The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) has played a major role in stability operations and the accomplishment of strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. The program has yielded thousands of successful projects funded by billions of appropriated dollars. However, congressional concerns over the efficiency and effectiveness of the program threaten the availability of this popular program for the next stability operation. The CERP’s shortfalls include a lack of internal and external DOD coordination, unity of effort, clearly established objectives and measures of effectiveness. This paper analyzes the lessons learned over the past seven years and the efforts made to establish a common U.S. Government agency framework for conducting stability operations. It concludes that an operational art approach to applying the CERP will help the Joint Force Commander achieve the desired end state with the least amount of risk and cost.
“Operational Art and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program”

A paper submitted to the Provost, Naval War College, for retention in the NWC library and in the DTIC database. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

8 June 2010
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ABSTRACT

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) has played a major role in stability operations and the accomplishment of strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. The program has yielded thousands of successful projects funded by billions of appropriated dollars. However, congressional concerns over the efficiency and effectiveness of the program threaten the availability of this popular program for the next stability operation. The CERP’s shortfalls include a lack of internal and external DOD coordination, unity of effort, clearly established objectives and measures of effectiveness. This paper analyzes the lessons learned over the past seven years and the efforts made to establish a common U.S. Government agency framework for conducting stability operations. It concludes that an operational art approach to applying the CERP will help the Joint Force Commander achieve the desired end state with the least amount of risk and cost.
INTRODUCTION

Dr Milan Vego defines operational art as “a component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting and sustaining campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic or operational objectives in a given theater.”¹ Joint Publication 3-0 “Joint Operations,” identifies skill, knowledge, and experience as key components of the creative imagination leaders need to design strategies and major campaigns with operational art.² After seven years of major combat operations supported by the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the amount of experience, knowledge, and skills associated with stability operations have increased exponentially within the military and interagency. These lessons learned have led to numerous, significant improvements to doctrine, organizational structures and relationships, and overall understandings of what works and what does not in a full spectrum operations environment.

Since its inception in 2003, CERP has contributed greatly to the improvement of the operational environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military leaders attribute many of the successes in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) to the CERP. However, there are members of Congress in Washington D.C. that believe the CERP has not always been responsible for the most effective or efficient use of appropriated dollars in the GWOT. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how an operational art approach to applying the CERP will help the Joint Force Commander achieve the desired end state with the least amount of risk and cost.

This paper will discuss the problems documented with the CERP over the past seven years, the actions that have been taken to increase the effectiveness of stability operations and the

gaps that remain. It will then present recommendations on how to apply these lessons to the 
CERP in order to address the balance of Congressional concerns. These concerns stem from 
numerous audit and investigation findings that cite a lack of unity of effort, clear objectives, and 
measures of effectiveness. Measures of effectiveness should be “used to assess changes in 
system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment 
of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.”

**BACKGROUND**

The Department of Defense (DOD) created the Commanders’ Emergency Response 
Program due to the emergence of two extraordinary problems: the dissipation of Iraqi 
governance following the U.S. invasion in 2003 and a need to do something with hundreds of 
millions of dollars worth of Saddam Hussein’s cash stashes.\(^4\) With legal support, the simple 
solution was to authorize the expenditure of seized regime cash in support of a “Brigade 
Commander’s Discretionary Recovery Program to directly benefit the Iraqi People.”\(^5\) A 
fragmentary order (FRAGO) approved this program on May 7, 2003; however, the 
“Commander’s Emergency Response Program” superseded it shortly thereafter.\(^6\)

Combined Joint Task Force-7 released FRAGO 89 on June 19, 2003 to establish 
guidance and rules for executing the program.\(^7\) Between June and October, over $78 million was 
spent on more than 11,000 projects exhausting nearly all of the seized funds.\(^8\) An appeal was 
made to Congress for appropriated dollars to continue the CERP based on the successful use of

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\(^3\) U.S. Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 3-07 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the 
Army, 6 October 2008), 4-13.

\(^4\) Mark S. Martins, ”The Commander’s Emergency Response Program, ” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 37 (2\(^{nd}\) 
Quarter 2005): 47.

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Ibid.

\(^8\) Ibid, 48.
seized funds when they were nearly exhausted. By November, Congress approved $180 million for the CERP to be used in both Iraq and Afghanistan in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 requiring only that quarterly reports be submitted to Congressional defense committees listing monies spent on each project and CERP project category. The FY 2011 budget request includes $1.3 billion for the CERP. Since FY 2004, a total of $7.6 billion has been appropriated for CERP.

The program established commanders as approving officials with varying levels of authority ranging from $50K at the battalion level to $500K at the division level. Higher approval levels were established facilitating projects costing millions of dollars that created skepticism as to whether the original congressional intent of the program was being retained. Maneuver units, special operations forces, and provincial reconstruction teams all execute CERP projects. Projects are executed by unit members called project purchasing officers (PPO) with the authority to contract for the acquisition of goods and services and paying agents who draw cash from the military finance office to pay for the goods and services ordered by their respective PPO. According to DOD regulation, “the CERP is designed to enable local commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility that will immediately assist the indigenous population.”

Categories of projects include water and sanitation, agriculture/irrigation, electricity, healthcare, education, telecommunications, transportation, rule of law and governance, and civic support among others. Additional categories subsequently added to the program include battle damage  

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9 Ibid., 49.
12 Ibid.
and condolence payments.\textsuperscript{14} The few restrictions that do exist primarily prevent the use of CERP funds to be spent on items provided for by other appropriations or programs. For instance, CERP funds cannot benefit U.S. or coalition forces, national armies or forces, weapons buy back programs, or rewards programs.\textsuperscript{15}

In March 2010, the Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, General David Petraeus requested the expansion of CERP authority to Pakistan in support of counterinsurgency efforts there.\textsuperscript{16} Despite repeated accolades and testimonies from military and civilian leadership regarding CERP’s contributions to the GWOT, Congress did not enthusiastically support the request.\textsuperscript{17} The U.S. is committed to rendering $7.5 billion in economic aid to Pakistan over five years, so it is not a question of funding availability.\textsuperscript{18} According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) senior fellow, “CERP continues to be disliked on the Hill” and “adored” by the military for its ease of execution.\textsuperscript{19} Congressional aides cite any number of high-profile perceived misuses of funds to support their position that CERP lacks the necessary oversight to justify continued support for the program.\textsuperscript{20}

Indeed, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states “dozens of reports and articles published during the past six years have sought to analyze, criticize, and recommend action regarding the progress of reconstruction aid.”\textsuperscript{21}

CERP is extremely popular for its ease of use and commanders consider it critical to the U.S.’ counterinsurgency strategy. Another CRS report cites the use of CERP to win popular

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 27-4.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 27-8.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Curt Tarnoff, Congressional Research Service, “Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance,” 12 March 2009, 30
support, a wide variety of reconstruction activities at the local level, and infrastructure efforts with few “bureaucratic encumbrances.” The CERP has contributed to improvements in the security situation “while at the same time meeting immediate neighborhood development needs” faster than other programs.

Arguably, most individual CERP projects represent individual tactical successes but the program is not without shortcomings. Documented shortcomings at the tactical level include decentralized project selection and execution, intentionally minimalist controls, great availability of resources that are sometimes in excess of capacity to execute them, and susceptibility to fraud, waste and abuse. At the operational level, the shortcomings of CERP and stability operations in general include a lack of unity of effort within DOD commands as well as between these commands and the interagency, the international community, and the host nation. There is also a lack of clearly defined objectives and effectiveness metrics. The USG has documented each of these shortcomings in formal audits and reports.

CERP projects are executed by combat units and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) sometimes suffer from a lack of coordination between DOD commanders. The CERP is a flexible tool meant originally to address security concerns. Therefore, “it often was used on an ad hoc basis by military commanders to meet immediate short-term stabilization needs.” It has also been used to fund major million-dollar development projects. In retrospect, policy developers have identified several recurring tradeoffs with respect to how commanders approve and execute CERP projects. These tradeoffs include the following:

1. “Stability vs. host nation legitimacy: refers to the trade-off between the urgent need for international actors to secure the peace and the possibility that these actions are not seen by the

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22 Ibid., 24.
23 Ibid.
host nation population as connected to their local leaders or government and do not build the legitimacy or capacity of the host nation.

2. Expediency vs. sustainability: refers to short-term actions that show a peace dividend and signal that violent conflict is over, but are not sustainable by the host nation over time.

3. Meeting needs vs. building capacity: refers to the quandary faced by international actors—governmental and nongovernmental—when it is easier to fulfill needs directly than to build host nation capacity to deliver critical assistance.\(^\text{25}\)

These tradeoffs help to explain the diverse nature of projects selected for CERP funding. An infantry battalion commander in Afghanistan is likely to utilize CERP to establish stability, expediency, and basic needs in his area of operations whereas a PRT commander may utilize CERP in support of a development plan that increases host nation legitimacy and building capacity while focusing on sustainability.

On October 18, 2007, Mr. Stuart Bowen, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, testified before the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on the subject of PRT effectiveness in Iraq. He stated that they “found frequent instances in which the military’s use of CERP to perform tasks that properly belong to local and provincial governments conflicted with the PRT Program’s capacity-development mission.”\(^\text{26}\) In other words, combat commanders were approving projects that conflicted with PRT CERP projects in the same geographic area undermining their unity of effort as a result of unsynchronized lines of operation, objectives, and priorities.

Experts also documented shortcomings in the coordination of DOD CERP projects with the efforts of other USG agencies, the international community, and the host nations of Afghanistan and Iraq. CRS reports inform lawmakers “CERP has been criticized for not being


\(^{26}\) Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., “Testimony,” House. “Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, October 18, 2007, 5
part of a larger development strategy and not being synchronized with civilian assistance program plans.”

In a presentation at the 2010 PRT Conference in Afghanistan, Mr. Mark Ward, Special Advisor on Development to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, who is responsible for the coordination of donations and stability operations efforts amongst the international community, criticized U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) PRTs for pursuing small projects to provide services to the Afghan people that the Afghan authorities can and should provide. He acknowledged that between four and five years ago, “PRTs were the only game in town,” and during that period, there were no Afghan government bodies with any capacity, so there were no problems with these types of projects being done. He urged PRTs to target larger, longer-term projects that the Afghan authorities do not have the capacity to perform and to provide funding to the Afghan government in support of enabling host nation civil authority.

One of the most documented problems with the CERP and stability operations is the lack of clearly defined objectives and performance metrics. The 2008 CRS report entitled “Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance,” addresses the challenges of achieving clear program objectives in Iraq due to the large number of programs and implementing organizations: various assistance programs “are implemented by different agencies, with different funding sources, and different authorities, raising concerns regarding coordination of program coherence. Among other criticisms of PRTs are that they lack clear lines of authority, agreed missions, and measurable objectives.”

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28 Mark Ward, Special Advisor on Development to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan, UNAMA, (address, ISAF Joint Command 2010 PRT Conference, Afghanistan, 17 February 2010).
A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report dated June 23, 2008 asserted that leaders at the Multi-National Command-Iraq (MNC-I) level and above had “only limited oversight” of approximately 97% of projects worth $507 million in Iraq; that CERP personnel lacked capacity to manage and oversee contractor performance properly; and that there were no performance metrics. The report further stated, “Federal agencies should develop plans that establish objective, quantifiable, and measurable performance goals that should be achieved by a program.” According to the GAO, these metrics could be quantifiable or qualitative. In lieu of formal metrics, the GAO found that commanders usually established informal means of assessment and anecdotal information to assess CERP projects. The GAO, however, asserts “without performance measures or indicators, MNC-I and DOD do not have the necessary data to assess the results or outcomes of the CERP projects, and therefore lack information that would be useful in evaluating and validating commanders’ requests for CERP funding needs.”

Mr. Stuart Bowen, while testifying again before Congress in February 2010 about stability operations, stated: “reforms are necessary to prevent future waste.” He believes that DOD wasted $4 billion out of a total of $51 billion spent in Iraq on reconstruction since 2003. According to Bowen, weak planning, repeated shifts in program direction, poor management oversight, incomplete outcomes, and an inadequate asset transfer process contributed to the waste. He acknowledged that evaluating stability operations outcomes and effects is not easy but that stability operations “must move beyond the measurement of inputs, processes, and outputs

31 Ibid., 5.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 6.
(such as funds expended, laws passed, and Soldiers trained) to the assessment of outcomes and effects on strategic objectives (such as security, governance, and economic development).”

In summary, these reports demonstrate the imperfections associated with the military’s use of CERP and participation in stability operations in the recent past. They also point to the opportunity to improve the DOD’s operational art approach to CERP in a manner that can increase the unity of effort and synchronization across all phases of operations to achieve synergy with the rest of the stability operations community. The DOD’s operational art approach to CERP will facilitate the achievement of desired end states in this region and better prepare the USG’s capacity to respond to the next theater of operations. Fortunately, many of these faults have already been captured as lessons learned and incorporated into a number of strategic and operational level improvements to the way the USG conducts stability operations.

ANALYSIS

Significant progress has been made at all levels of operation since the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) to improve effectiveness and efficiencies as experience and knowledge bases increased. These actions include the issuance of presidential security directives establishing roles and responsibilities between departments, the creation of organizations, the establishment of stability operations key tasks and desired end states common to both Department of State (DOS) and DOD, and a common framework for measuring performance.

On December 7, 2005, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) establishing the Secretary of State as the lead for stabilization and reconstruction activities. NSPD-44 also authorized the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for

35 Ibid., 2.
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to coordinate State’s whole of government approach.\textsuperscript{36} The DOD in turn published DOD Directive 3000.5 implementing the President’s policy. DODD 3000.5 established stability operations as a core military mission with the same priority as combat operations. It acknowledged that many stability tasks are “best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”\textsuperscript{37} These decisions at the most senior levels of leadership clearly establish the DOS as lead in stability operations. They also establish the requirement for the military to train for and support stability operations on par with offensive and defensive operations.

Three organizations created since 9-11 that support stability operations includes the S/CRS, the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG). As previously mentioned, the NSPD-44 authorized the S/CRS to carry out Department of State’s new tasking.\textsuperscript{38} According to its website, the mission of the S/CRS is “to lead, coordinate and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”\textsuperscript{39}

The Army established the PKSOI at Carlisle Barracks to "serve as the U.S. military's premier Center of Excellence for mastering stability and peace operations at the strategic and

\textsuperscript{38} NSPD-44, 2.
operational levels in order to improve military, civilian agency, international, and multinational capabilities and execution.\textsuperscript{40} This organization has already worked extensively to establish a common framework for stability operations with DOS.

Of the many USG organizations designed to facilitate planning, only the JIACG works directly for the geographic combatant commander (GCC). According to the JFCOM website, JIACGs were created to facilitate coordination between the GCC and civilian agencies of the USG. “It supports day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters and advises planners regarding civilian agency operations, capabilities, and limitations. It also provides perspective in the coordinated use of national power.”\textsuperscript{41} Standing JIACGs in the COCOM enable DOD and DOS planners to collectively develop operational campaign plans to focus DOD and DOS efforts towards common lines of operation (LOO) and end states. Lines of operation are used to synchronize activities related in time and purpose “through a series of military strategic and operational objectives to attain the military end state.”\textsuperscript{42}

The Army published Field Manual (FM) 3-07 “Stability Operations” in October 2008. It provides “overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations” and it provides an explanation of the primary stability tasks, sectors, and end state conditions shared by the DOD and DOS for stability operations.\textsuperscript{43} These common definitions contribute significantly to the common framework needed to generate unity of effort between the military and interagency. This integrated approach to stability operations framework is found in JP 3-07 “Stability Operations” and is depicted below.

\textsuperscript{42} Joint Publication 3-0, IV-13.
\textsuperscript{43} U.S. Army, Stability Operations, Field Manual (FM) 3-07 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 6 October 2008), iv.
Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction was developed by the PKSOI and U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP). This document was recently released in November 2009. It is not “doctrine” but intended to provide U.S. civilian stability operations agencies with a document akin to FM 3-07. According to the USIP website, Guiding Principles provides “two important contributions: 1) a comprehensive set of shared principles and 2) a shared strategic framework.” Guiding Principles shares the same stability tasks and end states as JP 3-07 presented above.

The Reconstruction and Stabilization Essential Task Matrix can be found on the S/CRS website. It builds on the “Joint CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework” from Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, edited by Robert C. Orr, and published by CSIS Press in 2004. The matrix also follows the same five

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45 Ibid.
stability tasks and end states shared by DOD and DOS. It provides subtasks under each stability task for each of the following three conception phases: Initial Response (short-term), Transformation (mid-term), and Fostering Sustainability (long-term). This provides a menu of options for a Soldier or DOS officer to draw upon when identifying and prioritizing projects to complement designated lines of operation and end states in a stability operations environment.47

The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) is a “working” document recently published in March 2008 that can be found on the CSIS website. Its intent is to “establish a system of metrics that will assist in formulating policy and implementing strategic plans to transform conflict and bring stability to war-torn societies. These metrics provide both a baseline assessment tool for policymakers to diagnose potential obstacles to stabilization prior to an intervention and an instrument for practitioners to track progress from the point of intervention through stabilization and ultimately to a self-sustaining peace.”48 The MPICE follows the same five Lines of operation but also identifies drivers of conflict that require mitigation and outcome-based measures designed to strengthen institutional performance.49 This tool provides the practitioner on the ground with a means for assessing the operational environment as well as his or her own progress towards a desired end state.

These strategic improvements collectively create a common framework for stability operations that did not exist when CERP was first introduced. This framework is formally known as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework or “ICAF.”50 The ICAF enables

47 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
military and civilian agencies to embark upon common lines of stability and reconstruction operations through the full-spectrum of operations. In peacetime, the JIACG coordinates and supports the GCC’s Theater Campaign Plan during the shape and deter phases of full spectrum operations. Initial response activity planning begins when security conditions deteriorate, and it is necessary to seize the initiative and dominate. Access during this phase will likely be limited to military personnel who must conduct assessments and provide for immediate humanitarian assistance and reconstruction requirements. During these phases, the JIACG can work with the GCC to develop stability operations priorities from the S/CRS task list based on these assessments. They can also select appropriate measures of effectiveness from the MPICE to evaluate outcomes of the commander’s stability operations campaign. Because the JIACG develops this stability operations framework jointly with the interagency from common documents, other USG agencies can resume the same LOO towards jointly agreed upon end states as security conditions improve in the transformational phase of stability operations. During phase three of stability operations, activities that improve sustainability are conducted to enable the civil authority. In conclusion, when the DOD is able to plan and launch stability operations integrated with the DOS and other USG agencies, a superior level of unity of effort and synergy is possible. This results in the greatest probability for achieving USG strategic objectives in the least amount of time with the least amount of resources and risk.

There are some who would suggest that the CERP is a commander’s program and that the commander has sovereign authority to identify, prioritize, approve, and execute projects in his area of operations (AOR) without regard to campaign plans or development strategies. Such a position would be strongly supported by the literal text of documents governing the CERP since its inception in FY 2004. Supporters of this position would argue that the tactical commander on
the ground knows the conditions in his AOR the best and has the greatest fidelity with regards to local stability and reconstruction requirements. He might also argue that he is responsible for the lives of his Soldiers on the ground and the overall operational environment and therefore must have maximum flexibility to utilize all resources, kinetic and non-kinetic, as he conducts stability operations simultaneously with offensive and defensive combat operations.

This counterargument marginalizes the importance of the operational level of war, operational campaigns, and operational art. According to FM 3-0, “The operational level [of war] links employing tactical forces to achieving the strategic end state. At the operational level, commanders conduct campaigns and major operations to establish conditions that define that end state.”

Few combat commanders would disagree that offensive and defensive combat operations are nested in operational campaigns. In this respect, there is no difference between combat and stability operations.

FM 3-0 also emphasizes the importance of operational art: “Without it, tactical actions devolve into a series of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success. Through operational art, commanders translate their concept of operations into an operational design and ultimately into tactical tasks. They do this by integrating ends, ways, and means and envisioning dynamic combinations of the elements of full-spectrum operations across the levels of war. They then apply operational art to array forces and maneuver them to achieve the desired end state.”

Dr Milan Vego also emphasizes operational art and the need for a

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52 Ibid.
strong linkage between strategy and tactics. He states that without them, “no favorable strategic results can be achieved quickly or decisively.”

Past experience with stability operations demonstrate the importance of tactical level understanding and adherence to operational level campaigns consisting of clear Lines of operation and end states for the most efficient and effective employment of fiscal, military, and non-military resources. Selection of CERP projects without regard to these campaign plans may result in limited successes but are unlikely to result in the advancement of strategic objectives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Two recommendations for improving stability operations are presented in the next section. The first of these recommendations focuses on “operationalizing” the improvements developed from lessons learned over the past seven years. The second recommendation provides guidance for the implementation of stability operations metrics in Afghanistan.

Operationalization

Most of the improvements mentioned in this paper were published in the last five years. Some were released in the last five months. Consequently, a considerable number of personnel involved in stability operations, or about to become involved may not be familiar with them. Therefore, the first recommendation is to continue to “operationalize” these strategic and operational level initiatives across all levels of operations to include the tactical level. Soldiers redeploying to Afghanistan with CERP experience are likely to rely on these experiences during their upcoming deployment. This might entail associating stability operations success with inputs such as projects started, schools built, and money spent; and not outcomes. Effective methods for implementing organizational change must be employed to change these behaviors.

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Successful implementation of the ICAF will require leadership, education and training at all levels as well as changes to incentives systems. Leadership must implement change management methods to overcome tendencies that prevent institutions from taking effective corrective actions to include “the reluctance to change preferred ways of functioning, and when faced with [a] lack of results, to do more of the same.”

Social psychologist Kurt Lewin provides a three-stage model for planned change. The first stage, unfreezing, focuses on creating motivation to change and creating dissatisfaction with the status quo. He cites benchmarking as a technique to accomplish this task. Benchmarking might include comparing DOD’s stability operations performance against high-performers such as USAID or the British military for example. The second stage, changing, involves learning through “providing employees with new information, new behavioral models, and new ways of looking at things.” Military learning should include training units preparing to conduct stability operations and education to develop stability operations professionals. The final stage, refreezing, locks new behaviors into place through coaching, mentoring, and positive reinforcement. Positive reinforcement should place emphasis on outcomes vice inputs during battle update briefs and when writing performance evaluations.

Support of ISAF and the ANDP

The U.S. stability operations framework should be implemented during all future operations with two exceptions. The first exception is in the case whereby the U.S. is a

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56 Ibid., 396.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
participant in a larger coalition effort such as ISAF. The second is when the host nation has the
capacity to develop its own stability and reconstruction strategies and end states as in the case of
Afghanistan, which has developed their Afghan National Development Plan (ANDP). Because
the overall objective of stability operations is to eventually “return home” leaving a functioning
government in place, U.S. stability operations must yield to host nation stability planning and
governance as they acquire sufficient capacity to develop domestic stability tasks and end states.

ISAF recently developed an assessment and metrics approach in support of the ANDP
that the U.S., as a coalition member, should support. At the 2010 PRT Conference in
Afghanistan, ISAF introduced its operational district and provincial assessment process.59
According to their presentation slides, these assessments will be inclusive of all levels of
government from village to national and will include input from Afghan partners and the
international community. ISAF will conduct district level assessments that will focus on
governance, development, and security conditions while provincial level assessments will look at
the capacity of the provincial government to serve the Afghan people by delivering leadership,
planning, and resources.60

In the interest of unity of effort, the U.S. should support ISAF’s metrics and not
undermine them by adhering strictly to measures and end states contained in American doctrine.
ISAF’s metrics system should provide the type of measures of effectiveness requested by the
GAO and Congress.

CONCLUSION

The common stability operations framework and metric strategies discussed here carry
significant potential to address Congress’ concerns regarding the CERP. The DOD may acquire

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CERP authority for use in Pakistan from Congress in the near future. A senior congressional staffer suggested that GEN Petraeus’ Pakistan authority request be granted temporary approval until the ongoing CERP review is completed. Congressional extension of CERP authority to a new theater of operations provides the DOD with an opportunity to demonstrate a more sophisticated operational art approach to CERP based on lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Stability lines of operation and measures of effectiveness should be designed by the whole of government with an operational art approach. It is imperative that the interagency agree on strategic objectives, desired end states, and key tasks by phase that should be completed and by whom. Most importantly, they should establish common, well-defined, and quantitative measures of performance and effectiveness.

Execution of the CERP in Pakistan carries the potential to demonstrate its effectiveness towards achieving strategic goals. During project selection, commanders must balance stability with host nation legitimacy, expediency with sustainability, and meeting current needs with building capacity. Project selection should embrace Congress’ original intent for the CERP to fund urgent and small-scale humanitarian assistance and reconstruction projects. Commanders should resist the urge to leverage the CERP to fund large-scale projects more appropriate for other programs or for projects outside established lines of operation that do not support desired end states. Lastly, commanders must select the right outcomes to measure that will most accurately capture the obtainment of progress towards strategic objectives. Leaders must ensure that all CERP projects started in Pakistan have measures of effectiveness established during the project design phase. They must then allocate sufficient forces to capture effectiveness in accordance with the original plan. Quantitatively-sound assessments demonstrating the
efficiency and effectiveness of CERP resources towards the accomplishment of strategic objectives in Pakistan may be sufficient for Congress to preserve CERP authority as an annually funded, globally available program like the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program.

The CERP has played a major role in stability operations and the accomplishment of strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq. The program has yielded thousands of successful projects funded by billions of appropriated dollars. However, the types of problems that can be expected when there is a lack of controls to ensure interagency coordination, clearly established objectives and effective performance measures have also been documented. Military and interagency staff officers and leaders have captured, documented, and implemented lessons learned across all levels of operations. The Joint Force Commander can best achieve the desired end state with the least amount of risk and cost by incorporating these lessons learned and applying an operational art approach when using the CERP in support of stability operations. His success will be evidenced by improved coordination between organizations and across all phases of operations that will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of stability operations programs like the CERP. His implementation of effective and quantifiable measures of performance will also satisfy Congressional concerns regarding the program and preserve the CERP for use in future theaters of operations.


Ward, Mark, Special Advisor on Development to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan, UNAMA, (address, ISAF Joint Command 2010 PRT Conference, Afghanistan, 17 February 2010).
Websites

HQ ISAF Joint Command website, https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/PRTConference2010.aspx


Government Documents


Joint Publications, Field Manuals, and DOD Financial Management Regulations


