DELIBERALIZATION IN JORDAN: THE ROLES OF ISLAMISTS AND U.S.-EU ASSISTANCE IN STALLED DEMOCRATIZATION

by

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June 2010

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### Abstract
Despite some political openings in Jordan during the 1980s, the democratization process is presently stalled. What explains the lack of continuous democratization in Jordan while democratic transitions in many other countries around the world have taken place? This study seeks to understand the reasons behind stalled democratization in Jordan by analyzing three variables: the nature of the opposition movement; the role of domestic and international events in shaping opposition-regime interactions; and the role of U.S.-European Union (EU) assistance to Jordan. The major finding of this study is that democratization in Jordan has stalled due to the regime’s policy of preventing political opportunities to maintain the status quo backed by the U.S. and the EU. Political inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) will bode well for Jordan’s democratic progress. The MB’s strategic behavior has withstood an Islamist radicalization in light of repression and unpopular western policy. Nevertheless, neither the U.S. nor the EU pushed for more liberalization, which enables the MB to gain political access. The U.S. and the EU opted for a realist approach, focusing on security in Jordan. This thesis proposes a rethinking of assistance to Jordan based on a burden sharing between the U.S. and the EU.
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMENA</td>
<td>Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Common Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>ECC</td>
<td>Economic Consultative Council</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>European Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GID</td>
<td>General Intelligence Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCCNOP</td>
<td>Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Islamic Action Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCS</td>
<td>Islamic Center of Charity and Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
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<td>MEDA</td>
<td>Mediterranean Economic Development Area</td>
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<td>MEPI</td>
<td>Middle East Partnership Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Program</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIZ</td>
<td>Qualifying Industrial Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UfM</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The third wave of democratization has skipped over the Middle East. Whereas major democratic transformations in Latin America, East Asia, Africa, and elsewhere emerged, the Middle East remains mired in authoritarian regimes with the façade of democratic institutions and procedures. Jordan is an excellent example of this type of “hybrid” regime that has a multiparty system, regularly held elections, and a government that utters the language of democratic participation. Yet, it is anything but a genuinely free democracy, as reflected in its Freedom House ranking, which was recently downgraded to “not free.” The question is: Why has democratization stalled in Jordan?

This study explores this vexing question by analyzing three aspects of the Jordanian polity: the nature of Islamist opposition to the regime in Jordan; the nature of regional challenges facing Jordan; and the role of international donors, especially the U.S. and the European Union (EU), in the democratization process. Specifically, this study asks the following questions:

(1) What is the nature of the Islamist movement that challenges the regime in Jordan? What are its strands and strategies toward the regime?

(2) How do domestic and international factors shape the interaction between the Islamist movement and the regime in Jordan, and what effect do these interactions have on the democratization process?

(3) How has international economic assistance shaped the democratization process in Jordan? Has U.S.-EU assistance to Jordan promoted political liberalization or hindered it?

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B. IMPORTANCE

The study of stalled democratization in Jordan is important for three reasons. First, Jordan is a vital ally of Western states, recognized as a moderate regime that has weathered difficult regional circumstances while siding with the U.S. on major policy issues: countering the threat of radical pan-Arab nationalism; promoting peace between Arabs and Israel; supporting the war on terrorism; and, presently, is siding with the U.S. in its confrontation with Iran. In addition, in light of the EU enlargement, Jordan’s role in providing stability and security in the EU’s neighborhood became more significant.

Second, interrelated with the first reason, Jordan’s stability is vital because of its proximity to Israel, and one of the few Arab countries that has made peace with the Jewish state. Stability and security in the EU’s neighborhood depends on the development of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which Jordan seeks to play an important role, not least since more than fifty percent of its population are of Palestinian provenance.

Third, understanding the democratization process in Jordan is important because it could offer lessons on how democratization progresses and falters, especially in light of the fact that Jordan is one of few Muslim countries that allows its Islamist opposition groups space in the political and social spheres. In many ways, Jordan offers the potential for learning on two fronts: how to advance democratization, and how to do so when the beneficiaries of democracy might be Islamists. Jordan, in this respect, could potentially be another case in a limited universe of cases in which democratization and Islamism can coexist (e.g., Turkey, Morocco, and Indonesia).

C. CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

The Hashemite Kingdom has been able to sustain a stable monarchy, allowing limited democratic progress and defending its place within the international community. Western policymakers even think that Jordan contributes to a stable and peaceful Middle East and has the potential to become a role model for democratization in other Arab
However, while the third wave of democratization has bypassed the Middle East, Jordan became a “hybrid regime,” residing somewhere between authoritarianism and democracy. Political openings as in the late 1980s are short-lived and indicate that the Jordanian regime has never intended to follow the path to democracy. Nevertheless, the stability of Jordan’s “halfway house,” as Huntington put it, is higher than expected. Opposing political forces, besides the MB, are weak while rifts within the Jordanian population regarding the Transjordan-Palestine divide are growing. Islamism remains the untried but much called for solution to Jordan’s political and social challenges.

Political opportunities for opposing political forces are not likely to emerge in the absence of economic or political “shocks” that could compel the Jordanian regime to relinquish decision-making prerogatives. Jordan is a dependent state in need of aid and remittances from neighboring rich Gulf countries, as well as U.S.-EU assistance. A plurality of scholars highlights the importance of the monarchy’s alignment with the West from a historical and economic point of view. They point out Jordan’s economic dependency on the West and the states in the Gulf due to Jordan’s scarce resources and weak economic basis. In general, alignment with the West and foreign aid has shaped Jordan’s foreign policy, in particular Jordan’s policy of reconciliation with Israel, since budget security is a focal point of the regime’s survival strategy. Finally, Jordan’s

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dependence on the West is remarkable. The U.S. and the EU provided 83 percent of grant assistance to Jordan in 2002, while U.S. support skyrocketed in light of the Iraq War in 2003.\textsuperscript{5}

The trajectories of Jordan’s foreign policy have affected the stability of the Jordanian regime since the country’s foreign relations and economic dependency are closely linked. In short, the Jordanian regime’s alliance with the U.S. places it in direct opposition to mass public opinion, reflected in the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement. As the main opposition force in the social and political realms, the MB is viewed as a formidable threat to the regime. King Abdullah II has chosen an exclusionary strategy toward Islamist organizations due to its alliance with the U.S. in a critical period of tumultuous regional conflicts (e.g., the second Palestinian uprising; invasion and occupation of Iraq; and Israeli wars in Lebanon and Gaza).

While the political inclusion of the MB may bode well for democratic progress in Jordan, Western fears of Islamism have prevented Jordan’s Western allies from pushing for genuine liberalization.\textsuperscript{6} “We are very suspect of those parties and groups that use the democratic process to come to power and once they’re in power they destroy the democratic process and stay in power.”\textsuperscript{7} Nevertheless, “defensive democratization” in Jordan might not withstand the dynamic of Islamization in times of political and economic crisis.\textsuperscript{8} How, then, do the U.S. and the EU respond to this dynamic?

In light of Jordan’s dependence on U.S. and EU assistance, the doors for promoting democracy are supposed to be open. However, as noted, since liberalization has stalled, U.S. and EU assistance has stabilized Jordan’s status quo. A realist approach


seems to dominate U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan while security and stability come first. As Islamism is widely seen in light of security threats, the U.S. and the EU do not seem willing to put pressure on the Hashemite regime to enhance further liberalization that would enable substantial political inclusion of moderate Islamist organizations.

This conceptual context sheds light on two debates, which are central to this study. (1) Does political inclusion lead to the moderation of Islamist organizations? (2) Is U.S.-EU assistance beneficial or deleterious to democratization in Jordan? Before addressing these debates, it is important to describe the nature of Jordan’s stalled democratization.

1. Jordan as a Hybrid Regime

Scholars studying regime types in the Middle East argue that elections have become one element of Jordan’s democratic façade as a prerequisite for stability of the Jordanian “hybrid regime.”9 As George concludes, Jordan never aimed for a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy because neither the monarchy nor the Jordanians really seek democracy. He argues that Jordan’s establishment has sought to maintain its privileges while signaling their willingness for reforms, however, predominantly in the economic sector. Moreover, most Jordanians do not trust political representation. Family and tribal ties, as well as social justice, individual security, and accountability of the state, are more important than normative principles of western democracies. Many Jordanians prefer the status quo in Jordan in light of its hostile neighborhood and authoritarian rule in Syria or Saudi Arabia.10

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Baylouny offers further explanations of this lack of interest in democracy, highlighting the role of the military in securing patrimonial ties between the monarchy and the Transjordan population. She shows that the military has grown in importance as a major employer with regard to social welfare and economic affairs. As George does, Baylouny argues, “seemingly successful economic and political reforms have been used to advertise the American vision of societal transformation in the Middle East.”

As Jordan’s macroeconomic conditions improved, scholars focused on the emerging business elites in Jordan under King Abdullah II. With reference to a World Bank Study on twenty countries in the Middle East in 2009, Jordan was assessed as the country which conducted the highest number of economic reforms. In this light, business elites were promoted to the inner circles of the King. This new elite recognizes that liberalization favors Islamist organizations, which makes them less likely to initiate democratic reforms from above.

Bellin and Wiktorowicz show that the mukharabat (security service) and bureaucratic regulations of civil society organizations are major hindrances to democratic progress. Wiktorowicz shows that such control has led to the rise of radical Islamist organizations that aim to defy state control despite a sophisticated Jordanian security apparatus. He points to the importance of informal social networks of Salafi

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organizations and their implications on politics and society in Jordan.\textsuperscript{14} Further, with regard to social-welfare networks, Clark’s study of Jordan shows that networks have expanded in the private realm and between Islamists and non-Islamists. She argues that care by Islamic Social Institutions has strengthened horizontal ties among the educated and marginalized middle class, while the poor had to seek additional aid elsewhere as they could not afford the costs of social care raised by these institutions.\textsuperscript{15}

Collectively, the literature on Jordan’s “hybrid regime” highlights the regime’s success in maintaining the status quo and Jordan’s democratic façade. Nevertheless, one conclusion from all these studies suggests that democratic exclusion does not put an end to Islamist activism, but instead shifts it toward informal—and perhaps clandestine—organizing that circumvents state control. Islamist movements became the remaining legitimate opposition to the regime while radical strands might gain in importance. Therefore, it is important to analyze the dynamics between the regime and Islamist movements and the factors that shape their behavior, as well as the prospects of moderation by political inclusion as the literature in the next section debates.

2. Moderation of Political Islam

The absence of democracy on the one hand and the rise of Islamist movements in the Middle East on the other hand have led to a wide spectrum of literature that deals with the emergence and role of political Islam in Middle Eastern societies. Whereas one camp of scholars points to the cultural dimension of Islam as an obstacle to modernity and democracy, the other camp argues that Islam is not hostile to the modern world and incorporates democratic elements. Since the literature of neither camp elaborates on the


political context Islamists operate in, the reviewed debate in the literature focuses on social movement theory, which aims to explain the behavior of Islamist movements in certain political and socio-economic contexts.16

Berman’s approach to political Islam uses analogies from the political developments in Europe of the early twentieth century, which were characterized by political instability. Her approach offers different perspectives on the “inclusion-moderation theory:” (1) Parties become moderate in order to attract the bulk of voters in the middle of the political spectrum (Anthony Downs’ median-voter theory). (2) Political parties need to create a bureaucracy, which draws resources from the organization. While they are included in a competitive political environment, they focus on pragmatic solutions to organize and run the organization (Robert Michel). (3) As parties are confronted with the needs of the daily life of the people and take over political responsibility they become pragmatic and distance themselves from former radical ideas.17

Moaddel supports Berman’s argument showing that Jordan’s Islamists became more moderate and pragmatic by legally competing with other political parties. With reference to Jordan’s authoritarian pluralism, and in contrast to ideological driven regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iran, the MB in Jordan was not politicized as their counterparts and, therefore, able to moderate their ideology. The Jordanian regime never fought the religious basis of Islamist organizations. Munson points to the capability of

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the MB in Egypt to absorb repression by its structure and social network.\textsuperscript{18} El-Ghobashy argues that the “metamorphosis” of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers derives from their survival strategy. Against the exclusion of moderate Islamists from political participation, political inclusion is without alternative since they are the only legitimate political force in Egypt. However, moderation in a highly diverse political spectrum is supposed to fail without strong democratic institutions in place.\textsuperscript{19}

Boulby explores the relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and the MB in different periods. She argues that the MB in Jordan, in contrast to its counterpart in Egypt, shows a “lack of intellectual engagement as well as the limited Islamic theoretical legacy on the formation of the state.” Nevertheless, the MB in Egypt, as well as the MB in Jordan, has remained politically ambiguous. However, the Egyptian heritage of an Islamic reformist movement against British colonial rule in the nineteenth century and the exclusive and repressive political context in Egypt differ from the case of Jordan significantly. The relationship between the monarchy and the MB is based on common interests against common threats, such as Arab-nationalism or radical Islamism, which enhances the alignment between the Hashemite regime and the MB through turbulent political changes.\textsuperscript{20}

In addition, Robinson argues that moderate Islamists in Jordan proved to follow to democratic rules as they push for more liberalization. More democracy is in the interest of the Islamist movement as it protects it from further repression, but stands in contrast to the regime’s interests. In contrast to Boulby, Robinson argues that the Muslim Brothers’ special relationship with the Hashemite regime is clearly over along with Jordan’s reconciliation with Israel and increasing repression since the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{21} Adams adds


that the MB in Jordan was not successful in achieving its political ends, but profited from political liberalization as it became the largest political opposition in parliament.\textsuperscript{22} As Adams does, Freij points to the regime’s tactics of using the MB as a political instrument according to commonalities of political interests. However, the weakness of the Islamist political front derives from the factions within the MB with regard to interests of the Palestine and Transjordan constituencies as well as independent Islamists.\textsuperscript{23} Kaye and others point out the danger of a re-radicalization with reference to the decreasing political influence of the MB and a new relationship between the monarchy and the MB.\textsuperscript{24}

Denoeux supports the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis” in his cross-national study of moderate and radical Islamists in the Middle East. He argues that the regimes’ policy between cooperation and confrontation has strong implications on the agendas of Islamist organizations. As a strict line between moderate and radical Islamist does not exist, different factions occur in certain ideological issues. He concludes that government policy should seek opportunities of political cooperation in order to contain radical Islamists. However, Denoeux argues, according to a weak empirical basis, that the scenario of formerly moderate Islamists becoming more radical after having seized power cannot be ruled out.\textsuperscript{25} In addition, Brumberg insists that liberalized autocracies face a trap. On the one hand, autocrats are more capable of containing Islamists in a politically diverse realm; on the other hand, limited inclusion can result in a zero-sum, which leads to a radicalization of Islamist organizations.\textsuperscript{26} Herb adds that inclusion of Islamist organizations has not paid off to the extent that it has established “hybrid regimes” rather than challenging the autocrat’s power. It entrenched the cleavages between liberal


\textsuperscript{24} Kaye et al., \textit{More Freedom, Less Terror?: Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World}, 77.


\textsuperscript{26} Michael Herb, "Emirs and Parliament in the Gulf," in \textit{Islam and Democracy in the Middle East}, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Daniel Brumberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 84–90.
tensions and authoritarian rule. Thus, the dynamic between inclusion and moderation has many facets, which might lead to unintended consequences. Consequently, inclusion of moderate Islamists has to be considered case by case.

Clark challenges the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis” while analyzing the role of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) in Jordan. She argues that political cooperation has its limits with regard to ideological “red-lines” of the IAF. She concludes that political cooperation with the IAF occurred regarding democratic procedures rather than substance.

Schwedler analyzes the spectrum of Islamists in Jordan. She argues that the MB has played a key role in Jordan’s political development and will contribute to democratic progress if the regime imposes political reforms. She also challenges the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis” as it did not answer different developments of co-opted parties in Jordan (Islamic Action Front) and in Yemen (Islah). Schwedler shows that moderation takes place when “limited political openings restructure public political space, even when transition processes seem to have stalled.” She identifies three reasons for the IAF’s success: (1) the IAF did not directly threaten the regime's legitimacy in public; (2) discipline prevented factionalism within the party; and (3) the IAF justified political cooptation according to Islamic values.

Since key ideologues of political Islam and their organizations were shaped under western colonial and Arab authoritarian rule, scholars focus on the socio-economic and

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30 Ibid., 172, 198–205.
political context in which Islamists operate.31 Hafez’s political process approach to the circumstances of the devastating violence during the civil war in Algeria shed light on the relationship between harsh repression of the Islamist movement spearheaded by the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) and the anti-civilian massacres committed by militant Islamists of the *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA). Not only the brutality of the regime’s repression, but the way in which it fostered the “spirals of encapsulation” fueled the radicalization of Islamists and created a vicious circle of violence.32 Hafez and Wiktorowicz’s research on the Egyptian Islamic movement and the violence in the 1990s showed that relative deprivation could not sufficiently explain the emerging violence. As well as in the case of Algeria, the Islamist movement in Egypt was able to accumulate resources and expand their networks before the regime’s countermeasure were effective. They argue that repertoires of violence were also used by “moderate” strands in Egypt since indiscriminate repression posed a threat to the existence of the Islamist movement.33

The reviewed literature does not provide a clear-cut approach to the question of whether inclusion of moderate Islamists in the political process bodes well for the political development in Jordan. The camp, which criticizes the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis,” is growing, not in the least due to evidence for successful political inclusion of Islamist organizations falls short. Based on the consensus of this literature that Islamist organizations act rationally, the motives and the driving factors of their behavior are of main concern, since they could lead to radicalization, continuity (no change in behavior), or moderation as the political process approach states. Thus, instead on


focusing on the question of moderation, the rationales of strategic behavior of Islamist organizations, which operate in a certain political and socio-economic context, have to be explored.

In addition to this debate in the literature, demographic shifts in the Middle East and in Jordan, along with economic development and modernization including the globalization of media, makes it increasingly difficult for regimes to deny the youth and emergent middle classes genuine opportunities for political participation. Islamism attracts the aspiring middle class professionals (e.g., engineers, doctors, etc.) in large part because the existing political order shuts them out, while Islamism offers them a vision of a just political order.

Finally, Islamism is a political force that garners mass support. Denying these constituencies a genuine voice in their political affairs opens up the space for radicalism, even if this radicalism remains at the level of ideological rejection of the regime and its Western allies. As the Iranian revolution shows, should these Islamist forces come to power through revolutionary means they will certainly take a negative attitude toward the U.S. and the West more generally. Thus, a managed transition to democracy where Islamists are invited responsibly into the process offers the U.S. and the EU an opportunity to enhance its standing with the dominant opposition. Needless to say, anti-Americanism in the Middle East is driven by widely-held belief that Western rhetoric of freedom, liberty and democracy is not matched by Western actions, which invariably side with autocrats. Consequently, given that the Jordanian Muslim Brothers have a long history of pragmatism and moderation, they are ideal candidates to incorporate in a democratic political process.

Collectively, despite Western uncertainty about the real aims of the MB in Jordan, the status quo in Jordan might be more risky for peace and stability than political change in Jordan that favors the substantial political inclusion of the MB. The next section highlights the variety of strategies to promote democratic transitions. While there is no consensus in the literature on how to proceed, there is general agreement that international actors can aid or hinder the process.
3. U.S. and EU Assistance

The assistance of the U.S. and the EU to Jordan aims to support a stable development that enables further liberalization and democratization. Carothers identifies three different target areas of assistance: (1) political process, (2) governing institutions, and (3) civil society. There is consensus in the literature that a universal approach does not exist. In addition, the understanding that U.S. and EU assistance needs both “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches prevails in the literature. With reference to the aim of this thesis, the literature discusses the limits and the chances of U.S. and EU assistance to the Middle East, in general, and to Jordan, in particular, focusing on the role of Islamist organizations.

Wittes argues that there is no alternative to the promotion of democracy to prevent radical Islamists from gaining power. She sees a commonality of strategic interests between the U.S. and its autocratic allies. In contrast to Wittes, Ottaway and Carothers challenge the school of thought that terrorism can only be fought by promoting democracy. They point to the different historic experiences in Europe, such as in the cases of the Basque separatists (ETA) in Spain and the Irish Republican Army in Ireland. Moreover, Piazza’s cross-regional quantitative research in the Middle East shows that more liberal Middle Eastern states are more vulnerable to terrorism than their more authoritarian counterparts. In addition, Kaye and others argue on the basis of their cross-national study in the Middle East that a pragmatic approach of democracy promotion including moderate Islamist organizations is needed. However, they note that

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36 Carothers, Taking Stock of US Democracy Assistance, 199.


inclusion of Islamist organizations has failed when political participation did not pay.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, Fuller is cautiously optimistic about trends of moderation in Islamist organizations. He argues that political Islam is doomed due to harsh repression by regimes and the missing pressure of the U.S. and EU on authoritarian regimes for democratic progress.\textsuperscript{41}

Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso insist that a weak civil society is the major obstacle for the democratization process in many countries of the Middle East. They argue that as Islamist parties play the major role in social and political realms, Western approaches have to put pressure on the regimes to give space for the development of civil society. In the case of Jordan, reforms have to focus on “expanding legislative powers, adopting new press legislation, decreasing regulations on non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), and undertaking electoral system reform.” They conclude, “paradigm shifts” are likely to emerge by political “shocks” rather than by democratic promotion.\textsuperscript{42}

Scholars studying the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) highlight the chances of the EU to assist democratization with regard to its wide spectrum of capabilities, but criticize its reluctance to push for reforms.\textsuperscript{43} In this context, Youngs argues that the EU’s comprehensive approach to a safer EU neighborhood is remarkable as it significantly differs from U.S. and NATO initiatives. Nevertheless, he insists that the EU has to expand its approach to the Middle East to create a coherent approach to the region including challenges in Iraq and Palestine. Therefore, the EU’s approach to the Middle East has to go beyond its near neighborhood to address sources of instability in

\textsuperscript{40} Kaye et al., \textit{More Freedom, Less Terror?: Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World}, 163–176; see also Hafez Mohammed M. Hafez, \textit{Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World} (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 204.


the region and security threats to Europe. With regard to the French initiative in 2008 to revitalize the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), Kausch and Youngs argue that European national interests have prevailed over a comprehensive approach to the Middle East. The U.S. and other rising powers in the region have to be addressed by the EU approach to the Middle East. Moreover, as security comes first, the efforts in promoting human rights, good governance, and democracy fall short, while the role of Islamist organizations is ignored. In addition, Haukkala questions the normative power of the EU since it does not attract the Middle East. He criticizes missing concrete incentives in conjunction with clear conditions to push for democratic progress in a top-down approach.

Shahin’s study on the Egyptian reform process shows that U.S. and EU assistance were inconsistent. Political alternatives to the regime were missing since the opposition was weak and fragmented. In this context, Resende and Kraetzschmar’s research on the role of parties in Egypt highlights the importance of EU assistance to foster a pluralistic competitive political realm, which facilitates inclusion of Islamist organizations. However, the real world looks different. Neither the U.S. nor the EU was able or willing to push the Egyptian regime for political reforms that favor the inclusion of Islamist organizations. In research on trends of political Islam in Egypt, El Houdaiby advocates that Europe should make its difference from U.S. policy clear since Islamists are more skeptical about the U.S. than the EU. Besides a top-down approach, the EU should seek direct cooperation on the party-level and with NGOs. El Houdaiby


argues, therefore, that the selection of actors on the grass-roots level and clear criteria for an EU engagement focused on the political process is decisive. In addition, cultural exchange between the EU and Islamists will create a basis of trust between both sides.49

Tocci’s case study on the ENP in Palestine shows only limited success of EU assistance. Whereas the EU could have expanded its influence in Palestine via its support for the Palestinian Authority, it failed to claim concrete conditions for assistance, along with a missing coordination of its efforts. She argues that EU assistance also failed to bridge the trenches between secular and Islamist forces in Palestine.50 Nevertheless, Tocci and Mikhelidze add that EU engagement should foster political inclusion, as positive examples of inclusion of former radical organizations in Europe have shown.51

Emmerson, Youngs, and Springborg conclude, referring to a cross-national study on political Islam in the Middle East and the ENP, that moderate Islamists generally embraced EU rather than U.S. assistance. However, Islamists were concerned about drawbacks regarding repression, political competition, and popularity. Thus, Springborg argues that the EU has to define its’ goals and how it wants to engage with political Islam. He advocates a pragmatic approach in order to address democratic challenges, which are not objectionable to religious beliefs. Finally, the EU should strengthen political institutions and their acceptance by society since most people are more interested in patrimonial relationships than in political representation.52 In later research on Islamist radicalization in the Middle East, Springborg adds that European approaches


to states in the Middle East have not prevented a trend towards radicalization since repression by regimes has continued and the political influence of moderate Islamists has declined significantly alongside an increasing apolitical society. But, he argues, the real threat derives from co-opted Islamists who might become strategic partners of autocrats while political alternatives are missing: “Authoritarianism is bad enough, but Islamist authoritarianism would be even worse…”

Thus, Asseburg highlights that the European paradigm of Middle Eastern engagement has shifted since “moderate Islamists should no longer be excluded from measures aimed at democracy promotion.” Asseburg concludes that legislation, strengthening political parties, and fostering the political process and free and fair elections should be the EU’s main concern.

Consequently, the reviewed literature does not provide a consensus on U.S. and EU assistance to the Middle East in light of the resurgence of Islam and terrorism. Along with the contentious issues of the previous section with regard to moderation of political Islam, the question whether the West should push autocratic regimes for political liberalization remains under debate. Whereas one camp insists that democracy promotion might create more harm than good and threatens the security of the region, the other camp advocates that the U.S. and the EU should push authoritarian regimes for more political liberalization and the inclusion of moderate Islamists. Nevertheless, the latter camp highlights the benefits of the EU approach in some cases with regard to its civilian capabilities and its positive reputation in the public on the one hand, but questions the willingness and effectiveness of the EU in the region to push for more political reforms. However, there is a consensus that neither the U.S. nor the EU has developed a clear approach of how to respond to moderate Islamist organizations in the Middle East.

Finally, the reviewed debates show the wide spectrum of literature related to this thesis. However, it also shows that a straightforward approach to foster a democratic and


stable environment in Jordan and including Islamist organizations in the political process does not exist. The literature lacks a comprehensive approach to analyze the intersection between regime policy, the strategic behavior of Islamist organizations in Jordan, and the effects of assistance by major foreign actors such as the U.S. and the EU to Jordan in a context, which is shaped by political and socioeconomic factors.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis addresses the research questions in a three-step approach. First, the political opportunities of Islamist organizations in Jordan are explored. In this context, the policy of the Jordanian regime against the background of political and socioeconomic factors in Jordan is examined. Therefore, the first step draws from social movement theory focusing on the political process approach to explore the dynamic between political opportunities and the behavior of Islamist organizations in Jordan. Instead of ideological framing and mobilizing structures of the political process approach, this approach highlights ideational and organizational motives of Islamist organization’s behavior.

Whereas the approach of the first step focuses on the entire Islamist spectrum, the second step explores the MB’s strategic behavior. Since the strategic behavior of Islamist organizations is of main concern, as it explains their development in a spectrum between radicalization and moderation, this approach focuses on the question whether political inclusion of the MB bodes well for Jordan’s polity. Beyond the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis,” this approach explores the rational choice of the MB in response to changing political opportunities, as elaborated in the first step, focusing on considerations regarding costs and benefits from an organizational and ideological point of view. In this context, action, decisions, and political agendas are assessed.

Third, the underlying rationales and strategies of U.S. and EU assistance are explored and compared. With reference to the previous two steps, the effects of U.S. and EU assistance on political opportunities and their responsiveness to moderate Islamist organizations such as the MB are examined. This approach highlights the realist and liberal school of thought as competing families of theories in international relations.
Finally, main primary sources are derived from the Center of Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, the United Nations, as well as publications by U.S. administrations and the European Union.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

In accordance with the depicted methods and sources, this thesis is organized into three main chapters and one concluding chapter.

Chapter II explores political opportunities of Islamist organizations in Jordan and the Islamist spectrum in which the MB operates. Since political opportunities are supposed to emerge predominantly top-down, the role of the Jordanian regime and its means to maintain the status quo will be highlighted. In addition, political opportunities will be examined with regard to socio-economic factors and public trends in Jordan. The importance of the MB with regard to its network and ideology in comparison to competing Islamist organizations is assessed to provide the basis for Chapter III.

Chapter III draws from the development of the MB’s special relationship with the Jordanian regime in order to explore the MB’s strategic behavior and the chances of moderation by political inclusion. This chapter takes into account rationales of moderation, political agendas, and the recent development in the light of the 2007 elections while focusing on the reign of King Abdullah II since 1999.

Chapter IV examines U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan to explain common and different strategic interests and strategic cultures as well as the effects of their concepts and means on political opportunities in Jordan reflecting the conclusions of Chapter II and III. In this context, the U.S. and EU responsiveness to moderate Islamist organizations in Jordan is explored.

Finally, Chapter V summarizes the findings of this thesis and recommends a rethinking of U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan.
II. ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN

This chapter examines the factors that shape strategic behavior of Islamist movements and frame the prospects of liberalization in Jordan. Islamist movements are treated as rational unitary actors with preferences based on cost-benefit rationales, organizational capabilities, and ideologies. This approach raises the following questions: (1) What are the factors that shape strategies of Islamist movements in Jordan? (2) How might these movements change the prospects of political liberalization in Jordan?

Social movement theory explains the emergence and development of Islamist movements in different regime types. Based on research on social movements predominantly in the western world, scholars have developed a “political process approach” (e.g., McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1998; and Tilly, 1978/1995), which focuses on political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and ideological frames. This approach acknowledges that grievances according to the theory of “relative deprivation” and resources according to the theory of “resource mobilization” matter. However, neither grievances nor resources will cause mobilization if political opportunities do not occur.55 While mobilizing structure provides the necessary material and organizational resources, framing processes are necessary to create just cause based on perceived or created injustice. These processes are necessary to create a movement’s identity, which is crucial for a movement’s cohesion and its momentum.56 In accordance

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with the “political process approach,” recent research on social movements in the Middle East (e.g., Hafez, 2003; Munson, 2001; Wickham, 2002; and Wiktorowicz, 2004) has provided the most comprehensive explanation for the emergence and development of social movements in a highly constrained social and political context of authoritarian regimes.57

![Diagram of Political Opportunities, Ideologies, and Organizational Structures that Shape the Behavior of Islamist Movements]

Figure 1. Political Opportunities (*), Ideologies, and Organizational Structures that Shape the Behavior of Islamist Movements

However, the political process approach does not exhaustively apply to the explanation of strategic behavior of Islamist movements in Jordan. Whereas political opportunities are supposed to alter a movement’s cost-benefit rationales, mobilizing structures and ideological frames focus on mobilization rather than on strategic choice. Thus, in place of mobilizing structures, this chapter focuses on how organizational structures and networks influence a movement’s behavior and its prospects to achieve its ends. In order to explore strategic choice of a movement, the dynamics between the variables in Figure 1, and how they shape the underlying rationales of a movement’s decision, are of importance. Political opportunities might provide benefits for organizational structures with regard to new resources or might threaten the organizational autonomy and its resources. Access to the political decision-making

process and alliances with influential elites might benefit organizational structures and outweigh the costs of ideological concessions, which can threaten a movement’s support or even cause splintering of factions from a movement.58

Furthermore, in place of ideological frames of the political process approach, this chapter examines the relationship between political opportunities and ideologies. A movement might engage in politics by playing by the rules of the regime if its ideology resonates with emerging political opportunities. By contrast, a movement might reject political opportunities since its ideology refuses an accommodation with the regime. Repression might not necessarily lead to a radicalization of an organization’s ideology if the benefits of an accommodative stance outweigh the costs of confrontation with the regime. Trends and shifts in public opinion shape a movement’s ideological and organizational response. A movement is supposed to adapt its ideology in order to attract public support and enhance recruitment if its ideology is open for interpretation. Vice versa, a rigid ideology remains exclusive and less able to attract the bulk of public opinion. Nevertheless, this exclusiveness might be necessary for a movement’s identity to distinguish itself from “co-opted” mainstream movements.59

Collectively, this approach to explore the strategic behavior of Islamists and the prospects for liberalization in Jordan focuses on political opportunities and the responsiveness of organizational structures and ideologies of Islamist movements to windows of opportunity for political change, as well as the dynamics between these variables.

Consequently, the first section provides an overview about Islamist strands in Jordan and explores how ideologies and organizational structures of Islamist movements resonate with political opportunities. This section highlights that moderate Islamist movements behave according to strategic decisions in order to play by the rules of the regime. The MB is the most powerful Islamist movement from an organizational and ideological point of view. Its identity is inclusive as its pragmatic approach offers

59 Ibid., 773–776.
opportunities for interpretations in response to political opportunities. The MB is the only opposition movement that is able to bridge rifts within Jordan’s identity and public opinion and to attract a majority of the population in order to take over political responsibility. Nevertheless, besides the MB, its “natural ally” Hamas, and radical strands such as Salafism, have grown in importance and influence the MB strategic choice. However, jihadi Salafism remains exclusive. It will not win the Jordanian hearts and minds.

The second section elaborates on political opportunities that shape the strategic behavior of Islamist movements, which derive from changes of political access, variations of state repression, and divisions among elites and influential allies as well as from shifts of public opinion (see Figure 1). It shows that political opportunities are not likely to emerge. Political access remains limited for Islamist movements to challenge the power of the regime and to take over political responsibility. The regime’s repression is not blunt but it effectively controls the social realm. It varies in accordance with major domestic and foreign security threats by a wide spectrum of bureaucratic regulations that limit civil liberties. Divisions among elites and influential alliance did not occur since the King was able to reshuffle the elite structures effectively. Lastly, Jordan’s public opinion has not experienced major rifts recently. Nevertheless, it is divided by increasing clientelism and by its political stance with regard to a future political system in Jordan. Windows of opportunity might open as the regime retreats from the social realm, which undermines the regime’s legitimacy in the long run.

A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND IDEOLOGIES

The spectrum of Islamist movements in Jordan is manifold as Figure 2 shows. Moderate strands, such as the MB or the Islamic Center Party, are willing to play by the rules of the regime and call for political participation since they believe in accordance with Islamic law that this is the most appropriate way to achieve their ends. Nevertheless, the responsiveness of moderate strands to political opportunities differs depending on internal factions and their networks. The MB is the only movement that could effectively exploit political opportunities. By contrast, the responsiveness of
radical strands to political opportunities is low from an ideological and organizational point of view. It varies between movements, which reject the democratic framework or political participation whereas the jihadi Salafist movement fights against the regime to achieve their ends. Networks of radical strands have gained in strength, but they are limited regarding organizational structures and resources since countermeasures of the state force them to defy state control.

Despite the diversity of the Islamist spectrum, all strands share common ideological roots. The resurgence of a reformist strand of Salafism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries under British colonial rule inspired key ideologues of today’s Islamist strands such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb of the MB in Egypt and Syed Abul A’ala Mawdudi of the Jama’at-i-Islami in Pakistan. However, ideologies have developed in different ways depending on the socio-economic and political context.

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60 These roots stem from the Salafi movement, which adheres to Hanbali jurisprudence as the most conservative school of jurisprudence besides Wahhabism.

The plurality of Jordan’s Islamist strands stem from the MB, which is the most influential moderate Islamist organization in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{62} Hasan al-Banna founded the MB in Egypt in 1928 whose philosophy of political Islam still inspires today’s Islamic organizations. Hasan al-Banna believed that the decay of Muslim values in society was the major reason for Muslim backwardness in comparison to western modernity. After society has returned to true Islam, an Islamic state under the rule of the Shari’ah will be achieved by focusing on education to foster adherence to true Islam and to strengthen the community of believers.\textsuperscript{63} Al-Banna created a network consisting of usrahs (“family” cells), public and religious institutions providing the message of Islam (da’wa), but did not create a political master plan of a transition to an Islamic order. Moreover, he lacked intellectual vigor since pragmatism has been the major determinant.\textsuperscript{64}

Al-Banna and Mawdudi believed in the unity of religion and politics in accordance with the oneness of God (tawhid) in the tradition of Taqi al-din ibn Taymiyyah, a leading scholar of the Hanbali jurisprudence. Mawdudi expanded Taymiyyah’s concept of jahiliyya to autocratic Muslim rule in order to demonstrate the illegitimacy of rulers in Muslim countries and justify jihad against them. Nevertheless, al-Banna and Mawdudi advocated a gradual approach to transforming the state as the


most effective course of action. Therefore, they rejected *jihad*, not because of ideological reasons, but because of rational action and pragmatism.65

Sayyid Qutb, key ideologue of the MB in Egypt in the 1950/60s, suffered as many members of the MB under harsh repression and torture by the Egyptian regime. A gradual approach as proposed by al-Banna and Mawdudi did not pay off and became impossible under the new Nasser regime. Consequently, Qutb advocated a far more rigid ideology. He argued that a society living in ignorance of God (*jahiliyya*) and under a *kufr* regime (regime of unbelief), which rejects the sovereignty of god (*hakimmiyyat*), has to be reshaped by a vanguard of true believers. According to Qutb, *takfir* (excommunication) became a means to bypass *fitna* (fighting Muslims is forbidden) and to blemish Muslim “collaborators” as unbelievers. These infidels had to be fought by *jihad* as an obligation of every Muslim (“sixth pillar of Islam”).66 Needless to say, Qutb’s ideology opened the door for radical Islamist strands. While the MB distanced itself from Qutb’s ideas in the 1960s under Al-Hudabi, violent Islamist strands have drawn from Qutb’s ideology to legitimatize their actions since then.67

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1. Moderate Strands

Moderate Islamists are willing to change a political situation by obeying the rules of the regime. Social and religious activism as well as political participation stands for a reformist approach of political Islam. In this spirit, Abu Qurah, a wealthy merchant, founded the MB in Jordan in 1945 in Amman as a branch of the Egyptian MB. His primary goal was to support the Palestinian resistance against a growing Israeli predominance. The ideology of Hasan al-Banna provided the blueprint for the MB’s agenda and its structures. Its primary constituency derived from educated (becoming) professionals of established Transjordan families, and later predominantly Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Non-violent action and political competition supported by a strong social basis should lead to Islamic order based on Shari’ah. However, as noted, the MB did not create a detailed political agenda for a transition to Islamic order.

In addition, the MB in Jordan is not a monolithic bloc and the frontlines between “hawks” and “doves” are not linear. The MB incorporates moderate and radical ideologies since different factions in the MB have existed, but mainly adheres to the school of Hasan al-Banna. The “weight distribution” between radical and moderate ideologies of the MB is supposed to shift in dependence on political opportunities. Thus, if political opportunities (especially political access) emerge, the MB might follow the moderate wing while the radical wing splinters from the movement.

The Islamic Center of Charity and Society (ICCS), founded in 1963 to support and administer the MB’s charity activities, became the largest and financially most

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69 Despite close ideological and administrative ties between Muslim Brothers in Jordan and Egypt, the MB in Jordan has stayed independent. Boulby and Voll, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993*, 169.
70 Ibid., 51, 82–84.
powerful NGO in Jordan. The young, well-educated middle class constituency of the MB spread out in universities and professional associations and repelled the leftists from their strongholds. In addition, the MB gained access to the Ministry of Education and was able to influence school teaching beyond the elementary level. In contrast to Egypt, mosques stayed under control of the government as the demands by a growing religious population in the 1980s could be met by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which had also been infiltrated by the MB. The MB’s network controlled the social centers in many communities. Thus, when the remittances from the Gulf States skyrocketed in the 1970s, the MB’s network became the crucial source for resources, recruitment, and collective action with regard to social and political affairs.

Moreover, the MB was able to achieve its hegemony in the Islamist spectrum as the regime cracked down on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on “Black September” in 1970. The monarchy neutralized the MB’s main rival and allowed the MB to widen its social networks to fill the vacuum in Palestinian dominated regions in Jordan. The MB’s network even expanded in the private realm between Islamists and non-Islamists and strengthened horizontal ties among the middle class. Finally, the success in the 1989 parliamentary elections pushed the expansion of the MB’s movement. However, as Section B will elaborate, the political opening did not last long.

75 The network of charity comprised in 1997/1998 forty-one education facilities, two hospitals and fifteen medical centers housing, thirty-two medical clinics and eleven laboratories, six centers of income generation and training, and thirty-three centers to support orphans and poor families. The ICCS is subordinated by law to the General Union of Voluntary Societies (GUVS) as the umbrella organization of all NGO’s in Jordan. Janine A. Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 87–93; and Choucair-Vizoso, Illusive Reform: Jordan's Stubborn Stability, 45–71.


After the Political Parties Law was adjusted, the IAF was founded in 1992 as an umbrella party of all Islamists officially separated from the MB. However, the IAF became a political actor dominated by the MB, which gave the MB the flexibility to act in the political realm, while focusing on its “core business.” The IAF did not reshape the political party system significantly, as the IAF incorporated the MB’s agenda and became the political arm of the MB. Since the IAF is the most successful established Islamist political party in Jordan, the MB dominates the Islamist spectrum from a political and societal point of view.

The MB’s ideology of a moderate gradual bottom-up approach incorporates various factions and different schools of thought, which allows interpretation of ambiguous political goals. Thus, the MB was able to unify Transjordan and Palestinian communities under one “roof,” which accounts for the movement’s success. The ambiguity of the MB’s ends, as the slogan, “Islam is solution,” indicates, is the product of limited political access and state repression. Nevertheless, the ambiguity opens the opportunity to frame various grievances to provide a meaning to its members and potential supporters.

However, the support for Islamist movements does not necessarily derive from religious motives, but from the opposition to the regime. The IAF constituency is in favor of a more religious approach in politics, which does not necessarily imply the implementation of Shari’ah. In addition, people supported the IAF as its candidates seemed to be more educated. Consequently, political responsibility and less repression are supposed to fuel political disputes within the MB and factionalism. However, as the MB profited from its alignment with regime, the MB will not risk a confrontation with the regime as long as the organizational benefits outweigh the costs of political and ideological concessions.

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The Islamic Center Party is an offshoot of the MB and adheres to the MB’s moderate and non-revolutionary approach to achieve its ends. The Islamic Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat al-Islami) is committed to the democratic process, pluralism, and rights of women. Former Transjordan members of the IAF, who joined the IAF in 1992 as did many other independent Islamist candidates but rejected the increasing influence of the MB and Palestinians within the IAF, established the party in 2001.81 The Islamic Center Party emerged in the light of growing factionalism of the MB during the 1990s and disputes about political inclusion while the regime’s repression increased.82 Its foundation was an attempt to create a political alternative to the MB hegemony. In contrast to the MB’s opposition against the regime’s policy of reconciliation with Israel, the Islamic Center Party has accepted the Jordan-Israeli peace treaty as it passed in parliament. However, its initial success in the 2003 elections was short-lived as the party lacked support of Palestinian constituencies and a basis of mobilization at the grassroots level. Finally, the Islamic Center Party was perceived as being co-opted by the regime.83 However, the creation of the Islamic Center Party demonstrates that strategic considerations apart from religious motives prevailed. The Islamic Center Party embraces political opportunities but will not profit from change like the MB does, since its public resonance and organizational capabilities are weak.

A similar logic applies for the creation of the Dua’a Party in 1993 as an alternative to the MB (formerly “The Arab Islamic Democratic Movement”). Nevertheless, its political ideology did not resonate with the public as the party attempted to merge Arab-nationalist ideology with Islamic virtues. The party is committed to

81 Nawal al-Faouri, the first women who won a seat in the IAF consultative council in the late 1990s, became a key figure of the foundation of the Islamic Center Party.

82 Besides the monarchy’s policy of reconciliation with Israel, repressive laws most notably the Election Law, caused the dispute within the MB between “doves” who were still in favor of political inclusion and “hawks” who objected political inclusion as long as the regime sticks to the repressive policy and its policy with Israel. Because of this dispute, the 1997 elections were boycotted by the IAF, but also by major political parties. Nevertheless, the dispute between “doves” and “hawks” is ongoing and overshadows other political issues such as women rights.

democracy and pluralism and advocates an enlightened approach to a modern Islamic
democracy. Nevertheless, the Dua’a Party’s social and political influence is low.84

Lastly, besides moderate Islamist parties, independent Islamist candidates have
emerged in the political spectrum along with growing clientelism, as Section B will
show. The political agendas of independent candidates are not bound to strict ideologies
and remain ambiguous. Since their political survival is based on opportunistic rhetoric
and clientelism, their responsiveness to political opportunities depends on client interests
but will remain insignificant with regard to political change in Jordan.85

2. Radical Strands

Radical strands operate illegally or in a “gray zone” in order to defy state control.
Their ideology and agenda remain outside the democratic framework and the use of
violence to achieve political ends in Jordan is not clearly rejected or even a legitimate
means.

The Liberation Party splintered from the MB and was founded in 1952 in
Jerusalem by a former Muslim Brother, Shaykh Taqii al-Din al-Nabahani. The
Liberation Party shared the ends of the MB, but rejected the MB’s political
accommodation since it advocates the resurgence of an Islamic caliphate and a peaceful
overthrow of the regime in Jordan. Therefore, the Ministry of Interior denied the last
application of the Liberation Party for registration in 1992. In light of the party’s attempt
to recruit military personal of the Jordanian army and accusations that the party
participated in an attempted assassination of King Hussein in 1993, the Liberation Party
became suspicious of the monarchy as seeking to topple the regime by a military coup.
Finally, the Liberation Party has strongly opposed the MB’s alignment with the
monarchy and the MB’s commitment to democratic rules and its reformist debate about
the role of women in society. However, the MB and the Liberation Party share
ideological commonalities with regard to the implementation of Islamic order (Shari’ah).

84 Hanieh, Women & Politics: From the Perspective of Islamic Movements in Jordan, 127–130.
85 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 204; and Lust-Okar and
Zerhouni, Political Participation in the Middle East, 301.
Nevertheless, since the party is missing a strong social network and has no access to the legal political realm, its responsiveness to political opportunities and its contribution to political change is marginal in comparison to the MB.86

Movements of Islamic Nationalism, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, have not operated in Jordan to change the Jordanian political system. Nevertheless, the MB historically has maintained close ties with Hamas, which has fueled disputes within the MB between the factions of “hawks,” who insist on a close relationship with Hamas, and “doves,” who advocate a policy of disengagement in Palestine to the benefit of a policy that concentrates its efforts on domestic challenges in Jordan. Hamas, as an offshoot of the MB, was created in light of the Second Intifada in 1987 as a Palestinian resistance movement based on the MB’s ideology and social network. Radical facets of key ideologues carried more weight since Hamas operated in a highly political and hostile environment.87 However, the monarchy’s indirect acceptance of Hamas ended when King Abdullah II expelled its administration in 1999 and banned Hamas in 2006 in the aftermath of Hamas’ electoral success. Nevertheless, the influence of Hamas on the MB as its “natural ally” and on the Palestinian majority of the Jordanian population has remained since Hamas’ popularity is still high.88 Consequently, changes in Hamas’ political approach and its success in Palestine on the one hand, and the regime’s approach to Hamas on the other hand, affect the MB identity and strategic behavior.


87 Jihad against foreign occupation (“far enemy”) became a legitimate way of resistance. Nonetheless, with reference to the political agenda of the MB, Hamas is not more anti-western than the MB and has demonstrated that it is willing to play under democratic rules. However, since Hamas does not reject the use of violence, it will remain stigmatized in the radical Islamist spectrum. Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 64–65; and Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, 121–130.

In contrast to the previously mentioned political Islamist organizations, Islamist movements such as the Jamaa’ah at-Tabligh wal Da’wa (Missionary, Advocacy and calling or invocation to God group) do not aim to establish an Islamic state by political involvement. They reject political engagement since they focus on Islamic education in society. Nevertheless, they ultimately seek to shape a society that adheres to true Islam and that is governed by an Islamic caliphate under Islamic laws (Shari’ah) outside the democratic framework. Besides the MB, the Jamaa’ah at-Tabligh wal Da’wa is a well-established non-violent Islamic movement in Jordan’s society. It was founded in 1945 in India (headquartered in today’s Pakistan) by Sheikh Mohammad Ilyas Ben Isma’il al-Kandahlawi and spread to Jordan in 1964, expanding into Jordan in the 1970s. The movement has its stronghold in the poor urban regions of Jordan (e.g., Zarqa) where it competes with the Salafi movement. Thus, transitions of members of the Da’wa movement to the more conservative and radical strands of Salafism have emerged. However, the movement’s apolitical approach and a lack of resources indicate that political opportunities to achieve the movement’s ends are not important. Rather, missing political opportunities and a strong religious trend in public opinion (see Table 1) will benefit their apolitical conservative religious view since political participation does not pay.

Salafism emerged in Jordan in the 1970s, advocated by Nasr al-Din al-Albani, a Syrian scholar who ultimately moved his activities to Jordan in 1979 when the regime in Damascus cracked down on the Syrian MB. According to the Salafi movement, the understanding of the oneness of God (tawhid) and the literal meaning of the Quran is crucial to their belief. They argue that the uniqueness of God’s attributes leaves no room for human interpretation. Thus, the return to authentic Islam goes along with their ambition to practice Islam according to the early generations after the Prophet Muhammad. As the da’wa movement, the traditional strand of the Salafi movement seeks to reshape society by returning to Islamic virtues without interfering in politics.

The movement has been supported by Saudi Arabia and was even backed by the Jordanian regime during the 1990s as a counterweight against the growing importance of the MB.\footnote{Schwedler, \textit{Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen}, 203.}

The Salafi movement gained strength from major incidents such as the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the assassination of Sadat in 1981. The movement expanded and radicalized in the 1980s while some hundred “Arab Afghans,” among those Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi and Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, returned to Jordan. In light of unsuccessful struggles of Islamists against the repressive regimes in Egypt and Algeria, as well as the U.S. hegemony of the 1990s and its presence on the Arabian Peninsula, the jihadi strand of Salafism and Qutb’s doctrine of \textit{jihad} gained in importance. By the use of \textit{takfir}, jihadi Salafists targeted moderate Islamists since they were perceived as collaborators of the regimes (“near enemy”). As noted, in contrast to the educated middle class constituency of the MB (mostly Palestinian provenance), jihadi Salafists were able to recruit predominantly Transjordanians in the poorer and less educated realm of society. However, the Salafi movement in Jordan was fragmented since the Jordanian regime’s countermeasures proved effective and disputes between the two radical figureheads Maqdisi and Zarqawi occurred. However, “the split is not in thought, it is in strategy.”\footnote{Wiktorowicz, \textit{The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan}, 127–128; Hanieh, \textit{Women & Politics: From the Perspective of Islamic Movements in Jordan}, 49–63; and Ayoob, \textit{The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World}, 142–150.}

Nonetheless, the traditional strand of Salafism by far dominates the movement. But, its dogmatic world view stands in contrast to the pragmatic approach of the MB, which enables the incorporation of multiple identities and opens the door for interpretation of an Islamic approach to political challenges. Moreover, since applications by the Salafi movement to create further official structures such as the Quran and the Sunna Society were rejected by the Ministry of Culture, the movement was

\footnote{The assassination of a U.S. Aid official Laurence Foley in 2002, attempted attacks on Jordanian ministries, the U.S. embassy and U.S. vessel in the port of Aqaba, as well as the devastating hotel bombings in Amman in 2005 are the recent examples of their terrorist activities in Jordan. Maqdisi moderated his radical ideas (imprisonment in the 1990s). He has argued against the use of \textit{takfir} and indiscriminate terrorist violence. Rumman and Hanieh, \textit{The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordan After Zarqawi: Identity, Leadership Crisis and Obscured Vision}, 143.}
forced to create an informal network based on personal ties to defy state control. Whereas their network to accumulate resources is relatively weak in comparison to the MB, the Salafi ideology successfully competes with the MB and the Da’wa movement in mosques and private realms, as well as in religious scholarly publications. Thus, the Salafi movement has gained many sympathizers among the members of established Islamist movements of which many have converted to Salafism. Since an alignment with the regime’s policy and political participation does not pay, Salafism is gaining support among conservative strands in society. Consequently, Salafism has become the most popular mainstream movement besides the MB. In contrast to the MB, the Salafi movement does not benefit from political opportunities. Repression in conjunction with a pro-western policy resonates with their belief that any accommodation with the *kufr* regime is *haram* (forbidden). In accordance with Qutb’s ideology, *jihad* against collaborators and the regime is legitimate.

Finally, the rise of Hamas and the growing importance of Salafism in Jordan influence the MB strategic choice against the background of the MB accommodative relationship with the regime and its gradual non-violent approach to achieve its ends. The MB behaves according to strategic decisions in order to play by the rules of the regime. The MB gained an exceptional status in the political and social realm with regard to its network and its ideology, since the MB embraces emerging political opportunities from an organizational and ideological point of view. The question is whether political opportunities are likely to emerge and how the MB is able to take advantage of them to challenge the status quo.

B. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

1. Political Access

Political access for Islamist movements is not closed, but is highly constrained by the regime’s laws. The Election Law has proven to be an effective tool with which to

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manipulate the political process in order to maintain the regime’s security by a strong pro-regime constituency in parliament. Moreover, the regime’s political engineering has undermined the public trust in political representation and prevents political competition, which is supposed to radicalize political agendas, as moderation does not pay.93

“King Abdullah II has made it clear that progress toward democracy, pluralism, economic prosperity and freedom of expression, speech and thought in Jordan is an irreversible process.”94 However, democratic progress is lagging behind Jordan’s economic reform agenda. Elections in Jordan have become one element of Jordan’s democratic façade and survival strategy. Several adjustments of the Election Law have maintained an overrepresentation of independent loyal Transjordan candidates to contain Islamist movements from gaining political influence. Thus, the regime’s “political engineering” implemented political patron-client ties between the monarchy and its loyal Transjordan constituencies at the cost of the Palestinian population.95

Major adjustments of the Election Law started in 1985 after the success of Islamist candidates in the “By-elections” in 1984. The new Election Law caused a disproportionately low representation of the Palestinian population, in particular in refugee camps, in the East and West Bank, and urban areas with a significantly high Palestinian population, in relation to Bedouin tribal dominated rural areas. In addition,
the size of electoral districts shrank and the number of their seats was cut. The regime rationale behind this manipulation was to urge the electorate to vote based on kinship rather than ideology.96

However, the regime’s manipulation failed in the elections in 1989. The voting system “first past the post, multiple vote” allowed accumulation or distribution of votes. Instead of loyal constituencies in the East Bank and rural regions, oppositional political organizations (parties were not allowed yet) such as the Islamists and the leftists won the majority of the seats. Nevertheless, in the legislative periods that followed until 1993, the government and the prerogatives of the King prevented the designation of an Islamist Prime Minister and major Islamist objectives.97

The regime’s lessons learned in the 1989 elections led to further adjustments of the Election Law in preparation for the next legislative period in 1993. A new voting system “one person, one vote” was implemented for the same reason as in 1985. In contrast to the elections in 1989, leftist and Islamist parties lost a significant number of seats, whereas loyal candidates took over the majority in parliament.98 However, the parliamentary elections in 1993 confirmed the initial success of Islamist organizations in 1989. Islamists won more seats in parliament than expected. First and foremost, the MB was able to mobilize their constituency in the urban cities because of their widely respected reputation and their well organized structures. Moreover, the elections in 1993 also showed the strength of the MB to incorporate Palestinian and Transjordan Islamists. For many Palestinians and Transjordanians the MB remained the last honest political broker in Jordan after the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the Jordanian-Israeli policy of reconciliation.99 However, along with the rise of Hamas in Gaza, as well as its popularity in the region and close relationship with the MB, the appeal of the MB to Palestinians is potentially higher than to Transjordanians who in contrast to Palestinians predominantly

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 254–257.
vote according to tribal ties. Nonetheless, when nationwide municipal elections were held in 1995, for the first time in Jordan’s history, the “weight distribution” shifted to the rural Transjordan population.

Consequently, the political influence in parliament of Islamist organizations diminished significantly. The regime’s policy of political containment of Islamist movements and privileging its loyal constituency has created a fragmented political realm shaped by clientelism. In this context, the political decline of the IAF since 1989 is striking, as the IAF is still the best-organized political force in Jordan and the last remaining party besides independent candidates in the current parliament after the elections of 2007. As recent opinion polls show, the majority of the Jordanian population does not trust in democratic representation and institutions to be able to handle Jordan’s security concerns, as well as unemployment, poverty, and corruption. With reference to the latest opinion polls, only five percent of the respondents believe that existing political parties represent their demands. The trend of declining public political interest has also affected the decreasing public resonance of the MB. Nonetheless, King Abdullah’s reform agenda aims to reshape the political environment

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100 Nevertheless, there are multiple Palestinian identities. The MB attracts first and foremost the middle class but also “refugee camp dwellers” on the one hand, and successful Palestinian businessmen on the other. By contrast, Transjordanians pledge allegiance to their tribes as their voting behavior in elections such as in 1993 and recently in 2007 showed. Michael D. H. Robbins, "What Accounts for the Success of Islamist Parties in the Arab World?" Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, http://www.dsg.ae/LinkClick.aspx?link=WP10-01.pdf&tabid=308&mid=826 (accessed January 2010); and Laurie A. Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 48–49.


103 Seats gained by the IAF in Parliamentary Elections since 1989: (1) 1989: 22 out of 80 seats; (2) 1993: 16 out of 80 seats; (3) 1997: boycott; (4) 2003: 17 out of 110 seats; and (5) 2007: 6 out of 110 seats.

104 “The IAF was more representative of citizens’ political, social, and economic aspirations than any other Jordanian political party, as indicated by 3.7% of respondents in this poll compared with… 14.7% of respondents in the 2003 poll… after the parliamentary elections held on June 17, 2003.” Dr Fares Braizat, "Opinion Poll: Democracy in Jordan 2008," Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, http://www.css-jordan.org (accessed February 12, 2010).

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by encouraging the formation of stable political parties, but under the control of the regime in accordance with the new Political Parties Law of 2007.  

Collectively, political opportunities for Islamist movements in Jordan will not occur on the basis of changes of political access in the near future. While political access for Islamist movements in not closed, the Election Law and a fragmented political spectrum shaped by weak parties and clientelism undermines the political prospects of Islamist movements and promotes an apolitical society. This trend might result in the MB’s withdrawal from the political tribune while focusing on its services and charity to maintain its organizational power in the social realm.

2. State Repression

Jordan’s propensity and capacity to repress in order to stay in power is omnipresent, but not as blunt as its neighbors Syria or Saudi Arabia demonstrate. The Jordanian regime maintains control over society mainly through the implementation of bureaucratic regulations. Thus, the most serious challenge for the regime’s policy of social control is that groups are acting outside the frame of regulations and surveillance. Consequently, grassroots activities are channeled in the bureaucratic state apparatus while activism outside the administrative frame is repressed by the mukhabarat (intelligence agency).  

Needless to say, political discussion and action is limited to political parties. With reference to growing Islamist networks, Jordan has developed a

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106 For instance, the ministry of interior regulates political parties, unions, and professional organizations; the ministry of culture regulates all voluntary cultural organizations, ministry of social development regulates all charitable organizations. Thus, NGOs must fall under the category of the appropriate ministry (e.g. culture) while the provision of different charities outside the bureaucratic frame is prohibited. Robinson, Defensive Democratization in Jordan, 387.
semi-state level of institutions to control charity activities. Consequently, the euphoria of political change in 1989 was short lived. As the numbers of NGOs between 1985 and 1989 skyrocketed, “defensive” means of the regime were adapted or reinforced.

In addition, patrimonial structures in the security apparatus and the military, in conjunction with coercive capabilities, manifest the strong will of the authoritarian regime to stay in power. Thus, it is striking that military expenditures increased even during economic crises. Jordan’s coup-proofed military is the backbone of the regime. While it is too weak to deter major threats from outside Jordan’s borders, it has been effective against domestic uprising, such as the riots in 1989 in Ma’an and in 1996 in Karak showed.

Repression against regime critics is supposed to alter the cost-benefit rational of social movements, whereas its absence might open a window of opportunity and foster contention. However, besides the last political opening in 1989, repression has remained

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107 The MB’S network of charity, which comprised in 1997/1998 forty-one education facilities, two hospitals and fifteen medical centers housing, thirty-two medical clinics and eleven laboratories, six centers of income generation and training, and thirty-three centers to support orphans and poor families is subordinated by law to the General Union of Voluntary Societies (GUVS) which is a stately controlled umbrella organization of all NGO’s in Jordan. The GUVS is also the primary recipient of international aid such as U.S. Aid.

108 The number of NGOs increased to 67 percent as well as charity organizations and cultural societies to 271 percent.

109 Law 60 of public meeting of 1953 limits collective action. Registered groups have to apply at least forty-eight hours in advance, signed by fifty “well-known” individuals, which are not objectionable to the regime. The governor approves if security is not threatened. Law 33 of societies and social organizations of 1966 limits the provision of social services. Social services have to be without any intention of financial gains or any other personal gains, including political gains. It restricts external support as donations and transgression between social and political affairs. Law 32 of 1992 restricts “The use of the premises, instrumentalities, and assets of associations, charitable organizations, and clubs for the benefit of any partisan organization.” Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan," Comparative Politics 33, no. 1 (2000): 33–36.


on a high level without periods of substantial liberalization (see Figure 3). It is noteworthy that less than fifty percent of the population in 2008 perceived that the state guarantees means of collective action such as demonstrations or sit-ins. Nevertheless, instead of deterrence, repression might backfire as it creates a “repressive paradox.” On the one hand, repression can increase a movement’s commitment to achieve its political aims as well as the solidarity and identity within a movement. On the other hand, emerging debates about how to respond might fuel differences between factions of a movement and lead to splintering groups and violence. Furthermore, as repression continuous, Islamists, who are objectionable to the regime, will attempt to defy state control by informal networks. Consequentially, a radicalization of Islamist movements threatens the incumbents of the regime and moderate strands alike. Nevertheless, the regime has been successful in containing the emergence of strong radical movements.

The case of Layth al-Shubaylat, a formerly independent member of the Jordanian Parliament who investigated corruption of the government after his election in 1989, sheds light on the effects of repression on Islamist movements. The detainment and publicized trial was a clear sign for every political Islamist who does not obey the “rules of the game.” Although Layth al-Shubaylat was not affiliated to the MB, debates within the MB about a cooperative relationship with the regime between the camp, which tend to be loyal to the regime (mainly East Bankers) and the camp, which criticizes the regime’s policy (mainly Palestinians), were fueled. Moreover, as the repression since 1993 has continued, factionalism and a radicalization of Islamist movements is likely, as

the recent election of the prominent “hawk” Hamam Sa’id as the General Guide of the MB indicates. Nevertheless, the MB counterbalanced this impression as the MB’s Shura Council elected Abd al-Latif Arabiyat, who belongs to the moderate camp.

Jordan’s political stability and the regime’s security depend on its complex neighborhood, primarily with regard to the Palestine cause and the development in Iraq since 2003. Jordan strongly supports the Saudi-Arabian initiative for a two-state solution in Palestine as Jordan confronts the scenario of becoming the hosting nation of Palestinians while losing its Transjordan heritage (“Jordanian Solution”). Thus, Jordan hopes that its alliance with the West and its commitment to the reconciliation with Israel will pay as Jordan expects that the West, foremost the U.S., is pushing Israel to make concessions in the Palestinian cause. However, the Palestinian population will remain dominant even if the Palestine-Israeli peace process is successful.

Besides the Palestine cause, Jordan confronts an unstable development in Iraq, which already led to half a million refugees in Jordan and an increase in jihadi Salafist terrorist attacks. Jordan’s former policy of cooperation with Iraq was driven by Jordan’s dependency on Iraqi oil and its military weakness in the light of an aggressive Iraqi foreign policy. Jordan’s cooperation with Iraq also aimed to counterbalance Syria, which vehemently rejects Jordan’s pro-western stance and, therefore, has been willing to take advantage of Jordan’s moments of weakness in the past. However, Jordan’s pro-Iraq policy was adjusted beginning in the mid-1990s in light of Jordan’s economic downturn and the suspension of foreign aid from the West and the Gulf. King Hussein’s rapprochement to the West peaked in King Abdullah’s support of the unpopular U.S.

policy in Iraq. Jordan provided logistical support during the Iraq War in 2003 and has trained Iraqi security forces in Jordan since then.121

Figure 3. Guaranteed Public Freedoms [%] in Jordan from 1996 to 2008122

Figure 3 shows a correlation between perceived liberties and major external political “shocks” drawing from opinion polls. Jordan’s policy of reconciliation with Israel in the early 1990s and its rapprochement with the former anti-Iraq coalition since 1994, in particular because of economic reasons and foreign aid, was a focal point of public and political criticism in Jordan. The regime’s approach of preemptive repression shaped the remaining years of the era King Hussein (until 1999).123 The first major setback of civil liberties beginning in 2000 corresponds with a failing Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the Second Intifada, Jordan’s support of the U.S. in the War on Terror, and the preparation of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.124 Parliament was suspended between 2001 and 2003 and the elections of 2001 postponed. The new monarch was concerned about the effects of his foreign policy on the behavior of the electorate. As the elections

"the Political Economy of Regime Security*, 263–266.
in the past showed, a fair election law might shift the power in parliament from the tribal Transjordan constituency to the Palestinian population in Jordan.\textsuperscript{125} The averaged perceived civil liberties and freedom of the press decreased significantly (about ten percent) between King Abdullah’s accession to the throne in 1999 and 2001. The rise of Hamas in 2006 and emerging violence in Gaza, as well as the regime’s restrictions in preparation for elections in 2007, marked the next setback of civil liberties. Furthermore, the respondents of these opinion polls also assessed foreign issues as being responsible for this development. They acknowledged that Jordan’s security concerns do not allow for rapid political change.\textsuperscript{126}

Consequently, Jordan’s hostile neighborhood and its pro-western policy is a constraint for liberalism in Jordan. Western interests and policy in Jordan’s neighborhood impinge on liberalization in Jordan. Thus, since the public acknowledges Jordan’s security concerns and “red lines” are well known and as state repression is discriminate, people tend to accept reduced civil liberties and to refuse action against the regime. Thus, opposition to the regime is constrained since the majority might not see it as legitimate. However, windows of opportunity might derive from changes of the balance of power of elites and new influential allies as the next section explores.

3. Elites and Alliances

King Abdullah inherited a stable elite structure without major rifts and alliances, which could threaten the power of the King. Although major changes in the elite structure were expected with regard to a more liberal policy, Abdullah’s reshuffling of his

\textsuperscript{125} During the suspension of the parliament, 211 provisional laws and amendment were issued. Julia Choucair-Vizoso, "Illusive Reform: Jordan's Stubborn Stability," in Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World, eds. Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 53.

\textsuperscript{126} Braizat, Opinion Poll: Democracy in Jordan 2008.
circles of elites gave evidence for continuity rather than change as major security concerns occurred in the aftermath of the al-Aqsa Intifada, as well as with regard to Jordan’s pro-U.S. policy in Iraq.\textsuperscript{127}

King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999 without an established “coterie” that pledged allegiance to him as he was designated only days before King Hussein’s death. Although the royal far-reaching prerogatives aim to put the Jordanian monarch in a position of uncontested rule, the politically inexperienced Abdullah faced the challenge of shaping a loyal elite structure to maintain the security of his reign. Moreover, as changes at the top of a state are supposed to lead to rifts in the balance of power, windows of opportunity might occur for the rise of new elites and for new alliances. Therefore, Islamist movements might benefit from contention in the elite structure if they are able to project their influence in the inner circles of the King or even challenge the power of the monarchy in cooperation with influential allies. Vice versa, elites might reach out for strong movements to support their case by assuming the public tribune.\textsuperscript{128}

The rise of new elites or changes of elite positions (of the first and second circles in Figure 4) challenges the balance of power and threatens the stability of the elite structure and the King’s ability to control the behavior of elites. Thus, conflicts between elites are resolved by removing them from their positions.\textsuperscript{129} Moreover, elites fall from favor as “red lines” are crossed, as the dismissals of the heads of the General Intelligence Department (GID), Samih Battiki in 2000 and Mohammed Dahabi in 2008 showed.\textsuperscript{130}


\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 35; Tarrow, \textit{Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics}, 79–80.

\textsuperscript{129} After harsh public criticism of the head of the GID, Battikhi, by the director of the Center of Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan in Amman, Mustafa Hamarnah, both were ultimately demoted to other posts. Harmarnah was nominated to the board of a committee for the privatization of the Jordanian media, while Battikhi was appointed to the Senate. Bank and Schlumberger, \textit{Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform}, 40.

\textsuperscript{130} Samih Battiki opposed the prime minister, which gave evidence for his increased power. The Palestinian Mohammed Dahabi was suspected of a pro-Hamas approach. Vogt, \textit{Der Gaza Krieg und seine Folgen: Realpolitik in einer verunsicherten Nachbarschaft}, 9–12; and Bank and Schlumberger, \textit{Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform}, 39–40.
The King’s policy of choosing and reshuffling elites has a long tradition in Jordan and has two major effects. First, it secures the King’s base of power by maintaining patrimonial dependencies and, therefore, limits the power of elites. Second, it channels the political will of the King into the bureaucracy, which operates along the regime’s guidelines.

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**Figure 4.** Concentric Circles of Jordanian Elites 2002

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131 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are on the payroll of the state such as the Queen Noor Foundation and/or infiltrated with loyal representatives of the regime. This figure was developed based on Figure 2.1 in Bank and Schlumberger, *Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform*, 46.
However, institutions do not have a fixed position within the elite structure. Thus, with regard to the first two concentric circles of elites, the King appoints and dismisses elites depending on personal ties and loyalty. Whereas elites of the first circle directly contribute to the decision making on the strategic level, elites of the second circle influence these decisions as far as their area of responsibility is concerned. By contrast, elites of the third circle predominantly draw their legitimacy from their popularity and might have a voice within the limits the regime sets.132

As Jordan’s hostile neighborhood and internal security in the past has shown, security issues have dominated Jordanian politics ever since. Moreover, given the nature of Jordan’s “hybrid” regime, the sources for recruiting elites are the security services, the police, and the military. In addition, the senate, which members are appointed by the King, provides a “pool” of political elites of the first circle (political advisors). Besides the importance of the Prime Minister for the conduct of the regime’s policy, the speaker of the senate communicates the political will of the King to the lower house as a directive for the rubber stamp process.133

By contrast, the public will has no access to the inner circles of the King. Members of the lower house, which are directly elected, accede only the third circle. Needless to say, elites from the political opposition or the critical public, who, however, acknowledge the legitimacy of the monarchy, do not accede the first two circles of the King. From the perspective of the King, elites of the third circle cannot be fully controlled such as the IAF and professional associations, which proved to be the strongest legal oppositions to the regime’s policy (in particular after the policy of reconciliation with Israel in the 1990s). Nevertheless, popular journalists such as Fahd al-Fanek, who writes for the Jordan Times and the Lebanese Daily Star and favors a pro-Transjordan stance, belong to the third circle as important brokers of the monarchy’s opinion. Therefore, the third circle functions as a buffer zone of the King’s first two circles and vice versa influences opposing bottom-up trends.134 Moreover, it is striking that the

132 Bank and Schlumberger, Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform, 36–37, 43–44.
133 Ibid., 37–39, 44–47.
134 Ibid., 47–49.
ulema (clergy) as traditional elite in Islamic states is pushed back to the third circle. While this is a clear sign to limit the power of the ulema, it also reflects the monarch’s religious self-confidence as belonging to the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Muhammad.

Consequently, the architecture of the elite structures has not substantially changed after Abdullah’s succession. However, besides the “traditional” elites, business elites gained access to all circles in the light of Abdullah’s remarkable economic reform agenda and improved macroeconomic conditions. Nevertheless, the King’s pursuit of economic reform is a response to the economic and fiscal pressure on Jordan but also an attempt to dominate the debate about Jordan’s path to a “modern” Islamic state. The King’s agenda is framed in a narrative, which aims to maintain western trust in the Jordanian regime and to draw the public awareness to domestic (economic) challenges while the regime’s pro-western policy is increasingly unpopular.

The Economic Consultative Council (ECC) became the driving force for the creation and implementation of the King’s reform agenda. Consequently, the ECC became a new source for recruiting elites, which belong to the same privileged western educated generation of Abdullah, believing in economic liberalism. In addition, besides these patterns of elite recruitment, families of wealthy Palestinian provenance (al-Masri) or of a traditional tribal Transjordan heritage (al Sha’ir) receive lucrative posts within the circles of elites. Members of privileged families, which were able to attract Abdullah’s attention, became important brokers of the King’s reform agenda against conservative elites from the security apparatus or the political realm. Thus, the ECC, which is not only responsible for the conduct Jordan’s economic agenda but expanded to realms such as

135 With reference to a World Bank Study on 20 countries in the Middle East in 2009, Jordan was assessed as the country which conducted the highest number of economic reforms. Privatization of state owned companies, foreign investment, especially from the U.S. and EU as well as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, has increased significantly. Domestic consumption, demand in the building industry (caused by massive immigration since the Iraq War began in 2003), and foreign trade have all increased considerably. Despite the ongoing crisis of the world economy, Jordanian annual economic growth has averaged six percent since 2007. World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, "Doing Business in the Arab World 2010: Comparing Regulations in 20 Countries," The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/FullReport/2010/DB10_ArabWorld.pdf (accessed February 12, 2010).

educational, administrative and institutional reforms as well as legislation, became the reform motor and a “hoard” for handpicked elites of the King.137

Finally, the King’s reshuffling of the elite structures has been successful.138 A top-down approach of further liberalization that favors Islamist movements is not likely since rifts within the “power map” of the King have not occurred. Neither the “old” elites nor the elites from the business sector are inclined to embrace Islamist movements. Whereas new business elites of the inner circle of the King are supposed to prevent economic deliberalization, they are concerned about political transitions that threaten the business climate, in particular with regard to the negative image of Islamists in the West. Potential allies for the social movement sector are pushed back to the third circle, which lacks the power to significantly influence the decision-making process or even to challenge the power of the King.139 Therefore, alliances between elites in opposition to the regime are more likely to emerge within the third circle among likeminded elites, as cross partisan coalitions in opposition to the regime’s policy of reconciliation with Israel in the 1990s showed.140

Collectively, the political opportunity structure in Jordan is less likely to open windows of opportunity “top-down” as the restricted political access, the sophisticated pattern of repression, and the stable “power map” show. Therefore, the next section explores political opportunities for Islamist movements, which derive from trends of public opinion with regard to Jordan’s political system and Jordan’s struggle for identity along with social changes.

4. **Struggle for Identity and Democracy**

Jordan is divided with regard to its identity and its public opinion about a political system, which is most appropriate to handle the current political, economic, and social challenges. In addition to the Transjordan-Palestine divide, rifts in society occurred as clientelism increased along with social changes inflicted by the state’s retreat from social welfare. With regard to social and religious demands of the public, Islamist movements are predestined to bridge rifts in Jordan’s society by providing solidarity and identity.

Jordan’s Transjordan heritage is becoming contested as the Palestinian influence has been growing. Patrimonial structures have been a cornerstone of the regime’s security since Transjordanians dominate the security apparatus and the military, which is the biggest employer in Jordan.  

Thus, according to Jordanian “traditions” the Transjordan population tends to be loyal to the regime in exchange for privileges in the public sector and social services, whereas the Palestinian population has developed a more independent stance in the private economy. Hence, the regime’s policy of economic and social adjustment in accordance with Jordan’s agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) disproportionately affects the loyal Transjordan

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142 The Palestinian population has increased significantly in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967 and not least because of a higher birth rate.
communities. Therefore, the lasting economic pressure on the regime might again lead to a phase of political opening in response to growing protests against the regime as in 1989.\textsuperscript{143}

Consequently, to the extent that “neo-liberal economic policies removed a key source of welfare,” they could be leading to more opposition to the regime.\textsuperscript{144} In this context, the regime’s downsizing social welfare provides an opportunity for Islamist movements to link empirical credibility of social injustice with its just motives and goals by providing social welfare and solidarity. Accordingly, Islamist movements are able to increase resources and recruitment along with an expansion of their networks as the case of Hizballah has shown.\textsuperscript{145} Nevertheless, as noted, acknowledging Jordan’s successful macroeconomic situation in comparison to other states in the region, and generous western aid, social cleavages could be even more significant.

Patron-client ties also affect the political system in Jordan as several adjustments of the Election Law in order to maintain a strong loyal Transjordan majority in


\textsuperscript{144} Baylouny, \textit{Militarizing Welfare: Neo-Liberalism and Jordanian Policy}, 278.

Parliament show. In this context, Lust-Okar’s research on clientelism in Jordan highlights that the Transjordan population, which dominates the rural areas, tends to vote for independent Transjordan candidates according to tribal ties. Nonetheless, Palestinians who predominantly live in the urban areas of Jordan primarily support candidates from their district since they mistrust the effectiveness of political parties as the Transjordanians do. However, turnouts in urban Palestinian districts are lower than in the rural Transjordan areas. The voting behavior of the Palestinians follows the motto “nothing to win” whereas the Transjordanians fear “something to lose.” Consequently, the King’s ability to redistribute patronage and manage political participation to prevent Islamists from gaining influence seems to be successful at first glance. Nevertheless, the regime’s policy has fostered clientelism along with a reduction of social welfare, which hampers the emergence of civil society and of lasting political parties. The regime is caught by the “dictator’s dilemma,” since weak and fragmentized political and social realms are also less favorable for the security of the regime while institutions to mitigate demands from below are missing. Moreover, the regime is the main visible actor and therefore the main target of criticism while liberalization falls short. Thus, repression remains as the only alternative to liberalization, which threatens the status quo.

However, with regard to the resurgence of Islam in the entire region since the 1970s and in the light of corruption, unemployment and poverty as well as foreign policy


147 In contrast to only 19.3 percent of Palestinians, 56.8 percent of Transjordanians are affiliated to vote in accordance with their tribal ties. Michael D. H. Robbins, "What Accounts for the Success of Islamist Parties in the Arab World?" Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, http://www.dsg.ae/LinkClick.aspx?link=WP10-01.pdf&tabid=308&mid=826 (accessed January 2010).

148 Lust-Okar and Zerhouni, Political Participation in the Middle East, 75–95.


concerns, Palestinians and Transjordanians are supposed to share common interests. Nevertheless, nationalist strands, particularly within the Transjordan community, have attempted to exploit the fear that Jordan might lose its Transjordan heritage. In this context, the Palestinians dominance in the economic sector and the “Palestinian cause” is of main concern as the regime’s campaign for national unity “Jordan First” in 2002 against an increasing Palestinian influence shows.\textsuperscript{151} However, as a comparative study of the success of Islamist parties in the Middle East highlights, political power will be assumed by those political parties which are able to bridge the identity-based divisions and clientelism in order to challenge elites and established institutions.\textsuperscript{152} Thus, the identity of the Islamist movement, as the next chapter explores, has to be flexible enough to incorporate different identities as well as tribal, clan, and family ties.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{151} Clark, \textit{The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan}, 546; Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso, \textit{Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World}, 54; Perthes, \textit{Geheime Gärten}, 315–316. See also different scenarios of the Palestinian cause as (1) the “drift scenario” which assumes the continuation of the status quo in Palestine (no statehood) without any changes in the current Palestine-Jordan relations; (2) the “functional scenario” which is similar as the “drift scenario,” but with functional Palestine sovereignty in Gaza and the West Bank with a close cooperation between Jordan and Palestine; (3) the “separation scenario” relying on a sovereign Palestine state clearly separated from Jordan; and (4) the “cooperation scenario” which could lead into a federation of Palestine and Jordan (also called the “Jordan Option” which is strongly refused by the monarchy) or into a close cooperation between two states. Mustafa Hamarneh, Rosemary Hollis and Khalil Shikaki, \textit{Jordanian-Palestinian Relations: Where to? Four Scenarios for the Future} (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 129.

\textsuperscript{152} Robbins, \textit{What Accounts for the Success of Islamist Parties in the Arab World?}, 38.

\textsuperscript{153} As the MB in Egypt and Hezbollah’s identity show, religious movements are able to bind different identities with different levels of commitment to the movement. Munson, \textit{Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood}, 494, 499; and Harik, \textit{Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon’s Hizballah}, 49–62.
Domestic issues of main concern | Corruption | Poverty | Unemployment
---|---|---|---
A parliamentary system in which only Islamist parties compete in parliamentary elections | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 7 | 8 |
A political system ruled by a strong authority that makes decisions without considering election results or opposition opinions | 5 | 14 | 7 | 15 | 7 | 15 |
A system governed by Islamic Shari’ah without elections or political parties | 30 | 28 | 31 | 28 | 29 | 28 |
Multiparty Parliamentary Democracy (nationalist, leftist, rightist and Islamist) | 44 | 38 | 38 | 33 | 41 | 35 |
None of these systems | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
Don’t know | 15 | 8 | 16 | 9 | 15 | 9 |

Table 1. Public Opinion Poll about Political Systems in Jordan\textsuperscript{154}

Moreover, besides the rifts in Jordan’s identity, the public opinion to the question of what political system is best suited to solve the present domestic challenges in Jordan is divided (Table 1). The respondents are less in favor of a democratic system of western provenance as western rhetoric assumes. The second largest group of respondents, close behind the democratic camp (yellow row), favored the implementation of Shari’ah without elections and political parties as the best political system for Jordan (green row). Despite an increase of six percent since 2007, every second respondent dismissed a democratic system in Jordan. However, since the regime’s policy of deliberalization along with a growing social injustice and corruption has been branded democratic by western rhetoric, a majority of Jordanians will not embrace this kind of democracy. Nonetheless, this trend in public opinion offers political opportunities for Islamist movements to attract a majority of the Jordanian public by bridging these two camps and linking the implementation of Shari’ah in a democratic multiparty system.

In addition, as the public opinion about the government’s performance shows, public criticism does not focus on the King but on the government. The dissolving of the government and the parliament in November 2009 by the King, and his call for new parliamentary elections by the end of 2010, were reasoned by the government’s bad

performance and the public discontent regarding the implementation of necessary reforms as clientelism has increased in parliament. Nevertheless, while the King aims to push Jordan’s economic modernization the public fears economic and social consequences.\textsuperscript{155} Whereas the King of Jordan remains in a sacrosanct position, the government has to play the role of the “scapegoat.” This dual “game” has successfully channeled pressure from below to the government and secured the monarchy’s almost unchallenged position. Therefore, opposition to the regime is limited as the public acknowledges Jordan’s hostile neighborhood and public criticism does not focus on the King despite his political responsibility and his far-reaching prerogatives. Thus, as Goodwin puts it, “…people do not tend to join or support revolutionary movements when they believe that the central state has little if anything to do with their everyday problems, however severe those problems may be.”\textsuperscript{156}

Finally, Islamist movements are predestined to respond to the public concerns (e.g., corruption and poverty) as they provide the message of solidarity and social justices. It is widely perceived that religious piety is immune to selfish and corrupt behavior. In contrast to the previous factors that prevent political opportunities to emerge top-down, political opportunities might emerge if Islamist movements are able to bridge Jordan’s divided identity and clientelism as well as antagonistic political views. This bridge can be built based on a broad and flexible identity of the movement as the MB provides it most successfully. Nevertheless, clientelism in Jordan and in many countries in the Middle East has a long tradition and is not likely to change in the short-term in light of stalled democratization and repression along with declining social welfare.

C. CONCLUSION

The ideologies of different Islamist movements in Jordan have common roots, but their identities have changed significantly. A wide spectrum of ideologies exists, which


range from a non-violent gradual political approach, which enables Islamic interpretation over an apolitical religious ideology, to a rigid ideology of jihad against kufir regimes and Muslim collaborators. Finally, religious ideology is a necessary amplifier of preexisting political and social grievances, but it fails to explain the strategic decisions of Islamist movements to compete against each other by playing to the regime’s rules.

The MB dominates the Islamist spectrum from an organizational and ideological point of view and has the potential to challenge the regime’s power effectively. Its responsiveness to political opportunities is high as its identity is able to bridge clientelism, rifts within Jordan’s identity, and antagonistic political views in contrast to the rigid worldview of its major competitor the Salafi movement, which excludes the majority of the Jordanian population. Besides the MB, the moderate spectrum is weak since it has lacked support at the grassroots level and has missed achieving lasting political influence. In contrast to the moderate strands of Islamism, the fragmented radical spectrum has grown in strength. However, radical movements are not able to accumulate resources through their networks in Jordan as the MB could since the pressure of the security apparatus is high. Therefore, radical Islamism in Jordan is not likely to assume the predominance in the Islamist spectrum as long as the regime does not indiscriminately repress moderate strands.157

Changes within Jordan’s Islamist spectrum create opportunities for the emergence of new Islamist movements and forces established movements to make strategic decisions. Besides disputes with regard to crucial Islamic beliefs such as tawhid or jihad, a process of political opening will increase the pressure on movements to debate their political approaches. If repression decreases, Islamist movements have to adjust their focus from opposition to the regime to solving political challenges and prepare for taking over political responsibility while Islamist political “gray-zones” dissolve. This process

157 See relationship between the factors of repression with regard to timing and targeting versus inclusion of Islamist movements in Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, 203–205.
is supposed to cause political contention and factionalism within the Islamist spectrum in 
general, and within larger movements as the MB in particular as political opportunities 
emerge.

However, political opportunities “top-down” are not likely to occur. Major 
political and economic “shocks” from outside the country and domestic political and 
social changes were effectively countered by limited political access and repression. 
Jordan’s “power map” was not substantially redrawn after King Abdullah ascended the 
throne in 1999. Elites from the security apparatus and the military, as well as from the 
political realm, still dominated the inner circles of the King. Nevertheless, a new elite 
segment has occurred as Abdullah has followed an approach of “more business as 
usual.”158 Neither the old elites nor the new business elites embrace an increasing 
political significance of Islamist movements. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that major economic and political changes, which led to a short-lived political opening 
between 1989 and 1993, might not challenge the regime’s power in the future and trigger 
political contention. Nevertheless, Jordan has survived major political and economic 
shocks since this period of political opening as Chapter IV elaborates in detail.

The regime’s retreat from social welfare, along with economic reforms, opened a 
window of opportunity for Islamist movements to link empirical credibility of social 
injustice with the just motives and goals of the movements and to expand their 
networks.159 Islamist movements are supposed to be successful if their ideology is 
capable of bridging clientelism and rifts between the Palestinian and Transjordan 
identities as well as competing views with regard to Jordan’s political system since 
western democracy is by far not “the only game in town.”160

Moreover, the regime is defensive with regard to its dependence on the West, its 
increasing challenges in the economic and social realms, as well as corruption and

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160 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), 5; and Munson, *Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood*, 494, 499.
unemployment. However, many Jordanians have acknowledged Jordan’s successful stance in the international arena in contrast to other authoritarian Arab countries in the Middle East. In addition, King Abdullah has sought to address the religious concerns of many Jordanians in his Amman Message, as well as economic decisions of symbolic importance such as the promotion of Islamic banks in the financial sector. However, the King faces the “dictator’s dilemma,” while a transition to participatory politics is the remaining exit strategy, which necessarily incorporates the inclusion of Islamist movements.

Finally, this chapter shows that “what matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives.” Since no alternative strong secular movements are on the rise, moderate Islamist movements cannot be ignored. This begs the question: are Islamist organizations preferable? Since the MB is the most promising movement in opposition to the regime, the next chapter focuses on the political inclusion of the MB and its contribution to Jordan’s path to democracy.

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III. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: POLITICAL INCLUSION OF THE MB

The previous chapter examined the factors that shape strategic behavior of Islamist movements and highlighted the MB’s outstanding responsiveness to potential political opportunities from an organizational and ideational point of view. In addition, the MB assumed a special relationship with the Hashemite monarchy based on a commonality of interests that has served both sides spanning decades. The MB expanded in the social and political realms, whereas the Hashemite monarchy was able to achieve two objectives: (1) creating a counterweight to radical pan-Arab nationalism, and later, radical Islamism; and (2) since 1989, legitimizing the monarchy by controlled political liberalization and cooptation of a major political force in the country. However, as the previous chapter showed, liberalism and political access have decreased, since the mid-1990s while the pro-western policy of the monarchy under the reign of King Abdullah II has increased significantly.

This context raises three questions: (1) Has the accommodative relationship between the monarchy and the MB reached its limits or can it continue indefinitely? (2) Is the MB on a path to radicalization in light of repression and limited political access? (3) Does a substantial inclusion of the MB in the Jordanian polity bode well for democratizing Jordan, or will it harm the process of democratic progress?

This chapter explores the significance of the special relationship and its effects on the MB’s behavior from an organizational and ideational perspective, drawing from three phases. First, this thesis examines the rise of the MB between its foundation in 1945 and its major political success in 1989. This era shows the benefits of the special relationship for both sides. The MB backed the regime in many instances for strategic reasons rather than ideology. Pragmatic decisions of the MB paid off as its network became the dominant force in the social realm and gained substantial access to the ministerial level.

The second phase between 1990 and 1999 is characterized by major political changes, which eroded the “pact” between the monarchy and the MB. The regime’s
policy of reconciliation with Israel caused serious tension between the monarchy and the MB. Nevertheless, despite increasing repression and decreasing political access, the MB did not become more radical in its action or with regard to its ideas. Rather, this phase shows the MB’s capabilities to align with antagonistic political forces in order to achieve common goals. Again, strategic decisions based on cost-benefit considerations prevailed. Nevertheless, “red lines” regarding the MB’s interpretation of Islamic law were not crossed. The MB rejected concessions since it became clear that political ends could not be achieved.

Third, the era of King Abdullah II from 1999 to 2009 led to the end of the relationship between the monarchy and the MB as the regime opted for an unconditional pro-western policy. Disputes between factions of the MB about the MB’s political approach in light of repression and decreasing political access increased. However, internal debates to specify ambiguous ends show the ideational diversity of the MB, which indicates a potential of moderation. The weight distribution between moderate and radical factions within the MB changed but did not lead to a radicalization of the MB’s political agenda. Rather, the political agenda of 2009 reflects the MB’s commitment to democracy in accordance with Shari’ah. Major foreign political incidents driven by the western interests in Jordan’s neighborhood shaped the MB’s political agenda.

Consequently, a substantial political inclusion of the MB will bode well for Jordan’s path to democracy if political competition within the framework of stable institutions is established. Political competition will force the MB to make further strategic decisions to maintain its stance as the leading Islamist mainstream movement in Jordan. Its political ambiguity will resolve along with taking over political responsibility, as the MB will be forced to offer solutions to Jordan’s major challenges. Political access will provide incentives for political cooperation and confrontation, which will shape ideas of different factions of the MB and increase the likelihood of moderation.

Despite the initial warm beginning of the relationship between the monarchy and the MB,165 the “pact” between the two sides incorporated potential conflicts from the beginning with regard to the monarchy’s close western ties on the one hand, and the MB’s support of the Palestinian resistance on the other hand.166 However, the relationship between the monarchy and the MB was not severely threatened until 1989, as the organizational benefits of the MB outweighed the cost of its alignment with the regime. The MB’s accommodation with the regime gives evidence for the MB pragmatist approach focusing on a strategic choice based on the rules of the “pact.”

The 1948 war in Palestine marked the turning point of the MB’s apolitical approach. Palestinians and Transjordanians were attracted by leftist pan-Arab nationalism and the MB. The MB sharpened its political profile, took part in parliamentary elections in the 1950s, and became a counterweight to the revolutionary leftist movements.167 After a coup attempt of 1957, King Hussein imposed martial law, which banned all political organizations except the MB. Thus, the MB was able to set the organizational prerequisites for its expanding social network in the 1970s when remittances and aid

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165 The MB always respected the Islamic roots of the Hashemites in Jordan who belong to the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Muhammad. Vice versa, King Abdullah I warmly welcomed the MB as providing a chance to strengthen his Islamic legitimacy. Boulby and Voll, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993, 39.

Speech of King Abdullah I: “I will combat [the spread of] communism and [the establishment of] foreign schools because both are a threat to our society. The first is in contradiction with our Islamic religion, our Prophet’s teachings, and the Holy Koran … The second is a thorn planted by colonialists to create division within the nation’s ranks … I seek to play an important role in the Arab world to combat them.” Hourani et al., Islamic Action Front Party, 10.

166 The MB’s engagement in Palestine was limited: “The Brothers paid lip service to the idea of resistance, but beyond organizing weapons training, they were largely inactive.” Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence, 28.

167 The MB was also seen as a means to contain radical Islamist – however less strong than the leftist revolutionary movement – such as the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir) founded in Jerusalem in 1952. Hourani et al., Islamic Action Front Party, 15.
from the Gulf States increased significantly. In addition, the repression of the Nasser regime against the Egyptian MB made it clear that the MB’s alignment with the Jordanian monarchy was without alternative.168

The decline of Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 gave rise to Islamist and Palestinian resistance movements in the Middle East. The emergence of the PLO challenged the authorities in Jordan as the regime lost control over parts of the country. The MB backed the monarchy’s crackdown on the PLO since the PLO’s leftist ideology and influence in Jordan challenged the MB’s moderate Islamist approach.169 With the MB’s main rival neutralized, the MB assumed predominance in the social movement sector in Jordan. Not surprisingly, as the socioeconomic situation during the economic crisis of the 1980s deteriorated, the MB’s demands for political change increased.170 The MB stayed loyal to the monarchy despite Jordan’s unchanged relationship with Egypt after the Oslo Accords of 1978, as well as Jordan’s rapprochement to Syria and its backing of Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s.171

However, the Intifada in 1987 showed the diverging interests of the monarchy and the MB in Palestine. The MB’s reluctance in the Palestinian resistance was revised as to the decision to create Hamas on the basis of the MB’s network in Gaza and the West Bank as a counterweight against the PLO and the Islamic Jihad.172 The foundation of Hamas and the growing Palestinian resistance stood in contrast to the monarchy’s


170 Jordan’s rents decreased as they depend on (1) foreign aid from western countries and “petrodollars” from states in the Gulf region, and (2) remittance from Jordanians working in the Gulf region. Brynen, *Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan*, 70–72.


decision of disengagement in Palestine in 1988.\textsuperscript{173} The monarchy was concerned about Jordan’s stability with regard to a radicalization of the Palestinian population and the growing discontent of Transjordanians, who were particularly affected by the economic austerity of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{174} Moreover, the emergence of Hamas also affected the internal structures of the MB. The MB was concerned about factionalism between Palestinians and Transjordanians, as well as between reformists of Hasan al-Banna’s school of thought and radicals advocating the ideology of Sayyid Qutb.\textsuperscript{175} However, neither the MB nor the regime was able to develop a clear approach to Hamas, which has affected the relationship between the regime and the MB ever since.

The monarchy’s stability depends on budget security, the ability to maintain patrimonial structures, and a “social contract” which was designed to buy off the demands from below. Jordan’s fiscal crisis began in the early 1980s when the U.S. refused further aid as Jordan rejected a peace treaty with Israel. The crisis increased as a consequence of Jordan’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War when the remittances and petrodollars from the Gulf States declined significantly.\textsuperscript{176} The economic crisis in conjunction with social unrest led to the monarchy’s decision to call for the first full parliamentary elections in 1989 since the war in 1967.\textsuperscript{177} It is striking that the MB did

\textsuperscript{173} The King’s speech of disengagement in Palestine was interpreted in two ways. Transjordanians interpreted the King’s speech as his commitment to the Transjordan predominance in Jordan, whereas the Palestinians interpreted the King’s speech as Jordan being a state open for the Palestinian population until the Palestinian state is established. Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 228.

\textsuperscript{174} The loyal Transjordan population depends on public employment and state subsidies in contrast to the Palestinian population, which dominates the private economic sector. Boulby and Voll, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993, 95; and Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 199.

\textsuperscript{175} Rumman, The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing ‘Political Setback’ Or Diminished Popularity, 87.


\textsuperscript{177} Parties were not legal yet and the campaign period was limited to twenty-five days. Social groups that were already organized due to tribal structures or Islam communities as the MB profited most. Brynen, Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan, 72–78, 90–92; and Adams, Political Liberalization in Jordan: An Analysis of the State's Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, 509.
not directly take part in the unrest and did not criticize King Hussein, nor did the riots protest for democracy but against the reductions of subsidies. The MB remained loyal to the monarchy since the MB benefited from its privileged stance in the social realm. The monarchy’s rationale for calling for elections aimed to make the political opposition accountable for unpopular reforms forced by the agreement with the IMF in 1989 and to manifest “new patron-client ties” to the loyal Transjordan population by giving them more influence in parliament.\footnote{Robinson, \textit{Defensive Democratization in Jordan}, 391–392.}

However, the earth shattering success of the MB in the elections in 1989 shocked the incumbents of the Jordanian regime. The MB’s political program was committed to democracy and pluralism, human and minority rights, but strongly opposed to secular trends. Its primary goals were the complete liberation of Palestine from Israeli occupation and the implementation of \textit{Shari’ah}.\footnote{The MB won 22 of 80 available seats. The voting system “First past the post, multiple vote” allowed accumulation / distribution of votes. Greenwood, \textit{Jordan’s "New Bargain:” the Political Economy of Regime Security}, 253–254; and Schwedler, \textit{Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen}, 159–160.} The MB was able to take advantage of the political opportunity provided by the regime’s liberalization of 1989 as it expanded in the social and political realms.\footnote{Ibid., 252–254.}

Consequently, the MB’s accommodation with the regime has paid off. A strong faction in favor of a pro-accommodative stance with the regime spearheaded the MB approach, which went along with the regime’s policy of disengagement in Palestine. The increase of organizational capabilities and the unprecedented political success in 1989 calmed down critics, who were against the gradual accommodative approach. Thus, the MB policy of accommodation with the regime was backed from an organizational point of view and by the MB’s ideology of a gradual bottom-up approach in the spirit of Hasan al-Banna and Al-Hudabi.
B. FROM WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITIES TO STAGNATION (1990-1999)

The window of opportunity in 1989 was wide open for the MB, but too wide from the perspective of the regime. The initial liberalization stagnated and the “pact” between the MB and the monarchy eroded significantly as the regime opted for a stronger pro-western policy. Nevertheless, the MB was still willing to obey to the rules of the “pact” since the organizational benefits outweighed the costs of a confrontation with the regime. The MB’s ideational responsiveness to political challenges enabled cross-ideological cooperation, which indicates their pragmatism and the assertiveness of moderate factions within the MB despite limited political access. Limited political access and increasing repression fueled disputes within the MB but did not lead to a change of its moderate political approach of 1989.

As the previous chapter showed, adjustments of the Election Law and bureaucratic regulations counterbalanced the initial success of the MB. However, the MB’s accommodative approach continued as its “pact” with the regime paid off. The MB was able to establish privileges and expanded its influence to the ministerial level. The MB’s backing of the monarchy’s refusal to participate in the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War in 1991 gave King Hussein more flexibility to navigate through this crisis. The King rewarded the MB’s alliance with cabinet positions and leading positions within the ministries of justice, education, religious affairs, and social development. Nevertheless, the MB could neither push for an Islamist Prime Minister nor achieve its major objectives, such as segregation of sexes in schools, prohibition of alcohol, and abolishment of the peace talks with Israel.

In addition, during the legislative periods between 1989 and 1993, Martial Law was suspended, the Political Parties Law was adjusted and the Press and Publications

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181 The ministry of interior regulates political parties, unions, and professional organizations; the ministry of culture regulates all voluntary cultural organizations, ministry of social development regulates all charitable organizations. Wiktorowicz, *Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan*, 26–33.

Law was created. Whereas these reforms imposed new liberties as well as new restrictions, the National Charter was a remarkable achievement of Jordan’s political liberalization. All political groups inside and outside parliament supported the National Charter in 1991. The MB took the opportunity to assure its commitment to Shari’ah in accordance with the National Charter.

Since the IAF became a political arm of the MB, its political agenda incorporated ends of the MB such as the implementation of Shari’ah and jihad against Israeli occupation in Palestine. The IAF expanded its political agenda to specific liberties “as stipulated by Islam” and women’s rights in accordance with Shari’ah. In addition, the IAF was committed to a democratic consultative approach, which favored the principle of shura (consultation) since parliamentary democracy is not an end but a means to reach the IAF’s objectives. The IAF sought “Islamization of legislation, regulating policies and practices according to the provisions of Islamic law (Shari’ah) … to achieve the desired reform and to build a model society.”

The IAF did not specify its approach to and the characteristics of a “model society,” but responded with its agenda to major social and political concerns in the Jordanian public. Needless to say, its political stance contradicted western worldviews in many regards, but appeals to the public desire for democracy and also for conservative Islamic values (see Table 1). Consequently, the MB has opted for pragmatism rather than

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183 The Political Parties Law legalized political parties on the one hand, but restricted political activities outside political parties on the other hand. The law inhibited financial support from outside Jordan. It sets the preconditions for excluding Palestinians living in Jordan from political participation who might choose the Palestinian citizenship. The new Press and Publication Law brought more freedom for the media, but restricted critical news about the ruling elites. Robinson, *Defensive Democratization in Jordan*, 392–393.


186 According to the former leader of the IAF Ishaq Farhant: “…we believe in shura, in consultation and we think people should participate in taking decisions for the country. So the parliamentary process can be Islamic. But we are not after a certain model. If the means are sufficient in satisfying our goals we can say they are Islamic. If they do not then we just reject them and try other sets of procedures.” Boulby and Voll, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945–1993*, 130.
dogmatism. Its vague political agenda leaves room for interpretation, which affects internal debates about an appropriate political approach. Thus, substantial political access, political responsibility, and more liberalism might enhance political contention within and outside the MB.

However, the early 1990s brought up major political changes, which affected the “pact” between the monarchy and the MB and created new opportunities for the MB. As a consequence of Jordan’s policy of reconciliation with Israel in the early 1990s, the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) was founded as a political platform of the Communist and Ba’thist parties and the IAF to coordinate political action. Besides the HCCNOP, cooperation between these antagonistic political actors expanded into other organizations such as the National Committee for the Cancellation of the Israeli Trade Fair and the Anti-Normalization Committee of Jordan’s Professional Syndicates Association, as well as commonly organized protests in the streets.\(^{187}\)

The following repression by the regime had two effects. First, it united the new cooperation between the parties, and second, it alienated the loyal IAF from the monarchy and erected factionalism within the IAF. In contrast to a broad consensus about the political inclusion before the 1989 elections, the monarchy’s foreign and electoral policies opened the trenches within the IAF between “doves” (pro-inclusion) and “hawks” (contra-inclusion). However, the dispute revolved around the arguments of being accountable for the regime’s policy on the one hand, or losing democratic credibility by withdrawing political participation on the other hand. Finally, pragmatism prevailed since cooperation with other parties became a political necessity to achieve common ends.\(^{188}\) Moreover, the IAF enforced its democratic narrative inside and outside the party to justify its actions. The internal dispute ended in a majority decision in favor


\(^{188}\) Nevertheless, this pragmatism was absent after the election in 1989 when the MB could have formed a coalition with a majority of 60 percent which was one reason for the MB failure to achieve its objectives between 1989 and 1993.
of political participation, even if the peace treaty were to pass parliament. Consequently, despite a major shift in Jordan’s foreign policy in particular with regard to the Palestine cause, the MB/IAF continued with its gradual approach in accordance with the “pact” with the monarchy. The costs of confrontation were too high in comparison to the benefits that have served the MB well with regard to its organizational structures and social and political influence.

However, since the MB’s rationale for inclusion paid, the regime feared losing control over the rise of the MB. Besides selective repression against leading Islamists, the monarchy again adjusted the Election Law in advance of the parliamentary elections of 1993. The IAF lost six seats in the 1993 election, while loyal parties and candidates took over the majority in parliament. Nonetheless, the parliamentary elections in 1993 confirmed the MB’s initial success in the elections of 1989 since it could mobilize its constituency in the cities by its well-organized structures. However, the amendments to the Election Law and the repression against monarchy critics fueled the dispute between “hawks” and “doves” about the IAF’s inclusion in addition to the controversial debate about the Jordanian policy of reconciliation with Israel. These unresolved disputes weakened the IAF and led to their boycott of the parliamentary elections of 1997 together with other major opposition parties.

The harmony between the monarchy and the MB of the early days was over. The relationship did not recover in the remaining years of the era of King Hussein. It became

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190 The case of Layth al-Shubaylat shows this clearly. Layth al-Shubaylat investigated as a member of the Jordanian against corruption of the government. The detainment and propaganda trial was a clear sign for every political Islamist who does not obey the “rules of the game.”


As the justification for the retreat from political participation and a critique of the regime disregard of the MB’s role in the polity and society of Jordan, the MB published a political statement “Why did We Boycott?” Rumman, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing 'Political Setback' Or Diminished Popularity*, 86.
clear that King Hussein’s loyal tribal Transjordan constituencies would remain the cornerstone of the monarchy’s legitimacy. The monarchy’s support of the MB paid off as long as the MB could act as a counterweight against hostile political or Islamist strands. The “pact” was challenged when political “shocks” were related to the core interests of both sides, which were antagonistic from the beginning. Jordan’s economic vulnerability and its dependence on western aid forced the monarchy to make concessions in the Israeli-Palestine conflict, which stood in contrast to the MB political agenda. Nonetheless, the MB did not fundamentally change its pro-accommodative approach as moderate factions prevailed and the benefits with regard to the MB’s organizational stance in society outweighed the costs of confrontation. The MB demonstrated its ideational responsiveness and pragmatism during cooperation in cross-ideological alliances.

C. THE NEW ERA OF KING ABDULLAH II (1999-2009)

The “new” era of King Abdullah II brought about major changes in the relationship between the monarchy and the MB. The monarchy’s alignment with the West reached a new level. Military conflicts in the region and economic liberalization alongside a domestic policy of deliberalization, as well as a new approach to Hamas, have shaped the relationship between King Abdullah II and the MB. The elections of 2007 reached the lowest level of the relationship between the monarchy and the MB, which brought to mind a “couple that knows it is going to divorce.” Prominent issues such as women’s rights became a major area of contention as it contrasted the regime’s modern reform agenda with Islamist conservatism. The IAF action and political agenda mirrors its conservative religious approach, as well as the new political situation since the reign of King Abdullah II. However, the IAF’s political approach indicated neither moderation nor radicalization but continuity of its ambiguity.

194 Since the peace treaty with Israel, Jordan has received additional U.S. aid. The U.S. has spent annually 560 million U.S. Dollars to support Jordan’s economy. Vogt, Der Gaza Krieg und seine Folgen: Realpolitik in einer verunsicherten Nachbarschaft, 12.

195 Kaye et al., More Freedom, Less Terror?: Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World, 76.
King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999 and attracted hope for more liberalization in Jordan. Acknowledging the threat from political “shocks” outside the country and the monarchy’s vulnerable point of budget security, King Abdullah II aimed to dominate the reform process and draw public awareness to domestic challenges. His plea for national unity and programs such as “Jordan First” in 2002, the founding of the Ministry of Development in 2003, and the 2006 National Agenda were points on the King’s roadmap to a modern Islamic state. However, as noted, the implementation of the King’s democratic rhetoric lagged behind economic reforms.

Nonetheless, the new monarchy attempted to maintain its democratic façade by focusing on certain prominent issues such as women’s rights. Amendments to laws were drafted such as the “honor-crimes law,” the “quota” allocating seats for women in parliament and within political parties, and the Personal Status Law, giving women more divorce rights. As noted, the HCCNOP was the platform upon which a common approach in parliament was expected to be coordinated. However, the IAF refused to discuss the amendments of the Personal Status Law and “honor-crimes” within the HCCNOP as these issues are bound to the jurisprudence of Shari’ah. By contrast, the “quota” was put on the HCCNOP’s agenda as it became obvious that a majority in the HCCNOP would refuse it. However, the IAF opposed all three amendments with religious reasoning using anti-western rhetoric. Thus, substantial cross-ideological cooperation failed as ideological “red lines” of the IAF were crossed. The MB’s view on women’s participation in politics was made clear in the 1989 elections when the MB criticized the candidacy of non-Islamist women.

196 Besides economic development, these reforms aimed to reshape the political environment by encouraging the formation of stable political parties. Clark, The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan, 546; Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso, Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World, 54; and Perthes, Geheime Gärten, 315–316.


The IAF recognized women’s rights in accordance with Islamic virtues and officially allowed women to participate in politics and to take over political posts (except “head of state”). Although women in the IAF have never run for elections, they have taken over responsibilities within the party structures as shown by the unprecedented success of six women in the IAF council elections of 2002. Women cooperated with organizations outside the party to engage in women related issues in society, while factions within the IAF have not been able to find a consensus on the role of women in society. In addition, the internal party dispute about women’s rights blurred the fronts between “doves” and “hawks” (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Factions in the IAF According to Disputes about Women’s Rights

The dispute within the IAF about women’s rights indicates the heterogeneity of the IAF and its wide ideational spectrum. Consequently, if repression decreases and political opportunities emerge, the IAF will be forced to develop a clear political

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200 After the elections in 2003, the IAF cooperated with Hayat al-Musani, the first elected woman under the quota system. Ryan, Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and Democracy.

201 Clark and Schwedler, Who Opened the Window? Women’s Activism in Islamist Parties, 301–307.

202 Ibid., 297.
approach to major issues of concern, which affect political and religious views of its different factions. In order to attract a plurality of Jordanians, moderate factions are supposed to spearhead the IAF’s political response and to facilitate moderation of former radical ideas, as they are not bound to dogmatic ideologies. Therefore, moderation is supposed to take place beyond the camp of “soft-liners” (see Figure 5). Furthermore, “hardliners” might splinter from the IAF, as the Liberation Party did in 1952, or cross the divide to radical strands. Vice versa, if repression continues, factions are not likely to moderate their rigid worldview if political opportunities do not force them to do so. The costs for an ongoing accommodation with the regime will increase if ideological concessions do not pay in terms of more political access. Consequently, the regime’s policy of containment of Islamist opposition is counterproductive as it weakens the moderate forces.

Along with King Abdullah’s policy of deliberalization, the monarchy’s approach to Hamas changed. As noted, the foundation of Hamas in 1987 and Jordan’s policy of reconciliation with Israel in the early 1990s framed the antagonistic views between the regime and the MB with regard to the Palestine cause. Abdullah’s expulsion of Hamas in 1999 and his ban of Hamas after their success in the 2006 elections in Palestine were attempts to hamper Hamas’ influence in Jordan and to signal Jordan’s strong alliance with the West.203 Moreover, the war in Gaza in 2008 again showed the importance of Hamas and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the monarchy.204 The monarchy harshly criticized the Israeli War in Gaza in 2008 to warn Israel from unilateral actions, but also to appease pro-Hamas factions.205


204 Jordan insists on a separate Palestinian state. The worst scenario is that Jordan will be forced to take over responsibility for the West Bank if Israeli forces retreat unilaterally. The option that Jordan should be the hosting nation of all Palestinians (the “Jordan Solution”) is strongly rejected by the monarchy. On November 18, 2008, King Abdullah II warned the Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert and the defense minister Ehud Barak during a “secret” meeting in Amman to conduct military operations in Gaza.

205 King Abdullah II warned the Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert and the defense minister Ehud Barak to conduct military operations in Gaza during a “secret” meeting in Amman on November 18, 2008. Vogt, Der Gaza Krieg und seine Folgen: Realpolitik in einer verunsicherten Nachbarschaft, 9–12.
The election of 2007 ended in a debacle for the IAF. The internal disputes between “hawks” (pro-Hamas and contra-inclusion) and “doves” (disengagement with Hamas and pro-inclusion) about the monarchy’s approach to Hamas and the Election Law prevented substantial debates about the political program of the IAF. In addition, unprecedented countermeasures by the monarchy against the MB’s network were perceived as having crossed “red lines” as the government took over the lead of the ICCS in July 2006. Moreover, the regime’s media campaign to link terrorist activities with the MB has weakened the MB’s public support. Consequently, the regime’s policy in light of the 2007 elections weakened moderate factions within the IAF, as well as undermined substantial political programmatic debates and prospects of moderation of former radical ideas.

The regime’s “attack” on the MB/IAF network forged antagonistic factions together to respond collectively to existential threats against its organizational structures. The election in April 2008 of the MB’s new General Guide, the prominent “hawk” Hamam Sa’id, showed the MB struggle for an appropriate response to King Abdullah’s policy of containment. Nevertheless, as noted, the election of a moderate head of the Shura Council, Abd al-Latif Arabiyat, shows the MB’s awareness with regard to its reputation in public and gives evidence for its strategic behavior. The MB sends a clear signal with its new General Guide that the regime’s approach of confrontation might backfire as the MB might lose its role as a bulwark against radicalism and opt for a confrontational response. The MB’s election of the moderate head of the Shura Council aims to take away the regime’s ability to justify its new course in public against a seemingly radicalizing MB.

206 For instance, the regime claimed that the MB supported Hamas attempts to smuggle weapons from the northern border into Jordan in order to conduct terrorist attacks which should remind the public of the devastating hotel bombing in Amman in 2005.

207 Eisenberg, Hardliners Assume Leadership of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood - the Jamestown Foundation.

208 Sharp, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations (RL33546), 7.
The MB’s political influence in parliament has diminished significantly (see Figure 6). Thus, the MB’s political inclusion is increasingly irrelevant and currently designed to signal the MB’s commitment to a gradual “democratic” approach. As chances for achieving political objectives inside state institutions are low, political action might shift to other channels such as professional organizations, which have become an effective means to protest against the monarchy’s policy since the mid-1990s. Moreover, since new influential political parties in general, and Islamist parties in particular, have not emerged, the declining political attraction of the MB has left a vacuum that independent candidates are not able to fill. Moreover, this trend has undermined the emergence of a competitive political environment within state institutions as a

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209 El-Ghobashy, The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, 376.
prerequisite for Jordan’s path to democracy. Finally, as political inclusion does not pay, radicalization of the MB and growing support for radical Islamist strands is likely.\textsuperscript{210}

Figure 7. MB’s Online Declarations (2005-2007)\textsuperscript{211}

Nevertheless, the MB political decline also derived from internal disputes, which dominated substantial programmatic progress. The IAF was not able to launch a political program, which brought up plausible solutions to important concerns of the Jordanian public as corruption, unemployment, and poverty. Figure 7 shows the quantity of published online declarations by the MB between 2005 and 2007. Foreign Affairs (red color) dominated domestic issues (green color), and even economic and social affairs played a minor role compared with internal organizational issues (gray color). Thus, the IAF did not focus on the domestic needs of Jordanians, but on issues related to foreign affairs. Nevertheless, although the MB responds to public trends with regard to foreign politics, domestic politics fell short.\textsuperscript{212} This misbalance reflects the failed attempt of the moderate camp to draw attention from foreign issues to domestic affairs. This does not


\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., 50.

\textsuperscript{212} For instance, in 2005, more than seventy percent of Jordanians believe that Hamas is a legitimate resistance movement. The same respondent applies for Hezbollah with about sixty percent. Braizat, \textit{Opinion Poll: Post Amman Attacks: Jordanian Public Opinion and Terrorism (January 2005)}, 3. See also opinion poll about western criticism in \textit{Opinion Poll: Revisiting the Arab Street: Research from within (Feb 2005)}, 86.
mean that the radical camp, who criticizes the MB’s political accommodation with the regime, dominates the MB; but it shows that foreign affairs have gained in importance in light of major foreign incidents in Jordan’s neighborhood. Consequently, while in 1993 the political agenda focused on the Palestinian cause, the new geostrategic situation in Jordan’s neighborhood shaped the IAF’s agenda of 2009, which clearly contradicts western interests and does not exclude violence, as a means to achieve the IAF’s ends:

(1) …strengthening the programs of resisting normalization of relations with Israel (2) …confronting Zionist infiltration and globalization that aim to impose further American hegemony over nations combating destructive organizations such as … Zionism …; (3) …the Palestinian cause is central to the nation's ideology, hence all capacities should be mobilized to support the Palestinian uprising and resistance as a vanguard for liberating Palestine; (4) …the brave Iraqi national resistance movement must receive every support possible to liberate Iraq from American occupation.

Table 2 shows the continuity of the IAF political agenda in the domestic political realm between 1993 and 2009. Since Islam unites din wa dawla (religion and state), the IAF aims to follow a path to democracy as stipulated by Islam (Shari’ah). Moreover, besides the IAF’s plea for social justice and corruption, the IAF’s commitment to democracy goes along with its demand for national unity against antagonistic Transjordan and Palestinian clientelism. Consequently, as noted, the IAF’s political agenda aims to bridge rifts as far as the public opinion about Jordan’s political system and the Transjordan-Palestinian divide are concerned. Nevertheless, on the one hand, the IAF’s political agenda has remained ambiguous in achieving core objectives since 1993. However, on the other hand, a radicalization with regard to domestic issues has not taken place. The IAF emphasized its commitment to democracy and rejects compulsion in religious affairs (“securing religious freedom for all”). The ambiguity of the IAF is not surprising since political opportunities are missing and the IAF is not forced to take

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213 “The Preparation of the nation for armed conflict (jihad) against the Zionist and imperialist enemies”, Hourani et al., Islamic Action Front Party, 30.
215 IAF agenda of February 2009, "Arab Parliaments: Arab Political Database: Jordan."
over political responsibility. Moreover, the ambiguity of the IAF derives from the challenge to merge religious dogmatism with political pragmatism. From a western point of view, the IAF’s ambiguity with regard to its political ends in Jordan and its support for violence against Israel and western forces in Iraq creates a “gray zone” of uncertainty about their real goals.\textsuperscript{216} However, the comparison of the IAF’s political agenda of 1993 vs. 2009 shows that core domestic objectives have stayed unchanged and, therefore, do not indicate a radicalization while political opportunities are missing. The IAF’s aggressive foreign political stance reflects trends of Jordan’s public opinion and takes into account major political changes in Jordan’s neighborhood driven by the West.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shari’ah</th>
<th>The resumption of Islamic life and the application of Islamic Shari’ah in all fields.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993 / 2009</td>
<td>Islamization of legislation, regulating policies and practices according to the provisions of Islamic law (Shari’ah) and confronting attempts to Westernize our thinking and morality are priorities on the party’s agenda to achieve the desired reform and to build a model society.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Unity</th>
<th>Exerting efforts toward achieving national unity and liberty, as well as confronting imperialist and foreign influence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993 / 2009</td>
<td>Confronting all calls and policies that undermine national unity and adopting a national program for enhancing that unity is a matter of priority for the Party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Achieving national unity and establishing a system based on democracy and Shura (consultation). The defense of human dignity, liberty, and freedoms in general.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993 / 2009</td>
<td>Defending citizens' public freedoms and their constitutional rights, increasing their awareness of those rights and releasing the people's potential capacities to achieve comprehensive development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Core Objectives Comparison of Political Agenda of the IAF in 1999 vs. 2009\textsuperscript{217}


D. CONCLUSION

The accommodative relationship between the monarchy and the MB has served both sides over many decades. The MB took advantage of its privileged stance during the “golden era” between 1945 and 1989. However, the monarchy’s policy in this period dismantles its miscalculation of the costs of the MB’s inclusion. While the monarchy has supported the MB’s accumulation of resources, political inclusion of the MB has become more risky for the monarchy in the light of Jordan’s pro-western policy. Since political competition by political parties is missing, the monarchy has countered the strength of the MB by bureaucratic limitation and repression.

The MB is in danger of losing its role as a counterweight to radical Islamist strands. King Abdullah II seemed to be convinced that he is able to handle the threat of radical Islamism with Jordan’s security apparatus and his pro-western policy. In addition, the monarchy’s “attack” on the social network of the MB in 2007 was unmistakable and might provoke radical counter actions. The development of the “triad” monarchy, MB and Hamas against the background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has major implications for the future relationship between the monarchy and the MB. As the MB has not yet decided how it should respond to the “new” era of King Abdullah II, it faces the threat of being perceived as politically irrelevant by the monarchy and the people. The “electoral game” of the MB will completely lose its importance if the MB does not push for more political participation.

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218 “The cooptation of strategic constituencies is difficult for authoritarian regimes to sustain under conditions of underdevelopment and scarce resources.” Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt, 11.

219 “…Muslims rebel because of an ill-fated combination of institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and on the other, reactive and indiscriminate repression that threatens the organizational resources and personal lives of Islamists.” Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, 21–22, 204.

A similar logic applies for the development in Egypt after the formal inclusion of the 1980s was ended by exclusion in the early 1990s. Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement," in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 72.

220 Robinson, Can Islamists be Democrats? The Case of Jordan, 387.
Political engineering and social control have hampered democratic progress and weakened the conditions of moderation of radical ideas. The lack of political vigor of the MB raises doubts about whether it is able to take over significant political responsibility in the near future should political opportunities emerge. The MB has missed developing answers to current political challenges while struggling in ideological trenches. Moreover, in accordance with the public opinion, the moderate strand of the MB argues that the hostile environment in the neighborhood of Jordan does not allow for a rapid political change. Nevertheless, the MB’s ambiguity mainly derives from missing opportunities to take over political responsibility and the challenge to merge different religious views with political pragmatism.

Collectively, the MB acts strategically based on rational pragmatist considerations, balancing the costs and benefits of their political action and their cooperation with the regime. Despite limited political participation, moderation has taken place when the MB was forced to make alliances with competing political forces to achieve their ends. Thus, political competition while strengthening civil society, political parties, and parliament are crucial for a successful political inclusion of the MB. Moreover, internal disputes about religious affairs and the general question of cooperation with the regime point to the diversity and the changing boundaries of justifiable action within the MB. Therefore, moderation is likely with regard to multiple factions in the MB besides the camp of “hardliners” even with reference to ideological core issues such as women’s rights.

Finally, substantial inclusion of the MB will bode well for Jordan’s path to democracy if legislation and state institutions set the prerequisites for political competition. A radicalization of the MB’s political agenda between 1993 and 2009 has not taken place despite repression and limited political access. Despite changes in the balance of power between moderate and radical factions, the MB has remained

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committed to democracy in accordance with Shari’ah. The MB’s political agenda gives evidence of their mainstream approach embracing religious conservative and reformist strands in society. Its aggressive foreign political objectives give no evidence for a radical ideology, but show the general Muslim concerns about western policy in the Muslim world. Vice versa, since the MB does not clearly reject its direct or indirect support for violence outside the borders of Jordan, it is perceived as a threat to the West and its allies. This perception is crucial with regard to western approaches to Jordan, which refrain from pushing the Jordanian regime for more political liberalization and the inclusion of Islamists in the political process. Thus, the next chapter explores how U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan shapes Jordan’s path to democracy, as well as political opportunities for the MB and responds to moderate Islamists in Jordan as the remaining substantial political force in Jordan.
IV. U.S. AND EU ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN

Jordan’s artificial creation in the aftermath of the first World War, its scarce resources, and its weak economic basis have shaped its dependence on foreign aid, “petrodollars” from states in the Gulf, and remittances from Jordanians working outside the country. Jordan’s rentier economy used to be the source of a patrimonial distribution of social welfare and privileges that secures the legitimacy of the Hashemite Kingdom. Along with Jordan’s economic decline of the 1980s and its reconciliation with Israel in the 1990s, Jordan’s pro-western stance has characterized its foreign policy.

Consequently, Jordan’s path to democracy is supposed to be paved by western protagonists such as the U.S. and the EU. However, as Chapter II showed, liberalization during the 1990s stagnated and civil liberties have been reduced since King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999. Despite foreign aid, Jordan’s Freedom House rating, which has not increased since 1975, declined in 2008 and it recently downgraded to “not free.”

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226 Prior to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the process of European integration brought up different terms such as the European Communities (1950s–1960s), the European Economic Community (1960s–1970s), and the European Community (1970s–1990s). In 1992, the European Union (EU) evolved with its three pillars: (1) The Community pillar, corresponding to the European Community, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the former European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); (2) The pillar of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP); (3) The pillar devoted to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, the pillar structure was abolished to the benefit of a higher integrated and coherent European policy. For the sake of simplicity, this thesis will only use the term European Union (EU). "EUROPA - Glossary - Pillars of the European Union," http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/eu_pillars_en.htm (accessed December 11, 2009).

The debate about foreign assistance to the Middle East is ongoing and driven by the role of the U.S. in the region. The liberal camp argues that transforming autocracies into democracies, as the “third wave” in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America and in Europe showed, has served U.S. interests. Former autocratic rulers should become accountable for their action, as they have to care about the well-being of their people. Since 9/11, and according to UN Arab Human Development Reports, it was widely believed that terrorism derives from oppressive regimes in the Middle East and a lack of democracy. Finally, radical Islamism became the main concern that must be contained by spreading democracy as a world value.

By contrast, the realist approach to the Middle East highlights the stability and security in the region. Realists insist that democratic transitions are open-ended processes and can be costly. The resurgence of Islamism threatens the status quo that has served western interests ever since. A prudent approach to the Middle East should reject a moral overreach. Moreover, realist argue, “although standard measures of democracy promotion may well consolidate or even revitalize authoritarian rule, more radical techniques may produce as much good as evil.” Terrorism will even flourish during transitions and political instability if institutions are weak. The chances of western actors to promote democracy are marginal since their credibility is low with regard to their colonial era and hypocritical standards. Vice versa, elections are just a means to attract foreign aid and to maintain a democratic façade.

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This context raises three questions: (1) What are the commonalities and differences between the U.S. and the EU approach to Jordan? (2) How did U.S. and EU assistance shape political opportunities in Jordan? (3) Are the U.S. and the EU willing to push a democratic process in Jordan that favors political inclusion of moderate Islamist organizations?

This chapter compares and contrasts U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan with reference to its effects on political opportunities as elaborated in Chapter II. Therefore, first, Section A explores the rationales of U.S. and EU foreign policy in general, which provide the basis for strategic concepts and means as applied by U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan. Section B assesses the effects of U.S. and EU strategic concepts and means on political opportunities in Jordan, and examines the U.S. and EU responsiveness to moderate Islamist organizations.

A. RATIONALES OF U.S. AND EU FOREIGN POLICY

The ends of U.S. and EU foreign policy share more commonalities than differences. With regard to security threats of the twenty-first century, both the U.S. and EU share a common assessment. The conclusions and rationales of their foreign policies differ substantially along with geostrategic considerations, different interests in Jordan, and available capabilities. Thus, the perspectives of the EU and the U.S. are not homogenous. While the EU focuses on the Mediterranean in its neighborhood, the U.S. takes a broader perspective on the Middle East concentrating its efforts in the Gulf. Nevertheless, the EU depends on the U.S. to provide security in its neighborhood, since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial for peace and stability in the EU neighborhood where the U.S. rather than the EU is able to shape the peace process.233

Interests of the U.S. in the Middle East have changed due to the paradigm shift after the Cold War. The containment of Islamism and terrorism by promoting democracy

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has become a main concern. Democracy promotion, by peaceful means or by force, should remove authoritarian rule, combat the violation of human rights and terrorism, foster economic development and prospering economic relationships between the West and the Middle East, and finally enhance the countries’ abilities of solving domestic and interstate conflicts peacefully. Nevertheless, the current U.S. administration seeks a more pragmatic and quieter reconciliatory approach announced by the U.S. President in Cairo and Accra in 2009 and as the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2010 stipulates. On December 10, 2009 in Oslo, the U.S. President stated that:

...within America, there has long been a tension between those who describe themselves as realists or idealists - a tension that suggests a stark choice between the narrow pursuit of interests or an endless campaign to impose our values around the world. I reject these choices. I believe that peace is unstable where citizens are denied the right to speak freely or worship as they please; choose their own leaders or assemble without fear.

Nevertheless, the schism between the idealistic U.S. rhetoric and the realist conduct of U.S. policy in the past led to a significant decline of credibility in the Arab world and fueled anti-American resentments.

However, U.S. interests have not fundamentally changed. The constant determinant of U.S. policy in the Middle East is free access to strategic resources in the Gulf and the commitment to a secure and stable environment for Israel. Jordan’s policy

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235 See debate between Carothers and Paula J. Dobriansky (Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs in 2003); Ibid., 75–82; McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, 147; and Jason Ralph, "American Democracy and Democracy Promotion," International Affairs 77, no. 1 (January, 2001), 215–217.
of reconciliation was therefore greeted generously by the U.S.\footnote{Since the peace treaty with Israel, Jordan has received additional U.S. aid. In 2008, U.S. aid increased on an average annual level of $660 million including $300 million for military aid. In addition, the U.S. has spent annually $560 million to support Jordan’s economy. Achim Vogt, "Der Gaza Krieg und seine Folgen: Realpolitik in einer verunsicherten Nachbarschaft," Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Amman, \textit{http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/06110.pdf} (accessed May 14, 2010).} Despite some ups and downs in U.S.-Jordan relations during the era of King Hussein from 1957 to 1999, Jordan has become an important “bridgehead” in combating terrorism since 9/11.\footnote{Hatem Shareef Abu-Lebdeh, \textit{Conflict and Peace in the Middle East: National Perceptions and United States-Jordan Relations} (Lanham: University Press of America, 1997), 117–143.} Jordan’s engagement in the War on Terror was met as “annual U.S. assistance to Jordan has more than quadrupled.”\footnote{U.S. assistance increased from $223 million in FY 1998 to about $912 million in 2008. Jeremy M. Sharp, \textit{U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma} (RL33486) Congressional Research Service, [2006], \textit{www.crs.gov} (accessed April 21, 2010).} As the next section elaborates, Jordan took over an important role in supporting nation building in Iraq and aims to contribute to the solution of the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Since King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999, Jordan’s alliance with the U.S. has been unquestioned. Nonetheless, with reference to the resurgence of Islamism in Jordan, U.S. interests in Jordan might be challenged if the MB gains a significant voice in the political decision making process in Jordan as the previous chapters show. Thus, from a realist perspective, the benefits of Jordan’s status quo have a higher weight than significant political changes, which might confront U.S. interests.

While public interest has focused on the U.S., the EU reached its prominence as a quieter worldwide political actor committed to a multilateral approach. The EU’s source of power derives from its multifaceted civil capabilities and the diversity of its member states. However, the EU’s strength incorporates inherently weak points, which stem from manifold interests of its member states. The debate about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
and the Union of the Mediterranean in 2008 during the French presidency sheds light on a missing unity of effort and a resurgence of nationalization of European foreign policy.\textsuperscript{242}

However, the EU’s economic and civil strength reflects the EU’s normative power within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU’s contribution in ending the Cold War and promoting the “third wave” of democracy in Europe is, first and foremost, a result of its attractiveness with reference to democratic, legal, and economic standards and benefits. However, does this attractiveness apply for states in the Mediterranean neighborhood, which do not have a perspective of becoming an EU member state?\textsuperscript{243}

The EU’s need to provide security in its neighborhood differs substantially from the motivation of the U.S. approach to the Middle East. The EU’s geographic proximity to the Middle East, as well as the close historic and economic links between the Southern European and Arab states in the Mediterranean region, shape EU interests in the Middle East. The EU enlargement between 2004 and 2007 (e.g., Rumania and Bulgaria), prospects of a further enlargement in the Balkans, and last but not least Turkey’s status as an EU-membership candidate highlights the EU security interests in the Middle East. Thus, the remarkable EU enlargement from fifteen to twenty-seven member states between 2004 and 2007 pushed a new thinking about security in the European neighborhood including the Mediterranean states of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{244} However, the question is: How can security be provided to the European neighborhood if states such as

\textsuperscript{242} The “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” was launched under the French presidency. It aims to institutionalize the multilateral approach of the European Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process 1995) in order to enhance cooperation and co-ownership with its neighboring states (including Jordan). See next section and for further information: European Union, "European Union (EU) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," \url{http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/med/index_en.htm} (accessed April 6, 2010).


Iran or Iraq are not included in the EU approach and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stagnates as the U.S. is not willing or able to push the peace process?245

The EU success in spreading democracy and stability in the former states of the East Block shaped the EU’s self-confidence as a civilian normative power and its approach to its Mediterranean neighborhood. Moreover, the increasing integration and effectiveness of European capabilities according to the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 is supposed to provide a necessary means for a comprehensive approach to security challenges.246 Where does the need to provide security in the EU’s neighborhood end? While the EU focuses on the Mediterranean, a coherent strategic approach has to incorporate security threats, which are interlinked and derive from the entire Middle East as the relationship between Iran, Syria, and Hizballah, as well as between Jordan and Iraq before and after the Iraq War of 2003 shows. Whereas the EU focuses mainly on the Mashreq and the Maghreb, the U.S. takes up a Greater Middle East perspective, including the Gulf and the East (Afghanistan and Pakistan).247

However, the EU’s goals are just as ambitious as those of the U.S., as the EU Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 shows. The main difference between the EU and the U.S. derives from their geostrategic perspectives and the acknowledgment of a multipolar world. In contrast to the U.S., the EU is directly affected by its security concerns of its neighborhood in the Middle East such as human trafficking and immigration in conjunction with organized crime as well as Islamist terrorism. The underlying rationale of the EU’s strategic approach is “to promote a ring of well governed countries to the


246 Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, merges the competences of the formerly separated three pillars into areas of shared competence such as (a) internal market, (b) social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty, and (c) economic, social, and territorial cohesion. A Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) is supposed to be more consistent as the responsibilities of the High Representative of CSFP increased. European Union, "Treaty of Lisbon," *Official Journal of the European Union* 50, no. C 306 (December 17, 2007): 1–272.

East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations...;” however, trying to confront challenges globally as they occur. Whereas the NSS reflects the consensus of an administration of a sovereign state, the ESS is a multinational document and depends on the “common dominator” of all EU member states. Thus, the abstraction of objectives and commitments of both strategies differ.

Nevertheless, the EU and the U.S. security strategies share common ends based on a common threat assessment focusing on (1) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (2) terrorism, organized crime, and failing states, and (3) energy security. While both the U.S. and the EU emphasize the importance of multilateral frameworks and the commitment to a comprehensive approach, the EU points to its civil power whereas the U.S. highlights the importance of its military force and its willingness to maintain its worldwide military superiority. Nonetheless, while the current U.S. administration has moved away from the “Bush doctrine” to a multilateral approach as stipulated by the NSS 2010, the U.S. global perspective as the sole military superpower has remained as the U.S. President put it:

America's commitment to global security will never waver. But in a world in which threats are more diffuse, and missions more complex, America cannot act alone. America alone cannot secure the peace. But, I - like any head of state - reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend my nation.

Finally, it is striking that while the EU faces security threats from its Mediterranean neighborhood, it is convinced that security threats need to be countered,

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250 The White House, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize.
first and foremost, by civilian capabilities. This rationale is shaped by two circumstances, which derive from the EU’s “architecture.” First, a complex intergovernmental political-institutional framework drives the EU’s CFSP while civilian diplomats and the strong bureaucratic apparatus of the European Commission prevail over military representations. Military power is “downgraded” to an instrument equal to civilian power. Second, military capabilities remain part of EU member states’ sovereignty. Member states provide military capabilities based on common decisions, but they do not have to. Therefore, they might reject a military contribution although they support an EU’s military intervention.251

By contrast, the U.S. is willing to defend its strategic interests in the Middle East if necessary by the use of force, although it is not threatened by security challenges as in the case of the EU. Even the dependence of European member states on natural resources in the Middle East is substantially higher than the U.S. Whereas the EU imports 45 percent of its oil demand from the Middle East, only 17 percent of U.S. oil imports originate from this instable region.252 In comparison to the EU’s bureaucratic institutional power (foremost the European commission), which maintains the coherence of the CFSP, the U.S. Department of State lacks institutional power and capabilities to conduct its policy without relying on well developed military structures around the world. The report on 9/11 makes it clear that the:

State [Department] came into the 1990s overmatched by the resources of other departments and with little support for its budget either in Congress or in the President’s Office of Management and Budget...Increasingly, the embassies themselves were overshadowed by powerful regional commanders in chief reporting to the Pentagon.253


Another difference between the rationales of EU and U.S. foreign policy derives from the assessment of promoting democracy. Whereas the U.S. has advocated an active role in promoting democracy as part of its grand strategy including regime change that favors human freedom and leads to prosperity and stability, the EU opted for an approach that is mainly characterized by a strong technocratic top-down assistance. The EU believes that democracy evolves from within, moderated by strong institutions. However, the downside of the EU approach is the lack of clarity caused by multiple interests of EU member states and contradictions between the EU’s pursuit of maintaining stability and democratic ends. Differences between the U.S. and EU approach might diminish in the future, as the current U.S. administration has moved away from a rhetorically overloaded debate about democracy promotion to a more pragmatic stance as the NSS 2010 shows. Nevertheless, in accordance with John Winthrop’s paradigm, “America will always be a voice for those aspirations that are universal” as the U.S. President recently stated.

The dispute about the Iraq War in 2003 summarizes the different rationales between U.S. and EU policy to the Middle East. It also shows the diversity of available means and the political willingness to use military force to meet today’s security challenges. Nevertheless, the civilian strength of the EU and the military strength of the U.S. could complement one another in a multi-polar world if the U.S. values the EU’s civil strength. Vice versa, the EU should value U.S. capabilities and willingness to use military force as the continuation of foreign politics with other means as the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz put it. However, a common transatlantic approach

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256 The White House, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize.
to the Middle East is a significant challenge as far as differences with regard to political structures and the role of domestic politics on both sides of the Atlantic are concerned.\textsuperscript{257}

Collectively, the U.S. and the EU share common ends based on a common threat assessment. However, despite a more pragmatist U.S. approach of the current U.S. administration, differences between the U.S. and EU foreign policy to the Middle East derive from different geostrategic imperatives, available civilian and military capabilities, and views on democracy promotion. Jordan is part of the “outer ring” of the European neighborhood, which should bolster the EU’s security. By contrast, the U.S. views Jordan as its bridgehead to the Gulf, and as a reliable neighbor of the U.S.’s most important strategic partner, Israel. Consequently, vice versa, from the perspective of Jordan, the EU provides the access to a closer relationship with Europe and the states in the Mediterranean, while Jordan’s relationship with the U.S. enables Jordan to address its vital security interests in Iraq and Palestine. Thus, different approaches to Jordan are not motivated by different ends, but by different strategic rationales and capabilities, which determine concepts and means as the next section elaborates.

B. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND MEANS

This chapter explores how strategic concepts and means of the U.S. and the EU shape political opportunities and the responsiveness of the U.S. and the EU to Islamist movements as examined in the previous chapters. Besides manifold initiatives at the grassroots level, this chapter focuses on the major strands of U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan, and their effects on the behavior of the Jordanian regime.

In addition to the complexity of the European framework of assistance, every EU member state provides a pattern of assistance in Jordan, which follows certain political, cultural, or economic motivations. Consequently, knowing the shortcomings of limiting the scope of foreign assistance, this chapter focuses on initiatives and programs under the lead of the EU. The same logic applies to U.S. assistance to Jordan. Besides manifold state-funded organizations and initiatives of the U.S., this chapter focuses on the main strands of U.S. assistance to Jordan.

Whereas the U.S. and the EU differ in their approach with regard to quantity and military assistance, economic development and security issues is the common point of main effort. The U.S. and the EU approach apply to the conditionality of good governance, human rights, and democracy. Nevertheless, the U.S. and the EU opted for an approach that maintains the status quo, acknowledging the threat of unintended consequences of political change in Jordan. Thus, the realist approach prevailed over liberal conditionality. Therefore, political opportunities are not likely to be created by the U.S. and the EU. Neither the U.S. nor the EU supports moderate Islamist organizations explicitly or implicitly. The western version of a modern Islamic political approach does not reflect the reality in Jordan with regard to the MB as the most powerful moderate Islamist mainstream organization. Nevertheless, the EU is more willing to engage with Islamists than is the U.S. at present.

1. The EU Approach

The complexity of the EU and its institutions goes along with its manifold political initiatives, agreements, and programs. Table 3 provides an overview of the main strands of the EU/Jordan relationship. This section focuses on funds, strategies, and their implementations and how they affect the political development in Jordan and whether they create political opportunities for opposing political forces such as the MB.

Despite the wide spectrum of EU assistance to Jordan, economic and security interests dominate. Although EU assistance acknowledges the obstacles of Jordan’s democratization as shown in Chapter II, it primarily addresses economic progress and security as main facilitators of a stable and modern Jordan. The EU treats Jordan as a promising case in the region reconciling modernity with Islam. Assistance is conditioned in theory, but it is not used as an instrument to push the monarchy for a political opening, which might favor Islamist organizations. Instead, the EU shares the economic reform agenda of King Abdullah II and the risk assessment of the Jordanian regime with regard to Islamism. Finally, the EU remains ambiguous regarding more political influence by moderate Islamist organizations such as the MB.

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Table 3. EU Assistance to Jordan within the Scope of EMP and ENP

The EU’s contractual relationship with Jordan dates back to 1977. However, since then the EU has changed significantly. In 1995, the EU launched the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) with eight Arab countries including Jordan and Israel to create a buffer of stable states in the southern flank of the EU (Barcelona Process).²⁵⁹

²⁵⁹ The participants of the EU summit were twenty-five EU member states, ten Mediterranean neighbor states such as Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Israel; two observing states Libya, Mauretania, and three EU candidates such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Rumania.
However, the EMP’s effectiveness with regard to the increasing illegal migration from North Africa and terrorism in the Middle East and Europe was contested. The EMP’s multilateral approach, which aimed to create multinational institutions in the region to enhance economic, security, and cultural cooperation, failed, since the unity of effort between the cooperating states could not be achieved not least because of disputes regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.260

Moreover, the EMP reached its limits with reference to security issues, which were the point of main effort of the Barcelona Declaration. The EU had to acknowledge that any attempts to provide security in the near neighborhood of the EU go beyond the scope of the EMP. The EU strategy in its neighborhood had to incorporate states such as Iran and Iraq and be coordinated with U.S. strategy. Even more important were the concerns of the Arab states, which argued that any progress in security and stability depend on Israeli concession in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, cooperation between Arab states and Israel within the EMP did not take place. In addition, the incentives the EU was willing to provide were not attractive and the EMP was deemed an asymmetric partnership. The EU Association Agreements (AA) of 2002, which mainly focused on economic cooperation funded by the Mediterranean Economic Development Area (MEDA), supported this judgment since partner states confronted many negative consequences in the economic and social realms. In addition, the AA missed formulating clear objectives with regard to good governance and human rights as well as a system of evaluation of the reform progress. Thus, commitments by both sides (the EU and partner states) were vague and abstract.261


Recognizing the shortcoming of the EMP, the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean of July 13, 2008 ("Union for the Mediterranean" (UfM)), including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, and Tunisia, aimed to revitalize the EMP by creating permanent common institutions at the political level for trustful cooperation and co-ownership stressed by common projects.\(^{262}\) However, the effectiveness of the revitalization has not yet been tested. Nevertheless, the success of the UfM is threatened due to the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in conjunction with the EU’s decision to invite the Arab League. The structure of the secretariat of the UfM, which executes common decisions by the Union, misses any northern European presence, which could mediate emerging disputes in light of the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Consequently, as Aliboni put it, the UfM might become hostage to the Israeli-Palestine conflict.\(^{263}\) Moreover, instead of a comprehensive approach to the region, and according to national interests of some EU member states (foremost France), the EU opted for a regionalization of its approach, which prevailed over cooperation with other important actors in the Gulf or the U.S. The EU’s rhetoric with regard to its normative power in promoting human rights, good governance, and democracy lagged behind efforts with regard to technical assistance and security. In this context, the EU acknowledgement of the importance of political Islam in the region falls short.\(^{264}\)

In contrast to the multilateral approach of the EMP, the ENP comprises manifold instruments designed for each partnership in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was launched in 2004 as bilateral partnership with countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), Mashreq (Libya, Egypt),


the Middle East (Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Syria), the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), and Eastern Europe (Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus). The close bilateral cooperation of the ENP should be more effective than the multilateral EMP in addressing the challenges mentioned in the ESS such as terrorism, proliferation, migration, organized crime, and energy security by fostering good governance and economic, social, and environmental progress. Nevertheless, as the EMP, the ENP is highly contested with regard to its reluctance to push for reforms despite its wide spectrum of capabilities.\textsuperscript{265}

According to the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper,

\begin{quote}
the privileged relationship with neighbors will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighborly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.\textsuperscript{266}
\end{quote}

Financial and technical assistance by the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and Jordan’s participation in “Generalized System of Preferences” mainly focused on economic assistance. This approach should enable Jordan’s access to the EU’s internal market and the World Trade Organization (WTO), a common market and the reduction of trade barriers. Nevertheless, the restructuring of EU funding and the creation of ENPI gave the EU more flexibility to respond to main areas of concern besides Jordan’s economic development.\textsuperscript{267}

The core of the ENP is the implementation of Action Plans (AP), which are designed in accordance with the Common Strategy Papers (CSPs) to provide a contractual privileged partnership between the EU and each partner state over a period of five years to assist economic and political transitions. As in the case of Jordan, the AP


was created along with Jordan’s reform agenda to emphasize Jordan’s “ownership.” 268 The elements of the AP draw from the spectrum of the EU competence of external relations and highlight the EU’s technocratic top-down assistance. They incorporate: (1) political dialogue and reform; (2) economic and social reform and development; (3) trade, market and regulatory reform; (4) cooperation and issues relating justice; (5) cooperation and reform in sectors such as transport, energy, information society, environment, science and research; and (6) “people-to-people” areas such as civil society, education, public health, cultural cooperation. The effectiveness and the progress of the implementation of the AP are monitored by ten joint subcommittees and are reported to the EU-Jordan Association Council and the EU-Association Committee.269

However, a cross-national comparison of the effectiveness of the ENP shows that progress on the basis of the APs could be achieved if countries were dependent on the EU with regard to economic and security issues, such as Armenia, Georgia, Lebanon, Morocco, Moldavia and Ukraine. Vice versa, the EU has been less effective in states such as Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Libya, and Syria, which were not dependent on the EU and of which at least the former three confront strong Islamist movements. Jordan’s economic relations with the EU are marginal in relation to the EU’s worldwide trade (0.1 percent) and far behind countries in Jordan’s neighborhood or Morocco, which is often compared to Jordan’s political situation.270 Nevertheless, the EU is the most important import trade partner of Jordan (€2.6 billion), whereas Jordan’s exports to the EU (€0.3 billion in 2008) are insignificant. Thus, the EU profits from an enhanced

269 Ibid., 9–10.
economic partnership most. By contrast, the U.S. is the largest export market for Jordanian goods (30.9 percent of exports in 2005) mainly because of privileged textiles and clothing exports to the U.S. (see Qualifying Industrial Zones in the next section).

The assessment of the AP by the Center of Security Studies in Jordan (CSS) in 2008 shows that some progress was made besides the economic sector. Progress was achieved by founding the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, amending the Press and Publication Law as well as the Access to Information Law, building judiciary capacity, supporting human rights organizations and women’s rights.

A report of the EU Commission of 2009 confirms the CSS assessment to a wide extent. The EU assistance to Jordan applies to Jordan’s focus on economic development. Jordan’s increasing inflation (14.9 percent in 2008), high poverty rate (14.5 percent are living under the poverty line), youth-unemployment, and negative fiscal balance (-5.8 percent without grants, 7.9 percent including grants) were of main concern. Moreover, despite serious challenges with regard to the implementation of complex EU standards, unity of effort between the EU and Jordan could be achieved with regard to security threats such as terrorism and migration, and organized crime. Further cooperation in the realms of counter terrorism and organized crime were agreed upon in 2008. Although political reform, democracy, human rights, and good governance are major objectives of the EU approach (according to CSP), the progress in civil liberties, civil society and strengthening parliament and political parties fell short and remained behind the progress in the economic and security sectors. Finally, whereas some progress was made to

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combat corruption (Anti-Corruption Commission since 2008) and to strengthen the
capacity of the judiciary (JUST Strategy 2007-2008) and of health care, as well as to
enforce human rights and to reduce torture, major obstacles as were noted in Chapter II
on Jordan’s path to democracy could not be removed.275

The missing success of the EU in Jordan to create a political environment and
political opportunities that favor democratic competition goes along with EU financial
efforts. While the financial support within the scope of ENPI is supposed to increase to
thirty-two percent (budget of ENPI about twelve billion Euros) until 2013, the promotion
of civil society and civil liberties ranges below ten percent in total.276 Moreover, the EU
financial assistance to Jordan is perceived as insufficient, in particular with regard to the
influx of a half million Iraqi refugees in Jordan. Nevertheless, as a Jordanian official
noted, “We can’t deny that the EU provides assistance to Jordan, but the reforms required
cannot be achieved without the Action Plan that takes into considerations that
implementing such a plan takes time and sufficient amount of aid.”277

However, as Figure 8 shows, EU assistance to Jordan has followed trends of
deliberalization during times of major security threats. EU assistance to Jordan dropped
significantly when repression increased in the aftermath of the Second Intifada in late
2000 and during Jordan’s support of the Iraq War in 2003. Thus, the strongly varying
financial EU commitments positively correlate with the perception of civil liberties in
Jordan in these periods. However, this does not necessarily mean that the coincidence of
EU assistance with perceived civil liberties in Jordan follows a certain pattern that
acknowledges the shortcoming of King Abdullah’s reform agenda. The variation of EU
assistance also derives from changes of EU funds. The assistance of the EU in 2002
boosted when the NIP was launched in addition to MEDA. The flexibility to shift

275 Commission of the European Union, Commission Staff Working Document: Progress Report Jordan (Brussels: [2009]).


277 In comparison to Jordan’s remittance income in 2003 of more than $ 2 billion, the EU financial
support to ease the burden of Iraqi refugees in Jordan only measured 26.7 million Euros in total.
December 11, 2009); and George, Jordan: Living in the Crossfire, 72.
expenditures within the scope of NIP enabled the EU to signal its support of Jordan’s reform attempts since 2002; but despite decreasing civil liberties in preparation of the 2007 elections, NIP funds remained unchanged.

Figure 8. Perceived Civil Liberties in Jordan in Comparison to Trends of EU Assistance between 1999 and 2008

On the one hand, EU agreements in general and with regard to the case of Jordan in particular declare the protection of human rights in accordance with the UN Charter, as well as rule of law and democratic principles as being subject of conditionality of EU assistance. According to the strategy of the ENP, “the level of ambition of the EU’s relationships with its neighbors will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared.” On the other hand, the EU has very rarely used conditionality to

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suspend assistance. A study on EU conditionality shows that suspensions of assistance were only successful in times of significant political crisis and conflicts, which do not apply to the case of Jordan. Consequently, these seemingly “double standards” are not satisfactory from a liberal point of view but apply to EU’s Realpolitik.280 The inconsistency between democratic rhetoric and political conduct is one major facilitator for anti-western sentiments as opinion polls in five Arab countries in 2005 showed.281

Finally, EU assistance to Jordan could not prevent trends of deliberalization in Jordan. It is limited since Jordan’s security concerns mainly derive from its neighboring states such as Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where the U.S. rather than the EU is able to influence future political developments. Thus, the EU approach and its normative power neither attracts Jordan nor does it put the EU in a position to push the Jordanian monarch to political concessions, which might create political opportunities for opposing political forces such as the MB. Instead, the EU profits economically as well as with regard to security from Jordan’s status quo. Conversely, aside from EU funds, the monarchy profits from the legitimacy provided by its close relationship with the EU.282 However, does this approach pay for a long-term perspective of stability in Jordan?

The perception of the Jordanian public of EU assistance is striking. According to polls in 2008 in Jordan, only 12.7 percent view the EU programs to be fairly distributed. Whereas 32.2 percent of the respondents believe that the EU is successfully promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, 55.8 percent admitted that they had not heard of


the EU-Jordan cooperation in this realm. In contrast, EU assistance was perceived as most successful in combating terrorism (33.8 percent), followed by Jordan’s cooperation with regard to security and foreign policy (32.2 percent, elites 44.3 percent). Nevertheless, 25.2 percent of the respondents (elites 31.9 percent) perceive the EU as ineffective in preventing security threats to Jordan and crises. In this context, it is noteworthy that 48.5 percent highlight the EU’s neutrality with regard to Arab affairs. Nevertheless, 54.2 percent accuse the EU of being too pro-U.S.283

Collectively, this poll shows that more than two-thirds of the respondents see the EU predominantly engaged in security issues, but not able to provide the needed security for Jordan. A clear majority (75.5 percent, elites 85.3 percent) wish that the EU would take a more independent stance from the U.S. while almost every second embraces the role of the EU in ending the “Israeli occupation” and “to deal fairly with Arab issues.”284

The complex contractual framework of the EU partnership with Jordan ignores the role of Islamist movements in Jordan as a legitimate political force, as examined in the previous chapters. Islamism is only addressed in light of religious extremism in Jordan. Since “the standards of the dominant civilization always define modernity,” as Bernhard Lewis put it, the EU is convinced that Jordan is a rare example in the region for a modern Islamic state.285 In accordance with the Amman message issued in November 2004, the EU acknowledges Jordan’s fight at the forefront against Islamist extremism.286 However, the EU fails to address the nuances in the Islamist spectrum and the chances to incorporate moderate Islamist movements into the political process as the only legitimate

284 Ibid.
political force in Jordan. This dichotomist view does not help reconcile anti-western sentiments in the Arab world, nor does it enable democratic progress in Jordan taking into account moderate Islamist organizations.\textsuperscript{287}

Consequently, the EU misses a chance to engage in a closer relationship with political Islamism in Jordan. With reference to a cross-national study on political Islam in the Middle East and the ENP, mainstream Islamists who were willing to take part in the political process generally embraced EU rather than U.S. assistance. However, Islamists were concerned about the repressive responses, the criticism of political and Islamic opponents, and losing popularity. In addition, they criticized European reluctance to push democracy in the region.\textsuperscript{288} Later research on Islamist radicalization in the Middle East showed that European approaches to states in the Middle East have not prevented a trend towards radicalization since repression has continued and the political influence of moderate Islamists has declined significantly.\textsuperscript{289}

Nevertheless, the EU acknowledged in its strategy on Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism of 2005, “we need to empower moderate voices by engaging with Muslim organisations and faith groups that reject the distorted version of Islam put forward by al-Qa’ida and others.”\textsuperscript{290} Moreover, in May 2007, European Parliament passed a resolution that “the moderation of Islamism depends on both the stability of the institutional framework in which they evolve and the opportunities which the latter offers to influence policy-making.” It further states that the EU should:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{290} Council of the European Union, \textit{The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism} (Brussels, [2005]), \url{http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14781-re01_en05.pdf}.
\end{itemize}
give visible political support to...those political organisations which promote democracy by non-violent means, excluding sectarian, fundamentalist and extremist nationalist forces but including, where appropriate, secular actors and moderate Islamists...whom Europe has encouraged to participate in the democratic process, thus striking a balance between culture-based perceptions and political pragmatism. 291

Cooperation between the EU and Islamist organizations in Jordan depend on the goodwill of the ruling regime and the reluctance of the EU to implement its liberal statements into practice, not the least of which is because of a lack of unity of effort of its member states.292

2. The U.S. Approach

The U.S. revised its policy to the Middle East in the aftermath of 9/11 in accordance with its assessment that autocratic rule in conjunction with underdevelopment, a lack of education, and the repression of women (referring to UN Arab Human Development Reports) are the breeding grounds for terrorism and anti-Americanism.293 A “Forward Strategy for Freedom” should open the doors for democracy, human rights, and economic liberalization and provide stability due to the paradigm of democratic peace.294

The new U.S. approach to the Middle East started in 2002 with the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) focusing on: “(1) women's empowerment, (2) educational

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293 Main U.S. organizations promoting democracy in the Middle East are: (1) The National Endowment for Democracy; (2) the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs; (3) the International Republican Institute; (4) the Middle East Partnership Initiative; (5) the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund that promotes human rights in countries with a Muslim majority; and (6) various activities of USAID. Sharp, U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma (RL33486), 8.

advancement, (3) economic development, and (4) political participation” based on a bottom-up approach. Acknowledging that the “battle” against the reasons of terrorism has to be fought on many fronts, the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) of 2004 sought to address the G8 and the EU. While the European member states were skeptical about meeting manifold challenges in the Middle East with one approach while missing to incorporate the Arab-Israeli conflict and an Arab ownership, the Arab world harshly criticized the BMENA as an attempt of interference in internal affairs of Arab states and western cultural ignorance.

As a consequence of the broad front of Arab and European criticism, new U.S.-driven initiatives were added, such as the G8 Initiative “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa” and the “NATO Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” complementary to already existing initiatives and programs. Whereas the G8 initiative was an attempt to harmonize the BMENA with already existing initiatives of the G8, the NATO initiative was a complimentary contribution focusing on security and stability while fostering military cooperation and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialog.

However, since these initiatives are based on the least common dominator of the countries’ interests, their effectiveness and coherence is low. For instance, with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, neither the EU nor the U.S. was able to send a clear signal of willingness to push the peace process. The multilateral initiatives degenerated to “shopping lists” of single projects while missing a comprehensive approach. Nonetheless, although the success of these initiatives is highly contested, the awareness

298 Asseburg, Demokratieförderung in der arabischen Welt - Hat der partnerschaftliche Ansatz der Europäer versagt?, 273–274; and Dunne, The Baby, the Bathwater, and the Freedom Agenda in the Middle East, 129.
of an authoritarian Middle East with regard to democratic Zeitgeist changed. It became clear that the conduct of former Arab-U.S. relations was at least rhetorically adjusted by the U.S. Autocrats were urged to signal their willingness to give more political participation to their populations and to respect human rights. Thus, the path of political transition was rhetorically paved; whether noticeable democratic changes in the Middle East will occur and consolidate remains to be seen.

As noted, Jordan’s economic and military weakness with regard to its challenging geostrategic situation in a hostile neighborhood needs a strong ally who is able to influence Jordan’s neighboring states. Thus, Jordan’s former alliance with Great Britain and later with the U.S. has historical roots and strategic reasons. According to U.S. commitments to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq with regard to its military presence, arms sales, and economic aid, Jordan’s stability is closely connected with U.S. policy in the region.

The assistance by the U.S. to Jordan dates back to 1951. Since then, U.S. assistance has been a significant policy tool to support U.S. interests in the region. Assistance to Jordan was suspended when Jordan backed Iraq in the Gulf Crisis in the early 1990s, but it has increased significantly since Jordan’s policy of reconciliation with Israel (peace treaty in 1994). Not surprisingly, the assistance to Jordan quadrupled between 1998 and 2008 when Jordan became a crucial cornerstone of the War on Terror and an important bridgehead to the Middle East, especially since the Iraq War in 2003. The United States’ assistance to Jordan averaged over $700 million per year since 2003. Thus, it is noteworthy that U.S. military assistance is on average higher than EU

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301 Vogt, Der Gaza Krieg seine Folgen: Realpolitik in einer verunsicherten Nachbarschaft, 12.

financial commitments combined (see Figure 9). However, as in the case of the EU, U.S. efforts in Jordan are driven by economic assistance, not the least of which is in response to Jordan’s performance in security and its vital role in supporting the U.S. efforts in Iraq, such as training of Iraqi security forces as well as logistical support and military equipment.

As shown in Chapter III, and in contrast to increasing U.S. economic and military assistance, liberalization in Jordan has stagnated since King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999 (see Figure 10). The effects of U.S. assistance on the monarchy’s stability seem to contradict the objectives of U.S. democracy promotion. While the regime’s stability was strengthened by military and economic assistance, in particular after Jordan’s role in combating terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 and in light of the Iraq War, the perceived civil liberties reached bottom in 2001 and stayed at a low level until 2004. Conversely, when the perceived liberties peaked, U.S. assistance to Jordan stagnated in 2006. Finally, U.S. assistance increased in 2008 when Hamas mobilized in Jordan against the war in the Gaza strip while Jordan increased its efforts in supporting the Palestinian Authority.

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303 As noted, EU member states might follow an agenda separate from the EU approach. With regard to Jordan’s historic roots and its current role in supporting the stabilization in Iraq, the United Kingdom provides military training and equipment to Jordan. Moreover, France maintains close military relations with many states in the Middle East including Jordan in order to secure its “historic” influence in the region. Western military assistance to Jordan such as the support for the Jordanian Special Operations Command benefits also Middle Eastern states such as Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, which train their Special Forces in Jordan. Alfred B. Prados, *Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues (RL33546)* Congressional Research Service, [2006]), [www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov) (accessed April 29, 2010); and Library of Congress, "Country Profiles: Country Studies - Federal Research Division," Library of Congress, [http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles.html](http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles.html) (accessed April 30, 2010).


Figure 9. U.S. Assistance to Jordan Since 1999

Figure 10. Perceived Civil Liberties in Jordan Since 1999


In addition to Jordan’s access to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 2001 and the EU/Jordan association agreement of 2002, since 1998 the U.S. designated thirteen Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Jordan. The QIZ are conditioned to joint Israeli-Jordanian products designated to exports to the U.S. Consequently, in accordance with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 2000, Jordan is able to export goods to the U.S. duty-free if the products share an Israeli input of eight percent. Jordanian exports to the U.S. “grew from $15 million in 1997 to more than $1 billion in 2004” and are supposed to create jobs and attract foreign investment.\(^{308}\) However, instead of a boost in employment, 74 percent of currently 43,000 employed workers are from Southeast Asia since Jordanians are viewed as less skilled.\(^{309}\)

As discussed in Chapter II regarding the downsizing of social welfare, “the focus in the past ten years was on the economic front and very little was done on the social front” as Dr. Halaiqah, a leading figure of Jordan’s economic reform agenda, states.\(^{310}\) Jordan’s economic growth has not benefited most Jordanians.\(^{311}\) Rather, it bolstered the business community, maintained budget security, and, therefore, stabilized the status quo.\(^{312}\) Economic “shocks” as in the 1980s, which led to Jordan’s most substantial

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\(^{308}\) Today QIZs in Jordan “include; the Al-Hassan Industrial Estate (Irbid), and Al-Hussein Ibn Abdullah II Industrial Estate (Al Karak), both owned and operated by the Jordan Industrial Estate Corporation. Also, the now privately owned and operated Al-Tajamouat Industrial Estate (Amman), Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park (near Zarka), Jordan Cyber City (Irbid), Al-Qastal Industrial Zone (Amman), and El-Zai Ready-wear Manufacturing Co. sub-zone (Zarqa).”…”Other QIZs expected to be operational in the near future include the Gateway QIZ (northern Jordan-Israel border), Aqaba Industrial Estate (Aqaba), and the Mushatta International complex (Amman).” Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor, ”Q.I.Z – Qualifying Industrial Zones,” [http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/exeres/2124E799-4876-40EF-831C-6410830D8F02.htm](http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/exeres/2124E799-4876-40EF-831C-6410830D8F02.htm) (accessed April 20, 2010).


\(^{310}\) George, *Jordan: Living in the Crossfire*, 75–76.


\(^{312}\) George, *Jordan: Living in the Crossfire*, 112.
political openings, as well as political shocks in Jordan’s neighborhood, are countered by economic and military assistance. Before the boost in U.S. assistance in 2003, the U.S. provided 60 percent of the grant assistance, whereas the EU provided 23 percent in 2002. Moreover, the Jordanian government uses U.S. Economic Support Funds (45 percent) to ease the burden of debts. Between 1997 and 2006, the “USAID [United States Agency for International Development] has provided $1.163 billion for the cash transfer program” and additional $700 million during the Iraq War in 2003 (see Figure 9).

Consequently, Jordan’s strong backing of the U.S. since 9/11 and its role in stabilizing Iraq shaped U.S. assistance. Thus, political and economic shocks from outside Jordan are countered by the U.S. since instability in Jordan threatens U.S. effort in Iraq, challenges U.S. commitments in Israel, and might weaken the front against terrorism. Therefore, a realist approach of “status quo” prevails over “democratic change” in Jordan as the liberalist camp advocates. Thus, as well as in the case of the EU, U.S. assistance to Jordan is inconsistent, using double standards with regard to its Realpolitik versus manifold programs to foster democracy at the grassroots level. Therefore, Islamist organizations such as the MB in Jordan, which might challenge the power of the regime, are not welcome. With regard to Islamist terrorism in Jordan, the rise of Hamas in Palestine and objections of Islamists in Jordan against the U.S. policy in the Middle East, “the U.S. seems willing to accept whatever pace the government sets for the political process.”

In this context, a study of the Egyptian reform process showed that approaches to cooperate with moderate Islamist movements were rejected by the U.S. and the regime.

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313 Nevertheless, as noted, EU member states significantly contribute to the stabilization of the Jordanian regime. It “received a total of $184 million in bilateral and multilateral loans. The bulk of the loans were from the World Bank, which provided 68 percent of the total, followed by the German Government at 13 percent, the Spanish and Swiss Governments each at nine percent and Government of Norway at one percent.” USAID, "USAID/Jordan Strategy 2004 – 2009: Gateway to the Future," http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABZ632.pdf (accessed April 21, 2010).


315 Sharp, U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma (RL33486), 27.
Conversely, pro-reform forces refrained from cooperating with the U.S. as a consequence of harsh regime repression. Consequently, besides ideological reasons, moderate Islamists will not support U.S. assistance, since the U.S. does not push the regimes to refrain from repression and to include Islamists in the political process. Thus, conditionality of U.S. assistance in Jordan applies to U.S. realist interests but not to the liberal paradigm of democracy and human rights. This conduct of U.S. assistance might contradict U.S. legislation since 1974, which conditions U.S. aid to the benefit of the needy, human rights and democratic principles.

Nevertheless, an ideological-driven approach of promoting democracy to contain terrorism would overshadow a possible pragmatic approach to Islamist organizations, which should acknowledge that democracy comes in many forms and not as a uniform worldwide process. The latest research showed that states in transition to democracy, and even consolidated democracies, are more vulnerable to terrorism than dictatorships. Moreover, a cross-national study of the relationship between terrorism and different regimes in the Middle East shows that including moderate Islamist organizations in the political process is likely to fail if regimes and their political institutions are weak. Therefore, U.S. attempts to strengthen the Jordanian Parliament are evident. As the EU established a political dialogue at the political party level and


317 Commission of the European Union, The Application of Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s Bilateral Trade Agreements and Other Trade Agreements with Third Countries, 10.


cooperation between the European and Jordanian Parliament. USAID funded programs to strengthen the Jordanian Parliament as well as to train Jordanian political parties, however, focusing on gender issues. “While some IAF members, particularly women, may participate in U.S.-sponsored workshops, there is no concerted effort among U.S. diplomats in Amman to engage.” These initiatives do not engage in removing major obstacles on Jordan’s path to democracy since neutrality and nonpartisanship for staying in “business” is key. If political elites perceive that U.S. programs have an “agenda,” the success of these programs would be threatened since U.S. attempt of promoting democracy is perceived as opportunistic and hostile to Islam. Thus, foreign actors in general and the U.S. in particular are limited in promoting reforms in particular regarding the noted obstacles of Jordan’s path to democracy. Finally, “the final outcome in each country [in the Middle East] would owe much more to domestic factors than to the vigor of U.S. and European reformist zeal.”

C. CONCLUSION

Strategic ends of the U.S. and the EU in the Middle East in general, and with regard to Jordan in particular, do not substantially differ. Nevertheless, the EU’s foreign

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322 The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute have conducted the training of political parties. The Parliamentary Strengthening Program has been conducted by State University of New York since 2005 and was redesigned in 2008 regarding (1) communications and public relations; (2) integrated information technology; (3) strengthening committees; (4) creation of a new budget office; (5) creation of a new legislative research and training office; (6) public and civil society participation.


policy is dominated by a civilian approach, whereas the U.S. incorporates a more prominent role of its military assistance.\textsuperscript{326} Differences in both approaches derive from different geostrategic perspectives, Jordan’s special relationship with the U.S., and the availability of different capabilities. However, security in the European neighborhood depends on U.S. priorities in the Middle East such as in Iraq or Palestine.\textsuperscript{327} Moreover, the EU’s attractiveness with regard to its normative power does not apply to Jordan and does not significantly address the concerns of Jordan, which has maintained a close relationship with the U.S. Jordan’s destiny depends on security in its neighborhood and economic assistance by the U.S. Therefore, EU assistance to Jordan is perceived as a necessary “add on” but is not sufficient regarding Jordan’s major concerns. Jordan takes what it needs to stabilize the monarchy and rejects substantial change, which might threaten the regime’s stability. Consequently, in contrast to the U.S., EU assistance to Jordan does not have the power to force the Jordanian regime to push for further liberalization that favors the political inclusion of opposing political forces.

The U.S. and the EU seem to acknowledge the difficult domestic and geostrategic situation in which Jordan operates. Thus, rhetorical and contractual commitments to democratic developments in Jordan are \textit{kalaam fadi} (“empty words”) since democratic efforts fall behind economic progress and security concerns. Major obstacles that hinder a transition to democracy such as the Election Law, weak political institutions (foremost parliament and political parties), and repression have not been removed during U.S. and EU assistance, but have become even more substantial. Thus, political change is likely to emerge by political and economic “shocks” from outside Jordan if they are not countered by EU and U.S. assistance.\textsuperscript{328} Neither the EU nor the U.S. is willing to push the Jordanian regime too hard since short-term realist interests outweigh long-term liberal goals. Besides security assistance, approaches of the U.S. and the EU focus on economic assistance following the modernization paradigm. As in Jordan’s case, Przeworski and

\textsuperscript{327} Aliboni, \textit{The Mediterranean and the Middle East. Narrowing Gaps in the Transatlantic Perspective}, 2.
Limongi’s quantitative research in 1997 shows that economic development did not turn an authoritarian regime into a democratic one.\footnote{Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," \textit{World Politics} 49, no. 2 (1997): 155.}

Nevertheless, the EU is seen in a positive light while the U.S. is not. Since the EU lacks substantial influence on Jordan’s development, the EU cannot and is not willing to take advantage of these circumstances. The EU has to cooperate with the U.S. to provide security and stability in its neighborhood, while the U.S. should take advantage of the EU civil capabilities in order to develop a common gradual approach that fosters stability along with substantial political opening while strengthening political institutions that can handle the democratic process.\footnote{Asseburg, \textit{Conclusions: Dynamics in Political Islam and Challenges for European Policies}, 151–169.}

Finally, the realist approach of status quo prevails as stability of Jordan’s “hybrid regime” comes first. Neither the U.S. nor the EU has implemented an approach to Islamist organizations in Jordan. Clear objectives on how to engage with Islamist movements in Jordan must be defined.\footnote{Emerson and Youngs, \textit{Political Islam and European Neighbourhood Policy}, 1–12; Springborg, \textit{Political Islam and Europe: Views from the Arab Mediterranean States and Turkey}, 160–184.} Thus, U.S. military and economic assistance to Jordan and the EU’s reluctance has promoted a policy of deliberalization that hinders the MB’s political influence. Besides efforts at the grassroots level, the U.S. and the EU should put more effort into the political process, which creates political opportunities for moderate Islamist organizations, as the EU addressed in its strategy “Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism” of 2005 and in its resolution of May 2007. Examples of successful inclusion of former radical organizations in Europe have shown...
that ideological intersections exist and can be exploited for political inclusion and moderation of radical strands.\textsuperscript{332} Thus, a rethinking of U.S. and EU assistance to Jordan is necessary to provide long-term stability.\textsuperscript{333}


V. CONCLUSION

This thesis sheds light on the Jordanian regime with regard to preventing democratic progress in general, and political opportunities for opposing political forces such as the MB in particular. In this context, neither the U.S. nor the EU has been willing to push the Jordanian regime to a political opening that favors a substantial inclusion of the MB as the most promising political opposition in Jordan. Assistance by the EU and the U.S. has followed a realist approach maintaining the status quo instead of promoting democracy in Jordan.

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Figure 11. Corruption Perception Index, Rule of Law, and the Human Development Index in Comparison\textsuperscript{334}


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Nevertheless, as Figure 11 shows, Jordan ranks at the top for good governance, taking together significant indicators such as the “Corruption Perception Index” (2009) and “Rule of Law” (2008) in Jordan. According to data provided by the UN, World Bank, and Transparency International, Jordan not only outbids its neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, but also promising cases in the Maghreb such as Tunisia and Morocco. In addition, living conditions measured by the Human Development Index (HDI 2007) ranks third in the region. Even as far as “voice and accountability” (not depicted in Figure 11) is concerned, Jordan ranks third behind Lebanon and Morocco in 2007. Consequently, Jordan is a bridgehead for western interests in the region, which also bodes well for Jordanians in comparison with Arab countries in Jordan’s neighborhood. Thus, the realist approach of the U.S. and the EU seems to pay off.

However, Jordan’s positive stance in the Arab world is elusive as its democratic façade shows. The regime’s policy of repression and electoral engineering has undermined the emergence of political structures that enable fair political competition and the mediation of political demands by civil society. Since the mid-1990s, the regime systematically prevented political opportunities by repression and limited political access while successfully maintaining the “power map” of Jordanian elites. While economic and security issues in Jordan were dominant, social welfare declined, whereas

335 “Rule of Law: A subjective governance indicator aggregated from a variety of sources and measuring perceptions of the following concepts: legal impartiality and popular observance of the law. Estimates range between -2.5 and 2.5; higher is better.” The data is drawn from World Bank. Ibid.

336 “Corruption perceptions index measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. Ratings range in value from 10 (least corrupt) to 0 (most corrupt). The survey measures public sector corruption, the abuse of public office for private gain.” The data is drawn from Transparency International. Ibid.

336 “The Human development index (HDI) is a composite index based on the weighted average of three indices: educational attainment index measuring a combination of the adult literacy rate (two-thirds weight) and the combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio (one-third weight); life expectancy index measuring life expectancy at birth; and adjusted Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (PPP $) index measuring the standard of living. Ratings for the HDI are the following: Values between 0.1 – 0.499 imply low human development Values between 0.5 – 0.799 imply medium human development Values between 0.8 – 0.999 imply high human development.” Ibid.

unemployment and inflation increased. Thus, this trend might offer an opportunity for Islamist organizations to undermine the regime’s legitimacy in general. However, the weakness of political institutions and the mistrust of Jordanians in political representation in Jordan threaten the long-term stability in Jordan in particular. Increasing clientelism in conjunction with the Palestinian-Transjordan divide and rifts within public opinion about Jordan’s political future hampers political opposition from gaining momentum. As political participation does not pay, radical and apolitical strands of Islamism might gain strength in the future as Salafism has become more popular. Thus, while political opportunities for moderate Islamist strands are not likely to emerge, radical strands benefit from missing political access and repression in light of the regime’s pro-western policy. Consequently, Jordan’s prospects of a transition from authoritarian rule to a democracy are highly constrained while the costs of political inclusion of moderate Islamists have increased in the absence of strong institutions, which could handle political competition. Macroeconomic improvements and Jordan’s performance with regard to good governance and transparency have not led to more political liberalization.

Since the “pact” between the monarchy and the MB was abolished by King Abdullah II, MB influence in the legal political framework diminished while repression continued along with security threats in Jordan’s neighborhood. Nevertheless, since the MB’s foundation in 1945, it has demonstrated that it acts strategically. Its ideational pragmatism, as well as the organizational benefits of its accommodative stance with the regime, has prevented a radicalization despite repression and limited political access since the mid-1990s.

Significant political “shocks” in Jordan’s neighborhood, such as the War in Iraq in 2003, shaped the MB political agenda, which contradicts western interests. However, a confrontation with the regime is not likely as long as its organizational structures are not threatened and ideological concessions do not outweigh the benefits of the MB’s accommodative stance. Nevertheless, as the regime’s pro-western policy along with repression and limited political access continues or even increases during King Abdullah’s reign, the MB might also lose its potential to attract “fence-sitters” in order to contain radical Islamist strands from gaining momentum. Thus, the continuation of a
status quo in Jordan further weakens the MB political stance, strengthens radical Islamist strands, and threatens the Jordanian regime, as alternative legitimate political forces, which are loyal to the regime, are not available.

As empirical evidence in the Middle East about successful inclusion of moderate Islamists is weak, it remains uncertain how the MB will act if it assumes political power. Nevertheless, the worst-case scenario that Islamists will impose Shari‘ah under autocratic rule is less likely since neither the MB, the Jordanian public, or Jordan’s elites favor a drift or a revolution into a theocracy. By contrast, the biggest threat to Jordan’s transition to democracy derives from the co-optation of the MB as the remaining effective opposing political force in Jordan. This scenario would bolster the public mistrust in political representation as well as weaken the belief in democratic progress and the credibility of moderate Islamists such as the MB to the benefit of radical and apolitical Islamist strands in Jordan. Therefore, Springborg concludes, “authoritarianism is bad enough, but an Islamist authoritarianism would be even worse for the countries themselves as well as their neighbours and indeed for much of the rest of the world.”

However, since substantial political inclusion of the MB and political opportunities are missing, future scenarios remain uncertain. The MB is the only legitimate social and political force that has the organizational and ideological prerequisites to promote an endogenous democratic progress from within Jordan. Besides its strategic behavior, its ideology has the potential to incorporate multiple identities in Jordan against increasing clientelism, while radical strands remain exclusive and other moderate strands are weak. The question is whether the MB is able or willing to mobilize the discontent in Jordan’s public since moderate factions of the MB and public opinion acknowledges that Jordan’s hostile neighborhood does not allow for rapid political change.

Nevertheless, a substantial political inclusion of the MB will bode well for Jordan’s democratic progress. Moderation of radical ideas of the MB took place, as

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strategic behavior prevailed and concessions were necessary to achieve the MB’s goals. A political opening will encourage the debate between the MB’s multiple factions and create conditions for further moderation, but also for splinter movements. This process is supposed to lead to a diversification of the Islamist spectrum as competition and political accountability increases. The political ambiguity of Islamist organizations will be replaced by concrete political agendas to attract the different political factions in Jordan’s society. As long as democracy is not practiced in Jordan, Jordanians will not experience the benefits of having a democracy. Finally, Jordan’s democracy will not follow an exogenous western approach as long as they perceive western interference as unjust and selfish.

In this context, the EU and U.S. missed a chance to promote a policy in Jordan that favors a substantial inclusion of moderate Islamists such as the MB. The realist approach of both actors highlights the short-term benefits of Jordan’s status quo but fails to address the preconditions of long-term stability maintained by an endogenous process based on political liberalization. Besides Jordan’s good “grades” with regard to good governance, Jordan has the potential to become a role model for a successful inclusion of moderate Islamist organizations, which benefits western interests with regard to stability for the region. Western credibility in negotiating present and future conflicts in the Middle East is crucial when it comes to vital western security interests. Thus, U.S. and EU must adjust their point of main effort in assistance to Jordan. Economic and security assistance to Jordan is not sufficient in addressing the obstacles of democratic progress in Jordan. The U.S. and the EU should not prevent political opportunities, but push and assist the Jordanian regime to create political structures that enable political competition.

In this regard, the EU and the U.S. have the basis for task sharing. The EU and the U.S. share common ends but take different geostrategic perspectives. Whereas the EU focuses on stability in Jordan to promote security in its neighborhood, the U.S. uses Jordan as a secure bridgehead to address its interests in the broader Middle East. Nevertheless, the security in the EU’s neighborhood depends on U.S. policy in the Middle East such as in Iraq and Palestine. Moreover, whereas the EU is unable to provide security in Jordan’s neighborhood, the U.S. is able to address Jordan’s security
concerns. Nevertheless, the EU’s institutional power, civil capabilities, and coherent strategy offer a comprehensive approach to foster Jordan’s path to democracy. While the U.S. is able to push democratization in Jordan but lacks credibility in Jordan’s public and within the moderate Islamist spectrum, the EU is seen in a more positive light willing to handle political accommodation with Islamists. The EU is able to assist democratic progress along with institution building as the EU’s historic enlargement shows.\footnote{Aliboni, The Mediterranean and the Middle East. Narrowing Gaps in the Transatlantic Perspective, 2.}

The question is whether the U.S. and the EU can work out this burden sharing in a reasonable fashion and how might it work on the ground. In addition, too many unclear “variables” in Jordan’s neighborhood such as the development in Iraq and the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process do not encourage the U.S. and the EU to take further security risks in the region. Nevertheless, security risks increase as the democratic progress in Jordan falls short and radical Islamism gains momentum. Thus, Jordan has the potential to provide security as it successfully reconciles Islamism with democracy while the U.S. and the EU gain credibility to the benefit of many conflicts and crises in the Middle East.
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