

A Review of Marine Corps Intelligence Officer Training

CSC 2000

Subject Area - Intelligence

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## *Preface*

This project is the product of my exposure to intelligence training while serving at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps as the Intelligence Occupational Field Sponsor from 1996-1999. Prior to this assignment I was somewhat aware of the fundamental changes to the Intelligence field in the post DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM period, however, the depth and significance of them was something that I would come to appreciate only during my tour. As with any plan, the forceful implementation of it holds the key to success. Additionally, the ability to critically examine any plan, and make the necessary course corrections is also fundamental to success. In this light, I have attempted to look at the career training we provide to our Intelligence Officers to determine what needs to be done and how we can position our Intelligence Officer corps to excel under our future operating concepts. Hopefully, my conclusions will be implemented, or at a minimum, they will spur on further discussion and the development of better ideas.

As with any work, much credit goes to those that are not officially listed as the author. I appreciate the comments of those Intelligence Officers who responded to my questionnaire. Their input has been extremely valuable and it was evident to me that we have a highly motivated group of professionals who truly want to make intelligence better. I would also like to thank my faculty advisors, Lieutenant Colonel (Colonel select) J. D. Williams, USMC, and Doctor J.M. Klinger, for their perseverance. I know that shaping my rough ideas into an acceptable and viable paper was difficult, to say the least. It does seem like a small miracle that this train ever left the station! Lastly and certainly not least, I want to acknowledge the love and support of my wife, Shari, and our children Katelyn and Kurt. They make it all worthwhile. Life is pretty good.

## Chapter One

### Introduction

On March 24, 1995, the Commandant promulgated his formal “Program to Improve Marine Corps Intelligence” (here after referred to collectively as the “Intel Plan”).<sup>1</sup> This watershed policy change marks the beginning of the modern Marine Corps Intelligence Officer. Spurred on by the post Cold War realities and, more poignantly, by the purported failure of Marine Corps Intelligence in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the future of Marine Corps Intelligence was analyzed in various Marine Corps fora. The result of several service flag level studies, and with the input from other studies and reviews conducted outside the Marine Corps, was a fundamental revision of Marine Corps Intelligence.<sup>2</sup>

The Intel Plan highlighted six specific deficiencies for specific programmed improvements, which spanned the breath of how we fight, how we are trained, organized and equipped. Among these deficiencies was the lack of an Intelligence Officer Corps career progression. The solution under the Intel Plan was to establish an accession based<sup>3</sup>, unrestricted officer structure, rather than reliance on the historical mix of lateral move officers, (who were typically senior Captains and Majors), and restricted officers, both Warrant Officers and Limited Duty Officers (LDO). Four distinct entry-level officer disciplines were also defined for unrestricted lieutenants with MOS training coming from established Army, Navy, and Marine Corps training

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<sup>1</sup> Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps message to ALMAR (All Marines) 100/95, subject “Plan To Improve Marine Corps Intelligence,” 240040Z Mar 95.

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed review of specific panels and how the Intel Plan was formed, see Major Ronald Buikema, USMC, *Integration of Intelligence into Professional Military Education*, Masters of Military Studies Thesis (Quantico, Va: Marine Corps Command & Staff College, April, 1996), 6.

<sup>3</sup> Accessioned based occupation fields are those that utilize entry level Marines (Privates for enlisted structures and 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenants for officer structures) in sufficient numbers, and accounting for normal attritions, to fill higher billets over time. Lateral move occupation fields depend on an infusion of Marines who have previously served in other occupational fields, to be retrained and fill the structure requirements. Lateral move

programs. Upon selection to Captain, and augmented, each officer is returned to school for further training, ultimately resulting in redesignation as MOS 0202, MAGTF Intelligence Officer. Although various intelligence community training and education is made available to intelligence officers, no further formal intelligence schools are required.<sup>4</sup>

Since the Intel Plan was initiated in 1995, both the Marine Corps and intelligence officer training has evolved. OMFTS and its derivative supporting concept papers, sketch out the future of the Marine Corps. OMFTS is also defining, either specifically or implicitly, the operational intelligence requirements which future Intelligence Officers must strive to match. Over the last two years intelligence officer training has been revised and improved in response to FMF concerns. However, the review has not been holistic, but one narrowed to addressing the identified deficiencies of a particular entry-level officer program.

It has been 7 years since the inception of the Intel Plan and 5 years since the implementation of the intelligence training program. At this point, it is appropriate to conduct a relook at the Intel Plan's intelligence training program, and if necessary, advocate the issuing of additional policy. A review of formal intelligence officer training is needed to determine if adequate training is programmed over the course of the Intelligence professional's career. Additionally, a review is needed in order to position the intelligence officer to keep pace with the future operational environment envisioned in OMFTS.

I propose to study the Marine Corps Intelligence Officer formal training program. The study will begin with the concept of Intelligence Officer training as outlined in the Intel Plan and will trace the current formal intelligence officer training plan. This study will also examine OMFTS to draw out the tasks that Intelligence Officers will be required to accomplish in order to support

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occupation fields generally seek Marines entering their second enlistment contract (4-6 years), or for officers, those officers with 4-8 years in service.

the concept as presently envisioned. Finally, I will offer recommendations for appropriate changes in officer training. The author acknowledges that the current intelligence officer training program has made significant and durable improvements to Marine Corps Intelligence Officer Training. However, intelligence community discourse and comments from the Fleet Marine Force reflects a level of concern in the content and frequency of intelligence training. Through the above approach, I intend to address the fundamental question of whether the current intelligence officer career progression training program creates the best trained intelligence officer to meet both today's challenges and those envisioned under OMFTS.

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<sup>4</sup> ALMAR 100/95 delineates the formal MOS training for Intelligence Officers as entry-level (Lieutenants) and a career-level school (augmented Captain selects and Captains). No other intelligence training is mandated.

## Chapter Two

### **Background: Intelligence Training under the Intel Plan**

In April 1993, responding to congressional direction, the Marine Corps provided the Senate Armed Services Committee with an "Intelligence Roadmap" addressing present deficiencies, current efforts and future plans to improve our intelligence capabilities.<sup>5</sup> The "Intelligence Roadmap" committed the Marine Corps' leadership to finalizing studies and analyses regarding the current condition of capabilities and resources. The Roadmap also affirmed the Marine Corps commitment to take appropriate action to correct deficiencies and improve intelligence capabilities consistent with the Marine Corps' future direction. The 1993 Intelligence Study Group and the Mission Area Analysis 12 (Intelligence) draft final report of 12 January 1994 defined critical shortfalls in the Intelligence Mission Area. As a result, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) directed the development of a plan to address the six fundamental intelligence deficiencies. The identified deficiencies were:

- 1) Inadequate Doctrinal Foundation
- 2) No Defined Career Progression for Intelligence Officers
- 3) Insufficient Tactical Intelligence Support
- 4) Insufficient Joint Manning
- 5) Insufficient Language capability
- 6) Inadequate Imagery Capability

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<sup>5</sup> Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps letter to Senator Nunn, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 7000/C4I 30 April 1993. This letter forwarded the United States Marine Corps Intelligence Roadmap 1993-1998 to the Committee on Armed Services. A copy of the letter and document was also provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Armed Services Committee, the House Appropriations Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

On 2 March 1994 the ESG approved the basic plan and directed its implementation.<sup>6</sup> In FY95 the Marine Corps began a 4-year phased increase of Intelligence structure growth by 16 Officer and 353 Enlisted billets.<sup>7</sup> The Intelligence Officer structure was changed to phase out reliance on unrestricted lateral move officers and restricted (limited duty) officers and shifted to a accession based, unrestricted officer program. The goal was to develop “multidisciplined MAGTF intelligence officers”<sup>8</sup> who are “trained and experienced intelligence leaders and managers.”<sup>9</sup> The 02 Officer Marine Occupational Specialty (MOS) was redefined as follows:

### **Unrestricted Officers**

0202 MAGTF Intelligence Officer

0203 Ground Intelligence Officer

0204 Human Source Intelligence Officer

0206 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)/Ground Electronic

Warfare (EW) Officer

0207 Aviation Intelligence Officer

### **Restricted Officers**

0210 Counterintelligence Officer (Warrant Officer)

2602 SIGINT/EW Officer

The Officer career track was reformed to include reliance on direct accession of Lieutenants into 4 entry tracks (ground, air, SIGINT, HUMINT). Under the Intelligence Plan, lieutenants would be accessed from The Basic School (TBS) under one of the four entry-level intelligence officer programs (0203, 0204, 0206, or 0207). After completion of their initial FMF tour, and

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<sup>6</sup> ALMAR 100/95.

<sup>7</sup> Assistant Chief of Staff Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) letter to Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command 5000/C4I, subject: “Implementation of the Intelligence Plan,” 22 March 1994.

<sup>8</sup> C4I Staff, HQMC, “The Future of Marine Corps Intelligence,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 1995, 27.

<sup>9</sup> MGen P.K. Van Riper AC/S C4I, HQMC, “The Future of Marine Corps Intelligence: Rekindling an Operational Art,” briefing presented to the ESG, HQMC, Washington, DC, 2 March 1994.

upon augmentation and selection for Captain, the officer would attend the MAGTF Intelligence Officer Course (MIOC).<sup>10</sup> This follow-on MOS training, at the 4-8 years of service point, is programmed for unrestricted intelligence officers under the Intel Plan.<sup>11</sup> Completion of MIOC results in officer's redesignation as a primary 0202 while his initial 020x MOS is retained as his additional MOS (AMOS). Figure 1 illustrates the present 02 MOS training progression.

Following MIOC, the intelligence officer does not receive any formal programmed intelligence training or education. Intelligence training for specific skills is available, and in many instances funded by HQMC. However, this training is normally focused on requirements linked to a specific billet. Several Intelligence educational programs, such as the Director of National Security Fellowship program, Junior Officer Consolidated Cryptologic Program (JOCCP), and the Director of Central Intelligence Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program, are available to develop mid range and senior intelligence officer skills, however, only one officer per year attends these programs. Selection to the DCI EIAP is very competitive and may or may not accept the service's nominee. For the vast majority of intelligence officers, MIOC is the last formal programmed school they attend.

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<sup>10</sup> ALMAR 100/95.

<sup>11</sup> I will not address restricted officer (0210) training in this study for two essential reasons. First, restricted officers are, by definition, technicians and appropriately focused on developing a high level of skill in a relatively narrow field of intelligence. Restricted officers are not, under normal circumstances, called upon to function as Intelligence Officers and charged with orchestrating the intelligence cycle. Second, they are relatively few in number and in proportion to the total intelligence occupational field structure. Total intelligence officer structure (FY00) numbers 806 billets that include only 50 MOS 0210 Counterintelligence Warrant officers, and 30 MOS 2602 SIGINT/EW Warrant Officer billets.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Today's Intelligence Officer Training Program**

The present intelligence officer training program consists of formal MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) and non-MOS producing schools. These schools, in addition to Marine Corps Professional Military Education (PME) and personal professional reading, constitute the scope of the intelligence officer's skill development. The sum total of intelligence training and education, intertwined with operating force and real world exposure to various aspects of intelligence, accumulates with each assignment and forms the basis of the officer's experience level.

MOS schools are training programs dedicated to imparting a level of skill development to their students from which they can develop higher knowledge and understanding. Training programs are generally prescriptive in nature and are fundamental to entry-level training. Students exposed to a topic of study for the first time require basic information and foundational concepts in order to create a working knowledge of the discipline. After working in an area over a period of time, the student is able to take the newly introduced information and progress to a level of knowledge and understanding. MOS school curriculum generally revolves around the question of "how." For example, how to operate a specific system, or piece of equipment; how to establish an operating network of system; what the standing procedures are and how to employ them; how to build a reconnaissance and surveillance plan; how to plot enemy order of battle using geographic coordinates; or how to conduct an intelligence briefing. The present intelligence officer entry-level MOS schools are oriented primarily as training programs.

Education seeks to empower the student to develop critical thinking skills and reason through a problem. Critical thinking can be enhanced if the student has the ability to draw on the lessons of previous experiences. Years of work in a discipline provide the officer with a detailed level of understanding of his MOS and the experiences over time to be an effective critical thinker. Prescriptive training is required throughout a career in order to keep up with changing technologies and systems; however, the frequency is less over time. Accordingly, the requirement for prescriptive schooling is greatest at the beginning of a career and decreases over time. Conversely, descriptive education becomes more effective after a level of experience is achieved. As I will show, the intelligence field lacks mandatory intelligence education programs.

The Marine Corps PME program is reflective of this progression. The Basic School (TBS) is a prescriptive school designed to present the second lieutenant with the foundational level of information about the Marine Corps necessary to function as an officer. The officer's entry-level MOS school is similarly prescriptive in nature, and is focused on fundamentals and the company grade level skills pertinent to that occupational specialty. During an officer's PME, he receives more prescriptive type training early in his career (TBS for Lieutenants and Career level School (CLS) for Captains) with a lesser degree of descriptive education. As time goes on and experience is gained, the officer receives and increasingly descriptive education (Intermediate Level School (ILS) for Majors, and Top Level School (TLS) for Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels) while the prescriptive training aspect of schooling decreases. However, throughout an officer's career, non-MOS producing prescriptive training continue to be an important aspect of keeping up with developments in equipment, systems and policies.

## I. Entry Level Training

Of the four entry-level intelligence MOSs under the Intel Plan, three of them (0203, 0204, 0207) were new to the Marine Corps. To start up the new intelligence officer training programs quickly, the Marine Corps elected to utilize preexisting training courses for entry-level MOS training.<sup>12</sup> During the years since 1995, FMF feedback on officer MOS training identified several common deficiencies, among them:

- \* Inadequate coverage of Marine Corps and MAGTF organization and capabilities.
- \* Inadequate coverage of Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) or the Rapid Reaction Planning Process (R2P2).
- \* Inadequate coverage of Marine Corps intelligence capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- \* The joint class environment (where the Marine Corps is the minority in a sister service training program) officers were obligated to learn too much about the other service's intelligence training to the detriment of not being instructed on fundamentals required of them when they arrive in a Marine unit.<sup>13</sup>


The collective result is that each of the entry training programs has been, or is in the process of being, revised to more closely meet the training requirements of the FMF. *Figure 1* shows to current intelligence officer career progression from entry level to MIOC.

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<sup>12</sup> MGen P.K. Van Riper AC/S C4I, HQMC, "The Future of Marine Corps Intelligence: Rekindling an Operational Art," briefing presented to the ESG, HQMC, Washington, DC, 2 March 1994 and AC/S C4I letter to CG MCCDC 5000/C4I, subject: "Implementation of the Intelligence Plan," 22 March 1994.

<sup>13</sup> Author's notes from Marine Corps Intelligence Training Counsel (MCITC) Conference 7-9 April 1998.

# **INTELLIGENCE OFFICER CAREER PROGRESSION**



*Figure 1*

## A. MOS 0203 Ground Intelligence Officer Training

Under the Intel Plan, the 0203s MOS track initially consisted of the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) for 10 weeks (Infantry Officer School, TBS) and then Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course (MIOBC) for 19 weeks (U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), Ft Huachuca, Arizona). MIOBC was selected for essentially two reasons. First, MIOBC was an established course that generally addressed the broader ground intelligence training requirement of USMC Ground Intelligence Officers. Second, the training already existed and, therefore, was a cost effective option readily available to quickly initiate the new MOS.<sup>14</sup> The option of having MCCDC T&E develop and start a 0203 curriculum within an existing Marine Corps school was not pursued because of the cost and long delay in school startup. The cost to the Marine Corps for participation in MIOBC, other than the purchase of the school seats, was two instructors (Captain 0202).<sup>15</sup>

FMF feedback on MIOBC indicated that the course did not adequately prepare the 0203 for his MOS<sup>16</sup>. On MCCDC T&E established the Ground Intelligence Officer Course (GIOC) at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), Dam Neck, VA. GIOC commenced its first course in January 2000.<sup>17</sup> The April 1998 Marine Corps Intelligence Training Council (MCITC) conference also established the requirement for 0203s to formally

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<sup>14</sup> MGen P.K. Van Riper AC/S C4I, HQMC, "The Future of Marine Corps Intelligence: Rekindling an Operational Art," briefing presented to the ESG, HQMC, Washington, DC, 2 March 1994.

<sup>15</sup> <http://138.156.112.14/TFSD/TFSD.HTML> Table of Organization 5050

<sup>16</sup> The inadequacy of 0203 training was formally voiced at the 1998 Ground Commander Conference (CG SECOND MARDIV 101400Z MAR 98 message subject: Ground Combat Element Conference After Action Report. Para 2 e. MOS 0203 Training. Note that this message was coordinated between all four divisions) and during the Marine Corps Intelligence Training Council Conference (7-9 April 1998). Head, Standards Branch, T&E Div MCCDC letter to Head, Joint and Interservice Training Branch T&E Div MCCDC, 1500/C 461, subject: "Military Intelligence Officer Basic course (MIOBC) Deficiencies," 9 June 1998 documents a comprehensive review of MIOBC and established that the course satisfied only 11 of 43 MOS 0203 Individual Training Standards (ITS). Ultimately, MCCDC T&E and USAIC could not reconcile the deficiencies. On June 28, 1999 MCCDC T&E formally notified USAIC of the discontinuance of USMC participation at MIOBC.

<sup>17</sup> Navy Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center Desktop guide to Intelligence Training, [http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/marine\\_active/mactive\\_frame.html](http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/marine_active/mactive_frame.html).

receive sniper officer employment training. Previously, many 0203 officers received an informal sniper officer employment course (which was the first several days of the enlisted advanced sniper course training package), adapted from Weapons Training Battalion's Scout Sniper School. This training varied in length and quality and was provided to the lieutenants on a not to interfere basis if the officer had time between TBS graduation and his reporting date for MIOBC. The 0203 training track is now IOC (10 weeks), followed by Scout Sniper Platoon Commander's course (2 weeks) and then GIOC (11 weeks).<sup>18</sup> GIOC provides the 0203 with a wide range of instruction.<sup>19</sup>

### **B. MOS 0204 Human Resource Intelligence Officer Training**

Training for MOS 0204 was achieved by adding seats to the existing 17.5-week Marine Corps MAGTF Counterintelligence (CI) course taught at the NMITC. This course is also the MOS awarding course for enlisted MOS 0211 Counterintelligence Specialists and is, when required, MOS training for MOS 0210 CI Warrant Officers.<sup>20</sup> MAGTF CI is a Marine Corps course taught by Marine CI and Interrogator-Translator personnel. The course teaches CI/HUMINT roles, functions and operations in support of the MAGTF; national, DoD and organic Marine Corps intelligence assets and how CI supports the intelligence cycle. The course also provides instruction on hostile threat posed against U.S. interests, CI/HUMINT Operations, photography and digital imaging, CI/HUMINT automated Transmission system (CHATS), interrogation techniques, investigations, interview skill and report writing, and

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<sup>18</sup> Marine Corps Order P1200.7T, *Military Occupational Specialty Manual* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, May 1999), 5.

<sup>19</sup> NMITC Desktop Guide to Intelligence Training, [http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/marine\\_active/mactive\\_frame.html](http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/marine_active/mactive_frame.html). GIOC training consists of training in Intelligence disciplines; Intelligence cycle; Briefing skills; National, theater and Marine Corps and MAGTF intelligence structures; Intelligence analysis; Threat weapons, equipment, organization, doctrine and tactics; Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace; Tactical intelligence systems; National, theater, and MAGTF intelligence collection assets; Collections planning and management; Reconnaissance and surveillance planning; MCPP; R2P2; Intelligence support to MOOTW; Terrorism and intelligence support to antiterrorism; Intelligence support to force protection; and Garrison intelligence operations.

<sup>20</sup> MCO P1200.7T, 6.

certifies the student as a Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Level one instructor.<sup>21</sup> This course has not been significantly revised since the Intel Plan, but needs to be examined once the T&R manual standards have been incorporated.<sup>22</sup>

The chief issue with this course is the mixed enlisted-officer course and focus of the instruction. MAGTF CI trains the 0204 lieutenant along side with the 0211s. The 0204s are provided with additional instruction during the training that focuses them on their future role as Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) leaders and managers. Although NMITC makes efforts to provide the 0204s additional training and mentoring as to their role in managing and coordinating CI and Interrogator-translator support, the officers are being primarily trained to perform as enlisted CI specialists. They do not receive tailored instruction focused to their role as leaders and coordinators while de-emphasizing skill development to function as enlisted CI specialist.<sup>23</sup> The 02 T&R manual has more clearly delineated the difference in training requirement between 0204, 0210, and 0211 and should result in better defined requirements for the MAGTF CI course. However, the logical next step of breaking out 0204 training from 0211 training has not occurred.

### **C. MOS 0206 SIGINT/EW Intelligence Officer Training**

This MOS existed prior to the Intel Plan as primary MOS 2602 for both unrestricted and restricted officers. Within the Intel Plan the MOS was changed to 0206 and aligned as only an entry-level unrestricted MOS. MOS 2602 was retained as the designation for restricted warrant officers. Following TBS, Lieutenants attend the Cryptologic Division Officers Course (CDOC)

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<sup>21</sup> NMITC Desktop Guide to Intelligence Training, [http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/marine\\_active/mactive\\_frame.html](http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/marine_active/mactive_frame.html).

<sup>22</sup> Author's notes as 02 Occupation Field Sponsor, HQMC during 0204/0210 T&R Manual Subject Matter Expert conference January 1998.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with LtCol R.H. Irvine, HQMC, Head, Counterintelligence Branch, 14 January 2000. Marine Corps Intelligence G2 and Commander's Conference, *Marine Corps Intelligence Plan Update*, brief on July 8, 1999. Mr. M.H. Decker, DAC/S Intelligence, HQMC, briefed a "work in progress" was to monitor the health of the 0204 population and to determine if 0204 PMOS training was appropriate. Additionally, other senior intelligence officers have expressed similar views. Author's notes as the 02 Occupation Field Sponsor, HQMC.

taught at the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC), Correy Station, Pensacola, Florida (19 weeks). CDOC is a Navy administered course, attended by Navy Cryptologic and USMC 0206 officers. Prior to 1996, following TBS the 0206s attended the Basic Communications Officer Course (BCOC), the Marine Corps' MOS producing school for Communication Officers, and then attended CDOC. MOS 0206 attendance of BCOC was discontinued and a communications instruction package was established at Pensacola along with the creation of a billet for a Captain, Communications Officer instructor. The 0206s received the communications instruction concurrently with CDOC instruction, but the effectiveness of the instruction suffered greatly from a lack of focus on developing communications skills and from a lack organic Marine Corps equipment to train with. The FMF also voiced concerns that the 0206s were not instructed on Marine Corps organic intelligence capabilities and limitations, MCPP, and R2P2. These were similar to concerns voiced by the FMF about 0203 training at MIOBC.<sup>24</sup>

Since the completion of the 26 Occupation field Training & Readiness Manual in September 1999, HQMC C4I/CIRP and MCCDC T&E have determined that CDOC accomplishes only 50% of the 0206 entry-level (100 level) training requirements. Many of the deficiencies were related to the ineffective communications training embedded in CDOC.<sup>25</sup> Improving the communications package to the desired level is plagued by significant difficulty in sourcing and maintaining the requisite communications equipment. A proposed solution is to create a short communications course (estimated at not more than 5 weeks) at the Marine Corps Command and Control Systems School, Quantico, VA, to fill the training void. HQMC plans to make this proposal to MCCDC T&E during March 2000.<sup>26</sup> Other deficiencies in Marine SIGINT/EW

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<sup>24</sup> Agenda item at the MCITC conference April, 1998.

<sup>25</sup> Major Mark D. Knuth, 2600 Occupation Field Specialist at HQMC C4I, interviewed by author February 25, 2000.

<sup>26</sup> Major Knuth, interview by author February 25, 2000. Reversion to sending 0206s to BCOC is not a viable option. When the Communications Officers (2502) was merged with Data Processing Officers (4002) to form MOS 0602 Communication Information Systems Officer, BCOC was converted to a much longer, 0602 Communication Information Systems Officer course (23 weeks).

training requirements, such as identifying communications gear for training and defining who will maintain that communications equipment, are pending reconciliation between with NTTC Correy Station, Naval Education and Training (CNET), and MCCDC T&E.

#### **D. MOS 0207 Aviation Intelligence Officer Training**

This is a new intelligence officer MOS created under the Intel Plan. MOS 0207 officers are accessed from TBS and attend the Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course (NIOBC) at NMITC jointly with USN intelligence officers. NIOBC is the Navy's sole entry-level intelligence officer course and is, at present, 23 weeks long. The 0207s participate in 19 weeks of NIOBC. Many of the same complaints of the deficiencies of 0203 and 0206 training were also voiced by the FMF regarding NIOBC.<sup>27</sup> Concurrent with the Navy's revision of the course in February 1999, the Marine Corps coordinated changes to the NIOBC curriculum that greatly addressed the deficiencies. Because of the multitude of diverse entry-level assignments for Navy Intelligence officers (carrier, flying squadron, joint, amphibious force, etc.) the Navy was faced with preparing the officer for assignments that required differing skill sets. To address the need for special training linked to the assignment of the officer, the Navy adopted a "core and strand" approach to training.<sup>28</sup> The common intelligence requirements would be taught in blocks of instruction that constitute the "core" level. Instruction tailored to the officer's future assignment would be provided in specialized blocks of tailored instruction as a "strand." Under this concept, the Marine Corps established a Marine Corps Aviation "strand" which is planned to commence during FY00. The 0207 strand and Marine Corps unique training days total 10.5 days of the 19-week course. Although NIOBC is greatly improved with the addition of the

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<sup>27</sup> Author's notes as 02 Occupational Field Sponsor, HQMC at Marine Corps Intelligence Training Counsel (MCITC) Conference, 7-9 April 1998.

strand, the Navy is poised to lengthen the course beyond 23 weeks to cover more of their training requirements.<sup>29</sup> Should this occur, it would be very difficult to reconcile the length of the core curriculum and still include the USMC strand while remaining at 19-weeks or less. The Marine Corps cannot support a NIOBC of over 19-weeks for Marine Corps students as this would constitute the excessive cost of a PCS move for each student.

## II. Post Entry-Level Training

Post entry-level training is formal training required of all intelligence officers.

### A. MOS 0202 MAGTF Intelligence Officer Training

The MAGTF Intelligence Officer Course (MIOC) 0202 is unique within the Marine Corps in that no other MOS brings its officers back in to a formal school environment at the captain level. Prior to the Intel Plan, the 0202 course was designed as an entry-level course. In 1995-1996 NMITC revised the curriculum to meet the requirement of the Intel Plan. MIOC is a 17-week course designed to transition entry-level intelligence officer to be a MAGTF Intelligence Officer. MIOC focuses on developing the skills to support the commander in a MAGTF and joint environment. MIOC employs a mix of prescriptive and descriptive techniques to cover a wide range of topics to include: the Nature of War, service and joint intelligence doctrine, intelligence briefing and writing, IPB, MCPP, R2P2, the intelligence cycle, systems architecture and dissemination. MIOC also provides training on the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and Special Security Officer (SSO) training.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Director, Marine Corps Intelligence Training (N3), NMITC letter to CMC (Code C4I/CRP), subject: "Discussion topics/Position Papers for Marine Corps Intelligence Training Council (7-9 April 1998)," 21 March 1997.

<sup>29</sup> Author's notes as 02 Occupational Field Sponsor, HQMC at NIOBC CCRB as member of the Executive Steering Committee, February 1999.

<sup>30</sup> NMITC Desktop guide to Intelligence Training [http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/marine\\_active/Mactive\\_frame.html](http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/marine_active/Mactive_frame.html).

Operating force comments about MIOC have been positive. However, detracting comments have increased largely due to the relatively high proportion of lateral move officers in the course and the need to “water down” the curriculum. Additionally, operating force comments have indicated that the current eligibility for MIOC (Captain select) is too inexperienced to fully benefit from the curriculum.<sup>31</sup> Several operating force comments are that officers should not attend MIOC until they have completed two tours in their entry-level MOS. Such an argument contends that two tours in the entry-level MOS will solidify the officer’s skills in that discipline, particularly if the officer has one tour in the operating force and the second assignment in an external, theater, national or intelligence agency assignment.<sup>32</sup> In other words, the increased proportion of inexperienced lateral move officers has necessitated a migration to a more fundamental intelligence training approach vice the intended intelligence education program.

### **B. Mid-Career or Senior Intelligence Officer Course**

MIOC is the last formal intelligence course that each intelligence officer is required to attend as part of career progression. The Marine Corps does not have a required program of instruction at more senior levels, but some officers do take advantage of several courses such as the Naval Intelligence Mid-Career course (NIMCC), NMITC and the Senior Intelligence Officer Course (SIOC), Defense Intelligence Agency. Only 2-3 quotas of the SIOC are available annually. NIMCC, held at NMITC, is a two-week symposium designed to provide mid-level intelligence officers with national level perspective of issues, emergent technologies and ideas. It is open to all service and Department of the Navy (DoN) civilian intelligence professionals 0-4/0-5, E7 and above, and GS-12 and above. Guest speakers provide joint

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<sup>31</sup> LtCol E. M. Walters, Director Marine Corps Intelligence Training (N3), NMITC, briefing to Mr. Decker, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, HQMC on MIOC Class 99-1 Composition”, January 1999.

<sup>32</sup> MCITC conference (April 1998) discussion item. Additionally, recent emails from CO 2d Radio Bn and CO Marine Support Battalion commented in support of additional time in the operating forces prior to MIOC..

warfighting, and fleet perspectives, as well as, discussion on professional development, budgets, manpower and other issues related to the Navy intelligence community.<sup>33</sup>

NMITC also offers the two-week Naval Intelligence Officer Senior Course (NIOOSC) intended for Commanders (O-5) returning to sea duty. The focus of this course is on refreshing Naval intelligence officers for operational level staff N2, or Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC)) intelligence assignments. NIOOSC provides a level of training, but also is designed to provide a mentoring environment where the student is paired with a past or present N2/CVIC OIC. This course is similar in concept to the Marine Corps' Advanced Communication Information Systems (ACIS) course where 0602 field grade officers receive 2-weeks of formal training on current communications topics in order to optimize the effectiveness of MAGTF G-6 officers.<sup>34</sup>

### **C. Non-MOS Producing Schools**

Formalized non-MOS producing training and education is available. Non-MOS schools are critical to developing additional intelligence skills or as prerequisites for assignment to certain billets. The MOS manual and 02 T&R manual each identify skill progression training. Although the T&R manual links some non-MOS producing training to a billet assignment, the general progression of the officer's skills is left to his own initiative. Appendix A contains a list of non-MOS schools.

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<sup>34</sup> NMITC Desktop guide to Intelligence Training [http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/navy\\_active/nactive\\_frame.html](http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/dgit/navy_active/nactive_frame.html).

## Chapter Four

### I. Is Intelligence Ready to drive OMFTS?

In the post Cold War era and following DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the Marine Corps embarked on a debate to define and ready itself to be relevant in the future world environment. “From the Sea” and “Forward. . . From the Sea,” laid the foundation for development of future naval expeditionary forces for joint and multinational operations in the littorals. In 1996 the Marine Corps published its’ operational concept for the future, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). OMFTS sets forth operational tenants against a backdrop of an increasingly turbulent and volatile world captured in the concept of “chaos in the littorals.”<sup>35</sup> Since the unveiling of OMFTS, several supporting concepts have been published. Concurrently, General Krulak issued a call for a professional discourse that would rigorously examine not only OMFTS and its supporting concepts, but how Marine Corps functional areas need to adapt in order to meet the challenges of OMFTS.<sup>36</sup> OMFTS;

- Focuses on an operational objective.
- Uses the sea as maneuver space.
- Generates overwhelming tempo and momentum.
- Pits strengths against weakness.
- Emphasizes intelligence, deceptions and flexibility.
- Integrates all organic, joint, and combined assets.<sup>37</sup>

The OMFTS concept paper specifically states the impact of the concept upon intelligence.

*The key to effective intelligence support of OMFTS, lies in the orientation of intelligence specialists. In particular, intelligence specialists must be capable of rapidly making educated judgments about what the enemy is likely to do.*<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> United States Marine Corps, *Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command PCN 145 000001 00,1996), 3.

<sup>36</sup> *OMFTS*, 2.

<sup>37</sup> *OMFTS*, 11.

<sup>38</sup> *OMFTS*, 24.

Although OMFTS set a broad course for the Marine Corps to follow, it does not contain a definitive route to get there. As stated in OMFTS, “the purpose of this concept paper is to begin this process of proposal, debate, and experimentation.”<sup>39</sup> The purpose of this chapter is to examine OMFTS from the perspective of intelligence to understand and define the intelligence training requirements to support OMFTS.

OMFTS evolved from a view of the future operational environment characterized as that of “both danger and opportunity.”<sup>40</sup> The concept of danger is further characterized within the phrase “chaos in the littorals” which refers to increasingly urbanized, highly concentrated populations in coastal areas; increased numbers of economically failing states, the rise of non-state actors or rogue states, within an atmosphere of nationalism, ethnic conflict, exploding populations, and religious intolerance.<sup>41</sup> The Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Estimate 1995-2005, which was the service estimate of the future operating environment published just prior to the publication of OMFTS judged the key factors of future conflicts as nationalism, ideology, competition, demographics, ungovernability and technological acceleration.<sup>42</sup> Joint Vision 2010 addresses potential adversaries noting that access to advanced weapons technology, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the ability to employ these capabilities will increase the number of adversaries who can upset regional balances of power and seek to confront the United States asymmetrically.<sup>43</sup> Having a conceptual understanding of those factors which influence regional conflict will provide the intelligence officer the intellectual basis from which to provide effective intelligence assessments to the commander.

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<sup>39</sup> OMFTS, 2.

<sup>40</sup> OMFTS, 1.

<sup>41</sup> Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) *Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate 1997-2007: Finding Order in Chaos*. (Quantico, VA: MCIA 1586-001-97.

<sup>42</sup> MCIA, *Threats in Transition, Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Estimate, 1995-2005* (Quantico, VA: MCIA 1570-001-95), 1.

<sup>43</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, DC),10..

OMFSTS also cites “opportunity,” which is reflective of technological advances in information management, battlefield mobility, and the lethality of weapons, as a key element of the future operating environment. In total, this estimate of future conflict will have a singular impact on “where we fight, who we fight, and how we fight.”<sup>44</sup>

## II. Intelligence Tasks inherent to OMFSTS

The following is OMFSTS’s stated required intelligence capability:

*The high tempo of operations essential to successful OMFSTS requires that intelligence be provided to decision makers with a minimum of delay. Technology that permits the rapid dissemination of intelligence products will play an important role in this effort. However, a key to effective intelligence support of OMFSTS, lies in the orientation of intelligence specialists. In particular, intelligence specialists must be capable of rapidly making educated judgments about what the enemy is likely to do.(emphasis added)<sup>45</sup>*

*High tempo of operations...that intelligence be provided to decision makers with a minimum of delay.* To enable high tempo operations, decision makers must have timely intelligence of the environment, the enemy and weather conditions. Conceptually, this is what intelligence officers are charged with providing today. However, within OMFSTS, the scale of the requirement will increase dramatically.<sup>46</sup> OMFSTS allows for multiple, widely dispersed (potentially hundreds of miles) Littoral Penetration Areas (LPA), each with multiple Littoral Penetration Points (LPP), requiring intelligence to expend effort and limited assets to assess each point.<sup>47</sup> The intelligence analyst must efficiently and effectively orchestrate relevant and timely intelligence. To meet the challenge of OMFSTS, the intelligence function will require new or updated doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and supporting facilities (DOTES).

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<sup>44</sup> OMFSTS, 2.

<sup>45</sup> OMFSTS, 24.

<sup>46</sup> LtGen Carlton W. Fulford, Col Kent D.Keobke, and Mr. Jason M. Williams, “Organizing Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Forces for Tomorrow,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, (June 1999): 25-27.

Of these elements of DOTES, the area provided the least scrutiny is training. The adequacy of intelligence training will have a tremendous impact on the skills of intelligence professionals to provide the commander with the accurate and timely intelligence required to propel OMFTS.

***Technology that permits the rapid dissemination of intelligence products.*** This requirement speaks to intelligence's capability to either create organically or coordinate non-organic production of timely, tailored intelligence products and the Marine Corps' ability to move that intelligence product to the commander in a form that is relevant to his decision making process. Intelligence officers will need not only to understand MAGTF CIS, but must also be knowledgeable of the theater intelligence architecture in order to identify and shape an intelligence dissemination network that is responsive to the commander's requirement. The intelligence officer must recognize and exploit reachback capabilities in order to augment his organic intelligence collection, analysis, and production operations. He must also know how to tap into critical intelligence expertise from across the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, other U.S. government departments (Departments of Energy, State, Transportation, Justice, etc.), or non-US government expertise in academia or the private sectors. In addition, the intelligence officer must know how to operate these architectures while sea-based or ashore, and when in a joint or combined environment.

***Orientation of intelligence specialists.*** This requirement refers to the broad level of intelligence skills that intelligence officers must possess in order to remain relevant in OMFTS. Accordingly, the intelligence officer must understand, orchestrate, and exploit both organic and joint intelligence resources and capabilities. He must be proficient in MCPP and the planning, coordination and execution of intelligence operations in Marine Corps and joint intelligence

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<sup>47</sup> OMFTS, 17-18.

operations, across the intelligence disciplines (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT) and intelligence functions (collection and RFI management, reconnaissance and surveillance, targeting, etc.). Lastly, the intelligence officer must be proficient in analyzing the threat (conventional or unconventional forces, WMD, counterdrug, etc.), determining its capability and making assessments.

***Rapidly making educated judgments.*** The analysis and judgments of what the enemy is “likely to do” is perhaps the most difficult, and most important, aspect of the intelligence officer’s responsibility to the commander.<sup>48</sup> The complexity of gaining information and building rapidly to knowledge and understanding of the extensive OMFTS operations area while sea-based, is a difficult assignment.<sup>49</sup> A precondition to making a sound judgment is the availability of relevant information. That is, the intelligence architecture must facilitate the control of collection assets, and the flow of information between the MAGTF and adjacent, JTF, theater, joint or reachback site(s). Speed in the intelligence officer’s decision-making is a function of having sufficient information with which to base a decision. Secondly, the experience of the intelligence officer will play a large role in how rapidly he arrives at a critical judgment regarding the enemy and what the enemy is likely to do. Formal training coupled with experience contributes to the increased speed in which a well-reasoned judgment is made, given a constant level of information. Experience will play a greater role in the officer’s ability to arrive at a sound judgment.

The OMFTS Working Group (WG) report examined the OMFTS concept from the perspective of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and identified several critical intelligence capabilities. Following these overarching conclusions, the OMFTS WG

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<sup>48</sup> Major Harry E. Jones II, USA, “Closing the Intelligence Gap in the OMFTS Concept,” *Military Intelligence*, (January-March 1999), 33-49.

<sup>49</sup> LtCol J.D. Williams and others, “A Concept for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Intelligence Operations,” unpublished research paper (31 July 1999).

offered recommendations organized according to each of the elements of the MAGTF. Of the ten overarching concerns OMFTS WG identified for ISR, most were concerned with either the collection systems or the system to manage that information. Two of the conclusions were oriented on the human factors involve in OMFTS ISR. Specifically, one concern cites the increasing volume of information and the need to effectively analyze that information.<sup>50</sup> This concern of the OMFTS WG advocates development of automated support tools and data visualization tools to aid in analysis, but reinforces the central role of human intellect in the analysis process. The second concern notes the increasing complexity of the intelligence process and advocates that, “training and education systems must support the development of intelligence specialist capable of exploiting the capabilities provided by new technology . . .”<sup>51</sup>

### **III. Conclusion**

Since specific and detailed intelligence requirements for OMFTS are still undefined, the supporting training institutions must remain flexible and adaptable to rapidly changing, emerging requirements. What is clear is that the size of the maneuver area envisioned under OMFTS will demand that intelligence provide detailed expeditionary intelligence on a number of widely dispersed littoral penetration points, where as, historically, the challenge to intelligence for expeditionary intelligence was focused to a narrower geographic area with fewer littoral penetration points. Additionally, given the uncertainty of the future environment, OMFTS puts stock in intelligence officers who make good estimates. Success of OMFTS hinges on the intelligence estimate. Accordingly, measures to enhance the ability to provide well reasoned and timely intelligence estimates will materially ensure that intelligence is positioned to drive OMFTS.

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<sup>50</sup> *OMFTS WG Final Report* (July 1999), III-2.

<sup>51</sup> *OMFTS WG Final Report* (July 1999), III-2

## **Chapter Five**

### **I. Intelligence Officer Perspectives on Intelligence Officer Training**

The strengths and weaknesses of our present intelligence training program as noted in chapter 3, together with increased challenges to intelligence embodied within OMFTS form the key factors in determining the adequacy of our training plan. Analysis of our present intelligence training and OMFTS requirements illuminated several deficiencies and reinforced previously identified strengths and weaknesses in the focus of intelligence training.

A survey of intelligence officers was conducted in order to further define, from the occupation field perspective, the strengths and weaknesses of our current program. The survey also was useful in formulating potential adjustments to the training. The intelligence training questionnaire was constructed to solicit response by all intelligence officers, and was electronically mailed to all sitting USMC operating force G2s and senior intelligence officers currently in non-operating force assignments. The recipients were asked to forward the questionnaire to the intelligence officers within their respective areas. A total of 32 responses were received and were equally spread between Lieutenants, Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels. One Colonel provided a response. The purpose of the questionnaire (Appendix B) was to determine the opinion of intelligence officers regarding the state of intelligence training with a particular view on the challenges of OMFTS. What follows is a summary of these responses.

**Question 1.** *How well does current 0203, 0204, 0206, 0207 training prepare the officer to understand and develop expertise with basic classes of intelligence?*

Responses to this question followed a pattern where most of the respondents believed that the basic encyclopedic and current intelligence training was at the “right amount” (67% and 56% respectively) with only 45% believing the emphasis on estimative intelligence as appropriate. Correspondingly, 29% believed that basic intelligence required more emphasis, 44% believed current intelligence needed more attention, and 55% thought that estimative intelligence required increased attention. In general, those surveyed were satisfied with the officer’s skill in handling baseline research, but less sure that officers are skilled to adequately handle the increased analysis germane to producing current and estimative intelligence. One officer summed it up by saying;

We train our officers well in the knowledge and use of basic encyclopedic intelligence, however, we are still weak in the skills of presenting current intelligence and tying it all together to provide the estimative intelligence that is desired by the commanders we support. More emphasis needs to be placed on the questions, “So what?” and “What does it mean to me?” We must train our Marines to anticipate the questions and requirements of the operations personnel.

- 0202 Lieutenant Colonel

Further support to this observation is that amplifying comments for this question typically responded that the officer needs a higher level of both critical thinking and writing skills.

**Question 2-5. *How well does 0203(or 0204, 0206, 0207) training provide the officer with a functional understanding of the other three entry level disciplines?*** These questions solicited views on how well the designated 020x MOS producing school exposed the officer to the other three intelligence MOSs. As noted in chapter three, operating forces have criticized the lack of training exposure that the 020x MOSs received regarding the capabilities and limitations of their sister intelligence MOSs. The responses validated this concern. For each MOS, those surveyed the responses ranged from “not enough”, “need more”, or “right amount.” Responses

reflected the deficiencies of 0203 MIOBC, 0206 CDOC and 0207 NIOBC as previously outlined in chapter three. Although the responses were randomly spread between these three values, more significantly, no one responded that the training they received on the sister MOSs was “more than enough” or “too much.” Comments such as the following were typical.

In the initial training schools, other intelligence MOSs are barely glanced over. I did not know what I needed to know until I floated on a MEU and worked along side the other disciplines. We could have saved each other much wasted time and effort if we simply divided our duties according to what each is best at from the very beginning.  
- 0206 Lieutenant

Officers believe that training exposure to their sister intelligence MOSs would have a positive impact on their ability to understand the role of all-source intelligence and provide better intelligence support to the commander.

**Question 6. *How well does current 0202 training apportion training emphasis between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of intelligence?*** In a similar pattern to the responses to question 1, a clear majority (79%) responded that the “right amount” of weight was placed on the strategic and operational level. However, only 43% believed that tactical intelligence received the proper emphasis (“right amount”). More revealing is that 57% believed said that we “need more” emphasis on tactical intelligence.

**Question 7. *From your knowledge of OMFTS, how well does 0202 training prepare the officer to function across the intelligence cycle? Does the training provide proper emphasis on each step of the intelligence cycle?*** Those surveyed responded that the “right amount” of emphasis was placed on direction (67%), planning (60%), and dissemination (60%).

Conversely, the greatest area of improvement where respondents indicated “not enough” or “need more” were in processing/analysis (60%) and collection (57%). Only one officer declared excessive training attention (“more than enough”) in any function. The strongest

comments were expressed regarding lack of processing/analysis, production, and dissemination. Although 60% thought that dissemination training was the “right amount,” one officer typified those who believed that training was not adequate.

Officers checking into the FMF lack a clear understanding of how to track and disseminate intelligence products. We have reached the mindset where “it’s posted on the web page...” or “I sent you an e-mail” seems to be an acceptable answer for dissemination...NOT TRUE!!!

- 0202 Lieutenant Colonel

Regarding the lack of processing and analysis skills, one officer described the problem as,

Analytical capability starts in the schoolhouse. It continues are (at) every level along the career. If we cannot develop good analysts, then the intelligence (they produce), which is so vital, (will undermine sound) OMFTS decisions.

- 0202 Major

The lack of critical thinking in analysis was a particular shortfall and a recurring comment. Respondents remarked that development of analytical skills was lacking and too many officers confused the use of analytical skills with the ability to search the web and download finished intelligence products from theater or national intelligence organizations. Further, the importance of cultivating officers with good analytical skills was critical to sorting through the voluminous amounts of all-source information when providing timely and accurate estimative intelligence.

**Question 8. *Do we emphasize intelligence systems and architecture training in a disproportionately greater manner than focusing on the skills that essential to building a timely and relevant intelligence product? Based upon your thoughts of the preceding question, does the present training invest the right amount of time in making our officers “system smart?”*** The responses to this question were divided. An equal number of those surveyed said “not enough” emphasis was paid to systems training (two field grade officers,

both Majors, one of which a sitting G2), as those who said we have “too much” emphasis on systems training. The majority (61%) believed that more emphasis on systems is required (9% “not enough” and 52% “need more”). However, the comments, whether in support of, or against more systems training, reflected caution that officers become well versed in systems capabilities, architectures and making the systems work to support the commander, vice becoming a “systems administrator” or the duty “know everything systems expert.”

**Question 9. *Does training develop the right level of “regionally, culturally, and humint smart” intelligence officer?*** The responses were nearly unanimously in favor (79%) of each officer having this type of skill. Only 21% said that the training was the “right amount” and no one said that present training was excessive. Several respondents also advocated that intelligence officers should be required to obtain a language and exposure to cultures. In fact, several recommended that each officer be required to learn a second language. Others recommended that intelligence officers be routinely assigned to the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) or Regional Area Officer (RAO) programs. Several commented that the benefit of language and cultural expertise would manifest itself in a better skilled intelligence officer more able to develop insightful estimates of what the threat is “likely to do.”

**Question 10. *Do you believe that we should have some type of intelligence structured training program (TAD, Distance Education) for officers selected for senior field grade officers?*** This question and question 11 are linked. All respondents said that they support the requirement for senior intelligence officer training. The proposed training indicated in question 11 was overwhelmingly supported by 93% of the respondents. They agreed that the intelligence field should have some type of field grade intelligence officer training program particularly for officers returning to an operating forces assignment after 3-6 years in external billets. One

officer responded that he had attended the Naval Intelligence Mid-Career course (NIMCC) and saw it as beneficial. Several comments did not see the notional senior intelligence officer symposium's meetings with the Marines assigned in the Washington area joint billets as important. However, the respondents clearly supported (93%) the value of getting the most recent views from HQMC senior leadership on the vision and current policies for Marine Corps Intelligence, as well as, a refresher on doctrine, systems, and other issues.

**Question 12. *How well do you believe the present 0202 training prepares the officer to meet the intelligence tasks associated with OMFTS?*** Each response, in general, was split between “need more” and “right amount” for each of the 9 sub-categories. That is, officers across the board said that they want more training or the training was at the correct emphasis. The following received the greatest responses of “more than enough” or “too much” emphasis: counterdrug (29%) and WMD (17%). The top 4 areas where officers believed training was either “not enough” or “need more” are amphibious operations (73%), intelligence systems (72%), analysis (71%), and MCPP (67%).

**Question 13. *In general, is the length of 020x training sufficient to produce a basically trained officer?*** Most responded “right amount,” (0202 71%, 0203 80%, and 0207 75%), although 0204 (45%) and 0206 (58%) received the most number of “need more” or “not enough” training. An overriding concern was the officers were not well grounded in “core” general military intelligence, the MAGTF and its employment, Marine Corps intelligence collection capabilities and limitations, and MCPP. Concern was also raised that 0206 and 0207 receive too much exposure to USN cryptology and air intelligence to the detriment of learning about Marine Corps SIGINT/EW and aviation intelligence.

## II. Findings

The responses to the questionnaire have identified a number of deficiencies in the intelligence officer's current skills. These deficiencies can be summarized as follows.

**1. A lack of analysis and estimative intelligence skills.** The strongest comments received were regarding the lack of critical thinking and analytical skills capability of our officers.

Respondents thought both education programs and time in operating forces were the keys to developing credible analytical expertise. They also believe that development of analytical skills must be institutionally emphasized. LtCol Sofranac's article "Data Mining and Intelligence Outsourcing," is reflective of the sentiment of the respondents when he argues that not enough time is spent on the quality of the content of intelligence analysis. He further comments on the importance of intelligence analysis skills by stating they are critical and "can not be supplanted by mechanical or information technology searches."<sup>52</sup> Capt Paul Shelton's "Frontline Intelligence for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" also notes the decline in emphasis on intelligence analysis;

As our capabilities to collect information increased, we lost the art of focusing on the critical and spread our net wider and wider, eventually outstripping our ability to analyze collected information. Soon the mere storing of information in databases began to displace analysis as a key function of intelligence.<sup>53</sup>

Reviving the development of analytical skills is a key deficiency that must be addressed.

**2. Inefficient and lengthy entry-level intelligence training.** Not enough emphasis was placed on coordinating within each entry-level 020x officer training program standardized exposure to the other three lieutenant MOS disciplines. Further, each entry-level training course did not incorporate common general military intelligence curriculum. Common core intelligence training would ensure common intelligence officer development and would result in greater

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<sup>52</sup> LtCol Paul Sofranac USMC, "Data Mining and Intelligence Outsourcing," *Marine Corps Gazette* (March 1999): 45-46.

cohesion when working in the operating forces. The respondents generally wanted more training included in the entry-level programs, but at the same time saw a need to reduce the overall course length of entry-level training. Respondents believed that the 020x course lengths were artificially longer than required in order to cover sister-service training requirements. Additionally, a consensus of respondents believed the existing curriculum is also diluted to meet priority training requirements of the lead sister service school. Specifically, from a USMC perspective, NIOBC and CDOC are longer than required because of the need to cover USN unique intelligence officer training requirements. Similarly, the MAGTF CI course is longer than required, from a MOS 0204 perspective; because of the detailed CI skill set development required for MOS 0211. Efficiencies in both time and money could be realized should the Marine Corps decide not to train with the Navy in CDOC and NIOBC. The courses could be shortened much in the same way the 0203 training track length was reduced by leaving MIOBC at Ft Huachuca and establishing GIOC at NMITC.<sup>54</sup>

**3. A lack of regional and cultural expertise.** The preponderance of those surveyed (79%) believed that more emphasis is required to develop intelligence officers with regional and cultural skills. Respondents viewed an officer's first hand exposure to foreign cultures as critical to providing meaningful intelligence estimates and current intelligence analysis. Additionally, many advocated that each officer be *required* to obtain a foreign language with the belief that it would also enhance the officer's ability to develop accurate, meaningful, and timely estimative intelligence. In his discussion of "Non-Traditional Military Missions," General Anthony C. Zinni's comments dovetail well with the survey results. Specifically, he provides a compelling discussion, from a commander's perspective, of the importance of

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<sup>53</sup> Captain Paul Shelton USMC, "Frontline Intelligence for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," *Marine Corps Gazette* (September, 1996): 32-33.

understanding the dynamic of cultural intelligence in intelligence analysis.<sup>55</sup> Survey respondents supported programs that provided for language training or regional area expertise.

**4. A lack of formal intelligence training and education for mid and senior-level intelligence officers.** All respondents agreed that a need exists for mandatory field grade officer training and education to correct the present training and education void. The existing NIMCC is not a mandatory course for field grade officers. However, if it were, it is not tailored to Marine Intelligence Officer needs and presently only offers a limited return for the time invested. A proposal for a mid and senior level intelligence officer symposium, sponsored by HQMC, received overwhelming support (93%). This notional program would address the lack of refresher training and education for officers returning to operating forces from joint and external assignments. Additionally, the symposium would allow the officer to receive information on present service level intelligence policy, doctrine, systems, joint intelligence support, emerging intelligence issues, etc.<sup>56</sup> Training related specifically to the officer's next assignment, as well as, intelligence programs designed to enhance the officer's analytical skill, should also be identified and required where appropriate.

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<sup>54</sup> Marine Corps Intelligence G2 and Commander's Conference, July 8, 1999. The disengagement from MIOBC and start-up of the Scout Sniper Platoon Commander's Course (2 weeks) and GIOC (11 weeks) resulted in a net savings of 5 weeks of T2P2 per student. With an FY99 requirement for 41 0203 Lieutenants, this equates to a total of 205 weeks, or approximately \$63,000 in TAD funds saved.

<sup>55</sup> General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, "Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature, and the Need for Cultural Awareness and Flexible Thinking, A presentation to the Armed Forces Staff College, 4 June 1994" *Capital "W" War; A Case for strategic Principle of War* (Defense automated Printing Service Center; Quantico, VA): 266-267.

<sup>56</sup> LtCol Bruce E. Brunn, "A Challenge of Command," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (September, 1992): 19-20. LtCol Brunn advocates a similar course of education for intelligence officers by citing, "our fundamental education strategy is flawed by a lack of the career follow-on training that is essential in high technology fields such as intelligence, communications..." He further advocates schools to provide "skills required at each grade and concentrate our training on those skills that will be essential in that grade or billet assignment."

## **Chapter Six**

### **Assessment and Conclusion**

#### **I. Assessment**

Under the Intel Plan, Marine Corps intelligence has made significant and meaningful structural and conceptual progress in officer training. However, several organizational improvements must be made to strengthen the training and education regime. Additionally, changes are needed to position intelligence officer training to meet the emerging, requirements of OMFTS. Chapter 5 concludes with four key findings drawn from the survey responses regarding intelligence officer training. In reviewing the deficiencies of our present intelligence officer training, in conjunction with the perceived demands of OMFTS and the key findings of the survey, a number of training and education gaps are identified. These observations form specific training and education deficiencies, which we need to correct if we are to position intelligence officers for success in the future. The observed areas of weakness are as listed below.

1. That much of the entry-level, and post entry-level training appears to be devoted to understanding the process of intelligence (specific intelligence systems; C2; Standing Operating Procedures; tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)) rather than focusing on how to develop the skills to produce the timely and accurate intelligence analysis that commanders need. Surveys (key finding 1) and OMFTS both speak to the importance of intelligence officers possessing credible critical thinking and analytical skills. The ability to develop analytical skills and intelligence estimates that identify “what the enemy is likely to do” are critical to the

execution of OMFTS. Educational programs can provide the academic rigor necessary to develop the officer's judgment, critical thinking and analytical capabilities.

2. That the intelligence architecture to support the intelligence cycle functions is detailed and rapidly changing with technology. Because of this, up-to-date training courses that are tailored to each system are needed so that the officer can gain specific system knowledge when assigned to a specific billet, or if he is in need of refresher training prior to returning to the operating forces following an external tour.

3. Each 020x MOS has a common core of general intelligence concepts, functions, training, tactics and procedures. The T&R manual is the first document to articulate common core intelligence standards, however, a common block of instruction is not resident in each 020x course. The overall organization of entry-level courses presently does not lend them to developing a foundation of common intelligence concepts, or foster a single intelligence officer culture. Without a standardized core of intelligence instruction, each entry-level course trains their officers differently, or disproportionately, resulting in a loss of cohesion when the officers meet in the operating forces. Each intelligence officer needs a common point of reference for core concepts and subject matter such as, general military intelligence, intelligence support to operational planning, and MAGTF organization, capabilities and limitations. Different 020x schools can also inadvertently foster a culture of intelligence officers who more closely identify themselves as 0203, 0204, 0206, or 0207 *vice a future 0202 MAGTF Intelligence officer*.

Because of the lack of standardized exposure to other entry-level training, we are developing an environment of young intelligence officers who see themselves as an enclave of a specific intelligence skill without an understanding of the greater role of intelligence and how they contribute to that system.

4. The established training lacks focused programs to educate intelligence officers on regional and cultural issues. Entry-level MOS and MIOC do not address the need for intelligence officers with regional and cultural experiences. Intelligence officers educated in regional and cultural affairs will have a greater ability to understand the dynamics of the threat captured in the concept of “chaos in the littorals” while rapidly make educated judgments to support OMFTS. Of the available training and education, intelligence officers are not required to attend any schools or programs over any given period of time.

5. After MIOC, there is no required programmed intelligence officer training or education. Officers are free to pursue (or not) training and education on their own recognizance. Presently, PGIP and NMICC either do not support the throughput necessary to support the needs of the entire intelligence community, or the quality of the education is minimal. If the current state of a lack of professional education opportunities is allowed to prolong, the professional education level of the intelligence officer corps will vary greatly with some highly skilled and others desperately lacking in formal education. The consequences of such a diverse span of ability could be rather costly. The nature of OMFTS will require technological solutions to enabling the concept. Intelligence officers will likewise be required to understand and exploit emerging ISR technology while concurrently employing critical thinking and analytical skills geared to providing the commander with the best estimate of the battlespace on which he will make a decision. To meet the challenge, a deliberate intelligence education program, mandatory to all officers, must be implemented.

Given the above deficiencies, the following changes are proposed in order to fully professionalize the intelligence officer and position him best to meet the challenges of OMFTS.


## II. Recommendations

### **A. Consolidate all entry-level MOS training at NMITC under a single Marine Intelligence core-strand concept.**

A single location would allow flexibility to efficiently change training to best address OMFTS or other changes in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. A single Marine intelligence core-strand course, with strands for 0203, 0204, 0206, and 0207 will foster development of a Marine Corps intelligence officer culture much in the same way that TBS does for the officer corps (*Figure 2*). A single Marine intelligence core-strand course would also provide a synergistic environment for intelligence officers regardless of their specific entry-level discipline, and would ensure that training time would be focused on achieving Marine Corps training requirements. MOS 0206 and MOS 0207 would particularly benefit, as they would decouple the bulk of their training time from following curriculum weighted to satisfy Navy requirements.

This change would also be cost effective and reduce T2P2 without decreasing training days. For example, the shift of 0203 training from MIOBC to GIOC resulted in a decreased training time of 5 weeks per student. Similar savings in 0206 and 0207 training time is also likely, but would require additional study that is beyond the scope of this work. The proposed Marine Corps intelligence core-strand would also benefit 0204 training by efficiently orienting the officer to his role of CI employer/coordinator in the top down context of the MAGTF intelligence effort, vice the bottom up, highly skilled technician view of the 0211 and 0210.

# PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE OFFICER CAREER PROGRESSION



*Figure 2*

*Italics indicate Proposed Core & Strands*

## **B. Establish an Intelligence Officer Advance Degree Program.**

The development of an educational program for intelligence officers to pursue advance degrees in specific curriculum will enhance the officer's ability to understand the complex cultural environment describe in "chaos in the littorals." First, HQMC should institute a program where each year several officers (Captain through Major) are allowed to pursue funded studies in International Relations, WMD, Terrorism, Force Protection, Counterintelligence, Signal Intelligence, Imagery and Remote Sensing, Conflict Resolution, and Peacekeeping. After completing their degree, the officer would return to a MAGTF level assignment in the operating force. Second, the Marine Corps should increase its attendance at the Post Graduate Intelligence Program (PGIP) at the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), DIA. The education provided at PGIP addresses the several of the deficiencies identified by the survey findings. Presently, one intermediate level school quota per year is allocated for an intelligence officer to attend PGIP. Increased participation would provide a viable intelligence education program and should be investigated. Finally, selection to FAO or RAO would also build up the officer corps' population of officers skilled to make sound, well-supported intelligence estimates and analytical judgments consistent with the demands of OMFTS.

## **C. Institute Mandatory, Short-Duration, Annual Education.**

Because of throughput and resource constraints, not all intelligence officers will be able to attend the proposed advance degree program. To ensure that the intelligence officer corps is continually developing new skills or honing old ones, a new policy should be adopted that requires officers to complete at least one professional intelligence education program on an

annual basis. The training and educational courses listed in the T&R manual<sup>57</sup> should be expanded to form the basis for this required training. Where possible, educational and training programs should be linked to billet requirements and training should be attended enroute to the assignment. Courses such as the Dynamics of International Terrorism (AFSOC Hurlbert Field, FL), Latin-American Orientation Course (AFSOC Hurlbert Field, FL), Joint Targeting School (JFCOM course presented at NMITC) and the Joint Staff CI Course (DIA) are examples of short duration educational programs that currently exist. Although quotas for these courses are available today via the respective MARFOR, attendance is voluntary and at the discretion of the parent unit. These types of educational programs should be reviewed and integrated into the T&R manual as mandatory training for intelligence officer career progression.

#### **D. Establish a Senior Intelligence Officer “Fellowship” Seminar.**

The program should be designated as required enroute training. The focus of this program would be similar to the intent of the Navy’s Senior Intelligence Officer Seminar and the Marine Corps’ Communication Officer course where mid-level and senior officers review current issues in preparation for a return to an operating force assignment. Notionally, this seminar would be self-paced, targeting LtCol or LtCol selects returning to an operating assignment. Officers designated as future Intelligence Battalion, Radio Battalion, Marine Support Battalion (MarSptBn) commanders and MEF, MEB, Division, MAW, and FSSG G2s, G2A or, G2 Operations Officers would attend the seminar. Prospective topics would include; HQMC Intelligence Plans and Policies, visits to service field activities (MCIA and MarSptBn), contact with MCCDC (MSTP, Doctrine, MARCORPSYSCOM), and liaison with the senior Marine of various joint agencies (OSD, ONI, DIA, CIA, NIMA, NSA, etc.). The program

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<sup>57</sup> MCO 3500.32 Intelligence Training & Readiness Manual, Appendix J (for each MOS) contains a listing of academic training considered

would be tailored to the individual based upon the officer's experience level and should not exceed two weeks.

The creation of this program would provide a necessary education program for senior intelligence officers that do not currently exist. The effect would be a more cohesive intelligence community that is knowledgeable on current OMFTS related doctrine, concepts, systems, and manpower in addition to "getting on step" with current service level policies and programs. The seminar would also provide a valuable feedback mechanism to the Director of Intelligence of the state of Marine Corps intelligence from the perspective of the senior leadership.

### **III. Conclusion**

In the past five years Marine Corps intelligence has experienced two significant events that will continue to impact and shape its future. The Intel Plan encompassed a fundamental change whose changes are still being implemented, and whose affects are still being shaped. The near concurrent publication of OMFTS is having a similar affect on the Marine Corps as a whole, and the changes required to fulfill the concepts' potential will be determined more clearly as we receive the enabling capability resident in the MV-22, AAV, Amphibious shipping and other systems. The intelligence community's training appears to be moving in the right direction to support OMFTS, but needs to focus on a more effective entry-level training program and needs to develop mid and senior career education. Adoption of the recommended programs will capitalize on the gains of the Intel Plan and will build in the flexibility to adapt to the emerging requirement of OMFTS

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relevant to that MOS's career progression.

## *Appendix A: Non-MOS Producing Intelligence Schools*

### **Intel T&R Manual Chapter 1 Appendix J**

<b>Level</b>	<b>Academic Title</b>
200	Combat Targeting Course, (Goodfellow AFB)
200	Intelligence Support to Combined Operations, (DIA)
200	Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, (DIA)
200	Eastern Europe Orientation Course, (Hurlburt Field, FL)
200	Counterterrorism Analysis Course, (DIA)
200	Counter-Drug Basic Intelligence Course, (NMITC)
200	Chemical and Biological Warfare Intelligence Course, (DIA)
200	Advanced Counterterrorism Analysis Course, (DIA)
200	American Military University (Undergrad/Grad Intelligence), (Manassas, VA)
200	Dynamics of International Terrorism, (AFSOC Hurlbert Field, FL)
200	Survival Evasion Resistance Escape, (EWTGPAC, EWTGLANT)
200	Latin-America Orientation Course, (Hurlburt Field, FL)
200	Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC), (NMITC, FITCPAC)
200	Local Collection Manager's Course, (DIA)
200	Anti Terrorism Force Protection, (NMITC)
200	JTF Intelligence Manager's Course, (FITCPAC)
200	Afloat Intelligence Systems Manager's Overview, (FITCPAC)
200	Expeditionary Warfare Intelligence Course, (EWTGLANT, EWTGPAC)
200	Joint Targeting School, (NMITC)
200	JDISS Basic Operator's Course, (FITCPAC, JITAP)
200	Security Manager's Course
200	National Training Center Red Thrust OPFOR, (Fort Irwin, CA)
200	High Risk Personnel Course (HRP), (Quantico, VA)
200	Eastern Europe Orientation Course, (Hurlburt Field, FL)
200	Joint Staff CI Course, (Boiling AFB, DC) J-1

## *Appendix B: Intelligence Questionnaire*

### **Intelligence Officer Training Questionnaire**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Billet: \_\_\_\_\_

OMFTS can be summarized as follows:

Focuses on an operational objective.

Uses the sea as maneuver space

Generates overwhelming tempo and momentum

Pits strength against weakness

Emphasizes intelligence, deceptions, and flexibility

Integrates all organic, joint, and combined assets.

“OMFTS requires much of intelligence. The high tempo of operations essential to successful OMFTS requires that intelligence be provided to decision makers with a minimum of delay. Technology that permits the rapid dissemination of intelligence products will play an important role in this effort. However, the key to effective intelligence support of OMFTS lies in the orientation of intelligence specialist. *In particular, intelligence specialists must be capable of rapidly making educated judgments about what the enemy is likely to do.*” Gen Krulak 4 Jan 96

1. How well does current 0202 training prepare the officer to understand and develop expertise with basic classes of intelligence?

Basic, Encyclopedic intelligence?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Current intelligence?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Estimative intelligence?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

If you responded “Not enough” or “Need more” please provide specific comments.

2. How well does 0203 training provide the officer with a functional understanding of the other three (0204, 0206, 0207) entry level disciplines?

How well is CI/HUMINT covered in the 0203 training track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

< > No opinion

How well is SIGINT/EW covered in the current 0203 track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

< > No opinion

How well is Aviation Intelligence covered in the current 0203 track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

< > No opinion

If you responded “Not enough” or “Need more” please provide specific comments.

3. How well does 0204 training provide the officer with a functional understanding of the other three (0203, 0206, 0207) entry level disciplines?

How well is Ground Intelligence covered in the 0204 training track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much  
< > No opinion

How well is SIGINT/EW covered in the current 0204 track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much  
< > No opinion

How well is Aviation Intelligence covered in the current 0204 track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much  
< > No opinion

If you responded “Not enough” or “Need more” please provide specific comments.

4. How well does 0206 training provide the officer with a functional understanding of the other three (0203, 0204, 0207) entry level disciplines?

How well is Ground Intelligence covered in the 0206 training track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much  
< > No opinion

How well is CI/HUMINT covered in the current 0206 track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much  
< > No opinion

How well is Aviation Intelligence covered in the current 0206 track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much  
< > No opinion

If you responded “Not enough” or “Need more” please provide specific comments.

5. How well does 0207 training provide the officer with a functional understanding of the other three (0203, 0204, 0206) entry level disciplines?

How well is Ground Intelligence covered in the 0207 training track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much  
< > No opinion

How well is CI/HUMINT covered in the current 0207 track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much  
< > No opinion

How well is SIGINT/EW covered in the current 0207 track?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

< > No opinion

If you responded “Not enough” or “Need more” please provide specific comments.

6. How well does current 0202 training apportion training emphasis between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of intelligence?

Strategic?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Operational?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Tactical?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

If you responded “Not enough” or “Need more” please provide specific comments.

7. From your knowledge of OMFTS, how well does 0202 training prepare the officer to function across the intelligence cycle? Does the training provide proper emphasis on each step of the intelligence cycle?

Planning?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Direction?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Collection?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Processing/Analysis?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Production?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Dissemination?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

If you responded “Not enough” or “Need more” please provide specific comments.

8. Do we emphasize intelligence systems and architecture training in a disproportionately greater manner than focusing on the skills that are essential to building a timely and relevant intelligence product? Based upon your thoughts of the preceding question, does the present training invest the right amount of time in making our officers “systems smart?”

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Comments?

9. Does training develop the right level of “regionally, culturally, and humint smart” intelligence officer?

<> Not enough <> Need more <> Right amount <> More than enough <> Too much  
Comments?

10. Formal 020x MOS training is programmed up through the MAGTF Intelligence Officer course. Other formal intelligence training for specific billets, as indicated in the T&R manual, is available on an as needed basis. To date, some Marine Intelligence Officers have attended NMITC’s Naval Intelligence Officer Symposium (targeted for 0-4/0-5 level survey of current intelligence topics). Do you believe that we should have some type of intelligence structured training program (TAD, Distance Education) for officers selected for senior field grade officers?  
<> Yes <> No

11. If yes, would a short duration (5-7 days?) funded course, individually paced and tailored to the officer’s experiences, where the officer receives D/ACMC C4I policy and occfld updates, visits C4I field activities (MCIA/MarSpt Bn), MCCDC (MSTP, Doctrine, Syscom), and visits with senior Marines at DC area Intelligence Community (CIA, DIA, NIMA, OSD, etc.) be beneficial? Would this type of information be of particular need to field grade officers returning to the FMF?  
<> Yes <> No

Specific comments?

12. How well do you believe the present 0202 training prepares the officer to meet the intelligence tasks associated with OMFTS? Specifically...

Amphibious Operations?

<> Not enough <> Need more <> Right amount <> More than enough <> Too much  
<> No opinion

Intelligence systems training?

<> Not enough <> Need more <> Right amount <> More than enough <> Too much  
<> No opinion

Counterdrug?

<> Not enough <> Need more <> Right amount <> More than enough <> Too much  
<> No opinion

MOU?

<> Not enough <> Need more <> Right amount <> More than enough <> Too much  
<> No opinion

WMD?

<> Not enough <> Need more <> Right amount <> More than enough <> Too much  
<> No opinion

Terrorism?

<> Not enough <> Need more <> Right amount <> More than enough <> Too much

< > No opinion

Analysis?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

< > No opinion

Targeting?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

< > No opinion

Marine Corps Operations and Planning?

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

< > No opinion

13. In general, is the length of 020x training sufficient to produce a basically trained officer?

0202? (17 weeks: MIOC)

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

0203? (23+ Weeks: IOC (10), Scout Sniper Plt Cdr Crse (2), and GIOC (11-12)

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

0204? (17 Weeks: CI Agents Course)

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

0206? (18 weeks: CDOC)

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

0207? (19 Weeks: NIOBC)

< > Not enough < > Need more < > Right amount < > More than enough < > Too much

Any other comments?

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