Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces

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INTRODUCTION
Repeatedly called upon to provide soldiers to intervene in Africa’s numerous conflicts and potential flashpoints, the military forces of the African Union (AU) are frequently not up to the task. Factors working against the AU’s forces include ill-trained and ill-equipped armies, under-funded operations, disagreements over issues such as border demarcations among several of the AU nations, and linguistic and cultural barriers. Without strong AU military forces capable of providing effective interventions, many African conflicts will either remain unresolved or depend on forces outside the continent to attempt to impose a non-African solution on them.

THE AFRICAN UNION
The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU’s predecessor, had come to be known as the “Dictators’ Club”, reflecting the presence of numerous authoritarian heads of state who had failed to relinquish power in their individual countries. Though the OAU had African unity as a goal, it was both an unclear goal (as what constituted African unity was never clearly defined), and an insufficient goal (as the prevention of state-sponsored terror was not addressed). Non-interference and non-intervention in its member states served as OAU guiding principles. Unfortunately this head-in-the-sand approach allowed nations to ignore the human rights violations of their neighboring governments. When some of the countries ruthlessly slaughtered thousands of their own people, the OAU – bloated, bureaucratic, and mindful of its mandates – did not intervene.

The recognition that the OAU was failing to provide not just a better life for the African people but, in many instances, even basic protection from several countries’ reigns of terror was a major reason it was replaced by the AU in 2001. The new organization planned to address the vast injustices being perpetrated by some of the member

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nations against their own citizens. The promotion of “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance” became one of the underlying AU objectives, along with promoting human rights and “peace, security and stability”. The AU was to be empowered to initiate a peer review of countries suspected of genocide or war crimes and to impose sanctions. This was not going to be the passive OAU, which essentially stood by while crimes against humanity were being committed. The AU was going to actively engage its members, with military force if necessary, in order to prevent such occurrences.

Today the AU comprises 53 members. This number includes Mauritania, which was suspended from the organization due to its 2005 military coup. The only African nation not a member is Morocco, which opposes membership of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara). Morocco claims the Western Sahara as its own despite most other nations and the UN recognizing it as a sovereign nation.

The AU is modeled after the European Union, and aims to establish an effective parliament and create a single currency. Several organs comprise the organization, including the Assembly, Executive Council, Pan-African Parliament, and the Peace and Security Council. This last one, composed of 15 members, is tasked with peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions utilizing the African Standby Force which, according to the protocol that established the Peace and Security Council, is “composed of standby military contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.” Unfortunately, due to numerous obstacles, the creation and effective use of a rapid deployment force has proven far more difficult to achieve than the authors of the protocol probably originally imagined.

**Many Different Languages and Cultures**

Africa is not a monolith. Not in religions, not in economic systems, and especially not in languages. Estimates as to the number of different languages spoken on the continent, not including numerous dialects, range as high as 2,000 or more. While some languages, such as Swahili, are spoken by millions, others may be spoken by only a handful. Military commanders might find themselves not only having difficulty communicating with their counterparts from other nations, but also even with their own troops, as many individual African nations have numerous languages spoken within their borders. Nigeria, for example, has 510.

There are inherent difficulties in attempting to create a cohesive force from widely disparate populations. Should a nation’s military choose only soldiers who speak the same language; numerous others will be disenfranchised, which can lead to internal dissent. On the other hand, it can be costly in both money and time to train and fully integrate a military force of different linguistic backgrounds.

Language thus serves as both a barrier to communication among the nations who volunteer for peacekeeping missions, as well as to soldiers from various ethnic groups within each nation. Unlike NATO, where English and French are the official languages and where many troops are bilingual, it would be difficult, for political and economic reasons, to create a large African Union force composed of several countries where large
numbers of soldiers speak one of only two official languages. The language problem is compounded by illiteracy that is notoriously high in many African nations. Some soldiers will find it difficult or impossible to understand manuals and written orders.

Besides language, culture also comes into play when trying to forge a coalition of forces from different African nations. Religion, values, and traditions can all create numerous obstacles. These problems can range from supplying acceptable food to dealing with religions forbidding women to serve in the ranks. Though NATO troops certainly have their cultural differences, they do not appear to run nearly as deep as those present among the AU nations.

**INADEQUATE FIREPOWER**

At times the AU’s equipment is woefully inadequate for the task at hand. Soldiers of the AU Darfur Mission (AMIS) are armed with pistols for officers, AK-47’s for the majority of the troops, and one rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7) for every ten soldiers. When opposing unarmed civilians these weapons are quite adequate. However, against the factions armed by the government they are poorly equipped and little more than a “nuisance”. This imbalance in firepower helps explain how both an 18-man AMIS patrol and its 20-man rescue team were kidnapped by one of the factions fighting in West Darfur.

Further examination of AMIS shows just how skewed the firepower is in favor of the opposition. The Sudanese military and the Janjaweed (Arab tribal militias), have heavy weaponry. The various rebel groups also have their share of heavy weapons, including artillery, which they have apparently received, officially and unofficially, from Libya, Chad and Eritrea. Not only do all of these fighters have AK-47s or RPG-7s, as the AMIS soldiers have, but there are other weapons readily available. The truck-mounted PKM (also known as the PKB) 7.62mm machine gun is prevalent. The PKM has a range of one kilometer (three times that of the AK-47) and is capable of penetrating an armored vehicle at 500 meters.

The NSV 12.7mm heavy machine gun, and the similar, though older, model 12.7mm DShK, are part of the government’s arsenal. Whether mounted on vehicles or in bunkers, the NSV can destroy any of the AMIS’ vehicles a mile away. The opposition also has two 122mm Al-Saqr 30 multiple rocket launchers, hundreds of Soviet made T54/55 tanks, at least a dozen MIG-29 Fulcrum fighter jets, and a significant number of Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters which are armed with surface-to-air missiles that have a range of 30 kilometers.

The AMIS has no combat aircraft. Its fleet is mainly transport helicopters and a few Antonov AN-24 turboprops that are not equipped to serve as bombers. Compounding AMIS’s difficulties are Sudanese restrictions that often prevent its helicopters from flying, and allow only civilian pilots to fly the aircraft.

**EQUIPMENT DIVERSITY**

African nations possess an array of armaments, from Second World War vintage rifles to modern jet fighters. Countries of origin of these weapons are diverse, including: the
United States, Germany, North and South Korea, Iran, China and the former Soviet Bloc. The continent also has several home-grown weapons makers, mostly manufacturing small arms but some capable of more complex items such as missiles. South Africa had at one point even developed nuclear warheads, though these were purportedly dismantled nearly two decades ago.13

There are numerous reasons for such a diversity of weapons sources. Some countries deliberately followed a policy of purchasing from various nations in order to diversify their suppliers. Some turned to the former Soviet bloc when the West imposed arms embargoes for human rights abuses. Some just shopped around for the best deal: tanks from this country, artillery pieces from that.

This wide array of equipment can create numerous problems for a joint force. First, a senior commander from one nation may be unfamiliar with the capabilities of the equipment from another, a problem amplified when that other nation’s forces are put under his command. Not knowing ranges of artillery pieces, speeds of armored cavalry, or lift capabilities of aircrafts could be disastrous during combat.

Second, communication becomes difficult when various transmitters and receivers, of different vintages and from a variety of manufacturers, are pressed into service. This can easily lead to orders not being properly communicated to troops, and battlefield assessments not being relayed to commanders.

Third, sharing of ammunition as well as spare parts for broken armaments can present challenges. At the small arms level it is not so much of a problem as the AK-47 is rather ubiquitous on the continent, but for larger items such as tanks, which could have been manufactured in China, Russia, the US, or somewhere else, cannibalizing parts for repairs or obtaining rounds can be problematic.

Fourth, there is little to no cost savings from volume discounts for ammunition or parts because so many African countries use so many different weapons. Had there been agreements to purchase the same type of item, say a mortar, then the countries could have used their buying power to leverage the supplier for a better price per unit.

**INADEQUATE FUNDING**

Though the salaries of African troops are generally quite low compared to their Western counterparts, funding AU operations remains a difficult task. There are several reasons for this, beginning with the question of who should pay. As an example, consider the peacekeeping operations in Somalia. The country has not had a functioning government in many years, and thus has no treasury. Somalia, therefore, is unable to foot the bill, even though peacekeeping operations would directly benefit the country. Some of the countries that contributed or plan to contribute soldiers to the Somali peacekeeping operation include Uganda, which is extremely poor, and Nigeria, where corruption is so rampant that any funds allocated to its military will probably have to be significantly larger than that actually required, due to graft.

If there were only one or two relatively small peacekeeping operations, perhaps the AU could meet their funding and manpower needs. However, with numerous African flashpoints needing peacekeepers, the finite number of adequately trained soldiers and small amount of available funds from a largely impoverished continent are quickly
Problems Plaguing the AU Peacekeeping Forces

Depleted. Even South Africa, the continent's economic powerhouse (accounting for 40 percent of Africa's industrial output, 45 percent of its mineral output, and over 50 percent of its electricity generated) can only do so much.\(^\text{14}\) It already has peacekeeping commitments in Burundi, the Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo along with smaller missions in Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Eritrea.\(^\text{15}\) This thinning of its forces is one reason the nation has chosen not to send its troops to Somalia. As Sam Mkhwanasi, a South African Defense Ministry spokesman said, “South Africa supports the African Union deployment of peacekeepers, but South Africa, having contributed to the African Union and UN’s other missions, is currently stretched.”\(^\text{16}\)

Africa is large and transportation expenses can deplete funds, leaving little to support operations once troops arrive. Troops often move by air when the roads are inadequate, which is frequently the case.\(^\text{17}\) Inadequate African transportation for AU operations forces the AU to turn to outside sources. Outside funds come with restrictions and caveats. The AU, formed to control Africa’s destiny using Africa’s people, turns to its former colonial rulers and other outsiders for assistance.

AU Peacekeepers Unacceptable for Social and/or Political Reasons

The proposed peacekeeping mission to Somalia shows the problems that the AU faces from political and social constraints. After the colonial powers carved up the continent, Somali people lived in eastern Ethiopia, eastern Kenya, and Somalia – the last an amalgamation of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. With the overthrow of the brutal Somali dictator Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia fell into anarchy. In 1993, the UN intervened to help relieve a famine but failed to install a functioning government. It subsequently withdrew, leaving the country again in chaos. In 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) began to take control of the country and impose Islamic law. They opposed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which had been formed in Kenya, with international encouragement, before eventually moving to Somalia. The UIC controlled a large part of the country and threatened to overthrow the TFG. Ethiopia, not wanting a radical Muslim state on its eastern border, entered Somalia, routed the UIC, and provided military muscle to the fledgling TFG. The AU then began to look for troops to replace the Ethiopians.

Although Ethiopia and Kenya border Somalia, neither are acceptable sources of soldiers for the AU’s Somalia Peacekeeping operation. Ethiopia fought a war with Somalia when the latter attempted to claim the Ogaden region of Ethiopia as part of Greater Somalia. Additionally, Ethiopia has a large percentage of Christians while almost all Somalis are Muslim. Somalia is concerned that Ethiopia will try to convert its people to Christianity.

Unreasonable Restraints on Missions: The Sudanese Peacekeeping Experience

Despite having forces in theater, the AU has failed to stop the on-going genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. In an area the size of Texas, and with only 7,000 soldiers, the
AU force, AMIS, is inadequate for the task. Rape, murder and other crimes continue. Calls from many nations for a larger force to be led by the UN have been repeatedly rebuffed by the Sudanese government.

Even if there were a larger contingent of AU forces in Darfur, unreasonable Sudanese government restraints would continue to hamper their effectiveness. The overall mission of AMIS is to verify and monitor the ceasefire between the Government and rebel troops. This mission is also to “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.” Unfortunately, “a strict interpretation of this mandate does not allow AMIS to protect civilians from imminent attack unless the AMIS troops are present at that very moment. Even when AMIS knows an attack is coming, it is unable to react.” On 18 September 2005, villages in North Darfur were attacked. Not allowed to intervene, AMIS’s role was limited to investigating the aftermath.

Perhaps the situation is best summarized by a statement a Rwandan officer made to Refugees International, “We had genocide in our country, we are in Darfur to stop it from happening again. How can we do this if we cannot protect civilians?”

LIMITED INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES

Equipment Factors
AMIS lacks basic equipment for intelligence operations and communications. Though their vehicles often have VHF and HF radios, none are encrypted, leaving them open to both monitoring and tracking. Remote bases lack very small aperture terminals (VSAT), essentially cutting them off from headquarters and making co-ordinated command and control nearly impossible.

Even military maps of the region are missing from AMIS’ package of mission essential resources. The maps they do have are generally from the United Nations Humanitarian Information Center and are geared toward the needs of humanitarian agencies instead of a military force.

Limited Intelligence Capabilities: Human Factors
The intelligence capabilities of African forces are limited by the large number of languages spoken on the continent. AMIS in particular is hampered by its lack of Arabic speakers.

AMIS’ limited monitoring and intelligence capabilities are not shared by their adversaries. Sudanese government forces and their allied rebel groups have an intelligence capability built on informers and signal intercept of unsecured AMIS communications. The belligerents are more aware of the location of AMIS troops than AMIS troops are aware of the belligerents’ location.
Limited Open Source Material for Intelligence Analysis

Another impediment to intelligence-gathering is the lack of reliable newspapers, magazines, and other news media in many African regions. Open source analysts who comb through such material are at a distinct disadvantage compared to their counterparts in more open societies.

Publications are often government sponsored and biased. In countries where there is a relative degree of freedom of the press, publications are also often of limited value since rumor, innuendo, and sensationalism are frequently used to sell them. Corroboration of “facts” published in either government-controlled or free media can be difficult or even at times impossible.

Besides news media, the open source analyst in a developed country might look at economic data, college theses, corporate reports and other such items to develop a more comprehensive view of the topic under study. In many African countries only marginal amounts of these materials are available for analysis.

LIMITED EFFECTIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM/COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITIES

Many of the African nations that support an AU force have limited counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency capabilities. For nearly two decades the Ugandan army has fought the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel force dedicated to overthrowing the Ugandan government. Despite the government soldiers’ numerical superiority and a steady erosion of support for the Lord’s Resistance Army’s from their original backers, the Acholi in Northern Uganda, the Ugandan Army has not been able to eliminate this insurgency within its borders. Forces are spread too thinly, there is widespread corruption, and the enemy is skilled in guerilla warfare. Can the Ugandan Army successfully mount counter-insurgency campaigns in foreign countries when they cannot do so in their own country? At least in their own country they are generally closer to their lines of command and supply, have an understanding of both the terrain and people, and do not have the limitations placed on a multinational force that has to answer to military and political leaders from other nations. It is unrealistic to expect these soldiers to be magically transformed into counter-insurgency experts in other countries when they have not been successful in their own.

DISEASE AS AN OBSTACLE

Conflicts in Africa are reminiscent of the First World War and earlier campaigns among the western nations where disease played a major role. Western nations have not entirely eliminated disease from the battlefront; but their vaccinations, antibiotics, and public health measures have been able to limit its impact on the fighting capabilities of their military forces. This is not the case with many African nations.

HIV/AIDS is quite widespread among the population of many of the African nations. This is especially so in their armed forces. Large numbers of young soldiers visit prostitutes and become infected. Frequently the military forces have a significantly higher
HIV/AIDS rate than the civilian population. Limited amounts of antiretrovirals are available. Soldiers with HIV/AIDS are a military disadvantage. Their endurance is less and they are subject to disease.

South Africa, which provides soldiers to numerous peacekeeping missions and arguably has the best-trained military in Africa, has a 23 percent HIV/AIDS rate among its soldiers.²⁷ Soldiers who are HIV positive will either be excluded from peacekeeping missions, thereby reducing further the pool of available military personnel, or will serve but become gradually ineffective.

HIV/AIDS is not the only medical problem; Malaria, yellow fever, tuberculosis, and numerous other diseases are also prevalent. In mid-February 2007, a Rwandan soldier, part of the AU Peacekeeping mission in Darfur, apparently died from malaria.²⁸ This disease is kept at bay by modern military forces with proper preventive measures, including anti-malarial medications. Unfortunately, such measures are not always available or properly taken in African militaries on peacekeeping missions.

AU soldiers are asked to serve in areas where they may not have immunity against some of the local microbes, especially gastrointestinal. This leads to incapacitating “travelers’ diarrhea”; while the enemy forces, by virtue of having lived in that region their whole lives, can safely eat the local food. It can take up to two years to begin to develop significant immunity against these microbes, a time that is too long for deployed AU forces who are expected to immediately be, and stay, combat ready.²⁹

CAN THE AU BE EXPECTED TO DO BETTER THAN A SUPERPOWER?

The US military, which entered Somalia in 1992 as part of a humanitarian operation, withdrew a few years later. Public opinion had turned against the intervention once film of the dead Americans being dragged made its way to American television screens. The same could occur with AU forces. Should Ugandan casualties begin to mount in Somalia, there will be pressure from the Ugandan people to bring the remaining troops back home and abandon the AU operation. The Somalis and foreign fighters in Somalia who oppose the AU presence know from past experience with the Americans that it is not necessary to defeat the “enemy occupiers” militarily, but rather to create a situation that is untenable for the nations supplying AU forces to maintain. They drove out a superpower, they can also drive out a poorly-equipped, poorly-trained AU force.

There are differences between the original UN military mission in the 1990s and the AU one in 2007. Somalis might be more accepting in general of fellow Africans (though not the Ethiopians) trying to establish order than they were of the American military. Hopefully the AU learned from the mistakes that the Americans committed, which turned many of the Somalis against them. Still, a great deal of faith is being placed on an AU force to restore and maintain order – a force that does not begin to compare to the capabilities of the Americans.

It is not necessary for the adversaries of an AU force to achieve one defining blow, as the Somalis did against the Americans. Loss of support can also occur through numerous small-scale hit-and-run attacks, resulting in “death by a thousand cuts.”³⁰
Many of the African rebel groups are well-schooled in guerrilla warfare, and such an approach against an AU force is feasible.

**POORLY-DISCIPLINED SOLDIERS**

The human rights records of some of the militaries that constitute the AU forces are abysmal. Uganda for example has soldiers in Somalia as part of an AU peacekeeping force. In 2005, the World Court placed a ten billion dollar judgment against Uganda for its intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Upon examining the evidence, the court found that during Uganda’s five-year occupation of eastern portions of the DRC, they tortured and killed civilians.31

Accusations of rape and sexual exploitation, including of young children, have been leveled against African forces in UN peacekeeping operations.32 The spread of HIV/AIDS into areas where it previously was not present can sometimes be linked to the movement of peacekeeping forces.33 With such behavior it will be impossible to win the hearts and minds of the local people, the very ones the AU forces are sent to protect. This could result in less intelligence from the locals about the AU’s adversaries, less willingness to assist AU forces when they are in need, and perhaps even the locals joining the AU’s adversaries to drive these “foreign occupiers from our country”. History is replete with lessons of forces arriving in a country to help only to overstay their welcome and be treated as the enemy.

**PEACEKEEPING VERSUS PEACEMAKING**

Peacekeeping is a different task from peacemaking. In peacekeeping there is a cessation of hostilities and the troops are brought in to maintain the truce by keeping the warring parties apart. In peacemaking they must actively engage combatants to force them to stop fighting, and then revert to peacekeeper status to maintain it. If the peacekeepers in a conflict will not become peacemakers because of a limited mandate, or because they are ill-equipped and undermanned, then they are relegated to a defensive posture, mainly protecting themselves instead of innocent civilians, and assume a role not of a peacekeeping force but as targets.

Two Nigerian AU peacekeepers were killed by gunmen in Darfur in early March 2007.34 This brought the total number of deaths of AU soldiers in the Darfur operation to 11 since forces were deployed there in 2004. Another peacekeeper is missing. The number of civilians killed during that same time is possibly in the hundreds of thousands. There is no peace for the peacekeepers to keep, not for the civilians, not for themselves.

**STRETCHED TOO THIN**

The AU would like 8,000 soldiers for its Somalia mission. So far they have only been able to muster half the number of requested troops.35 There are several reasons for the AU’s inability to meet the Somali mission’s requirements. Funding is one.

Competition with the AU for military manpower is another limiting factor. Other organizations such as the United Nations and the Economic Community of West
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) also draw upon African nations for soldiers for their operations. ECOMOG, created by the Economic Community of West African States, is a multinational force comprised of the militaries of several West African nations, notably Nigeria but also Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia that have agreed to work together. Like the AU, ECOMOG has suffered problems such as poorly-equipped soldiers and, prior to 1999, military commanders answering to leaders back home instead of a central command.\footnote{36} Also, like the AU force, it has had its share of criticism, including accusations that it has acted as an active participant in conflicts instead of a peacekeeper.\footnote{37}

At times there appears to be an endless number of African conflicts, some lasting a relatively short period and others that seemingly drag on year after year. Whether it is the AU, UN, or ECOMOG forces called in as peacekeepers, to meet the force requirements of so many operations is a nearly impossible task.

Governments’ fears of political fallout are also the reason for inadequate and/or slow troop commitments. Ugandan peacekeeping troops were shelled during their welcoming ceremony in Somalia.\footnote{38} Had there been any fatalities in their mission (which was already controversial among the Ugandan people), political pressure could have been brought to bear on the Ugandan government to bring the troops home, effectively ending their mission as soon as it began.

CONCLUSION

There just are not enough trained troops, money, and political willpower among the nations that comprise the AU to effectively intervene in all of Africa’s conflicts. The probability that all three of these factors will change in the immediate future is quite low.

Even when a force can be assembled, additional problems limit their functioning as a unified entity with effective command and control. Language, religion and other factors frequently divide them. Geopolitics dictates which nations may contribute soldiers to which missions. Mandates that impede rather than facilitate peacekeeping minimize the forces’ impact. Yet, despite all of these obstacles, the AU is expected to make and/or keep the peace.

Many of the soldiers who have served in these operations have done so bravely and with honor. Some have paid with their lives. Except when troops have acted in an unprofessional manner, they deserve respect and appreciation. Far too often they are asked to do too much with too little.

With so many shortages – properly trained troops, funds, modern equipment, intelligence capabilities – the AU frequently places its soldiers in harm’s way, accepting risks that other multinational forces, such as NATO, might not find acceptable. Peacekeeping is rarely, if ever, risk free, but there has to be a reasonable chance that the operation will succeed with minimal casualties, and unfortunately that is not always true with AU missions.

There are several steps the AU could take to better protect their soldiers as well as increase the likelihood operations will be successful. These include:
1. Pursue clear mandates that facilitate, rather than impede, peacekeeping operations within targeted countries.

2. Prior to sending an AU peacekeeping force on an operation, realistically determine its capability to succeed as well as its ability to protect itself. Depending on the findings of such an analysis, the role of the force might need to be revised or the operation cancelled.

3. Develop a source of dedicated funding, such as through taxes, tariffs, and/or fees, to support military training and operations of AU forces.

4. Put effective accounting controls in place to ensure money intended for peacekeeping is not lost to corruption. Sometimes audits can be as powerful a “weapon” in a force’s arsenal as a division of soldiers. Besides, with proper auditing it can be ascertained whether or not that division actually exists and is not a contingent of ghost soldiers collecting salaries for a corrupt senior officer somewhere.

5. Enhance troop training, emphasizing joint force operations, and including an effective component on respecting human rights.

6. Enhance command and control capabilities, especially the ability to co-ordinate ethnically and culturally diverse forces.

7. Improve intelligence capabilities, beginning with basics such as maps and increasing in sophistication as money becomes available.

8. Secure and train with modern equipment.

9. Improve logistical capabilities, especially transport and communications.

10. Learn from past joint operations, both successful and not, and apply these lessons to future operations.

These are not easy changes to make. They will entail much debate, and perhaps even the loss of some AU members who are unwilling to accept certain provisions. However, they are the minimum requirements for the creation of an AU force that can effectively intervene in conflicts. Without such an entity, foreign powers, maybe even previous colonial powers, might enter the void with funds and/or forces to once again dictate the policies and futures of African nations instead of having those African nations develop and implement their own solutions to their own problems.

NOTES

1. The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the author’s and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Government.


3. Ibid.


5. Paul Reynolds, op. cit.


12. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.