized response team.

A standard response organization will be organized into five components. Primary is the **command section**, supported by four components which provide support to the command group. They are (1) Operations, (2) Information and Planning, (3) Logistics, and (4) Administration.

**Operations:** The operations section provides the coordination element for the response. The operations officer coordinates the activities of all responders based on the guidance of the incident commander/control group. He is the focal point for all the other support agencies to conduct their coordination and support actions to create a unified response. These other support agencies will position action officers
and liaison officers within the operations section to promote timely and seamless support to the operational requirements. In most disasters, the delivery of goods and services to both responders and disaster victims is tied directly to the conduct of operations; therefore, the operations officer also identifies logistic requirements and provides oversight for the delivery of response logistics support based on the incident commander’s stated priorities. It is essential for the selected operations officer to have the ability to see the bigger picture, be good at multitasking, and be good at working with and gaining the cooperation of other emergency response agencies supporting his efforts.

**Information and Planning:** The information and planning section is the intelligence and future plans cell for the emergency response team organization. This team does action tracking, provides situational awareness to the response, prepares briefings, and writes the daily situation reports. Sophisticated information and planning sections will also have geographic information systems (GIS) capability for the preparation of charts, graphs, demographics displays, terrain analysis, and so forth. Additionally, this section may include the branch that manages aerial surveillance, satellite photography support, and other technical support as may be required.

**Administration:** The administration section supports the disaster response team. They provide finance and personnel support to the disaster response team. Finance includes payroll (often team members are temporary or intermittent employees), capture reimbursable costs, do contracts and procurement in support of the disaster response and recovery, and provide administrative support to the hiring of employees, safety, security, and other personnel actions.

**Logistics:** Logistics has a two-fold mission. First, they support the deployment of the emergency response team. They may be called upon to obtain transport for the team into the disaster area and make transportation assets available to the team upon arriving in the disaster area. They provide for temporary office space, communications/Internet technology, food, shelter, medical support, special equipment, and other logistics support to the teams deployed as responders. Second, they support the operations section in acquiring, transporting, and distributing disaster response supplies to the disaster victims and other agencies supporting the response. It is absolutely essential that the logistics staff be integrated with higher and lower response organizations to reduce duplication in acquiring and distributing disaster supplies.

Once the head of the local emergency management agency is selected, the new emergency management director must begin to select, hire, assemble, and train the organizational components suggested above. This staff will conduct the local risk assessment and hazards analysis. Based on that analysis, they will develop plans to address the appropriate responses. In doing so, the local emergency management staff must not work in a vacuum. It is essential that they collaborate with their next higher counterparts to ensure that the local plan integrates effectively with higher authority plans to ensure a coordinated and effective response. In many cases, there is published guidance from national, state, or provincial emergency management offices that provides guidelines and establishes mandatory requirements for local planning consideration. In addition, the plan must be fully coordinated with the interagency group that will be supporting the plan implementation. Often, these other agencies will write or closely collaborate in the writing of the plan annexes that pertain to their area of responsibility for response actions; that is, transportation, medical, mass care, fire, etc.

Having developed a solid plan, it is necessary to train to the requirements established in the plan and then test the validity of the plan through regularly scheduled exercises. The plan is a living document and will be changed as necessary to adapt to changing hazards, changing organizational structures, improving technology, and other determinants that affect the plan. Training must include not only the response organization, but also the public at large (to include the business community), political leadership, and those not-for-profit organizations that may be called upon to support future disasters. It is essential that opportunities be sought to conduct exercises with higher levels of emergency management to improve on disaster response integration at all levels.

At this point, you have a functioning emergency management organization. Until tried and tested, it will be difficult to identify all shortcomings. Actual disasters have a way of quickly pointing out planning, coordination, logistics, or communications deficiencies. It is essential to have a process for capturing lessons learned, and for updating and modifying response
procedures as the learning curve improves. It should be noted that, in the period following a disaster, there is a window of opportunity to petition for fixes to the existing system. Political support and funding support are high immediately following a disaster, but the tendency to forget the disaster is surprisingly quick. Emergency management directors must be ready to plead their case sooner rather than later.

For more detailed guidance on planning and organization, it is suggested that the reader access the National Incident Management System publication and the National Response Framework as references.

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US Air Force Master Sgt. Chris Wilson, from the Montana Air National Guard, operates the Communication Incident Mobile Command Post truck during the Vigilant Guard 2009 exercise in Helena, Mont., Sept. 16, 2009. The exercise scenario involved the local community being struck by a magnitude 6.5 earthquake. The Vigilant Guard exercise is a Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency regional exercise hosted by the National Guard with the state of Montana. The primary goal is to enhance mutual emergency coordination, response, and recovery during a simulated natural disaster. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Master Sgt. Eric Peterson/Released)

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Introduction

Transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials constitute significant challenges to global security. The 2008 Congressional bipartisan report entitled “World at Risk” also argued that biological rather than nuclear threats present the greatest challenge and warned that, “It is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”

While significant concerns exist that terrorist groups may be provided assistance by State sponsors, the revolutionary developments in science and technology, and the wide availability of relevant know-how on the Internet, are also enabling factors for terrorist groups or individuals to create or acquire biological weapons or their means of delivery. Of note, two of the senior Iraqi bioweaponeers were trained abroad: Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha (nicknamed “Dr. Germ”) graduated the University of East Anglia-UK in 1984 and Dr. Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash (nicknamed “Mrs. Anthrax”) graduated from the University of Missouri-Columbia, United States (US), in 1983. Al Qa’ida in particular pioneered a new trend for a terrorist organization by releasing a call to scientists on 28 September 2006: “We are in dire need of you. The field of jihad can satisfy your scientific ambitions and the large American bases [in Iraq] are good places to test your unconventional weapons, whether biological or dirty, as they call them.”

Also, as reported by the Jamestown Foundation, in a jihadi Internet forum entitled: “Good News – Anthrax Production Technique” (al-ekhlaas.net, 3 March 2008) one participant, nicknamed al-Faz, posted a detailed description of anthrax isolation from soil or diseased animals from endemic areas from Africa, Asia, and in some parts of Europe, and also detailed production techniques; al-Faz dedicates his posting to jihadis everywhere: “I wanted to contribute in the preparations against enemies of God. Consider me the servant of the mujahideen. I closely follow your news. May God reward you for your sacrifices. It would make me very happy to see you use biological weapons against God’s enemies.”

Of note, shortly after the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US, a Bahraini scientist called for scientists to be more proactive against the misuse of biological research and stated that it is “regrettable to repeat that the individuals who carried out the anthrax attacks are scientists,” and that “there is no justification for the use of biological weapons by Governments or terrorist groups which would pollute our environment and ensure the ultimate extinction of the human race.”

The United States and other countries simply cannot counteract the threat of terrorism alone since the intent, resources, access, or knowledge of such activities (including clandestine biological laboratories) are difficult to observe or detect. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 focused the attention of States to non-State actors and called on States “to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation in addressing the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems.” It further obligates States to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring, or using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and their delivery systems. UNSCR 1540 also encourages international collaboration on combating WMDs by managing a website clearinghouse of countries’ requests for assistance and offers to assist them.
Building indigenous capacity and expertise to combat WMD threats and to execute CBRN consequence management operations is essential to our national and global security. While around the world, differences in threat perceptions translate into various levels of effort in the former area, the latter provides a common ground and opportunities for developing close collaborations. This allows adopting a common understanding and concepts of operation since it addresses not only the consequence management of deliberate incidents, but also that of inadvertent releases of CBRN contaminants, outbreaks, and pandemics. Any given country’s capability to execute consequence management operations in a mass casualty/mass destruction event could eventually be stretched to the maximum or overwhelmed, which highlights the need and value of regional and global cooperation.

**USCENTCOM’s Cooperative Defense Program - CBRN Passive Defense in Bahrain**

The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Building Partnership Capacity Branch - Cooperative Defense Program (CDP) works toward increasing the host nations’ indigenous WMD consequence management and CBRN passive defense (CBRN PD) capability through the conduct of targeted workshops and situational training exercises designed to evaluate existing plans, and validate military and civilian capabilities. The basic guiding principle is to build partnerships to mitigate the effects of a WMD disaster within the host nations in USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR), mitigate the consequences of CBRN or toxic industrial chemicals/toxic industrial material (TIC/TIM) incidents affecting their sovereign territories, and increase the interoperability with US forces.

The complex mix of threats in USCENTCOM’s AOR that includes the region-wide neo-Salafism, the presence of Al Qa’ida and affiliated groups, and the Sunni versus Shiite tension highlights the need for a cooperative approach in combating terrorism and providing education on WMD threats and available responses. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) are important US partners in addressing these regional threats.

The Kingdom of Bahrain is an archipelago of 36 islands located in the Persian Gulf off the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia; it has a population of 727,785 (including 235,108 non-nationals according to a July 2009 estimate). As a constitutional monarchy, Bahrain is led by King HAMAD bin Isa al-Khalifa (since 6 March 1999); the King is a 1973 graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and was awarded the Freedom Medal of Kansas City from the Mayor and people of Kansas City.7

Shaikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, the Crown Prince, is also the Commander in Chief of the Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF). BDF consists of approximately 12,000 personnel in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense, and Royal Guard units. The Civil Defense forces and the Coast Guard are separate from the BDF and report to the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). Bahrain also has a National Guard that consists of about 1,200 personnel.8 A National Emergency Control Center was established in 2003 in response to a potential Iraqi chemical attack and is charged with coordination of consequence management activities in response to deliberate or natural disasters.9 A first among Gulf nations, Bahrain’s Ministry of the Interior expanded the use of its existing geographic information system (GIS) in 2006 by selecting the Geographic Security System (GSS), developed by ESRI Northeast Africa, to facilitate seamless integration between the MOI’s different entities — that include the emergency “911” (which in Bahrain is 999 for fire, ambulance, and police, and 999/199 for traffic accidents with or without injuries), Traffic, Civil Defense, Coast Guard, Mission Planning, and Crime Analysis departments — by using live situational maps. The proposed system also provides ideal integration with radar, vessel tracking, and surveillance systems strengthening the MOI homeland defense capabilities.10
Among others, Bahrain is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, and the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism. The Joint Counterterrorism Center in Bahrain is promoting the sharing of intelligence, expertise, and coordination of counterterrorism activities among the GCC countries, and has helped Bahraini governmental agencies in terrorism prevention and response activities.

The US Navy’s 5th Fleet is stationed in Bahrain, and about 1,000 US personnel are assigned at its headquarters, which coordinates the US and allied support missions related to the interdiction of the movement of terrorists, arms, or WMD materials across the Arabian Sea.11

USCENTCOM’s CDP – CBRN PD mission took place in Bahrain, 01-12 March 2009. Training was conducted on the Bahrain Defense Forces’ Al Dhila Base in Manama. The training audience consisted of about 45 members of the BDF and MOI Civil Defense Directorate. Classroom training consisted of a series of briefing modules and videos focused on CBRN threat awareness, CBRN reconnaissance techniques, recognition of clandestine biological laboratories and associated terrorist activities, environmental sampling, CBRN detection equipment, medical triage, casualty lift and extraction, individual and mass decontamination, chain of custody, incident site considerations, infrastructure protection, incident command and control, and civil-military cooperation in consequence management operations. Throughout the training, instructors stressed that the CBRN consequence management process includes planning, preparation, response, and recovery phases as described in the Field Manual 3-11.21, 01 April 2008 (Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations).12 Situational/tabletop training exercises on interagency coordination in response to a smallpox outbreak, improvised nuclear attack, radiological dispersal device considerations, and a nerve agent attack on a local shopping mall, were provided to enhance the learning experience and help instructors understand and customize the curriculum according to the Bahraini national environment and relevant interagency coordination. The module on casualty lift and extraction focused on alternate methods of evacuation (using Sked® litter) when standard litters for patient evacuation may not be available for movement of casualties.

There were key lessons drawn from the CDP-CBRN PD training in Bahrain, as follows:

- For many of the BDF/MOI students, the coordination and interagency cooperation among their agencies, lines of command, and assignment of responsibilities were unknown until discussed at the prescribed time of training.
- There was a significant gap in knowledge and capabilities regarding tactical requirements of the first responders to a chemical or radiological incident versus a biological incident, in particular as related to trained personnel and detection equipment. Of note, while Bahrain has a comprehensive pandemic influenza plan,13 very few of the participants actually knew it existed.
- There is no publicly posted information on bioterrorism consequence management on the Bahraini Ministry of Health or other governmental agencies.
- The use of the Sked® extraction device may be viewed as “disrespectful” to the casualty when it is dragged not carried. The discussions were focused on the public perception of the technique.
- Some trainees expressed concern regarding working in a contaminated environment and the medical treatment available, which emphasized the need for more education and sharing of knowledge among various national governmental agencies with consequence management responsibilities.
- The BDF/MOI participants appreciated the technical knowledge of instructors and the training provided, and expressed interest in joint US-Bahrain field training exercises.
The CDP-CBRN PD training also included the observation of a chemical attack field training exercise (FTX) where BDF/MOI participants exercised a joint response, securing the site, chemical agent detection, casualty management, decontamination, and evacuation. The CDP-CBRN PD trainees attended the FTX rehearsal and shared observations during classroom training.

Conclusions

The USCENTCOM’s CDP-CBRN PD in Bahrain contributed to enhanced awareness of Bahraini BDF and MOI participants on CBRN WMD threats and related consequence management operations. It also highlighted the need for a continuous process to help allies, such as Bahrain, to build and sustain consequence management competencies in both the military and civilian first responders’ communities in support of national contingency plans, via formal education and training exercises.

Last, but not least, the CDP-CBRN PD training provided opportunities for the instructors to act as “cultural diplomats.” Cultural diplomacy (as defined by Milton C. Cummings, “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding”) may constitute a vital foundation of all USCENTCOM’s military activities in the region.

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14 Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, homepage at: http://www.culturaldiplomacynews.org/index.php?id=72,0,0,1,0,0

DISCLAIMER: The views of the authors do not purport to reflect the position of
the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the US Government (AR 360-5, para 4-3).

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Bahrain Field Training Exercise (FTX) - Chemical attack

Bahrain FTX - Chemical detection post-incident
Bahrain FTX - Securing incident site and preparing for mass casualty decontamination

Bahrain FTX - BDF and MOI trainees share observations

Bahrain FTX- MOI Civil Defense Medical Evacuation
In early 2007, the staff of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) was preparing for exercise Top Officials 4, a top-level US government counter-terrorism exercise. As part of USPACOM’s preparation, they requested the assistance of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), a Department of Defense (DOD) Combat Support Agency charged with supporting DOD components in all aspects of countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). DTRA’s Consequence Management Division (CSM), the central point for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) consequence management (CM) within DOD, began its work to support USPACOM’s request for a CBRN response “playbook.” Several years later, the result of this initial collaboration has come to be known as the CM Decision Support Tool (DST), a tool whose use has spread across the DOD CM community. Since this early start, additional DSTs have been built for US European Command (USEUCOM), US Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and US Central Command (USCENTCOM). The DTRA DST development team is currently in the process of producing a tailored DST for US Army North (ARNORTH), as well as fielding requests from other interested commands.

What is the DST?

In describing the DST’s utility, USEUCOM Plans and Operations Center – Plans Division (J35) lead CM planner, noted “The DST is USEUCOM’s go-to source for strategic and operational level foreign consequence management (FCM) planning considerations, CM capabilities (continental US reachback and USEUCOM specific), and FCM authorities. The tool first serves the command as a training platform allowing new staff and leadership information to quickly set their FCM foundations. Next, the tool serves as the FCM playbook to guide the staff and leadership through those critical and often complex FCM decisions. Finally, the greatest benefit is the ease with which the tool can be continuously updated with ever-changing policy and internal USEUCOM tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The DST remains the backbone behind USEUCOM’s ability to deliver fast, visible, and effective FCM response anywhere in the USEUCOM area of operations (AOR).”

In its simplest description, the DST is an electronic tool for planners and operators. Using Microsoft PowerPoint as its backbone, the DST depicts the CM response process using a five- or six-phase approach. DTRA tailors this approach to each combatant command’s (COCOM) unique adaptive planning process and its associated phases of response – five phases of response operations with a sixth depicting steady-state or “phase 0” activities. Within each of these phases, concurrent response actions are outlined at a variety of levels, to include the US national government, the international community, the COCOMs, and Service Components. Seeing multiple levels of activity in one common location affords a better understanding of how actions at different levels of response are linked. For instance, potential joint task force (JTF) Commanders can see how the scope of anticipated operations will be shaped by guidance from COCOM headquarters.

From each of these phases, the DST uses hyperlinks to “drill-down” to a variety of information to support critical command decisions, or to provide planning considerations to a JTF-CM planner. As an example, the DST has hyperlinks to information such as: response checklists, templates for orders, crisis action planning information, quick reference data, and links to specific locations on a COCOM web portal. The idea is to put all the relevant information for multiple phases of response operations within easy reach of a planner or operator. When providing information for each of these drill-downs, the DTRA DST development team draws on its own CBRN CM expertise, as well as specific information collected during comprehensive interviews with the COCOM and component staffs. The DST also includes an electronic “one-stop shop” reference library that contains relevant response publications, to include: joint doctrine, DOD directives and instructions, COCOM plans, interagency publications, international guidance documents, and legal statutes. An additional DST feature that has received rave reviews is an “acronym” button that is accessible from anywhere within the DST and links a user to a
A comprehensive list of each acronym and abbreviation used throughout the tool.

How is the DST Used?

The DST has multiple potential uses. When asked how USCENTCOM uses the DST, Ms. Fran Chancey (WMD Branch, FCM Analyst, Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate, USCENTCOM) said, “The framework provided by the DST has provided USCENTCOM real benefits for both training and responses to real-world CBRN incidents. It has helped capture our response requirements, helped our operations center manage time-sensitive challenges, and assisted planners anticipating actions and decisions in support of the CM mission.”

The DST was built predominantly as a staff support tool during real-world incident response. The initial concept was that the DST would help “operationalize” a COCOM’s deliberate planning process, serving as a useful and timesaving aid during the crisis action planning process. To this end, the DST is pre-populated with COCOM-specific templates for mission analysis and other orders. However, it has proven its utility as a training and familiarization tool to the CM mission, which has become especially useful during staff transition. CM operations, whether foreign or domestic, are characterized by a particularly close interface to other US Government interagency partners. The DST accelerates the learning curve for new staff by providing essential details on interagency response teams and national-level CM guidance, among other things.

Furthermore, it serves as a unique repository for key documents and evolving reference information, acting as a vehicle to “tie it all together” and help put guidance into an operational context. And finally, the DST is set up to function as a repository for ever-evolving tactics, operational guidance, and coordination structures. As USEUCOM’s MAJ McLean-Burrell mentions above, one of the DST’s chief benefits is that it serves as a “living mechanism” to track and document relevant observations, lessons learned, and improved response processes. For instance, representatives from the DTRA DST development team have participated as observers during the last several of USEUCOM’s FLEXIBLE RESPONSE exercises, focusing solely on capturing relevant information to feed back into the DST.

For additional information on the CM DST, please contact: CWO4 Darrin Flick, darrin.flick@dtra.mil, 703-767-4394

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Endnote:

1 Joint Task Force-Consequence Management (JTF-CM) is defined in Joint Publication 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management. 2 October 2006. Page II-2.
AFGHANISTAN

Civilian Casualties in Counterinsurgency (2009-2010)
US Central Command commissioned JCOA to conduct a detailed study of civilian casualty (CIVCAS) incidents in Afghanistan. This study was conducted in two phases: Phase I focuses on causal factors in the CIVCAS incident in Farah on 4 May 2009; Phase II is a comprehensive study of US-caused CIVCAS incidents in Afghanistan between 2007 and mid-2009. These products identify trends and causal factors associated with CIVCAS incidents; they also include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendations for reducing coalition-caused CIVCAS incidents and improving the coalition’s response to those incidents. Issues addressed in these products include challenges in positive identification, capturing CIVCAS battle damage assessments, improving escalation-of-force incidents, exercising tactical patience, moving toward special operations–conventional force collaboration, and conducting the battle for the narrative. This study is classified.

This study identifies and documents challenges associated with Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan’s (CSTC-A’s) organizing, training, and equipping of the Afghan National Police (ANP) forces and captures lessons learned associated with transitioning security responsibilities from coalition forces to the Government of Afghanistan during a counterinsurgency. Starting in April 2005, CSTC-A was tasked to organize, train, and equip the ANP forces. CSTC-A’s mission supports security sector reform of Afghanistan, to counter internal and external threats and ultimately ensure the long-term success of the Afghan government. This study is classified.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan (2006)
In October 2005, a team from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, and JCOA assessed provincial reconstruction team (PRT) operations in Afghanistan as part of an effort to distill best practices. The goals of the assessment were to (1) generate lessons to inform greater cooperation and coordination among various US government departments and agencies in conflict and post-conflict settings, (2) determine key lessons to inform the transition of PRTs to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and (3) analyze the PRT concept and various implementation approaches to determine their applicability to other current and future US peace and stability operations. This study is unclassified.

IRAQ

Iraq Information Activities (I2A) (2009)
JCOA identified lessons from the planning and execution of various information activities in Iraq from April 2008 to June 2009. JCOA learned that when commanders discussed information operations (IO), they referred to an activity beyond the five IO capabilities defined in joint doctrine (military deception, operations security, psychological operations, computer network operations, and electronic warfare). They were talking instead about the integrated employment of these core
IO capabilities, in concert with supporting and related capabilities including public affairs and defense support to public diplomacy, under the larger strategic communication umbrella. Our study, which used this broader concept of IO, focused on four key areas: the recognition of IO as “commanders’ business” used to convey his intent through a purposeful set of ideas and actions intended to both influence and inform; the unity of effort required to synthesize IO policy, doctrine, and the realities on the ground; the operational principles of IO that emerged over time; and the practical and methodological challenges that made assessment of IO difficult. In summary, JCOA observed a growing understanding and appreciation for the decisive role that information and influence played in the Iraqi operational environment, where commanders identified IO as “the most important issue facing the warfighter today.” We propose that the concept of the “battle for the narrative,” which characterizes today’s information activities in Iraq and elsewhere, could provide the framework to align, coordinate, integrate, employ, and organize lethal and nonlethal capabilities for counterinsurgencies and other types of warfare. This study is classified.


In April 2008, at the request of the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) Chief of Staff, the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication undertook a data collection effort to document MNF-I strategic communication best practices and their doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) implications. That effort culminated in a brief that was disseminated to appropriate customers within the Department of Defense. JCOA reviewed the brief and felt that the recent successes in MNF-I strategic communication needed to be further documented and shared with other combatant commands and joint task forces. This JCOA paper therefore builds upon the foundation laid by the USJFCOM Deputy Director for Strategic Communication and presents a further look at the key elements of this good-news story. This study is unclassified.

**A Comprehensive Approach: Iraq Case Study (2009)**

GEN David Petraeus requested that JCOA capture successes in the coalition’s integrated counterinsurgency efforts against Al Qaeda in Iraq during 2007–2008 (“Anaconda Strategy”). GEN Ray Odierno and AMB Ryan Crocker added that the study should empha-size civil-military cooperation from strategic to tactical levels. This study focused on four main themes: unifying efforts, attacking insurgent networks, separating the population from the insurgents, and building Government of Iraq capabilities. The study began in September 2008 and continued into 2009. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

**Joint Tactical Environment (2008)**

The Joint Tactical Environment (JTE) study originated from a request by Multi-National Force–Iraq to USJFCOM to document the innovation in Iraq between air-weapons teams and unmanned aerial vehicles during operations in Sadr City. That task expanded to include other urban areas in Iraq and the critical command and control and airspace operations in those urban environments. Ultimately, the JTE mission documented innovation and best practices involving the integration of joint capabilities in urban operations. Specifically, the study was tasked to address four main pillars: command and control; fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and airspace from the joint perspective in an effort to better understand how units in environments such as Sadr City, Basrah, Mosul, and others employed joint or nonorganic capabilities for their specific operational environment. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

**Counterinsurgency Targeting and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (2008)**

Multinational Force–Iraq requested this study to capture, document, and validate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) best practices and lessons to improve ISR employment in support of counterinsurgency (COIN) targeting in Iraq. JCOA collected data from almost all brigades, some battalions, and selected companies, in addition to higher-echelon headquarters. Team members observed operations, conducted interviews, and collected data to document best practices important to success or failure in COIN targeting. While conducting this study, it became clear that ISR support to COIN targeting had to be understood in relation to ISR support to the broader spectrum of COIN missions. This study is classified.

**Counterinsurgency Operations (2007)**

The counterinsurgency (COIN) study examines the shift in focus from reconstruction operations in 2003 to COIN operations (supported by a “surge” of US troops) in 2007. It focuses on the following areas: (1) evolution of US coalition strategy in Iraq, (2) elements of the latest strategy, and (3) impact of implementation.
This is the story of Task Force Freedom and how teamwork between those conducting operations and those providing intelligence led to success. Task Force Freedom adapted to a severely degraded security situation by developing a streamlined targeting cycle, lowering the threshold of actionable intelligence, and enabling distributed execution—underpinned by shared awareness and purpose. This study is classified.

Emerging Solutions: Al Anbar Best Practice Study (2007)
This study examines how Al Anbar changed dramatically between fall 2006 and spring 2007, from one of the most violent, anti-coalition insurgent strongholds to one in which local tribal leaders partnered with coalition forces in an effort to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Violence dropped significantly, reconstruction projects began, the economy resurfaced, and normalcy returned. This study is classified.

Transition to Sovereignty (2007)
This study examines Operation Iraqi Freedom from June 2004 to December 2005. This period began when the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred sovereignty to the newly elected Iraq government. During this time frame, the insurgency gained momentum, as it became apparent that the capabilities of other elements of US government could not be brought to bear on the situation because of the deteriorating security situation. This study is classified.

The Joint Staff and JCOA collected lessons during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Each evaluated stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations from the end of joint combined combat operations in May 2003 until the transition to Iraqi sovereignty on 28 June 2004. This study combines the two efforts to allow the reader to review them in a single document, if desired. This study is classified.

Joint Health Service Operations (2005)
The Department of Defense (DOD) medical community has had great success in the treatment of combat casualties in Iraq. Combat mortality, defined as a measurement of the percentage of all battle casualties that result in death (Killed in Action + Died of Wounds/Total Battle Casualties), is the lowest level in recorded warfare. Despite the success in the reduction of combat mortality among coalition combat casualties, DOD medical treatment facilities still face many difficult challenges. This study is classified.

Synchronizing Counter-IED Efforts in Iraq (2005)
This study examines the challenges of synchronizing and coordination the activities of multiple entities working to counter adversaries’ use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This study is classified.

This study compiles operational insights gathered during major combat operations and assesses their impact on future joint warfighting at the operational level. It catalogs important findings, puts those findings in context, and outlines the nature of the actions needed to address them. This study is classified.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

In May 2009, the Sri Lankan military concluded a three-year sustained offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), completely overwhelming the Tamil Tiger organization and killing its leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran. In the wake of this military victory, the Government of Sri Lanka announced its final triumph over Sri Lanka’s Tamil insurgency following twenty-six years of bloody civil war and centuries of ethnic conflict between Sri Lanka’s Buddhist Sinhalese majority and its Hindu Tamil minority. Sri Lanka’s self-proclaimed triumph over the LTTE has left some in the international community wondering whether the Sri Lankan approach represents a viable, aggressive alternative to less confrontational methods of resolving ethno-religious insurgencies. This study examines the approaches of Sri Lanka and the LTTE in executing their respective counterinsurgent and insurgent campaigns, and presents conclusions and implications applicable to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. This study is classified.

In 2006 the world watched as Israel responded to the 12 July killing of three Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
soldiers and the kidnapping of two additional IDF soldiers by fighters of the Islamic Resistance, the military arm of Hizballah. Over the course of the next month, Israel struggled to use military force and diplomacy to achieve the goals set out by Prime Minister Olmert. When Israel did not achieve these goals through an aggressive air campaign and subsequent ground invasion of southern Lebanon, many observers began to question Israel’s military capabilities. As one officer stated, “Israel has defeated larger Arab armies repeatedly since its creation in 1948. The IDF enjoyed a reputation of invincibility among its Arab neighbors, until last year.” What happened? Why? And what are the implications for future conflicts? Many institutions, government agencies, and military services have studied the 2nd Lebanon War. None, however, have reported all the major findings in one holistic account. Using those previous studies as primary data sources, this JCOA study seeks to identify, synthesize, and present the lessons learned about the hybrid threat that seemed to emerge in the 2nd Lebanon War. This study is classified.

**Super Empowered Threat (2008)**
A follow-on to the JCOA Techno-Guerrilla (TG) and National Response to Biological Contagion (NRBC), Super-Empowered Threat (SET) examines the development of modern terrorist groups and the changes in the asymmetric threat. Work in TG and NRBC demonstrated the exponential increase in the operational and destructive capabilities of small terrorist groups. The threat continues to evolve. Alliances between state sponsors, terrorists groups, organized crime, and transnational gangs are expanding. Terrorists groups are becoming more sophisticated in their use of commercially available electronic and modern telecommunications networks. Their influence is spreading across the globe while our focus is on the Middle East. The study evaluates the emerging terrorist threat using a law enforcement model analyzing behavioral resolve, operational practicality, and technical feasibility. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

**Georgia-Russia Conflict (2008)**
This study, tasked by the Joint Staff and conducted in coordination with EUCOM and several USG agencies, examines the summer 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict in terms of background, conduct of the conflict, and the resulting regional/strategic implications. The analysis highlights direct military action in conventional approaches that at the same time used irregular approaches which shaped this conflict for well over a decade. The study offers an opportunity to see the strengths and weaknesses of a re-emergent Russia, as well as the impact of the evolving nature of hybrid warfare with its impact on policy, plans, and preparations for future conflict. This study is classified.

This study explores the evolution of asymmetric warfare and terrorism. The Techno-Guerrilla is an asymmetric force with conventional techniques and capabilities that utilizes open source warfare (“Wiki Warfare”) and systems disruption, as it seeks to create a transnational insurgency. The study examines the phenomenon of super-empowerment—which is defined as the point at which a small group of individuals can create social-network disruption to an entire society with global effect, aka the 9/11 Effect. This study includes both classified and unclassified products.

**Historic Analysis of Lessons Learned from Modern Irregular Warfare (2005)**
This study provides an executive-level lessons learned overview of modern irregular warfare operations. It focuses on the nature of insurgencies and countering insurgencies, while recognizing that terrorism and intimidation are popular tools for insurgents. This study is unclassified.

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/ DISASTER RELIEF**

**International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (2007)**
This study analyzes four major humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) events: the Haiti peacekeeping mission (2004), the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), the Pakistan earthquake (2005), and the Guatemala mudslides (2005). Analysis of these events revealed a number of common enabling capabilities that were critical for success in a HADR response. This study is unclassified.

**Guatemala Disaster Relief: US Response to Hurricane Stan (2006)**
In October 2005, a team of JCOA observers, in conjunction with US Southern Command, conducted a study of Joint Task Force–Bravo’s quick response in the initial phase of helping the Guatemalan government deal with the devastation caused by Hurricane Stan. This study is unclassified.
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief in Pakistan (2006)
In October 2005, a devastating earthquake caused widespread destruction in northern Pakistan and adjacent areas. In response, US Central Command designated Expeditionary Support Group One as the Combined Disaster Assistance Command—Pakistan to assist the Pakistani government in recovery efforts. A team from JCOA observed and detailed the effectiveness of US forces in accomplishing the mission and strengthening the strategic ties that bind Pakistan and the United States in the Global War on Terror. This study is unclassified.

Operation Secure Tomorrow (Haiti) (2005)
This study focuses on issues that concerned US Southern Command, Combined Joint Task Force-Haiti, and their staffs as US-led multinational forces conducted a transition of military responsibility to the United Nations. The report describes these issues along with others developed through follow-on analyses of data and observations. It catalogs the team’s important findings, places those findings in context, and outlines the nature of the actions needed to address shortcomings. This study is classified.

OTHER PRODUCTS

Haiti Stabilization Initiative Case Study (2009)
Originating in response to a request from the US Ambassador to Haiti through United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the Haiti study’s purpose is to assess, document lessons learned, and capture best practices of the “comprehensive approach” implementation of the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI). The HSI was a pilot project designed to test and demonstrate a highly integrated civilian stabilization program, funded by DOD Section 1207, and designed and implemented by elements of the US State Department and USAID. The HSI effort focused on Cite Soleil, an area of metropolitan Port-au-Prince that was completely lost to Government of Haiti control until reclaimed by United Nations Stabilization Mission–Haiti (MINUSTAH) military operations at the beginning of 2007. The study provides insights into whether this approach supported both the USSOUTHCOM Theater Security Strategy and the US Embassy’s Mission Strategic Plans and has potential wider application in other stability operations. This study is unclassified.

Future biotechnology advancements will make it easier for a wide range of adversaries—including terrorist organizations—to launch a biological attack. This product studies biological incidents and examines USNORTHCOM’s role as the global synchronizer for pandemic influenza planning. The study goes beyond the example of Pandemic Influenza to inform decision makers and planners to help mitigate the effects of pandemic or similar biological threats. It identifies gaps and shortfalls in DOD’s participation in the nation’s preparation and response to a significant pandemic. This study is unclassified.

The report and briefing focus on the national response to Hurricane Katrina by local, state, and federal agencies during the month between the storm’s formation in the Atlantic Ocean and the post-hurricane stabilization of conditions in the Gulf Coast region. The report concentrates on response—as opposed to disaster mitigation or recovery—because the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in coping with domestic disasters lies primarily in providing civil authorities with response capabilities, not in providing assets for long-term recovery. This study is unclassified.

Today’s operations require that military forces work with interagency, nongovernmental, and multinational partners as part of a comprehensive approach. This report summarizes the findings and recommendations from the United States Joint Forces Command 2009 Lessons Learned Conference, hosted by JCOA, held on 17–20 March 2009 in Newport News, Virginia. The conference welcomed participants from the United States and eight partner nations, and its working groups were divided into four focus areas derived from the US National Defense Strategy: Joint Warfighting,
Joint Adaptation to Irregular Warfare, Theater Security Cooperation, and Homeland Defense. This study is unclassified.

This brief compares the purposes, approaches, and results of the 9-11 Commission Report to JCOA observations. This study is classified.

Kosovo (2004)
This is a combined study by NATO JALLC and USJFCOM Joint Center for Lessons Learned on operations in Kosovo and surrounding regions. This study is classified.

JCOA-SPONSORED PRODUCTS

Iraqi Perspectives Project

The Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) was a Secretary of Defense directed research project, sponsored by JCOA, and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP). This project examined the perspective of the former Iraqi regime’s civilian and military leadership on issues of interest to the US military, using information gathered through interviews and reviews of captured documents. The goal of this project was to determine how US operations were viewed and understood by the enemy. The following products emerged from this project:

Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (2008).

Events in this report on the ‘Mother of All Battles,’ as Saddam designated the 1991 war, are drawn from primary Iraqi sources, including government documents, videos, audiotapes, maps, and photographs captured by U.S. forces in 2003 from the regime’s archives and never intended for outsiders eyes. The report is part of a JCOA research project to examine contemporary warfare from the point of view of the adversary’s archives and senior leader interviews. Its purpose is to stimulate thoughtful analyses of currently accepted lessons of the first Gulf War. While not a comprehensive history, this balanced Iraqi perspective of events between 1990 and 1991 takes full advantage of unique access to material. This product is unclassified.

Saddam and the Tribes: Regime Adaptation to Internal Challenges (2007).
This study explores the complex relationship between Saddam’s regime and the tribes that lived under it between 1979 and 2003. This product explores the dynamics between tribe and state in dictatorial societies, and the ways in which tribal leadership can impact success or failure of central governance. This product is unclassified.

This study uses captured former regime documents to examine the links and motivations behind Saddam Hussein’s interactions with regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. This product is classified.

This book presents a historical analysis of the forces and motivation that drove our opponent’s decisions during Phase III (Mar03-May03) of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders, and by making extensive use of thousands of official Iraqi documents, it substantively examines Saddam Hussein’s leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process, revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from the insiders’ points of view. This product is unclassified.

This report is the classified report associated with the Iraqi Perspectives Project Book. In addition to providing the Iraqi view of combat operations from early preparation through the collapse of the regime during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, it also presents the Iraqi understanding of our capabilities and their efforts to exploit that understanding. A classified briefing and audio narrative slide show version is also available for this product. This product is classified.

Terrorist Perspectives Project

The Terrorist Perspective Project (TPP) examines the perspectives of the members of Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups which share its theology and world
view, on issues of interest to the US military, using primary source information principally gathered through open source and captured enemy documents. The goal of the project was to better “know the enemy” and to develop insights into enemy weaknesses and potential “Blue” strategies.

**The Call to Global Islamic Jihad: The Jihad Manifesto (2008).**
US intelligence has identified Abu Musab Al-Suri as the most important theorist of the global Islamic jihad, and considers his manifesto to be the definitive strategic document produced by al Qaida or any jihadi organization in more than a decade. But to Americans, his 1600-page manuscript largely consists of incomprehensible, impenetrable Islamic scholarship. This publication is a distillation of Al-Suri’s Call to Global Islamic Resistance. This product is unclassified.

**The Terrorist Perspective Project: Strategic and Operational Views of al Qaida and Associated Movements (2008).**
This book synthesizes the perspectives of Osama bin Laden and his fellow Salafi jihadists on how to wage war on their enemies. This product is unclassified.

**The Canons of Jihad: A Terrorists’ Perspective of Warfare and Defeating America (2008).**
Noting that the best way to understand Salafi jihadists is to ignore statements they release to the West in favor of examining what they say to each other, this book provides a definitive collection of the writings that intellectually underpin the jihadi movement. This product is unclassified.

**Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements: Phase 1 (2007).**
This project approaches Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) as a movement rather than as a network, and tries to understand whether and in what ways its members think above the tactical level. Drawing on the enemy’s own words both from open source materials and captured documents, it identifies seams and subjects of concern within the AQAM community. It explores the dichotomy between those members of AQAM who think instrumentally about their war and those who do not, and discuss topics such as the evolution of the enemy’s political and military thought, enemy assessments of the United States, their comparative views of their media and our media, and their concerns about attracting people to the movement. This product is unclassified.

**Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements Phase 2 (2007).**
This study draws upon words of AQAM found in captured documents and open-source pronouncements to describe a revolutionary movement which does not think of itself as a network. Intellectual leaders of AQAM are very concerned about the status of this movement, believing that the uncoordinated actions of its members repel the very Muslims that they need to attract. They are also concerned that they are losing the war of ideas and are isolated in an overwhelming hostile media environment. In response, the movement’s intellectual leadership engages in a vigorous process of analysis, self-criticism and adaptation. Unfortunately for them, their ability to implement their adaptive policies is imperfect. This product is classified.

**Voices of the Enemy Quotations from Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) (2007).**
AQAM have been living in a state of war for more than four decades. Salafi jihadist leaders have developed a powerful narrative of history that appeals to and mobilizes their membership, though this narrative is based on questionable historical interpretations and future assumptions. Their strategists have learned that they will need to have a sound strategy and leaders who will ensure that such strategy is followed. The IDA study team used the enemy’s own words from more than 250,000 documents from open and classified sources, including documents captured during OEF and OIF, to illustrate the enemy message for the reader. This product is unclassified.

**Other Sponsored Products**

This paper was prepared under the task order Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP), subtask Global War on Terrorism—Africa, for the USJFCOM. It helps address two objectives: (1) identify lessons from interagency efforts in the Horn of Africa; and (2) explore national security challenges and interagency collaboration processes and their results. This product is unclassified.
The Technical Cooperation Programme - a cooperative venture between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States - Joint Systems and Analysis Group established Action Group 13 on Fratricide Mitigation with an objective, among others, of collaborative sharing of records, analyses and findings on friendly fire and fratricide. This report presents the results of an event-by-event collaborative comparison of friendly fire records between the UK and the US, covering three recent Coalition warfighting operations: Operation Desert Storm/Granby, Operation Enduring Freedom/Herrick, and Operation Iraqi Freedom/Telic. This product is unclassified.

The study characterizes the OIF communications architecture and bandwidth used by USCENTCOM in theatre, including: joint command centers; service component operational and tactical centers; and the last tactical mile, including global reach back. The study covered Joint Combined Combat Operations. It expresses bandwidths in terms of allocated data rate equivalent capacity and performance based on actual usage derived from historical logs. This product is classified.

Requests for Information

Requests for information can be sent to jcoa.ed@jfcom.mil or jcoa.ed@hq.jfcom.smil.mil

NATO personnel may send requests for information to jcoa.ed@usa.bices.org.

We will respond to your request as soon as possible. Please indicate the type of information you require and the context of how the information will be used. If there is an urgent time requirement, please include that information as well.

Websites

NIPRNET
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