THE INTELLECTUAL REVIEWS OF FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC GROUPS’ LEADERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE JIHADI ACTION, THE MUSLIM WORLD, AND THE WEST

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

LTC SHEREEF GOUDA MOHAMED ELARAISHY, EGYPT
M.SC., Commanders and Staff Officers College, Cairo, 2006
B.SC., Military Academy, Cairo, 1990

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2010-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
**ABSTRACT**

After the events of the 11 September 2001 and the advent of the War on Terrorism focused mainly against Al-Qaeda, interest in studying the Islamic groups has increased. Such enquiries can have a huge impact on both the Muslim World as well as the West. In this stressful and hyped political and security environment in the region, intellectual reviews of the doctrinal and practical underpinnings of the activities of the leaders of Islamic Group and the Islamic Jihad Group in Egypt have been published. In the world of Islam, an intellectual review is an open public proclamation by an Islamic cleric of a sound standing. Most of these reviews have concluded that these supposedly Jihadist groups have gone astray. The reviews challenge the hard-line members of these groups and urge them to confess their doctrine is misguided and therefore course correction was in order. The reviews also ask groups’ rank and file to apologize to the public through a critical and dispassionate review of their jurisprudence, their wrong political behavior, their belief in legitimacy of violence and murder, and atone for their acts of omission and commission through sincere commitment to the governments and societies. I sincerely believe that an analysis of these intellectual reviews will strengthen our understanding of the nature of the ideas of fundamentalist Islamic groups.

This thesis seeks to answer the primary question of what is at the heart of the intellectual reviews of fundamentalist Islamic groups’ leaders and what potential impact could these reviews have on the Jihad Action, the Muslim World, and the West. To answer the primary question, this thesis focuses on four secondary questions: (1) What is the concept of jihad according to famous Islamic scholars? (2) What is the concept of jihad in the Qur’an and Hadith? (3) What is the history of the Egyptian Islamic groups? (4) What are the essential contents of famous intellectual reviews?

These reviews are considered in Egypt—and in the Muslim world—as an invitation to rationalize the Jihad action, and stop or stem the violence. They provide ideas about a productive way out of the deadlock and violence that has already claimed the lives of millions of innocent people in addition to causing massive damage to the economy of the affected nation.
Name of Candidate: LTC Shereef Gouda Mohamed Elaraishy

Thesis Title: The Intellectual Reviews of Fundamentalist Islamic Groups’ Leaders and Their Impact on the Jihadi Action, the Muslim World, and the West

Approved by:

__________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Alice B. Smith, Ph.D.

__________________________________________, Member
Sean N. Kalic, Ph.D.

__________________________________________, Member
John N. Cary, M.A.

Accepted this 11th day of June 2010 by:

__________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


After the events of the 11 September 2001 and the advent of the War on Terrorism focused mainly against Al-Qaeda, interest in studying the Islamic groups has increased. Such enquiries can have a huge impact on both the Muslim World as well as the West. In this stressful and hyped political and security environment in the region, intellectual reviews of the doctrinal and practical underpinnings of the activities of the leaders of Islamic Group and the Islamic Jihad Group in Egypt have been published. In the world of Islam, an intellectual review is an open public proclamation by an Islamic cleric of a sound standing. Most of these reviews have concluded that these supposedly Jihadist groups have gone astray. The reviews challenge the hard-line members of these groups and urge them to confess their doctrine is misguided and therefore course correction was in order. The reviews also ask groups’ rank and file to apologize to the public through a critical and dispassionate review of their jurisprudence, their wrong political behavior, their belief in legitimacy of violence and murder, and atone for their acts of omission and commission through sincere commitment to the governments and societies. I sincerely believe that an analysis of these intellectual reviews will strengthen our understanding of the nature of the ideas of fundamentalist Islamic groups.

This thesis seeks to answer the primary question of what is at the heart of the intellectual reviews of fundamentalist Islamic groups’ leaders and what potential impact could these reviews have on the Jihadi Action, the Muslim World, and the West. To answer the primary question, this thesis focuses on four secondary questions: (1) What is the concept of jihad according to famous Islamic scholars? (2) What is the concept of jihad in the Qur’an and Hadith? (3) What is the history of the Egyptian Islamic groups? (4) What are the essential contents of famous intellectual reviews?

These reviews are considered in Egypt—and in the Muslim world—as an invitation to rationalize the Jihadi action, and stop or stem the violence. They provide ideas about a productive way out of the deadlock and violence that has already claimed the lives of millions of innocent people in addition to causing massive damage to the economy of the affected nation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I want to thank my wife, Germeen, and my children, Donia and Mohamed, for their love and support. Germeen has stood by my side through all our life together. Her patience and understanding has allowed me the time to research and write this thesis.

I also want to thank Maj Meher Khan, Maj Ali Iqbal, and LTC Rustam Gozalov who read early drafts of this thesis and provided me with valuable feedback.

I owe special thanks to my thesis committee members from the Command and General Staff College--Dr. Butler Smith, Dr. Sean Kalic, and Mr. John Cary, and Dr. Robert Baumann, Director, Graduate Degree Programs. This thesis is better thanks to their insights and recommendations. Any errors that remain are my own. In addition, I want to thank Mr James Fain, Chief, International Military Student Division for his support to me during my study and stay in the college.

This thesis is dedicated to the soul of my father, my mother, my brothers Hamada, Islam, and Serag. In addition, my father-in-law, mother-in-law, and brothers-in-law, Ehab and Ibrahim. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my teacher and spiritual father, BG Sobhy Saed Omar (Ret).
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .......... iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS ....................................................................................................................... x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis .............................................................................................................................. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Research Question ............................................................................................ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Research Questions ....................................................................................... 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions.................................................................................................................... 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations .................................................................................................................... 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations ................................................................................................................ 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope ............................................................................................................................. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance .................................................................................................................... 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Methodology ................................................................................................. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 THE JIHAD ................................................................................................. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Concept of Jihad by Famous Islamic Scholars ...................................................... 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Difference Between Jihad and Fighting .............................................................. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Positions/Views of Jihad Among Common People ........................................ 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas for Jihad in Society ........................................................................................... 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Jihad and Preemptive Jihad ....................................................................... 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad Ruling: Obligatory or Voluntary? .................................................................... 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Should a Collective Duty be Done? .................................................................... 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When is Jihad an Individual Duty? ........................................................................... 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims Do Not Fight Those Who Extend Peace to Them ........................................ 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jihad in the Qur’ an ............................................................................................. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verses That Authorize the Jihad ................................................................................. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verses That Identify Reasons for the Jihad ................................................................. 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verses That Encourage the Jihad ............................................................................. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jihad in Hadith .................................................................................................... 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting for the Cause of Allah ................................................................................. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation of Desire for Jihad ................................................................................. 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyrs in the Way of Allah ...................................................................................... 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulfilling Safe Conduct .............................................................................................. 33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prohibition of Killing Women and Children in War .................................................. 34
Keeping a Covenant and Prohibition of Breach of Faith ........................................... 34
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 35

CHAPTER 2 THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC GROUPS ......................................................36

Introduction................................................................................................................... 36
The Establishment of the Egyptian Islamic Groups ..................................................... 38
Classifications of the Egyptian Islamic Movement in Modern Times ......................... 40
The Classification of the Islamic Groups According To Doctrine ........................... 41
Classification According To Method of Movement and Political Action .......... 42
Important Egyptian Islamic Groups .............................................................................. 42
Muslim Brotherhood Group ...................................................................................... 43
    The Organization ...................................................................................................45
    The Objectives .......................................................................................................46
    The Means..............................................................................................................47
Muslim Community Group “Al-Takfir Wal Hijra”.................................................. 48
    Al-Takfir Wal Hijra Group (Muslim Community Group) Thoughts................. 49
The Islamic Group “al-Gamaa al-Islamiya” ............................................................ 51
    The Operations of the Islamic Group................................................................ 52
An Analytical Study of the Islamic Jihad Group ...................................................... 53
    Factors That Influenced the Group’s Ideology ................................................... 54
    Split in the Group and the Emergence of Yahya Hashem Group ................. 56
    Another Split in the Islamic Jihad Group ..............................................................57
    Independence of the Group of Giza ................................................................. 57
    Establishment of Salih Sariyah Group ................................................................. 58
    What Happened with Ismail Tantawi Group until October 1981 ..................... 59
    Jihad Movement in Egypt and the Assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat ... 59
    The Strategy of Islamic Jihad Group: ............................................................... 66
    The Difference between Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad: ......................... 67
    Important Operations Implemented by Islamic Jihad Group ....................... 67
Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 69
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 70

CHAPTER 3 THE INTELLECTUAL REVIEWS ............................................................72

The Intellectual Reviews of the Islamic Group “al-Gamaa al-Islamiya” .............. 73
Motives Behind the Initiative and Its Strategic Significance................................. 73
Attitudes and Visions of the Group Before and After Reviews......................... 75
    The Position of the Ruling Regime .....................................................................75
    Before Reviews ................................................................................................. 75
    After Reviews ................................................................................................... 76
    Characterization of the Community’s Position ............................................... 77
    Before Reviews ................................................................................................. 77
    After Reviews ................................................................................................... 78
    The Position of Political and Intellectual Powers .............................................. 78
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>Ayman al-Zawahiri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAIR</td>
<td>Council on American Islamic Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARL</td>
<td>Combined Arms Research Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combating Terrorism Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGDP</td>
<td>Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIG</td>
<td>Egyptian Islamic Group, “al-Gamaa al-Islamiya”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIJ</td>
<td>Egyptian Islamic Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Graduate Degree Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Intellectual reviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUMS</td>
<td>International Union for Muslim Scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAF</td>
<td>Muhammad Abd-al-Salam Faraj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCG</td>
<td>Muslim Community Group, “Al-Takfir Wal Hijra”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMRI</td>
<td>Middle East Media Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFG</td>
<td>Libyan Islamic Fighting Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBL</td>
<td>Osama bin Laden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SGA  Small Group Advisor
SI  Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif (aka Dr. Fadl and Abd Al-Qader Bin Abd Al-Aziz)
SSI  State Security Investigation
U.S.  United States
INTRODUCTION

The aim of the War on Terrorism, according to the statement made by U.S. President George W. Bush, was to eliminate terrorism and punish countries that harbor terrorists. This campaign began after the tragic events of 11 September 2001, when Al-Qaeda became its central focus.¹ This War on Terrorism has been particularly unique because, as Georgetown University historian Bruce Hoffman said, “It is unlike traditional wars; the war on terror does not have a clear beginning and an end. In the war on terror, there’s no specific battlefield and the enemy isn’t an army and it’s a war without boundaries.”² Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said, “It is a hard war to define because of the multiple adversaries.”³

The emergence of Al-Qaeda, a self-proclaimed Jihadist organization, as a clearly identifiable enemy of the United States contributed to the perception in America that the next threat to the U.S. will come from the radical Islam. Some people in Arab and Muslim countries consider that this declaration is a war on Islam, waged on the pretext of combating terrorism. Dr. Parvez Ahmed, a national board member of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), stated that, “The association of a faith practiced by 1.2 billion people worldwide to terrorism creates the perception that the Global War on


³Ibid.
Terrorism is a war against Islam."⁴ The media in the United States and its Western allies have frequently connected Islam to terrorism through television programs and movies that often depict the enemy as a Muslim or an Arab, which gives the viewers an impression that is not only negative, but also inaccurate.

The War on Terrorism has caused many American and European research centers to pay more attention to the Islamic way of life, and the Islamic-Arab culture. In some cases, organizations argue that Islam is an inherently extreme religion that sanctions terrorism. The increasingly fashionable phrase “Islamo-fascism” is an extreme example of this perception. This notion accompanies accusations that Muslims oppress women, reject non-Muslims, disregard science, and refuse to accept technological progress.⁵ This is simply not the case. While some Islamist leaders may have indulged in anti-west rhetoric and even sanctioned violence, Islam as a faith and the entire Islamic world cannot be held responsible for this.

All this has made ordinary citizens in Western societies afraid of Islam and Muslims, created an environment of mistrust, and challenged ideas of a future peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, the same phenomenon has occurred in the Muslim world as well. Muslims believe that the Muslim community and the Arab world do not deserve this treatment because they are not responsible for the events of 11 September, and there is no problem between them and the West. Here, we find that the citizens of the West and

---


Arab or Muslim communities do not see each other as they actually are. Because of a series of events that did not involve any of them—such as attacks of terrorist groups claiming to belong to Islam, or series of military and political actions, or biased media programs—they see each other only through the eyes and interpretations of electronic communication media.

Egyptians, as well as other Arab and Muslim countries, have suffered greatly from terrorist attacks themselves over the past four decades. Egypt sacrificed thousands of innocent lives, and lost billions of dollars from declining tourism resulting from terrorist attacks such as the assassinations of President Sadat in 1981; Dr. Rif’at al Mahgoub, Speaker of the People’s Assembly, in October 1990; and a failed assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995. Other attacks include the Luxor incident in 1997 that killed 58 tourists, and the Taba bombings of 2004, which claimed the lives of 34 Egyptians and foreigners. The bombing in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2005 killed 83 Egyptians and foreigners. During the 1990s, more than 1,200 innocent people were killed in terrorist attacks in Egypt. These incidents were carried out by

---


elements of the Islamic groups. These events help remind the reader that the Islamic and Arab countries are also suffering from violence--not just Western countries. Statements written in the West often omit that the Muslim world, too, has been the target of terrorism and acts of violence. Arabs and Muslims share the same problem of terrorism.

Clearly, the people of the United States suffered after events of 11 September 2001. It was tragic that thousands of innocent people died. Although the group that carried out the attacks was part of a fundamentalist Islamic organization, the Muslim community as a whole never approved or endorsed this atrocity. Most Muslims do not support the murder and shedding of innocent blood. According to the Qur’an: “Whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land-it is as if he had slain mankind entirely.”

In the late 1990s, Samuel Huntington proposed the idea that the post-Cold War would be defined by, what was the title of his book, *The Clash of Civilizations.* In this book, he addresses several issues--the question of global civilization, the relationship between power and culture, the changing balance of power among civilizations, returning to the local roots in non-Western societies, and the political structure of civilizations. In addition, he discusses the conflicts generated by changes to the global balance after the Cold War, and makes predictions about the future of the West and the world’s civilizations. These ideas are suggestive when taken together with those in another book, by Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man,* which also addresses the

---


end of the Cold War. The United States’ triumph in the Cold War sent a message to the world to accept Western liberal democracy as the end point of humanity’s socio-cultural evolution and the ultimate form of human government.\textsuperscript{12}

Arguably, the problem is not the clash of civilizations, but the lack of communication between the Western and Islamic-Arab cultures. How to communicate with one another is the most urgent question and significant requirement today. The sincere desire to communicate allows one to look at the positive and more realistic aspects of the other. It is important to identify commonalities and avoid conflicts in order to maintain continuity of the dialogue.

After the events of 11 September 2001, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were declared. Fundamentalist Islamic groups played active roles in both their incitement to violence and propagation of their ideologies as their methods of fighting began to emerge. It is necessary for us at this stage as Arab and Muslim researchers to delve more deeply into the study of these groups, to understand the basis for their actions, and to evaluate the nature and authority of the claims against them.

\textbf{Thesis}

Recently a series of intellectual reviews of leaders of the Islamic Group and the Islamic Jihad Group in Egypt were proposed by some leading Islamic scholars. An intellectual review is an open public proclamation by an Islamic cleric of a sound standing. Most of these reviews have concluded that these supposedly Jihadist groups

have gone astray. The reviews challenge the hard-line members of these groups and urge them to confess their doctrine is misguided and therefore course correction was in order. The reviews also ask groups’ rank and file to apologize to the public through a critical and dispassionate review of their jurisprudence, their wrong political behavior, their belief in legitimacy of violence and murder, and atone for their acts of omission and commission through sincere commitment to the governments and societies. Analysis of these intellectual reviews strengthens our understanding of the nature of fundamentalist Islamic groups’ ideas, and identifies the potential impact of the intellectual reviews of the leaders of the fundamentalist Islamic groups on the Jihadi Action, the Muslim World, and the West.

The main objective of this thesis is to study the intellectual reviews of the Islamist groups. However, in order to be able to fully grasp the impact of these reviews, the readers should know the history of these groups in terms of their genesis, ideology and narrative. Since these groups draw their ideological basis from the concept of Jihad, it is essential to explain, right at the outset, the concept of Jihad in the light of the original sources like Qur’an and Prophet’s sayings, called Hadith, as interpreted and explained by leading Islamic scholars. The need for this arrangement explains the sequence of my paper.

Therefore, the thesis will review the concept of Jihad in terms of definition, types, views of various scholars the Qur’an and Hadith that speak of Jihad, the history of the Egyptian fundamentalist Islamic groups, the principal Islamic groups, especially Islamic Group and the Islamic Jihad Group in Egypt. The Islamic Jihad Group is a particularly significant case study because it is considered the main component of Al-Qaeda. In
addition to an analysis of the intellectual reviews of Islamic Group, this thesis focuses on the intellectual reviews of the activities and beliefs of Islamic Jihad Group as carried out by its own former leader Dr. Sayyid Imam, in his book, *Tarshid al-amal al-Jihadi fi misr wa al-alam* (translated as *Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World*). We will also analyze the responses to Sayyid Imam by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri, the Number Two Man of Al-Qaeda.

**Primary Research Question**

What is at the heart of the intellectual reviews of the fundamentalist Islamic groups’ leaders, and what potential impact could they have on Jihadist action, the Muslim world, and the West?

**Secondary Research Questions**

To further investigate the primary research question, the following secondary questions need to be addressed:

1. What is the concept of Jihad according to famous Islamic scholars?
2. What is the concept of Jihad in the Qur’an and Hadith?
3. What is the history of the Egyptian Islamic groups?
4. What are the essential contents of famous intellectual reviews?

**Assumptions**

The War on Terrorism will continue in the near future. Intellectual reviews will spread significantly, which will moderate Jihadists. The analysis of this intellectual review will strengthen our understanding of the nature of the fundamentalist Islamic
groups’ ideas, allowing us to measure their impact on the Jihadi action, the Muslim world, and the West.

**Limitations**

The greatest limitation is access to resources. Despite numerous references, they are all mostly secondary sources. The limited access exists because of the extreme secrecy surrounding the documents of the Islamic groups, which consider the disclosure of their operations a reason for failure of the group, as well as the sensitivity of the issue to the Egyptian security agencies and the United States. All of these reasons create apprehension during research and preparation of scientific materials, as well as research on the internet. Moreover, not all the intellectual reviews have been translated into English as Arabic does not always translate adequately or clearly.

**Delimitations**

The scope of the topic is the study of the Egyptian Islamic groups, the intellectual reviews, especially the Islamic Jihad Group and its former leader, Dr. Sayyid Imam’s intellectual reviews, and their impact on the Jihadi action, the Muslim world, and the West.

**Scope**

The scope of this thesis will review the concept of Jihad, the history of Egyptian Islamic groups, recent intellectual reviews, and the impact these reviews potentially have on Jihadists, the Muslim community, and the West. Chapter 1 reviews the concept of *Jihad* in terms of definition, types, views of various scholars, and the Qur’an verses and *Hadith* that speak of *Jihad*. Chapter 2 will talk about the history of the Egyptian
fundamentalists - especially Islamic Group and the Islamic Jihad Group in Egypt. It will
provide an analytical study of the Islamic Jihad Group in particular as a case study
because it is considered the main component of Al-Qaeda. In addition, the major attacks
by the Islamic Jihad Group will be reviewed.

Chapter 3 analyzes the intellectual reviews of the leaders of Islamic Group and
the Islamic Jihad Group detained in the Egyptian, high-security, (Mazra’ah Turrah)
Prison. The intellectual review of Dr. Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif, author of Tarshid al-amal
al-Jihadi fi misr wa al-alam (translated as Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and
the World), the former leader of the Islamic Jihad Group is the most important case study
throughout this thesis as the Islamic Jihad Group is considered the main component of
Al-Qaeda. Chapter 3 will also analyze the responses to Sayyed Imam, especially by Dr.
Ayman al-Zawahri, the Number Two Man of Al-Qaeda. This rebuttal was the content of
his own book, The Exoneration: A Treatise on the Exoneration of the Nation of the Pen
and Sword of the Denigrating Charge of Being Irresolute and Weak. Through a detailed
study, the reader will be exposed to an analysis of the nature of their arguments, how they
rely on Islamic law, and how they support and propose their arguments. Chapter 4 will
focus on the impact of the intellectual reviews on the Jihadi action, the Muslim world,
and the west. Chapter 5 provides a general conclusion of the salient points covered by
this research.

Relevance

This research is a contemporary and modern thesis. It focuses on the intellectual
reviews of the leaders of Egyptian Islamic groups. Although these reviews began in
Egypt in 1997, a limited research/discussion of this topic exists in Egypt and in the
Muslim world. These reviews are considered an invitation to rationalize the Jihadi action and stop the violence. The reviews are meant to provide ideas about a productive way ahead--out of the deadlock and violence--that has already claimed the lives of millions of innocent people and caused massive damage to the economy of the affected nation. All these reviews are inspired the glorious message of peace and understanding as given in Qur’an: “And if they incline to peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah. Indeed, it is He who is the Hearing, the Knowing.”

Research Methodology

This thesis addresses the primary question, what is the impact of the intellectual reviews of the fundamentalist Islamic groups’ leaders, and what potential impact could they have on the Jihadi Action, the Muslim World, and the West? This thesis uses qualitative research as the methodology. The data for the research has been collected from the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith, internet resources, books available in the Combined Arms Research Library, as well as the advice and counsel of Egyptian experts in this field.

---

CHAPTER 1
THE JIHAD

And if they incline to peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah. Indeed, it is He who is the Hearing, the Knowing. 14
— Qur’an

Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors. 15
— Qur’an

Islam is a comprehensive and universal religion for all races and classes of people; it is not oriented to serve a specific category or group of people, but specially aimed to address the needs of all humanity with its moral, spiritual, social, legal, political, and economic systems. Its moral purity and clarity, simplicity in a strict monotheistic creed and faith, and comprehensive prohibition of all types of criminality, oppression and injustice, appeals to all classes and categories of people, regardless of race, culture, education, social and economic status. The aim of Islam is to establish the ideal human society and brotherhood spreading general benevolence and the divine guidance among men for their betterment and salvation. Part of its mission is to establish justice at all times, at all levels, to maintain amicable relations even with potential enemies as long as there are no open acts of hostilities, and to promote peace whenever possible. Allah the Almighty states in the Glorious Qur’an:

It may be that God will grant love and friendship between you and those whom you hold as enemies. For God has power over all things; And God is Most Forgiving, Most Merciful. God forbids you not, with regard to those who do not

14Holy Qur’an, Verse 8:61.
15Ibid., Verse 2:190.
fight you for your Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for God loves those who are just. God only forbids you, with regard to those who fight you for your Faith, and drive you out of your homes, and support others in driving you out, from turning to them for friendship and protection. Those who turn to them (in these circumstances) do wrong.16

These verses call for peace with those that refrain from the hostile actions mentioned.17 Peace is one of the principles and pillars of Islam, which became a part of its entity. The idea of bringing hearts close to each others, and strengthening links and connection amongst a community, is enshrined in the Islamic greeting of *Assalam-o-Alaikum* (Peace be upon you). God made this greeting for the Muslims to make them aware that their faith is a religion of peace and security, and they are followers and lovers of peace. The righteous are promised the abode of Peace and security, which is Paradise. “And Allah invites to the Home of Peace and guides whom He wills to a straight path.”18 The people of Paradise neither hear nor speak a language other than the language of peace: “They will not hear therein ill speech or commission of sin, only a saying: Peace, peace.”19 The greeting of God for the believers is a greeting of peace: “Their greeting the Day they meet Him will be, “Peace.” And He has prepared for them a noble reward.”20

The frequent repetition of this word--*peace*--reaching as many as 50 times within his

16Holy Qur’an, Verse 60:7-9.
18Holy Qur’an, Verse 10:25.
20Ibid., Verse 33:44.
psycho-religious atmosphere, will awaken all the senses and ideas, and draw attention to this great ideal.

All this talk of peace is to make it clear that Islam is a religion of peace. The study of the concept of jihad leads us to focus only on the jihad. The majority of Western readers focus on the theme of the jihad only, and are unaware that this does not reflect the full scope of the Islamic religion. Because of the importance of the concept of jihad and its impact on the ideology of the Islamic groups and their operations, we will start our thesis by identifying the concept of Jihad in this chapter in terms of definition, types, views of various scholars the verses which speak of jihad in Qur’an, and Hadith.

The Concept of Jihad by Famous Islamic Scholars

The Jihad is an Arabic word that comes from the root word, Jahada, which means to strive for a better way of life. The nouns are Juhd, Mujahid, Jihad, and Ijtihad. Other meanings are endeavor, strain, exertion, effort, diligence, fighting to defend one’s life, land, and religion. Jihad is not a war to force the faith on others as many people think of it. It should never be interpreted as a way of compulsion of the belief on others since there is an explicit verse in the Qur’an that says: “There is no compulsion in religion.”

Jihad is not a defensive war only, but a war against any unjust regime. If such a regime exists, a war is to be waged against the leaders, but not against the people of that country. People should be freed from the unjust regimes and influences so that they can freely choose to believe in Allah. Not only in peace, but also in war, Islam prohibits terrorism, kidnapping, and hijacking when carried out against civilians. Whoever

---

21Ibid., Verse 02:256.
commits such violations is considered a murderer in Islam, and is to be punished by the Islamic state. During wars, Islam prohibits Muslim soldiers from harming civilians, women, children, elderly, and the religious men like priests and rabbis. It also prohibits cutting down trees and destroying civilian constructions. The Jihad consists of two types. While the Greater Jihad (\textit{Al-jihad al-akbar}) means the inner struggle against the self, Lesser Jihad (\textit{Al-jihad al-asghar}) implies physical fighting against the unbelievers.\textsuperscript{22}

Jihad means to make the effort and energy, and endure the hardship to fight /struggle in the way of God. The Jihad in Islam is an obligation upon the Muslim, and has two types when fighting to protect the nation--it is either the collective duty or individual duty. The collective duty is that one should and must be accountable. This collective duty is required if an enemy occupies \textit{any Muslim country}. A Jihadist must be Muslim, mature, wise, free, able-bodied, healthy, and have the energy to fight. The individual duty requires \textit{all} people to fight, whether they are men or women, children or the elderly, and women.\textsuperscript{23}

The definition of the Jihad in Encyclopedia Britannica is unfortunately negative because it states Jihad as a “struggle,” or “battle,” a religious duty imposed on Muslims to spread Islam by waging war. Jihad has come to denote any conflict waged for principle


or belief, and is often translated to mean “holy war.” In addition, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on its religion page identifies the literal meaning of jihad as a struggle or effort, meaning much more than holy war. Also, it is useful to consider these Western sources that define Jihad because they help explain the different views taken in different parts of the world. And Muslims use the word, *jihad*, to describe three different kinds of struggle: believer’s internal struggle to live out the Muslim faith as best as possible, the struggle to build a good Muslim society, and Holy War: the struggle to defend Islam, with force if necessary.

Many modern writers claim that the primary meaning of Jihad is the *internal spiritual struggle*, and many Muslims accept this. However, there are so many references to Jihad as a military struggle in Islamic writings that it is incorrect to claim that the interpretation of jihad, as holy war is wrong. The term to *live out* is not correct, but is better described as to *live in* the Muslim faith as best possible.

Pierre Tristam, whose view is important as he is the only Arab American with a regular current affairs column in a mainstream US newspaper, says:

> Jihad is the Arabic for what can be variously translated as “struggle” or “effort,” or “to strive,” “to exert,” “to fight,” depending on the context. In the West, the word is generally understood to mean “holy war,” and the terms are given, inaccurately, exclusively military connotations. The Qur’an does call for “jihad” as a military struggle on behalf of Islam. But the Qur’an also refers to jihad as an internal, individual, spiritual struggle toward self-improvement, moral cleansing and intellectual effort. It is said that Prophet Muhammad considered the armed-

---


struggle version of holy war “the little jihad,” but considered the spiritual, individual version of holy war—the war within oneself—as “the great jihad.”

And Imam Ibn Taymiyyah—the most influential medieval Islamic scholar—says, “The Jihad against the soul is the foundation for the Jihad against the disbelievers and hypocrites.”

The Difference Between Jihad and Fighting

In the first volume of his 2009 book, *Fiqh of Jihad*, the prominent Muslim scholar, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, head of the International Union for Muslim Scholars (IUMS), interprets the root of the word *jihad* means to “struggle,” which is most commonly understood as the fight to support the religion and defend the sanctity of the nation. Sheikh Al-Qaradawi talked about many people, and scholars are confused about the difference between jihad and fighting. Every time the word jihad is mentioned, it is misunderstood and thought to mean fighting or engaging in battle. In fact, jihad has a broader and more comprehensive meaning than simply fighting. In the Ibn al-Qayyim (Zad), the jihad is divided into thirteen types. There are the arranged Jihads of the soul, Satan, corruption, injustice, and evil in society; the Jihad against the hypocrites; Jihad of the call and statement; the patience and tolerance Jihad; and the armed Jihad of enemies.

---


While many of the commentators summarized Jihad in fighting only, Dr Qaradawi identified the fighting as a last of many components of jihad.28

Expanding the meaning of jihad beyond the concept of “fighting” provides every Muslim, male or female, capable or incapable, with the opportunity to play an important role in the realm of jihad. Although the term comprises one’s personal struggle, jihad against oneself and against Satan, one’s jihad by calling for virtue and prohibiting vice, speaking the truth to a despotic ruler, and so on. Jihad also involves fighting for Allah’s sake.29

Different Positions/Views of Jihad Among Common People

Sheikh Al-Qaradawi spoke about the position of the people on jihad, and divides them into three categories. First category believes Jihad is all about nurturing of right kind of spiritual values, attitudes and behavior as citizens as well as a society. This category does not always include physical fighting under the purview of the concept of Jihad.

Those in the second category overly focus on the physical aspects and see jihad as a never ending fight against anyone who physically attacks or challenges Muslims, or seduces the Muslims away from their religion.


The third category of people, which Sheikh Al-Qaradawi approves of, represent the moderate or middle view of the concept. This group of people believes that while it is justified to fight in self-defense, force should always be the absolutely last option and all other ways of resolution of conflicts must be tried first and foremost. While this category of people aspires for a righteous society and value system, it shuns compulsion and force. Sheikh Al-Qaradawi advocates peace ad fraternity but he also believes that Muslims must defend themselves when an aggressor tries to overwhelm them, and prevent them to convey the word of God, and the invite of his Messenger, to hear it highly explicit, free from every shop.\(^{30}\)

Areas for Jihad in Society

There is a mandatory type of jihad within society. It includes a host of fields. Jihad against injustice and the unjust, against which Islam demands that the Muslim should do two essential things - first, one should not be unjust themselves and second, one should not support an unjust person. Resisting corruption and decadence is another field of internal jihad and consists namely of resisting decadence, corruption, sinning, and obsession with lusts. These are serious aberrations that can thrust the ummah into the abyss of dissolution. Resisting heterodoxy and intellectual aberration is a third important type of local jihad, namely jihad against religious heterodoxy, which is telling people what is not in their religion; adding to their religion what human nature does not accept as a creed, doctrine, ethical principle, or tradition; or propagating concepts that contradict the religion’s doctrines, beliefs, and values. Resisting apostasy and the apostates is jihad

\(^{30}\)Hassan, 2009.
against corruption and evil within the Muslim society includes jihad against apostasy, which means relapsing into atheism after embracing Islam. The ruler’s apostasy is the most serious type of all apostasies. The ruler is supposed to safeguard the *Ummah’s* creed, resist apostasy, chase the apostates, and eliminate them from the Muslim community, so what if that ruler secretly or openly apostatizes? This ruler would then secretly or openly spread corruption and protect the apostates. He or she would open the doors and windows for them and would award them decorations and titles.\(^\text{31}\)

**Defensive Jihad and Preemptive Jihad**

Defensive jihad involves resistance against an enemy that enters a Muslim land, and occupies part of it, regardless of how small this area is; or against the enemy that launches an assault against Muslim lives, property, or sanctities even without entering or actually occupying their land. Jihad is necessary against those who persecute Muslims because of their faith, or those who plot to dissuade Muslims away from their faith, deprive them of their right to choose their own religion, or force them to renounce it through harm and torture. On the other hand, preemptive jihad is directed against the enemy whom Muslims pursue and target in their own land, in order to expand and secure the land of Islam. In this case, Muslims have a legitimate right to follow the principles of war and try to surprise the enemy before the enemy surprises them. They may do that to enable the enemy to listen to the new call of Islam, as these barriers must be removed to

\[^{31}\text{Maleeh, Book Review 2/11.}\]
enable Muslims to convey Allah’s call to all people, or to liberate nations from the tyrants who dominate and harm them.\textsuperscript{32}

**Jihad Ruling: Obligatory or Voluntary?**

Defensive jihad is an obligation according to the unanimous agreement of both early and contemporary jurists. There is scholarly disagreement over preemptive jihad, and consider it is only a must only when unavoidable or absolutely necessary. Imam Ibn Al-Qayyim says, “It is verified that jihad is an individual obligation, either by heart, by speech, by spending of one’s wealth, or by hand. Every Muslim must struggle through one of these types of jihad.”\textsuperscript{33}

**How Should a Collective Duty be Done?**

Implementation of a collective duty requires an organized, well-equipped and well-trained army under a central leadership to wage defensive warfare in defense of the Islamic state. The Muslim forces will be deployed on land and sea to repel the enemy and dissuade them from attacking Muslims. This doctrine or way of war is practiced today by all countries of the world. This is in line with the contemporary view that state sovereignty entails having capable armed forces to defend its borders against any attack on its sanctity or attempts to seize its land.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., Book Review 2/11.

\textsuperscript{33}Maleeh, Book Review, Book Review 2/11.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.
When is Jihad an Individual Duty?

According to Sheikh Al-Qaradawi, Jihad should be an individual duty when the enemy attacks a Muslim country; when the Imam commands a certain individual or group to participate in jihad; when the army needs the expertise of a specific person; and when they are actually present on the battlefield.35

Muslims Do Not Fight Those Who Extend Peace to Them

Sheikh Al-Qaradawi suggests that Muslims do not fight those who extend peace to them nor inflict any harm on them, and his stance is flawless. It is supported by the correct juristic vision and the common purposes of Muslim law, which calls for the preservation of human life, whether of Muslims or non-Muslims. However, the questions that arise here are has this been the case throughout human history? Has the world ever lived with no wars that devour everything? Did the Persians and the Romans, in olden times, or the Communists, the Jews, the Christians, and Secularists, in modern times, spare the Muslims their sacrilege, violations of sanctities, and military and cultural invasions in addition to looting their wealth and lands?36

It is hoped that one day mankind will enjoy peaceful coexistence. We hope that the powerful would not abuse the weak, nor would the rich subdue the poor. This is true so long as the Qur’an’s theory of repelling an enemy remains valid. Almighty Allah says, “[They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right - only because they say, “Our Lord is Allah.” And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by

35Ibid.
36Ibid.
means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned. And Allah will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in Might.\textsuperscript{37}

The Jihad in the Qur’an

The verses that talk about the Jihad in the Qur’an are divided into three sections, it is a mistake to confuse them, and carry the meaning of some of the others.

Verses That Authorize the Jihad

To understand the rationale of God’s permission to wage Jihad, one may look at the following verses. In order to fully grasp the wisdom of God’s words, it is also important to read through the explanation or interpretation these verses.

In Glorious Qur’an Allah says: “Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory.”\textsuperscript{38}

In one of the most respected interpretations called \textit{Tafsir al-Jalalayn}, the above verse is paraphrased as following: “Permission is granted to those who fight, namely to the believers, to fight back - this was the first verse to be revealed regarding the struggle [in the way of God] (jihād), because they have been wronged, as a result of the wrong done to them by the disbelievers, and God is truly able to help them.”\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37}Holy Qur’an, Verse 22:40.

\textsuperscript{38}Holy Qur’an, Verse 22:39.

At another place in Glorious Qur’an, Allah says of those who are compelled to fight back, “[They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right - only because they say, “Our Lord is Allah.” And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned. And Allah will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in Might.”

*Tafsir al-Jalalayn* explains the above verse as following: They are, those who were expelled from their homes without right, for their expulsion; they were expelled, only because they said, that is, because of their saying: “Our Lord is God,” alone: such a saying is “right,” and so then to be expelled for [saying] it is to be expelled without right. Were it not for God’s causing some people (ba’dahum, “some,” substitutes for al-nāsa, “people”) to drive back others, destruction would have befallen (read la-huddimat to emphasise a great number [of destructions]; or read la-hudimat) the monasteries, (sawāmi’) is for monks, and churches, (kanā’is) are for Christians, and synagogues, (salawāt) is the Hebrew term for Jewish houses of worship (kanā’is), and mosques, (masājid) are for Muslims, in which, that is, in which mentioned places, God’s Name is mentioned greatly, and with such destruction acts of worship cease. Assuredly God will help those who help Him, that is, [who] help His religion. God is truly Strong, overpowering His creation, Mighty, Invincible in terms of His dominion and power.

The authorization in these verses is to *defend*, not attack, as it relates to the stated cause to fight on behalf of people who are unjustly forced from their home because their faith in God Almighty.

Verses That Identify Reasons for the Jihad

Qur’an sets very clear preconditions or justifications for waging physical Jihad.

Here are some instances of that.

---

40 Holy Qur’an, Verse 22:40.

41 Tafsir al-Jalalayn, Qur’an, Verse 22:40.
In Qur’an, God says: “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors.”

_Tafsir al-Jalalayn_ interpretation goes as following: After the Prophet(s) was prevented from visiting the House in the year of the battle of Hudaybiyya, he made a pact with the disbelievers that he would be allowed to return the following year, at which time they would vacate Mecca for three days. Having prepared to depart for the Visitation [umra], [he and] the believers were concerned that Quraysh would not keep to the agreement and instigate fighting. The Muslims were averse to becoming engaged in fighting while in a state of pilgrimage inviolability in the Sacred Enclosure [al-haram] and during the sacred months, and so the following was revealed: And fight in the way of God, to elevate His religion, with those who fight against you, the disbelievers, but aggress not, against them by initiating the fighting; God loves not the aggressors, the ones that overstep the bounds which God has set for them: this stipulation was abrogated by the verse of barā’a, ‘immunity’ [Q. 9:1], or by His saying [below].

The Qur’an demonstrates that God does not accept any aggression and does not like the aggressor. This means that aggression is forbidden in Islam, in the name of jihad or fighting for God. Here is a verse from the Glorious Qur’an that makes it amply clear:

They ask you about the sacred month - about fighting therein. Say, “Fighting therein is great [sin], but averting [people] from the way of Allah and disbelief in Him and [preventing access to] al-Masjid al-Haram and the expulsion of its people herefrom are greater [evil] in the sight of Allah. And fitnah is greater than killing.” And they will continue to fight you until they turn you back from your religion if they are able. And whoever of you reverts from his religion [to disbelief] and dies while he is a disbeliever - for those, their deeds have become worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and those are the companions of the Fire, they will abide therein eternally.

_Tafsir al-Jalalayn_ explains this verse as following: Thus the Prophet(s) sent forth the first of his raiding parties under the command of ‘Abd Allāh b. Jahsh. They fought against the idolaters and killed ['Amr b. ‘Abd Allāh] Ibn al-Hadramī in [the sacred month of] Rajab, thinking that it was the last day of Jumādā II. The disbelievers reviled them for making fighting lawful in a sacred

---

42Holy Qur’an, Verse 2:190.

43_Tafsir al-Jalalayn_, Qur’an, Verse 2:190.

44Holy Qur’an, Verse 2:217.
month, and so God revealed the following: They ask you about the sacred, the forbidden, month, and fighting in it (qītālūn fihi, ‘fighting in it’, is an inclusive substitution [for al-shahri l-harāmi, ‘the sacred month’]). Say, to them: ‘Fighting (qītālūn is the subject) in it is a grave thing (kabīr, ‘grave’, is the predicate), that is, heinous in terms of sin; but to bar (saddun is the subject), people, from God’s way, His religion, and disbelief in Him, in God, and, to bar from, the Sacred Mosque, that is, Mecca, and to expel its people, the Prophet (s) and the believers, from it—that is graver (the predicate of the [last] subject), [that is] more heinous in terms of sin than fighting in it, in God’s sight; and sedition, your idolatry, is graver than, your, slaying’, in it. They, the disbelievers, will not cease to fight against you, O believers, until, so that, they turn you from your religion, to unbelief, if they are able; and whoever of you turns from his religion, and dies disbeliefing--their good, works have failed, that is, they are invalid, in this world and the Hereafter. Thus they will not count for anything and will not result in any reward. The specification of death as a condition is because if that person were to return to Islam [again], his original deeds would not be invalidated, and he will be rewarded for them, and he would not have to repeat them, [deeds] such as [performing] the Pilgrimage: al-Shāfi‘ī is of this opinion. Those are the inhabitants of the Fire, abiding therein.45

However, the Muslims are exhorted to fight those who incite or force them away from their religion, and strive to part them from their religion by seduction and terrorism, or otherwise, or who fight to destroy Islam. Here is a verse from the Glorious Qur’an again:

“And what is [the matter] with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women, and children who say, ‘Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people and appoint for us from Yourself a protector and appoint for us from Yourself a helper?’”46

The interpretation offered by Tafsir al-Jalalayn is quite enlightening: “What is wrong with you, that you do not fight: this is an interrogative of rebuke, in other words, there is nothing to prevent you from fighting, in the way of God, and for, the deliverance of, the oppressed men, women, and children, whom the disbelievers persecuted and prevented from emigrating. Ibn ‘Abbās, may God be

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Tafsir al-Jalalayn, Qur’an, Verse 2:217.}
\footnote{Holy Qur’an, Verse 4:75.}
\end{footnotes}
pleased with him and his father, said, ‘My mother and I were among them’; who say, supplicating, ‘O, our Lord, bring us forth from this town, Mecca, whose people are evildoers, through unbelief, and appoint for us a protector from You, to take charge of our affair, and appoint for us from You a helper’, to defend us against them. God responded to their supplication and facilitated escape for some of them, while others remained behind until Mecca was conquered - in charge of them the Prophet (s) placed ‘Attāb b. Asīd, who proceeded to seek justice for the wronged from those that had wronged them.”

The Muslims are also encouraged to fight in defense of the oppressed, weak vulnerable men, women and children who suffer from oppression and tyranny, pleading for help and rescue. Qur’anic concept of physical Jihad is principled and humane:

Except for those who take refuge with a people between yourselves and whom is a treaty or those who come to you, their hearts strained at [the prospect of] fighting you or fighting their own people. And if Allah had willed, He could have given them power over you, and they would have fought you. So if they remove themselves from you and do not fight you and offer you peace, then Allah has not made for you a cause [for fighting] against them.

_Tafsir al-Jalalayn_ explains the above verse as following: “Except those who attach themselves to, [who] seek refuge with, a people between whom and you there is a covenant, a pledge of security for them and for whoever attaches himself to them, in the manner of the Prophet’s (s) covenant with Hilāl b. ‘Uwaymir al-Aslamī; or, those who, come to you with their breasts constricted, dejected, about the prospect of fighting you, [being] on the side of their people, or fighting their people, siding with you, in other words, [those who come to you] refraining from fighting either you or them, then do not interfere with them, neither taking them as captives nor slaying them: this statement and what follows was abrogated by the ‘sword’ verse. Had God willed, to give them sway over you, He would have given them sway over you, by strengthening their hearts, so that assuredly they would have fought you: but God did not will it and so He cast terror into their hearts. And so if they stay away from you and do not fight you, and offer you peace, reconciliation, that is, [if] they submit, then God does not allow you any way against them, [He does not allow you] a means to take them captive or to slay them.”

---

47 _Tafsir al-Jalalayn_, Qur’an, Verse 4:75.

48 Holy Qur’an, Verse 4:90.

49 _Tafsir al-Jalalayn_, Qur’an, Verse 4:90.
Muslims must fight those who attack them and the Muslims do not have the right to attack those who refrain from fighting and declare truce. According to Qur’an:

Indeed, the number of months with Allah is twelve [lunar] months in the register of Allah [from] the day He created the heavens and the earth; of these, four are sacred. That is the correct religion, so do not wrong yourselves during them. And fight against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you collectively. And know that Allah is with the righteous [who fear Him].

Tafsir al-Jalalayn’s interpretation of the above verse goes as following: “Verily the number of months, used to reckon the year, with God is twelve months in the Book of God, the Preserved Tablet (al-lawh al-mahfūz), from the day that He created the heavens and the earth; four of them, that is, the months, are sacred, inviolable: Dhū’l-Qa’dā, Dhū’l-Hijja, Muharram and Rajab. That, making of them sacred, is the right, the upright, religion. So do not wrong yourselves during them, during these sacred months, with acts of disobedience, for their burden [of sin] is greater therein; but it is also said to mean [do not wrong yourselves] at any time during all the months [of the year]. And fight the idolaters altogether, all of them, throughout the months, even as they fight you altogether; and know that God is with those who fear Him, supporting and assisting [them].”

This verse, and those before it, illustrate that Muslims are encouraged/required to fight the infidels who do not believe in the oneness of Allah when the infidels collaborate with each other to fight or oppress the believers. The fighting and jihad in this case is defensive.

Verses That Encourage the Jihad

Verses that encourage Jihad with material means and in self-defense also outline a pattern of media war, and psychological warfare against the enemy, and tactical mission, and morale, such as:

---

50 Holy Qur’an, Verse 9:36.

51 Tafsir al-Jalalayn, Qur’an, Verse 9:36
“O Prophet, urge the believers to battle. If there are among you twenty [who are] steadfast, they will overcome two hundred. And if there are among you one hundred [who are] steadfast, they will overcome a thousand of those who have disbelieved because they are a people who do not understand.”\(^{52}\) and, it is further said in the Glorious Qur’an,

“Go forth, whether light or heavy, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the cause of Allah. . . . That is better for you, if you only knew.”\(^{53}\) and also,

Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur’an. And who is truer to his covenant than Allah? So rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that which is the great attainment.\(^{54}\)

Allh, in the Glorious Qur’an, announces the esteemed place of those who struggle in the way of right and against the wrong: “And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision.”\(^{55}\)

This stream of encouragement goes on at another place in Qur’an:

And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever

\(^{52}\)Holy Qur’an, Verse 8:65.

\(^{53}\)Holy Qur’an, Verse 9:41.

\(^{54}\)Holy Qur’an, Verse 9:111.

\(^{55}\)Holy Qur’an, Verse 3:169.
you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged. 56

The idea of jihad in the Holy Qur’an is based on self-defense and prohibits unprovoked assault on others. However, exhortation of self defense is no difference from other divine books like the Holy Torah (the Old Testament) and the Holy Bible (the New Testament). Consider the following verses from the Holy Bible: “And as for those who were against me, who would not have me for their ruler, let them come here, and be put to death before me.”57 And also, “Do not have the thought that I have come to send peace on the earth; I came not to send peace but a sword.”58

Readers may also consider the following verse from Holy Torah:

When you come to a town, before attacking it, make an offer of peace. And if it gives you back an answer of peace, opening its doors to you, then all the people in it may be put to forced work as your servants. If however it will not make peace with you, but war, then let it be shut in on all sides. When the Lord your God has given it into your hands, let every male in it be put to death without mercy. But the women and the children and the cattle and everything in the town and all its wealth, you may take for yourselves: the wealth of your haters, which the Lord your God has given you, will be your food. So you are to do to all the towns far away, which are not the towns of these nations.59

The above references from Holy Bible and Holy Torah do not obviously mean that these books or their sender, God Almighty, are all about war and violence. What they mean is that God grants believers the right to defend themselves by all means possible or necessary.

56Holy Qur’an, Verse 8:60.
58Ibid., Matthew 10:34.
The Jihad in *Hadith*

Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him) lived a life that reflected the sublime teachings of Qur’an. His words, quoted by his companions and compiled as several authentic collections of sayings called *Hadith*, make the entire concept of Jihad very clear. His noble ways in the struggle for establishment of a state based on Islamic principles is in itself an example of Qur’anic principles and guidelines for individuals as well as nations. In the ensuing paragraphs I will attempt to reproduce some of his sayings that relate to the concept and conduct of Jihad.

Fighting for the Cause of Allah

Narrated from Ibn ‘Abbas: *Allah’s Apostle, Peace Be Upon him* said: “There is no Hijra (i.e. migration) (from Mecca to Medina) after the Conquest (of Mecca), but Jihad and good intention remain; and if you are called (by the Muslim ruler) for fighting, go forth immediately.”

Narrated ‘Aisha: (That she said), “O Allah’s Apostle! We consider Jihad as the best deed. Should we not fight in Allah’s Cause?” He said, “The best Jihad (for women) is Hajj-Mabrur (i.e. Hajj which is done according to the Prophet’s tradition and is accepted by Allah).”

Narrated Abu Huraira: (That she said), “O Allah’s Apostle! What is the best deed?” He replied, “To offer the prayers at their early stated fixed times.” I asked, “What

---


61 Translation of Sahih Bukhari, “Aisha, Volume 4, Book 52, Number 43.”
is next in goodness?” He replied, “To be good and dutiful to your parents.” I further asked, what is next in goodness?” He replied, “To participate in Jihad in Allah’s Cause.” I did not ask Allah’s Apostle anymore and if I had asked him more, he would have told me more.62

The Prophet (Peace be upon him) said, “Nobody who dies and finds good from Allah (in the Hereafter) would wish to come back to this world even if he were given the whole world and whatever is in it, except the martyr who, on seeing the superiority of martyrdom, would like to come back to the world and get killed again (in Allah’s Cause).63

During the Battle of Ditch between the army of Medina under Prophet and the army of infidels under the pagans of Mecca, Allah’s Apostle (Peace be upon him) went towards the Khandaq (i.e. Trench / Ditch) and saw the Emigrants (those who, like himself, had been forced to flee Mecca) and the Ansar (those of the citizens of Medina who welcomed and hosted the emigrants from Mecca) digging in a very cold morning as they did not have slaves to do that for them. When he noticed their fatigue and hunger he said, “O Allah! the real life is that of the hereafter, (so please) forgive the Ansar and the Emigrants.” In its reply the Emigrants and the Ansar said, “We are those who have given a pledge of allegiance to Muhammad that we will carry on Jihad as long as we live.64

---

62Translation of Sahih Bukhari, “Abdullah bin Masud, Volume 4, Book 52, Number 41.”

63Translation of Sahih Bukhari, “Anas bin Malik, Volume 4, Book 52, Number 53.”

64Translation of Sahih Bukhari, “Anas, Volume 4, Book 52, Number 87.”
The Messenger of Allah “peace be upon him” said: Do not desire an encounter with the enemy; but when you encounter them, be firm.\(^{65}\)

These sayings amply clarify how Prophet viewed physical fight as the last option for defense and propagation of truth against falsehood. He however, also urged believers to fight firm and brave, as and when the fighting becomes a necessity.

**Stimulation of Desire for Jihad**

The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him), said “Someone who does jihad in the way of Allah is like someone who fasts and prays constantly and who does not slacken from his prayer and fasting until he returns.”\(^{66}\)

The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said, “Shall I tell you who has the best degree among people? A man who takes the rein of his horse to do jihad in the way of Allah. Shall I tell you who has the best degree among people after him? A man who lives alone with a few sheep, performs the prayer, pays the Zakat (taxes collected from the affluent for distribution among the needy), and worships Allah without associating anything with him.”\(^{67}\)

---


\(^{67}\) Translation of Malik’s Muwatta, “Malik, Book 21, Number 21.1.4.”
Martyrs in the Way of Allah

The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) was sitting by a grave which was being prepared at Medina. A man looked into the grave and said, ‘An awful bed for the believer. ‘The Messenger of Allah, Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, ‘Evil? What you have said is absolutely wrong.’ The man said, ‘I didn’t mean that, Messenger of Allah. I meant being killed in the way of Allah.’ The Messenger of Allah, Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, ‘Being killed in the way of Allah has no like! There is no place on the earth which I would prefer my grave to be than here (meaning Madina). He repeated it three times.”68

The Prophet (peace be upon him) said, “Last night two men came to me (in a dream) and made me ascend a tree and then admitted me into a better and superior house, better of which I have never seen. One of them said, ‘This house is the house of martyrs.’”69

Fulfilling Safe Conduct

Umar ibn al-Khattab wrote to a lieutenant of an army which he had sent out, “I have heard that it is the habit of some of your men to chase an unbeliever till he takes refuge in a high place. Then one man tells him in Persian not to be afraid, and when he comes up to him, he kills him. I swear by Allah, if I knew someone who had done that, I would strike off his head.”70


69Translation of Sahih Bukhari, “Samura, Volume 4, Book 52, Number 49.”

70Translation of Malik’s Muwatta, “Malik, Book 21, Number 21.4.12.”
Prohibition of Killing Women and Children in War

“During some of the battles fought under the leadership of Allah’s Apostle (peace be upon him) a woman was found killed, so Allah’s Apostle forbade the killing of women and children.”⁷¹

Keeping a Covenant and Prohibition of Breach of Faith

Hudbaifa b. al-Yaman (a companion of the Prophet) said: Nothing prevented me from being present at the Battle of Badr except this incident. I came out with my father Husail (to participate in the Battle), but we were caught by the disbelievers of Quraish. They said: (Do) you intend to go to Muhammad? We said: We do not intend to go to him, but we wish to go (back) to Medina. So they took from us a covenant in the name of God that we would turn back to Medina and would not fight on the side of Muhammad (peace be upon him). So, we came to the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) and related the incident to him. He said: Both, of you proceed (to Medina); we will fulfill the covenant made with them and seek God’s help against them.⁷²

Allah’s Messenger (peace be upon him) having said this: “There would be a flag for every perfidious person on the Day of Judgment by which he will be recognized.”⁷³

The above sayings of the Prophet of Islam amply highlight the significance of struggling both to control the base tendencies of one’s own soul as well as to defend the

---

⁷¹Translation of Sahih Bukhari, “Abdullah, Volume 4, Book 52, Number 257.”

⁷²Translation of Sahih Muslim, “Narrated Hudbaifa b. al-Yaman, Book 19, Number 4411.”

⁷³Translation of Sahih Muslim, “Narrated Anas, Book 19, Number 4308.”
faith and faithful against the aggression of the non-believers. However, even when physical fighting is necessary, it must be conducted as humanely as possible.

**Conclusion**

Having reviewed selected verses from Qur’an and Prophet’s sayings, it can be safely concluded that Islam’s idea of Jihad is much more comprehensive, humane and principled than what some of the contemporary Jihadist groups attempt to make others believe. Jihad in Islam is all about maintaining, preserving and promoting peace, protecting the lives of the innocent, defending the weak and defeating the aggressor. However, this is just one dimension of Jihad. The real struggle must take place within us-deep in our hearts—in terms nurturing and promoting right kind of attitudes and values. Having understood the true and original concept of jihad in this chapter, I will now delve into the genesis of some of the recent Jihadist groups and cover their history in Egypt along with a look at their ideology, narratives and objectives.
CHAPTER 2

THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC GROUPS

The Islamic civilization can take various forms in its material and organizational structure, but the principles and values on which it is based are eternal and unchangeable. These are: the worship of God alone, the foundation of human relationships on the belief in the Oneness of God, the supremacy of the humanity of man over material things, the development of human values and the control of animalistic desires, respect for the family, the assumption of being the representative of God on earth according to His guidance and instruction, and in all affairs of this vice regency the rule of God’s law (al-Shari’ah) and the way of life Prescribed by Him.74

— Sayyid Qutb

What can my enemies possibly do to me? My paradise is in my breast; wherever I go it goes with me, inseparable from me. For me, prison is a place of retreat; execution is my opportunity for martyrdom; and exile from my town is but a chance to travel.75

— Ibn Taymiyyah

Introduction

Before we analyze the intellectual reviews of the Islamic groups, we should know the history of these groups in terms of upbringing, as well as to identify their ideology and narrative. Egyptian Islamic groups emerged in Egypt in the 20th Century, and were influenced by the ideas of both medieval and modern Islamic scholars. The most influential medieval scholar was Imam Ibn Taymiyyah, born in 1263, at Harran located in what is now Turkey close to the Syrian border. He lived during the troubled times of the Mongol invasion. Ibn Taymiyyah devoted himself from early youth to various Islamic sciences (Qur’an, Hadith, and legal studies), and he was a voracious reader of books on


36
sciences that were not taught in the regular institutions of learning, including logic, philosophy, and *kalam* (the art of speech). Ibn Taymiyyah studied law under the direction of his father and the scholar, Shams al-Din Abd al-Rahman al-Maqdisi (1283). Ibn Taymiyya wrote his famous book of the *Fatwas* (edicts) in 14th Century, which is the most popular text for Egyptian Islamic groups, and is considered to be one of the basic references for them, particularly his writings about the invading Mongols. He constructed arguments to justify fighting a Jihad against the foreign invaders by arguing that Mongol rulers who converted to Islam were not really Muslims.  

He declared that Jihad upon the Mongols is obligatory on the grounds that the Mongols could not be true Muslims despite their conversion to Sunni Islam, because they ruled using “man-made laws” (their traditional *Yassak* code) rather than Islamic law or *Shari’ah*. Thus, they were living in a state of *jahiliyya* or pre-Islamic pagan ignorance outside the folds of Islam. He died in prison in the Citadel of Damascus in 1328.

The most influential modern scholar was Sayyid Qutb, born in 1906. He was an Egyptian author, educator, Islamist, poet, and the leading intellectual of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. He is famous in the Muslim world for his work on the social and political role of Islam, particularly in his books, *Social Justice*, *Milestones*, and *In Shadow of Qur’an*. His extensive Qur’anic interpretation book, *Fi Zilal al-Qur’an* (translated as *In the Shade of the Qur’an*) contributed extensively to

---


77 Emmanuel Siven, “Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics,” Yale University, 1985, 97.
modern perceptions of Islamic concepts such as Jihad, jahiliyyah, and ummah. Qutb, in Milestones, charged that Muslims and Muslim rulers who do not implement God’s laws (Shari’ah) are apostates, living in a state of jahiliyya (ignorance), and must be opposed.

There are many more thinkers and scholars who influenced the Islamic groups in the Islamic world. A list of these thinkers and scholars can be found in Appendix A.78

The Egyptian Islamic groups focused on the interpretations of Ibn Taymiyyah and ideas of Sayyid Qutb that demanded Egypt be ruled by Islamic law. These groups agreed that the problems Egypt faces are due to secular laws and loss of Islamic identity.

The Establishment of the Egyptian Islamic Groups

Researchers disagree on the reasons for the emergence of the Islamic movement in Egypt in modern times, which has been widely described as a new phenomenon accompanying the transition of the Islamic world to modern times. They attribute the sense of alienation suffered by many young Muslims to these accelerating social and cultural transformations. These transformations have taken on a wide range since the spread of contemporary Western civilization, which is largely seen as a clash with the tenets of Islam, which is part of Arab culture.

Other researchers consider the emergence of the Islamist movement as an alternative to failure of Arab nationalism after defeat of the Arabs against Israel on 5 June 1967. Another group of researchers sees the emergence of the Islamist movement as a reaction to the fall of the Islamic Caliphate, which was abolished by Kemal Ataturk under the establishment of the secular Ottoman Republic. Of course, it can be debated that it

78William McCants, Jarret Brachman, Joseph Felter, 13, 17.
was the fall of the Caliphate or the defeat in 1967 that inflamed the enthusiasm among young people that was responsible for increased activity of Islamic movements, but it is not possible to say that the Islamic movements arose only because of any one specific factor.  

In his book, *Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner*, Ayman al-Zawahiri said,

"The Jihad movement in Egypt began its current march against the government in the mid-1960s when the President Nasser regime began its famous campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood [MB] group in 1965. Some 17,000 members of the MB were put in prison and Sayyid Qutb (one of the most prominent MB thinkers) and two of his comrades were executed. The authorities thought that they had eradicated the Islamic movement in Egypt once and for all. But God willed that those events were the spark that ignited the jihad movement in Egypt against the government."

On the other hand, others see the emergence of these movements as the result of the reduced role of traditional religious institutions of the state. The Muslim world is suffering from sharp ideological divisions between the different branches. The reason for this suffering is ignorance of religion, detachment from the moral guidance of Islam, and contemporary trends, namely:

The Secular Movement calls for building a life based on secular and non-linked with Shari’ah assets and inherent customs and social legacies which from their point of view, create obstacles to progress and moving towards civilization.

The Religious Extremist Movement opposes the modern civilization and everything related to the progress of civilization. From their perspective, it is corrupt in

---


morals, and the source for the disintegration of families and stagnation in social relations. They feel that civilization makes the individual live for himself, responding only to his self-centered wishes, regardless of morality and virtue.

Each side refuses to see the other’s viewpoint and is suspicious of the other’s. They do not believe they can live in co-existence, and are unwilling to find common factors in fundamental principles that might unite them.81

Classifications of the Egyptian Islamic Movement in Modern Times

Dr. Osama Abd Al-hamid, Professor of Geopolitics at the University of Banha and one of the leading political thinkers of the Egyptian Jihad Group, who reported on the division of the Islamic movements in a paper presented to a conference on “Islamic Political Thought,” organized by the Institute of Islamic Thought in London in the mid-1980s. In his study, Dr. Osama Abd Al-hamid divided the Islamic movements into four trends:

Islamic Reform Trend: Representative in Egypt, “Muslim Brotherhood” and their ilk from other groups that do not seek to change through immediate and fast use of armed force.

Current Islamic Revolutionary Trend: Representative in Egypt, “Islamic Jihad Group” and its ilk from the organizations that seek to make a swift change and extensive use of armed force.

81Dr. Asmaa bint Abdul Aziz Al-Hussein, “Asbab Al-anf we Al-arhab we Tatarof (The Causes of Terrorism and Violence and Extremism),” Riyadh, 7.
Political Islam Trend: Represented in Egyptian’s modern history “Young Egypt Group,” led by Ahmed Hussein, adopted Islam as an approach and political Referenced in the face of the ruling without depth at the root of the Islamic concepts, Islam for him is a mere slogan and enthusiastic wave in the face of injustice of the ruler.

Pseudo Islamic Trend: Depending on the characterization of the author, President Gamal Abdel Nasser represented this trend after he seized power. It took Islam as an appearance and emblem to achieve its interests and other things unrelated to Islam, but every person or group that belonged to the political Islam movement turned out to belong to the Pseudo Islamic movement when they seized power.

The following classifications are not accurate because they are restricted to only groups of revolutionaries and reformists, and focuses on weapons only to differentiate between features and descriptions of the groups, regardless of the ideas, objectives, and the social and political nature of each group.\textsuperscript{82}

The Classification of the Islamic Groups According To Doctrine

Sunni Groups (\textit{Ahl as-Sunnah}): All groups that adopt the doctrine of the Sunnis, \textit{Ahl as-Sunnah wa\textquoteright{}l-Jam\textacute{a}\textquoteright{}ah}, and includes the Muslim Brotherhood, \textit{Al-Qutbeyyoun} after 1981, \textit{Salafis, Ansar al-Sunnah, Al-gameia al-shareia, Jihad}, and the like.

Sects Groups (\textit{Al-fe\textquoteright{}ruk}): All groups that adopt opinions and beliefs contrary to the doctrine of the Sunnis, and includes the Muslim community known by media as \textit{Al-Takfir Wal Hijra}, which means atonement and migration, \textit{Alshawkion}, and the groups of

\textsuperscript{82}Munib, 11.
Al-tawkef wa ’l-tabeen such as the survivors of the fire group Al-Najoun men Al-Nar and Al-Qutbeyyoun before in 1981, and the like.  

Classification According To Method of Movement and Political Action

Peaceful Groups: Those groups that take peaceful means as methods to achieve its goals, and includes Al-Gamia Al-Shariaa, Ansar al-Sunnah, Salafis, and the Muslim Brotherhood after the mid-seventies, some groups of Al-tawkef wa ’l-tabeen and Jamaat al Muslimeen after 1982, and Al-Qutbeyyoun, and others.

Armed Groups: Those groups that take armed means as methods to achieve their goals, and include the Jihad Group, Tawhid, and the Islamic group, al-Gamaa al-Islamiya before 1998, and Al-Shawkeyoun, and the Muslim community (Al-Takfir Wal Hijra) before 1982, and the like.

It is important to audit the classification, identification trends, factions and groups of the Islamic movement in the past or present because these factors help us to identify the future trends of political behavior of these groups as well as to identify development and trends in accordance with its intellectual, organizational and social structure.

Important Egyptian Islamic Groups

In modern times, organized groups emerged outside the traditional religious institutions as the result of controlling these traditional institutions by the rulers. The first founder of an Islamic organization in Egypt, the Shariaa Assembly for the Cooperation of Workers of Book and Sunnah (Al-Gamia Al-Shariaa), was Sheikh Mahmoud Khattab

83Ibid., 12.
84Munib, 13.
Subki, a scholar in Al-Azhar. He established the *Al-Gamia Al-Shariaa* in the late 19th Century, but it did not become official until nearly twenty years in 1913 after a law was enacted regulating the establishment and management of associations.\(^{85}\)

Since then, many Islamic groups have appeared in Egypt, influenced by many aspects of life within the Egyptian society. Included in these groups were the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammad’s Youth, *Al-Qutbeyyoun, Al-Jihad* (Islamic Jihad Group), the *Al-Sameyoun*, Muslim Community (*Al-Takfir Wal Hijra*), *Salafis, Hezbollah, al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, Hizb Al-Tahrir, Al-Najoun men Al-Nar*, and *Al-Shawkeyoun*. The most important of these Islamic groups in Egypt in 20th Century are the Muslim Brotherhood, Muslim Community (*Al-Takfir Wal Hijra*), *al-Gamaa al-Islamiya*, and *Al-Jihad* (Islamic Jihad Group).

**Muslim Brotherhood Group**

In 1928, six Egyptian workers, employed by British military camps in Isma’iliyya in the Suez Canal Zone in Egypt, visited Hassan al-Banna, a young schoolteacher who they had heard preach in mosques and coffeehouses on the need for an Islamic renewal.\(^ {86}\) “Arabs and Muslims have no status and no dignity,” the workers said. “They are no more than mere hirelings belonging to the foreigners. . . . We are unable to perceive the road to

\(^{85}\) Ibid., 8-9.

action as you perceive it.” They therefore asked him to become their leader, and he accepted, thus founding the Society of the Muslim Brothers.  

Society of the Muslim Brothers later transformed into what we now know as The Muslim Brotherhood (MB). MB today is a Sunni transnational movement and the oldest and the largest Islamic group in many Arab states, particularly in Egypt. Hassan al-Banna tried to converge the thinking of Islamic intellectuals within this group to unite the ranks of Muslims in the face of the serious challenges that confronted them. He declared, “We are Salafi da’wa and Sufi belief.” Hassan’s success in unification was limited. Neither Salafis nor Sufis left their ways to join the Brotherhood. Instead, the Brotherhood is now comprised of Salafis and Sufism trends. Banna attacked Western intellectualism as being contrary to Islam, although he benefited from many Western sciences, especially the sciences of organization and administration, press, media and others, which are not contrary to Islam.

Banna, like other leaders of modern Islamic movements, believed that Muslims have eroded their culture because they have strayed from Islam, and saw that Muslims can solve their problems and return to the glory of the Islamic Nation by their commitment to return to Islam as it was practiced by the companions, i.e., the friends the Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him). The Muslim Brotherhood has undergone many changes since being first founded by Hassan al-Banna. But even now, after the

---

89 Munib, 35.
evolution of the group, having reached the height of its power, Banna established what he called the Private Organization. It was both a secret ideological and armed organization because al-Banna was aware that the British and the ruler, and other major world powers, would not allow the existence of a large and powerful Islamist political organization to seek restoration of the caliphate, so he prepared for a day of confrontation.  

After the assassination of al-Banna on 12 February 1949, there were attempts to eliminate the group. However, Hassan Hudhaibi, the successor of Al-Banna, sought to rebuild the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood took part in successive conflicts with President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s government. The revolution ceased when the Muslim Brotherhood was imprisoned until they were released by President Anwar al-Sadat in the mid-seventies. However, Brotherhood’s Private Organization was disbanded and disorganized. Thus, Muslim Brotherhood entered a new phase of history in Egypt, which abolished the armed action as a means of political change, and pursued a change of government and society through peaceful political struggle, service of social work, media, and cultural work, and soon fought via elections to the People’s Assembly, Shura council and local councils. 

The Organization

According to the by-laws of the Muslim Brotherhood, and regulations, which issued in 12 April 1994, the group consists of the following principal parts:

---

90Ibid., 35-36.

91Munib, 36.

92Muslim Brotherhood, “Al-laeha Al-ama le Gamaet Al-ekhwan Al-moslemen,” (Public Regulations of the Muslim Brotherhood),” 30 December 2009,
General Guide: The General President of the group, Chairman of the Guidance Office, and the Shura Council in addition to responsibilities and powers in accordance with the General Rules.

Guidance Office: The executive authority which supervises the call, and is responsible for all its affairs. It consists of 13 members for four-year terms, elected by secret ballot of the Shura Council in addition to three members appointed by the Guidance Office.

The Shura Council: The legislative authority of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It consists of at least 30 members for four-year terms, chosen by secret ballot of the members of Shura Councils of the Governorates in addition to 15 members appointed by the Guidance Office.

Another tier within the administrative structure of Brotherhood comprises what are called the Shura Councils and the Administrative Offices of Governorates.

The Objectives

According to their stated objectives, Muslim Brotherhood is a comprehensive Islamic organization, working to establish the religion of Allah on earth, striving to achieve the purposes for which the religion of Islam was created. Its objectives are to spread the call to Islam to all people, Muslims in particular, to explain this call, and respond to falsehoods and suspicions. They want to win the hearts and souls on the


principles of Islam, renew their impact, and unify viewpoints between the Islamic sects. They endeavor to raise the standard of living of individuals and develop the nation’s economy and security. The Muslim Brotherhood strives to achieve social justice and security for every citizen, and fight against ignorance, disease, poverty, and vice. It encourages acts of kindness and goodness. They aspire to liberate the Islamic homeland from all non-Muslim occupiers, to help Muslim minorities everywhere, and to unite the Muslims as one nation. They are working to establish the Islamic State to implement and protect the provisions of Islam and its teachings in practice, through worldwide communication. The Muslim Brotherhood advocates global cooperation under Islamic law to safeguard freedom and rights, and participate in building human civilization based on synergy of faith and means, consistent with the overall principles of Islam.’

The Means

The Muslim Brotherhood\textsuperscript{94} depends on a combination of means to achieve their objectives. It uses advocacy of its objectives through broadcasting and disseminating its messages, using bulletins, newspapers, magazines, books, publications about the processes of its delegations and missions at home and abroad. It educates its members on Islamic principles, urging them to reflect upon the meaning of religion as individuals and families, in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah. It teaches spirituality with science, and guide spiritual worship, moral virtue, and physical sports.

The Muslim Brotherhood offers guidance in curriculum development throughout every aspect of society: education, legislation, judicial, administrative and military, the economy, health, and governance. Competent authorities provide this guidance, and political and legislative bodies at the executive and international levels are given access to this guidance throughout all stages, from concept development to their practical implementation. Islamic guidance is provided to the media in an endeavor to refine its message about the true nature of Islam to avoid misinformation.

The Muslim Brotherhood also achieves its objectives by establishing educational, social, economic, and scientific institutions; mosques, schools, clinics, shelters, and clubs. It forms committees for the organization of Zakat, and performs alms-deeds, acts of kindness and reconciliation between individuals and families. It urges resistance of social ills, harmful habits, drugs, intoxicants, gambling, and guides young people to the path of righteousness.

Another means to achieving its objectives is the preparation of jihad to stand in the face of invaders and tyrants who are the enemies of God as a prelude to establishing a mature Islamic state.

Muslim Community Group “Al-Takfir Wal Hijra”

*Jama’at al-Muslimin* in Arabic means “Muslim community.” It is known by the media as *Al-Takfir Wal Hijra*, meaning “atonement and migration.” The word *takfir* means to judge somebody to be a *kafir*, based on their behavior resembling that of infidels. *Hijra* means “flight or emigration” or leaving from your homeland.

Shukri Mustafa, the founder of this group, was a young man whose sympathy was with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s. He was arrested with others of the Muslim
Brotherhood, joining their plight in prison from 1965 until their release from prison by President Anwar al-Sadat after the death of President Abdel Nasser. Shukri Mustafa became unsatisfied with the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood. The severe torture he and others experienced in prison caused him to think critically of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and their doctrinal position of power and society. Shukri adopted an ideology based on the condemnation of anyone who did not follow their narrow interpretation of Islam and *Shari’ah*. This doctrine is similar to the *Kharijites* (exclusionists) doctrine, which is an Islamic sect that emerged from the succession of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib (a cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet of Islam). Shukri left prison and founded the *Al-Takfir Wal Hijra Group*.  

**Al-Takfir Wal Hijra Group (Muslim Community Group) Thoughts**

Riad Hassan Moharam, a leading expert on Islamic groups, states that Shukri Mustafa’s thought can be summarized as following: “All existing communities and societies, except his own group, are ignorant and infidels. His group rejects what almost everyone else believes out of the sayings of the Imams, and processes like *Qiyas*, approbation and interests. The commitment to Muslim Community Group was the only basis for being recognized as a Muslim. Islam is not to say *Shahaadatayn* (believing in Allah’s oneness and Muhammad’s prophet-hood) only, but commitment and work under Muslim community Group is essential. True Islam is the type being embraced by Muslim

---

Based on these ideas, the Shukri Mustafa Group rejected the traditionalist scholars and their statements in books. They chose from Hadith only that what supported their beliefs and rejected what did not support their ideas. From these grounds, Shukri Mustafa started to form a vision of political reality and how to change. His idea was to establish an Islamic state according to his intellectual method, and concluded from his analysis of the political realities of the international and regional powers that they would seek the help of Israel to fragment the Arab world into small states to facilitate the process of weakening the Islamic nation. Shukri Mustafa thought this situation would represent a favorable circumstance for him to establish an Islamic mini-state in Egypt, and the international powers would either support or ignore his work because it still would contribute to the colonial scheme of fragmentation. After that, he sought to consolidate these mini-states by overcoming them, one after the other, until he was able to reunite the entire Islamic world into one country.97

The Al-Takfir Wal Hijra Group was involved in the kidnapping and assassination of the Minister of Endowments, Dr. Mohammed Hussein Al-Zahabe, in 1979, after he criticized the thought of the Shukri Mustafa group on one occasion. On 30 March 1978, Shukri Mustafa and his associates were executed on the morning of President Anwar al-Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. After the execution of Shukri, the group was weakened and


97Munib, 71-72.
took a different approach to change, based on the idea of waiting for the emergence of the Mahdi and joining them. Then they engaged in advocacy of their ideas without arms or sought any political or military action of any kind, and worked exclusively within the community in the social work in addition to the educational work because the Al-Takfir Wal Hijra Group prohibited entry into schools and universities after the execution of Shukri and his associates.\(^98\)

The Islamic Group “al-Gamaa al-Islamiya”

The Islamic group, al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, is a student movement formed in the mid-1970s within the Assiut University in Upper Egypt. Similar student movements formed in throughout Egyptian universities during this period, most notably Abul-Ela Madi, Mohiuddin Issa, Salih Hashim, Karam Zuhdi, Nageh Ibrahim, Rifai Taha, and Osama Hafez. In 1978, the Muslim Brotherhood made an offer to all the Islamic groups at the universities to join them. Some agreed and others refused. Abul-Ela Madi and Mohiuddin Issa were among those who joined the Muslim Brotherhood, Abul-Ela Madi, Mohiuddin Issa, and those who refused which included Karam Zuhdi, Nageh Ibrahim, Rifai Taha, Salih Hashim and Osama Hafez, and the majority of al-Gamaa al-Islamiya at the Assiut University.\(^99\)

In 1980, the Islamic group led by Karam Zuhdi adopted the strategy of the Al-Jihad Group in using armed action to achieve their goals, but the group did not have means or military cadres to plan it. The military expert of the Group was Mustafa Hamza,

\(^{98}\text{Ibid.}, 72-73.\)

\(^{99}\text{Munib, 84.}\)
a former reserve lieutenant in the Egyptian army who planned the assassination of
President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995. Mustafa Hamza was a member of Al-
Jihad Group. He joined the Islamic Group while in the prison in 1983 when the Islamic
Group split from the Al-Jihad Group because of differences as to who should be Emir of
the two Groups.100

The Islamic Group was known for the use of force to change the sins of what they
saw as contrary to the teachings of Islam in society, such as preventing mixing of men
and women, drinking wine, attending music concerts, weddings, plays, or films, and so
on. They exercised this kind of control in the cities and countryside, wherever the
opportunity arose, attacking houses of prostitution, drug dealers, and forcing swindlers to
return money to their owners. These acts raised the ire of the government because these
acts prevented it from controlling society while widening the influence of the Islamic
Group. The government struck to stop the activities of the Islamic Group. The Salafis,
Muslim Brotherhood, and the Jihadists blame the Islamic Group because of these
practices.101

The Operations of the Islamic Group

Because of these methods, al-Gamaa al-Islamiya has been conducted thousands
of armed incidents or paramilitary alike. Clashes with law enforcement on various
occasions between 1986 and 1997, which included attacking police leaders and personnel
in the district of Ain Shams in Cairo in 1988, and the district of Imbaba in Giza

100Ibid., 84.

101Ibid.
Governorate years in 1990 and 1992. In 1990, there was attempt to detonate a car bomb driven by a member of the group into a parade with then Interior Minister Zaki Badr, in Cairo, but the explosives failed because of technical malfunctions. A number of senior officers of the State Security Investigation (SSI) in Cairo and Upper Egypt were assassinated. A campaign was launched in 1994 against a number of banks in Cairo and Giza by putting explosive devices beside these banks to intimidate. In 1995, a group of Islamic group members conducted assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on his way to attend the African Union Summit, but the operation failed because the president was traveling in his armored vehicle while the attackers used only Kalashnikov rifles and did not use any anti-armor weapons.

The loudest and most violent campaign was against tourists throughout various governorates of Egypt. Their most recent attack was carried out at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor in 1997, which killed 58 foreign tourists. This was the last violent incident of the group.\footnote{Munib, 85-86.}

In 1997, the Islamic Group declared the initiative to stop violence, which was a change in its ideology and we will study and analyze this initiative in chapter 3 of the thesis.

An Analytical Study of the Islamic Jihad Group

After the establishment of Muslim Brotherhood, the Youth of Muhammad and \textit{Qutbeyyoun}, and the Egyptian Jihad Group were founded in 1964 as the first cells of Jihad in the modern Islamic movement in Egypt. The most notable are the three founders
Mustafa Alawi (from the district of Heliopolis), Ismael Tantawi (from the district Manial), and Nabil El-Borai (from Maadi district) and they were all students in high school, and Ismail have graduated from the Faculty of Engineering at Al-Azhar University later, and Alawi graduated from the Faculty of Engineering, too, while Nabil El-Borai delayed in his studies and then joined the Faculty of Arts at the University of Beirut in Alexandria.¹⁰³

This group became an organization, which included a number of groups in Cairo, Giza and Alexandria, and a few other provinces. They all included students of secondary schools or universities. Ayman al-Zawahiri was one of the members of the organization in the late sixties. Yahya Hashim, Rufai Soror, and Essam al-kamare, and Mohamed Ismail from Alexandria joined the organization. During the same period at the end of the 1960s, a group from Giza also joined, led by Mustafa Yosre and Hassan Hlaoui, but this group separated from the group soon afterwards in the early seventies when the group experienced disagreements.¹⁰⁴

Factors That Influenced the Group’s Ideology

All the Group’s leaders and members were raised in the mosques of two Salafi groups, Al-gameia al-shareia and Ansar al-Sunnah. They were influenced by Sheikh Mohamed Khalil Heras, one of Al-Azhar’s scholars and the chairman of the Ansar al-Sunnah group at this time. The idea of military coups, which was popular in the Arab region and throughout the world at that time, had been implemented with great success in

¹⁰³Ibid., 42-43.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 43.
many Arab and Muslim countries, in addition to the idea of guerrilla war for national liberation. The leaders of the group believed that the Free Officers Movement was a follower of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Free Officers Movement betrayed the Muslim Brotherhood because they did not improve training and educating officers in the group’s thought. The Brotherhood erred when it did not use armed action during the military coup against Egyptian President Nasser.  

The direct consequences of these three factors were the adoption of a Salafist approach in the fields of belief and studies of Shari’ah, in addition to political, social, and economic changes by armed forces. The organization initially opted to use a military coup to achieve this change, and adopted provisions penetrate the military with people from the group and have them join the military colleges. The group adopted the education curriculum of the Shari’ah studies based on the Salafist approach, and committed the members of group to attend Sheikh Mohamed Khalil Heras’s lessons in mosque “Kawala” in Abdin district, which is the headquarters of “Ansar al-Sunnah” in Cairo. The curriculum included the books In Shadow of Qur’an, and Milestones, by Sayyid Qutb.

In the area of military exercises, the group trained through hard physical and combative training like wrestling and karate, and pushed the members of the university students from the group for conversion to military colleges to use them for a military coup. Therefore, they were not interested in buying or storing weapons to practice outside the military, except for individual actions. This group depended on the area of

---

105 Munib, 43-44
106 Ibid., 44.

55
recruitment on personnel who were committed to the teachings of Islam, whatever their intellectual belonging or capacity. The most important condition of eligibility for group’s membership was belief in way of change by armed action. This has been the approach of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group in advocacy and recruitment so far.\textsuperscript{107}

Split in the Group and the Emergence of Yahya Hashem Group

In 1968, there was trial of the Air Force leaders who were considered responsible for the defeat of June 1967. The provisions were attenuating, so there were demonstrations of students and workers in the Cairo and Alexandria against the government of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Yahya Hashim, the prosecutor and a prominent member of the group, took the opportunity to lead the masses to overthrow President Nasser because he felt the military coup approach adopted by the Jihad Group and led by Ismail Tantawi, would take decades, if ever, to accomplish.\textsuperscript{108}

Yahya Hashim was captured and quickly released when they learned he was a prosecutor. Problems started and differences arose, not only between Yahya and the authorities, but also between Yahya Hashim and the group, with him on the one hand, and Ismail Tantawi and the rest of the group on the other. Ismail said that Yahya made a mistake, and the group was dangerously exposed. Differences emerged in the discussions and many attempts of reconciliation failed. Yahya and his team broke away from the group and founded another group. In 1975, Hashim Yahya’s group clashed with police in

\textsuperscript{107}Munib, 44-45.

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., 46.
the mountains. Yahya Hashim and his group of leaders were killed, and others were imprisoned, thus ending the Yahia Hashem Group.\textsuperscript{109}

Another Split in the Islamic Jihad Group

After the war in October 1973, another dispute erupted between members of the group on the extent of Islam of military officers from the group’s members who participated in the war, especially those who died. Among those who died was the brother of Mustafa Alawi. Alawi declared they were martyrs, while others insisted they were not martyrs because they fought under the banner of President Anwar al-Sadat to achieve his objectives. Ismael Tantawi tried to reconcile the two parties to no avail. Alawi and others broke away from the Islamic Jihad Group without joining another. The group continued to be led by Ismail Tantawi. Many others remained with him, like Nabil El-Borai, Essam al-kamare, and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif was among them at that time or joined shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{110}

Independence of the Group of Giza

After multiple differences, Mustafa Yosre and Hassan Hlaoui, who were leaders of the Group of Giza, decided to separate from Ismael Tantawi group until the differences were resolved.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{109}Munib, 46-47.
\textsuperscript{110}Ibid., 47-48.
\textsuperscript{111}Ibid., 48.
Establishment of Salih Sariyah Group

Dr. Salih Sariyah, a Palestinian national and an employee of the Arab League, established his group, which comprised Ahmed Salih (Port Said), Karim Al-anadoli, Mustafa Yosre, Hassan Hlaoui (Giza), Talal Al-ansari, Khalid Al-menshawi, Ali Al-maghrabe (Alexandria), Mohamed Shakir al-Sharif (Qena) and others. In his book, Ayman al-Zawahiri has said,

The youth began putting pressure on Sariyah to start the confrontation. Under their pressure, he agreed to carry out an attempt to overthrow the regime. A plan was prepared under which group members would silently overpower the policemen guarding the college gate, enter the college, and seize weapons and armored vehicles with the help of students acting as night supervisors. They would then march toward the Arab Socialist Union headquarters to attack President Anwar al-Sadat and his government officials who were meeting there. . . .

The group conducted a coup attempt, known as the case of Military Technical College in 1974. Sariyah and Al-anadoli were sentenced to death, and the rest of the group were sentenced under various provisions. Ahmed Salih, who was acquitted, was elected Emir of the group. Although this operation was nipped in the bud, it marked a new change in the general march of the Islamic movement, which decided to carry arms against the government.\textsuperscript{112}

The group suffered a security blow in 1977, and the police arrested a large number of leaders and members of the group, what was known as the case of the Jihad Organization. Ahmed Salih was sentenced to ten years in prison, and the remainder received various provisions. Dr. Mustafa Yosre was elected Emir of the group, and he issued a decision to dismantle the group in 1979 after a security breach. Following the dissolution of the group, each of intermediate level leaders formed his independent group from the members who had belonged to him before the dissolution. Some tried to reunify the groups into one large group. One of these leaders was Muhammad Abdus Salam

\textsuperscript{112} Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner,” 2001, 49.
Faraj, author of *The Absent Obligation*, and the commander of the group who assassinated former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in October 1981.  

**What Happened with Ismail Tantawi Group until October 1981**

When Salih Sariyah was arrested for secret calculations that his name come in the investigation, Ismael Tantawi fled to the Netherlands, where he married and obtained Dutch citizenship. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Sayyid Imam, and Essam al-Kamare reorganized the group and continued their activities until they were discovered by the security forces in October 1981 in their attempts conspire with the Muhammad Abdus Salam Faraj Group. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Essam al-kamare, Nabil El-Borai, Dr. Amin Demeiri, and most of the members, both Sayyid Imam and Muhammad al-Zawahiri escaped.  

**Jihad Movement in Egypt and the Assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat**

“The fight against the enemy nearest to you has precedence over the fight against the enemy farther away. . . . In all Muslim countries, the enemy has the reins of power. The enemy is the present rulers.”  

In 1980, history witnessed several significant events in the of the Egyptian Jihad movement summarized as follows:

Dr. Mustafa Yosre dismantled the Jihad Group in 1979. He became emir of the group, but the intermediate level leaders refrained from informing members under their control.  

---

113 Munib, 49.

114 Ibid., 49-50.

authority of the dissolution of the Jihad Group. Each leader eventually formed his own independent group under his own views, which he had learned from the group before the dissolution.

Muhammad Abdus Salam used his vision of tactics and methods in the jihadi action in their quest to achieve his goals, which are a combination of the methods used by Jamaat al-Tablighi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Mohamed Salam was a leader of an intermediate level in the Jihad Group. Muhammad Abdus Salam succeeded in several steps, having a major impact on the movement by successfully recruiting Lieutenant Colonel Abbud al-Zumar from the military intelligence to his group as well as recruiting the leadership of the Islamic Group in Upper Egypt, and merging them into his group. He integrated several jihadist groups, the most important was the Nabil Al-maghrabe Group.

In his book, Ayman al-Zawahiri said,

Muhammad Abd-al-Salam Faraj and his comrades met with the youth in southern Egypt. With the unification of these two movements the Islamic Group [Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah] was formed under the leadership of Umar Abd-al-Rahman, who is now serving a life sentence in Rochester prison in Minnesota in the United States on charges of involvement in the [1993] New York bombings.\(^{116}\)

The manner in which Muhammad Abdus Salam attempted to achieve his goals led to the decline of the Jihad organization because it increased membership at the expense of quality. At the time, it was believed their security would be compromised, but the prevailing political and security situation in Egypt helped perpetuate the group’s activity and safety until August 1981. Muhammad Abdus Salam sought to overturn the President Al-Sadat’s government using Egyptian army and paramilitary units composed of civilian

---

members of the Group. He succeeded in the formation and training of civilian units and also succeeded in recruiting a number of army officers into his group. The most famous of them were Lieutenant Colonel Abbud al-Zumar from the military intelligence, First Lieutenant Khaled Islambouli, Reserve First Lieutenant Engineer Atta Tayel, Lieutenant Colonel Mamdouh Abu Jabal, and others. The group of Muhammad Abdus Salam ostensibly invoked secrecy, but the practical applications of most of the leaders and members of the group were as close as possible to the public, not because of regulatory principles, but as an expression of random neglect. However, the weak state of the security services at the time was the main reason for the lack of detection of the group.117

The Ayman al-Zawahiri Group focused on the collection of material resources, such as money, weapons, and houses for use as safe houses or storing weapons, more than focusing on individuals. Recruitment of individuals would be the next stage after completing the acquisition of material resources. In addition, an agreement was reached on the merger between the two groups through Tariq el-Zomor, a representative of Muhammad Abdus-Salam, and Dr. Amin Demeiri, delegate of Ayman al-Zawahiri.118

Mohamed Abdel-Salam determined President Al-Sadat’s assassins from a number of army officers, affiliates like Khaled Islambouli. Initially, Abboud and a number of Jihad leaders (headed by Engineer Ahmed Salama Mabrouk) opposed the operation, but Muhammad Abdus Salam, the strongest man in the group, decided to implement it. President Al-Sadat’s assassination succeeded, but other operations failed. It was easy for

117Munib, 51.

118Ibid., 53.
police in the following weeks to arrest members and leaders of the group because of the 
group’s weak security procedures.\textsuperscript{119}

In his book, Ayman al-Zawahiri said:

Thus the 1401 Hegira (1981) uprising ended with a fundamental gain--the 
 killing of President Al-Sadat. The attempts that followed it were not successful 
because of poor planning and insufficient preparation. However, the issue must 
not be viewed from the angle of these small events. That uprising must be viewed 
from the angle of the aftereffects of these events and the facts that they proved. It 
is obvious that the uprising proved several facts:

The events showed the courage of the fundamentalists who attacked forces 
that were more experienced and larger in number and equipment.

The events showed the offensive nature of the fundamentalist movement, 
which decided to attack the regime in an attempt to kill its upper echelons among 
a huge crowd of spectators.

The events showed that changing the regime, which had departed from 
Islam, became the central idea that preoccupied the Islamists, who rejected partial 
reform programs, patch-up jobs, and the attempts to beautify the ugly face of the 
regime with some reformatory measures.

The events proved that the phase of the unilateralism of the regime in 
attacking the Islamic movement had ended and that the enemies of Islam in the 
White House and Tel Aviv and their agents in Cairo must expect a violent 
response to every repression campaign they carried out.

The events proved that the idea of work through martial laws, submission 
to the secular constitution imposed by referendums, and recognition of the 
legitimacy of the government had become worn-out ideas in the minds of the 
Islamists. Those Islamists decided to carry arms to defend the absented creed, the 
banned \textit{shari'ah}, their violated honor, their homeland that was occupied by new 
international imperialism, and their sanctities that were sold in the agreements of 
surrender with Israel.

The events also showed the utter failure of the security services, which did 
not know that the country was charged with the jihadi movement. This movement 
was able to infiltrate the armed forces and to take from them some weapons and 
was able to join the military parade forces, despite the tight security measures that 
were adopted to secure the parade.

\textsuperscript{119}Ibid., 56-57.
I (Al-Zawahiri) say that the youth of the 1981 uprising were “pure” and vigilant, avoiding and even rejecting blandishments. They carried arms in defense of their religion, creed, sanctities, nation, and homeland.”

Al-Zawahiri added:

With the killing of President Anwar al-Sadat the issue of jihad in Egypt and the Arab world exploded and became a daily practice. Confrontation of the regime, which was against the shari‘ah and allied with America and Israel, became a battle of continuous chapters that did not stop until today. On the contrary, jihad is increasing day after day, gathering more supporters and increasingly threatening its enemies in Washington and Tel Aviv.

Two differences emerged in the prison. First, the belief that the attack on the Security Directorate in Assiut on 8 October 1981, after the assassination of President Al-Sadat and attempted occupation by the Islamic group, was a random act and caused a lot of blood and very large number of them were arrested and killed. Therefore, they found that the number of those facing trial at the issue of Jihad organization is very large. Therefore, Dr. Umar Abdel Rahman issued a fatwa calling for fasting 60 days on the grounds that what happened was error. The second was the difference in the Emirate of Sheikh Umar. The Jihad Group nominated Abbud al-Zumara military man and lieutenant colonel in military intelligence and has the qualities of the leader - the senses, especially sight, and he is best suited to be a prince. The Islamic group nominated Sheikh Umar Abdel Rahman on the grounds that Azahari, personal scientific and spiritual.

---

121 Ibid., 23.
Three separate jihadist groups were released from prison. The Islamic Group, Abbud al-Zumar Group, which was led by Majdi Salim after getting out of prison, and the third was Ayman al-Zawahiri Group. In 1988, Abbud al-Zumar Group and Ayman al-Zawahiri Group has united and formed its leadership in Peshawar from Ayman al-Zawahiri, Ahmad Salama, Major Abdul Aziz al-Jamal, Muhammad al-Zawahiri, Adel Abdul Quddus and others, and The Emir was Dr. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif. The name of this new Group became “Islamic Jihad Group” and famous outside Egypt as “the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.” After that, in 1991 Abbud al-Zumar, Tarek al-Zumar and many of the leaders of Islamic Jihad Group who were in prison has separated from the Islamic Jihad Group and joined the Islamic Group in prison.\textsuperscript{123}

Hani Al-Sibai, a lawyer and director of the Maqrizi Center for historical studies and a member of \textit{Shura} Council for the Islamic Jihad Group in his dialog with “Al-hayat” newspaper said, “Sayyid Imam liked the work to be confidential. Therefore, people were going to pledge allegiance to Dr. Ayman on the grounds that he was the prince. They thought him prince because his name was known through the trials. Abu Hafs al-Masri and Abu Obeida Alpincheri were among those who worked on the re-composition of the group. Thus, the group reorganized itself abroad and revived Jihad organization in 1987.”\textsuperscript{124}

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a golden opportunity for the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to transform the tribal resistance into a holy war, an Islamic jihad to expel the godless communists from Afghanistan. Over the years the

\textsuperscript{123} Munib, 60-61.

\textsuperscript{124} Al-Sibai, n.d.
United States and Saudi Arabia expended about $40 billion on the war in Afghanistan. The CIA and its allies recruited, supplied, and trained almost 100,000 radical Mujahideen from forty Muslim countries including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria, and Afghanistan itself. Among those who answered the call was right-wing, Saudi-born millionaire, Osama bin Laden and his cohorts.\textsuperscript{125}

Some elements of the Islamic Jihad Group and the Islamic group participated in the war against Soviet Union with the Arab Mujahideen and they met at this time with Sheikh Abdullah Azzam a famous Mujahid in the war against Soviet Union. They also met Osama bin Laden, the future leader of Al-Qaeda who was also participating in the jihad against the Soviet Union. In this time, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan got a lot of support from the governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.

In 1993, most of the members of the Islamic Jihad Group moved from Afghanistan to Sudan, the group conducted assassination attempts of former Prime Minister Atef Sidky and former Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in Egypt, one thousand members of Islamic Jihad Group were arrested in what is known by media as \textit{Tunzeem Ta’laea El-fatah}. Because of this, there were disagreements within the group, prompting Sayyid Imam to resign and Ayman al-Zawahiri assumed the emirate. The Group bombed the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in Pakistan in 1995. It was the last operation against the Egyptian government, after that the group declared stopping the armed actions.\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{footnotesize}

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{126} Al-Sibai, Part II.
\end{footnotesize}
In the Sudan, problems happened between the Islamic Jihad and the Sudanese authorities after the execution of two young men accused of treason, without the permission of the Sudanese authorities, which asked the group to leave the Sudanese territory. Islamic Jihad Group, led by Dr. Al-Zawahiri moved to Afghanistan in 1996, where he obtained substantial convergence with Sheikh Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda leader. The culmination of this rapprochement on 23 February 1998, declared the establishment of the world Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders. In June of 2001, Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged into one group called *Qaeda al-Jihad*.\(^{127}\)

**The Strategy of Islamic Jihad Group:**

“Victory by the armies cannot be achieved unless the infantry occupies the territory. Likewise, victory for the Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.”\(^{128}\)

The Islamic Jihad Group believes that as long as the governments of the Muslim world have usurped power from the military coup against the people with support and blessing of Western colonialism, it entitled the Muslims to regain their usurped control by armed force. The Egyptian jihad saw that taking power in the Islamic world is better than fighting the West, despite all the injustice and oppression by the West toward Muslims,

---

\(^{127}\) Al-Sibai, Part IV

and has depended on to say that the regimes in the Islamic world is the near enemy, while the West is the far enemy.\textsuperscript{129}

**The Difference between Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad:**

Although Islamic Jihad cadres were the main pillar in the establishment and administration of Al-Qaeda, in 1998 Al-Qaeda adopted the strategy to fight the United States and its allies by striking their interests anywhere in the world to undermine their ability and influence in the Arab regions. Al-Qaeda’s intent was to also to prevent the United States support to rulers of the Muslim world to overcome jihadist attempts for power. The aims of these operations are to gain public support in the Islamic world for Al-Qaeda and future attempts to obtain power.”\textsuperscript{130}

**Important Operations Implemented by Islamic Jihad Group**

The Islamic Jihad Group has implemented numerous operations over the years. Specifically, these included an abortive coup attempt in 1974, known as the case of Military Technical College, leaders and members of the group were sentenced to various provisions.

In 1977, the Islamic Jihad Group attacked a guard of a foreign consulate in Alexandria, and attempted to take his weapon. Leaders and members of the group were tried and sentenced in what was known by the media as the Jihad Organization Case.

In 1977, Ali Al-Maghrabe, who was a member of the Jihad Group in Alexandria, killed a state security officer during a clash with a force of police that tried to arrest him,

\textsuperscript{129}Munib, 63.

\textsuperscript{130}Ibid., 65
and then was killed. They also threw a grenade at a security forces camp in the Al-sahel District of Shubra in Cairo on 8 October 1981.

Four members of the Jihad Group took part in the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat and a group of his companions in the military parade on 6 October 1981.

The Islamic Jihad Group also took part in an assassination attempt of former Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993. A member of the Group blew himself up in the minister’s convoy in front of the American University in Cairo. Only the bomber was killed, while Major General Hassan al-Alfi and a number of his guards were seriously injured.

In November 1993, the Islamic Jihad Group attempted to assassinate former Prime Minister Atef Sidky with a remote controlled car bomb in his motorcade in the streets of the Heliopolis district of Cairo. The Prime Minister was unhurt, but some passersby suffered various injuries. The Islamic Jihad Group assassinated the first witness just several terrifying hours before the 1993 trial of the attempted assassination of Atef Sidky.

There were numerous failed attempts to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak in the streets of Cairo by the Islamic Jihad Group. One of which was a car bomb in front of a mosque, and the other was through landmines placed on the main road traveled by the motorcade. All attempts failed because the President changed the course of his motorcade at the last minute.
The Islamic Jihad Group were involved in the bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in Pakistan in 1995, as well as siding with Al-Qaeda in the bombing of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania at the same time in 1998.131

Analysis

It is clear that Islamic groups not only have problems with the Western countries, but also have problems with the governments and peoples of the Arab and Muslim countries. The Islamic groups’ foremost conflict with the Western countries is over the latter’s constant support for Israel. This particularly fuels hatred of the West, above all the United States. The West’s support of Arab and Islamic regimes is also unwelcome. From the viewpoint of these groups, Western countries prop up and support Muslim governments that do not rule by Islamic laws, and instead promote Western values in Muslim societies. Some groups, such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad, see that the United States and the Western world are the main source of the problems of the Islamic world.

Islamic groups resist the Arab and Islamic governments because they, according these groups, have replaced shariah with man-made laws. They also disagree with those countries conducting peace negotiations with Israel, which was one of the reasons for the assassination of President Al-Sadat. These groups oppose the Arab and Islamic governments that fight against religious movements and symbols of Islam.

The Islamic groups combat against people who do not follow Islamic teachings such as the prohibition of mixing of men and women, drinking wine, attending music concerts, weddings involving un-Islamic activities, lewd art and films etcetera. The

131Munib, 66-67.
Islamic groups see these as violations that should be stopped through Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. They also condemn and attack all the workers / employees in state institutions in Arab and Islamic countries because, these groups think, such employees support the governments in their un-Islamic rule.

Some groups like the Muslim Brotherhood want to achieve their objectives by establishing an Islamic state and employing peaceful means to achieve their goals, while other groups such as Islamic Jihad believe that the change will not happen except by using armed actions. Other groups, like Islamic Group and some elements of the Islamic Jihad Group, declared intellectual reviews, which expressed a change in their ideology by stopping violence and taking peaceful means to achieve their objectives. In 1997, al-Gamaa al-Islamiya declared an initiative to stop the violence, and in 2007, former leader of Islamic Jihad Group, Sayyid Imam, declared his intellectual reviews. These reviews will be further examined and analyzed in chapter 3.

Conclusion

Islamic groups have multiple ideas and goals, some of them take armed action to achieve their objectives while others take peaceful way to achieve their objectives, but both methods agree on a single goal of establishing an Islamic state. Egypt has suffered much due to acts of violence carried out by these groups during the last century, which has killed thousands of innocent people, as well as causing enormous damage estimated at billions of dollars in tourism and investments, which negatively impact Egypt’s rate of growth and development plans.

It is clear that the Islamic groups are not only in an obvious conflict with the West, but these groups also have considerable problems with vast majorities of people
within the world of Islam. All acts of violence carried out by these groups are rejected by most Muslims because of their being contrary to the teachings of Islam as enshrined in Qur’an and Prophet’s sayings and also because of the harm they cause to the affected nation’s economy as well as security. After our study of the history of the Islamic groups in Egypt and their ideology and agendas, we will now analyze the intellectual reviews in the next chapter and the main ideas of these groups subjected to some dispassionate examination by these reviews.
CHAPTER 3
THE INTELLECTUAL REVIEWS

An intellectual review is an open public proclamation by Islamic clerics of a sound standing. Most of these reviews have concluded that these Jihadist groups have gone astray and way off the original teachings of Islam on the concept of Jihad. The reviews challenge the hard-line members of the Groups to confess their doctrine was misguided and urgently needed course correction. The reviewers also ask the group members to declare repentance to the public through a critical review of their jurisprudence, of their wrong political behavior, and the legitimacy of violence and murder in addition to bravely recommending to the governments and societies to atone for their misdeeds.\textsuperscript{132}

On 5 July 1997, one of the defendants of the Islamic group at a session of a military court, “Mohamed Abdel-Alim,” declared in a written statement which renounced violence, (which is also) known as the initiative to stop violence of the Islamic Group.\textsuperscript{133}

From this time, intellectual reviews became a term used when the Islamic Group debated new jurisprudent visions. In 2007, the former leader of Islamic Jihad group, Sayyid Imam, released his intellectual review of the activities and ideas that form basis for most


Jihadist groups. In this chapter we will study and analyze some of the recent intellectual reviews of the Islamic Group and Islamic Jihad Group.

The Intellectual Reviews of the Islamic Group
“al-Gamaa al-Islamiya”

Mohamed Abdel-Alim, of the Islamic Group, declared an initiative to stop violence on 5 July 1997. In 1997, however, members of the Islamic group killed fifty-eight tourists in the Luxor incident, disrupting the initiative’s goals. In March 1999, the group’s entire Shura Council signed a resolution approving the initiative to stop violence. In 2002, the group published its intellectual revisions in a series of four books. The first was, Silsilot Tashih Al-Mafahim (Concepts’ Correction Series), that emphasized the importance of an honest and dispassionate audit of the issues of thought and faith that formed the bedrock for group’s ideology. In 2003, other three reviews of that series followed: River of Memories; The Riyadh Bombings; and al-Qaeda Strategy. In 2004, they were followed by a new series entitled: Islam and the Challenges of the Twentieth-Century Atheist.

Motives Behind the Initiative and Its Strategic Significance

In June 2007, Dr. Najih Ibrahim, one of the leading theorists of the Islamic Group, submitted a paper to a conference organized by the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies, marking the Initiative’s 10th anniversary. Ibrahim listed the motives behind the initiative and its strategic significance, and highlighted the main aspects of the group’s reviews or this process of collective introspection.
“Followers of the same religion, who are also citizens of the same country, fought one another; their blood is shed everyday with no Islamic justification, while the Shari’ah ordains protection and preservation of life.

Israel aims at dominating the region, thereby weakening the Egyptian State, and marginalizing its role. Since internal fighting can only weaken Egypt (and facilitates the goals of Israel), the Islamic movements must stop violence forever.

The Islamic Group has also considered the threat posed by an aggressive Western civilization to Islamic identity through the ideas like “end of history” and “clash of civilizations.” The fighting in Egypt actually supports the motives of Western civilization at the cost of Islamic values.

The Islamic Group has taken into account the danger rising from the emergence of the policy of besieging and uprooting any Islamic phenomenon, be it a state, a movement, or a minority. These tenets are part of the anti-Islamic international powers’ strategies. Therefore, the continuation of the violent operations pave the way for annihilation or siege, under the pretext of standing against terrorism or a preventive war against it.

The Islamic Group has considered the jeopardy resulting from the attempts made by migrant Copts (Egyptian Christians) to utilize international pressures against Egypt to achieve undue or illegitimate gains under the pretense that Copts are targeted for attack from Islamic groups, even though the government obscures this fact.

They also have considered the threat emerging from the fiery conflict between the heralds of Islamic thought and those supporting secularist thought. Some opponents of Islamic thought are obviously utilizing the fight in Egypt to provoke authorities against
anything Islamic in order to achieve a decisive victory against the heralds of Islamic thought. It is our duty to deprive them of such opportunity.

The Islamic Group bears in mind the menace coming from the growing disorder in Egyptian society because of the continuation of fighting between the citizens of the same country with all the grudges and animosities that follow it.134

Attitudes and Visions of the Group Before and After Reviews

After a long experience in prison and a study of the realities at local, regional, and international levels, the Group started to develop its thinking and desire to review its mistakes. The state benefited from the positive energies of youth and the Islamic Movement and community developed in return for leaving their violent ways.135

The Position of the Ruling Regime

Before Reviews

In the book, The Inevitability of Confrontation, the group believed in the use of violence with the ruling regime to remove a kaafir (infidel) ruler who does not rule with the law of God (Shari’ah); fighting recalcitrant groups in the teachings of Islam; establishment of the caliphate and the installation of a successor to the Muslims; the country’s liberation, release of prisoners, and the propagation of religion.


They believed that the establishment of state of Islam cannot be achieved under a state of falsehood. They declared that the institutions of the regime, such as the police and the executive authority, are in the rule of “recalcitrant groups” of the laws of Islam, including groups who cooperate with the government, disrupt God’s laws, and refrain from ruling with his book. The group must fight all of these people according to the rule of Islam, even if these people prayed, fasted, and claimed that they would apply the Islamic law someday.\textsuperscript{136}

After Reviews

The group laid out a logical vision in dealing with the system, consisting of the full support of each position of the regime or other that was consistent with the purposes and provisions of Islamic law and the interests of the country and the people, while at the same time working as a peaceful opposition. The book, \textit{The Application of the Provisions of the Jurisdiction of the Rulers}, refers to the need for the Islamic movement to leave sovereign matters to the state, while the state should leave educational roles, faith, moral, social, and reform to the disciplined Islamic movements, away from the hot or cold conflict with authority.\textsuperscript{137}


Characterization of the Community’s Position

Before Reviews

Like most contemporary Islamic movements that use violence as a mechanism to change, the writings of thinkers, Abul Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, were the main sources for the Islamic group theorists. During the upsurge of violence and counter-violence between them and the State, they declared that Egypt (community) would not become a House of Peace (Dar al-silm) just because its inhabitants were Muslims, just as a country does not become a House of War (Dar al-harb) just because majority of its people were infidels. Only a proper and complete implementation of Shariah would make a country a true House of peace. Therefore a political expansion of the Islamic group through its campaign of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, was necessary and only philanthropic and missionary activities in the mosques won’t achieve the goal of converting Egypt into a House of Peace.138

The Islamic Group used force to change what they saw as contrary to the teachings of Islam in society, such as preventing the mixing of men and women, drinking wine, attending music concerts, or lewd films, and so on. In addition, they exercised control in the cities and countryside whenever the opportunity arose, and attacked prostitution apartments, drug dealers. They also forced swindlers to return funds to their owners.139

---


139 Munib, 84.
After Reviews

The Islamic group has sought to define its relationship with society through the renewal of the concept of “The Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,” The book, Governance: Religious Vision and a Realistic View, shows that the real function of the religious scholars, is not to accuse people of infidelity, immorality, or hypocrisy, but their mission is to guide and help Muslims. The group rejected the previous practices when violence was used to change the habits in the community and punish individuals through “The Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice” by force, and gave the right of enforcement to the judicial authority.\(^\text{140}\)

The Position of Political and Intellectual Powers

Before Reviews

The group was characterized at the universities by a kind of intensity in dealing with opponents of leftist students, resulting in some cases with severe beatings and the use of violence. It appeared to establish its control in the university, and later extended it into the street. Members of Islamic group severely criticized The Muslim Brotherhood and their students and often called them, the “Surrendered Brotherhood,” and in some cases, sought to disrupt their activities. The group considered launching a coup in an attempt to unify the various Muslim groups, as well as aimed to bring about intellectual

unity within the movement. In short they reject the secular views as an alternative to the implementation of Islamic rule.  

After Reviews

The reviews did not show a clear intellectual change to the secular forces due to mutual hostility and intolerance between the parties during an era of violence. Until now, not yet known what the nature of dealing with these parties and forces in the coming period, and whether intellectual change will occur or will be limited to tolerance as a matter of fact cannot be denied? Dr. Najih Ibrahim, one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, said in several media interviews that the Muslim Brotherhood is an important group and cannot be denied its historic role of providing services for the benefit of Islam. He added, “Now we continue to consecrate relations with all Islamic movements, and the differing views and interpretations are now one of the manifestations of democracy, and this is useful for the Islamic movement in particular.”

The Position of a Religious Minority

Before Reviews

The Islamic Group entered in the cycle of conflict with the Copts (Egyptian Christians) in the 1970s. If an ordinary quarrel occurred in one of the villages or remote cities, the type of which could occur any normal day, and if one of the parties were a Copt, then it could be classified as a sectarian conflict between the Group and the Copts.

---

142 Ibid.
From this point it would escalate into a bloody clash between the Group and the State, which had a particular sensitivity to problems of this kind.\textsuperscript{143}

After Reviews

Leaders of the Group declared the Copts are partners in the home, and Islam urges us to not only do justice, but also urges us to engage in charity.\textsuperscript{144} They added that Islam calls us to treat people kindly, Muslims as well as non-Muslims, and a mistake by anyone must be attributed to the person and not to the religion.\textsuperscript{145}

The Position of Women’s Issues

Before Reviews

Group did not have a clear position on women’s issues. A number of wives of leaders of the Group were employees in the government and had special jobs, which required them to mix with men. The group did not object. Some women members of the group entered into a confrontation with security forces during the period of violence, were arrested, and referred to military trials, which issued sentences of up to twelve years in prison in some cases.\textsuperscript{146}

After Reviews

The group declared that Islam gives women greater rights and honors, giving her a special financial disclosure, full rights to education, and a decent life. They declared

\textsuperscript{143} Aziz, 2007.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
that the group was not against women’s rights, but it was against their appointment to the Presidency or the Office of the Judiciary. They emphasized the rights of women and equal status with men in the book, *The Renewal of Religious Discourse.* 147

**Group’s Position on the Ideology and Method of Al-Qaeda**

In a dialogue with Dr. Najih Ibrahim, a leader of the Group, he said that,

The Group respects all who work for Islam. The difference between Al-Qaeda and us is not personal, but a different interpretation of jurisprudence. Many of the common folk might be happy of 11 September because of the hatred for America. I say to them, if 11 September made you happy for days, it has made millions of Muslims sad everywhere for years and years. This is like what happened when Pearl Harbor made the Japanese happy for days, but made them sad for years after the atomic bombardment in 1945. The problem of Al-Qaeda is that they want to fight the whole world and win with its potential, which are known to all the people of the Islamic movement. It has fought America on 11 September, Russia in Chechnya, India in Kashmir, in Pakistan by trying to kill all the symbols, Indonesia and Australia in Bali, Saudi Arabia in Riyadh, and so on. As well as Morocco, Egypt, and with almost all countries, although the Prophet (peace be upon him) did not fight two enemies at one time. We do not approve the atrocities in which Al-Qaeda killed civilians, both Muslims and non-Muslims, women and children and staff, the elderly and adults. Islam prohibits all that even if the civilian was from the fighting state. What did not carry weapons. And the inviolability of killing civilians from non-Muslims and Muslims, which is one from the most important principles of Jihad. I replied to them on the subject of *Tatars,* which they do not understand correctly in my book, *Riyadh Bombings,* and also the response of Sheikh Essam El-Din Derbala in his book, *Al-Qaeda Strategy.* All these as well as the ideology of Al-Qaeda itself, which expiates all Muslim rulers, without exception, as well as members of parliament, prosecutors and judges and all the army and the police, as well as many other varieties of these things which are the beginning of the flaws. 148

---


The Intellectual Reviews of the Islamic Jihad Group

The intellectual reviews of Islamic Jihad group appeared in December 2007 when the former leader of Islamic Jihad group, Sayyid Imam, aka Dr. Fadl, published his Document, *Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World* (*Tarshid al-amal al-jihadi fi misr wa al-alam*). In March 2008, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahri, the number two man of Al-Qaeda, published his responses to Sayyid Imam’s Document in his book, *The Exoneration: A Treatise Exonerating the Nation of the Pen and the Sword from the Blemish of the Accusation of Weakness and Fatigue*. In November 2008, Sayyid Imam published his responses to Al-Zawahri with his Document, *The Denudation of the Exoneration*. From these publications, a debate evolved between two leaders of the Islamic Jihad group over a number of important issues, which are illustrated in this chapter. Before beginning this debate, the reader should know important events in the lives of both leaders.

Important Events in the Life of Dr. Fadl

Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif, aka Dr. Fadl and Abd Al’Qader Bin Abd Al-Aziz, is described as a major figure in the global jihad movement. Dr. Fadl became one of the most famous leaders of the Islamic movements in the world. Not known to many, he was the first practical jihadist leader to issue a comprehensive review (critical analysis) of the jihadist organization’s ideology. He is the leader and ideological theoretician of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Group, of which some members took part in the assassination of the late Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat.
Dr. Fadl was born on 8 August 1950 in Bani Suwayf city in Upper Egypt. He earned a medical and surgery degree in November 1974 with distinction and honors from the College of Medicine, Cairo University.

He joined the Islamic Students’ Group, which formed the Jihad Group in Egypt with the Al-Qaeda organization’s present second-in-command, at Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1977. Dr. Fadl and other members of the Jihad group were accused in the “Major Jihad” case in the aftermath of the assassination of President Al-Sadat in 1981. He was able to escape in 1982 and settled for a short time in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) where he worked. He left the UAE for the city of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, where he was joined by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1986, who worked with him at the Ibn al-Nafis Clinic.

The Peshawar (Pakistan) stage is considered the most dangerous chapter in Fadl’s life. Outlines of the global jihadi action were still in their formative stage, but quickly developed during the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, thus starting a new phase of jihadist operations.

The personality of Dr. Fadl became greatly prominent in the Arab Mujahideen camps when he was asked to act as the Shari’ah role-model among the youths. It was during this period that Dr. Al-Zawahiri and Fadl met Osama Bin Laden, the leader of what would become Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden was also participating in the jihad against the Soviet Union with and Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a famous Mujahid in the war against the Soviet Union. Fadl was the leader of the Islamic Jihad Group from 1987 until 1993.

He completed his first book, *Al-Umdah fi I’ddal-Uddah* (translated as *The Essential Guide for Preparation*), which appeared in 1988 and became one of the most important texts in the jihadi training camps in Afghanistan as well as his other book, *Al-
Jami fi Talab al-Ilm al-Sharif (translated as The Compendium of the Pursuit of Divine Knowledge), which is considered as the “Mujahideen’s constitution.”

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, he relocated to Sudan where Dr. Al-Zawahiri and most members of Al Jihad and Osama Bin Laden had relocated before him. In 1993, the group had a major setback when Egyptian authorities arrested over 1,000 members of the group’s military wing, Tali’at al-fatah (The Liberation Vanguard). Following a fundamental disagreement between him and the group, he resigned and Al-Zawahiri took charge of the group.

Fadl went from Sudan to Yemen in the middle of 1994 and worked as a doctor in the General Al-Thawrah Hospital and a specialist for the Dar Al-Shifa in Ibb Governorate. The Yemeni authorities arrested and handed him over to Egypt on 28 February 2004.

He has been an inmate in (Mazra’ah Turrah) Prison in Cairo since 2004, as he is serving a 25-year sentence for his conviction in the “Returnees from Albania” case. The Higher State Security Court convicted him of leading the Jihad group and his participation on the organization’s Shari’ah committee.

The prison apparently provided Dr. Fadl with the “lost opportunity” for reviewing his ideas. He started to review his jihadist career and the theories on which he based his ideology, and began to formulate his ideas for stopping the violence.
In 2007, he issued his initiative for stopping the violence, which he called *A Document for Rationalization of Jihad in Egypt and the World*. This has been recorded as a major turning point in the history of Islamic movements.\(^{149}\)

**Important Events in the Life of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri**

Dr. Ayman Muhammad Rabaie al-Zawahiri (Arabic: أيمن محمد ربيع الظواهري) is a prominent leader and second-in-command of the current Al-Qaeda organization, and was the second and last “emir” of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

He was born on 19 June 1951 in Maadi, Egypt into an upper-class family of doctors. Al-Zawahiri was a studious boy who established his first Islamist group in Maadi in 1968. He graduated from Cairo University in 1974 and received his master’s degree in surgery in 1978.

By 1979, Al-Zawahiri had joined the Jihad Group with Muhammad Abdus Salam, who arranged to assassinate President Anwar al-Sadat. After the assassination of President Al-Sadat, he was convicted of dealing in weapons, and received a three-year sentence, which he completed in 1984.

He went to Afghanistan and reorganized the Egyptian Jihad Group under the leadership of Sayyia Imam in 1987. During this time, Dr. Al-Zawahiri met Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, who was also participating in the jihad against the Soviet Union with Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. After the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from

Afghanistan in 1989, he and most members of Al Jihad relocated to Sudan where he met Osama Bin Laden.

In 1993, after the group had a major setback when Egyptian authorities arrested over 1,000 members of the group’s military wing, *Tali‘at al-fatah* (The Liberation Vanguard). He took charge of the group after Dr. Fadl resigned.

Dr. Al-Zawahiri moved to Afghanistan in 1996, where he met often with Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda leader. The culmination of this relationship occurred on 23 February 1998, when he declared the establishment of the “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.” In June of 2001, Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged into one Group called “*Qaeda al-Jihad*.”

A Debate between Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahri and Sayyid Imam aka Dr. Fadl

The following debate illustrates the actual opinions and views of both leaders, as contained in the three aforementioned books: Sayyid Imam’s, *Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World*; Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahri’s response, *The Exoneration: A Treatise Exonerating the Nation of the Pen and the Sword from the Blemish of the Accusation of Weakness and Fatigue*; and Sayyid Imam’s published responses to Al-Zawahri, *The Denudation of the Exoneration*.

---

All the views of both of them are based on a number of Qur’anic verses, the *Hadith*, and Islamic history from the era of prophecy until now. Both perceive these sources through personal analysis, and they are convinced of their truth.

The final opinion of both leaders is summarized, staying away from direct quotations of the Qur’anic verses, the *Hadith*, and Islamic history so as not to overwhelm and confuse the reader, which can be further researched from the bibliography.

Imagine both of them speaking to the audience.

Was the Document of Rationalization of Jihad Written Under the Auspices of America and the Jews?

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

These reviews (Dr. Fadl reviews) were not written in circumstances of oppression, imprisonment, and fear alone, but were composed under the supervision, direction, planning, and financing of the resources of the crusader-Jewish campaign. The Egyptian security officers and Americans, who supervised the writing and publishing of his document, forced people to accept it. The benefit of the document here goes to the Americans and the Criminal Investigation Department in Egypt for making people “refrain from disturbing the public order.” They devoted their resources and efforts to it only because it served their purposes. If it had not been so, they would not have allowed the document’s author to utter a word.\(^{151}\)

Dr. Fadl

Al-Zawahiri repeatedly said that I wrote the Document (*the Tarshid*) under the supervision of the U.S. and the Jews. He is a liar and I call him to a mubahala (Islamic tradition to invoking the curse of God on the erring party). I swear to

God that I wrote the Document to help Islam, and if Al-Zawahiri has lied about this, may God curse him. What Al-Zawahiri says about the Document, he also said about Osama Bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri once accused Osama Bin Laden of being an agent of Saudi intelligence working among the Islamic movements when Osama Bin Laden did not support them with money in 1995. Al-Zawahiri thinks everyone is a traitor like him.152

Are America and the Jews the Cause of Misfortunes of Muslims?

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

The Americans have committed assaults and crimes on Islam and the Muslim people by fighting against Islam, replacing it with infidel democracy, and imposing it on the region; occupying Muslim countries and attempting to redraw the regional map; assaulting the Muslims in their persons, property, and resources, including oil supporting the Jews, who are the nation’s enemies, against the Muslims in Palestine; and insulting Islam, the Koran, and God’s best messenger, may prayers and peace be upon Him.153

Dr. Fadl (asks and gives his analysis)

Who lost Palestine?--Arabs who fought the Ottomans, and expelled them from Palestine in WWI and then handed it over to Britain in 1916, who gave it to the Jews with the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

Who kills Palestinians today, especially their leaders?--The Palestinians who collaborate with Israel. Their betrayal makes it possible for Israel to kill whomever it wants.

Who today is building Jewish settlements in the West Bank to consolidate its occupation by Israel?--Palestinian laborers.


Who let America enter Afghanistan in 2001?--Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri.

What was the reason that the U.S. opened the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba for imprisoning Muslims?--Bin Laden’s stupidity.

Who let Mongol enter Baghdad long ago in 1258?--The minister, Ibn al-`Alqami.

Who let America enter Baghdad today in 2003?--Terroristic Iraqi government officers.

Who killed the Lebanese for 15 years, from 1975-1990?--The Lebanese.

Who occupied Kuwait and killed its people in 1990?--The people of Iraq, not America or Israel.

Who is killing tens of thousands of Sudanese in Darfur today?--The Sudanese themselves are killing one another, just as the Yemenis are doing.

Regardless of the legitimacy of their presence, the American forces did not kill a single Muslim in Saudi Arabia during their presence there after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The number of Muslims whose death and displacement was caused by Al-Qaeda over a few years in Kenya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Pakistan, and elsewhere greatly surpasses the number of Muslims killed or displaced by Israel in Palestine for the last sixty years. The declaration that Al-Qaeda defends Muslims is a myth; it kills Muslims and displaces them. Muslims are the cause of their own problems, not Americans as Al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden say. The reform of Muslims has to begin with themselves.154

11 September Attacks

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

This is a question that we address to the brothers who use the term “terrorism” to describe what happened in America. I would like an answer to it. This is the question: When the United States fired missiles on the medicine factory in Sudan (August 1998), destroying it over the heads of the employees and workers who were inside, what do you call this? What America did against the Sudanese factory, does it not constitute terrorism, but what those men did against

the American buildings is terrorism? Why did they condemn what happened in America but we heard no one condemn what America did to the Sudanese factory? I see no difference between the two operations except that the money used to build the factory was Muslim money and the workers who died in the factory’s rubble were Muslims, while the money that was spent on the buildings that those hijackers destroyed was infidel money and the people who died in the explosion were infidels. Was this the difference that made some of our brothers call what happened in America, terrorism? They did not condemn what happened in Sudan and do not call it terrorism. What about starving the Libyan people? What about the almost daily starving of the Iraqi people and the attacks on them? What about starving the Libyan people and the attacks on them? What about the sieges and attacks on the Muslim state of Afghanistan? What do you call all this? Is it or is it not terrorism?\(^\text{155}\)

I will quote the words of Shaykh Nasir Bin-Hamad al-Fahd in an article called, *The Merciful One’s Signs as Seen in the September Raid*. He said that someone might say: Where is the victory that this attack brought? The answer is, if the attack only turned upside down their history, power balances, strategic and military doctrines, and global order, that is enough of a victory. The raid was a momentous historical junction that caused many ideas and studies to be reconsidered.

That event’s success is evident in five aspects: [First,] it restored Islam to the forefront in the wars against the infidels whereas formerly nationalist and ethnic factors and interests were the primary factors in provoking wars and conflicts. It thus brought out the crusader hostile spirit from its concealment and forced it into action. [Second,] it gave prominence to the great role of jihad in overturning global balances. [Third,] it ended the idea that “national states” control “politics” and declares “peace” or “war.” The management of the conflict is not in the hands of persons of a particular national affiliation, but is in the hands of people spread—as the Americans say—over more than 60 countries who are joined by nothing else except salafi Jihadist Islam or what they call “Wahhabi” Islam. [Fourth,] it irreversibly ended the era when the United States could attack the Muslims with impunity, God willing. [Fifth,] it was the beginning of the collapse of the “New World Order,” which the Americans enjoyed for a few years only and it marked the beginning of America’s total collapse, God willing.\(^\text{156}\)


Dr. Fadl

Al-Zawahiri lived to call for the establishment of an Islamic state, and after thirty years of work, the Islamic state arose in Afghanistan. God willing that they do not have any role, but in its destruction, when they declared war on America from the land of the Taliban by declaring (the global front) in 1998, and they were the cause to destroy it after three years when America destroyed this nascent Islamic state in 2001. He crossed the ocean, went to his enemy in his home, and destroyed a building, and his enemy came and destroyed state (the Taliban) and after that claimed this Jihad. The person who does this must be stupid. 157

Al-Zawahiri and Osama Bin Laden talk about Palestinian children being hurt, but not about the death they bring to the children of Afghanistan. The truth is that wherever Al-Qaida exists, the destruction of Muslims exist. This has occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. 158

The Localization of Emirate

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

Since the summer of 1997 and until 10 September 2001, the Americans have been diligently working on striking Al-Qaida and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. (He pointed out 49 actions about this in his book, The Exoneration.) The American Government, since the summer of 1997, has been trying to kidnap or assassinate Shaykh Osama Bin Ladin, as revealed by the CIA memorandum, which I have referenced. This was before the declaration of the “International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Christians” and before the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salam. I then say to Dr. Fadl that the amir of the believers, Mullah Umar, may God protect him, is a courageous, noble, quick-tongued leader who is strong-willed and I don’t think is in need of anyone’s advice in order to reward or punish Osama Bin Ladin. He is His soldier and under


His banner. This is a personal matter of his, so do not trouble yourself. I say to Dr. Fadl, if you are concerned with the state of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan and are sad about what has happened to her, the Amir of the believers, Mullah Muhammad Umar, may God protect him, has alerted Muslims everywhere.\footnote{Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Exoneration: A Treatise on the Exoneration of the Nation of the Pen and Sword of the Denigrating Charge of Being Irresolute and Weak,” (Archive.org. Al-sahab Media), http://www.archive.org/details/el-tabre2ah, 2008, 225, 226, 247; Al-Zawahiri, “Exoneration: A treatise on the exoneration of the nation of the pen and sword of the denigrating charge of being irresolute and weak,” Vers. English, 2008.}

Dr. Fadl

Osama Bin Laden violated the command of his amir, Mullah Umar, not to attack the United States. He developed the heretical notion that he only had to obey him in matters internal to Afghanistan.

Islamic scripture does not limit obedience to one’s amir to a location. You have to obey your amir no matter where you are. Moreover, medieval scholars say there can be no raid beyond the borders that your amir controls without his permission. Osama Bin Laden betrayed Mullah Umar, but this does not excuse Umar’s responsibility for the loss of Afghanistan. He could have prevented it if he had acted wisely at the first sign of trouble without violating Islamic law. But he failed to act. Osama Bin Laden innovated a local emirate to respond to critics of his followers, and told them that Mohamed Umar is their leader in Afghanistan, and he has no authority over them in what they do outside Afghanistan.\footnote{Sayyid Imam, “The Denudation Of The Exoneration,” (Jihadica), http://www.jihadica.com/the-denudation-of-the-exoneration-part-3/, Vers. Arabic, 2008, http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=187236&IssueID=1231 (accessed 15 March, 2010); McCants, The Denudation of the Exoneration: Part 1, Vers. English, n.d.}

Fighting the Far Enemy Before the Near Enemy

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

For 30 years, Al-Zawahiri preached fighting against the near enemy, the Egyptian government, until he decided in 1998 that it was more important to fight the far enemy. That was after the failure of Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Egypt and its financial bankruptcy. So he joined Osama Bin Laden’s Global Islamic Front for Jihad in 1998, even though the United States had done nothing to Egyptian Islamic Jihad before that, and causing destruction in his group because American started to kidnap his companions, including his brother in all countries of the earth.162

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

What Are Legitimate Options for Muslims with Their Enemies?

It was and is still obvious to everyone who is just and can see, that this corrupted reality will not change by softness and submission, but it will only change by force. Even this document, which they promote, acknowledges this in its folds, as the main idea in the document says that we are weak and incapable of change, so let us raise our hands and flee. And any other option is poisons of weakness and paralysis that are spread by similar documents under the state security’s supervision and its American masters.163

Dr. Fadl

The legitimate options for the Muslims with their enemies are jihad, peace, truce, isolation, concealment of faith and patience. Al-Zawahiri rejects my argument that jihad is not the only option Muslims can use to confront their enemies. He also rejects the idea that there are conditions and barriers to jihad. My experience with Al-Zawahiri is that he is the most reckless of those who do


not think about consequences. But he is an unusual reckless person. A normal reckless person risks something he owns. But Al-Zawahiri risks what he does not own. In Egypt, he risked the lives of hundreds of his brethren and then he fled and did not die with them in Egypt as he had promised. He then risked the Taliban state, the Afghan people, and then the Iraqi people. He always risks what he does not own, flees, and then leaves others to pay the price. Al-Zawahiri orders the people today to fight America and Sheikha Osama Bin Laden offered a truce to America “Al-Hayat Newspaper 1/20/2006,” and Al-Zawahiri offered negotiations with it “Al-Hayat 2/21/2006.”

Can Mujahideen Kill Muslims or Non-Muslims According to “Tatars” Concept?

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

Muslim jurists permitted killing Muslims used as human shields by the enemy after they fall captive into the infidels’ hands. If the infidels use Muslim captives to protect themselves from the Muslims’ arrows, they may be killed although they are faultless. It is permissible to kill Muslim and infidels who are employed by the enemy as human shields

Dr. Fadl

Killing Muslims who are mixed with infidels under the concept of “Muslim Tatars” is not allowed, because there is no text allowed this, but is discretion and not allowed except only within the general rule. Anyone entered infidel countries with their safety not permitted for him to betray or kill any Military or civilians. He cannot determine Kafr of civilians, even if we assume that the Muslim does not conduct with them covenant or safety, even if we assume that civilians are Kafrs, this not give us the right to kill them on the planes, trains, In the civil buildings and hotels under the concept of “infidel

---


Tatars,” This means the intentional killing of civilians directly, and this is not Tatars in something, and this forbidden, do not be intentionally killed them.\textsuperscript{166}

Is It Permissible to Kidnap Hostages?

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

The writer (Dr. Fadl), although he is supposed to know better, disregards the obligation of making preparations for jihad, keeping in mind that preparation involves the gathering of resources.

The document’s author stated that some who wish to make preparations for jihad take innocent hostages to get ransom. My comment on this statement is the following:

There is a definite Shari’ah rule that permits the abduction of infidel combatants, particularly those who commit aggression against the Muslims, and allows us to dispose of them in a way that serves the Muslim people’s interests.

Regarding the seizure of Christian property, his predecessors, and the Islamic Group’s leaders who are now in jail, did it but then recanted. They went so far in their recantation, however, that they regarded Al-Sadat as a martyr. Why does he address his remarks to others, then? Does not this constitute deception? He knows as well as we do that we do not consider such seizure of property useful at this stage. I will explain this later.\textsuperscript{167}

Dr. Fadl

It is unfortunate to see some people who are not obligated to join the jihad because of lack of resources, have started to pursue illegal means of obtaining money including abducting innocent hostages to ask for ransom or by stealing the money of protected persons who may be killed in the robbery, all these are not


Excommunication and Killing Because of Nationality

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

Carrying the nationality of the infidel nations is proof of allegiance and acquiescence to infidel laws. A Muslim carrying such a nationality is not an infidel but very close to it. He goes on to say that anyone who acquires the nationality of these countries is an apostate. As we see today, citizens in infidel nations must serve in their armies.\textsuperscript{169}

Dr. Fadl

First, if Al-Zawahiri were correct, then hundreds of millions of Muslims would have to be excommunicated in countries like India, China, Russia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and so forth. These infidel nations apply their laws to Muslims. However, it is not possible to know for certain that all of the Muslims acquiescence to these laws, especially since it may not be possible to travel to the Abode of Islam in this age. One cannot infer someone’s status when there are several possibilities (i.e. the status is indeterminate). Yet Al-Zawahiri does just that, advocating excommunication by possibilities. As I argued in the Document, you cannot excommunicate someone on the basis of possibilities; you must be certain of his status. Second, some countries have no army at all, such as Switzerland, some of which recruitment is not compulsory, including the United States itself today, so you should know that not every citizen in the land of \textit{kufir} fights against Muslims, as alleged. Even if we accept that all these people are infidels, there are still categories of people that cannot be killed in war, like workers, peasants, and staff, with women and children and these are most people in this country, how permissible to kill them wholesale with the forbidding about it in our religion?\textsuperscript{170}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168}Imam, Tarshid al-amal al-jihadi fi misr wa al-alam: \textit{“Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World,”} 2007, 16-17.
\end{itemize}
Permitting the Killing of Those Who Pay Taxes to Infidel Countries
Because They Are Fighting With Their Money

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

The payment of tax is fighting. All citizens pay taxes to the infidel governments, and as the laws determine fields of expenses of taxes, including the military budget, all who pay taxes to the State are fighting against the Muslim with the money and permissible to kill them.171

Dr. Fadl

This doctrine is obviously corrupt and extreme, for implementing it would mean killing millions of Muslims in India because they pay taxes to their government that has been fighting the Muslims in Kashmir and in Russia because their government fights Muslims in Chechnya.172

The Heresy of the Unrestricted Application of the Principle of Reciprocity

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

I will quote the words of Shaykh Nasir Bin Muhammad al-Fahd when he said anyone who considers America’s aggressions against Muslims and their lands during the past decades will conclude that this is permissible based on the rule of “repaying in kind” alone, without any need to mention other proofs. One of the brothers has added up the number of Muslims they have killed with their direct and indirect weapons. The total is nearly ten million. As for the lands that their bombs, explosives, and rockets have burnt, only God can compute them. The most recent thing we have witnessed is what has happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. If a bomb were dropped on them, destroying 10 million of them and burning

---


as much of their land as they have burned of Muslim land, that would be permissible without any need to mention any other proof. We might need other proofs if we wanted to destroy more than this number of them!”\textsuperscript{173}

Dr. Fadl

We use the principle of reciprocity except what is religiously impermissible “principle of reciprocity with only what is permissible in the Shari’ah,” and thus it is illegal to kill infidels without discrimination. If the infidels killed Muslim women and their children, this not gives us the right to kill their wives and their children. So, we must know that principle of reciprocity is not absolute but have limitations.\textsuperscript{174}

Is the Visa a Safe-Conduct (\textit{Aman})?

Dr. Al-Zawahiri

Visas are a recent issue with no textual provision in the Qur’an, the Hadith, the consensus, or any pronouncement by previous jurists. Indeed, some scholars have issued a fatwa that a visa should not be considered an impediment to harming America, and Shaykh Nasir al-Fahd is one of them. Thus it is a disputed question, a matter of opinion, and individual judgment. Anyone uncomfortable with an opinion should not make use of it, and anyone who is comfortable with it can make use of it. If you look at the definition of visa in the Encyclopedia Britannica, you will know that the definition and meaning of visa implies no indication of safe-conduct. An applicant for a visa at any embassy or consulate will be asked to fill out an information form and sign a promise at the end of it that the information is correct. The form contains no clause related to a safe-conduct from the embassy’s country or from the visa applicant, or even a commitment to respect their laws. In addition, America gives itself the right to arrest any Muslim without examining his visa, residency permit, or passport, like the kidnapping of Abu-Talal al-Ansari Tal’at Fu’ad from Croatia. Although he

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
was carrying a Danish passport and an entry visa for Croatia, American intelligence kidnapped him and turned him over to Egypt, where no one knows his fate until now.\textsuperscript{175}

Visa for tourism in Muslim countries is not a pact of safe passage and does not protect them from killing and kidnapping. This invitation or contract is not to be considered a safe-conduct (\textit{aman}), because it contains no explicit promise of safety. What is stated is that service is to be rendered in return for wages. That is not an explicit, literal promise of safety.\textsuperscript{176}

\textbf{Dr. Fadl}

Visas are the equivalent of an Islamic pact of safe passage (\textit{aman}), which means that Muslims who got visas in foreign nations do not have the right to attack the citizens of those nations. When the 9/11 attacks happened, some said it violated the pact of safe passage that a visa represents, because all personnel who conducted the attacks got visas to enter the U.S. No one disagrees about America’s crimes, but these crimes are not a justification for perverting religion. It is not permissible to take the safety contract (visa) as trick to betray and kill the infidels, contrary to the views of Muslim Scholars.\textsuperscript{177} We believe that foreigners coming and living in a Muslim country not permitted exposure to kill, pillage or abuse, whether they came for tourism or work or trade and so on, and so many reasons to prevent Victimization of them, including that maybe some of them are Muslims, these foreigners may come to a Muslim country at the invitation or employment contract from a Muslim employer or owner of a tourism company.


safety contract, or these foreigners and tourists do not come to the Muslim
countries to war or to fight.178

Conclusion

The intellectual reviews, which were conducted by the Islamic group, opened the
way for other Islamic groups to reevaluate their ideas about the use violence. It took
much time to gain the trust of the Egyptian authorities and the community. The reviews
focused more specifically on groups located in Egypt because most of their activities
occurred in Egypt. Also, the Islamic Jihad reviews addressed all jihad groups in the
world. This was evident from his document name, Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in
Egypt and the World. The reviews gained greater importance because the author Dr. Fadl
was a prominent jihad theoretician, and his books are major references for the
Mujahideen camps. The document is expected to have a major influence on Jihad groups
in general and Al-Qaeda in particular, and this has been shown when Al-Zawahiri and
Al-Qaeda responded to him, which confirms Dr. Fadl’s influence on the jihadists.

---

178 Imam, Tarshid al-amal al-jihadi fi misr wa al-alam: “Rationalizing the Jihadi
There is no doubt that once the idea to stop the violence was launched in 1997 by the Islamic Group that its initiative circulated in social, political, and intellectual circles and jihadist forces expressed their opinions and counter-arguments. There were different reactions between supporters and skeptics of the initiative. Starting in 1997, a movement began to reassess Egypt’s four-decades of history with violence. This process not only reassessed Islamic groups, but also extended itself to all political and intellectual circles to assess the best way to respond to these reviews for the benefit of the country. This chapter illustrates the impact of the intellectual reviews of the Islamic and Jihad Groups on the Jihad Action, the Islamic world, and the West.

The Intellectual Reviews’ Impact on the Jihadi Action

The Islamists who were previously charged in cases of violence welcomed the reviews and considered it as a positive development in the march of the Islamic group and Jihad group, but there were objections to the reviews by some of the groups’ members, especially those living abroad. Some of them pointed to the absence of the political dimension in those reviews, and an undue focus on getting rid of the mistakes of the past without suggesting a viable approach for the future of the group.

Mixed Reactions to the Intellectual Reviews

Once the announcement of the initiative to stop violence was made in 1997, the majority of Islamic group members declared their approval for the initiative. The
Egyptian government released the historic leaders and most of the members of the groups. In 2007, after Dr. Fadl announced his intellectual reviews, most of the incarcerated Islamic Jihad group members declared their approval for his initiative.

Sheikh Umar Abdel Rahman, a spiritual leader, Mufti, and adviser to the Islamic group, was sentenced in 1996 to life in prison for the first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993. He announced his support for the Islamic group initiative, but he withdrew his support for it on 15 June 2001. A statement distributed by his American attorney, Lynne Stewart, announced that though he had withdrawn his approval, but he had delegated the matter of the initiative to the historic leaders of the Islamic group in (Mazra’ah Turrah) Prison, and that they now had the right to make their decision in this regard. In May 2002, he returned and approved the initiative. He called upon Muslim youth in Egypt and JI elements to continue the suspension of armed operations.¹⁷⁹

Mohamed Khalil Al-hakima issued a statement on behalf of Al-Qaeda in Egypt under the title, Reviews Jihad: The Facts and the Axioms. He criticized the reviews, saying that they were done under the pressure of prison, and they were the result of a strategic project of Egyptian intelligence begun ten years ago. Its name was, Plan Polarization and Dialogue, which meant to “hit hard” but at the same time, polarizing the group through an intellectual divide. Al-Hakima launched a website opposed to the reviews, entitled, “Islamic Group - Holding to the Covenant,” and the group’s leaders


Sheikh Aboud El-Zomor, former historical leader of Jihad group and now one of leaders of the Islamic group, and Dr. Tarek al-Zumar declared their statement, *Jihad Initiatives Towards a Better Future*. They said there was no doubt that the conflict in the 1990s hurt Egypt at the political, economic, social, cultural levels, and even with regard to human rights. “This obligates us all as an Islamic movement to take responsibility, arrange priorities, consider the interests of people, help to get out of this ordeal, avoid the causes and effects, achieve a balanced offering peaceful existence of the movement, and stop the infighting and bloody conflict between the parties.”\footnote{Sheikh Abbud al-Zumarand el-Zomor, “Jihad Initiatives Towards a Better Future,” Vers. Arabic, 27 March 2007, http://www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=233554 (accessed 23 March 2010).}

Ayman al-Zawahiri, in his book, *The Exoneration*, said that the Islamic Group’s reviews began in 1997, but slowed down until events on September 11, 2001 occurred. A new wave of reviews began, which many Islamic group members denounced who had initially accepted the no-violence initiative. This wave went so far as to consider Al-Sadat a martyr. More significantly, they mostly focused on attacking Al-Qaeda. Then world benefits began to accrue to those who subscribed to these reviews. In 1994, Dr. Fadl returned to his private life under his real name in Yemen in a show of a strange co-existence with its security forces. After 11 September 2001, the Yemeni authorities arrested him on U.S. orders and extradited him to Egypt. The Americans imagined that he...
might be useful to them in their new crusade. After remaining silent about his detention for about three years, during which he was undoubtedly subjected to various forms of pressure, restrictions, and oppression, combined with alternating periods of temptation and intimidation, he was brought into the open and surrounded with great media attention.\textsuperscript{182}

Shaykh Abu-Mus’ab al-Suri, one of the most important leaders of Al-Qaeda, accused the Islamic group of joining U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s war of ideas and becoming part of the apostates’ and the U.S. campaign against terrorism. They did not forget to criticize the 11 September incidents and those who carried them out. The Islamic Group’s initiative began to receive praise from the proponents of the antiterrorism programs that filled the Arab media. It started to be cited as a praiseworthy initiative by the scholars of Saudi Arabia and other countries as a tool to fight the growing incidence of Jihad in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere with the encouragement of the recent U.S. crusades.\textsuperscript{183}

Dr. Hani Al-Sibai, a lawyer and director of the Maqrizi Center for historical studies in London and a member of Shura Council for the Islamic Jihad Group, declared that he did not agree with Dr. Fadl’s reviews, and they conflicted with what was previously written in his books. Dr. Fadl responded to him by saying that Dr. Hani was one of the members who fled, receiving political asylum in the land of the infidels


(United Kingdom) to secure the future for their children without the presence of any
danger to them, and his children are not leaders.\textsuperscript{184}

Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, head of the International Union for Muslim Scholars
(IUMS), declared his support for the intellectual reviews of the Islamic and Islamic Jihad
Groups more than once. Most recently in his book, \textit{Fiqh of Jihad}, in 2009, he described
how the position of groups changed when they abandoned many of old concepts in moral
courage.\textsuperscript{185}

\textbf{Analysis}

There is no doubt that the intellectual reviews had a big influence on the jihadi
action. In outline, impact of the reviews may be formulated in the following points:

In 2002, when the Islamic group published its intellectual reviews, it made a
significant impact on the rest of the Islamic groups. As a result, the Islamic Jihad group
published its intellectual reviews by its former leader, Dr. Fadl. This gives us hope that in
the future we will see other intellectual reviews by other Islamic groups.

The reviews impacted jihadi action further, with Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri
publication of his book, \textit{The Exoneration}, in response to the document, \textit{Rationalizing the
Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World}, by Dr. Fadl. The theological rift centered on
Al-Qaeda and its ideology.

\textsuperscript{184}Dr. Hani al-Sibai, Dialogue with Alhayat Newspaper, Vers. Arabic, 16
(accessed 23 March 2010)

\textsuperscript{185}Maher Hassan, 2009.
In Algeria, similar de-radicalizing transformations occurred between 1997 and 2009. As did the Islamic group of Egypt, the self-declared armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), known as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), declared a unilateral ceasefire in October 1997. The ceasefire led to a disarmament and demilitarization processes that were aimed at the reintegration of AIS members as well as other armed Islamist factions into Algerian society. The former commander of the AIS, Medani Mezraq declared his intention to hold a conference with the objective of “uprooting Islamist armed activism in Algeria.” Hassan Hattab, the founder of Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (GSPC), also actively supports ending the remnants of the insurgency.  

In Libya, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), another former ally of Al-Qaeda, initiated a de-radicalization process in 2006-2007. Leading FIG figures in Afghanistan, such as Abu Layth al-Libi, refused to accept the process. With the death of Abu Layth in 2008, the process was reactivated and is currently ongoing. The commander of the LIFG, Abd al-Hakim Belhaj, issued a statement confirming that there are talks with the Libyan regime, identifying some of the key issues that stalled the process in 2007 and 2008. On 1 September 2009, on the occasion of Muammar Qadhafi’s 40th year in power, LIFG prisoners in Abu Selim Prison issued a public apology to the

---

Colonel, declaring that the LIFG was abandoning political violence and dismantling its secret units.\(^{187}\)

Former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) leader Noman Benotman charges that bin Laden "does not have legal Islamic guardianship" over Muslims living in the West to order them to participate in "the war effort," He also says that "revisions" issued by many Islamist groups in recent years helped to rein in the "mobilization" process carried out by Al-Qaeda.\(^{188}\)

There is considerable evidence in Morocco of many changes in thought of the Salafi Jihadist Moroccan groups to renounce violence, and this was demonstrated by the positions taken by three leaders, Hassan Kettani, Abdel Wahab Rafeke (Abu Hafs), and Mohamed Alvezazi, of the incidents on 11 March and 10 April 2007, in Casablanca. They condemned the violence, and denounced the killing of innocent people, and saying these actions were not in the interest of Islam and Muslims.\(^{189}\)

In Saudi Arabia, the government-sponsored the \textit{al-Munasaha} (Advising) Program, as well as interventions by independent Islamic theologians, have had some


success in de-radicalizing individuals and small groups who allegedly supported or were loosely linked to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{190}

Saudi thinker Salman al-Odah, a leading intellectual icon who influenced Osama bin Laden, in an evolution similar to “Dr. Fadl,” Sheikh Salman took the unprecedented step of publicly criticizing the leader of Al-Qaeda because of excesses in the use of violence in September 2007.

In Iraq, programs are underway for the most powerful radical groups who advocate violence to renounce political violence and radicalism, although its results are still under scrutiny. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Islamic Party (the main wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq), and some factions of twenty revolution battalions, the Islamic Army still cling to their narrative.\textsuperscript{191}

In Afghanistan, some individuals and former commanders of the Taliban, declared their renunciation of violence and accepted political participation in the electoral process.\textsuperscript{192}

The intellectual reviews by the Egyptian Islamic groups have opened the way for similar intellectual reviews of groups outside of Egypt. These groups are basing their reviews on the new ideas of the Egyptian groups. As the Egyptian Islamic group were the first to do jihad in Afghanistan, began developing the jihadist project, and its history confirmed its seriousness to change the systems of government, it was also the vanguard

\textsuperscript{190} Ashour, 2009.


\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
of the intellectual reviews, and therefore their impact was significant on the jihad action in the Islamic world.

It is clear from our review of the most important reactions to the reviews, that the majority of elements of the groups within the country approved it. There is a refusal and face to these reviews from Al-Qaeda and some members of these groups abroad because it runs counter to their interests.

Expected Future Impacts on the Jihadi Action

Although it is difficult to predict the future, but through analysis of the impact of intellectual reviews, it is anticipated that these reviews will have a considerable impact. Already some of the effects are visible like the emergence of new intellectual reviews of other Islamic groups or leaders that call for alternatives to violence. A decline in numbers of volunteers and recruits for Islamic armed groups that take the path of violence to achieve its goals is expected, especially in Al-Qaeda. However, some members of armed Islamic groups will secede, joining other groups that renounce violence, or they will integrate individually into the community and refrain from joining any groups because of a change in their opinions on the feasibility of violent course. The emergence of moderate trends in Al-Qaeda will call for reconsideration in the overall strategy of Al-Qaeda, which makes for the probability of a lower rate of violence in Al-Qaeda’s activities, especially the targeting of civilians. Funders will further change their opinion of the violent groups, and will provide less financial support to armed groups. The impact of reviews in Egypt will extend to Al-Qaeda’s members and subsequently down to new groups and organizations, leading to a state of confusion throughout its ranks. The
credibility of Al-Qaeda’s ideology will decline among its members and supporters during the oncoming future.

The Intellectual Reviews’ Impact on the Muslim World

Undoubtedly, the intellectual reviews have had wide-ranging reactions in the Islamic World, through the opinions of experts in Islamic affairs, writers, and intellectuals within these communities. These reviews serve as a source of reconciliation between different groups and communities that have suffered several centuries of violence carried out by these groups. After the emergence of the reviews, Dr. Fadl’s reviews especially triggered a wide interest in the Muslim world through the publication of these reviews in major newspapers in Islamic world accompanied by a significant analysis of leading experts and writers such as Almasry-Alyoum in Egypt, Asharq Al-Awsat in Saudi Arabia, and Aljarida in Kuwait, in addition to important Islamic websites, “Islam Online” and “Islamists Today.” Their impact extends beyond Egypt to cover most parts of the Muslim world.

Mixed Reactions to the Intellectual Reviews

The reaction of the Egyptian security services was skeptical in the beginning of declaring the reviews in 1997, especially after the Luxor incident in the same year. Over time, they began to deal positively with the initiatives by allowing leaders to visit various prisons where their members were located in order to illustrate and discuss the reviews with the members of the group. In addition, the security services permitted the leaders of group to receive books and references needed to complete the study of these reviews. After the reviews were completed, Egyptian security forces approved publication in the
market and the Cairo International Book Fair in 2002. Subsequently, most group members were released after they pledged to renounce violence.

Makram Mohamed Ahmed, editor of Egyptian newspaper, “Al-mosawer,” visited the leaders of Islamic groups in prison to discuss their ideas and accompanied them in their visits to prisons to illustrate these reviews to elements of their groups. He wrote about his experience, stressing that the reviews are real and refused any doubt as to their credibility.193

Dr. Kamal Habib, an expert on Islamic movements, said in his interview of 22 November 2007 with al-Masry al-Youm, that the reviews conducted by the Jihad group by the first Jihad theoretician, Sayyid Imam, will have a significant impact on the Islamic trend in general and on Al-Qaeda in particular. He reasoned that Sayyid Imam was a personal friend of Ayman al-Zawahiri and was an Amir to him, and all esteem and respect to him. Habib stressed that the Islamic movement was changed by events and the situations moved from militancy to moderation, and there is understanding of international realities and its pressures, in contrast to the seventies, in which the experience was a superficial and limited. Some Islamic groups were not reading the newspapers, but today many of the Islamists who participate in public life in all its forms.194


Montaser Al-Zayat, the lawyer of Islamic groups in Egypt, said after the issuance of Jihad reviews that disagreeing with Dr. Fadl is permissible, but accusing him of insincerity was unfair. Dr. Fadl’s views are not the result of years of imprisonment as they claim. His views were announced several times before his arrest, and he stopped his activities with the Jihad group since 1992. As a result of the sharp differences between him and Al-Zawahiri arose about regulatory and mobility issues, and the determination of Al-Zawahri to conduct combat operations in Egypt. The crisis occurred when the book of Dr. Fadl, The Compendium of the Pursuit of Divine Knowledge, was misrepresented by Al-Zawahri. After that, Dr. Fadl announced his withdrawal from the Islamic Jihad and issued statements condemning jihad operations that took place in Egypt.195

Rami Ibrahim wrote that it is not an exaggeration to describe the document as a “rationalization of the jihad that made a new future for the region and the world. Their impact on the Islamic Movement is the most important political phenomenon in three decades. It divided the Islamic Movement into two phases: the one after the document and the one before it. Dr. Fadl did not leave a way out for them; he trapped them intellectually so they did not have any way except to repent terrorism or continue on their road, his words haunting them until their conscience ruptures.”196


Analysis

No one can diminish the importance of reviews of the largest, oldest, and worldwide Jihadist groups, and their impact on the Islamic world. Many changes have happened in the people’s opinions in Egypt and the Islamic world about the Islamic groups. Since the declaration of these reviews, a reconciliation process has commenced between these groups and their communities. A state of satisfaction has prevailed in the community due to the withering of the specter of violence. These events have given the people great hope for the future, and changed their perspective about these groups. They are being respected for their courage to recognize their mistakes with the anticipation of how they will be treated in society after getting out of prison.

It is difficult to determine the impact of reviews on the Islamic world because of the sensitivity of this subject in Islamic societies, and the magnitude of the exposure to security forces in these communities. The citizens do not always speak on this subject because they fear the security forces, which have sensitivity to this issue, particularly after the events of 11 September.

Therefore, it is easier to understand the impact of the intellectual reviews on citizens through public opinion polls about the popularity of Al-Qaeda, which anonymously reflects the citizens’ support or rejection of Al-Qaeda’s acts of violence.

During the period from 2003 to 2007, the support of Osama bin Laden decreased from fifty-six percent to twenty percent in Jordan; from twenty percent to one percent in Lebanon; and fifty-nine percent to forty-one percent in Indonesia according to data published by the Pew Research Center. A similar sentiment in Saudi Arabia has been noted as well, despite the commitment of the majority of Saudis of Salafi trend. About
two-thirds of those who participated in the poll of “Terror Free Tomorrow” in early 2008, hold negative views of Al-Qaeda. In 2009, a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center about public opinion in Pakistan indicated that sixty-one percent of Pakistanis do not support Al-Qaeda as eighty percent of Pakistan are concerned about the instability caused by Islamic extremism in their country.197

These polls show declining popularity of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic world and it represents a change in the general direction to reject violence because of negative impact on Muslim world. This confirms the trend of the reviews to renounce violence and try to take peaceful ways to deal with Islamic issues.

Despite the importance of the reviews and the associated ideas, there are still many questions about their views of the political life, participation, and integration into society, especially since it is a state of suspicion. These groups are now rethinking how they will conduct themselves with society in the future. The Islamic Group has launched a site on the internet “http://www.egyig.com” to disseminate its new ideas after the reviews, and after a period of direct broadcasting, they removed the sword from the logo of the group to confirm the renunciation of violence.

Expected Future Impacts on the Islamic World

In the medium to long term, it is possible to extrapolate some potential future impacts of the reviews on the Islamic world. These could possibly include a drop in support within the Muslim world to Islamic groups, which take violence as a way to

achieve objectives, especially Al-Qaeda. Increased political activity will begin abroad by the Islamic movements through its attempts to establish political parties as some of them announce their agreement with the concept of the civil state. These activities of Islamic movements will meet violent resistance by opponents of the seculars and Christians in the Islamic world by questioning the intentions of these Islamic movements. There will be difficulty in integrating these groups in the community because the ruling authority will not agree to give any roles to the groups, or open any room for movement within the community, which may bring us back to square one.

Political conflicts between these groups are also a possibility they turn to political action, which may be fed by the ruling authorities to reduce their popularity and fragment their efforts. In the long run, some Islamic movements may succeed in playing a political role in some countries, especially that large groups of them want to emulate the Turkish experience, like Justice and Development Party with Islamic leanings.

The Intellectual Reviews’ Impact on the West

After 11 September, the Western world paid a lot of attention to Islamic studies, and many universities have adopted changes reflecting the issues discussed in this thesis. Among these are making the availability of qualified scholars to teach courses on Islam and its civilization, and establishing centers and programs for the study of Islam and its societies. American Muslims should step forward and fund more university programs, especially adding Focus Programs on Muslim community and societies. Muslim governments should support academic efforts in the U.S., and help student to utilize Muslim scholarships. Islamic-related courses should be introduced in government studies. Interfaith movements and religious departments should play a role in these
courses. A website for Islamic studies in the U.S. should be established to educate students and the public on \textit{Shari'ah} and facilitate meaningful exchange between students. Islamic books should continue to be translated into English, and outreach to the policy world should be increased.\textsuperscript{198}

As a result of the changes in the security environment, more U.S. colleges and universities have begun to teach students about the Islamic civilization and beliefs of the Islamic religion. The University of Chicago, for example, has developed its own comprehensive curriculum and reading material for the sequence on Islamic civilization that was originally conceived by the well known University of Chicago historian, Marshall Hodgson.\textsuperscript{199}

Not to be outdone, the U.S. government, established centers and institutes that focus on Islamic and Arabic world studies: The Combating Terrorism Center, established in 2003 at the United States Military Academy at West Point; the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) established in August 2004; and the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center established in 2006 at the U. S. Army Combined Arms Center.\textsuperscript{200}

The U.S. military colleges, such as The Command and General Staff Colleges, War Colleges, and National Defense Colleges have shown increased interest in Islamic Studies. The U.S Army Command and General Staff College, for example, has even


\textsuperscript{199}The State of Islamic Studies in American Universities, 2007.

developed its own history curriculum to include lessons on Islamic and Middle East history.

There is no doubt that the intellectual reviews, which advocated not killing civilians, impacted the west and the world wide movement. There is a shift in the ideas of these groups to use peaceful methods to achieve their goals in confronting both internal as well as external challenges.

Mixed Reactions to the Intellectual Reviews in U.S and Canada

The reviews have been translated into English under the name, *Rationalization of Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World; A Treatise on the Exoneration of the Nation of the Pen and Sword of the Denigrating Charge of Being Irresolute and Weak*; and *The Denudation of the Exoneration* on the Jihadica website on the Internet.201

Will McCants, a Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center and an expert on Islam, said that when Sayyid Imam’s first book was released serially last year, counterterrorism pundits were split. Some, like Lawrence Wright and Peter Bergen, said it was evidence of a serious fissure in the Jihadi Action and would further divide it. Others, like Michael Scheuer, said it was neither evidence of a fissure nor would it divide the movement because Sayyid Imam was being coerced, which instantly discredits his book.202

Will McCants, said that several hard-line religious scholars that used to support Al-Qaeda have now renounced the organization. Awda (Saudi cleric), Hamid al-Ali

---


202Ibid.
(Kuwaiti cleric), Sayyid Imam (former head of Egyptian al-Jihad), and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia are the most commonly cited personalities. These attacks from former prominent supporters or fellow travelers are severely damaging the publics’ opinion of Al-Qaeda, especially among educated Salafis. The books or letters written by Awda or Sayyid Imam are carefully formulated criticisms of Al-Qaeda from within the classical Islamic tradition, not Silly,-there-is-no-violence-in-Jihad arguments. Moreover, these men have major names in the Jihadi-Salafi community and their earlier works are still much cited, so they have to be dealt with. Although Al-Zawahiri dismisses their attacks in precisely the same way Scheuer, “a former CIA employee” does, he wrote a 188-page book in response to one of them addressing Sayyid Imam’s review. In addition, he released it only two months after Imam’s book came out.203

Amr Hamzawy and Sarah Grebowski “The Carnegie Middle East Center”, said that after years of violent confrontation with the Egyptian government and society, and defeat by the country’s security forces, al-Jama’a al-Islamiya and, later, segments of al-Jihad have accepted their failure to radically change society and politics, and to recognize the harm that their violent activities--formerly justified using religious concepts—have inflicted on Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These developments have given rise to a Jihadi revisionism that renounces violence and redefines attitudes toward the state, politics, and society. The same Islamic concepts that once were used to justify violence have been redefined to sanction and urge nonviolent social and political activism.

Revisionist documents outline a careful cost-benefit analysis that effectively rules out the use of violence to achieve the groups’ goals.\textsuperscript{204}

Omar Ashour, an Egyptian political scientist in McGill University in Montreal, Canada said that in July 1997, the largest armed Islamist movement in Egypt surprised many officials, observers and even its own activists by declaring a unilateral ceasefire. This declaration by the Islamic Group started a comprehensive “de-radicalization” process that led to its practical abandonment of violence. The process also included an ideological component that used Islamic theological arguments to delegitimize the use of violence against the state, the society and the “other.” By 2007, the Islamic group’s de-radicalization process appeared successful: no armed operations since 1999, no significant splits within the movement and around 25 volumes authored by the Islamic group leaders supporting their new ideology with both theological and rational arguments. Two of the volumes were critiques of Al-Qaeda’s behavior and a third was a critique of the “clash of civilization” hypothesis, arguing instead for cultural dialogue. The drafting of these volumes by the same movement that co-assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat for signing the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was a significant development. This process of de-radicalization removed more than 15,000 Islamic group militants from the Salafi Jihadist camp led currently by Al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{205}


Michael Jacobson, senior fellow, at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that, in recent years ideologues and former leaders who have renounced Al-Qaeda have all cited its misinterpretation of Islam as one of their primary motivations. Former Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (aka Dr. Fadl) called Al-Qaeda’s terrorist actions “reprehensible” in his recent book attacking the group. Nasir Abbas left Jemah Islamiyah in Indonesia in part because he disagreed with the notion that attacking civilians was religiously acceptable. Other ideological factors that have contributed to disillusionment include objection to the group’s general direction, loss of confidence in its leadership, and frustration with its hypocrisy. Mundane factors can cause defections as well. In some cases, terrorists drop out due to financial concerns, because they believe they are not being properly compensated for their “work.” Others may hold a glorified view of what terrorist life will entail and are inevitably disappointed when their expectations are unmet. External factors such as family pressure or a change in circumstances may also give them second thoughts about the terrorist or extremist path. Once such individuals leave the insulated world of terrorist training camps and reunite with their family in mainstream society, their perspective can sometimes change.206

Colonel Brian M. Drinkwine, who commanded the 4th Brigade Combat Team, said that Dr. Fadl’s message is extremely powerful and could have been exploited by both moderate Islamic scholars, as well as our own strategic communications

apparatus. According to Drinkwine, Fadl is a legitimate former Jihadist who is credible among the Islamist activists and his counterargument to Al-Qaeda is significant. Drinkwine further noted that Dr. Fadl is not alone, as there are other former Jihadists who have “come out” recently against terrorism and the violent methods of Al-Qaeda.

J. Scott Carpenter and Matthew Levitt, senior fellows at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that former supporters and extremists are turning against their old organizations, and expanding existing fissures. The most prominent is former Egyptian Islamic Jihad head Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl). Although Al-Qaeda often cites Dr. Fadl’s previous treatises as ideological justification for its actions, he has since firmly renounced Osama bin Laden and has written a new book rejecting Al-Qaeda’s message and tactics. Sheikh Salman bin Fahd al-Awdah, an extremist cleric whose incarceration in the 1990s by the Saudis reportedly helped inspire Osama bin Laden to action, went on television to decry Al-Qaeda’s actions, asking bin Laden, “How much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed . . . in the name of Al-Qaeda?”

Taken together renunciations by these former ideologues have undermined Al-Qaeda’s message.

Abdul Hameed Bakier, a writer at the Jamestown Foundation, said that the Salafi Jihadist ideology, the doctrine and constitution of Al-Qaeda’s terrorists, is being re-


208 Ibid., 46.

evaluated by prominent Salafi Jihadist ideologues. The same ideologues that previously sanctioned terrorist operations are now having second thoughts about the ideology behind many heinous terrorist acts. Last month Sayyid Imam Abdulaziz al-Sharif, a founder of the Egyptian Jihad organization and a prominent Jihad theoretician better known as “Doctor Fadl,” released a new ten-part document called “Rationalizing the Jihadi action in Egypt and the world.” The treatise is expected to have a major influence on Salafi Jihadist operatives in general and Al-Qaeda in particular. Despite all of the negative responses to Dr. Fadl’s initiative by Salafi Jihadist leaders, calls by Egyptian Gama’a al-Islamiya leaders on bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to seriously consider Dr. Fadl’s document are likely to have a major impact on Al-Qaeda. Furthermore, the document will have a long-term influence on second level and new generations of Salafi Jihadist leaders because Egypt’s al-Gamaa al-Islamiya has always been a major ideological authority in the Arab and Islamic world.  

Other U.S. and British commentators on Islamic movements have made similar observations. Clifford D. May, the President of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on terrorism created immediately following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, said that Dr. Fadl “may be the most influential Islamist you’ve never heard of.” The Telegraph, a British newspaper, notes that he was “part of the tight circle which founded Al-Qaeda in 1988 in the closing stages of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.” He went on to lead an insurgency against Egypt,

---

210 Bakier, 2007, 1,4.

which landed him in (Mazra’ah Turrah) prison in southern Cairo, where he has since spent his days thinking and writing. In 2007, he published The Document of Right Guidance for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World. In an in-depth report, Daniel Lav, of the invaluable Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), boils Dr. Fadl’s “guidance” down to “the Jihadi action has “strayed from the proper practice of Jihad as laid down in Islamic law.” Lav notes that Dr. Fadl challenges Al-Zawahiri to a kind of Islamic duel “a ritual exchange of curses (mubahala), in which each side invites Allah’s curse on the party that is lying.” Dr. Fadl adds insult to injury when he stated that “some people pay money for fame, or to promote themselves or their product, but al-Zawahari pays in the blood and lives of his brothers, and leads them to waste away in prison, for his own media fame.”

Analysis and Expected Future Impacts on the West

In looking over the reviews from the West, there are not many differences from those of the Islamic world, although most of the Western reviews focused primarily on Al-Qaeda. Most authors did not address the impact of these reviews on the Islamic world. Furthermore, they also did not fully explore the extent to which the reviews impacted western societies.

There is no doubt that the reviews will have a significant, yet indirect, impact on Western societies. The call to stop the violence and to the restriction of killing civilians will reduce the vulnerability of Western citizens to violence, and increase their personal

---

protection. Reducing the incidents of violence in Islamic countries will allow a safe foreign presence for their business and investments, or tourist travel.

Moreover, the chances of changing Al-Qaeda’s strategy to prevent the killing of civilians or carry out attacks on civilian targets will reduce the exposure of citizens and their property to destruction. In addition to the possibility of ending the War on Terrorism in the short run, which will help the safe return of troops to the United States, and this will make U.S. families happy who were affected socially by this war.

In the long run, there will be an impact of these reviews on the legitimacy of carrying out terrorist operations in Western countries because it represented a violation of religion and distorted of the image of the Islam worldwide, which is strongly refuted by all Muslims. In addition, this will have a positive impact on the security of citizens in western societies.

In the military realm, these reviews will affect Al-Qaeda and radical groups, which use violence as a way to achieve their objectives. It can be seen that the reviews may cause the decline in the number of volunteers and recruits, loss of financial support, and even the potential to make Al-Qaeda reevaluate the strategy. Moreover, it may help the transition to less severe actions in the future like using the powers of negotiation or truce. It also may help the end of the War on Terrorism as soon as possible, which will reflect positively in economy, social life, and politics, creating an environment of stability in the Western and Muslim societies that can begin a new phase of peaceful coexistence.
Conclusion

Through analysis of the intellectual reviews, it has become amply clear that these documents have generated a large volume of global interest, and they reflect a new trend within the Islamic groups’ calls for moderation and renunciation of violence based on the texts of the Qur’an verses, *Hadith*, and Islamic history. It also called upon the radical Islamic groups, particularly Al-Qaeda, to conduct a comprehensive review of their strategy, and assess what they learned from their achievements or failures. The reviews have demonstrated to these groups that acts of violence distort the image of Islam and project Islam as a religion of violence.

Most writers and critics who have analyzed these reviews focused largely on their impact on jihadi action more than their impact on the Islamic world and the West. Most writers did not provide a vision on how to integrate these groups within their societies. Moreover, the leaders of these groups did not get the opportunity to have interviews in the media to talk about their new theories directly to the public, and their connection with the society was via journalists who wrote about the reviews.

We must recognize the importance of these reviews at this moment and their impact on the jihadi action, Islamic world, and the West. So far, we have not invested them well. The impact of these reviews was very big, although this could not be evaluated scientifically through opinion polls or personal interviews because of the sensitivity of the subject to security agencies, especially after the 11 September events. However, we can illustrate as a proof of strength that Al-Qaeda responded to the reviews for the first time, recognizing the importance of the leaders of these reviews. This occurred when Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri mentioned the name of Sayyid Imam, aka
“Shaykh Abd-al-Qadir Bin-Abd-al-Aziz” as one of the most important scholars in his book, *The Exoneration*, in response to Dr. Fadl’s book, *Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World.*\(^{213}\)

The future will show many reviews which advocate a call to renounce violence and correct the Islamist discourse to the world. The Western Hemisphere should understand the nature of the Islamic religion. The Western media, universities, and research institutes are responsible for correcting misconceptions about the Islamic religion in order to reach a common understanding and lead to peaceful world for the benefit of humanity.

---

CHAPTER 5
THE GENERAL CONCLUSION

At the end of this thesis, I would like to say that I conducted this research project because I believe it may benefit both the Islamic world and the West by opening a window on this often misunderstood or under-researched subject. I hope researchers in the Muslim world and the West will use my research because I believe that only a sufficiently diverse set of views on any given topic can truly establish the facts. I hope that my analysis of these intellectual reviews has strengthened the understanding of the true nature of the ideas and ideology of fundamentalist Islamic groups, as well as on the impact they have had on Jihadi Action, Muslim World, and the West.

In the first chapter, we reviewed the concept of jihad in terms of definition, types, views of various scholars, the western view of jihad, and the verses, which speak of jihad in Qur’an and Hadith. In this chapter, it became clear that the concept of jihad does not only mean fighting. The jihad has a broader and more comprehensive meaning than simply fighting. The jihad has been divided into thirteen types, namely arranged jihad of the soul, Satan, corruption, injustice, evil in society, the jihad against the hypocrites, jihad of the call and statement, the patience and tolerance Jihad, and the armed Jihad of enemies. The concept of jihad in terms of fighting is based mainly on the theory of self-defense, and does not sanction offensive acts or aggression. It uses violence only when certain that the adversary intends to attack the Muslims.

Throughout Chapter 2, we talked about the history of the Egyptian Islamic groups, and the most important fundamentalist Islamic groups, al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya and the Islamic Jihad Group. The Egyptian Islamic groups emerged in Egypt in the
twentieth century, and were influenced by ideas of medieval and modern Islamic scholars like Imam Ibn Taymiyyah and Sayyid Qutb. We also covered how the fall of the Islamic Caliphate, abolished by Kemal Ataturk, reduced the role of traditional religious institutions of the state and how the defeat of the 1967 War, inflamed enthusiasm among young people leading them to increased activism in context of the various Islamic movements.

There are several classifications of the Islamic Group according to the doctrine include Sunni groups and Sects groups, other are defined by the method of movement and political action include peaceful and armed groups. Other classifications include Islamic reform movement, the Islamic Revolutionary trend, Political Islam trend, and the Pseudo Islamic. It is important to examine the classification, identification trends, factions, and groups of the Islamic movement of the past or present because it helps to identify the trends of the future political behavior of these groups as well as to identify new developing trends, in accordance with their intellectual, organizational, and social structure.

The four most important Islamic groups in Egypt in twentieth century are the Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim Community (Al-Takfir Wal Hijra), the Islamic group, the al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, and Al-Jihad (the Islamic Jihad Group). Throughout this study of these groups, we identified differences among their ideologies and ways and means required to achieve the objectives of each group. For example, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes peaceful means to achieve their goals, a group like Islamic Jihad takes armed actions as means to achieve its objectives.
Throughout this analysis of the history of Islamic groups and their operations in Egypt, it is clear that Islamic groups not only have problems with the western countries, but also with the governments and peoples of the Arab and Muslim countries. Egypt has greatly suffered from terrorist attacks over the past four decades. Terrorist’s attacks needlessly sacrificed thousands of innocents and wasted billions of dollars in lost tourism revenue. These incidents will help the reader understand that the Islamic and Arab countries also suffer from violence - not just Western countries.

In Chapter 3, I analyzed the intellectual reviews of the Islamic groups’ leaders while detained in the Egyptian (Mazra’ah Turrah) Prison. I presented the intellectual reviews of the Islamic group, al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, and their unilateral initiative to stop violence on 5 July 1997. I detailed the motives behind the initiative and its strategic significance. We also looked at the attitudes and vision of the group before and after the reviews on important issues such as the position of the ruling regime, characterization of their position in the community, their positions on political and intellectual powers, the religious minority of Egyptian Christians, women’s issues, and the Group’s position from the Ideology and method of Al-Qaeda. Of the most important changes, Sheikh Karam Zahdi, the leader of the group, declared that Sadat was killed as a martyr, and Sheikh Nagah Ibrahim, the group’s thinker, said that reconciliation with Israel is possible, citing a truce of the Prophet, peace be upon him with the Jews.

I also analyzed and studied the intellectual reviews of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group’s former leader, Dr Sayyid Imam, aka Dr Fadl, which appeared in December 2007, published under the title, *Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World*. Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahri responded in March 2008 to the Sayyid Imam Document in his
book, *The Exoneration*. In return, Sayyid Imam responded to Al-Zawahri with his document, *The Denudation of the Exoneration*, in November 2008, by conducting a debate between the two leaders on issues of the 11 September attacks, localization of emirate, fighting the far enemy before the near enemy, excommunication, killing someone on account of his nationality, permitting the killing of those who pay taxes to infidel countries because they are fighting with their money, the heresy of the unrestricted application of the principle of reciprocity as well as important questions about the rationalization of Jihad written under the auspices of America and the Jews or not, America and the Jews as the cause of misfortunes of Muslims or otherwise, legitimate options for the Muslims against their enemies, the *Tatars* concept, permissibility of kidnapping hostages, and visa as a safe-conduct (*aman*).

It became clear during this debate, there are many differences between Sayyid Imam and Al-Zawahri on various issues. While Al-Zawahri sees the only way to deal with the West and Muslim world is with force, Sayyid Imam sees there are many other ways to achieve the goals, like truce and reconciliation. The two also differed in the interpretations of *Shari‘ah* when dealing with civilians and Western societies. While Al-Zawahri believes they are an essential part of the battle, Sayyid Imam sees they are not part of battle and should not be exposed to any harm. The dispute between them included the assessment of what has been achieved so far. While Al-Zawahri confirms that Al-Qaeda has achieved unprecedented achievements in the interest of Muslims, Sayyid Imam sees that Al-Qaida has brought the ruin and destruction to the Muslims, and is the source of the distorted image of Islam, and projects Islam as a religion of violence.
In Chapter 4, I analyzed and illustrated the impact of the intellectual reviews on the Jihadi Action, the Muslim world, and the West. There is no doubt that once the intellectual reviews were published, the jihadist forces, society, political and intellectual circles, and the West expressed their outlooks of these reviews. There were different reactions from supporters and skeptics, and set in motion a reassessment process of the four-decade period of Egypt’s history of violence. This process was not a reassessment conducted only by Islamic groups, but also included all political and intellectual circles to assess the best way to respond to these reviews for the benefit of the country.

There is no doubt that the intellectual reviews had a big influence on the jihadi action. Proof of this came in the response of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri in his book, *The Exoneration*, to the document, *Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World*, by Fadl, because of their impact on Al-Qaeda elements and its ideology. The intellectual reviews by Egyptian Islamic groups have opened the way for similar intellectual reviews of groups outside of Egypt. These groups have based their reviews on the new ideas of Egyptian groups. As, the Egyptian Islamic groups were the first to do jihad in Afghanistan, and began working in the jihadist project, it also had a head start in the intellectual reviews, and therefore their impact was significant and has spilled out of Egypt into Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

It is difficult to predict future impacts on jihadi action, but expectations like the emergence of new intellectual reviews of other Islamic groups or leaders; a decline in numbers of volunteers and recruits for Islamic armed groups; secession of some members from armed Islamic groups to join other groups that renounce violence; the emergence of moderate movements in Al-Qaeda; low rates of financial support to armed groups;
extending the impact of reviews in Egypt to Al-Qaeda and new groups and organizations in the short term; and a decline in the credibility of Al-Qaeda’s ideology among its members and supporters in the future are potential possibilities.

No one can diminish the importance of reviews of the largest and oldest jihadist groups worldwide, and their impact on the Islamic world. Many changes have occurred in how people regard Egypt and the Islamic world concerning the Islamic groups. These reviews have given people great hope for the future, and changed their perspective about these groups. They respect the Islamic groups for the courage to recognize their mistakes with the existence of a state of anticipation of how they will interact with the society after getting out of prison.

Polls show declining popularity of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic world, which represents a change in the general direction of rejecting violence because of the negative impact on the Muslim world. This confirms the inclination of the reviews to renounce violence and the effort to take peaceful means to deal with Islamic issues. The groups are now rethinking how they will relate with society in the future.

After analysis of the impact of the reviews of the Islamic world, we illustrated anticipations for future impacts of the reviews such as a drop in support within the Muslim world for Islamic groups that choose violence as a way to achieve its objectives, and extensive political activity will begin abroad by the Islamic groups in attempts to establish political parties. Some will announce agreement with the concept of the civil state. These activities of Islamic movements will meet violence resistances by its opponents of the seculars and Christians in the Islamic world by questioning of the intentions of these Islamic movements. It will be difficult to integrate these groups into
the community. Political conflicts between these groups are likely as they turn to political action, which may be intensified by the ruling authorities to limit their popularity and fragment their efforts. In the long run, some Islamic movements may succeed in playing a political role in some countries.

There is no doubt that the reviews will have a significant impact on Western societies indirectly. The call to stop the violence and cease killing civilians will reduce the vulnerability of the Western citizens for violence. Reducing incidences of violence in Islamic countries will allow a safe foreign presence in this country for the exercise of their business and investments, and encouraging tourism. Moreover, the opportunity of preventing Al-Qaeda’s strategy of killing civilians or carrying out attacks on civilian targets will reduce the exposure of citizens and their property to destruction, in addition to the possibility of ending the war on terrorism in the short run.

In the long run, these reviews will have impact on the legitimacy of carrying out terrorist operations in the western countries. These operations represent a violation of religion and distortion of the image of the Islam worldwide, which is strongly refuted by all Muslims. In addition, this will have a good impact on the security of citizens in Western societies.

For the military, these reviews have impacted Al-Qaeda and other radical groups, who use violence as the way to achieve their objectives by reducing the number of volunteers and recruits, reducing financial support, and encouraging moderate factions in Al-Qaeda. Moreover, it may help the transition to less severe actions in the future, such as negotiations or a truce. It may hasten end the War on Terrorism sooner, which would reflect positively in the economy, social life, and politics, which would create a situation
of stability in the Western and Muslim societies, beginning a new phase of peaceful coexistence.

In the end, I hope that the Islamic groups evaluate their work permanently, and take into account the interests of their fellow Muslims, the balance of power, political, social, and economic changes, and take Islamic world out of this impasse, which prohibits the Islamic nation these days to arrive at a better tomorrow, God willing. I also hope that the Muslim world unites for its own good and that of humanity. The Muslim world needs to communicate with other cultures and civilizations to reach a state of peaceful coexistence. I also call upon the West to deal with Muslims, with mutual respect to establish bridges of communication and dialogue on a sustained basis.
GLOSSARY

A.H. After *Hijrah*.

Apostate. One who has abandoned their religious faith, principles or cause.

Al-Azhar. A mosque and university in Egypt

Allah. Refers to God, glory be to Him, there is no god but He. Allah is a Divine name of God.

Amir/Emir. Commander, governor, or prince.

Ayah. A sign of Allah or a verse of the Qur’an (pl. *Ayat*).

Caliph. Ruler of Islamic states.

Caliphate. Pan-Islamic states.

Companions. Known as *sahabas* - friends who are frequently in the company of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him).

Dar al-Harb. *Abode of War*. Territories not under Muslim control where Jihads are fought.


Dar es Salam. *Abode of Peace* or *State of Peace*.

da’wa/da’wah. The *Call to Islam* given by Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him). A call to turn away from false gods and to the worship of the one true God

Du’a. Supplication

Facism. Political theory advocating authoritarian hierarchical government (as opposed to democracy or liberalism); established by Mussolini in Italy 1922-43.

Fatwa. Religious ruling or edict issued by a respected scholar of Islamic law/Shari’ah, is a verdict.

Fiqh/faq. Jurisprudence. The science of Islamic/Shari’ah law. Also, the principles of legal reasoning.

Free Officers Movement. A movement composed of young junior army officers who conspired to unseat the Egyptian monarchy and its British advisors. It was founded by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Fundamentalism. Rigid adherence to literal interpretation of a holy text; oppose excessive modernization as a betrayal of traditional religious values.

Ghazw or Ghazah. (plural ghazawāt) (Arabic: غزوة) was originally an Arabic term referring to the battles in which Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) personally participated. It has since evolved into a term for battle associated with the expansion of Muslim territory. The term ghāzi or Warrior for the faith came to represent participants in these later battles and is cognate with the terms ghāziya and maghāzī.

Hadith. A tradition, usually written, relating to what the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) said or did. Sometimes includes what his companions did. Collections of hadiths compose the Sunnah (the way) or the Sunnah/hadith, the second principal source of Islamic law/Shari’ah.

Hajj. Religious pilgrimage to Mecca.

Halal. That which is lawful and permissible to use/consume in Islam

Haram. That which is unlawful in Islam. It is necessary to abstain from the acts which are haram.

Hijra. The day the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) left Mecca to Medina.

Ibadah. Devotion or worship

Imperialism. Extending a nation’s authority by territorial acquisition or by establishing economic and political hegemony over other nations.

Infidel. An unbeliever with respect to a religion.

Islamist. An Islamic activist.

Jahiliyyah. The age of ignorance. The period of Arab history before Islam (before the revelation of the Koran), Ignorance; un-Islamic behavior.

Jihadist. Muslim involved in a Jihad

Kafir. Unbelievers or infidels.

Kalam. The Islamic philosophy of seeking Islamic theological principles through dialectic.

Kharījites. A general term embracing various Muslims who, while initially supporting the caliphate of the fourth and final Rightly Guided caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib, later rejected him.

Kufr. Impious; unbelief.
Land of the Two Holy Places. The nation of Saudi Arabia.

Madrassa. A Islamic religious school.

Mahdi. A normal man who is going to follow the true Islam. His name will be Muhammad and his father name will be ‘Abdullah. He is a descendant from Ali and Fatima (daughter of the prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him). Mahdi is NOT a prophet but he is the final Rightly Guided Khalifa who will return to preside over the era of perfect justice.

Moderate. Opposed to radical or extreme views; especially in politics and religion.

Mujahid. (plural form: Mujahideen or Mujahidoon). A participant, soldier, or warrior in a Jihad, or someone striving to live righteously (e.g., to overcome a sinful bad habit). Often used as the equivalent of the English terms, freedom fighter or patriot. Always carries a positive connotation.

Nationalism. Devoted to the interests of a particular nation.

Salafi/salafiyyah. From the Arabic, al-salaf al-salih, “the venerable forefathers,” referring to earliest generations (usually the first three) of Muslims, including prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) and his companions, and sometimes including the early scholars of Islam--Abu Hanifa, Malik ibn Anas, al Shafii, and ibn Hanbal—the founders of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence that bear their names.

Salafism. Strict adherence to traditional Islamic values, religious orthodoxy, correct ritualistic practice, and moral issues.

Sect. A religious body, especially one that has separated from a larger denomination.

Shahaadatayn. Translated to mean, I testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah.

Shari’ah. The compilation of Islamic law drawn from/based on the Koran (God’s Word), hadiths (saying or actions of the Prophets), qiyas (analogies/analogous reasoning), and ijma (consensus opinion). The product of fiqh. The normative code of all human behavior.

Shi’a. Party or partisans of Ali, the second largest major sect or division in Islam, who believe the Islamic caliphate (successor to Muhammed) should have gone to Ali (Muhammed’s son-in-law and cousin, eventually the fourth caliph) and then to his direct descendants.

Source. A thing or place from which something comes or arises; also origin, root cause.
Sunnah. The way of life prescribed as normative in Islam, based on the teachings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him). Also used to refer to the compilation of all accepted hadiths.

Sura. A chapter or division in the Koran. There are 114 suras arranged in a precise order based on length, not order of their revelation.

Takfir. Excommunicate; declare as unbelievers.

Tatars. When the enemy uses persons (Muslim or infidels) as human shield, to secure himself and repel the Muslims.

Ulama/ulema. Plural of alim; refers to religious scholars or clergy

Umma. Community of Islamic believers. ²¹⁴

---

²¹⁴Some of these definitions were taken from Islam/Arabic Primer, Student Courseware, Middle East Strategic Study Course, US Army Command and and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 2010. Used with permission; Major John D. Johnson, “Analysis of the Sources of Islamic Extremism” (Master’s thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2007).
APPENDIX A

INFLUENTIAL THINKERS AND SCHOLARS AMONG JIHADIST IDEOLOGUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Died</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ibn Taymiyya</td>
<td>1328</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sayyid Qutb</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Abdullah Yusuf Azzam</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Abd Al-Qader Bin ‘Abd Al-’Aziz, (Sayyid Imam-Dr Fadl)</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Yusuf Al ‘uyayree</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Osama bin Ladin</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ayman al-Zawahiri</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Abu Musab al-Suri,</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Abu Basir al-Tartusi</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Muhammad Qutb</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sultan b. Bajad al-’Utaybi</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>’Abd al-’Aziz b. Salih al-Jarbu’</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>’Umar ’Abd al-Rahman</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Abu ’Ubayd al-Qurashi</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Abu ’Umar al-Sayf</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Abu Qatada al-Filistini</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Abu al-’Ala al-Mawdudi</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Nasir al-Fahd</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>’Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Abu Jandal al-Azdi</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ahmad b. Hammud al-Khalidi</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Muhammad b. Salim al-Dusari</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Sulayman b. Nasir al-’Alwan</td>
<td>Alive</td>
<td>Saudi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY

1258 ..........Mongols conquer Baghdad; destroy Abbasid Caliphate.
1263 ..........Imam Ibn Taymiyyah was born at Harran.
1328 ..........Imam Ibn Taymiyyah died in prison in the citadel of Damascus.
1903 (Sep) ....Abul Ala Mawdudi was born in Aurangabad, Hyderabad Deccan, India.
1906 (Oct) .....Sayyid Qutb (one of the most prominent MB thinkers) was born in Egypt.
1913 ..........The establishment and management of “Al-Gamia Al-Shariaa,”
1917 ..........Balfour Declaration.
1923 ..........Modern state of Turkey founded; Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) first President.
1924 ..........Ataturk abolishes caliphate.
1928 ..........The establishment of Muslim Brotherhood Group by Hassan al-Banna.
1948 (May) ....State of Israel established.
1949 (Feb) .....The assassination of al-Banna, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood Group.
1950 (Aug) .....Sayyid Imam born in Beni Suef City, Egypt.
1951 (Jun) .....Ayman al-Zawahiri born in Egypt; leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
1957 (Mar) ....Osama bin Laden born in Saudi Arabia; founder of al-Qaida.
1958 ..........Nabil El-Borai established a group of armed jihad and joined him Sultan Ismail, Mohamed Abdel-Aziz al-Sharkawy, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mustafa Alawi.
1964 ..........The Egyptian Jihad Group is founded as first cell of Jihad in the modern Islamic movement in Egypt by the three founders, Mustafa Alawi, Ismael Tantawi, and Nabil El-Borai.
1964 ..........Sayyid Qutb publishes manifesto, Milestones.
1965 ..........President Nasser Regime began its famous campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood group.
1966 (Aug) .....Sayyid Qutb hanged for plotting against the Egyptian government.
1967 (Jun) .....Arab-Israeli War.
1968 ..........Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri established first jihadist cell in Maadi, Egypt and joined Nabil El-Borai and Ismail Tantawi and Dr. Sayyid Imam and others.
1973 ..........Mustafa Alawi dissent and established the Jihad group and joined with Lt. Essam Al-kamare.
1973 ..........Dr. Saleh Sareia has established a secret organization known as the group of the military-technical and joined by some members of the old groups.

1973 (Oct) .....Arab-Israeli War.

1974 ..........Al-Zawahiri graduated from Cairo University as a Physician.

1974 ..........Dr. Salih Sariyah and Al-anadoli were sentenced to death.

1974 (Nov) ....Sayyid Imam earned the medicine and surgery degree with distinction and honor from College of Medicine, Cairo University.

1975 ..........Dr. Salih Sareia and his colleagues were executed for attempting to overthrow the government.

1977 ..........Shukri Ahmed Mustafa established the Takfir wal Hijra group and executed in 1978 thanks.

1978 (Mar) ....Shukri Mustafa the founder of Al-Takfir Wal Hijra Group hanged for plotting against the Egyptian government.

1978 ..........Al-Zawahiri received his master’s in surgery.

1979 (Apr) .....Egyptians vote to approve peace treaty with Israel.

1979 ..........Al-Zawahiri had joined the Jihad Group with Muhammad Abdus Salam who arranged to assassinate President Anwar al-Sadat.

1979 (Sep) .....Abul Ala Mawdudi died.

1979 (Dec) ....Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

1979 ..........The kidnapping and assassination of the Minister of Endowments, Dr. Mohamed Hussein Al-Zahabe by Al-Takfir Wal Hijra Group.


1981 (Oct) .....Assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

1981 (Oct) .....The attack on the Security Directorate in Assiut by The Islamic group.

1982 ..........Mohamed Abdel Salam Farag hanged for the assassination of President Sadat.


1989 (Feb) .....Last Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan.

1990 (Oct) .....The assassination of Dr. Rif’at al Mahgoub, Speaker of the People’s Assembly.

1992 (Jun) .....The assassination of the Egyptian writer Farag Foda.
1993 ..............Sayyid Imam resigned from the Amir position of Islamic Jihad Group.
1993 (Feb) .....First World Trade Center bombing.
1993 ..............Most of the members of the Islamic Jihad Group moved from Afghanistan to Sudan.
1993 (Aug) ....The attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi.
1993 (Nov) ....The attempted assassinations of Prime Minister Atef Sedky.
1993 ..............Sayyid Imam resigns from Amir position.
1994 ..............Sayyid Imam went to Yemen.
1995 (Jun) .....Attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
1995 (Nov) ....Car bomb attack on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan.
1995 ..............The Islamic Jihad group declared stopping the armed actions in Egypt.
1996 ..............Islamic Jihad Group, led by Dr. Al-Zawahiri moved from Sudan to Afghanistan.
1996 (Aug) ....Osama bin Laden issues fatwa Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.
1997 (Jul) ......Islamic Group declared the initiative to stop violence.
1997 (Nov) ....Luxor massacre in Egypt.
1998 (Feb) ....Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, et al., issue the World Islamic Front Declaration of Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders.
1999 ..............Islamic Group’s Shura Council entirely signed on a resolution approving the initiative to stop violence.
2001 (Jun) .....Al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged into one Group called “Qaeda al-Jihad,”
2001 (Sep) .....11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US.
2001 (Oct) .....Start of war in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom).
2001 (Dec) ....Al-Zawahiri publishes AQ manifesto Knights under the Prophet’s Banner.
2003 ..............Islamic Group published three books River of the Memories, the Riyadh bombings, and Al-Qaeda strategy.
2004 (Feb) ..... The Yemeni authorities arrested Sayyid Imam and handed him over to Egypt.

2004 (Oct) ..... The Taba bombings.

2005 (Jul) ....... The bombing in Sharm el-Sheikh.

2007 (Mar) .... Sayyid Imam published his document, “Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World,”


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Al-Hussein, Asmaa bint Abdul Aziz, Dr. Asbab Al-anf we Al-arhab we Tatarof (The Causes of Terrorism and Violence and Extremism). Translated by Shereef, LTC Elaraishy. Riyadh.


**Government Documents**


**Newspapers**


Other Sources


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Alice B. Smith
SAMS
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Dr. Sean N. Kalic
DMH
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. John N. Cary
DJIMO
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301