RADICALIZATION IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC CLIMATE
DISCOVERY WORKSHOP AT DRDC TORONTO
7-8 DECEMBER 2009

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ABSTRACT

The recent downturn in the global economy may exacerbate a number of potential threats to Canada’s well-being, including the possibility for increased radicalization and violent extremism. As such, the Adversarial Intent Section at Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto (DRDC Toronto) held a discovery workshop at their facilities on 7-8 December, 2009, in order to explore and discuss the implications of such an economic downturn for Canada’s security and social stability. The workshop was entitled, “Radicalization in the National Economic Climate.” Several academic, government, and industrial organizations participated in the two full days of activities, which included 11 presentations given by subject matter experts and two break-out group discussions. Two broad conclusions were largely shared by the participants at this discovery workshop. Firstly, it was agreed that there is no direct link between the economy and radicalization. Secondly, the relationship between the economy and violent extremism is a complicated one with many mitigating factors, whereby the economy may serve as a catalyst for violent extremism. This report contains notes and impressions from participants, and key points and outcomes from the workshop.
RÉSUMÉ

Le récent ralentissement économique mondial risque d’exacerber un certain nombre de menaces qui planent sur la prospérité du Canada, et de favoriser notamment la radicalisation et l’extrémisme violent. C’est pourquoi la Section de l’intention de l’adversaire de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada – Toronto (RDDC Toronto) a tenu un atelier multidisciplinaire, les 7 et 8 décembre 2009, pour discuter des répercussions possibles de ce ralentissement économique sur la sécurité et la stabilité sociale du Canada. Cet atelier était intitulé « La radicalisation dans le climat économique national ». Plusieurs organisations universitaires, gouvernementales et industrielles ont participé aux activités organisées dans le cadre de cet atelier. Il y a eu 11 présentations par des experts, et deux réunions en petits groupes. Deux grandes conclusions se sont imposées aux participants. Premièrement, il n’y a pas de lien direct entre l’économie et la radicalisation. Deuxièmement, la relation entre l’économie et l’extrémisme violent est très complexe et comporte de nombreux facteurs d’atténuation, bien qu’il soit vrai que l’économie peut servir de catalyseur à l’extrémisme violent. Le présent rapport contient les notes rédigées et les commentaires formulés par les participants, ainsi que les principaux points de discussion et les résultats de l’atelier.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Radicalization in the National Economic Climate Discovery Workshop at DRDC Toronto 7-8 December 2009

Michelle Gauthier; CR2010 - 025; Defence R&D Canada - Toronto; April 2010

The recent downturn in the global economy may exacerbate a number of potential threats to Canada’s well-being, including the possibility for increased radicalization and violent extremism. As such, the Adversarial Intent Section at Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto (DRDC Toronto) held a discovery workshop at their facilities on 7-8 December, 2009 in order to explore and discuss the implications of such an economic downturn for Canada’s security and social stability. The workshop was entitled, “Radicalization in the National Economic Climate.”

Several academic, government, and industrial organizations participated in the two full days of activities, which included 11 presentations given by subject matter experts and two break-out group discussions. The workshop’s format balanced formal expert presentations with open discussion-based interaction and drew on scientific research from several different disciplines using sociological-, psychological- and security-based approaches. Break-out sessions following the presentations brought together workshop participants to explore key questions related to radicalization in the national economic climate. The workshop produced thought-provoking and insightful observations on factors involved in radicalization.

Two broad conclusions were largely shared by the participants at this discovery workshop. Firstly, it was agreed that there is no direct link between the economy and radicalization. Secondly, the relationship between the economy and violent extremism is a complicated one with many mitigating factors, whereby the economy may serve as a catalyst for violent extremism. Several insights were drawn from participants on how to prevent, detect, and mitigate potential threats of radicalization within and outside of Canada.

Capturing the collaborative nature of the workshop, this report contains notes and impressions from participants, and key points and outcomes from the workshop in three main sections. The first section, Summary of workshop presentations, provides substantive highlights from the presentations. The second section, Summary of questions and discussions, provides the questions and discussions that were raised following the presentations. The third section, Summary of break-out and plenary discussions, describes the process and outcomes of the interactive break-out sessions, including factors that were implicated in the potential for radicalization in the wake of the national economic climate. Implications for Canada’s security and social stability are also discussed in this last section.
Le récent ralentissement économique mondial risque d’exacerber un certain nombre de menaces qui planent sur la prospérité du Canada, et de favoriser notamment la radicalisation et l’extrémisme violent. C’est pourquoi la Section de l’intention de l’adversaire de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada – Toronto (RDDC Toronto) a tenu un atelier multidisciplinaire, les 7 et 8 décembre 2009, pour discuter des répercussions possibles de ce ralentissement économique sur la sécurité et la stabilité sociale du Canada. Cet atelier était intitulé « La radicalisation dans le climat économique national ».

Plusieurs organisations universitaires, gouvernementales et industrielles ont participé aux activités organisées dans le cadre de cet atelier. Il y a eu 11 présentations par des experts, et deux réunions en petits groupes. L’atelier a combiné les exposés formels des experts avec des discussions ouvertes, et il s’est inspiré des travaux de recherche qui ont été réalisés dans plusieurs disciplines différentes à l’aide d’approches sociologiques, psychologiques et fondées sur la sécurité. Les réunions en petits groupes qui ont suivi les présentations ont permis aux participants d’examiner les questions clés liées à la radicalisation dans le climat économique national. L’atelier a produit des observations intéressantes et stimulantes sur les facteurs qui contribuent à la radicalisation.

Deux grandes conclusions se sont imposées aux participants. Premièrement, il n’y a pas de lien direct entre l’économie et la radicalisation. Deuxièmement, la relation entre l’économie et l’extrémisme violent est très complexe et comporte de nombreux facteurs d’atténuation, bien qu’il soit vrai que l’économie peut servir de catalyseur à l’extrémisme violent. Les participants ont fait plusieurs suggestions sur la façon de prévenir, de détecter et d’atténuer les risques de radicalisation au Canada et à l’étranger.

Fidèle reflet de l’esprit de collaboration qui a marqué l’événement, le présent rapport contient les notes rédigées et les commentaires formulés par les participants, ainsi que les principaux points de discussion et les résultats de l’atelier. Le rapport comprend trois sections principales. La première section, Résumé des présentations de l’atelier, donne les grandes lignes des présentations. La deuxième section, Résumé des questions abordées et des discussions, fait état des discussions qui ont fait suite aux présentations. La troisième section, Résumé des réunions en petits groupes et des séances plénières, décrit le déroulement et les résultats des séances de discussion en petits groupes, y compris les facteurs de radicalisation potentielle dans le climat économique national. Les incidences sur la sécurité et la stabilité sociale du Canada sont également examinées dans cette dernière section.
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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

This report, completed under contract for Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto (DRDC Toronto), is a documentation of the proceedings of a DRDC Toronto workshop entitled, “Radicalization in the National Economic Climate.” Specifically, this report describes the presentations and resulting questions and discussions concerning the national economic climate and radicalization. Additionally, notes and impressions from participants, as well as the key points and outcomes of the workshop, are detailed in this report.

1.2 Background

In light of the extremism characterizing cultural, political, social, and religious realities, the question of radicalization has drawn much attention in the last few years. Linked to this issue of radicalization is the recent downturn in the global economy, which some have hypothesized may lead to increased radicalization and violent extremism. At the request of the Assistant Deputy Minister (Science and Technology), the Adversarial Intent Section at DRDC Toronto has undertaken a research project to investigate the implications of an economic downturn for Canada’s security and social stability. The project plan for this endeavour, entitled “Radicalization in the National Economic Climate”, was created in June 2009.

One major objective of this project is to determine if and how economic distress might exacerbate any social, economic, and psychological factors that increase the likelihood of radicalization and violent behaviour. Similarly, the project aims to identify factors that may increase resilience to radicalization at the individual, community and societal levels. To gather information and expertise on the topic area, the Adversarial Intent Section at DRDC Toronto hosted a two-day discovery workshop featuring 11 presentations from subject matter experts within the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND), other Canadian ministries, academia, and industry. Within the context of this workshop, “Radicalization” referred to an increase in and/or reinforcing of extremism in the thinking, sentiments, and/or behaviour of individuals and/or groups of individuals. Implications for policy will be addressed at a one-day follow-up workshop in spring 2010.

1.3 Objectives

The objective of this workshop was to support DRDC’s investigation of the effect of the downturn on the potential for radicalization within Canada. In pursuit of this objective, the contents of this report will help the project team and DRDC Toronto’s current partners to focus the problem space of radicalization and the economy. This report will also be used to
communicate findings and results to the project’s clients and stakeholders, and to potential collaborators.
2  STRUCTURE OF THE WORKSHOP

This section describes the structure of the workshop in terms of the organizational group, attendees, and workshop agenda.

2.1  Workshop organizational group

The workshop was organized by members of the Adversarial Intent Section at DRDC Toronto. The workshop organizational group was composed of the following participants (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lianne McLellan</td>
<td>Defence Scientist and Workshop Organizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Tikuisis</td>
<td>Senior Defence Scientist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Lauder</td>
<td>Defence Scientist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quan Lam</td>
<td>Research Technologist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2  Workshop participants

The workshop was attended by 38 participants from within DND Canada, other Canadian ministries, academia, and industry. Table 2 provides a list of organizations that participated in the workshop.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAE Professional Services</td>
<td>Innovative Analytics and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Revenue Agency</td>
<td>Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)</td>
<td>Multi-Health Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carleton University</td>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3 Workshop structure

Eleven papers were presented by subject matter experts within DND Canada, other Canadian ministries, academia, and industry, providing multiple perspectives on the issue of radicalization. The following subsections provide details regarding the presentations, questions, discussions, and break-out and plenary sessions.

2.3.1 Presentations

Presentations were scheduled in pairs. Each presenter was given 20 minutes to present his or her research. Six presentations were delivered on Day 1 and five presentations on Day 2.

2.3.2 Questions and discussions

Following each pair of presentations, participants were given the opportunity to discuss or comment on the presentations and question the presenters about their research.

2.3.3 Break-out and plenary discussion sessions

Interactive break-out sessions took place at the end of each day, following the presentations. The break-out groups were organized as four concurrent one-hour sessions in which teams explored key questions related to radicalization in the national economic climate. For each of the two break-out sessions, participants were randomly assigned to one of four teams (i.e., blue, red,
yellow, or green). Each group was moderated by a pre-assigned workshop participant. The main points of the discussions were presented by a volunteer from each group at the plenary session that followed.

The break-out sessions provided participants with an opportunity to share their thoughts, perspectives, and reflections on the presentations, and to discuss future research directions.

2.3.3.1 Break-out session questions

Several questions were addressed and discussed during the break-out sessions. Each team was assigned specific questions (see Table 3).

Questions that were addressed on each day of the discovery workshop are listed in the next section.

2.3.3.1.1 Discussion questions – Day 1

*Question 1.* What factors contribute to Canada’s vulnerability to violent radicalization in the wake of an internal economic crisis?

*Question 2.* What factors contribute to Canada’s resilience to violent radicalization in the wake of an internal economic crisis?

*Question 3.* How might radicalization arising from economic factors in other countries generate or influence radicalization in Canada?

*Question 4.* What can be done to help i) prevent, ii) detect, and iii) mitigate potential threats of radicalization in the wake of an internal economic crisis?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Qs 1 &amp; 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Qs 2 &amp; 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Qs 2 &amp; 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Qs 1 &amp; 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Team assignment to address break-out session questions on Day 1
2.3.3.1.2 Discussion questions – Day 2

Question 5. What is our understanding of radicalization (cognitive, emotive, and motivational characteristics), and is it sufficient to deduce how an economic crisis might spawn radicalization at the individual level?

Question 6. What is our understanding of radicalization (cognitive, emotive, and motivational characteristics), and is it sufficient to deduce how an economic crisis might spawn radicalization at the group level?

Question 7. What can be done to help prevent the development or growth of radicalization in Canada due to external extremist influences? How might this change due to economic distress in Canada, elsewhere, or globally?

Table 4: Team assignment to address break-out session questions on Day 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Qs 5 &amp; 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Qs 5 &amp; 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Qs 6 &amp; 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Qs 6 &amp; 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4 Agenda

The agenda from the discovery workshop is outlined in Table 5.
### Table 5: Discovery workshop agenda

**Monday December 7, 2009 - 10 am to 5 pm**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0900-1000</td>
<td>Registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1005</td>
<td>Lianne McLellan, DRDC Toronto Welcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1005-1015</td>
<td>Joe Baranski, DRDC Toronto Overview of DRDC Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1015-1040</td>
<td>Peter Tikuisis, Matthew Launder, and Lianne McLellan, DRDC Toronto Workshop overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1040-1100</td>
<td>Robert J. Brys, University of Toronto The Social and Political Gap between Economic Crisis and Radicalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1120</td>
<td>Cor Muddle, University of Notre Dame Radicals in the Wake of a Global Economic Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1120-1140</td>
<td>Questions and discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1330</td>
<td>Lorne L. Dawson, University of Waterloo Depression and the Process of Radicalization: A Theoretical Overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330-1340</td>
<td>Paul Bramstad, University of Victoria The role of religious identity in the contemporary economic downturn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1340-1400</td>
<td>Questions and discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400-1420</td>
<td>Health break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1420-1440</td>
<td>Kevin A. O'Brien, Innovative Analytics and Training Building Counter-terrorist Communities: British efforts to counter violent extremist among Britain's Muslim communities 1979 to 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1440-1500</td>
<td>Phil Gurski, Public Safety Canada Going for broke - Islamist extremists and capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1520</td>
<td>Questions and discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1520-1620</td>
<td>Break-out discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1620-1700</td>
<td>Plenary discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tuesday December 8, 2009 - 9 am to 3 pm**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0900-0920</td>
<td>Networking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0920-0940</td>
<td>Bill Magee, University of Toronto Economic crisis and psychological well-being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0940-1000</td>
<td>Ian McGregor, York University Effects of uncertainty threats on attitude polarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1020</td>
<td>Questions and discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1020-1040</td>
<td>Health Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1040-1100</td>
<td>Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hutley, RMC Socio-economic determinants of radicalization? Evidence from Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100-1120</td>
<td>Rick Ruddell, Correctional Service of Canada Developing Longitudinal Indicators of Political Climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1120-1150</td>
<td>Questions and discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1300</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300-1320</td>
<td>Elaine Pressman, Carleton University Exploring the impact of the economic climate for criminal violence: A multi-fac torial assessment approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1320-1400</td>
<td>Break-out discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1420-1500</td>
<td>Plenary discussion and wrap-up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lianne McLellan, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000 ext. 2121
3 SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS

This section provides background information for each presenter, and a title and summary of each talk.

3.1 Day 1

3.1.1 Introductions and background

Introductions to the workshop and a background to radicalization and the economic climate and an overview of DRDC Toronto were given by DRDC Toronto’s Chief Scientist, and members of the Adversarial Intent Section.

3.1.1.1 Joe Baranski, DRDC Toronto

Biography: Dr. Joe Baranski is Chief Scientist, DRDC Toronto.

Title: Overview of DRDC Toronto capabilities

Summary: DRDC is a Special Operating Agency of the Department of National Defence. It has nine research centres across Canada, of which DRDC Toronto is one. DRDC Toronto’s Chief Scientist, Dr. Baranski, gave an overview of the Centre’s organizational structure and capabilities, its vision, and its mission to provide S&T leadership and advance and maintain Canada’s Defence and National Security capabilities as a ‘full service’ S&T Organization. The focus of Baranski’s presentation was on the new Defence S&T Strategy that was implemented in 2007. The program was created to provide a holistic systems-based approach to human performance and effectiveness. DRDC Toronto is the agency’s centre of excellence for Integrated Human Effectiveness S&T and addresses the broader human domain in partnership with DRDC Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA), Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA), and other DRDC centres. The DRDC Toronto program is based on four themes: Individual Readiness, Collaborative Performance and Learning, Adversarial Intent, and Human Systems Integration.

Joe Baranski’s presentation can be found in Annex A.

3.1.1.2 Peter Tikuisis, DRDC Toronto

Biography: Dr. Peter Tikuisis is a Senior Defence Scientist in the Adversarial Intent Section, DRDC Toronto.
Title: Radicalization

Summary. Dr. Tikuisis presented his stage model that describes one path (of potentially many) to violent radicalization. He described the four stages that compose the model (see Figure 1).

- **Stage 1: Policy.** Radicalization might arise where the means to satisfy basic human needs are compromised or threatened, where security and ‘rule of law’ is compromised or non-existent, where a sense of belonging is eroded or non-existent (e.g., ethnic disparity, isolationism), and alternatives are sought. Policy is the origin of deprivation/discontent/grievance/etc. A crisis (national or personal) can become a catalyst for change.

- **Stage 2: Internalization.** A sense of retribution (i.e., reprisals) and rectification (i.e., putting things right) might arise among those negatively affected, either directly or indirectly. One’s worldview is shaped by perceived injustices and unfairness. Perception becomes the centre of gravity for a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign waged by radicals/extremists.

- **Stage 3: Organization.** ‘Ideologically-inspired and socially-glued networks’. Leaders and followers might emerge amongst those sufficiently motivated to effect change by joining a macro organization or cult, by starting a micro group (e.g., an autonomous but ideologically-connected terrorist cell), or by acting alone (e.g., a lone wolf).

- **Stage 4: Manifestation.** ‘Action’. Finally, sabotage/violence is carried out against the state and/or its citizens in an effort to effect change in government policy – domestic or foreign.

Tikuisis acknowledged that this model represents just one of many different pathways to violent radicalization. According to the model, an individual could first join an organization for social (i.e., identity) reasons, and then become indoctrinated into its ideological worldview. The economic factors that can mediate the potential for radicalization are economic upheaval and political instability. Canadian policy and security professionals therefore need to recognize and mitigate risks to national security (e.g., by using intelligence and surveillance to disrupt terrorist...
cells and to prevent strikes). This model, Tikuisis posits, can be used to help understand and counteract radicalization.

Peter Tikuisis’s presentation can be found in Annex B.

3.1.1.3 Matthew Lauder, DRDC Toronto

*Biography:* Mr. Matthew Lauder is a Defence Scientist in the Adversarial Intent Section at DRDC Toronto, and cross-appointed as an Adjunct Professor at the Defence and Security Research Institute (DSRI) at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC).

*Title:* Through the looking-glass: Self-reflecting on the study of radicalization and violent extremism

*Summary.* The focus of Mr. Lauder’s presentation was to propose that the theoretical construct of radicalization needs to be diverse and have a multi-disciplinary focus. He argued that ‘the extremist movement is diverse and varied, and so are the pathways towards, and reasons for, one’s involvement.’ He proposes that there is much to be learned by examining radicalization and extremism as a much larger and broader social phenomenon (i.e., one that exists across societies, cultures, nations, politics, and religions), and not something that is exclusive, or limited, to Islam. Multi-disciplinary perspectives are therefore required. The multi-disciplinary nature of the workshop, and the varied experience and perspectives of both the presenters and attendees make this workshop so important. It represents a significant effort, on the part of the Canadian defence and security science and technology (S&T) community, to set resources aside and critically examine the issue of radicalization and violent extremism.

Matthew Lauder’s presentation can be found in Annex C.

3.1.2 Summary of guest presentations

3.1.2.1 Robert J. Brym, University of Toronto

*Biography:* Dr. Robert J. Brym, Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada (FRSC), is Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto. His research focuses on politics and social movements in Canada, Russia, and the Middle East. He is currently completing a project, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, on suicide bombing and state repression in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza during the Second Intifada (2000-05). The results of this research have appeared in Social Forces, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Political Science Quarterly, and other academic journals.

*Title:* The social and political gap between economic crisis and radicalization
Summary. Dr. Brym illustrated the decisive role of social and political forces in influencing the strength and direction of the correlation between economic distress and radical action. He concluded from his research that, overall, the correlation between economic distress and radicalization is weak and, in some circumstances, negative. He does propose, however, that longstanding grievances, articulated ideologies, social cohesion, and political organization can mediate the relationship between economic conditions and radicalization. The impact of economic distress may be to decrease the probability of radicalization (possibly due to a populace’s preoccupation with safeguarding the well-being of their families).

Brym then considered the implications of economic forces for the potential to radicalize Muslim Canadians in times of economic crisis, and proposed policies for moderating such radicalization. He identified particular groups, such as immigrant populations (e.g., Muslim Canadians) that, when not well integrated into society, may be initially attracted to groups with radical agendas because of a perceived similarity in outlook or belief set. Government mechanisms such as credential evaluation, skills upgrading, and job placement need to be improved in order to better the absorption of immigrants into society.

Brym stipulated that successful recruitment into radical groups relies, in part, on the ideological homogeneity and social cohesiveness of those groups. He concluded by advocating for public relations work (e.g., street monitoring) to be stepped-up in order to maintain awareness of the activity of social groups and places that may pose a threat (e.g., public service and function groups, jihad groups in prison, and locations where Halal products are sold). Such awareness can help to minimize the threat of violence due to radicalization.

Robert Brym’s presentation can be found in Annex D.

3.1.2.2 Cas Mudde, University of Notre Dame

Biography: Dr. Cas Mudde is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Antwerp in Belgium. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Leiden in the Netherlands. He has published widely on topics of extremism and democracy, including his most recent book, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2007), which was named Outstanding Academic Title by Choice and won the Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social Science Research of the International Social Science Council/European Consortium for Political Research (ISSC/ECPR). This academic year he is a visiting fellow at the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame in the United States.

Title: Radicalization in the wake of a global economic crisis

Summary. Dr. Mudde presented his research demonstrating short- and long-term effects of economic crisis on anti-democratic forces within Europe. Results from his research indicated
that, while there is no direct relationship between economic crisis and the rise of anti-democratic forces, there is a complex, indirect relationship between the two.

He suggested that an economic crisis has very diverse short- and long-term effects, and it is difficult to predict when and where the effects will happen. In the short-term, in times of economic crisis, socio-economic issues (e.g., unemployment, taxation, housing, etc.) become more salient and socio-cultural issues (e.g., crime, immigration, corruption, etc.) become less important. People therefore will generally play it safe and stick with mainstream parties whose focus is the shorter-term socio-economic issues. In the long-term, optimism (i.e., positive expectations for the future) may mitigate the potential for radicalization of a nation’s population due to an economic crisis. That is, if people have hope that the situation will improve, they will demonstrate patience for improvement. Dr. Mudde used the example of why support for right-wing political parties did not increase in Eastern European countries during previous times of economic hardship. A survey of population attitudes suggested that people were optimistic that if their country joined the European Union, their economic levels would automatically increase to Western European levels. In the autumn of 2007, it was found that optimism post-European Union was decreasing. It remains to be seen whether support for radical parties will increase.

Mudde concluded that there is no universal direct relationship between economic crisis and support for radical (right) parties. There is some evidence to show that the short-term effect of an economic crisis hampers success of radical parties, while the long-term success or failure of a radical movement depends on various factors that are often determined by mainstream parties (e.g., policy concerning multiculturalism, integration, social programs, regional and local economic stimuli, etc.).

Cas Mudde’s presentation can be found in Annex E.

3.1.2.3 Lorne. L. Dawson

Biography: Dr. Lorne L. Dawson is a Professor in the Department of Sociology and Religious Studies at the University of Waterloo. He is a sociologist of religion with a theoretical orientation and expertise in the study of new religious movements, particularly why some have engaged in acts of mass violence. Insights from the latter inform his new research on the radicalization of home-grown terrorists. For example, see Dawson, L. L. (2010). The Study of New Religious Movements and the Radicalization of Home-grown Terrorists: Opening a Dialogue. Terrorism and Political Violence, 22, 1-21.

Title: Deprivation and the process of radicalization: A theoretical overview

Summary. Dr. Dawson presented relative deprivation (RD) theory and sought a critical perspective on this approach as it applies to radicalization. He discussed some foundational theories and noteworthy applications of the concept of deprivation on extreme religious and political groups, including recent studies of terrorism. He concluded that many factors that cause
radicalization are relative and not absolute. Dawson presented Glock’s (1964) and Gurr’s (1970) modified basic premise of the RD theoretical approach stating:

“If people perceive a discrepancy between their value expectations (i.e., the goods and conditions they believe they are entitled to) and their value capabilities (i.e., the goods and conditions they are capable of getting and keeping), and they do not accept some explanation for their deprivation, there will be an incentive to support movements for social change and social conflict”.

Dawson stipulated that deprivation is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for radicalization. Additional conditions must also be present, including shared deprivation (i.e., a group identity factor), lack of alternative institutions, and an emergence of leadership with innovative ideas for radicalization. He explained that there are many (five) forms of relative deprivation and three main patterns of RD: decremental, aspirational, and progressive.

Dawson pointed to several chief criticisms of deprivation theory, notably that the different versions of RD have been used in a variety of ways, and this has led to inconsistent results. Dawson concluded his presentation by assessing RD’s continued feasibility, and suggested ways in which continued use of concepts of deprivation within the context of studies of terrorist radicalization can be improved. The RD approach, while not all-encompassing, does point to and favour adopting a more “processual” approach to radicalization (i.e., that radicalization cannot be understood fully merely by considering factors; it can only be understood by considering the systems that acted upon the individual that led him/her to radicalize).

Lorne Dawson’s presentation can be found in Annex F.

3.1.2.4 Paul Bramadat, University of Victoria

Biography: Dr. Paul Bramadat is the director of the Centre for the Study of Religion and Society at the University of Victoria. Prior to moving to Victoria he taught religious studies for ten years at the University of Winnipeg. He has been conducting research in the area of religion and public policy in Canada. His books include The Church on the World’s Turf (2000), Christianity and Ethnicity in Canada (co-edited with D. Seljak 2005), Christianity and Ethnicity in Canada (co-edited with D. Seljak 2008), and International Migration and the Governance of Religious Diversity (co-edited with Matthias Koenig 2009). He has also worked in the area of religion, ethnicity, and post-colonialism in Canada.

Title: The role of religious identity in the contemporary economic downturn

Summary. Dr. Bramadat’s presentation addressed the role of religion in radicalization and how Canadians’ approach to religious identity may make it difficult to engage religious communities productively, especially during the contemporary economic downturn when some Canadians may become suspicious of ethnic and religious minority communities. He stated, “It is crucial to
reflect critically and dispassionately on the often tacit assumptions that are made when we talk and think about the role of religion in these social forces”.

According to Bramadat, religion is the elephant in the room in security discourse. Although Islam has currently been identified as being at the centre of radicalization in the West, this has not always been the case; many other religious groups have been at the centre of attention in the past. Also, while secularism tends to mitigate extremes of religious thought, it promotes ethnocentric and naïve essentialist “religious illiteracy”. For example, religion is seen as peaceful and religious people as sweet and nice. This, Bramadat claims, can lead to the notions that religion has a minimal role in life; violent acts or claims that are explicitly religious are considered merely ruses or psychopathic acts. These notions make it difficult to appreciate the role of religion in acts of violence. Bramadat recommends that religion be taken seriously. Otherwise, we may miss the chance to understand the role of religion on its own terms.

Religion, according to Bramadat, provides an orderly view of the world in times of distress, when people are motivated to see order; it is a “master narrative” (e.g., 9/11 conspiracy theories). He stressed that while it does not seem that the external political and economic climate in Canada will lead to large numbers of radicalized individuals, there are several caveats to consider. First, it doesn’t take many people to cause tremendous damage. Second, religious subcultures can be extremely unpredictable. Third, media (e.g., Twitter) can promote viral communications. Fourth, the global and political tensions that were instrumental to the formation of some religious movements continue to exist. Finally, the fifth caveat is that the effect of an economic slowdown on existing exclusionary policies can trigger radical behaviour within a community. Bramadat concluded his presentation by claiming that there is a need to monitor radical communities and radical discourses.

Paul Bramadat’s presentation can be found in Annex G.

3.1.2.5 Kevin O’Brien, Innovation Analytics & Training

Biography: Dr. Kevin A. O’Brien is a Senior Advisor to Innovative Analytics & Training LLC in Washington, DC, supporting US government intelligence and counter-terrorism programmes. As the Director of Alesia PSI Consultants Ltd., he spent the previous three years as a senior advisor to the UK Home Office agencies and forces on intelligence transformation and strategy. He was co-author of the first assessment conducted for the Home Office on radicalization and recruitment towards terrorist violence within the UK’s Muslim communities, and more recently co-authored a study for the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office on radicalization and extremism amongst Sierra Leone’s Muslim communities. Previous positions included Deputy Director of Defence and Security for RAND Europe and Deputy Director of the International Centre for Security Analysis at King’s College London. He is the author of more than forty academic monographs, articles, and chapters on issues relating to contemporary security challenges. His book, “The Terrorist Craft of Intelligence”, will be published by Hurst in 2010.
Title: Building counter-terrorist communities: British efforts to counter violent extremists amongst Britain’s Muslim communities, 1970 to 2009

Summary. In his presentation, Dr. O’Brien discussed the United Kingdom’s growing problem of domestic radicalization. He addressed current UK government initiatives to combat domestic radicalization and develop community intelligence capabilities to help identify radicalization and recruitment efforts at the earliest possible stage.

While the number of individuals engaging in terrorist acts overseas (e.g., in Kashmir, Somalia, North Africa, etc.) has been growing since the 1980s, the focus of terrorist violence in the post-2000 era has increasingly been a domestic occurrence in industrialized Western countries (specifically Western Europe and the North American continent). O’Brien stipulated that the growing radicalization in Western countries, particularly in the UK, is directly influenced by the al-Qaeda worldview. While most of Britain’s Muslims are well integrated and peaceful, a number of young British Muslims have gone abroad to participate in terrorist or jihad activities. A particularly worrying new type of terrorist are those who are recruited domestically, trained overseas, and return as a potential domestic terrorists.

The socially-, economically-, and educationally-deprived communities of Britain’s Muslim and South Asian populations are particularly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by radical groups. It was found that factors such as conflicts over identity, conversion to Islam after a bad incident in life, and feeling deprived relative to other communities, can also increase the propensity to radicalize.

O’Brien concluded his presentation by claiming that government policies and strategies need to address these issues to defuse community tensions and re-establish trust in the government by these communities. Government strategies must also support more active counter-terrorist measures (e.g., critical infrastructure protection, anti-terrorist actions, and niche counter-radicalization efforts such as in prisons).³

3.1.2.6 Phil Gurski, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Biography: Mr. Phil Gurski is a Senior Analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Title: Going for broke: Islamist extremists and capitalism

Summary. The main premise of Mr. Gurski’s presentation promoted the notion that Islamists’ anti-capitalist views fuel radicalization in times of economic distress. Although Islam recognizes the role of the private sector and supports the ownership of private property, Islamist extremists have long railed against capitalism as an imposed system in the Islamic world. Gurksi claimed

³ For a copy of Kevin O’Brien’s presentation manuscript, please contact the Contract Scientific Authority, Lianne McLellan, Defence Scientist, DRDC Toronto, at lianne.mcelellan@drdc-rddc.gc.ca.
that Sayyid Qutb, the father of modern Islamist extremism, labelled capitalism a Western “bad” system and called upon Muslims to embrace Islam as the only “pure” solution.

According to Gurski, the recent economic downturn has served two purposes for Islamic extremists. First, it has bolstered their conviction that Western economic systems do not work. Secondly, it has led to the conviction that their campaigns of violence have elicited reactions (e.g., wars, invasions, increases in security budgets, etc.) that have been very costly for Western countries. Indeed, for a relatively small investment, terrorist acts can have a huge economic impact. Gurski concluded that Islamist extremists firmly believe that the Western economic society must change according to their beliefs, that terrorism pays, and that they can have an effect on Western economies. This ideology may lead to an increase in acts of terrorism, especially during times of economic difficulty, as a means to accelerate the defeat of the West.

Phil Gurski’s presentation can be found in Annex H.

3.2 Day 2

3.2.1 Summary of guest presentations

3.2.1.1 Bill Magee, University of Toronto

Biography: Dr. Bill Magee is a sociologist at the University of Toronto who has published primarily on health and mental health related issues. His participation in this workshop reflects a fairly new interest in the relation between personal and political turning points, and a longer-term interest in the emotional dynamics that underlie action.

Title: How effects of economic crises on subjective well-being may influence extremism

Summary. Dr. Magee reviewed the relationship between severe economic downturn and mental illness, particularly the link between depression and activism. He discussed a theory that suggests links between the economy and shame and anger on one hand, and between politically directed anger and extremism on the other.

In his attempt to understand the relationship between economic downturn and activism, Magee explored the economic motivations of terrorists. He stated that the bulk of the research presented in the workshop so far suggested that terrorists are motivated by persistent political issues rather than by fluctuations, including severe economic fluctuations. The strategic logic of terrorism suggests that terrorists might increase the frequency of attacks during an economic crisis if they perceive an opportunity to further destabilize an already destabilized system.

 Magee then explored Jonathan H. Turner’s Spasmodic Extreme Violence model (see Figure 2). According to this model, emotional reactions to economic crises are likely to be individualized and include self-blame, and guilt or shame. The model provides an account of how economic
crises may promote extremism by first influencing how people feel about aspects of themselves that are distinct from their group or social identity. Magee suggested that we should try to understand political radicalization in terms of personal, initially individualized processes, such as self-blame.

![Figure 2: Jonathan H. Turner's Spasmodic Model](image)

Magee explored Turner’s theory in light of economic crises and issues of mental health—that is, how cuts to mental health treatment may also contribute to extremism. He speculated that when treatment resources are cut, the capacity to individualize suffering is undermined and grievances associated with suffering may become politicized. Magee concluded that some of those who endure a difficult combination of personal and economic crises will gravitate towards negative forms of extremism. (See Annex J for an Annotated Bibliography of this presentation.)

Bill Magee’s presentation can be found in Annex I.

### 3.2.1.2 Ian McGregor, York University

**Biography:** Dr. Ian McGregor is an Associate Professor of Personality and Social Psychology in the Faculty of Health at York University, Toronto, Canada. His experimental research on conviction and zeal is internationally acclaimed, published in the top scientific journals, and funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. His most recent research reveals social factors and personality traits that combine to cause political and religious extremism. It also illuminates neural mechanisms that can help explain why people go to extremes. His research is guided by rigorous psychological science methods and by insights gleaned from his eclectic personal and academic background. He grew up as the son of a Baptist minister, studied theology and philosophy at a seminary, and earned degrees in Biomedical Science (BSc), General Psychology (BA), Personality Psychology (MA), and Social Psychology (PhD). Further, before his current position at York University he held a post-doctoral research position in the Department of Human Development and Social Policy at Northwestern University. McGregor is married and lives with his wife and two young children in Waterloo, Canada.
Title: Effects of uncertainty threats on attitude polarization

Summary. Dr. McGregor presented his research that investigated the causes of zealous ideology and extreme action. Through a set of psychological and neurological experiments, he showed that psychological threats can lead to compensatory extremes of ideals. McGregor demonstrated that uncertainties or frustrations in the pursuit of important goals caused experimental participants to react by becoming more zealous and closed minded about their values, identities, goals, and groups which could make them prone to violent acts. In his most recent experiments, he found that the same threats also caused participants to become more extremely idealistic, religious, disdainful of dissenting religious views, and willing to support religious warfare. Participants most prone to this reaction rated more highly on dispositional eagerness and aversion to uncertainty. In his neuropsychological studies, he demonstrated that these individuals tended to also rate highly on self-esteem and were the most likely to minimize risk associated with adverse actions. Their religious zeal increased when exposed to personal threat. McGregor’s research offers new insights into the neural and motivational mechanics of reactive extremism and sheds light on new intervention opportunities.

Ian McGregor’s presentation can be found in Annex K.

3.2.1.3 Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hataley, Royal Military College

Biography: Dr. Christian Leuprecht is currently the Visiting Bicentennial Associate Professor of Canadian Studies at Yale University's Whitney and Betty Macmillan Center for International and Area Studies. He is on leave from the Royal Military College of Canada where he is an Associate Professor of political science. Additionally, he holds cross-appointments with the Department of Political Studies as well as the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University. Leuprecht's research focuses on the political implications of demographic change, especially insofar as they affect the security sector, internecine conflict and violence, as well as democratic, federal, and multi-level governance.

Dr. Todd Hataley is an Adjunct Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada. His current research interests include the management of international boundaries and transnational threats. Hataley holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

Title: Violent extremism: Socio-economic antecedents

Summary. Drs. Hataley and Leuprecht presented research conducted at the Royal Military College of Canada, which aimed to identify the individual, group, and mass level drivers to violent extremism. They collected systematic and methodological data in Canada in order to identify factors that are endogenous to Canada. A meta-analysis of the literature and data collection of incidents, individuals, and victims identified only 33 individuals charged, convicted, or strongly suspected of engaging in violent extremism or providing material support.
These individuals tended to be predominantly middle class and educated; to be recent immigrants (first and second generation); to have a collective acceptance of violence; to possess divergent socio-economic attributes of violent extremists in Canada; to have anti-capitalist views; and to exhibit ethno-religious violent extremism. These attributes are shared with extremists located in other countries (e.g., United States), but extremists in Canada tended to be less right-wing, to exhibit less Christian extremism, and to focus more on ethno-nationalist movements. These preliminary findings can be used to identify policies to decrease the incidence of violent extremism.

Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hataley’s presentation can be found in Annex L.

3.2.1.4  Rick Ruddell, Correctional Service of Canada

Biography: Dr. Rick Ruddell is the Director of Operational Research with the Correctional Service of Canada. Prior to that appointment, he worked for the Ministry of Corrections, Public Safety, and Policing in Saskatchewan and was an Associate Professor at the California State University, Chico, and Eastern Kentucky University.

Title: Developing longitudinal indicators of political climate

Summary. Dr. Ruddell presented his research that examined the relationships among terrorist acts, public mood, and economic data on the United States, from 1970 to 2007. He used several longitudinal indicators of American public mood claiming that longitudinal political, social, and economic variables might act as ‘barometers’ of antipathy toward government or social institutions, noting a shortage of such ‘barometers’. He examined several indicators of self-reported American public mood created using algorithms, including political disaffection (1952 to 2008), liberal-conservative identification (1937-2006), and public policy mood (1952 to 2008). These data were contrasted against several economic indicators, including Okun’s Misery Index (the sum of unemployment and inflation), income inequality (Gini coefficient), and Okun’s Misery Index based on non-official estimates of unemployment and inflation. Results indicated little or no correlation of the incidence of terrorist acts with public mood, government programs, or justice system factors. There was also little or no relationship between economic factors and terrorism. There was a strong relationship, however, between urban riots and terrorist acts, suggesting that further research to delineate the mechanisms of this relationship is warranted. Ruddell concluded that economic conditions exerted only a minimal impact upon terrorist acts that occurred in the United States from 1970 to 2007. Finally, he noted that the relatively large number of terrorist acts in the 1970s might have affected results of these analyses and suggested that future investigators might consider examining other eras (e.g., 1980 to 2007).

Rick Ruddell’s presentation can be found in Annex M.
3.2.1.5 Elaine Pressman, Carleton University

Biography: Dr. D. Elaine Pressman earned her B.A. degree from the University of Manitoba and a Master’s and Ph.D. from The Ohio State University. She was a post-doctoral fellow in Psychology, and completed training and certification in forensic voice identification. Pressman has been associated with, or held faculty positions at, several universities over her career including Carleton University, University of Ottawa, the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and Laurentian University, and was a Subject Matter Expert in Security and Defence at The Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands. She is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies (CISS), at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) Carleton University, and an Adjunct Professor at RMC. Pressman has been involved in research activities in the Netherlands, Canada, and the US. In Canada, she has received contracts or grants from the National Research Council of Canada; the Department of Communications, Community and Social Services of Ontario; the RCMP; Canada Revenue Agency; and Public Safety Canada.

Title: Violent political extremism, criminality and economic downtown

Summary. Dr. Pressman explored the causes and motivations that drive violent extremism and general criminal violence, using a multi-factorial, cumulative structured assessment approach. Pressman presented her work on the development of the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment Protocol (VERA), a risk assessment tool that has potential use for helping to predict who (from a population that can be assessed, typically those in the correctional system) will perpetrate acts of terrorism. VERA is based on 25 indicators compiled from measured variables assessing attitudes/grievances/ideology (10), context (4), history (6), protective factors (5) plus three demographic variables. Results of assessments using the tool showed that criminal violence indicators had marginal or no relevance to extremism, and that national economic climate and poverty were not indicators for the risk of violent extremism. Ideological-based indicators were significant predictors of violent extremism as were other attitudinal, historical, and contextual factors. Pressman concluded that although risk assessment indicators are useful, more research is needed to validate the tool in broader settings. Risk assessment tools provide an empirical and systematic approach to assessing the risk of violence.

Elaine Pressman’s presentation can be found in Annex N.
SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWER SESSIONS

The following section outlines the main points that were raised from the question and answer period following the presentations.

4.1 Day 1

4.1.1 Robert J Brym and Cas Mudde

Question/Comment #1

A comment was made on the Swiss referendum on the issue of minarets. He questioned whether this socio-cultural issue could be used as a back-door to push radical far-right ideologies during times of economic distress.

- Referendums do not show majority support and the Swiss use referendums a lot. Therefore, the results of this referendum cannot be evidence of majority views. The party that orchestrated the referendum are a radical right party and are Islamophobes. They used this issue to defend liberal democracy (i.e., to defend rights of women and gays). In addition, the majority of the Swiss are against Turkey joining the EU and used this issue to their advantage.

Question/Comment #2

What is the difference between gangs and radical groups? Are they simply being politicized?

- Juveniles tend to gravitate toward organized activities. Governments need to integrate minorities by organizing more benign, heterogeneous organizations in their neighbourhoods; get them involved in other friendship cliques; and minimize membership in radical groups.

- Youths in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods may group along ethnic lines, especially when they feel they are in “danger” of being swamped by the majority ethnic groups. There is evidence of this with white groups emerging as a consequence of being a white minority. Youths are busy with ethnicity and “whiteness” more than they were before. We often see white as the majority, but there are large groups of whites living among predominantly non-white groups in a white majority country.
**Comment/Question #3**

There is a lack of examples linking economic distress and radicalization in the two presentations. The means by which governments respond with policy is less important than governments with an existing (strong) multi-cultural policy.

- The presenters disagreed but did not elaborate.

**Comment/Question #4**

Are we concerned with what people are thinking or are we concerned with what people are doing? Radicalization is a transient problem with the second generation. How do we tackle the problem?

- Long-term underemployment can result in radicalization. Failing to pay attention to Muslims with low economic status can be dangerous (e.g., recent events in Paris). I am concerned that what they are thinking is a manifestation of what they are doing (e.g., wearing head-scarves).

- It is not a second generation problem. Europe is backing away from second generation findings. The perceived success of radical groups polarizes the community.

- We have to pay attention to what people say, not just what they do. For example, in NYC, some people are preaching radical Islam religion. They recruit into the radical organization and increase that radical perspective in the head of the members. Therefore, we need to keep an eye on them.

**Comment/Question #5**

A comment was made regarding pre-empting action by listening to words and divining thought. European experiences and actions vary widely.

- There have been radical religious groups in Europe for ages but now they are linked to terrorism and it is growing. Radical Islam is not fundamentally different in one country or another. We are afraid because it is growing and we don’t understand it.

- Ideology is shrinking in Europe but growing in North America.
4.1.2 Lorne L. Dawson and Paul Bramadat

**Question/Comment #1**

John Turner does profiling even if he says he doesn’t.

- Turner’s approach focuses on process. Hudson’s discussion is unsatisfactory, but it is useful for process-based approaches. I believe that processes lead to characteristics and outcomes. I see that research in the terrorism field is lacking in mid-range level of testable propositions. Most research on terrorism is descriptive and historical.

**Question/Comment #2**

Bramadat identified religion as a premise of terrorism, which is a good thing. While there is a lot of primary data, most of it is unavailable to academics because it is classified. How do academics get primary data?

- We must talk to terrorists and inquire about their motivation to commit terrorist acts. You do not have to sympathize with them but you can enter into discourse with them to explore their shared beliefs and common ground.

- Getting accurate accounts is labour intensive. However, it is important that we talk to people from radical groups. Also there is a need for collaboration between academic and security institutions. Different people will pick up different things from conversations with religious radicals, compared to law enforcement specialists.

**Question/Comment #3**

There is an assumption that religion is the predominant factor. I argue that low levels of religious literacy can discount the role of religion. What level of religious literacy is ideal?

- We need to have people tell their stories in their own language. Otherwise we can miss the meaning. Let them tell their stories in their own terms.

4.1.3 Kevin O’Brien and Phil Gurski

**Comment/Question #1**

Muslims in certain countries (Pakistan, Northern Africa) have become “Muslims” – as part of a larger community. When did they transition from Ethno-national to ethno-religious identities?
• It is difficult to make the separation between national and religious identification. For example, UK Pakistanis went to Pakistan to fight for Pakistanis.

• We are not sure how Muslims identify themselves in Canada. In Canada, everyone maintains their heritage with their nationality.

• Canadians identify themselves as Canadians first, then their faith.

• Gordon Brown has talked about imposing a British identity. This may not work. In the UK, there is a need for ultra grassroots initiatives for new Muslims (other than terrorist organizations).

• It is a grassroots solution to a grassroots problem.

**Comment/Question#2**

What about Indian Muslims? How are they different? Why accept immigrants from unstable countries with individuals/groups on terrorist watch lists? This can have broader implications for immigration policies regarding immigrants coming from “terrorist originating” countries.

• East African Indians are more likely to become radicals than those from mainland India. Sikh extremism is extremely low in the UK.

• There is evidence of Islamist extremist groups reaching out to Sikh groups to attack India.

**Comment/Question#3**

Is it simply about getting people to identify with the host nation?

• Extremists have been very successful at pushing the *ummah*, the Muslim brotherhood. This precedes national boundaries.

**Question/Comment #4**

Canada might have buffered itself from a certain kind of extremism. The internet is very good at forming kinship and a new kind of Islam (repackaged) and it became the new authoritative voice.

• We cannot discount the notion of religion. There is a notion that these leaders have shallow knowledge of religion. Take a bunch of youths who don’t have much knowledge, and they just need someone with a bit more knowledge whom they will follow.
• Youth like to rebel. Young men and women may be looking for answers to their turmoil. They have distorted ideas that take on a momentum of their own.

• You can track the movement of people and ideas from website to website.

4.2 Day 2

4.2.1 Bill Magee and Ian McGregor

Question / Comment #1

How can you [directed towards Dr. McGregor] extrapolate your results to long term effects in real world?

• I can’t really give an answer to that because the laboratory studies have little external validity. Their advantage, however, is that they can establish case and effect relationships with experimental control.

• In the real world, we expect continued uncertainty, which may persist outside of a lab setting.

• It has been shown in animal studies that maladaptive behaviours can persist for years.

Question / Comment #2

Hopelessness and self-esteem seem to be related to gangs. There is a difference between gangs and radical groups whereby gangs have a lack of ideology. Any comments?

• High self-esteem in combination with bravado has been shown to lead to extreme responses. Gangs have strong ideologies but it is different from religious beliefs.

• Studies have shown that terrorists rate high on self-esteem.

Question / Comment #3

Has anyone considered looking at how nationalist groups compare to religious groups? There seems to be a curious correlation between the middle class and religious zeal.

• The middle class has more to lose and is less certain about their position. They may be most vulnerable to religious zeal since they had to claw their way out.
• There are very few middle class terrorists. The terrorists from the UK were from the working class but had educational failures.

• We should examine terrorists’ narratives.

**Question / Comment #4**

Sociological studies examining why youth join radical groups support McGregor’s studies. They tend to be overachievers and have an approach-motivated element. When they experience uncertainties of the real world, it may lead to anxiety. The youths may adopt extreme ideology to stabilize their anxiety (No comments from speakers).

**Question / Comment #5**

Every group has leaders and followers. Is there a difference between leaders and followers in terms of efficacy? Suicide bombers can rate high on efficacy.

• A study examining people selected for cannon fodder came from difficult situations but had high efficacy.

• Studies on extremist Palestinians showed that they rate high on self-esteem.

**4.2.2 Todd Hataley, Christian Leuprecht, and Rick Ruddell**

**Question / Comment #1**

Do you plan to apply behavioural templates to your work [directed to Hataley and Leuprecht]?

• I am interested in anything.

**Question / Comment #2**

Your N in this study is quite small and you must be careful with any conclusions. You may be able to increase the N by diversifying the type of terrorism (e.g., anti-abortion demonstrations). Can you explain why it is so low in this study [directed to Hataley and Leuprecht]?

• There is more in Canada but we had to keep a narrow focus, and focused on individuals. We needed to know who committed a terrorist act so that we could get information about their socio-economic class.
• You can obtain regional indicators for the location of the act at the time of the act.

• It was a challenge to gather data in Canada compared to Europe. We need to reconstruct information with open source data (e.g., from Justice).

**Question / Comment #3**

Your N is small because plea bargaining renders charges lower (e.g., sex offence is plea bargained down to trespass) [directed to Hataley and Leuprecht].

• Our starting point is incidents, not charges and convictions.

• The advantage of working with people who have been convicted is that you can get anecdotal evidence, but you must specifically look at trial transcripts for unbiased evidence.

### 4.2.3 Elaine Pressman

**Question / Comment #1**

Who could VERA be useful for?

• It can be used for someone already in the criminal justice system to see who is more dangerous. It can also be used for dangerous extremists already in the justice system. Individual risk assessment decontextualizes the person. You should take into account the type of action or structure of action committed. The small N is a problem.

• Risk assessment is based on individuals rather than differentiating among groups.

**Question / Comment #2**

How do you deal with false positives and false negatives?

• The tool is based on empirical research meaning that the items on the assessment tool were identified by a literature review and by professional choice. The Ns are so low that they cannot be tested empirically.

**Question / Comment #3**

Do you see the tool useful at arrest?
• Yes, it is useful to use as structured observation – it is a standardized approach.

**Question / Comment #4**

Is the VERA an additive scale?

• I specifically stayed away from a quantitative approach. Grading is done according to criteria on low, medium, high on each item. A multi-dimensional approach (i.e., using interviews, transcripts, historical info, and background info) should also be employed.

**Question / Comment #5**

This indicator is a “garbage in garbage out” assessment tool because it is based on existing research and information. It works for what we know now.

• That is how risk assessment tools work now. They are revised as new evidence becomes available.

• There is a risk that these assessments will be used by authorities without training and background.

• We need to make sure that those who use this assessment must be trained in a systematic method of application.
5 SUMMARY OF BREAK-OUT AND PLENARY DISCUSSION SESSIONS

This section details the main points of the discussions to explore key questions related to radicalization in the national economic climate. Volunteers from each team presented the main points of the discussion. Participants produced a list of what they see as the main factors associated with the economy and radicalization, and the consequent implications for Canada’s security and social stability.

5.1 Day 1

5.1.1 Question 1. What factors contribute to Canada’s vulnerability to violent radicalization in the wake of an internal economic crisis?

5.1.1.1 Blue team’s main points

Recognizing that certain groups are historically more likely than others to participate in violent radicalization, a new question was raised: “who is more vulnerable to succumb(ing) to extremism?” In addition, it was felt that there was insufficient evidence—that even if there is an economic downturn—that “an economic crisis” causes vulnerability sufficient to cause violent extremism. Therefore, a second question was posed: “Is crisis significant enough to result in violent extremism?”

Team members recognized that, yes, there are particularly vulnerable groups and that some of these groups are more prone to violent acts. Recognizing this, the following four factors were identified as contributing to Canada’s vulnerability to violent radicalization in the wake of an internal economic crisis.

- **Factor 1.** Perceived inequalities between the group and reference groups as they relate to policy and procedural components associated with economy and government response.

- **Factor 2.** Inability of government to direct spending/budget towards “Immersion” programs for minority groups to maintain a stable social fabric.

- **Factor 3.** Limited upward mobility amongst minority groups is heightened in an economic downturn. There is limited recourse in government spending to address the issue.

- **Factor 4.** Poor management of Canada’s banking system, natural resources, and international relations by the government could make us more susceptible to inadequate spending/programs by the government.
5.1.2 Green team’s main points

The following main points were derived from the discussions during the break-out session.

- There is little evidence to suggest that radicalization in Canada is significantly more prevalent than when Canada was not undergoing an economic recession.

- “Contributing Catalyst”. Radicalization may be the manifestation of perceived procedural injustice faced by immigrant communities. In essence, the economic crisis may serve as an aggravating or contributing factor to radicalization, rather than as a direct causal factor.

- The reference group for first generation immigrants is communities from home countries. Researchers have found that first generation immigrants are quite satisfied with their position in Canadian society, regardless of whether their status was drastically lowered as a result of their immigration (e.g., from a doctor to a janitor). The reference group for second generation Canadians is non-immigrant populations. Second generation Canadians may be angered at the injustices they feel their parents have faced (e.g., underemployment). They compare their status to those of other Canadian citizens who did not, in recent generations, immigrate to Canada.

- They feel deprivation relative to the opportunities they expected to achieve. They often have high expectations for employment and economic opportunities and feel as though their expectations are not being met. In this sense, they are experiencing relative deprivation of employment and income prospects and thus a national economic crisis may directly affect radicalization.

- Second generation youth in Canadian society are not able to integrate as well as the second generation immigrants in European counties; they are under and unemployed, and cannot gain the same employment opportunities as immigrants who immigrate to Europe.

- An outreach program may be beneficial to promote multiculturalism.

5.1.3 Question 2. What factors contribute to Canada’s resilience to violent radicalization in the wake of an internal economic crisis?

5.1.3.1 Red team’s main points

The following factors contribute to Canada’s resilience to violent radicalization in the wake of an internal economic crisis.

- Social safety net that would mitigate pressures (e.g., when unemployment/inflation is high). There are many necessary and helpful programs out there, but none of them are sufficient.
• **Cultural Mosaic.** Through the mosaic model, individuals from immigrant communities can be encouraged to celebrate their indigenous culture. This may act as a resilience factor that may prevent them from being psychologically inclined to hostile extremes.

• **Recognition of being part of a wider society to be celebrated.** Community integration—immigrants with ghettoized mentalities eventually emerge from those mentalities to become part of the larger picture when there is a sense of security, collaboration with other groups, and recognition of being part of a wider society.

• **Fewer barriers to mobility.** More interactions and mobility (between classes)—people are not pigeon-holed and upward mobility is possible.

• **Economic crisis has not been as severe.** In Canada, the economic crisis has not had as big of an impact/effect on our way of life as is in other countries, and cannot really be compared to other international communities. The less severe economic crisis has contributed to Canada’s resilience to radicalization. Banks have not been affected as much, and the crisis has not gone on for as long, nor has it gone as ‘deep’.

5.1.3.2 **Yellow team’s main points**

The Yellow team first attempted to address this question by identifying if there was a relationship between economic crises and radicalization and secondly by addressing the question, “Is the economic crisis a root cause or factor that leads to radicalization?” They concluded that there is an indirect relationship such that the economy is circumstantial—it provides the tipping point to produce radicalization. It was felt that relative deprivation may play a mediating role in that disadvantaged groups may feel aggrieved (e.g., unemployed, Aboriginal groups). However, Canada’s social safety nets provide resilience to radicalization. The following factors were believed to contribute to Canada’s resilience to violent radicalization in the wake of an internal economic crisis.

1. Tolerance/diversity cushion.

2. Social welfare net.

3. Appeals to the different forms of extremism are exclusive (not universal). For instance, jihad is very restricted to extremist Muslims (i.e., it doesn’t appeal to most Canadians). It is a fragmented movement.
5.1.4 Question 3. How might radicalization arising from economic factors in other countries generate or influence radicalization in Canada?

5.1.4.1 Blue team’s main points

The following issues leading to radicalization arising from economic factors were also identified as influencing radicalization in Canada.

1. **Wars overseas.** For example, there are individuals who go for training overseas and may not participate in the wars. They acquire para-military training which they bring with them back to Canada.

2. **Remittances: Fundraising in Canada.** For example, recruiting for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri-Lanka) in Canada gain financial support from donations earned by gaining sympathy for their cause.

3. **Canadian Policy.** It can be a source of grievance. For example, immigrants to Canada may suffer due to provision or withdrawal of aid to their native countries, and trade restrictions.

4. **Larger ethnic group.** There is a greater potential for issues developing with that group if they have economic strife in the homeland.

5. **Importing conflict.** Situations in other countries can lead to undesirable activities occurring in Canada, regardless of whether those situations are actually demonstrably directed at Canadian interests.

5.1.4.2 Red team’s main points

The following issues leading to radicalization arising from economic factors were also identified as influencing radicalization in Canada.

1. **Interconnectedness (of communications and economies) and Immediacy.** The ability to easily access a lot of unedited and un-moderated information allow consumers to interpret it any way they like. This leads to a greater inter-connectivity between communities and economic systems and it is not bounded by geographic boundaries. Immediacy of information sharing is still thrilling—people get excited by receiving news immediately.

2. **Models of Justice.** Models of fairness and justice can cross borders. Issues of justice and fairness have been challenging for Canada.

3. **Transference.** Immigration and the flow of resources (3 million Canadians live abroad). There are very few barriers, and a lot of flow of resources back and forth to support families overseas (i.e., there is a risk of deprivation).

4. **Flight from Xenophobia.** Canada’s openness is attractive to others, and it may be good place to flee from xenophobia; is immigration, then, too easy?
5. *Ultimately fewer barriers.* Immigration policies in harder hit countries may be tougher, so radicals stay where they are, as it is tougher to go somewhere else (e.g., need to make immigration policies tougher in Canada to prevent the immigration of radical individuals).

### 5.1.5 Question 4. What can be done to help i) prevent, ii) detect, and iii) mitigate potential threats of radicalization in the wake of an internal economic crisis?

#### 5.1.5.1 Yellow team’s main points

1. **Prevention (builds tolerance):**
   a. Education: try to increase cultural competency, tolerance, and acceptance of diversity; address the problem of racial profiling.
   b. Maintain Canada’s safety net (will require increased taxes).
   c. De-fuse grievances, encourage grass-roots / alternative programs, integrate (co-opt) elites.

2. **Detect:**
   a. Local, local, local (community-based policing).
   b. Rapport building (cross-over with grass-roots).
   c. Balance detection with basic human rights issues.
   d. Need Big Brother watch (surveillance and intelligence).
   e. Maintain relationship with community while monitoring it.

3. **Mitigate:**
   a. Grass-roots / alternative programs (shows them a way out).
   b. Facilitate education by community leaders. (e.g., QUILLIAM: former jihadist and extremists can educate). Also, educate society about the lack of integration of minority groups.
   c. Restorative justice. Works well with Aboriginal communities.

#### 5.1.5.2 Green team’s main points

The following are the Green Team’s main discussion points in response to answer question 4.

- Making better job opportunities is not the answer.
  - The threat of violent extremism has more to do with moral and social concerns than with job opportunities.
Those who commit acts of violent radicalization tend to be well educated and integrated, but still have high rates of unemployment.

- However, many youths face underemployment, regardless of their backgrounds.

- There is a need for more public relations campaigns to educate people to detect the potential threats of radicalization.

- Include those who identify first with ummah (global community of Muslims), and secondly with Canadian national identity.

5.2 Day 2

5.2.1 Question 5. What is our understanding of radicalization (cognitive, emotive, and motivational characteristics), and is it sufficient to deduce how an economic crisis might spawn radicalization at the individual level?

5.2.1.1 Blue team’s main points

The following items outline the Blue team’s understanding of radicalization and how this might explain the relationship between an economic crisis and radicalization at the individual level:

- Identified radicalization as having 2 aspects: 1) the assumption of violence and 2) it can also involve the “intent”, or willingness, to engage in ideologically-motivated violence.

- In terms of economic uncertainty being a factor, social uncertainty can be an affirmation to existing radicals.

- Personality and contextual factors can enhance or accelerate violent radicalism. Economics is, at best, a secondary intervening factor that can attenuate or intensify the impact of personality and contextual factors on violent radicalism.

- Economics therefore appears to be a secondary factor to spawn radicalization.

- There is a need, therefore, to have interactive models involving cognition, personality, and real-world context to study interactive effects (as opposed to models that weight factors).

- Radicalization is a dynamic process involving the interaction of many factors (e.g., individual choice, one’s economic situation, and social features).
• Also need to look at possible related factors such as optimism and disenfranchisement which may make someone more inclined to commit radical acts.

It is known that economic depressions do not cause revolutions. It is more about perceptions versus capabilities. Relative deprivation is defined as perceived injustice. The following hypothesis was derived by the Blue Team as a result of the aforementioned discussion. That is, egotistic relative deprivation is based on values of fairness. A downturn in the economy may impede someone’s basic goals and an existing ideology is reinforced when that person experiences frustration and anxiety as a result of not being able to achieve his or her goal.

5.2.1.2 Red team’s main points

The following items outline the Red team’s understanding of radicalization and how this might explain the relationship between an economic crisis and radicalization at the individual level:

• Impossible to predict/deduce how one factor (e.g., an economic crisis) will act on the individual, though we may know a lot about the topic of radicalization. The question has a serious flaw.
  – The effect of an economic crisis may be unpredictable with or without comprehensive information on radicalization.
  – There is no one path to radicalization, but there are ideas of the types of paths that are available.

• Protective factors may be helpful to reduce radicalization.

• How do you predict individual choice?

• Understanding of cognitive processes may not be robust enough for reliable prediction of individual actions. It is hard to explain how two individuals with the same internal and external characteristics can experience different cognitive processes.

• The relationship between attitudes and behaviour is an issue. That is, the connection between idea/attitudes/ideals and behaviour/actions is missing.

• We need to understand dynamics between leaders and followers.
  - What happens to small cults/organizations when they are submersed in pressure?

• We need a rich organizational picture to understand the group dynamics. An economic crisis doesn’t necessarily spawn radicalization; it might just be an intervening variable.
5.2.2 Question 6. What is our understanding of radicalization (cognitive, emotive, and motivational characteristics), and is it sufficient to deduce how an economic crisis might spawn radicalization at the group level?

5.2.2.1 Yellow team’s main points

Following a lengthy discussion, the Yellow team determined that “it is not sufficient to deduce how an economic crisis might spawn radicalization at the group level. Economic conditions are not necessary and sufficient, but they may be a contributing factor.” The following main points were identified as potential factors of how an economic crisis might spawn radicalization at the group level:

- We need to differentiate between radicalization (as a process) and violent extremism (as a means to an end).

- The impact of the economic crisis on radicalization is context-specific (geographical area):
  - In the Canadian context, economics may play less of a role than in other parts of the world.
  - But if we look at places like Palestinian territory, Iraq, and Afghanistan, economics are a factor.

- Perhaps the economy has an impact on the environmental movement. That is, the economic crisis is taking focus away from the environmental crisis; this may determine whether environmentalists go the parliamentary way or not.

- One must consider the larger social context. It’s not real deprivation, but perceived deprivation. Not necessarily at the individual level but at the group level (i.e., how one identifies with his or her group vs. other groups).

- Need to consider what is meant by the terms “extremism”, “group”, and “violence”.

- We need to understand the role that small terrorist groups play within the broader socio-cultural group. An economic downturn can provide small groups with an opportunity to mobilize larger socio-cultural groups to political action.

- An economic crisis can have an effect on radicalization of groups because it changes people’s priorities.
5.2.2.2 **Green team’s main points**

The main points that were generated by this team during the break-out sessions are highlighted here.

- Self-radicalization occurs through the internet and social networking sites.
- There is ease of dispersing negative messages and materials of radicalization through the internet.
- Persons act as independent agents of groups.
- Do the authorities act to deal with radical groups/individuals when those groups/individuals initially express their objections to the status quo and their intent to change it? Or should the authorities wait to intervene until a radical group/individual acts to pursue their agenda?

- What differences exist between those who do act and those who don’t?
  - Individual differences.
  - Situational variables / environment.
  - Cultural factors.
  - Group processes.

5.2.3 **Question 7. What can be done to help prevent the development or growth of radicalization in Canada due to external extremist influences? How might this change due to economic distress in Canada, elsewhere, or globally?**

5.2.3.1 **Blue team’s main points**

The Blue team first tried to address the question by characterizing external extremist influences:

- Radicalization is a returnee issue (immigrants who emigrate from countries where there is conflict).
- There are exogenous shocks (e.g., conflict in homeland that impact immigrants’ mental state.
- Trans-national connections: there are currently 3 million Canadians living abroad with Canadian citizenship and who use their Canadian passport to travel.
The following factors that could help prevent the development or growth of radicalization in Canada due to external extremist influences were identified:

- Fill the air with ambient, benign ideals for the plucking by Canadians.

- Encourage outreach by grassroots organizations to foster cross-cultural understanding and identification with Canadian culture. It can be complicated, however, because of cross-cultural differences across communities (i.e., there is no one way to achieve effective outreach).

- Provide access to opportunities among youth (e.g., community resources). This could help address their frustrations and increase their perceptions of fairness within their communities. We need to work towards anti-terrorist efficacy that goes beyond gangs.

- Promote procedural justice by giving people a chance to voice their concerns. The fairness element is about procedural justice; procedural injustice causes frustration and anger.

- Increase inclusion initiatives:
  - Increase English as a Second Language (ESL) education to immigrants.
  - Educational models to increase school performance among youths by helping them feel like they belong.

### 5.2.3.2 Red team’s main points

The Red team identified the following factors that could help prevent the development or growth of radicalization in Canada due to external extremist influences:

- We need to look at the radicalization of inmates in federal institutions, and what to do with those arrested in our society. For example, do we segregate terrorists from other inmates to prevent radicalization of other inmates? Should we allow terrorists access to other inmates?

- We may require an individual-level solution for an individual-level problem. Radicalization is individualistic; prevention and de-radicalization is similarly individualistic.

- The only thing that has been shown to work is increasing various forms of community policing (e.g., by schools officials, police, and church members). They have knowledge of what’s happening with the youths in their community.

- Engage in frequent course correction.

- Funding may not be available for prevention programs.
5.2.3.3  Yellow team’s main points

The following factors were identified by the Yellow team that could help prevent the development or growth of radicalization in Canada due to external extremist influences:

- Improve immigration screening controls to try to prevent individuals with violent backgrounds coming into countries.
- Tighten border controls.
- However, we must be careful not to isolate one population.
- Increase education and community awareness. Educate communities to identify individuals with violent attitudes and identify ways to remove these individuals from the community.
- Have tangible and meaningful political engagement of youth and extremist groups in community programs to show that there is an alternative pathway that can have positive consequences.
- Are we exaggerating the issues / how pervasive is the problem of radicalization? Better monitoring of potential radicalization and grassroots outreach programs is required.

5.2.3.3.1  Green team’s main points

The Green team identified the following factors that could help prevent the development or growth of radicalization in Canada due to external extremist influences:

- Community-based, youth-focused education programs should be enacted to promote critical thinking and goal development.
- Increase general public communication means, and invest in a formal education system.
- Provide venues to allow people the ability to express grievances and support claims. These venues can provide an alternative to violent radicalization. This is a top-down method, grassroots initiative.
- Crack down on and challenge radicalization on the internet.
- Canada fosters an identity of multi-culturalism and peace-keeping. This identity perhaps made Canada less susceptible to the effects of an economic downturn on radicalization.
WORKSHOP SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

The discovery workshop on the topic ‘Radicalization in the National Economic Climate’ brought together a wide variety of academics and practitioners from relevant fields. The group brought a breadth and depth of perspectives to the issue. Two broad conclusions were shared by the participants at this discovery workshop. Firstly, research does not support the existence of a direct relationship between the economy and radicalization. Secondly, the relationship between the economy and radicalization/violent extremism is complex and potentially mediated or moderated by a number of factors. Examples of mechanisms (i.e., mediators) through which economic hardship might facilitate radicalization include: feelings of feelings relative deprivation, religious zeal in response to threat, and antipathy toward the government. Examples of factors that might interact with (i.e., moderate) effects of an economic downturn to facilitate radicalization include: ineffective integration of immigrants and lack of optimism for the future.

Four main themes emerged from the workshop. These are listed in no particular order below.

1. **Relative deprivation may play an important role.** There is some evidence to suggest that some minority groups, particularly immigrants, may feel relatively deprived compared to the majority within their society. They may have certain expectations for employment and economic opportunities which could lead them to feel as though their expectations are not being met. Deprivation was purported to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for radicalization. Additional conditions must also exist, including shared deprivation (i.e., a group identity factor), a lack of alternative institutions, and an emergence of leadership with radical and innovative ideas.

2. **We need better integration of minority groups.** It was widely accepted that some immigrant populations (e.g., Muslim Canadians), particularly second-generation immigrants, may be vulnerable to radicalization when they are not well-integrated into society. These groups, when not well-integrated, might identify with other groups that perceive themselves to be victims of societal injustices. They may be particularly susceptible to recruitment into groups with radical causes.

3. **Economic distress can serve as a catalyst for radicalization.** Research has shown that individuals who are prone to committing radical acts tend to be recent immigrants (first and second generation) who are middle class and educated, and possess anti-capitalist views [and exhibit ethno-religious extremism]. An interesting concept was provided by Phil Gurski who stipulated that Islamists’ anti-capitalist views can fuel radicalization in times of economic distress. This anti-capitalist ideology may lead to an increase in acts of terrorism, especially during times of economic difficulty, as a means to accelerate defeat of the West.

4. **There is a need for grassroots/ alternative programs.** All participants agreed on the need for government policies and strategies to increase the integration of minority groups to defuse community tensions and re-establish trust in the government by these communities. Government mechanisms such as credential evaluation, skills upgrading, and job placement need to be improved in order to better the absorption of immigrant communities into the larger society. Such grassroots initiatives will likely also support more active counter-terrorist measures such as monitoring radical groups for evidence of potential acts of violence.
7  LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAE PS    CAE Professional Services
CORA      Centre for Operational Research and Analysis
CSIS      Canadian Security Intelligence Service
DGMPRA    Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis
DND       Department of National Defense
DRDC      Defence Research and Development Canada
DSRI      Defence and Security Research Institute
ECPR      European Consortium for Political Research
FRSC      Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada
ITAC      Integrated Threat Assessment Centre
NPSIA     Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
RCMP      Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RMCC      Royal Military College of Canada
RD        Relative Deprivation
S&T       Science and Technology
ISSC      International Social Science Council
VERA      Violent Extremist Risk Assessment Protocol
ANNEX A

JOE BARANSKI’S PRESENTATION
Defence R&D Canada (DRDC)

- **Status**
  DRDC is a Special Operating Agency of the Department of National Defence.

- **R&D Objective**
  To ensure the Canadian Forces of the future remain technologically prepared and operationally relevant.

- **Mission**
  To provide Science & Technology leadership and advance and maintain Canada’s Defence and National Security capabilities as a ‘full service’ S&T Organization.

Defence R&D Canada Centers

- **Suffield**
  Chemical & Biological Defence
  Milt. Engineering
  Tactical Vehicles

- **Toronto**
  Human Individual and Collective Performance
  Human-Systems Integration

- **Ottawa**
  Radar Communications
  Electronic Warfare
  Information Operations
  Space Systems

- **Valcartier**
  Electro-optics
  Weapons Systems
  Command & Control
  Information systems

- **Atlantic**
  Undersea Warfare
  Acoustics
  Marine Vehicle Technology

- **CORA**
  Operational Research & Analysis
  CBIS
  Security Sciences

- **Corporate Centre**
  Program Formulation
  Project Direction
  Program Oversight
  S&T Policy

DRDC Resources (2008)

- **Funding**: $350M/yr (2% of DND Budget)
  - ~ 50% of R&D conducted through Canadian Industry and Universities

- **Staff**: 1500 (includes 60 military)
  - 900 Science & Technology employees

- **Matching Contributions from Canadian Industry**: $60M+

- **International Leveraging**: $80M+
  - The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP)
  - Canada, USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand
  - NATO Research and Technology Organization (RTO)
  - Bi-lateral and multi-lateral S&T agreements and arrangements with various nations - US, UK, France, Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden.
**Defence S&T Strategy 2007**

- Containing 3 domains of S&T expertise
  - Human Systems Integration
  - Behavioural Effects
  - Command and Control
  - Personnel Protection

- Containing 11 areas of S&T expertise
  - 6 within the Human Domain
    - Information Domain
    - Physical Domain
    - Command and Control
    - Personnel Protection
    - Weapons Systems
    - Mobile Systems

**Defence R&D Canada Toronto**

- **Vision**
  To become the world leader in integrated Human Effectiveness S&T that impacts upon defence and security.

- **Mission**
  To ensure that Canadian Defence and National Security capabilities exploit the full potential of Human Effectiveness S&T.

**DRDC Toronto’s Program**

- DRDC Toronto is the agency’s center of excellence for Integrated Human Effectiveness S&T
  - Address the broader “Human Domain” in Partnership with DRDC CORA, DGMPRA, and others.
- Collectively DRDC Toronto’s program spans
  - All 3 S&T domains,
  - provides leadership in 2 S&T Areas of Expertise (Behavioural Effects and Human Systems Integration),
  - contributes to an additional 2 (Command and Control and Personnel Protection).

**DRDC Toronto’s Program**

- Is based on 4 themes
  - Individual Readiness
  - Collaborative Performance and Learning
  - Adversarial Intent
  - Human Systems Integration
**DRDC Toronto’s Capabilities**

- **People:**
  - 170 (Civilians) + 70 (CFEME)
  - ~100 S&T workers (~60 DSs + 40 Technologists)
  - Expertise in Integrated Human Effectiveness S&T (Psychology, Physiology, Human Factors, etc.)

- **Tools / Infrastructure:**
  - Major facilities (Diving, Climatic, Centrifuge, SERF, etc.)
  - Other facilities (Team research lab, soldier systems, adaptive interface, etc.)

- **Networks:**
  - National partnerships (Other DRDC Centers, RMC, CFC, NRC, academia)
  - International partnerships (NATO, TTCP, Tri-Lateral, etc.)
  - Defence and Security partnerships (CFD, CMP, CSS, Commands, etc.)

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**Individual Readiness Section**

- Focus on humans in psycho-physiologically stressful environments:
  - **Core S&T Challenge: 10.3 Monitoring, predicting and enhancing psycho-physiological readiness**
    - FIA #1: Defining, measuring and optimizing operational effectiveness under challenging environments (Performance Group).
    - FIA #2: Developing measures to counteract psycho-physiological stress and adversity (Resilience Group).
  - **Support S&T Challenge: 8.2 Diagnostic and adaptive systems for environmental stresses**
    - FIA #3: Monitoring, detecting and preventing psycho-physiological impairment (Diagnosis and Prevention Group).

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**Collaborative Performance and Learning Section**

- Focus on human effectiveness in collective and organisational settings:
  - **Core S&T Challenge: 11.2 Strategies for promoting collaborative behaviour among teams, agencies, organizations, and societies.**
    - FIA #1: Enhance the social and cognitive capabilities of distributed and co-located teams (Distributed Collaboration Group).
    - FIA #2: Enhance the ability of the Canadian Forces to work effectively in culturally diverse environments (Organizational Behaviour Group).
  - **Support S&T Challenge: 10.5 Distributed, adaptable and on-demand learning, training, and rehearsal.**
    - FIA #3: Advance learning and training in JIMP, NOps and command and control environments (Learning & Training Group).

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**Adversarial Intent Section**

- Understanding, forecasting, and influencing the intent of non-cooperative actors at the individual, collective and societal levels:
  - **Core S&T Challenge: 11.1 Understanding, prediction and influence of adversaries’ intent.**
    - FIA #1: Psycho-social intelligence (Thinking, Risk and Intelligence Group)
    - FIA #2: Influence and Effects Group
  - **Support S&T Challenge: 1.3 Effects-based visualization and awareness for the decision maker**
    - FIA #3: Effects-Based Visualization Group
Human Systems Integration Section

- Specifying, developing and implementing effective socio-technical systems:
  - **Core S&T Challenge**: 10.2 Human Systems Integration.
    - FIA #1: Injecting the “Human View” into technology insertion, CD&E, project implementation and planning (Human Engineering Group).
    - FIA #2: Developing and optimizing advanced human-technology interface concepts (Adaptive Interface Group).
  - **Support S&T Challenge**: 1.1 Enhanced Decision Making in C2 Environments
    - FIA #3: Enhancing decision making and decision support concepts (Enhanced Decision Effectiveness Group).

Two S&T Exploitation Sections

- **Human Effectiveness Experimentation Centre (HEEC)**
  - Major Facilities (e.g., Centrifuge, Climatic Suites, Diving facility, Noise Simulation Facility, Group Immersive Simulator, Synthetic Environment Research Facility (SERF))
  - ~ 25 technicians, engineers, computer scientists.
  - Exploitation of mature S&T

- **Aerospace, Undersea, Medical Sciences (AUMS)**
  - LCol led military section (n ~ 25: Medical doctors, technicians)
  - Medical investigation in order to determine operational suitability of referred military personnel with regards to disease, treatment, and mission impact;
  - the evaluation and proposal of solutions for the challenges to force employment and sustainability in austere operational environments;
  - conducting training and operational investigation in the undersea and aerospace medicine fields.

Corporate Services Section

- Vision – to create the conditions necessary for a productive workforce for S&T and government priorities
- Goal – full service business partner that influences organizational goals through the management and delivery of seven distinct Corporate Services functions (~ n = 40):
  - Information Technology Group
  - Communications Group
  - Materiel Management Group
  - Infrastructure & Environment Group
  - Human Resources Group
  - Finance Group
  - Management Support Services Group (AO Community)
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ANNEX B  PETER TIKUISIS’S PRESENTATION
Radicalization Defined

Currently there is no globally accepted definition of Radicalization.

‘(Violent) Radicalization is understood to describe the cognitive transformation in people who decide to take non-democratic and unlawful action to seek a social and/or political change.’

[Note that radicalization is not exclusive to any particular ethno-cultural, racial, religious, national, or other group.]
Stage 1: Causation

- Crisis occurs

Stage 2: Internalization

- Internalization

Stage 3: Organization

- Organization

Stage 4: Manifestation

- Manifestation
Where does the Economic Factor fit?

**Political Instability Index**

“Economic upheaval sharply raises the risk of social unrest and violent protest.”

Where does the Economic Factor fit?

Are national policies suitably robust to deal with an economic crisis and lessen the possibility of a radical response (weak policies might only become apparent during a crisis)?

Where does the Economic Factor fit?

Is our understanding of radicalization (cognitive, emotive, and motivational characteristics) sufficient to deduce how an economic crisis might spawn radicalization at the individual level?
Where does the Economic Factor fit?

Is our understanding of radicalization (cognitive, emotive, and motivational characteristics) sufficient to deduce how an economic crisis might spawn radicalization at the group level?

Is our understanding of organizational processes and structures that facilitate the recruitment of individuals into radicalized groups, and the role of instigators of violence sufficient to inform security forces on the disruption of such groups and their intent?

With special thanks to Dr. Lianne McLellan, Dr. David Mandel, and Matthew Lauder for their valued contributions.
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ANNEX C

MATTHEW LAUDER’S PRESENTATION
Through the Looking-Glass: Self-Reflecting on the Study of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

Matthew A. Lauder, MA, MPhil
Adversarial Intent Section (DRDC Toronto) /
Defence & Security Research Institute (RMCC)
07 Dec 2009

Canada

Three Self-Referencing Points

1. I am encouraged by the broad range of perspectives present at this workshop

2. I argue that ‘the extremist movement’ is diverse and varied, and so are the pathways towards, and reasons for, one’s involvement. Multi-disciplinary perspectives are required.
Three Self-Referencing Points

3. I argue that extremism is not limited to one particular ideology or faith, rather it exists across societies, cultures, and religions – so, let’s not get fixated on one form of extremism and lose sight of the big picture!

Left-Wing / Issue-based Extremism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Incident Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Jan 2006</td>
<td>Guelph</td>
<td>New-build home set on fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>Guelph</td>
<td>Construction equipment vandalized under the name “Anarchist Solidarity”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 June 2006</td>
<td>Guelph</td>
<td>New-build home set on fire, damage est. $200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 July 2006</td>
<td>Guelph</td>
<td>Construction equipment and vehicles damaged at new-build site, under the name of “Anarchist Fire Brigade”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July 2006</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>12 construction vehicles sabotaged, damage est. $2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July 2006</td>
<td>Brantford</td>
<td>Construction vehicles and equipment sabotaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July 2006</td>
<td>Guelph</td>
<td>New-build house set on fire, damage est. $80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 July 2006</td>
<td>Brantford</td>
<td>Three construction sites vandalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Nov 2006</td>
<td>Guelph</td>
<td>ELF attempts to set fire to election office of Guelph Mayor, three banners left reading “If she builds it, we will burn it”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Earth Liberation Front (ELF) related activities, SW Ontario, 2006 – total damage caused approx. $3 million

Right-Wing Extremism

- chart showing the number of active US Hate Groups from 1998 to 2008 with a significant increase from 2000 to 2008.
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ANNEX D  ROBERT BRYM’S PRESENTATION
The Social and Political Gap between Economic Crisis and Radicalization

© Robert J. Brym
Department of Sociology
University of Toronto
rbrym@chass.utoronto.ca

Paper presented at a workshop on Radicalization in the National Economic Climate, Defence Research and Development Canada
Toronto: 7 December 2009

Suicide Bombing, Israel and the Occupied Territories; and Unemployment, West Bank, 1995-2008

Factors Mediating Economic Crisis and Radicalization

- Longstanding grievances
  - expressing persistent sense of injustice

- Articulated ideology
  - specifying ultimate goals, preferred means of achieving them, the demarcation of friends from enemies, and so on

- Social cohesion
  - involving frequent and close social interaction based on common occupational, ethnic, religious, and other memberships and sustained by friendship and kinship ties

- Political organization
  - providing a routinized framework for translating ire into action aimed at achieving group goals

Strikes and Unemployment, Canada, 1976-2000

\[ r = -0.297 \]

Suicide bombings

\[ r = 0.769 \]
The Social Standing of Muslims in Canada, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims in Canada</th>
<th>All Canadians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 yrs+ with university degree (%)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median income (index)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Improving Mechanisms of Immigrant Absorption

- Credential evaluation
  - introduce standardized mechanisms for evaluating credentials and identifying skill gaps
- Skills upgrading
  - create and fund programs aimed at skills upgrading
- Placement
  - create agency to help employers find qualified personnel and vice-versa

Factors Mediating Economic Crisis and Radicalization

- Longstanding grievances
  - expressing persistent sense of injustice
- Articulated ideology
  - specifying ultimate goals, preferred means of achieving them, the demarcation of friends from enemies, and so on
- Social cohesion
  - involving frequent and close social interaction based on common occupational, ethnic, religious, and other memberships and sustained by friendship and kinship ties
- Political organization
  - providing a routinized framework for translating ire into action aimed at achieving group goals

Social Homogeneity vs. Social Heterogeneity

Social homogeneity encourages similarity of outlook and social cohesiveness, and facilitates recruitment to radical causes. Social heterogeneity limits similarity of outlook and social cohesiveness, and hinders recruitment to radical causes.
Factors Mediating Economic Crisis and Radicalization

- Longstanding grievances
  - expressing persistent sense of injustice
- Articulated ideology
  - specifying ultimate goals, preferred means of achieving them, the demarcation of friends from enemies, and so on
- Social cohesion
  - involving frequent and close social interaction based on common occupational, ethnic, religious, and other memberships and sustained by friendship and kinship ties
- Political organization
  - providing a routinized framework for translating ire into action aimed at achieving group goals

Surveillance Sites

- Jihadi websites
- Non-jihadi criminal groups that finance jihadi cells;
- Study, public service and friendship groups formed through mosques and non-jihadist, fundamentalist movements
- Jihadi cliques formed in prison or through association with former jihadi inmates
- Friendship groups formed around retail facilities frequented by Muslims
ANNEX E  CAS MUDDE’S PRESENTATION
RADICALIZATION IN THE WAKE OF A GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

CAS MUDDE
University of Antwerp & University of Notre Dame

THE PREMISE
ECONOMIC CRISIS leads to POLITICAL CRISIS

(1929 – KRACH – HITLER)

THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT
ECONOMIC CRISIS
leads to
INSECURITY & CONFUSION
lead to
SUPPORT FOR RADICAL (RIGHT) PARTIES

THE EMPIRICS
INCONCLUSIVE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
E.G.: - OIL CRISIS in 1970s
- EASTERN EUROPE since 1989
Since 1980s RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES often STRONG(ER) in RICHER (parts of) COUNTRIES (e.g. A, N, VL)
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW

ECONOMIC CRISIS HAS (AT LEAST) TWO POLITICAL EFFECTS.

SHORT-TERM: INCREASED SALIENCE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES

PLAY IT SAFE => MAINSTREAM PARTIES

RADICAL RIGHT WILL NOT PROFIT!

MOST SALIENT ISSUES (10-11 2008)

NO SHORT-TERM SUCCESS, BUT...

HOW ABOUT THE LONG-TERM?

(1) RETURN TO PRE-CRISIS?

(2) A QUESTION OF PATIENCE?

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© Sa majesté la reine, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2010
EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

SATISFACTION WITH OWN LIFE

CONCLUSION

THERE IS NO UNIVERSAL DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC 'CRISIS' AND SUPPORT FOR RADICAL PARTIES.

THE SHORT-TERM EFFECT IS EVEN NEGATIVE FOR RADICAL PARTIES.

THE LONG-TERM EFFECT DEPENDS ON MANY FACTORS, MOST OF WHICH ARE LARGELY IN THE HANDS OF MAINSTREAM PARTIES.
ANNEX F LORNE DAWSON’S PRESENTATION
Deprivation and the Process of Radicalization: A Theoretical Overview

LORNE L. DAWSON
UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO
DRDC DISCOVERY WORKSHOP:
“RADICALIZATION IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC CLIMATE”
TORONTO, DEC. 7&8, 2009

Deprivation Assumption & Its Problems

- post 9/11 - politicians, policy makers, scholars, ordinary citizens assume root cause of terrorism is poverty and lack of education
- other research reveals:
  - (1) disproportionately from well-educated, middle class, high income families*
  - (2) disproportionately upwardly mobile individuals
  - (3) not necessarily from poor countries
  - (4) weak aggregate link between terrorism and lack of economic opportunity
  - (5) positive correlation of support for terrorism with income and education
  - caution: poverty → revolution linkage = influence of civil war/ethnic strife

*(e.g., Sageman 2004: 71% of sample had some college & 43 % professionals)
(e.g., Krueger & Malečková 2003; Sageman 2004; Krueger 2007; Berrebi 2007)

Deprivation Assumption – cont’d

- But ...
  - correlation not proof of causality, and lack of correlation does not necessarily imply lack of causality
  - micro-level data limited and inconsistent, especially for home-grown terrorists (Silke 2008: 1 % of research based on systematic interviews, and none with home-grown jihadis)
  - difficult to drawn micro-level conclusions from macro (aggregate data)
  - must differentiate overseas terrorists & home-grown
  - many 9/11 and other terrorists “under-employed” and perhaps marginalized/alienated in other ways (e.g., living in foreign land; status inconsistencies)
  - need to differentiate leaders and foot soldiers (especially in overseas contexts, but also home-grown)

Deprivation Assumption – cont’d

- theoretical & common sense reasons for continued role of “deprivation” for radicalization – but is “relative deprivation” (RD)
- implicit in most discussions of “root causes” of terrorism (explicit in few cases, e.g., Victoroff 2005) – but treatment is vague, limited, inaccurate
- e.g.: Anne Speckhard “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism” (2007)
  - two motivational sets:
    - (1) within active zones of conflict: actors traumatized, dissociative, seeking revenge
    - (2) outside active zones of conflict: actors have some kind of “secondary traumatization,” through media, and vulnerable to ideology due to “sense of alienation, marginalization, lack of life meaning, and lack of positive identity"
  - (1) plausible & substantiated by data; (2) plausible but speculative; lacks specifics/data; based on experience of European Muslims; RD not mentioned (but implied); (3) not clear how alienation, etc., leads to terrorism per se (causal link missing)
Relative Deprivation Theory

- **basic premise**: If people perceive a discrepancy between their value expectations (i.e., the goods and conditions they believe they are entitled to) and their value capabilities (i.e., the goods and conditions they are capable of getting and keeping), and they do not accept some explanation for their deprivation, there will be an incentive to support movements for social change and social conflict. (Glock 1964 & Gurr 1970 modified)
  - is subjective (deprivation may or may be objective)
  - is cognitive and affective (perception and feeling)
  - motivational underpinnings: frustration → anger → aggression
  - involves comparison/evaluation – primarily with “reference group,” but some also include a past condition, or abstract ideal, or standards articulated by leader
  - is a matter of degree (i.e., the intensity of the felt discrepancy)
  - may not be fully conscious
  - is learned behaviour
  - is a ‘necessary’ condition for radicalization, but not ‘sufficient’
  - additional conditions: deprivation is shared (group identity vital factor); no alternative institutional means of resolving; emergence of leadership with innovative ideas

Relative Deprivation Theory – cont’d

- **chequered history of theory**:
  - irrational motivation for collective behaviour, movements of social and religious protest
  - sectarianism and linkage of real economic deprivation & religious compensation (Niebuhr 1929; Pope 1942)
  - problem: social & religious mov’ts of 1960s; rising SES of sectarians
  - introduction of relative deprivation (RD)
  - old idea, implicit in de Tocqueville (re: French Revolution), Marx and Engels, Weber
  - first modern formulation: S. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier: Adjustment to Army Life* (1949); developed in social psychological & social movement research (e.g., Davis 1959; Pettigrew 1967; Glock 1964; Runciman 1966; Gurr 1970).
  - discredited by strong critiques (e.g., McPhail 1971; Gurney & Tierney 1982)
  - displaced by social identity theory & resource mobilization theory in 1980s
  - yet never really abandoned, & revived and refined significantly in 1990s

Five Forms of Relative Deprivation

- Glock (1964):
  - economic: differential distribution of wealth
  - social: differential distribution of status, prestige, signs of power
  - psychic: differential distribution of love, affection, and other psychological rewards
  - organismic: differential distribution of mental and physical health
  - ethical: differential distribution of satisfaction with dominant values

  - **ethical** = least clear and developed, yet perhaps most crucial; Glock sees as most overtly religious and likely to emerge in absence of other forms of deprivation (fit profile of most home-grown terrorists?; the “moral outrage” stressed by Sageman 2008)

Three Pattern’s of RD

- Gurr (1970)
  - **decremental**: steady value expectations, declining value capabilities
  - **aspirational**: sharply rising value expectations, and constant value capabilities
  - **progressive**: rising value expectations & capabilities, with eventual fall off and decline of capabilities
The Critique

- **key criticisms (simplified):**
  - use solely with regard to reference groups or some broader basis of comparison?
  - types and patterns of RD - objective circumstances or perceptions (affects how they are measured)?
  - does RD actually create frustration/aggression – how? how much? how measure?
  - too readily assuming individual experience accounts for a group phenomenon (too reductionistic)

Critique

- **cont’d:**
  - RD research largely post hoc – cannot show whether perceptions of RD are cause or consequence of collective action
  - inconsistent application in empirical studies (theoretically & methodologically)

All above correctable, more problematic:

- nonparticipants, as well as participants, might be experiencing RD; RD might be present in varying degrees among participants; in fact variation in RD among participants may be greater than between participants and nonparticipants
- given alternatives, need further specification of why a small proportion actually turn to violence?

Gurney & Tierney (1982: 40): “[The] failure to link convincingly psychological states with antecedent societal conditions on the one hand and with subsequent movement participation on the other is the Achilles heel of RD research.”

New Research/New Opportunities

- criticisms can be deflected: (1) they are premised on a level of explanatory rigour in excess of needs in improving grasp of home-grown terrorist radicalization; (2) are key refinements not considered that resolve some issues and demonstrate the value of applying to radicalization:
  - focus consistently on “reference groups”
  - egositic & fraternalistic RD (Runciman 1961) – only latter correlates with social action (i.e., agitation for & against structural change)
  - distributive (outcomes) & procedural (fair treatment) justice – stronger link of latter to social action

Application

- through primary & secondary research seek evidence about:
  - whether home-grown terrorists are experiencing RD?
  - is it fraternalistic?
  - what is the reference group?
  - what type (e.g., social, ethical, etc.) of RD involved?
  - what pattern of RD involved?
  - are grievances distributive or procedural?
  - precursor to “moral outrage” and “vicarious traumatization”? details of nature, intensity, scope, etc.
  - how originated, and developed
  - details of group-interactive processes: consciousness raising, identification, & solidarity (entail considerations of ideology & leadership)
### Why Turn to RD?
- establish a common explanatory language, to bring greater sense and order to discussion of “root causes” of terrorism
- one which makes more claims testable
- link terrorist radicalization to the many other social phenomena treated in RD literature - systematic grounds for enlightening comparative analysis
- reduces the “extra-ordinariness” or “unique” character of terrorism, which aids real comprehension and hence more effective counter-terrorist strategies

### Findings & Role of Religion
- key role of “sense of entitlement,” of “deservingness” in RD: points to role of ideology, especially moralistic/totalistic one (e.g., Islamic fundamentalism, Christian Identity)
- key role of “normative” influence of reference group, and not just “comparative” role in FRD: religion particularly suited to cultivating (e.g., “setting the milieu”) and framing “moral outrage”
- key role of social identification & in-group solidarity in FRD: traditional function of religious ideology & organizational structures (and pre-exist)

### Final Inference/Conclusion
- approach encompasses the existing orientation to “root causes” of terrorism, but points to and favours adopting a more “processual” approach to radicalization
  - as advocated by J. Horgan
  - as long advocated by Symbolic Interactionists, and others, in sociology (e.g., R. Prus and “generic social processes”)
- RD = partial explanation of push; need to give due regard to the positive pull (Hine 1974; Sageman, 2008)
ANNEX G       PAUL BRAMADAT’S PRESENTATION
An Ambiguous Legacy

- In general, secularism was and is very effective at constraining certain (usually “illiberal”) religious influences in the political and legal spheres in Europe and North America
- However, in its early phases, it led to political arrangements that have not prepared us well for the current situation of religious diversity and mobility
- Also, it tended to produce “religious illiteracy”

Two main approaches to religion in Canadian society:

1. Ethnocentric/racist/xenophobic essentialism according to which all religions, or (usually) particular religions, are seen as inherently pernicious or illiberal
2. Naive essentialism according to which (usually) all religions, or particular religions, are seen as inherently worthy and appropriate for modern liberal democracies; this second form is more pervasive among policy makers and among the elite
Naive Essentialism....

- Leads to notion that religion is merely a “multiplier” in political or social conflicts
- Leads to the notion that the liberal democratic “minimalist” approach to religion is natural
- Leads to the notion that explicitly religious violent acts or claims are ruses, or psychopathic acts
- Makes it difficult to pay attention to religion on its own terms because it is seen as an epiphenomenon

My case

- We need to take religion seriously on its own terms; to avoid doing this means we will miss a chance to appreciate and work with (or against) the logic of the individuals and communities interested in dialogue (and most are interested in some kind of dialogue)
- It also means we will miss a chance to address some of their concerns and (perhaps) improve our own societies in some ways

Some questions we should ask ourselves

- 1. Do we assume that all religions are essentially sweet and lovely?
- 2. Do we assume that all religions, or just particular religions, are essentially pernicious?
- 3. Do we assume that under circumstances of material plenty and social cohesion people will naturally opt for a minimalist or liberal approach to religion?
- 4. Do we assume that there will never be or there never ought to be a reconsideration of secularist claims about the need to keep religion out of the public sphere, or constrained within it?
- 5. Do we assume there is overwhelming evidence (or no evidence at all) to justify the focus on Muslims?

Radicalization and the Economic Crisis

- Overlapping but instructive social phenomena:
  - H1N1 conspiracies
  - 9/11 conspiracies
  - The Secret (book, website, industry)
  - The DaVinci Code (viewed by many as investigative journalism in the form of a novel)

  All four of these examples purport to offer coherent and encompassing (perhaps “post-religious”) accounts of the current period of uncertainty; all four are wildly popular.
Likelihood of significant radicalization in Canada?

- Not very high
- However, some provisos:
  - Very few radicalized individuals can have an enormous effect
  - Small groups are inherently unpredictable
  - Viral communications media foster rumour, suspicion, and bonding social capital within globally-linked groups
  - Global social and political tensions (pre-dating crisis) make addressing broader concerns difficult

In conclusion

- While the growth of radicalization in Canada is not likely to be directly attributable to the current recession, if this economic crisis leads to a deterioration in a rights framework minorities (and others) consider to be integral to Canadian society, a small number may come to view the changes as vindictive personal attacks tantamount to an attack on their individual and communal (religious) identities
- As such, during this period of economic uncertainty, the state could improve relationships with such communities and strengthen social policies aimed at inclusion
GOING FOR BROKE: ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS AND THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM

MAIN THEMES
- How do Islamist extremists view capitalism? - Sayyid Qutb
- How do extremists see the effect of their actions on capitalism?
- What is the actual cost of Islamist terrorism?

ISLAM AND CAPITALISM
- Islam recognizes free enterprise and ownership
- Islam does not recognize the payment of interest
- Islamic banking has risen to take the place of capitalist systems
- Islam is concerned foremost with justice and fairness, although it does recognize individual abilities

SAYYID QUTB AND CAPITALISM
- European models based on greed
- Materialism is jahili
- Islam alone establishes moral and human values
- Under Islam, no preferential treatment in acquiring wealth
- East no better than West
MODERN ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS AND CAPITALISM

- Abu Basir Al-Tartusi: capitalism is the root cause of the global financial crisis
- Adam Gadahn: “escalating chaos and looming crisis”
- Taliban: US cannot win in a recession
- Al-Sahab: 9/11 caused the economic crisis

WHAT IS THE ACTUAL COST OF TERRORISM?

- 9/11: $25 billion in lost assets and clean-up alone (cost of attack <$500,000)
- Madrid: 212 million €
- Washington sniper: $150 million
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ANNEX I  BILL MAGEE’S PRESENTATION
How Effects of Economic Crises on Subjective Wellbeing May Influence Extremism
Bill Magee & Amy Klassen, University of Toronto

1. Programmatic Politically Motivated (e.g. terrorists)
2. “Spontaneously” Enraged Who Engage in Sporadic / Spasmodic Violence
3. Economically Motivated Actors (i.e. Gangs - non-government and government affiliated)
4. Individual Actors (i.e. the “Temporarily Insane”)
5. Sympathizers

1. Programmatic Politically Motivated (Terrorists)
   - Research suggests, but does not demonstrate, that economic crises are unlikely to influence people to become terrorists
   - Terrorists are “not Robin Hoods”... they have political agenda (e.g. control over land) - economic agenda are secondary (Kreuger)
   - The logic of terrorism is consistent with idea that terrorists are likely to seize on an economic crisis as an opportunity to further destabilize an already destabilized system

2. Spasmodic Extreme Violence Linking Individualized Reactions to (Jonathan H. Turner)

5. Sympathy For Radical Change, Group Differentiation & Group Conflict 

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4. Individual Actors - “Temporarily Insane” extremists

- Rhetoric around extremism sometimes confuses types of extremists, and justifies inequitable restrictions of freedoms and resource allocations.
- Economic crisis and cuts to welfare programs (e.g. unemployment insurance) may
  - increasingly marginalize the already marginalized,
  - and may reduce the individualization & internalization of grievances, and thus lead to a more politicized responses.
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ANNEX J ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY FROM BILL MAGEE & AMY KLASSEN
Annotated Bibliography for DRDC Workshop  December 8, 2009
Bill Magee and Amy Klassen, University of Toronto, Sociology

I. Economics & Extreme Actions

Terrorism: (see the paper by Robert Brym for additional references):
Alan B. Krueger. *What makes a terrorist? : economics and the roots of terrorism*
*Note:* Analyses are consistent with the conclusion that terrorists are not relatively economically deprived, and if anything are relatively advantaged. This does not inform us about motivations around economic trends and crisis. In particular, it says nothing about the relation between economic crisis and the frequency of terrorist attacks.

Sporadic, Less Centrally Organized Group-on-Group Violence:
Case studies and histories are unclear about role of economic factors.

Violent Conflict Among Governmental & Non-governmental Regimes:
*Note:* Argue that a sequence can be identified in which grievances lead to opposition against the state. The state increasingly responds to mobilized opposition with force. The elite/vanguard are unable to provide economic incentives comparable to those offered by the state, but can still provide protection. Protection leads to radicalization of nonelite, & greater organized resistance. Economic incentives are critical maintaining action/ participation of nonelite at this point. Implication is that capacity for mass extremist action (e.g. revolution) may be limited by economic crises. Thus economic crises may reduce the numbers of people involved in violent oppositional extremism, if not also the numbers involved in the violent oppression of extremism.

*Note:* Using case study evidence argues that violence increased following an economic downturn, and was substantially due to gangs recruiting unemployed youth for "security details".
II. Economics and WellBeing

Suicide:
*Note:* Analyses suggest that in richer OECD countries (24 countries including Canada) suicide increases as economic conditions deteriorate. This is consistent with other research suggesting a *countercyclical* effect of economy on suicide. However, in poorer countries suicide rates seem to be *procylical*. Canada is in the richer country group, with data extending from 1980-2002. Note, other studies show even in poor countries (Russia) economic downturns can be associated with increased suicide.

Health & Mental Health:
*Note:* This paper illustrates the complexity of the issues - Deaths attributed to heart disease, pneumonia, accidents, liver disease, and senility—making up about 41% of total mortality—tend to fluctuate *procyclically*, increasing in expansions. Suicides, as well as deaths attributable to diabetes and hypertensive disease make up about 4% of total mortality, and fluctuate *countercyclically*, increasing in recessions. Deaths attributed to other causes, making up about half of total deaths, *don't show a clearly defined relationship* with the fluctuations of the economy.

*Note:* This study is one of many that *qualifies the procylical conclusion of Granados*, above. Brenner finds that, holding constant the effects of tobacco, animal fats and alcohol, increased income and social welfare expenditures are related to heart disease mortality rate declines, whereas increased unemployment and business failure rates are associated with heart disease increases over more than a decade.

Happiness, Satisfaction, Psychological Distress:
*Note:* Downward economic cycles decrease happiness and life satisfaction, and increase psychological distress. The effects seem to be mild in the aggregate. These aggregate level effects may be explained by individual level outcomes. Other research indicates strong effects of unemployment on distress at the individual level.

*Note:* This paper shows that economic downturns have effects on distress and dissatisfaction among the employed, not just the unemployed. These effects occur through job restructuring in periods of recession. Implication is that negative reactions are not confined to those who have lost the most.
Shame (individual level):


Note: There is some evidence that unemployed feel relatively more shame.

Alan Dolan (2007) "Good luck to them if they can get it: exploring working class men's understandings and experiences of income inequality and material standards" Sociology of Health & Illness Vol. 29 No. 5 2007 ISSN 0141-9889, pp. 711–729.

Note: Shame usually arises not as a direct result of being poor or not having a job, but instead as a result of others' reactions to that status or condition.

III. Wellbeing & Extreme Actions

Wellbeing in General:


Note: This is a theoretical paper that focuses on material welfare rather than wellbeing, but the theory also applies to wellbeing.

Shame/ Esteem:


Note: This is a theoretical paper by a sociologist. The assertion is that the theoretical analysis applies to a broad range of extreme violence. The most relevant idea is that socioeconomic downturns may contribute to extreme violence if (a)


Note: Once recruited and honored for their choice, suicide attackers are motivated to carry out the attacks because they know they would suffer a severe loss of status if they backed out. Also, cites other research which notes that emotional distress and moral outrage associated with experiences of humiliation frequently motivate suicide attacks.


Note: excellent outline of the relevant elements of psychological explanations.


Note: Includes a brief review of humiliation and perceived injustice in terrorism, along with other psychological motivators made many academics.

Note: Refers to research which shows that high unstable self-esteem is a likely characteristic of terrorists.

Mental Illness:

Note: "...comparative research on the psychology of terrorists does not reveal major psychopathology, agreeing with the finding of Martha Crenshaw (1981) that 'the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality.' Others studying Algerian & IRA terrorists also find 'the best documented generalization is... terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology.' (p128)


Note: Very early corrective to claims that terrorists are mentally deranged.

Relative Deprivation/ Perceived Inequities:

Note: Relative deprivation has repeatedly been tested and rejected as a direct cause of extremist action. However, it may be a contributing factor under some circumstances.

IV. Misdirected Concerns of Politicians and The Newsmedia


Note: see “Introduction” pp 1-25 where quotes document claims that terrorists are portrayed being motivated by psychological problems rather than political interests. These delegitimizing portrayals may contribute to misdirected public policy and general population reactions.


Note: A recent analysis of effects of fear of extremism on domestic policies.
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Effects of Uncertainty Threats on Attitude Polarization

Ian McGregor
Kyle Nash
Mike Prentice

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

Goal Regulation

Conflicted
Absorbed
Approach

ACC
Uh-Oh!

BIS
Anxious Vigilance
Absorbed
Approach

Palliative, Maladaptive, Eager Approach

Idealistic, Palliative, Maladaptive, Eager Approach?

Palliative Approach

Of Goals
→ Absorbed in the goal
→ Goal irrelevant anxieties “shielded”

Of Ideals
→ “Tranquil-mindedness under naturally agitating circumstances.”
→ “Sand/grit of selfhood disappear”

+ Anger
Eager Approach of Ideals
(Carver & Scheier; Powers; Higgins; Vallacher & Wegner)

Ideals, Meanings, Values, Worldviews, Self-Guides

Concrete Goals

Personal Uncertainty → Eager Extremes

Uncertainty Threat

Approach
Avoid

Eager Ideological Extremes

1: Personal Uncertainty → Meaning Quest
(McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, Psychological Inquiry, 2009)

Religious Zeal Scale

- Confident
- Grounded in objective truth
- Most people would agree if understood
- Would support a war to defend
- Believe in heart more correct than others’
2: Personal Uncertainty → Religious Zeal

(McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, Psychological Inquiry, 2009)

3: Uncertainty Aversion and Religious Zeal

(McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, raw data)

Extremes of Religious Rapture

- alacrity of the soul
- infinite strength
- endless vitality
- increased energy and vigor
- freedom
- courage
- buoyancy
- walking on air
- swimming in beams of sun
- soaring on eagles wings

Approach Motivation

Academic Uncertainty

Where \( n \) (eta) is an \( m \) by 1 vector of latent endogenous variables; \( \xi \) (xi) is an \( n \) by 1 vector of latent exogenous variables; \( B \) (beta) is an \( m \) by \( m \) matrix of coefficients of the effects of endogenous on endogenous variables; \( r \) (gamma) is an \( n \) by \( n \) matrix of coefficients of the effects of exogenous variables \( (\xi \text{'s}) \) on endogenous variables \( (\eta \text{'s}) \); \( \zeta \) (zeta) is an \( m \) by 1 vector of residuals, or errors in equations. It is assumed that the means of all the variables are equal to zero – that is, that the variables are expressed in deviation scores. Also, it is assumed that \( \zeta \) and \( \xi \) are uncorrelated, and that \( B \) is nonsingular. The measurement model specifies the relations between unobserved and observed, or latent and manifest, variables. Two equations describe this model:

\[
y = \Lambda \eta + \epsilon \ldots
\]

\[
x = \Lambda \xi + \delta
\]
4: Trait-Approach Moderation

(McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, under review)

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Approach Traits (Esteem, Promotion-Focus, BAS, ACS)

5: Neural Approach

(McGregor, Nash, & Inzlicht, 2009, JESP)

Left Frontal EEG, r = -.53, with ACC

Religious Zeal, r = -.51, with ACC

6: Anterior Cingulate Cortex

(Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh, & Nash, Psych Science, 2009; Nash, McGregor, & Inzlicht, unpublished)

“Uh-Oh” detection and correction
Left EEG, r = -.53, with ACC
Religious Zeal, r = -.51, with ACC

Aversive Uncertainty → Eager Extremes

Uncertainty Threat
Approach
Avoid
Eager Approach
Angry Ideological Extremes
Annex L

Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hataley’s Presentation
Outline

- Research Questions
- Background
- Research Design
- Method
- Preliminary findings
- Implications for Canada
- Implications for the literature
- Conclusion

Research Questions

1. How robust are socio-economic determinants at driving the propensity for and diffusion of violent extremism?
2. To what extent do socio-economic variables enable rather than drive violent extremism?
3. Which socio-economic variables prove significant at predicting extremism violence?

Background

- Meta-analysis of the literature, data collection of incidents, individuals, victims, etc. (in collaboration with CSS)
- Gather Canadian data to subject to empirical scrutiny a dozen hypothesis of individual, small-group and mass-level explanations of violent extremism (in collaboration with START)
- None of these hypotheses deal with socio-economic factors
- If (to be tested in this study) We should be paying more attention
Research Design

- Scope conditions:
  - Residents of Canada
  - Charged, convicted or strongly suspected
  - of engaging in violent extremism or providing material support
    \( n < 100 \)
- Independent variables:
  - H1: Socio-economic context of upbringing
  - H2: Socio-economic context of the perpetrator as an adult
  - H3: National economic developments
  - H4: Global economic developments
  - H5: Ideological Motivation

Method: Multivariate approach

- Individual variables:
  - Income
  - Level of education
  - Type of education
  - Level of employment (full/under/unemployed)
  - Level of attachment (married, number of children)
  - Rural/Urban
- Structural variables:
  - GDP/capita
  - Unemployment rate
  - Percentage of persons in poverty
  - Changing nature of immigration
  - Incidence rate/frequency of such events elsewhere (national and international)

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Preliminary Findings

- Negative GDP growth is not a driver of violent extremism
- Shared socio-economic attributes of violent extremists in Canada:
  - Predominantly middle class, educated, dominated by recent immigrants (1/2 gen)
  - Collective acceptance of violence
- Divergent socio-economic attributes of violent extremists in Canada:
  - Divergence of grievances but common anti-capitalist component
  - D/I binarized
- Trend towards ethno-religious violent extremism
- Discrepancy between incidents and arrests (environment, abortion)
Implications for the literature: Are Canada’s violent extremists different?

- Shared socio-economic attributes among violent extremists in Canada vs. elsewhere?
- Education, class, wide spectrum of violent extremism, wide spectrum of political extremism
- Divergent socio-economic attributes among violent extremists in Canada vs. elsewhere:
  - Less prevalent right wing, Christian extremism less visible, ethno-nationalist movements (First Nations, language)

Conclusion

- Under what circumstances and for which type of extremist are socio-economic factors robust predictors?
- The specter of ideology.
- How robust are the findings? (Next Steps)
- Is the nature of violent extremism in Canada changing?
- Problem with a sampling bias – reflection of resources dedicated to enforcement? “Incident” based analysis is necessary (anti-abortion violence, environmental violence).
- Diffusion of ethno-religious violent extremism.
- Recent immigration patterns and a tolerance for politically motivate violence (deficit of democratic norms).

Growth rate of GDP per person, Canada 1961-2009

Unemployment rate, Canada, 1976-2009
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Developing Longitudinal Indicators of Public Mood

Rick Ruddell, Research Branch

Public Mood, Economic Conditions, and Terrorism

• There has been growing interest in the relationships between economic conditions and terrorist activities in North America.

• But - there is a shortage of longitudinal political, social, and economic variables that might act as “barometers” of antipathy toward government or social institutions (or indicators of economic instability).

• Recent software developments enable us to create longitudinal indicators of public mood from a variety of different poll items taken over time.

Public Mood

• The WCALC Algorithm can be used to combine survey items from different surveys – about similar public opinion issues – to construct a single indicator of self-reported attitudes or beliefs.

• Examples of longitudinal indicators of public mood are introduced.

• The relationships between terrorist acts, public mood and economic variables are examined for the United States from 1970 to 2007.

Public Mood

• With the exception of the Gallup Poll on capital punishment (starting in 1935) there are very few long-term indicators of public mood.

• Most indicators suffer from missing data (e.g., polls conducted infrequently).

• Long-term U.S. polls emerge around 1950:
  • National Election Studies (1948)
  • Gallup (Most Import. Problem – starts in 1950s)
  • General Social Survey (1972)
  • Media organizations: Newspapers, Television
Public Mood

• James Stimson – a political scientist – developed a software program called WCALC that enables researchers to combine the results of different public opinion polls, from different sources, over different years, into a single longitudinal variable.

• Switch from what we don’t know – missing values – to what we do know, which is similar self-reported information from different sources.

Public Mood

• WCALC enables us to combine results from different self-report items or series that ask questions that tap into a similar concept.

• Include data from short-series [e.g., results from polls done in 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974 that ask respondents the same question]

• Use long-term series with missing data [e.g., U.S. election polls: 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1968]

• Can be used for daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual data.

Public Mood

• WCALC uses a regression-based algorithm much like Factor Analysis. Based on an average of the measured values.

• Data is first ‘smoothed’ using a moving average approach – necessary to “observe common movements in the evolution of the series and not tailor a fit to particular zigs and zags that may be random variation.”

• A summary index (or indices) are produced that represents a dimension of public mood.

Dyad Ratios Algorithm

\[
Mood_t = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{t} \frac{\text{Issue}_{ij}}{\text{Issue}_{ib}} \times \text{Metric}_b \\
\]

Where:
• \( i = 1, n \) is all available issues (or items) for year \( t \)
• \( j = 1, t \) is all available dyadic comparisons for issue \( i \)
• \( b \) is the base year for the recursive metric generation
• Metric \( b \) is the value of the metric for year \( b \)
U.S. Political Disaffection

- Created using 15 poll items from 1952 to 2008:
  - Harris Alienation Index (e.g., “Rich get richer”)
  - National Election Studies – Five items (e.g., Percentage agree “Govt. officials are crooked”)
  - Gallup poll – (Most important problem facing nation – e.g., corruption, officials “crooked”)
  - General Social Survey (“No confidence in Congress”)
  - ABC Washington-Post (“wrong track”)
  - Gallup (“Govt. a threat”)
Terrorism and Economic Conditions

- Some scholars have found that terrorism and revolutionary behaviour increase with economic inequality – other economic factors might also lead to these acts.
- It has been argued that the American, French, and Russian Revolutions were associated with increases in inequality.
- Government programs today, however, (e.g., Medicare, Assistance to the poor, and Social Security) might mitigate the impact of inequality.

Caveats

- Caveat 1: There is always a danger in attributing individual-level characteristics or behaviours (engaging in terrorism) to national-level data (“ecological fallacy”).
- Caveat 2: Time series analyses are sensitive to the years examined and the results presented might be entirely different if the terrorism data extended into the 1950s or 1960s.

Correlations: Terrorist Acts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Mood</th>
<th>Justice System Factors</th>
<th>Government Factors</th>
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<td>Outlay Assistance NEG</td>
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<td>Policy Mood NS</td>
<td>Murder Rate POS</td>
<td>Social Security/Med NEG</td>
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<td>Rep. Party Govern. NS</td>
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NS = Non-Significant Assoc.  
POS = Positive Assoc.  
NEG = Negative Assoc.

Correlations: Economic Factors and Terrorism

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<td>OKUN Misery: POS</td>
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<td>Consumption: NEG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit Market Debt: NEG</td>
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ARIMA Time Series Analyses


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Stationary $R^2 = .431$


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<tr>
<td>Murder Rate</td>
<td>NEG</td>
<td>Savings (% Income)</td>
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Stationary $R^2 = .422$

Summary

- Preliminary analyses suggest that economic conditions exert only a minimal impact upon terrorist acts that occurred in the United States from 1970 to 2007.

- But: A national analysis might hide regional or local economic conditions.

- The relatively large number of terrorist acts in the 1970s might shape the results of these analyses. Future investigators might consider examining other eras (e.g., 1980 to 2007).

- There appears to be a strong relationship between urban riots and terrorist acts – this relationship might be worthy of further examination.

Next Steps

- Researchers who want to extend these analyses can use this PowerPoint presentation, as well as the data used in this study, which are available on request from:

  rick.ruddell@csc-scc.gc.ca

- The WCALC program, used to create the indicators of public mood, is available “free of charge” from James A. Stimson:

  http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/
Violent Political Extremism (VPE)
Criminiality & Economic Downturn:
Relationships & Risk Assessment

D. Elaine Pressman, Ph.D.
DRDC Presentation, Toronto
December 8, 2009

Introduction

1. Moderate to high predictability for violence risk now accepted?
2. Need for specific tools relevant to violent political extremists
3. Development of VERA (Violent Extremist Risk Assessment Protocol)
4. Use in criminal justice system

Questions

1. Poverty & Terrorism: Myth or Fact?
2. Terrorism, radicalization, & VPE: Convergence?
3. National Economic Climate & Canada’s experience with VPE?
5. Limitations and Strengths of Risk Assessment

Connecting Poverty & Terrorism

- Myth or Fact?
Economic Hardship & Terrorism

- "Evidence is nearly unanimous in rejecting either material deprivation or inadequate education as an important cause of support for terrorism or participation in terrorist activities" (Kreuger, 2007)

Poverty & Terrorism: Myth or Fact

- No evidence: motivation + western materialistic eyes (Kreuger, 2007)
- 172 Global Salafi Jihadists: "not poor, angry or fanatic religious", middle class, 35% college educated, caring families (Sageman, 2004)
- Individual: higher standards of living & higher education (Berrebi, 2006)

Convergence?

Violent Radicalization, VPE & Terrorism

- Convergence at point of violent unlawful action within criminal justice system.
- "Unlawful violence calculated to inspire terror in the general public in order to achieve a power outcome, address a grievance, or propagandize"

Canada, Economic Climate and VPE History: Relationship?

- Nationalistic Causes
- Aboriginal Rights
- Animal Rights
- Urban Guerillas/infrastructure bombings
- Anti-Abortionists
- Religious extremists from 1920’s
- Racial Murders
- Air India, Diplomatic Assassinations
VERA Indicators

- 25 indicators + 3 Demographic
- Attitudes/grievances/ideology (10)
- Contextual (4)
- Historical (6)
- Protective (5)
- Demographic (3)

Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism

- Public Safety Canada Cat. No. PS3-1/2009-2-1E-PDF

HCR-20

Criminal Violence Indicators
Marginal or No Relevance

- Relationship stability
- Employment problems
- Substance abuse
- Major mental illness
- Early maladjustment
- Personality disorder
- Prior supervision failure
- Lack of insight
- Impulsivity

Risk Assessment Strengths and Limitations

- 1. Not silver bullet of prediction of terrorists
- 2. Not profiling
- 3. Empirically based systematic approach analyzing presence/ or absence of risk & mitigating factors
- 4. Structured controlled judgment
**“SPJ” Risk Assessment?**

*structured professional judgment*

1. **Systematic approach**
2. **Assess Risk of Violence**
3. **Individuals**
4. **Forensic Application**

---

**Conclusions**

1. Risk Assessment procedures useful
2. Need for VPE specific tool (VERA)
3. Indicators may have other applications—more research needed
4. National Economic climate/poverty not indicator for risk Ideological based indicators important and other attitude, historical, contextual items
5. International interest in VERA
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(U) The recent downturn in the global economy may exacerbate a number of potential threats to Canada’s well-being, including the possibility for increased radicalization and violent extremism. As such, the Adversarial Intent Section at Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) – Toronto held a discovery workshop at their facilities on 7–8 December, 2009 in order to explore and discuss the implications of such an economic downturn for Canada’s security and social stability. The workshop was entitled, “Radicalization in the National Economic Climate.” Several academic, government, and industrial organizations participated in the two full days of activities, which included 11 presentations given by subject matter experts (SMEs) and two break–out group discussions. Two broad conclusions were largely shared by the participants at this discovery workshop. Firstly, it was agreed that there is no direct link between the economy and radicalization. Secondly, the relationship between the economy and violent extremism is a complicated one with many mitigating factors, whereby the economy may serve as a catalyst for violent extremism. This report contains notes and impressions from participants, and key points and outcomes from the workshop.

(U) Le récent ralentissement économique mondial risque d’exacerber un certain nombre de menaces qui planent sur la prospérité du Canada, et de favoriser notamment la radicalisation et l’extrémisme violent. C’est pourquoi la Section de l’intention de l’adversaire de RDDC Toronto a tenu un atelier multidisciplinaire, les 7 et 8 décembre 2009, pour discuter des répercussions possibles de ce ralentissement économique sur la sécurité et la stabilité sociale du Canada. Cet atelier était intitulé « La radicalisation dans le climat économique national ». Plusieurs organisations universitaires, gouvernementales et industrielles ont participé aux activités organisées dans le cadre de cet atelier. Il y a eu 11 présentations par des experts, et deux réunions en petits groupes. Deux grandes conclusions se sont imposées aux participants. Premièrement, il n’y a pas de lien direct entre l’économie et la radicalisation. Deuxièmement, la relation entre l’économie et l’extrémisme violent est très complexe et comporte de nombreux facteurs d’atténuation, bien qu’il soit vrai que l’économie peut servir de catalyseur à l’extrémisme violent. Le présent rapport contient les notes rédigées et les commentaires formulés par les participants, ainsi que les principaux points de discussion et les résultats de l’atelier.

14. **KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS** (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

(U) Radicalization; Extremism; Terrorism; Economic Conditions