NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND “INNERE FUEHRUNG”

by

Markus Reinhardt

June 2010

Thesis Advisors: Donald Abenheim
Dirk Rogalski

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
# Civil-Military Relations in the European Union and “Innere Fuehrung”

Markus Reinhardt

**Naval Postgraduate School**
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB Protocol number ________________.

This thesis investigates the compatibility of sociological and cultural interpretations of the phenomena of civil-military relations in the Euro-Atlantic realm within the contemporary challenges of European Security Defense Policy (ESDP). This study further describes and analyzes the key features of the German approach of “Innere Fuehrung” with its guiding principle of the “citizen in uniform”—a central ideal with a long European tradition. The thesis argues that conceptual deficiencies and terminological imprecision in the field of civil-military relations within the European Union, in general, and ESDP, in particular, could lead to problematic consequences for European military integration in the future. If these deficiencies are not addressed by those affected by them, such problems of democratic civil military affairs in the leading European nations could have a significant impact on the evolution and future shape of civil-military relations in the European Union, in general, and on the role and status of European soldiers, in particular, amid the challenges and threats of the present and future. This thesis answers the question of how well suited the German civil-military concept and philosophy of Innere Fuehrung can be to the enhancement of EU military integration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
<th>Civil-Military Relations in the European Union and “Innere Fuehrung”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUTHOR(S)</td>
<td>Markus Reinhardt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 |
| SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | N/A |
| SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB Protocol number ________________.
| DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT | Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited |

**SUBJECT TERMS**

**NUMBER OF PAGES**
83

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT**
Unclassified

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE**
Unclassified

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT**
Unclassified

**LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**
UU
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND “INNERE FUEHRUNG”

Markus Reinhardt
Lieutenant Colonel (GS), German Air Force
Diploma, University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, 1999

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(EUROPE AND EURASIA)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2010

Author: Markus Reinhardt

Approved by: Donald Abenheim, PhD
Co-Advisor

Colonel (GS) Dirk Rogalski, German Air Force, Visiting Lecturer
Co-Advisor

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the compatibility of sociological and cultural interpretations of the phenomena of civil-military relations in the Euro-Atlantic realm within the contemporary challenges of European Security Defense Policy (ESDP). This study further describes and analyzes the key features of the German approach of “Innere Fuehrung” with its guiding principle of the “citizen in uniform”—a central ideal with a long European tradition. The thesis argues that conceptual deficiencies and terminological imprecision in the field of civil-military relations within the European Union, in general, and ESDP, in particular, could lead to problematic consequences for European military integration in the future. If these deficiencies are not addressed by those affected by them, such problems of democratic civil military affairs in the leading European nations could have a significant impact on the evolution and future shape of civil-military relations in the European Union, in general, and on the role and status of European soldiers, in particular, amid the challenges and threats of the present and future. This thesis answers the question of how well suited the German civil-military concept and philosophy of Innere Fuehrung can be to the enhancement of EU military integration.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1  
   A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE .................................................................1  
   B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES .............................................................4  
   C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION .................................................9  

II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ..........11  
   A. FOUR WAVES OF LITERATURE ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ..........11  
   B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE EU ..................................16  
   C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS WITHIN ESDP .................................21  
   D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL ..........27  
      1. The Trend to End Conscription and the Role of Women at Arms ..........28  
      2. Trade Unions and the Military ..........................................................30  
      3. Military Education and Academic Research ....................................32  
      4. Military Culture ............................................................................34  

III. INNERE FUEHRUNG ....................................................................................37  
   A. GERMAN ARMED FORCES AND INNERE FUEHRUNG ..................37  
   B. INNERE FUEHRUNG: THEORY AND PRACTICE ............................42  
   C. INNERE FUEHRUNG AND ESDP—AN ONGOING DEBATE ............46  

IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................51  

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................57  

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..............................................................................71
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank everyone who made it possible for me to achieve success at the Naval Postgraduate School, especially my thesis advisors and my family.

I am very grateful to Professor Dr. Donald Abenheim and to Colonel (GS) Dirk Rogalski, who gave me their unconditional support, knowledge, experience, wisdom and fair critique. Without their flexibility and patience during the entire time of my study, my success would not have been possible. Their cordiality made my stay at the Naval Postgraduate School a worthwhile and unique experience.

I especially want to thank my wife, Maike, and my son, Mats, for their support, patience and encouragement during this year of study.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE

Almost 12 years after the December 1998 British-French St. Malo initiative on European Defense, and after eleven years of rapidly developing European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)\(^1\) activities, one can suggest that, through various ESDP missions and operations,\(^2\) combat at the tactical or operational level in security building alone is not sufficient to achieve the political goals of peace, stability, and democratic transformation in the zones of contention and instability in Eurasia and beyond. In today’s scenarios, European Union (EU) soldiers have to be able to function effectively in a complex interagency environment with a variety of civilian actors in the field of operations. These developments have equally significant consequences for political and military roles, hence for civil-military relations as a whole.\(^3\) Besides enormous transformational efforts concerning military structures, military activity is, in general, taking place at the international level.

Although the EU is the only international organization with the full spectrum of civil and military operational resources, its success in complex scenarios depends on combining these civil and military forces to cope with the security and defense challenges of the twenty-first century. Thus, not only has the level of integration of EU missions

---


changed, but also the political and strategic role of the soldier in ESDP operations, characterized by relatively little violence but by significant political effect.

Civil-military relations have become more important in all security-related areas in the strategic and tactical realms. Within this scope, the cooperation among EU soldiers will have to increase significantly, especially in the light of “a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence,” as indicated by the ratified Treaty of Lisbon and as expressed in the former President of the European Parliament’s vision of a European Army. Thus, the different military cultures, traditions and institutions of contributing European Union nations will be challenged with, for example, the harmonization of currently varying rights of soldiers originating from different political and social traditions of state and society. Challenges will also include legal and policy aspects that reach far beyond technical synchronization and tactical or operational interoperability as seen in terms of weapons and defense management in a politically neutral sense. Hardly any progress has been made in this field of the collective inner structure of European armies over the past 10 years. National caveats have proven to constrain operational effectiveness, at least in the eyes of some critics. But, such caveats are to a lesser or

---

4 The first missions called “civil-military” by the EU were the supporting missions to the United Nations in Sudan and the peace monitoring mission in Aceh (Aceh Monitoring Mission, AMM).


6 Hans-Gert Poettering, former President of the European Parliament, “New Developments and Approaches to a Defence Europe” (Speech at Congress on European Security and Defence, Berlin, November 10, 2008), http://www.daten.euro-defence.eu/2008/poettering_e.pdf (accessed August 1, 2009). Besides the intent to come up with a comprehensive approach to security within the EU, the economic viability of national defense budgets can be put into question. In times of the present financial crisis, budgetary pressure on national defense budgets demands new approaches and is likely to further foster these thoughts. In Germany, for example, announcements of Federal Minister of Defence, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (Christian Social Party [CSU]) to drastically cut defense spending in light of the overall budgetary needs and, with that, the put to test of the conscription system, triggered a vigorous political debate with aftermaths that affect the governmental stability. Compare Oliver Hoischen et al, “Kabale und Hiebe: Wie ein Wunschkombinat zerfallt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine faz.net, http://www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc–EFC78DCF315BF4620AD7B33D4FE93D11C–ATpl–Ecommon–Scontent.html (accessed June 13, 2010).

greater degree (a) a mirror of domestic politics as well and their effect on military institutions and (b) indicative of the unchanging truths of military burden-sharing that are surely nothing new in European security and defense. The permanent need for compromises (which are the bedrock of modern European statecraft for peace, prosperity, and security) imposes pressure not only on military leaders but also on political decision-makers. Such compromises have been limited to purely operational rules of engagement thus far, but they will increasingly have an impact on the ongoing political and social process that is a central part of the integration of European Union soldiers into the EU’s civil society.

The civil-military concept and philosophy of “Innere Fuehrung,” first drafted in 1953 and implemented in conjunction with the build-up after the Second World War of new West German armed forces has enabled the “Bundeswehr,” the German armed forces to integrate into state and society, especially after the reunification of Germany in 1990. Innere Fuehrung formed the basis for the swift and relatively easy manner in which the soldiers of the East German armed forces, the “Nationale Volksarmee,” were transformed from a potentially dangerous force into a unified German army. Innere Fuehrung remains the cornerstone of German civil-military relations. Twenty years after the reunification of Germany it has also proven its value for the successful integration of former citizens of a totalitarian state into the armed forces of a democracy.

This thesis investigates how compatible the sociological and cultural approaches to explaining the phenomena of civil-military relations in the Euro-Atlantic realm are with the particular challenges within the framework of European Security Defense Policy. The author is familiar with these issues through service in the headquarters of such European institutions and agencies as well as his own professional commitment to Innere Fuehrung as the basis of professional excellence. The present work further

---

8 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of Defence), Zentrale Dienstvorschrift (Joint Service Regulation) ZDv 10/1. Innere Fuehrung (Leadership Development and Civic Education) (January 28, 2008). This term does not make full sense in its customary English translations. It can be best interpreted as the concept and philosophy of “Leadership Development and Civic Education.”

9 Abenheim’s scholarship on this topic is of note. See, i.e., Donald Abenheim, Image of the Wehrmacht in Federal German Society and in the Tradition of the Bundeswehr. Occasional Paper #3 (Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Monterey 1999).
analyzes the key features of the German approach of Innere Fuehrung with its guiding principle of the “citizen in uniform”—a central ideal with a long European tradition. With a view to common ESDP operations, the principles and practices of Innere Fuehrung will be discussed to explore the potential value of Innere Fuehrung as a starting point for reflection about the evolution of civil-military relations within the EU in general and as an impetus for a broad discussion about the enhancement of European armed forces in particular.

The major research question of this thesis is: what role has the perception of civil-military relations played within the framework of European Security and Defence Policy in the development of agreed-upon European Union concepts and in the transformation of integrated European Union military structures, and how well suited is the German civil-military concept and philosophy of Innere Fuehrung to enhancing EU military integration?

The study addresses two aspects: First, the author suggests that the absence of a comprehensive approach towards civil-military relations in the EU has a negative impact on the Union in general and on ESDP in particular. This study further argues that the German civil-military concept and philosophy of Innere Fuehrung is well suited to the needs of Europe as a whole, showing that this concept of leadership, command and morale has performed well in the integration of soldiers and democracy in the 1950s and the 1990s for both the Federal Republic and Central Europe and the evolving requirement to formulate a code of the military professional within the framework of the modern democratic nation state and now union of European democracies.

B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

International security challenges cause the expansion of necessary skills, both for the civil and the military professional, especially in diplomatic and intercultural skills and expertise. This development calls for a fundamentally different system of interconnected

---

10 Compare, i.e., Uwe Hartmann, *Innere Fuehrung. Erfolge und Defizite der Fuehrungspolitik fuer die Bundeswehr* (Eschede: Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 2007).

civil, military, and civil-military training, education, career paths, promotion, and status rights. Overall, this requirement reflects the evolution and internalization of strategic and civil-military cultures, both at the domestic and at the EU levels. It is, in fact, the political cause for a newly required guidance for military professionalism and for a review of the balance between democratic civilian control and military professionalism on all levels of operations and military service. Within the framework of ESDP (CSDP since December 2009), the guiding hypothesis in this regard is that, although national military autonomy is likely to become less important, national military cultures will continue into the transformation phase.

One can rightly assert that there exists the problematique that nationally assured rights and constitutional and social values could be partially sacrificed within the multinational environment of an ESDP/CSDP operation in favor of tactical and operational determinism that overemphasizes combat in the traditional sense and/or which tramples on necessary civil military practices of great merit. Evidence indicates that this problem has not been noted comprehensively on the political level. That is, if one recalls the history of the European Defense Community in the early 1950s, the progressive reform ideas that presently soon became Innere Fuehrung encountered

---

12 Compare Volten and Drent, Civil Direction of the Military, 19.
13 Ibid., 20.
14 Fundamental differences among EU member states’ national leadership principles and national strategic cultures are still prominent, looking, i.e., at the fact that Germany still holds on to conscription while Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands have transformed their armies into fully professional armed forces.
opposition from especially France, whose tradition of republican soldier in Catholic Europe diverged from the Protestant, northern European reform essentials of Innere Fuehrung.16

Different concepts of and approaches to civil-military relations have emerged among scholars, international organizations, and governments in the Euro Atlantic realm but also within the leading nations of the EU and its predecessors. But neither a common language nor the very definition of civil-military relations has been agreed upon yet, leading to a diversified understanding.17 The cultural and sociological aspects of civil-military relations in the context of this thesis refer to the relationship between the military and society. The term democratic “civil-military relations” in this thesis is understood as the dynamic process of interaction between armed forces and their parent civilian society, more concretely, between the EU’s armed forces and the EU’s society at large. This interaction encompasses the changes in content as well as in form of military activity for the time period observed and includes aspects of social integration, such as recruitment and resettlement, military education, and military aid to the civil community.18

One argument of this thesis is that the European trend to end conscription and the denigration of the “citizen-soldier” could weaken democratic attitudes within EU armed forces and that the perceptions within the European Union regarding security aspects will increasingly differ between the civil society and the professional armed forces. If one

---


follows this argument, then the basics of “Europeanized” civilian control of the military and civil-military relations within the EU in general deserve more attention.19

Hitherto, there has not been, nor has there been an effort to prepare, a comprehensive EU concept at the political level with definitions of key terms and fundamental principles for democratic civil-military relations.

One finding of this thesis is that, at the strategic and conceptual level, cultural intersections that would have to be addressed in the context of a comprehensive civil-military approach, have been mostly neglected within the framework of ESDP.

Looking furthermore at the degree to which democratic norms within EU member states’ militaries are distinctive at the domestic level, one has to note significant differences in practice, heritage and political effect in service. This generalization applies, for example, to central areas like the restriction of basic rights, freedom of association, degree of participation, or the basic principle of leadership, command, discipline, morale, military order and soldierly obedience. Those differences are also expressed through the respective military cultures of the EU, which, when compared one to another, reveal unequal statutory bases and states of democratization.20

With a view to the enhancement of a common strategic culture21 within the EU in general, and in the light of the importance of common norms and perceptions in the framework of ESDP/CSDP, however, this holistic approach should be undertaken in light of the record of the EDC in the early 1950s and the requirements of the present in the face of operations. Even if there were opinions that favor “pragmatism and realism” over

---

19 Compare Caforio, Sociology, 438.

20 Ibid.

“developing civil-military concepts,” the methodological and sociological importance of an underlying strategic framework should not be disregarded totally.

This thesis is based on the assumption that there is ambiguity in theory and practice regarding key terms in the field of civil-military relations within the framework of the EU, with substantially different connotations among EU member states. This ambiguity has not been addressed comprehensively by scholars so far; it will have to be addressed for the ends of effective policy and the further construction of Europe and its army of the future.

The study argues that this ambiguity will affect the individual level as well, that is, the general status of the European soldier, during EU operations as well as in peacetime outside of operations. This status will determine the future face of civil-military relations within the EU with a qualitative impact upon the democratic face of the EU in general. The discussion on a general common legal and social system for European soldiers in the long term has already started.

This study furthermore answers the question of how well suited the German civil-military concept and philosophy of Innere Fuehrung is to enhancing EU military integration.

The main argument of the thesis is that conceptual deficiencies and terminological imprecision in the field of civil-military relations within the EU, in general, and ESDP, in particular, could lead to problematic consequences for European military integration in the future. It is further argued that, if these deficiencies are not addressed, they could have a significant impact on the evolution and future shape of civil-military relations in the EU, in general, and on the role and status of European soldiers, in particular, amid the challenges and threats of the present and future.

---


23 Compare, i.e., Gertz, Europaeischer Staatsbuerger in Uniform: Anspruch und Realitaet.
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION

According to the aspects of this study, the thesis’ investigation after this introduction (Chapter I) is organized as follows:

Chapter II analyzes the perception of civil-military relations since the beginning of ESDP in 1999. In connection, it analyzes how those perceptions affected the developments of concepts regarding the transformation of the integrated EU’s civil-military structures, thereby exposing conceptual deficiencies. In particular, this chapter investigates the cultural and sociological aspects of civil-military relations in reference to the relationship between the military and society among EU member states. It encompasses aspects of social integration, such as recruitment and resettlement, embedding of military education, and military aid towards the civil community. The investigation covers briefly how those cultural intersections are developed differently among EU member states’ militaries. This will answer the first part of the major research question of this thesis.

Chapter III, in historical narrative form, elaborates upon the conceptual genesis of the German concept of Innere Fuehrung and identifies its key features, principles and practices. This chapter finally analyzes the domestic debate about Innere Fuehrung in the context of out-of-area operations of the Bundeswehr in general, and with a view to unique features of Innere Fuehrung within the realm of ESDP/ CSDP, in particular, such as aspects of social integration and legal status, recruitment and resettlement, and military education.

Chapter IV concludes my study by discussing how the key features of Innere Fuehrung could be applied to the constructive evolution of civil-military relations within the EU. This will answer the second part of this thesis’ major research question.

Summing up, this thesis addresses two main themes. First, it investigates the extent to which the absence of a common definition of civil-military relations has a negative impact on ESDP. Second, it examines how the German concept of Innere
Fuehrung is well suited to the situation at hand because it has performed the integration functions now called for in the European Union well in the context of Germany’s own history.

By deducing a consistent and comprehensive understanding of democratic civil-military relations based on an identification of all the related functional areas and by linking this frame of reference to the well-established German concept of Innere Fuehrung (single case), this thesis bridges the existing gaps in scholarship and policy. It merges findings from existing bodies of scholarly literature, which pays too little heed to the German case and its possible multinational importance in the context of the EU and NATO in the twenty-first century. Looking at the broad topic of democratic civil-military relations from a different angle may give an impetus to a reorientation of ideas and analytical frameworks in order to find out what might be problematic.24 This may contribute to the solution of practical problems. At the very least, this thesis can provoke debate on the subject. The respective normative assessment, namely, the opinion of the author, will be clearly expressed and marked as such in the thesis at the respective positions and again contrasted to major opposing arguments25 in the conclusion.

24 Respective initial thoughts on this methodology were further encouraged by reading Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), xi–43.

25 Such arguments have been rare because of the mostly outstanding approaches to the subject having emerged only for a short time; see, i.e., Eric Chauvistre, Wir Gutkrieger. Warum die Bundeswehr im Ausland scheitern wird (Frankfurt; New York: Campus Verlag, 2009), Jürgen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan. “About the Primacy of Politics over Military Matters: (West) Germany’s Approach to Integrating the Bundeswehr into its Democracy,” in Renaissance of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Contemporary Societies, (eds.) Hans Born, Karl Haltiner, and Marjan Malešič. Arbeitskreis Militaer und Sozialwissenschaften Band 36 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 77–101.
II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Once you have educated, orderly, upstanding, and free citizens, you will have disciplined and obedient soldiers.26

Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859)

A. FOUR WAVES OF LITERATURE ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

In order to investigate specific ESDP-related questions concerning civil-military relations, it is necessary first to have a broader fundamental orientation about civil-military relations in general. Scholarly work on civil-military relations has evolved in four waves of study since the Second World War, linked to different functional approaches to the subject.

In the late 1950s, authors, especially in the U.S. in light of the Korean War, gave in-depth attention to what can in broad terms be called the relations between the soldier and the state. In this first wave of study, Samuel P. Huntington, Michael Eliot Howard, Morris Janowitz, and Samuel E. Finer, the prominent scholars of this first period,27 developed major theories28 from their empirical observations of Western democracies. Huntington’s main argument was that “military professionalism,” especially within the officer corps on the model of U.S. military custom in the 19th until mid 20th centuries, is the decisive concept to keep the military out of politics. This functional approach is


linked to technical expertise and military “secondary” virtues, such as discipline, accuracy, “military craft,” and a high degree of responsibility to the public and its citizens. This professionalism, he argued, will make the officer corps focus its loyalty on the military ideal. Motivated by this loyalty, such a politically neutral military would ultimately accept the civilian authority as the legitimate superior of the state and carry out its orders without a risk of military intervention. Janowitz did not agree with this logic, concluding in a more sociological approach that transformation in technology and society, as well as in missions, had led to an even greater political role of the military. For him, this role, however, was far from involvement like a coup d’état, at least in the U.S., due to the apolitical ethic of the military profession. Finer countered Huntington’s main argument by his observations of the highly professional and technically competent German and Japanese armies’ interventions in the politics of their states. He prevents any attempt to devalue those armies as being not fully professional or as being armies of non-democracies by challenging Huntington’s concept of professionalism in toto. Karsten expands Finer’s criticism by noting that “the military will always have some political role in even the most mature competitive democracy.” This is to be seen as an answer to Huntington’s enhanced argument that democratization has led to improved civil-military relations and limited involvement of armed forces in politics.

The second wave of study ranges from 1963 to 1979 and can be related mainly to the development of economic and political theory. Given the important political changes

---

30 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 74, 84–88, 534.
31 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier.
32 Finer, The Man On Horseback, 25.
33 Karsten, Coup d’État, 152.
in Spain and Portugal in the 1970s, as well as in Latin America,\(^{35}\) and developments in Asia and Africa, all closely connected to strong military involvement, the studies in this period focused on theories to explain policy outcomes and the likeliness of coups d’état.\(^{36}\) The research of this likeliness gained momentum through the developments in Turkey (1960), France (1961), and Greece (1967).\(^{37}\) Polar to the more empirical approach during the first wave, scholars like van Doorn\(^ {38}\) developed a highly theoretical framework for civil-military relations and democratic control of armed forces in general, but also in the light of the Vietnam War and the end of military conscription in the United States.\(^ {39}\) After 10 years of inconspicuous research and as a consequence of the political events in Eastern Europe and Germany, the focus shifted again.

The third wave\(^ {40}\) of democratization, beginning in 1989 drew the attention in the field of civil-military relations research to the modernization challenges faced by countries of post-communist Europe, then transforming into democracies and reforming their armed forces and security sectors.\(^ {41}\) For over a decade, NATO and its Partnership

---


for Peace (PfP) program remained the focal point for institutionalist approaches that explored policy transfer mechanisms with regard to international security.\textsuperscript{42}

In parallel, the advent of major theoretical paradigms, such as neo-realistic, post-modernistic, (social) constructivist, liberalist, positivistic, and rational choice approaches, changed the respective methodological angles towards civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{43} In the view of this author, this trend towards rigid scholarly categorization detracted from the growing demand for a multidisciplinary approach to civil-military relations.

In the context of decreasing scholarly interest in the question of civil-military relations in the early twenty-first century, the rise of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the framework of the superordinated Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union as a consequence of the Kosovo war in 1999, and with it the build-up of the European security architecture attracted scholarly attention.\textsuperscript{44} As a consequence, the fourth-wave work dealt with civil-military relations in post-conflict states\textsuperscript{45} as well as the initial missions and operations of ESDP with a view to civil-military cooperation.\textsuperscript{46} Along with that, domestic factors, characteristics, and norms within EU candidate states as well as institutional reform capability itself were examined.\textsuperscript{47} Only a few scholars paid attention to the overall context and incorporated

\textsuperscript{42} Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). For a comprehensive overview that also touches upon locally orientated studies of the developing world (Latin America, Asia, and South Africa) see Diamond and Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy.

\textsuperscript{43} According to its topic, this thesis does not investigate these theoretical approaches further. This has been done, i.e., by Jordan Baev and Edwin R. Micewski (eds.), Civil-military Relations Postgraduate Program. National Defense Academy, Vienna, in cooperation with G.S. Rakovsky Defense and Staff College, Sofia, December 2004, 16–23. Another comprehensive study is Diamond and Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy.

\textsuperscript{44} Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{45} Compare, i.e., George Christian Maior and Larry Watts (eds.), Globalization of Civil-Military Relations: Democratization, Reform and Security (Bucharest: Enciclopedia Publishing House, 2002).


cultural and case-based experiences and lessons learned. Yet, they generally did not comprehensively incorporate socio-cultural factors.\textsuperscript{48} Sociological aspects of status and role, however, are considered to be crucial for the general set-up of civil-military relations within a society and nation.\textsuperscript{49} Studies of the post-communist democracies or the debate about the crisis of civil-military relations in the U.S.\textsuperscript{50} provide evidence that problems can still arise within countries where the potential of political influence by the military leadership through coercion is virtually excluded. Even if those problems are of a different nature than those discussed here, they are still relevant to the principle question about the quality of a democratic society in that effectiveness of civilian control, its respective constitutional consequences, and the participative quality of a democratic society are linked to the consolidation of democracy as such. Against this background and as an exception to the trend, the little-appreciated work of Abenheim addressed national experiences with the social integration of soldiers over time and the cultural aspects of civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{51}

Scholars did address sociological factors and their ethical implications for the emerging privatization of security and the increasing recourse to private military companies in conflict regions. The prevailing argument is that increasing privatization


\textsuperscript{49} Compare first and foremost Abenheim’s work, \textit{Soldiers and Politics Transformed}; additionally Desch, \textit{Civilian Control of the Military}.


abroad weakens domestic civil-military ties.\textsuperscript{52} Like Bruneau and Trinkunas, who note that the literature continues to focus on traditional aspects of civilian control of the military, one could claim that new security challenges require a shift in methods to enhance defense efficiency and military effectiveness.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE EU}

Work on civil-military relations generally concerns two dimensions. First, scholars investigate how procedural relations are set up institutionally on the strategic and operational levels. In this study, this is called the \textit{functional dimension}. Second, scholars explore how the armed forces are embedded into society, how interaction takes place, and what the underlying principles and perceptions concerning civil-military relations are. In this study, this is called the \textit{sociological dimension}. The functional dimension has been by far the more frequently researched one with regard to the development over the past 10 years of the EU in general and ESDP in particular.\textsuperscript{54}

This thesis focuses on the latter, the sociological dimension. It investigates the conceptual genesis in connection with the usage of key terms. In doing so, it provides evidence to verify the underlying assumption that there is ambiguity regarding key terms in the field of civil-military relations within the framework of the EU, with substantially different connotations among EU member states, and that ambiguity has not been addressed comprehensively yet by parliaments, by European institutions, by soldiers or even scholars to the degree warranted by the needs of the moment.

\textsuperscript{52} Compare, i.e., Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (eds.), \textit{Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-Military Relations} (London; New York: Routledge, 2008). This aspect is not further investigated in this study.


\textsuperscript{54} Aldis and Drent, \textit{Common Norms and Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU}. A very comprehensive analysis is provided by Caforio, \textit{Sociology}. It is not possible to give a complete overview of the numerous studies concerning the subject. Therefore, references are made only to publications that directly relate to the thesis subject. Compare recently Marco Overhaus, \textit{Zivil-Militärisches Zusammenwirken in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU}, SWP-Studie, Berlin, May, 2010.
Hence, it is useful to investigate whether there are commonly accepted norms and values with regard to the relationship between citizens of EU member states and their military forces that have been officially agreed to and published.

As a result of the research for this study, one has to note that such principles are not present in EU’s treaties of Rome (March 25, 1957), of Maastricht (February 7, 1993), of Amsterdam (October 2, 1997), of Nice (February 1, 2003), and of Lisbon (December 1, 2009), nor are they explicit in criteria that accession candidate states must satisfy for membership in the EU. Accession candidates, such as post-communist countries, in addition to formal admission criteria for EU membership, are implicitly expected to accept unwritten rules and norms. But what are those norms with respect to civil-military relations? To explore them, distinct approaches to the different domains of civil-military relations should be examined.

According to Greenwood, there are five domains: first, the relationship between the military and the state; second, the relationship between the military and the executive branch of government; third, the oversight power of the legislature; fourth, the relationship between the military and a country’s domestic security community; and fifth, the relationship between the military and pluralistic society at large. While the first three appear to belong more to the functional dimension, the fourth and fifth relate more to the sociological one.

Besides this approach, other definitions include all relations between the military and civilian society, namely, between soldiers and citizens. If one follows liberal democracy theory, good civil-military relations are always linked to, and based on, the democratic control of the armed forces, which means that the military is unambiguously subordinated to the lawfully-elected democratic civilian authorities, who, in turn, do not meddle with purely professional military affairs. Additionally, it is assumed that the military leadership does not have unwarranted public influence beyond its professional

---


domain, i.e. public sector expenditure. Therefore, and even if not officially agreed to in official EU documents, this can also be assumed as the general position across EU member states.

One main finding of this study is that, at the EU level, there is no comprehensive approach at all to the sociological dimension of civil military relations, but only a functional effectiveness based on time worn, non-comprehensive concepts, which neglect the control issue. The EU is lacking a comprehensive approach to civil-military relations. But this does not contribute much to the question at hand. It seems as if everything is linked to “control”—a term that itself is open to many meanings freighted with considerable conflict and misunderstanding.

Thus, to develop the argument further, it is useful to explore what stands behind the key term for good civil-military relations: the stressed perception of democratic control of the military.

It is commonplace that civil-military relations can be gauged by the way interactions of policy and operations take place. Good democratic civil-military relations, as has also been stated, are normally subjected to a functional democratic control in state and society as well as the international system. Yet, a problem arises when investigating how this good is achieved in EU member states, as in other mature democracies: It is assumed that these countries have developed adequate civil-military relations, but when investigating how this control functions in fact, it seems to be the military’s professional adherence to democratic principles rather than the imposed

57 Jasmina Glisic, “The Role of Public Opinion and the Media in Civil-Military Relations,” in Common Norms and Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU, Aldis and Drent, 83. Compare further with regard to the question, “how public opinion shapes the context within which the military do their job” and how much trust the EU member states have in their military and how the agenda-setting potential of the media influences military legitimacy. Greenwood, Resource Allocation and Resources Management, 139.


59 Compare this author, Zivil-Militaerische Beziehungen im Rahmen der ESVP, 1–3.

60 For the purpose of this investigation it is not necessary to explore the question of whether—with a view to the post-communist countries—really all EU member states are mature democracies.
executive power of the civil authority to control the military in practice.\textsuperscript{61} Therefore, it is not only the institutional set-up and rule of law that provides the civil control, at least not alone, but rather the political legitimacy of the civil authority, which also relies on the continuous will of the armed forces to value the democratic state. There have obviously been quite a few cases where armed forces, or, more explicitly, leading military figures, have not adhered to this will, with results that range from suspension to (attempts of) coups d’état.\textsuperscript{62} It is noted that the mere declaration that the military is controlled is no guarantee that it really is and also is no explanation of how this control works in the first place. The emerging harmony is, besides social and political harmony, the foundation for effective defense. It requires a culture that is based on a comprehensive framework of institutional set-up and civil authority. Hence, dogmatic demands for unconditional democratic civilian control of the military without explaining, at the same time, what exactly is meant by that, lack the necessary comprehensive approach.

It is quite obvious that whatever is meant by democratic civilian control cannot be a matter of coincidence but has to rest on a sound conceptual and normative framework. At the domestic level, concepts and civil-military regimes\textsuperscript{63} can generally be found. However, institutional set-ups, rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures, all affecting civil-military relations, are different among EU member states due to their national cultural, historical, and political distinctiveness.\textsuperscript{64} However, the lack of such a conceptual and normative framework at the EU level is problematic, especially as it touches upon one central political challenge of the EU: its democratic legitimacy.

\textsuperscript{61} Compare, i.e., Kuhlmann, \textit{Primacy of Politics over Military Matters}, 98.

\textsuperscript{62} See footnote 29.

\textsuperscript{63} For further explanation of the regime theoretical approach towards civil-military relations compare Bland, \textit{Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations}, 526–528.

\textsuperscript{64} For more detailed explanation of key terms like principles (beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude), norms (standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations), rules (specific prescriptions or proscriptions for actions), and decision-making procedures (prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choices) compare Stephan Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” \textit{International Regimes}. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2–4. In Bland’s explanation: “principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime, rules and decision-making procedures provide its main operating features”. Bland, \textit{Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations}, 531.
The lack of democratic legitimacy within the European Union became blatant after the negative referendums in The Netherlands and France during the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty in 2006. One year before, the European Council had already noted a gap between EU citizens and EU institutions. To bridge this gap and to remedy the lack of legitimacy, the Council attempted to initiate a broad debate by holding a convention on the future of the EU. However, this undertaking failed. Remarkably, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP), as well as the ESDP, were barely mentioned. However, looking at the speed of development of this policy area that defines the EU’s external activities to a large extent, it is only logical to explore questions of legitimacy in this policy area also, which relies upon civil and military capabilities of EU member states as well as the increasing build-up of EU means.

In the context of civil-military relations in the framework of ESDP, an interchange of ideas through public debate within EU’s civil society and within EU’s institutional setting about the further transformation and integration of its armed forces seems indispensable with a view also to legitimacy. Legitimacy of ESDP, however, has so far only been addressed officially in an output-oriented manner in the context of ESDP mission results (output legitimacy) and with a view to civil-military cooperation effectiveness (the functional dimension). Legitimacy of ESDP has so far not been addressed in an input-oriented manner in terms of the sociologic dimension of EU’s civil-military relations. This input-legitimacy in ESDP is based on the various democratic cultures, institutions, procedures, and norms of the respective EU member states—mainly through national parliamentary participation and control. On the one side, this input-

---


legitimacy is linked to national constitutional limits with a view to the (decisions about the) employment of armed forces within the framework of ESDP.\footnote{With a view to Germany compare, i.e., Christian Schaller, Rechtssicherheit im Auslandseinsatz. SWP-Aktuell, Berlin, 2008, \url{http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=6634} (accessed December 12, 2009).} On the other side, the more greatly enhanced process of European integration of EU member states’ armed forces is desirable and necessary for the EU’s overall development.

C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS WITHIN ESDP

There are five areas of ESDP: origins, decision making, capabilities, missions and operations, and strategic culture. Civil-military relations affect all of these areas in turn. However, this thesis only relates to the last one, that of strategic culture.\footnote{Compare, i.e., Cornish and Edwards, Strategic Culture of the European Union, 801–820; Johnston, Strategic Culture Revisited, 519–23; Johnston, Thinking about Strategic Culture, 32–64; Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture; Rynning, The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?, 479-496. The aim of this thesis as well as its scope do not allow for an in-depth discussion on the debate concerning strategic culture. This debate originates from the classic works of Thucydides, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz who grounded the argument that culture could influence national security policy. In conjunction with the prior literature review chapter, it should be noted that the rise of constructivism significantly advanced the theoretical work on cultural interpretations as it focuses on social structures at the system level, and includes identity, culture, norms, and ideas at the state level. The quintessential work on strategic culture has been accomplished 1995 by Johnson and marks the starting point of scholarly interest in EU member states.} Scholars have noted that, if there was a common EU strategic culture, it would be “heavily influenced by civilian-military synergies.”\footnote{Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 315; Alfred C. Stepan and Yale University, Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 265.} For others, a common strategic culture has clearly and unsurprisingly not developed among 27 disparate member states, unless it has been that of NATO as well as, in certain cases, somewhat that of U.S. military operations in the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns.\footnote{Anand Menon, “Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten,” International Affairs 85, no.2 (2009): 244–245.}

The debate about whether or not the EU is developing a common strategic culture has been ongoing since 1999. The opinions about the EU developing a strategic culture are split into two camps: the optimistic one is stressing the converging aspects within the realm of ESDP, and the pessimistic one pronounces divergence. The term “strategic
culture” has been challenged by the broadened term “security culture” as Howorth has pointed out. For him, “security culture” gets rid of the “heroic” and “martial” approach to the topic, and therefore is “more appropriate as a label for whatever collective mindset is in fact taking shape in the EU.” However, in terms of operationalization, Howorth, like most other scholars, uses both terms synonymously.73 For the purpose of operationalization, Meyer’s definition seems adequate. He proposes “strategic culture as comprising the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behavior that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defense goals.”74 The conclusion for the time being is that the EU is developing some kind of strategic culture with areas of convergence but also remaining disparities among EU member states.

As stated previously, civil-military relations within ESDP implicitly assume certain common propositions and perceptions. However, different national perceptions of security challenges have been a significant obstacle to developing comprehensive common EU policies.75 The development of a comprehensive and common civil-military perception within the EU is “a bottom-up process that requires the alignment of member states’ conceptions”76 (if there are any), thereby contributing to a common European Union strategic culture, an ambition implicitly set by the European Security Strategy (ESS).77

73 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 18, 48, 178–206, 252. This denial of the role of military heroism is more than odd, when one considers that the two oldest EU democracies and their armies still retain a pantheon of military heroism in their soldierly heritage, even if such is less the fashion in continental Europe or especially in Germany. This issue merely highlights the problematic nature of this theme and the further requirement for analysis of same in the service of policy, practice and theory.

74 Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, 20.


77 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a better World. European Security Strategy (ESS). Brussels, December 12, 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed June 1, 2010). The ESS mentions the importance of human rights, multilateralism, security dialogue, the respect of human life and democratic norms as points of ideational convergence. Indeed, these can be seen as the ideational basis and point of departure of the strategic culture of the EU.
In sum, despite the fact that increased civil-military cooperation in the definition being used has to be based on common norms of civil-military relations, this dimension has not yet been addressed officially. Civil-military relations in their sociological dimension have only been dealt with implicitly, despite the risk of varying perceptions and different intentions based on divergent norms regarding the matter.

As stated in the 2008 report of the European Council on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (2003), coherence and coordination remain key challenges for EU security.\(^78\) However, at the institutional level, competences are dispersed within the complex structures of the European Council. A more integrated civil-military structure is necessary.\(^79\) Within the European Commission, the situation was even worse due to the internal struggle for competences among the different general directories. In some ESDP missions, competences have been distributed over all three pillars of the EU in the past.

Having come into effect on December 1, 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon could improve the situation by streamlining the EU’s “unwieldy bureaucracy.”\(^80\) Formally the three-pillar structure of the EU is being dissolved, and this will probably lead to a more coherent EU program of action and will influence outside perceptions of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty includes basically the same provisions in the domain of CFSP and (as it is now called) CSDP\(^81\) as the ill-fated EU Constitutional Treaty. It is, however, intended to allow for a more active international role of the EU with regard to its stated ambitions in general and should provide a more coherent, effective, and visible Common Security and Defence Policy for the EU.\(^82\) CSDP will remain an integral part of CFSP and encompasses the deployment of civilian and military means for peacekeeping, conflict


\(^79\) Heise, 10 Jahre Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, 30.


\(^81\) See also Treaty of Lisbon, 44.

\(^82\) Ibid.
prevention, and strengthening of the international community.\textsuperscript{83} The implementation is likely to depend to a high degree on the cooperation among the top three EU posts at the political level:\textsuperscript{84} the (permanent) President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (at the same time Vice President of the European Commission and Commissioner for external relations).

At the institutional level, decisions on CSDP matters will still require unanimous support of the EU member states\textsuperscript{85} within the domain of the European Council and without the participation of the Commission and the European Parliament (EP).\textsuperscript{86} However, the High Representative now has the right to take initiatives and can, in cooperation with the Commission, resort to Commission instruments. The HR’s new role and double-hatting could therefore contribute to overall strengthening of the cohesion of EU crisis management even if it formally remains under intergovernmental and common competences.

Yet, an ambiguity remains. As agreed, EU documents continuously demand more coherence, synergy, and cooperation. One possible conclusion is that the 27 EU member states not only have internalized the EU as part of their domestic policy, but still see the EU partially as an object of their respective foreign policies.\textsuperscript{87} In fact, the Treaty of Lisbon preserves national autonomy in the realm of CFSP and CSDP decision-making through ultimately continuing the principle of unanimity.\textsuperscript{88}


\textsuperscript{84} As a fourth one, one could add the Secretary-General for the Council Secretariat to the troika.

\textsuperscript{85} With the exception of Denmark due to its opt-out concerning ESDP.

\textsuperscript{86} However, the role and function of the EP with regards to scrutiny and CSDP matters is overall strengthened. See Council of the European Union, \textit{Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy}, 18.


\textsuperscript{88} According to the string of arguments, it is not necessary to go into details concerning the respective Articles 21, 24, 42, and 43 of the Lisbon Treaty.
The gap between the rhetorical integration ambition, and factual expressions of keeping distance from it, as could be observed during the ratification process of the Treaty of Lisbon, has yet to be bridged. Therefore, it can be doubted that the approach within the EU, up to now, is yet sufficient for the future shape of a common strategic culture.

Hitherto there has not been, nor has there been an effort to prepare, a comprehensive EU concept with definitions of key terms and fundamental principles for civil-military relations.89

Nonetheless, the EU has developed some approaches to the topic.90 However, these documents address only the domains of decision-making, operations and missions (implementation of civilian and military instruments in crisis management),91 or capabilities.92 Focusing solely on the functional dimension of civil-military relations, they totally omit the socio-cultural aspect. The initial outlining paper on civil-military relations within the ESDP, Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO), although rhetorically underlining “the central importance of CMCO as a culture of co-ordination,”93 refers solely to the technical and institutional necessity for effective co-ordination of civilian and military instruments in a comprehensive approach, but does not further elaborate the cultural aspects of the topic. What is described as “the need for a culture of co-ordination rather than seeking to put too much emphasis on detailed structures and procedures”94 and as “an essential element in ensuring overall coherence in the EU’s response to a

---

89 This author, Zivil-Militärische Beziehungen im Rahmen der ESVP, 5.
90 Ibid., 5. Additionally, the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) should be mentioned. ERGOMAS is an association of European scientists who study and analyze the relationship between the military and society, and related phenomena. However, in view to this study’s topic, ERGOMAS’ output could be rated limited in scope.
94 Ibid., 2.
crisis,” thereby adding an intrinsic element, is in fact not further filled with a cultural content that goes beyond the direct relationship to crisis response operations. Thus, the official perception of “culture” is left with a merely technical connotation.

The related hypothesis is that this linguistic ambiguity contributed to an insufficient comprehension and perception of civil-military relations within the framework of ESDP and affected all follow-on conceptual work on the subject insofar as the strategic, cultural, and sociological dimensions were never really considered. This claim can be substantiated by recent officially agreed-upon announcements within the framework of ESDP. During the informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers in September 2009 in Goteborg, Sweden, the nexus of civil-military relations for the ambitions of the European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003 remained within the functional dimension only. “Civil-military requirements and synergies for future missions and operations” are linked only to capability development, not to the enhancement of a respective cultural environment.

Another recent example is the Swedish EU Presidency Report on a civil-military capability development seminar. Based on “experiences from ESDP missions and operations” and with a view to “EU perspectives on future civilian and military capability development,” the findings and recommendations concerning future concepts emphasize coordination and cooperation efforts, thereby again taking into account only

---


98 Ibid., 1.

99 Ibid., 2.
the functional dimension of civil-military relations. The necessity for a harmonization of methodology and the lack of a respective formal coordination mechanism were noted only in the margin.

A dilemma for the EU’s crisis management ambitions is the “capability-expectations gap: while the EU is taking on an increasing number of missions and developing a growing profile as a security actor, it does not always have the resources to back up its commitments.” This fact gives an indication as to why the overall strategic culture within the framework of ESDP was and remains driven merely by a functional focus. It is about “modalities” rather than mentalities.

D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL

Looking now at the domestic level, this section investigates the major cultural and sociological aspects of civil-military relations as they refer to the relationship between the military and society with a brief view of the EU member states of France and the United Kingdom. The investigation briefly covers the way the major military cultural intersections are developed among those EU member states. Together with the case of Germany, which is explored in more depth in the next chapter, the “big three” of the European Union are covered. If one follows the argument that France, the United Kingdom, and Germany are driving the European Union and ESDP, then insights on the domestic level could provide evidence for the explanation of the findings concerning the EU level.

---

101 Ibid., 3.
102 Gross, EU and the Comprehensive Approach, 13.
103 Ibid.
104 The German case relates to the Federal Republic of Germany and the developments after 1949.
105 Compare, i.e., Menon, Empowering paradise?, 236.
106 The distinct views of the middle and eastern EU member states should not be neglected. Their views on civil-military relations might be quite different from the “Big Three.” However, this is not accomplished in the scope of this thesis.
The underlying hypothesis is that the claimed deficiencies at the EU level are linked to cultural and sociological specifics at the domestic level and that national military cultures\(^\text{107}\) will continue into the transformation phase of integrated European Union civil-military structures. Transformation in that context addresses some of the various national characteristics of civil-military relations.

Armed forces in this context are always understood as an institution that is inherently undemocratic in aspects of their inner structure due to its hierarchical organization and the requirements of operations, to include combat. Yet the European Union boasts armies in a democracy and, in fact, a union of democracies. This understanding follows an organizational sociological approach, which allows for the identification of specific organizational characteristics, which can be decoupled from individuals. Such a theoretical approach undergirds the present study and its essential for an examination of democratic civil military relations in the domestic politics, society and political culture of the leading EU nations.

1. **The Trend to End Conscription and the Role of Women at Arms**

With the end of the era of mass armies in Western Europe in the 1990s, many countries abolished conscription.\(^\text{108}\) Yet, conditionality in that matter is not given despite rising political pressure, as shows, for example, in the case of Germany, which is investigated in the following chapter.\(^\text{109}\) In contrast, the participation of women in the armed forces seems very well directly related to conscription; more concretely, “it seems

\(^{107}\) Fundamental differences among EU member states’ national leadership principles and national strategic cultures are still prominent, looking, i.e., at the fact that Germany still holds on to conscription while Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands have transformed their armies into fully professional armed forces.

\(^{108}\) Karl W. Haltiner, “The Decline of the European Mass Armies,” in Sociology, ed. Caforio, 361–384. Conscription ended in the United Kingdom in 1963, when the British Army had all regular forces for the first time since 1939. In contrast, conscription did not end in France until 2001. France, the United Kingdom and Germany have percentagewise made about the same force reduction (35 percent) over the last 30 years.

\(^{109}\) Since this is the overall trend, it is not considered necessary in this thesis to explore the causes for this development, but rather to investigate the causes for adhering to conscription against the trend and the majority of public opinion, which is accomplished in a later chapter on the German case. For the figures in favor of compulsory military service within EU member states see, for example, Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in Sociology, ed. Caforio, 333.
that the further existence of compulsory personnel for the military is the largest obstacle to an increase of Women Military Participation Ratio.”\textsuperscript{110}

The presence of women in the armed forces of EU member states is significantly lower in conscription-based systems, for example, Germany. But since the overall percentage of the total force is not in the two-digit figures for any EU member state and because women have admittance to all posts in most EU member states,\textsuperscript{111} the comparatively low level of female personnel in conscript systems is rather considered an adaptation trend with regards to the labor market than an indicator for gender equality and generally more open-minded and modern societies.

The countries that do still have conscription in times of shrinking armed forces increasingly face the problem of fairness and equity in conscription, especially among cohorts with a strong birth rate. The decline of the conscript ratio further causes a decline in the military participation ratio throughout EU member states, thereby reducing the general degree of “military awareness” in the European Union’s societies.\textsuperscript{112} Because of the low conscription rates\textsuperscript{113} and the extension of voluntary recruitment, the systems in the respective states are sometimes called “de facto volunteer systems” or even “pseudo conscript systems.”\textsuperscript{114}

No European Union country forces its conscripts to serve on missions abroad outside the task of homeland or territorial defense.\textsuperscript{115} In this context, scholars note that the military structural difference between conscript systems and all-volunteer forces does not...

\textsuperscript{110} Since this is the overall trend, it is not considered necessary in this thesis to explore the causes for this development, but rather to investigate the causes for adhering to conscription against the trend and the majority of public opinion, which is accomplished in a later chapter on the German case. For the figures in favor of compulsory military service within EU member states see, for example, Philippe Manigart, “Restructuring of the Armed Forces,” in Sociology, ed. Caforio, 383.

\textsuperscript{111} Exceptions are Greece, Italy, Poland, and Portugal.

\textsuperscript{112} Haltiner, The Decline of the European Mass Armies, 383.

\textsuperscript{113} Compare, i.e., Wenke Apt, Demographischer Wandel als Rekrutierungsproblem, SWP-Aktuell, Berlin, May, 2010.

\textsuperscript{114} Haltiner, The Decline of the European Mass Armies, 384.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, 381. The reasons for staying with conscription will not be explored in depth. They range from national historical experiences to recruitment patterns and the extension of conscription to civil services.
not justify any more “the dichotomy used in politics and sociology between conscript forces on the one hand and volunteer systems on the other. ... The transitions are gradual.” Forces have transformed structurally and functionally according to the changing security environment. Therefore, “the socio-psychological, political and legal impact would probably be much greater than the military structural one” for those countries still adhering to conscription as of now, if they abolished it in the future. In contrast, this thesis argues that the German case indeed reveals differences that could have a significant positive impact on EU military integration. The basic argument is that conscription is not only an individual burden; it is rather to be seen as societal participation in a central field of the executive authority. Thus, it complements parliamentary control of the military.

2. Trade Unions and the Military

The overall trend to abolish conscription has also drawn some attention to the question of renewing representation instruments (i.e., right of free association as in the trade union movement) for military personnel. Historically, in this vital civil military matter of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, conservative attitudes can be contrasted with modern ones. The end of the Second World War generally caused an overall drop of social prestige of the military profession in Western Europe. The downgrading of social status had an impact on the question of unionization in the countries where it applied. In those countries, for example, Belgium (or to a lesser degree Germany), modern attitudes called for innovative adaptations with regard to the labor market while


\[117\] Ibid.

\[118\] In anticipation of the next chapter it should be mentioned that fundamental differences among EU member states’ national leadership principles and national strategic cultures are still prominent, looking, i.e., at the fact that Germany still holds on to conscription while Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands have transformed their armies into fully professional armed forces.

in countries with a strong military establishment, like France\textsuperscript{120} and the United Kingdom, conservative attitudes held that military unions were unthinkable and incompatible with the traditions of command and obedience in the armed forces.\textsuperscript{121}

In those countries, armed forces “have a special relationship with the civil power whereby the rights and privileges of the dominant social group are automatically guaranteed to members of the military: in this relationship there is no need to seek unionization to provide the political, social and economic rights of members of the organization for these will be always protected by the power elite with which the military is closely associated.”\textsuperscript{122} This is the case in the United Kingdom and in France, while it is not in Germany.\textsuperscript{123} In the United Kingdom, “military service has never emerged as a hallmark of citizenship. Instead, in Great Britain, for example, it can be argued that an inalienable right of the individual has been that of not serving in armed forces.”\textsuperscript{124}

On the one hand, this “Anglo-Saxon” or “insular”\textsuperscript{125} model corresponds to conservative attitudes in the meaning explained above. On the other hand, it is to be distinguished from another model, which can be called “continental,”\textsuperscript{126} and which applies, for example, to France and, in a variable form, to Germany. This model accordingly corresponds as well to conservative as to modern attitudes: conservative, because the historical social strength and autonomy of the military establishment has so far prevented significant unionization developments (as in France); modern, because “the ongoing relationship between military institutions and citizenship creates a very specific

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{122} H. Jenkins, 1977, cited after Caforio, \textit{Sociology}, 313.
\item \textsuperscript{123} In Germany, the „Deutsche Bundeswehrverband“ fills out the role as a union for soldiers (active and retired). Even if the Deutsche Bundeswehrverband emphasizes its role as a mere vocational association, in contrast to a union, it acts rather similar. Compare, i.e., Kuhlmann, \textit{Primacy of Politics over Military Matters}, 86.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Caforio, \textit{Sociology}, 317. For an in-depth analysis of British civil-military relations see Strachan, \textit{The Politics of the British Army}, especially 263–271.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Caforio, \textit{Sociology}, 317.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
political culture in which military service ... is defined as an integral part of citizenship. This recognizes that the institutionalization of citizen conscription was an essential component in the emergence of Western parliamentary institutions.\textsuperscript{127}

Hence, this continental model of the “citizen-soldier” in the second half of the twentieth century includes a protective dynamic, which allows for social change within the parent society being mirrored in the possibility for systematic representation of the interests of military personnel.\textsuperscript{128}

The aspect that the role of the soldier corresponds historically much more to the role of the citizen than it does in the United Kingdom puts France, which abolished conscription very late, and Germany in the same category.

3. Military Education and Academic Research

It is possible to view the officer corps as the most vital part of the armed forces due to its leadership role, which affects, among other factors, ethics and mindset, including the democratic spirit of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{129} It has therefore a key role in civil-military relations. Thus, it is considered reasonable to also look into major features of national military education of officers.

While in Germany almost all cadets are expected to accomplish academic studies at one of the two armed forces universities, the officer education process in the United Kingdom differs significantly. The great majority of British officer candidates already hold a degree, and military academies are therefore strictly distinguished from universities. France can be considered to have a somewhat intermediate position.

\textsuperscript{127} Caforio, \textit{Sociology}, 317.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
Without going into detail about the educational system of each state, it is worth noting that a nexus between military sociological education and related career fields and tasks, like personnel matters or counseling of military leaders, does not exist at the domestic level.\textsuperscript{130}

The way in which military sociological research is driven and the way it is organized could give an indication about the quality of civil-military relations in the respective countries. The related hypothesis is that the form in which military sociological research is organized is directly related to the respective national culture with regard to military issues. More concretely, a country with a state-run research program would mirror a society which is, outside the military organization, much less interested in military affairs, as is the case in a country with a strong involvement of the private sector.\textsuperscript{131}

As a result, military sociological research in France and Germany is mainly governmentally driven through national research institutes,\textsuperscript{132} while it is more balanced between publicly and privately owned centers, including freelancers, in the United Kingdom. Freelancers also work in Germany and France, but to a much lesser degree, while collaboration with universities is to be observed in all three countries.\textsuperscript{133} But this fact also concerns the continental European experience of soldiers and universities, which in the case of the UK departs from that of France and especially Germany. Strategic studies and military affairs still wrongly suffer from the dark legacy of the twentieth century, while in the UK the relations of universities and soldiers (as in the U.S.) is more benign one.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{130} Caforio, Sociology, 31.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 26. The German \textit{Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr} and the French \textit{Centre d’Études en Sciences Sociales de la Défense} are both supervised by the respective Ministry of Defense.

\textsuperscript{133} Caforio, Sociology, 29.

The countries with state-run institutes, like France and Germany, are exposed to criticism that notes a monopoly of the supervising Ministry of Defense and doubts whether independent and free research is feasible in these conditions.\textsuperscript{135}

4. Military Culture

A cultural aspect that is undergoing transformation is the military identity. Western European armed forces are under pressure from their parent societies, the political elite, and the international community “to change [their] exclusiveness into a more civilianized outlook. The military has lost some of its classic military functions regarding the national security of the country ... and gained some new military functions reflecting operations other than war. Contemporary armed forces in Europe [and] soldiers from different countries ... are developing a new sense of multicultural military identity. This means the overwhelming conversion of a nation-based military mind into an international military identity.”\textsuperscript{136} But this development brings along also the widening of “the cultural gap between civilian values and military values.”\textsuperscript{137} It is worth noting in this context that culture is not inherited but learned and that it derives not from genes but from a social environment.\textsuperscript{138}

The socio-cultural environment in EU member states changes, and this also affects their armed forces. Post materialistic values and “greater cultural diversity, the essence of postmodernism,”\textsuperscript{139} affect traditional values in a way that weakens them and strengthens individual rights. “Soldiers are no longer motivated by patriotism. They are much more interested in their working conditions than before; and there is a decline of trust in institutions in general and in military institutions in particular.”\textsuperscript{140} However, it can be assumed that through the character of ESDP missions and operations in the past,

\textsuperscript{135} Caforio, Sociology, 33.
\textsuperscript{137} Gerhard Kuemmel, “A Soldier Is a Soldier Is a Soldier!??,” in Sociology, ed. Caforio, 429.
\textsuperscript{139} Manigart, Restructuring of the Armed Forces, 326.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
public confidence in the military has in general regained strength, with around a two-thirds positive vote in France and Germany, and over 80 percent of confidence in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{141}

The relationship between a parent society and its armed forces is extremely complex and dynamic. The responsiveness of the public to military operations and missions is unique to every EU member state. Notwithstanding the basic trend that, even from formerly pacifist and military-critical parts of a parent society, interventions within the realm of ESDP have been increasingly accepted by EU citizens, there has been a backlash. If one follows the argument that, at the domestic level, a parent society has been disappointed by the results of ESDP missions and operations. It is possible to argue, that, despite a generally still positive attitude towards the EU and even ESDP, the reluctance to be in favor of a leading national role in those missions and operations increases in the face of the manifest problems of security building and peace enforcement in the shadow of the disorder of the twenty-first century. This fact promotes the ambiguity to be in favor and against ESDP developments at the same time, which, in turn, has a significant impact on national behavior at the EU level.

At the domestic level, and without looking at the micro level of military subcultures, such as the differences between one country’s army, navy, and air force, one can note national differences within the major aspects of culture, military routine, hierarchy, and discipline, when contrasting respective EU member states.\textsuperscript{142}

There seems to be a common international military culture in the Euro-Atlantic space, granted the historical development of armies and societies, that could be described as homogenous, and this military culture obviously differs from a civilian business organization’s culture.\textsuperscript{143} This circumstance leads to two conclusions: first, military and civilian cultures are \textit{sui generis} problematic concerning compatibility; and, second, military cultures could still differ significantly when compared nationally. When, for

\textsuperscript{141} Manigart, \textit{Restructuring of the Armed Forces}, 327.

\textsuperscript{142} Soeters et al, \textit{Military Culture}, 240. It is noted that the aspect of the operational effectiveness of the armed forces is not investigated in this context since it is not related to the major research question.

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 242.
example, military academies and officer education are compared, Germany and France appear to be rather institution-oriented, which is connected to their officers sustaining lifetime commitment to the armed forces.

On the contrary, in the United Kingdom careers are generally shorter, which has an effect on the perception of military life that is not seen as much in the center as in France and Germany. However, when it comes to the degree of coerciveness, the French system is structurally much stricter than the German or British ones, which are considered to be more “enabling” in nature. Along the same line, discipline is not as much of an issue in military academies in Germany as it is in France, where it has a very high importance, originating from the bureaucratic and centralistic Gaullism, which gives great importance to state institutions and which emphasizes formalism in military culture. In the United Kingdom, military discipline also has a very high standing. However, this is for other reasons, such as the distinctive British hierarchy within the military and the absolute power of its academies.

With the change away from conscription in France in the middle-1990s, and the general trend towards a more civilian, businesslike culture within the armed forces, it will be interesting to observe a possible change over the next decades either towards adopting armed forces or towards a conservative backlash granted the shared combat experience in distant lands, as well as the potential for a growing sense of military caste in the absence of conscription and the socio economic ills since the crash of 2008.

The question of whether the end of conscription causes a disconnect of the armed forces from their parent society, which weakens the democratic spirit within the military, could not be answered at this point. It will, however, be discussed in the next chapter, together with the question of whether the indisputably increasing lack of broad personal experience of military service alienates the parent society from its armed forces and from being interested in international security.

144 Soeters et al., Military Culture, 240. It is noted that the aspect of the operational effectiveness of the armed forces is not investigated in this context since it is not related to the major research question, 241.
145 Ibid., 242.
146 Soeters et al, Military Culture, 243.
147 Caforio, Sociology, 438.
III. INNERE FUEHRUNG

A. GERMAN ARMED FORCES AND INNERE FUEHRUNG\textsuperscript{148}

Innere Fuehrung has become the trademark of the Bundeswehr, and its character and development are closely connected with the history of the German soldier in the modern era. This chapter merely gives an introduction to the development of the German Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, built up after the Second World War as new West German Armed Forces. Longer, more comprehensive works on the history of the Bundeswehr have already been accomplished by scholars.\textsuperscript{149} The aim of this chapter, in fact, is to provide an overview of the civil-military concept and philosophy of Innere Fuehrung, implemented in conjunction with the build-up of the Bundeswehr. The German case, through Innere Fuehrung, can be considered unique with regard to the degree German armed forces have been integrated into state and society, especially after the reunification of Germany in 1990. Innere Fuehrung formed the basis for the swift and relatively easy manner in which the soldiers of the East German armed forces, the Nationale Volksarmee,\textsuperscript{150} were transformed from a dangerous opposing force into a unified German army.

With one foot still in the shadow of the Second World War, but with the other foot already in the light of forging alignment with the West and NATO, Germany’s first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer (Christian Democratic Union [CDU]), in 1950 ordered the development of an initial concept for the possible build-up of new West German armed forces in the framework of a European army. Besides the question of how to structure the new army to meet the needs of the European Defense Community and NATO’s requirements, it was imperative to come up with an internal arrangement that would prevent political misuse of orders and would inhibit the army from becoming a “state

\textsuperscript{148} See footnotes 10, 11, 16.
\textsuperscript{149} See footnote 16.
\textsuperscript{150} For a cultural description of the Nationale Volksarmee see Abenheim, Soldiers and Politics Transformed, 13, 17–19, 22, 23, 45; shorter see Van Creveld, The Culture of War, 364–374.
within the state.”151 The bad experiences of the German armed forces, the “Reichswehr,” during the period of the democratic Weimar Republic—experiences which unveiled the incompatibility of such armed forces with democracy—and the recent nemesis of the “Wehrmacht, in national socialism” led to the demand for a new model for the army.152

Concerning the military strategic framework for the Bundeswehr, the supranational European Defence Community (EDC) was foreseen, especially by France, as a multinational organization that would exclude nationally functioning German Armed Forces and instead integrate them into a supranational structure that would furthermore “promote the idea of the United States of (Western) Europe.”153 It was somewhat akin to the same unifying and controlling idea as undergirded the coal and steel community of the same time. But the EDC never came into being, and West Germany was instead integrated into NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). The issue of integration at different levels was the main force behind this development. Beyond the integration at the systemic level of international security, the German public debate focused on the integration of the future West German Armed Forces into the constitutional framework. Thus, at the domestic level, the issue was about “the place of the Bundeswehr in society, about the political control of its leadership, and about the mechanisms necessary to guarantee its compatibility with democracy.”154 The constitutional set-up therefore comprises not only general conscription but also the individual right for conscientious objection, which obligates those, making use of this constitutional right, to instead perform other civil duties (“Zivildienst”). At the individual level, the soldiers should be integrated with “as much civil spirit and behavior as possible into the everyday life of the armed forces.”155


152 Ibid., 146–152.

153 Ibid., 147. The question whether this idea was at all seriously followed by the main political players at the time, as well as the chronology of events, is not further investigated here.

154 Ibid., 148.

155 Ibid.
The new German soldier should be political in the sense that he defends freedom of self-determination and social justice via participation in the life of a democratic state and society. However, the creation of the Bundeswehr had to rely in part on the military expertise of former Wehrmacht officers. The result of the first conceptual developments for the internal arrangement of West German Armed Forces, “Inneres Gefüge,” was in large part driven by Wolf Graf von Baudissin, a former officer of the Wehrmacht along with others. He reinvented the guiding principle of the citizen in uniform—a central ideal with a long European tradition. This tradition is tied to the Prussian military reformers around General Gerhard Scharnhorst in the time span from 1807 to 1813 and encompasses the idea of congruency of a civil society and its armed forces. Together with the military resistance against Adolf Hitler and the establishment of a tradition of the Bundeswehr on its own story since 1955, these three pillars were to form the tradition of the Bundeswehr and are still valid today. Baudissin and the other reformers provided a sociopolitical framework to lessen the fundamental tension between armed forces and democratic society. His comrades and he did so with the placement of the cannon of basic rights of West German Basic Law for soldiers. In Baudissin’s own words: “Only the integration of the soldier into civil life provides him with the experience of those values he stands for.”

It was a general consensus in West German civil society and among politicians that the military traditions of German armed forces could not restore either the Reichswehr or the Wehrmacht. Baudissin still had to face strong opposition during the

---


157 See footnote 8. This term, taken from the Wehrmacht, can be interpreted as having a more static, structural connotation than its successor Innere Führungs. That is, the noun structure versus the noun leadership, the latter being naturally a dynamic process.

158 Among the leading figures along with Graf Baudissin were Ulrich de Maizière, Johann Graf Adolf von Kielmannsegg and Heinz Karst. Compare Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*.


r disarmament phase of West Germany in the 1950s from certain former officers of the
Wehrmacht who wished to retain the privileges of their former estate or who refused to
accept the role of the soldier in national socialism in its full dimensions. From the point
of view of these so called “traditionalists,” armed forces had traditional principles, norms,
and values that were incompatible with democracy. Therefore, they dismissed or other
belittled Innere Fuehrung.162 Instead, they embraced a military romanticism and apologia
which, nonetheless, never assumed the dimensions as such had prior to 1945 or 1914 in a
society that was fed up with soldiers and war.

Being the opposition party at the time, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) were
suspicious about the democratic compatibility of the envisaged new West German Armed
Forces because of the experience of the German left with soldiers and domestic politics in
modern history. The reintroduction of conscription was disputed with a view to a
justification that was purely functional in terms of NATO manpower requirements.163
However, the idea of preventing the future Bundeswehr from self-isolation through the
periodic draft of all young men as citizens in uniform would reconcile German civil
society and its armed forces. This idea ultimately became reality. In the course of the
1950s, and especially after the Godesberg declaration of 1959, Social Democrats
accepted the new concept, which had been named Innere Fuehrung in 1953. However, the
SPD demanded further political checks and balances, which were established in the form
of parliamentary control of the German armed forces within German Basic Law and in
the form of a Parliamentary Commissioner, an ombudsman who assists the German
parliament (Bundestag) in exercising its supervision and control over the Bundeswehr.
He can be petitioned directly by any soldier for his/her case of complain, thus being
legally entitled to bypass the chain of command. Furthermore, the responsibility for
financial and administrative tasks was assigned to a civilian defense administration by
German Basic Law. Together with the constitutional right of conscientious objection,
Germany got an extensive legal and institutional set-up with regard to its armed forces.
To this day, the Bundeswehr is the only “parliamentary army” worldwide.

163 Ibid.
In addition to these checks and balances, former Federal Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Strauss (Christian Social Union—CSU), in 1958 had established an advisory board for questions on Innere Fuehrung. This board, “Beirat Innere Fuehrung,” which consists of mostly civilians who are professionally experienced in education and personnel leadership and management, was designed to advise the Federal Minister of Defence in those questions. It remains an important force for the spirit and body of the Bundeswehr and its reflection of constitutional principles in accord with West and United German society.

The political legacy of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht formed a problematic issue for the self-image of the Bundeswehr, which had to be based on the principles of Innere Fuehrung. The years from 1919 until 1945 served poorly as a pantheon of the ideas of duty, honor and country. However, the majority of officers and non-commissioned officers of the new Bundeswehr had served in the Wehrmacht and even in the Reichswehr.\(^\text{164}\) That fact made it unlikely that, with the exception of military resistance against Hitler, they could empathetically accept the tradition of Prussian reforms, while developing a new tradition of the Bundeswehr, which, of course, was unfeasible in what was an army created nearly from scratch and with no baptism of fire in the Cold War.

The traditionalist camp, which was opposed by the “reformers,” was prominent until 1982, when then-Federal Minister of Defence, Hans Apel (SPD), established unambiguous guidelines on the military tradition of the Bundeswehr. These guidelines categorically rejected any kind of tradition with the Wehrmacht as an institution or with individual Wehrmacht officers. The sole exception was to be the men and women who participated in the resistance against Adolf Hitler, which culminated in the failed assassination attempt by Colonel Claus Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg on July 20, 1944.\(^\text{165}\) Although the guidelines on tradition, issued in 1965, were the first attempt to

\(^{164}\) Although a Committee of Experts on Personnel Matters was established in 1955 in order to prevent those former Wehrmacht officers that had verifiable been entangled with the national socialist terror to be able to enter the new West German Armed Forces, this author claims that it was practically impossible at the time to ban militaristic ideas from finding their way into the Bundeswehr.

address the issue constituted by the phantom of the Wehrmacht\(^{166}\) (and to a certain extent its predecessor, the Reichswehr), it was not until 1982, when the second guidelines on tradition were issued, that this identity paradigm shifted to a focus on the West German military in its own right. A new generation of soldiers, almost 30 years after the first swearing-in of Bundeswehr recruits in 1955, added to this development.

Before that, isolated attempts were made by some generals to challenge political decisions in the context of educational reforms within the Bundeswehr.\(^{167}\) The attempts were initiated to accommodate the social change that took place around 1969 by then–Federal Minister of Defence, Helmut Schmidt (SPD), or concerning NATO’s double-track decision in 1979; but they failed and resulted in the critiques’ dismissal.\(^{168}\) The progress in the decade from the 1980s until 1990s saw the generations of the first years of the Bundeswehr vanish and the intensity of this debate lessened in the face of German unity and the reorientation of the Bundeswehr to new roles and missions. The issue of soldierly tradition re emerged in the middle of this decade in an incident that lies outside the scope of this study.

B. INNERE FUEHRUNG: THEORY AND PRACTICE

The fundamental ideas of Innere Fuehrung were already codified in the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act in compliance with West German Basic Law in 1956. Thereby were constitutional rights codified together with military duties. Hereafter, civic rights and liberties also apply to the military realm and can only be abridged by requirements of military duty. In this context, soldiers retain active and passive voting rights. Furthermore, command and obedience are subject to legal norms. For example, an

---

\(^{166}\) Abenheim, *Image of the Wehrmacht.*


\(^{168}\) Von Bredow, *Germany*, 152.
order that implies a criminal act must not be followed; basic military obligation and military duty of allegiance are geared towards German free democratic basic order, not towards a person or a specific government.169

With the implementation of this legal status, based on the cannon of basic rights of West German Basic Law, the foundations needed to balance the principal tension between the functional necessities of a military institution on the one hand and democratic society and its social order on the other hand had been laid in accordance with the rule of law. As a consequence, the legal status of each German soldier gives him/her the same rights as every other German citizen, and with that, by far more than soldiers of most of the other EU member states.170

Over time, several changes took place concerning the constitutional and regulatory set-up, but the underlying civil-military principles are still valid: “as much integration of the armed forces into civilian society as possible and as much civil control as possible in order to keep the armed forces compatible with the norms, values, and attitudes of a democratic society.”171

In compliance with the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act, the Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1, Innere Fuehrung (Leadership Development and Civic Education),172 published in 1972, 1993, and in 2008, and the complementary Joint Service Regulation ZDv 12/1, “Politische Bildung” (Political and Civic Education)173 together form the regulatory basis for the Bundeswehr and comprise the key features and principles of Innere Führung. Both have been modified multiple times since the first

---

170 One example could be the right of codetermination for every soldier in the Bundeswehr.
171 Von Bredow, Germany, 148–149.
173 Federal Ministry of Defence, Zentrale Dienstvorschrift (Joint Service Regulation) ZDv 12/1. Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr Political and Civic Education in the Bundeswehr), Bonn, 2007. This regulation will be discussed only in conjunction with Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1.
release of their precursor, the “guidelines for the education of the soldier” in 1957. One of the modifications of the central Joint Service Regulation, ZDv 10/1, was made in 1993 in the light of German reunification that had taken place three years earlier. The authors were fully aware that, at this point in time, the amendments could only be seen as preliminary. In light of the urge to integrate soldiers from the Nationale Volksarmee and in order to come to terms with this institution, Joint Service Regulation 10/1, the superordinate regulation, focused primarily on the issue of political education. It could, however, not accommodate the beginning of German military out-of-area engagement that immediately followed in 1994.

It took until 2007 for the current version of Joint Service Regulation ZDv 12/1 and until 2008 for the current version of Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 to be issued. These documents reflect not only the global political security changes, which made obsolete territorial homeland defense as the sole reasoning for armed forces, but they also mirror the reality of robust operations for the Bundeswehr, as well as social developments that, for example, led to the opening of military service for women in 2001. This was the first time that those regulations had been marked releasable to the public.

Laying out the foundations and principles of Innere Fuehrung, as well as objectives and requirements, norms and leadership culture, and the areas of application, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 “is the most important regulation for service in the Bundeswehr.” It clearly states that Innere Fuehrung “ensures a maximum of military effectiveness,” and, at the same time, “guarantees a maximum of freedom and rights for soldiers.” It reassures the guiding principle of the “citizen in uniform” who should be a free man/ woman, a responsible citizen, and a fully fledged soldier. In conjunction

---

174 As with Innere Fuehrung in general, the chronology of these alterations and their in-depth investigation are not part of this thesis.
175 Compare, i.e., Meyer, Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsaetze, 8–11.
176 Meyer, Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsaetze, 12.
177 Federal Ministry of Defence, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1, preliminary remarks.
178 Ibid., Art. 302.
179 Ibid., Art. 301.
with the legal, political, and social foundations of Innere Fuehrung, its principles\textsuperscript{180} form
the basis for a cooperative leadership culture of the Bundeswehr.

In the context of various simultaneous operations abroad, the aspect of political
education is again emphasized in Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1. Military leaders are
obligated to communicate to the soldiers under their command not only comprehensively
about the political justification of the deployment, but also to provide essential
knowledge about the country of deployment, be it political, cultural, or social. This way,
German soldiers should be reassured as citizens in uniform and intrinsically motivated to
fulfill their duty.\textsuperscript{181} Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1 explains the necessity for all
soldiers to be familiar with the organizational principles and leadership cultures of other
countries’ armed forces in the context of multinational operations, as well as those of
Non-Governmental Organizations.\textsuperscript{182}

Studies have ascertained that “there is the insight on the political level as well as
in the new version of ZDV 10/1 that especially peace keeping and peace enforcement
missions require soldiers with a high degree of sensibility for communication and inter-
cultural competence and that therefore an education in the sense of “Innere Fuehrung”
could be very helpful.”\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{180} Federal Ministry of Defence, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1, Art. 316: integration into state
and society; the guiding principle of the “citizen in uniform;” ethical, legal, and political legitimacy of the
mission; the realization of fundamental constitutional and social values in the armed forces; the limits of
“orders and obedience;” the application of the principle of mission command; the observance of the
statutory participation rights of soldiers and, the observance of the freedom of association guaranteed in the
Basic Law Article 9(3), Basic Law.

\textsuperscript{181} Federal Ministry of Defence, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1, Art. 628, cited after Meyer,
Innere Fuehrung und Auslandseinsaetze, 13.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{183} Meyer, The Concept of “Innere Fuehrung” and its Translation into the Agenda of Socialisation of
German Soldiers, 36. For a more critical view on the practical implementation of Innere Fuehrung in times
of out-of-area operations see Claus Freiherr von Rosen, “Innere Fuehrung und Einsatz aus Perspektive der
Paedagogik,” in Auslandseinsaetze der Bundeswehr. Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen, Diagnosen und
Perspektiven, eds. Sabine Jaberg, Heiko Biehl, Guenter Mohrmann, and Maren Tomforde (Berlin: Duncker
und Humblot, 2009), 187–190.
Moreover, evidence has been provided that Innere Fuehrung is in fact identity-building together with the ideal of the “citizen in uniform.” Reasons for that can be found, for example, in other areas of application, such as compatibility of family and duty, pastoral care and the practice of religion, welfare and recreation, or medical care.

Looking at out-of-area deployments with combat operations, Innere Fuehrung has proven its suitability. Yet, with a view to the further development of Innere Fuehrung, one has to note a lack of political guidance at the domestic level, which might become problematic.

C. INNERE FUEHRUNG AND ESDP—AN ONGOING DEBATE

At the time that Graf Baudissin and others designed Innere Fuehrung, the guiding principle of the citizen in uniform was substantiated by the idea of a citizen who is actively democratic and through his conviction has an intrinsic motive to protect his country and fellow citizens. Accordingly, civic education as key features of Innere Fuehrung aims at explaining the political justification for the Bundeswehr, not only for outside defense, but also for its democratic legitimacy as a well-fortified democracy. This approach was consistent with the system of conscription until the end of the Cold War. It began to be challenged, however, with the beginning of out-of-area operations and the

---


185 In conjunction with the stressing of the importance of the superiors and leadership, civic education is categorized equally important as law and military discipline. Federal Ministry of Defence, Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1, Art. 660–677.

186 Hartmann, Innere Fuehrung, 113.


188 Ibid., 12, 25.
broadening of the Bundeswehr’s tasks beyond mere territorial homeland defense in the mid-1990s, and those challenges caused related discussions about conscription that started time and again.

This ongoing discussion focuses on the question of whether Innere Fuehrung is a contemporary concept and philosophy that is suitable for today’s armed forces. The disputants do not explicitly resort to the Wehrmacht, yet they basically draw upon the same traditionalists’ arguments. In the context of increasing combat operations, it is argued that Innere Fuehrung, as good as it might be during peacetime operation, reaches its limits in times of multinational operations. Neither, they claim, can a tradition and identity that have been artificially designed at a drawing-board substitute the necessary role models, nor can Innere Fuehrung dictate the tradition necessary in order to cope with life-threatening environments that increasingly demand recourse to military “secondary” virtues. But if a military banishes democracy in favor of twenty-first century combat and security building, how then could it possibly be a force for democratic principles?

In a way, this reasoning corresponds with Huntington’s argument, stated earlier in this study, that “military professionalism,” especially within the officer corps, is the decisive concept to keep the military out of politics and will make the officer corps focus its loyalty on the military ideal. However, this approach towards military professionalism is challenged through this study. This author argues that the opposite applies, namely, that the power of Innere Fuehrung has not only overcome the problematic issue of tradition of the Bundeswehr over time, but it has also anchored German armed forces into democracy for the first time in history. Innere Fuehrung is opposed to a purpose-rational concept of military technocratic patterns of thought and behavior, which, in worst case, might lead to the delimitation of force. Innere Fuehrung has also proven its validity and its unique suitability for multinational operations, in general, and CSDP operations, in particular. In this regard, it would also match demands within the functional dimension


190 This argument, however, is also drew upon by agents of the opposite camp for whom Innere Fuehrung is put into practice nowhere near enough. See, i.e., Kuhlmann, *Primacy of Politics over Military Matters*, 94.

of civil-military relations. “In order to be fully combat-effective, the modern soldier must be deeply convinced of the superiority of the social and political system he stands and fights for.”

Scholars have noted a discrepancy between the original ambitions of Innere Fuehrung and the current situation. They note a disentanglement of the Bundeswehr from its parent society, caused by the new spectrum of tasks together with a decreasing democratic legitimacy due to the significant downsizing of conscripts. Moreover, the remaining conscripts are not employed in operations other than territorial homeland defense, which means that they are not employed at all in today’s scenarios.

Other scholars investigate the seeming discrepancy between the “citizen in uniform” and the image of the soldier as a “warrior.”

As has been stated, the form of military service among EU member states differs between compulsory and volunteer military systems. Along with different military cultures, different leadership philosophies, traditions, as well as unequal legal and social status of soldiers, the EU is challenged to cope with these matters and to harmonize in a way that reaches far beyond technical synchronization and tactical or operational interoperability. Security has a social and cultural dimension which has, over the past ten years, hardly been addressed and very little progress has been made in this field. Attempts to overcome the slow integration progress of national armed forces within the

---

192 Von Bredow, Germany, 148–149.
193 Compare, i.e., Guentner, Der multifunktionale Bundeswehrsoldat, 17; further see Chauvistre, Wir Gutkrieger.
EU have their origins long before ESDP existed. But those attempts cannot belie the fact that the EU still lacks a comprehensive integration concept.

Notwithstanding comprehensive political cooperation and various missions and operations, the EU has not yet developed a common EU legal status for soldiers. In practice, this causes a clash of the different national systems. While in some areas, such as, for example, voting right or freedom of association, the impact on daily multinational military service is lesser, this is not the case in others. In those areas, for example disciplinary right, legal protection and prosecution of soldiers, or bindingness of orders, interference with military service operations might take place. A subjective perception of being treated unprivileged in comparison to others could, at the individual level, have a devastating effect in terms of trust, motivation, and morale.

It is to note, that recently the European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL), founded in 1972, seems to gain strength as an “umbrella organisation consisting of 37 national military associations and trade unions, and is starting to attend to the social and professional interests of military personnel of all ranks in Europe.”

EUROMIL promotes human rights, fundamental freedoms and socio-professional interests of soldiers, such as inclusion into social legislation by the EU, by monitoring and advocating in multinational negotiations on the European level. Among other matters, EUROMIL “seeks to raise awareness about the right of association in EU armed forces and to encourage the audience to consider servicemen as “citizens in uniform,” entitled to certain inalienable human rights.”

---

196 Such as the creation of a bilateral German-French brigade in 1989, which was transformed into a multilateral European one in 1995. See John McCormick, The European Union. Politics and Policies (Indianapolis: Westview Press, 2008), 343. Without making the claim to be complete, other examples are: the Eurocorps in Strasbourg, France (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain); the German-Dutch Corps in Muenster, Germany; the Multinational Corps North-East in Stettin, Poland (Danmark, Germany, Poland).


One causal explanation for the deficiency is the level of integration of EU’s military forces and structures. While certain projects on military integration can be considered very successful, the EU still lacks a comprehensive military integration approach. Compared to NATO, for example, the EU does not yet have a standing integrated military structure. So far, it has to be generated for every ESDP/ CSDP mission individually. Another indicator is the cultural aspect of language regime. While it is clear in NATO that English is the operational language, this does not apply automatically for the EU.

A common European approach to security requires a common European comprehension of security. Only then European soldiers would have a clear vision of the political causes for their missions. Unfortunately, the Lisbon Treaty has not provided a common vision concerning European security and defense.

---

199 See footnote 196. In addition, the recent initiative on “Synchronized Armed Forces Europe” (SAFE) as an intermediate step towards a European Army should also be mentioned, although, in the logic of this study, it could be categorized as being of a purely functional as opposed to a socio-cultural approach.
IV. CONCLUSION

The transformation of European Union forces is still in its infancy. Different national scopes prove that heterogeneity persists among EU member states with a view to the possibility of further “Europeanized” forces. If a common strategic culture is wanted, the role of European soldiers would have to be explored and a common view developed, in particular concerning the relationship between armed forces and society in the European Union.

A common view is also important because of the involvement of the EU in political processes of state-building in ESDP missions. These processes can be seen as involving the use of armed force as a part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.

But apart from those EU typical missions and operations, the thought that EU military capabilities will increasingly be challenged with combat scenarios, should not be dismissed in principle. ESDP’s/ CSDP’s scope and the associated aspect of a EU strategic culture have proven to be of a dynamic nature. If one follows the argument that an EU identity would ultimately develop through “de-Americanization” in order to find common ground among the 27 diverse EU member states, then this might, despite the fuzziness of the term “de-Americanization,” affect NATO’s coherence. 200 That having noted, a broader EU military scope could be envisaged as an aftermath of a growing antagonism between the EU and the U.S., and de facto neutralize the overlap of membership in both, NATO and EU. The way, NATO and the EU are being treated differently as well in politics as in literature provides evidence in this regard. As a consequence, the topic of this study would gain even more relevance.

The cultural and sociological aspects of civil-military relations refer to the relationship between the military and society as it encompasses aspects of social integration, such as recruitment and resettlement, military education, and military aid to the civil community.\textsuperscript{201} An EU comprehensive civil-military approach should thus rest on a sound framework at the international political and strategic level that includes the sociological dimension.

EU civil society needs to come to terms with its military and its broadened and increasingly complex tasks. Only then will it be reciprocally possible to convince “that society at large appreciates their performance”\textsuperscript{202} as citizen soldiers as opposed to mercenaries, and provides them with trust, confidence, respect, and prestige. Moreover, the matter of a future common European army and its leadership culture is non-detachably intertwined with the future of the EU as a whole, that is to say the self-image and the balance of responsibilities, duties and rights at the polity level, among its society and at the individual level. The meager statements and remarks in official EU documents speak volumes in that regard. EU soldiers feel that they are not on solid ground/concerning their employer.\textsuperscript{203} The problematique that nationally assured rights and constitutional and social values could be partially sacrificed within the multinational environment of a CSDP operation in favor of a tactical and operational determinism that overemphasizes combat in the traditional sense and/or which tramples on necessary civil-military practices of great merit, should be addressed.

One step to accomplish that at the political level could be the development of a European White Paper on security and defense,\textsuperscript{204} which would also foster legitimacy within the EU as it would communicate with and explain to European society the EU’s political vision. Another step could be the strengthening of the European Parliament in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[203] Compare, i.e., Varwick, \textit{Euroarmee}, 48.
\item[204] Compare ibid. Obviously, and because the EU is rather a polity and not a state, the hand-over of EU member states’ national sovereignty and the delegation of national competences to the EU level is an ongoing and partially tenacious process. This process is multifaceted and cannot be investigated in its entirety within the scope of this study.
\end{footnotes}
CFSP and CSDP matters, for example through decision taking authority and the establishment of a permanent parliamentary committee on security and defense matters. The necessity for parliamentary decisions in the realm of CFSP and CSDP would, at the institutional level, strengthen democratic legitimacy. Those thoughts have already been expressed in the 1950s in conjunction with the European Defence Community that was envisaged by some in the early 1950s but never came into being.\(^\text{205}\)

At the individual level, military education, not only training, will have to be Europeanized, for example institutionally by establishing a European military academy. As has been noted in this study, a nexus between military sociological education and related career fields and tasks does not exist at the domestic level.\(^\text{206}\) At the EU level, initiatives, such as the French ERASMUS\(^\text{207}\) program, which is aimed to provide EU officers with knowledge about different military leadership philosophies, or the further enhancement of the European Security and Defence College,\(^\text{208}\) seem to address this gap partially.\(^\text{209}\)

In order to cope with the related challenges and to promote cultural coherence among EU member states, it is recommended that career tracks be established that incorporate interdepartmental and conflict-related skills; facilitate internationalization of personnel in relevant ministries and state entities. These career tracks could further encourage universities to establish international conflict-oriented education options for civil servants and experts with relevant domestic experience; support EU development of inter-departmental expertise in the security-sector reform, including police, justice, and prison reform; recognize the additional (administrative) costs; enhance work on the

\(^\text{205}\) Compare, i.e., Varwick, *Euroarmee*, 48. Already then, a common European Ministry of Defense was considered.


\(^\text{208}\) The objective of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is to enhance the EU’s security culture. The virtual college is organized as a network of EU member states’ national institutes, academies, colleges, and institutions, which deal with security and defense policy issues. The ESDC is intended to foster joint EU training in the area of CFSP and CSDP.

\(^\text{209}\) The somewhat dull role of ERGOMAS has been addressed earlier in this study.
development of a set of guidelines to regulate relations between civil and military entities; and encourage and promote further research and debate among the general public, parliamentarians, and international partners.  

An approach to further research could be to investigate in more depth to what extent cultural intersections have developed differently among EU member states and their military forces. At the EU level, those intersections would also have to be addressed in a comprehensive civil-military approach.

Civil-military relations within ESDP implicitly assume certain pre-prepositions and perceptions. Good civil-military relations should not be taken for granted. Different national perceptions of security challenges have been a significant obstacle in developing comprehensive common EU policies. However, a common European approach for security requires a common European comprehension of security. This development of a comprehensive and common civil-military perception within the EU is “a bottom-up process that requires the alignment of member states’ conceptions” (if there are any), thereby contributing to a common European strategic culture, an ambition implicitly set by the European Security Strategy (ESS).

If it was correct that “defence is not like other policy sectors” and that, “because of its political sensitivity, governments will not entrust responsibility for either making or implementing decisions to others,” then the achievements within the framework of ESDP as well as the various number of missions and operations can be called impressive, given especially the institutional constraints under which ESDP operates. However, it could then accordingly be argued that national characteristics in the realm of civil-military relations had and continue to have an inhibiting impact also on

---

210 Meunier, *Developments in French Politics*, 12.
213 Menon, *Empowering paradise?*, 244.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
civil-military relations within the realm of ESDP/CSDP, as has been investigated in this thesis with a brief view to the “big three,” France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Constraints at the domestic level limit the evolutionary scope of civil-military culture at the EU level. The conceptual and connotative restriction of civil-military relations within the European Union might affect the EU’s overall democratic legitimacy.

The successful integration of the Bundeswehr and that of a large number of former soldiers of the Nationale Volksarmee into the Bundeswehr after the reunification of Germany in 1990 adds to this logic. Despite national differences between EU member states’ civil-military relations, it is suggested that the EU as a whole can draw upon Germany’s “lessons” in order to shape a common and comprehensive EU civil-military concept. Germany, because of its foreign policy paradigm of multinationality, participates in almost every multinational military formation within the EU.

The aim of this thesis is not to identify possible solutions to the problem but to stimulate discussion on the matter. It looks at a field of ESDP/ CSDP from a different angle, not investigating the usual—functional—fields of ESDP/ CSDP: origins, institutions, operations and missions, and capabilities.

This author agrees to arguments that note the need for an intense debate over the necessity for Innere Fuehrung to regain strength in its entirety as opposed to its mere institutional appearance. He also agrees on that this matter, which is argued to have evolved due to the increasing focus on purely functional aspects in the line of this thesis’ train of thought, has to be taken on by political as well as military elites. However, the opinion that a decision about the preservation of the conscription system in Germany is linked solely to security policy aspects and budgetary needs is not shared by this author. Although one can agree to the conclusion that, in light of the institutional set-ups and evolution of the Bundeswehr in its entirety over the past 55 years, the two key

---

216 Respective initial thoughts on this methodology were encouraged by reading Abenheim, Image of the Wehrmacht, 2–4, 33.
217 Compare, i.e., Kuhlmann, Primacy of Politics over Military Matters, 94.
218 Ibid., 90, 92–95.
219 Ibid., 96–97.
original aims, (a) to prevent political misuse of orders and (b) to inhibit the armed forces from becoming a “state within the state,” have been achieved. In conjunction with the explanations in this study about the sociological dimension of civil-military relations, one can note an inverse drift of the parent societies away from its armed forces, which, it is argued here, is likely to become stronger with the end of conscription.\textsuperscript{220} At the domestic level, former Federal President Horst Koehler has described this phenomenon as “freundliches Desinteresse”\textsuperscript{221} (friendly indifference).

At the EU level, this trend has not been noted at all. But from what has been argued in this thesis, it might be even more problematic in light of a future European Army. If created, it would have yet to be related (not only communicated) in its entirety to the EU population as a whole.

The central role of man in the complex arrangement of EU’s military seems to be undervalued. It is the belief of this author, that the idea of congruency of a civil society and its armed forces through the principle of citizen in uniform should remain the focal point within a holistic approach towards comprehensive EU security and defense. Being a likewise unique historical situation, and even if with a different starting position, the EU could, with regard to the EU’s vision, benefit from the experience and lessons of Germany and Innere Fuehrung, which has clearly proven to be robust through times of significant systemic and domestic challenges and has been most progressive in including its armed forces into multinational structures. With approximately two million soldiers, Europeans should be able and willing to integrate and combine their national experiences in view of a “European citizen in uniform.”\textsuperscript{222}

\textsuperscript{220} The matter of discussion about the conscription system in Germany is not in the centre of this thesis’ focus as it only applies to Germany. However, because conscription is no longer an issue in other EU

\textsuperscript{221} Compare, for example, \url{http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,593131,00.html} (accessed June 12, 2010).

\textsuperscript{222} Compare, i.e., Walther Stuetzle, “Lasting Peace needs more than Free Trade. The EU has to develop a Joint Policy for Security, Energy and Foreign Affairs.” \textit{The German Times}, no.9 (September 2009): 3.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California

3. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung
   Fuehrungsstab der Streitkraefte I 5
   Bonn, Germany