STRATEGY’S RELEVANCE TO THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

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### ABSTRACT

Using a methodology consisting of identifying the policy and associated strategy for the initial Afghanistan war period compared to the policy and associated strategy for the current Afghanistan war, the study identifies strategic composition derived from policy. The study also explores the intervening years between the two strategies as a necessary link to understand how the United States went from an origination period to the current period. The study finds two distinct policies and two distinct strategies. The first strategy focused on using the military instrument of national power. The current approach attempts to use all instruments of national power. Both periods of policy and strategy, however, address the same core United States interest. The interest identified in the study is protecting and pursuing American security. Recommendations for additional research include identifying how historical United States strategies link to policy and whether or not the operational environment shapes strategies. This is in contrast to the accepted approach that indicates policy informs strategy and strategy incorporates a balance between ends, ways, and means while considering risk to achieve the policy’s stated objective.

### SUBJECT TERMS

Policy, Strategy, National Interests, Instruments of Power, Ends, Ways, Means
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background

The initial campaign in Afghanistan focused almost exclusively on removing the Taliban from power and disrupting the base from which al-Qaeda could train, operate, plan and deploy in order to conduct terrorist activities. This approach was the strategy in 2001. In effect, the American effort was a counterterrorism fight and received resources accordingly. The initial design called for special operations forces to work with the Afghan Northern Alliance and required few conventional troops. Michael O’Hanlon, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, stipulated “. . . GEN Tommy Franks, and Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet devised a plan for using limited but well-chosen types of American power in conjunction with Afghan opposition to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda.”

Subsequent to the fall of the Taliban and during the Interim Afghanistan Authority, the majority of United States military resource allocations went to support Operation Iraqi Freedom in order to combat a rising insurgency movement from 2004 to 2008. Iraq has stabilized and the United States is planning to withdraw combat troops by the end of 2011.

The situation in Afghanistan, however, deteriorated between 2003 and arguably the present. To address Afghanistan in March 2009, the White House issued a position statement indicating a policy calling for the United States, “. . . to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.” Additionally, after a second Afghanistan review on 1 December 2009 the
president announced a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan. In conjunction with his March position statement the strategy announced 1 December 2009 detailed a comprehensive program to accomplish the United States’ Afghanistan objectives.\(^5\)

This study seeks to identify the policy objectives and the policy links to strategy and the war in Afghanistan, the national interests the conflict addresses and answer what exactly is the current United States strategy for Afghanistan. Crucial to the study is an understanding of the initial strategy of 2001 versus the strategy of 2009 and an answer to whether or not the strategies are different. If these strategies are different what explains the differences or what changed in the environment? Additionally, the study will determine if the national interests pursued in 2001 are the same interests the strategy pursued in 2009.

To frame the study properly, establishing several baseline terms and their definitions is important. Overarching terms that readers need to understand include policy, strategy and national interests. Additional terms to understand are visited in detail in chapter 3 (methodology) and include ends, ways, means, risk and their importance to strategy formulation. Similarly, an understanding of national level products and their relationship to strategy composition is necessary.

First, policy is the overall end state sought by government.\(^6\) Policy, in theory, delineates the guidance that strategy must follow in its development.\(^7\) Policy is the primary directive for strategy formulation. In his article, “Strategic Theory For The 21st Century: The Little Book On Big Strategy,” Harry Yarger indicates “Policy provides guidance for strategy.”\(^8\) Additionally, long-time U.S. Army War College strategy instructor Arthur Lykke further explains that policy is, “. . . a broad course of action or
statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.”

Second, a helpful way to understand strategy is through an analogy. Strategy is to policy and operations what a bridge is to one side of a river and the other. It translates national policy into definable and measurable objectives. Strategy identifies what is critical to achieve and establishes the framework in which to operate along with designating the resources available to fulfill objectives. Strategy is about reaching or meeting the objective but is distinct from planning. Planning outlines the steps necessary to facilitate strategy. Additionally, strategy is different from policy. The bridge analogy explains that policy indicates we need to cross the river. Strategy indicates that to cross the river you must use a bridge and planning mandates the number of people, at what time, and what order to cross a specific bridge. Strategy, though, derives separately from policy; it is the by-product of stated policy. In an article on teaching strategy from the United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Colin Gray expresses a more formal definition. He writes, “Any definition of strategy unambiguously must convey the idea that it is about directing and using something to achieve a selected purpose.”

Third, products from national leadership that seek to clarify U.S. national interests and illustrate national policy drive strategy. Formalization of strategy at the national level includes the National Security, Defense and the National Military Strategies. Some writers term these products as an expression of what they call “grand strategy”. In his article “The Strategic Appraisal: The Key To Effective Strategy,” Harry Yarger proposes strategies that include the term national embody grand strategy because of their level and the areas they address. Strategist John Collins articulates a concept of grand strategy as
“... the art and science of employing national power under all circumstances to exert desired degrees and types of control over opposition through threats, force, indirect pressures, diplomacy, subterfuge, and other imaginative means, thereby satisfying national security interests and objectives.”\textsuperscript{12} The national-level strategies detail objectives. To illustrate what the national strategies desire to achieve defining the U.S. national interests that drive policy and in turn propagate strategy is worthwhile.

Primary or “core” U.S. national interests are physical security, the promotion of values, a stable international order and economic prosperity.\textsuperscript{13} In order, they represent protecting the U.S. physical territory and people from attack, promoting core American values and facilitating or countering attempts to hinder American economic prosperity.\textsuperscript{14} Another way to describe the core interests of America today is to define them as security, economic well-being and democratic values.\textsuperscript{15} Due to resources, time or particular circumstances translating the interests expressed through policy into strategy often requires a proportional effort. Every interest cannot be weighted the same. The process of ranking national interests is stratification, which delineates vital interests, important interests and peripheral interests.\textsuperscript{16} According to an article by Derek Reveron and James Cook in \textit{Joint Forces Quarterly}, stratifying interests respectively defines what we are willing to “die for, fight for, or willing to finance.”\textsuperscript{17} After prioritizing U.S. national interests, strategy seeks to galvanize, apportion and synchronize the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, informational and the military) to protect, pursue or advance interests.\textsuperscript{18}

Grand strategy is the epitome of linking objectives with power in pursuit of national interests. In their book \textit{Making Strategy An Introduction to National Security}
Processes and Problems, Dennis Drew and Donald Snow complement John Collins’
grand strategy description and help define strategy’s linkage to objectives and the
instruments of national power by indicating “Grand strategy is the art and science of
coordinating the development and use of those instruments to achieve national security
objectives.”\textsuperscript{19} Yale University professor and strategy instructor John Lewis Gaddis
further crystallizes grand strategy by stating “It’s about how one uses whatever one has to
get to wherever it is one wants to go.”\textsuperscript{20}

The study does not equate the strategies examined to a grand strategy. Rather, the
study asserts the applicable approaches constitute national strategy corresponding to the
war in Afghanistan. Moreover, upon examination the strategies reviewed in accordance
with Collins’ definition explains the strategy in Afghanistan from the war’s inception to
the present and explores whether or not they incorporate elements of national power to
meet the defined objective for each period analyzed.

Regarding definitions, a brief explanation of the concept of ends, ways, means
and risk as the primary method to explain strategy formulation proves helpful. These are
addressed in more detail in chapter 3; however, to place them in context readers should
note that the ends, ways, means and risk construct comprises the variables that when
combined represent strategy. What we want to accomplish represents the “ends.” How we
want to accomplish the ends equals the “ways” and what are we going to use to
accomplish the ends translate as the “means.” Risk is the variance between successfully
achieving the objective or failing. Risk is also the opportunity cost for pursuing a strategy
knowing that the strategy may require or receive inappropriate levels of resourceing.
The study specifically does not address the situation in Iraq or the U.S strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom, which warrants a separate study. Furthermore, limitations on the study include contrasting a baseline evaluation time period with an ending time period. For the study, I selected the initial war period from 2001 to 2002 as the origin for comparison to the strategy from the 2006 to 2009 time period. These periods encapsulate the breadth of the war from inception to present and permit explanation of the environmental changes during the intervening years. These changes include the initial defeat of the Taliban government, al-Qaeda disruptions, force growth, commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an administration change, a recent change of U.S. military command in Afghanistan and Afghanistan national elections. The end point for strategy comparison is 1 December 2009. Exploration of material published after the president’s 1 December 2009 strategy announcement is relevant only if it pertains directly to the strategy implementation or illustrates the importance of strategic study or formation. In addition, the thesis does not attempt to define or establish the strategies from either period as a grand strategy. Describing the different approaches in effect for the periods examined as national strategies is conducive to the thesis.

The thesis is particularly relevant today and will remain so in the future due to the current effort placed on transforming and re-emphasizing the Afghanistan strategy and resourcing it accordingly. Since the primarily U.S. led phase of the Iraq campaign is nearing completion, the focus of the U.S. is increasingly centered on Afghanistan and Pakistan. American and coalition forces have been at war in Afghanistan for eight years
and a cessation of violence appears distant instead of imminent. The ISAF and United States Forces-Afghanistan Commander, GEN Stanley McChrystal, writes as follows:

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans-in both their government and the international community-that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents.22

This study intends to examine the relationship between policy and a strategy formulation methodology versus actual implementation of strategy, emphasizing the proper context in which to analyze former and current Afghanistan strategy. The study also illustrates the steps needed to arrive at fundamentally sound strategy. A secondary objective is for readers to gain a better appreciation of where strategies are enacted; however, not sufficiently supported by the ways, or means, or fail to account for existing or future risk. Additionally, the study addresses whether or not the strategy from 2001 to 2002 is in practice actually different from the 2006 to 2009 strategy. Another area for examination is whether the operational environment influences strategy. In short, after the study, the goal is for readers that are better equipped to understand solid, rationale strategy formulation and implementation versus loosely aligned components that are difficult to implement. Writing in Makers of Modern Strategy, Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert expressed similar concern when reviewing coherent, historical strategies such as those enumerated by the Founding Fathers, or the Truman administration in the late 1940s and early 1950s. They write:

Common to these strategies was their complete rationality in formulation and, in their implementation, a realistic appraisal of the international context in which they were to be pursued, an accurate view of the capabilities and proclivities of potential opponents, an underlying assumption that the accumulation and employment of military force must be justified by demonstrable political
advantage and must not impose too heavy a burden upon national resources, and a
determination that the use of force should end with the attainment of the political
objective.  

Studying strategy’s formulation and applying a specific methodology to analyze
its composition is crucial for ensuring perspective and consistent effort. The above
illustrates what variables interact to comprise strategy as well as differentiated between
policy, strategy and planning. Additionally, using the core U.S. national interests as the
origination point for policy and then strategy development indicates not all strategies
receive equal priority. Subdividing strategy into vital, important and peripheral categories
assists to allocate resources appropriately.  

This study aspires to identify the stated
national interest imperative(s) for the American strategy for Afghanistan by first
identifying the U.S. policy driving the strategy and then examining the strategy from a
baseline period in comparison to a concluding period. The study compares the strategy
from 2001 to 2002 with the strategy from 2006 to 2009 and explores the two
independently with respect to the national interests they address in an environment that
changed over the past eight years. Exploring what we are doing to fulfill our objectives
and whether or not we are mitigating or accepting risk and employing the instruments of
national power to accomplish our objectives is also productive. Similar to other research
studies, after establishing a common understanding of key terms, and the goals for the
study a review of relevant literature highlighting trends, differences, and applicability to
the thesis is essential.

1Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military
Operations, and Issues for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service,
23 January 2009), 2.


5 The White House, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, West Point, NY, 1 December 2009.


16 Ibid., 9.


24 Reveron and Cook, 23.
Based upon the nature of the topic there is an abundance of material to review including both primary and secondary sources. Even with the quantity available, sorting through the material for quality information presented challenges. For the thesis, differentiating the material through a review by topical area is advantageous not only for organization but to facilitate answering the research questions. Therefore, the review entailed analysis of literature addressing policy, strategy, strategy composition and the changing environment during the intervening years. Concluding the literature review entails describing trends, observations and discrepancies with the material considered.

First, regarding policy, an example of a source for the initial period from 2001 to 2002 is President Bush’s address to Congress and the American people given 20 September 2001. Another example that highlighted the initial policy is Kenneth Katzman’s research for the Congressional Research Service dated 21 September 2009. With respect to current official policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, research finds two clear examples for review. The first is the president’s position statement dated 27 March 2009, and the second is the national address given 1 December 2009. These two speeches explain the current policy and guide the effective strategy from now until July 2011.

Complementing these primary policy sources are two books that offer extraordinary insight into and exploration of the United States’ initial Afghanistan policy and how policy directed the war’s strategy. The first book, Bush at War, written by Bob Woodward, while not authoritative, provided good background on national security inner-workings. Woodward’s book encapsulates and explains the thoughts of the Bush
Administration in the aftermath of 9/11. Woodward’s book also explores how the administration developed policy and implemented strategy to address terrorism. The second source is *Understanding the War on Terror*, edited by James F. Hoge Jr. and Gideon Rose. The second book highlights the initial war strategy, derived from the Bush Administration’s policy, and introduces the linkage of Afghanistan with Pakistan. The source also provides context for the current administration’s regional policy and strategy. Notably, based upon the currency of the Obama Administration’s Afghanistan policy, the review reflects an absence of comparable policy references similar to Woodward’s book and the Hoge and Rose book.

Next, regarding strategy and strategy composition, there is a great deal of quality literature published at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. In general, their publications are in the form of collections of monographs in national security or strategy related volumes. The quality of the work is excellent. Specific literature reviewed that addresses strategy and strategy formulation includes literature from the Strategic Studies Institute and national strategy documents. In the first strategy category, is the 2008 J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. two volume set of the U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues. The first volume addresses the theory of war and strategy. The second volume addresses strategy and national security policy. The second strategy category consists of national strategy documents. Literature reviewed in this area includes the National Security Strategies from 2002 and 2006 as well as the National Military Strategy from 2004 and the 2008 National Defense Strategy.

Similar to the material created by the Strategic Studies Institute, several books written by personnel specializing in U.S. National Security Strategy proved valuable to
the research. Authors in this category include National Defense University Professor John M. Collins (USA, Retired) and Dennis M. Drew (USAF, Retired) while he was with the Airpower Research Institute. Mr. Collins’ text, *Military Strategy*, published in 2002, is particularly noteworthy. This text clearly explains the development of strategy and its relationship to policy and offers mutually supporting evidence of the ends, ways, means and risk construct.

Much of the literature relating to strategy includes material derived from two main sources: scholarly articles and reports from the Congressional Research Service. Strategy is also a common topic for scholars and practitioners in journals, magazines, and newspapers. Scholarly articles, such as Colin Gray’s work, “Schools For Strategy: Teaching Strategy For The 21st Century Conflict,” represent this literature area. Interestingly, some of the literature follows current U.S. regional policy and does not treat Afghanistan as a separate nation. Rather, linking Afghanistan and Pakistan follows ethnic lines instead of geographical boundaries. An example is the 2003 Kenneth Katzman Congressional Research Service report titled, “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy.”

The quality of the reports published by the Congressional Research service is largely excellent. The reports compiled by the Congressional Research Service are valuable sources used to provide the historical context in which to view recent events. The report by Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, titled “War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,” typifies the service’s research. Also, in this category is the 30 August 2009 edited version of the International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan Commander’s Assessment. The assessment provides an
excellent overview of the entire Afghanistan and Pakistan environment, inter-workings and offers insights into what GEN McChrystal views as the challenges and direction regional strategy should pursue. The same primary source documents that describe strategy and its composition also address U.S. national interests and assist in defining the ends, ways, means and risk construct. However, Arthur Lykke’s book Military Strategy: Theory and Application stands out as an excellent source for the discussion of ends, ways, means and risk. Additionally, Lykke taught strategy for several years at the U.S. Army War College and his work on the ends, ways, means three-legged stool concept is widely used as a strategy composition and explanation model.

Another literature area focuses on transcripts of testimony offered to either the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) or the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). The testimony of people before the SASC and the HASC is also valuable for understanding the context and thinking of political and military leadership throughout the duration of the Afghanistan war. Informative examples of testimonial literature are the statements given before the HASC the day after President Obama gave his speech at West Point. In the 2 December 2009 proceedings, the committee members address questions to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that centered on the new strategy, its need and reflected upon the deteriorating situation that transpired post 2003. Also, the August 2008 edition of Military Review provided an excellent primary source for describing Afghanistan strategy during the intervening years. As the former commander, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), retired LTG David W. Barno’s article illustrated the formulation and implementation of strategy during these years.
Lastly, an example of material that addresses operations and the changing environment from a NATO perspective is Rebecca Moore’s book, *NATO’s New Mission Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*. Furthermore, specifically regarding Operation Enduring Freedom, the operational environment, policy and strategy, the oral histories presented by Christopher Koontz in his work titled *Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan* is as an invaluable source used to illustrate the intervening years. And, of significant note, it captures nuances reflected in the current 2009 strategy. Complementing Koontz’ material is a report by COL Ian Hope, Canadian Armed Forces, titled “Unity of Command In Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle Of War.” The importance of COL Hope’s work is the detailed analysis of the complex, often fragmented command and control structure during the intervening years. Additionally, he recommends solutions to improve efficiency and synchronize resources. Some of his recommendations or those of a similar nature are now in effect as evidenced by combining the senior U.S. officer’s role as Commander International Security Assistance Forces and Commander of United States Forces-Afghanistan.

Other sources of literature reviewed include newspaper articles and opinion pieces. These areas of literature are the most difficult to analyze because they constantly change and are nearly always based upon opinion and speculation. Examples of this literature include Elisabeth Bumiller’s 23 November 2009 *New York Times* article titled, “In 3 Tacks for Afghanistan War, a game of Trade-Offs;” where discussion of troop increases centers on what they can accomplish with the troop levels in the areas in which they operate. Another article, “Going Local: The Key to Afghanistan” that appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* in August 2009, by Seth Jones, - implies unless we focus on the
villages, and abandon helping develop Afghanistan’s central government the U.S.
strategy will fail. Much of this material is provocative and provides ideas on additional
research.

Notably, a trend in some of the literature reviewed that relates to a research
question is the assertion that development of the operational level of war and its demands
consumes strategy, hence, blurring traditional roles, is offered in Justin Kelly and Mike
Brennan’s 2009 monograph on operational art. Though, Kelly and Brennan reference a
manual, Field Manual 100-5 that is today’s Field Manual 3-0, their argument is worthy of
exploration. In 2009, they wrote the following:

In the American/NATO usage of FM-100-5, rather than meeting its original
purpose of contributing to the attainment of campaign objectives laid down by
strategy, operational art-practiced as a “level of war”—assumed the responsibility
for campaign planning and, by reducing the political leadership to the role of
“strategic sponsors,” quite specifically widened the gap between politics and
warfare. The result has been a well-documented ability to win battles that have
not always contributed to strategic success, i.e., “a way of battle rather than a way
of war.” To a large extent, the creation of an operational level of war undid all the
good effort to constructively connect politics and tactics that had been expended
by theorists since Moltke.¹

The theme of operational art expanding and squeezing strategic planning is also
found in Dr. P.W. Singer’s article taken from his book, Wired for War. In his article,
“Tactical Generals,” “A pyramid represents the traditional concept of a military
operation, with the strategic commander on top, the operational commanders beneath,
and the tactical commanders occupying the bottom layer. Aided by new technologies,
strategic and operational commanders who usurp authority from tactical commanders are
erasing this structure from above.”² The salient point comments like the above illustrate
is a unique shift in the way the U.S. conducts planning and operations. As a result of the
development, demands and capabilities of operational art, it has pushed up into the sphere
of strategy while at the same time technology has enabled leaders who should be focused
on strategy choosing, and often, to reach down and become involved in operations at the
tactical level. By the blurring of traditional roles, there is some evidence of the
operational environment informing strategy and perhaps even policy.

Additionally, much of the literature reviewed emphasizes the evolving, changing
and adaptability strategic planners and strategy itself must embrace. With respect to the
study, applicability of the literature reflecting this observation is evident when viewing
the initial policy and strategy, and the current policy and strategy. Because of flexibility
and adaptability, the initial period and the current effort have different emphasis.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM Michael Mullen, recently illustrated this
point. “Policy and strategy,” Mullen said, must “constantly struggle with one another.”
Rather than setting a strategy and stepping aside, political leaders must remain involved.
The day the U.S. stops adjusting is the day the country loses.”
Moreover, in his 1973 handbook on grand strategy, John Collins writes that strategy is similar to a game with
multiple variables, defined as “players” who affect the outcome. There are few set rules
for strategy; only tools that strategic planners and thinkers must be cognizant of when
creating products. Collins writes, “The entire purpose of this handbook is to assist that
process. No attempt has been made to tell aspiring strategists what to think. The
preceding chapters simply show them how. There are no pat answers or school solutions.
There are only strategic tools.”
Strategy is as an art with limited set rules. Its formation,
though, does have prescribed almost scientific guidelines to ensure practitioners logically
address all variables.
Discrepancies in the literature reviewed for the thesis include several pieces of literature expressing disagreement or a lack of clarity regarding the definition and description of what constitutes grand strategy. Perhaps, publication date and changes in the overall study and development of strategy explain these differences; however, they need illustration for readers to understand strategic subtleties. First, in Derek Reveron and James Cook’s article in *Joint Force Quarterly*, page twenty-five depicts grand strategy consisting of the National Security Strategy. Yet, in Harry Yarger’s piece in the *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, page fifty-three depicts grand strategy consisting of National Strategy, National Military Strategy and Theater Strategy. Lastly, in John Collins text on strategy he explains that grand strategy and military strategy are “interrelated,” but are not “synonymous.” The relevance of the discrepancies with respect to the thesis is to demonstrate to readers both the fluidity and changing composition of strategy. In three writings, from three authors over a period of thirty-six years, the variables of grand strategy changed.

Moreover, for the study, grand strategy is viewed as the synthesis of the instruments of national power to achieve an end. Such a synthesis is the relationship and application of the instruments available to fulfill policy objectives. Again, the study does not attempt to define either the initial or the current Afghanistan strategy as a grand strategy. However, for clarity, I subscribe to John Collins’ description in order to bridge between the instruments of national power and the ends, ways, means and risk construct the study adheres to; which is depicted in chapter 3.

Another area of discrepancy is accounting for and describing the command and control relationships and reporting structures during the intervening years. An
explanation for the differences is the use of unclassified material versus classified material in combination with reviewing summations of other author’s explanations of the structure. For example, the study finds Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale’s 2009 Congressional Research Service article, “War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,” mentions special operations forces’ unique reporting structure with U.S. Special Operations Command either in place of or simultaneous to reporting to CFC-A or later ISAF. Major Francis Park, an instructor in the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations, indicates potential discrepancy with the report. MAJ Park has demonstrated knowledge of the reporting structure in question indicating special operations forces were under the operational control of Combined/Joint Task Force-180 and then placed under tactical control to Combined /Joint Task Force-76. The divergence is illustrative for two key reasons. First, it helps to define the inherent complexity of the intervening years and the requisite analysis of material related to these years. Second, it assists in identifying an area for further research.

In general, there was ample material to review for the study. The challenge for the review involved a requirement to remain focused and research material directly related to the topic in order to understand the formation and applicability of strategy as derived from policy. The initial period from 2001 to 2002 has both documented policy and strategy as does the period from 2006 to 2009. Specifically, the United States now has a purported clear strategy to fulfill a policy based upon vital U.S. national interests. What needs explaining, however, is the relationship between the two strategies with respect to the policy that informed them using the methodology outlined in chapter 3, while
addressing the interests served during these two periods. In sum, the overall trend in the literature review is a recent cascade of material explaining the current strategy for Afghanistan and its components. The literature review determines material directly related to policy normally resides in speeches and reflective analysis of literature that considers the implications of associated policy. The review also finds literature related to strategy, implementation and objectives is widely available in various mediums by authors from diverse backgrounds. Also, because something is published does not inherently equate to quality; therefore, another challenge was winnowing down the vast supply to identify material relevant to the thesis.

1Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, *Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 93. Kelly and Brennan explore FM 100-5 (the predecessor of the current FM 3-0) as the formalization of the operational level of war to illustrate their assertion of the coalescing between operations and strategy.


6Reveron and Cook, 25.

7Yarger, “The Strategic Appraisal,” 53.


CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology first identifies the policy then its supporting strategy for the initial period, followed by defining how the impact of the changing environment affected both policy and strategy. This approach is informative and necessary prior to exploring the policy and supporting strategy for the current period. In addition, the material related to the thesis is qualitative in that historical documents and analysis provide the factual context necessary for the study. Using the detailed systematic approach described in this chapter permits thorough examination and illustration of pertinent material, and is an appropriate design to answer the research questions and facilitate appropriate conclusions. As a component of exploring each strategy an explanation of the variables that comprise strategy becomes necessary and follows the strategy discussion.

In order to answer the research questions the methodology requires exploration of the policy, associated objectives and national interest(s) from 2001 to 2002. Second, the study will explore the strategy established to fulfill the stated policy. Subsequent to this, an examination of the environment during the intervening years, explores differences between 2001 and 2009 and helps to identify if the same national interest(s) remain the focus of policy and strategy. Lastly, the study uses the same methodology to address the current period.

Effectively applying the methodology requires examination of the sources of historical, current literature and contextual material referenced in chapter 2. For example, to identify the policy for both periods, a review of policy speeches and analysis background material is necessary. Sources used to fulfill this step include presidential
addresses and research material that specifically address policy. Examples used to reflect the initial policy include Alexander Moens’ book *The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush*, President Bush’s 20 September 2001 address to the nation as well as speeches from administration personnel. Examples that highlight the current administration’s policy regarding Afghanistan are President Obama’s speech on 27 March 2009, and his address to the nation given 1 December 2009. Additionally, interviews with administration personnel, like Ambassador Holbrooke’s interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, highlight policy.

Next, an analysis of strategy related documents that include supporting academic evidence as well as published material indicating or referencing strategy needs exploration. In addition to articles and information pieces, examples of material addressing the strategy of the initial period, includes *Rumsfeld’s War*, by Rowan Scarborough, and Hall Gardner’s book *American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism.”* Also, relating to strategy and subsequent analysis of strategy related material requires additional definitions pertaining to strategy composition corresponding to the national interest(s) the strategy attempts to address.

The national “Grand” strategies comprised by the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy inform strategy across all levels. Therefore, illustrating in detail, the variables that combine to form strategy is relevant. Grand strategy is the synthesis of the instruments of national power as expressed by objectives (*ends*), concepts (*ways*), and resources (*means*), encompassed by (*risk*). Using the Lykke three-legged stool model, as a component of the methodology, the study seeks to identify the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan from 2001 to 2002 and compare it to
the strategy from 2006 to 2009, which culminates as the current strategy for the Afghanistan war. The study also identifies if the strategies nest with policy; demonstrating the national interests they fulfill and whether or not they are actual strategies or operational concepts. Furthermore, the study seeks to analyze what changed during the intervening years that necessitated a new strategy.

Arthur Lykke’s model posits that the concept of strategy is really an equation. “Strategy equals Ends (objectives towards which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means (instruments by which some end can be achieved).”¹ “Risk” is the potential for loss, damage or not realizing an objective because of an imbalance between the variables.² Risk is the backstop against which all sound strategies receive evaluation. The model is universal to strategy at any level.³ Constructive to the study is viewing the variables in the following manner: “ends” are the objectives that when achieved make or foster the actualization of the desired end state for the level of applicable strategy. Achieving the end fulfills national interest(s). “Ways” specifically address how to achieve the end. The term deals with the methods used to meet an objective. “Means” represent the resources that are available to support the ways to achieve the end. Resources are either tangible or intangible. Lastly, “risk” is the difference or delta between the available means, with respect to the ways to achieve the end. A successful balance between the other three variables mitigates risk.⁴ By employing the Lykke model, the study has a common framework in which to analyze two distinct time periods. It also facilitates the examination of individual strategy components to assess whether or not they properly integrate, form and align to achieve the stated strategy and fulfill national policy objectives.
Arthur Lykke’s strategy model is in use at the United States Army War College, arguably due to its simple, effective structure and military officer’s general comfort with structured analysis of problems. The thesis uses the Lykke model as a component of methodology based upon its applicability to any strategy. Arthur Lykke explains, “This general concept can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type strategy—military, political, economic, etc., depending upon the element of national power employed.”

Every strategy needs an objective. Every strategy must have a process to achieve the objective and all strategies must have the appropriate resource levels to meet the end. Furthermore, the benefits to pursuing a strategy must outweigh the risks, or risk specifically enumerated and mitigated to maximize the chances for success. Nevertheless, there are other models in which to analyze and construct strategy that are newer and offer readers another way in which to view strategy. The strategy model espoused by Eliot Cohen is one such example.

Mr. Cohen recently wrote about strategy formulation in a different context than Arthur Lykke. Mr. Cohen stipulates that strategy consist of means, objectives, priorities, sequencing and a theory of victory. Cohen asserts that strategy is an art that “binds,” means with objectives and prioritizes resources to achieve the objective. He also establishes that a strategy must specify what to do first, second, third etc. and then, for a strategy's completeness, it must stipulate the reasons why it will succeed.

Cohen’s model, although useful for viewing recent or current applications of strategy, nevertheless appears to be a synthesis of the Lykke model with minor nuances. As indicated, the Lykke model is composed of ends, ways, means and risk. The Cohen model consists of means, objectives, priorities, sequencing and a theory of victory.
Cohen’s objectives and means are equal to Lykke’s ends and means, yet sequencing and prioritization are simply a re-wording of the ways, or the methods to achieve an objective. Prioritization and sequencing are operational matters and best not specified at the strategic level.

Additionally, a sound strategy naturally indicates a theory of victory as a specified objective or end. Strategy implementation is to achieve something; not fail. The something is a victory or quantifiable degree of success. Here, too, the Lykke model better encapsulates the theory of victory. The path to or strategy for “victory,” is inherently linked to a successful combination of ends, ways, means and risk.

Regarding achieving objectives or the ends consider current realities as a factor in methodology. While a strategy may reinforce the pursuit or protection of a core national interest, often the interest pursued or protected receives less attention due to a lack of capability or will. The risk present whenever there is an imbalance between ends, ways and or means presents strategists with a unique problem set. Either they have to revise objectives, resources, or methods to achieve the balance necessary to pursue or protect the interest or recognize the national interest driving the strategy is not a core interest worth embracing. The interest may prove not a vital, rather an important or peripheral one. The distinction is valuable as it focuses energy towards realistic policies and the necessary strategies to support them. Harry Yarger’s writing in the U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy addressed this imbalance by the following:

A third premise of a theory of strategy is that the strategy must identify an appropriate balance among the objectives sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and the resources available. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways,
and means are part of an integral whole, and if one is discussing a strategy at the national (grand) level with a national level end, the ways and means similarly would refer to national level concepts and resources. That is, ends, ways and means must be consistent. Thus a National Security Strategy end could be supported by concepts based on all the instruments of power and the associated resources.

Analysis of available literature demonstrates the prominent linkage between ends, ways and means, encompassed by risk as a viable methodology for strategy construction and review. True, there are variations of this methodology; however, the completeness in which the Lykke model fuses the variables to policy is appropriate based upon simplicity and scalability to any type and level of strategy. By using the methodology, in conjunction with analysis of a changing environment, the policy and the initial strategy from 2001 to 2002 is ready for comparison with the same for the period from 2006 to 2009.

The last portion of the methodology requires an examination of material that addresses the intervening years to establish the background necessary to place the current strategy in proper context with respect to both time and objectives served. Material found in works such as Christopher Koontz’s *Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan* and related background products from the Congressional Research Service provide additional background for information and exploration of the changing environment between 2002 and today.

The approach described above that compares similarly constructed material, albeit from two distinct periods, in conjunction with sources that explore the changing environment proves the best methodology to answer the research questions. The approach requires significant comparison of detailed material so a possible weakness in methodology presents itself. The possible weakness in the methodology stems from
potentially not reviewing enough material, or overlapping distinct time periods.

Nevertheless, the weakness is also the methodology’s potential strength in that documented material exists to compare both periods with discernable dates and objective distinction. Reinforcing the strength, regarding methodology, is the fact that the thesis research utilizes available and verifiable unclassified material. The nature of the topic in conjunction with the methodology assists in answering the proposed research questions while enabling readers to gain better appreciation of strategy with respect to policy and its relevance to the war in Afghanistan.

1Lykke, “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” 3-5.

2Ibid., 5.

3Ibid., 3.


6Lykke, 3.


8Ibid.

9Yarger, 108.
And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.

These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share their fate.¹

President Bush’s 20 September 2001 Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People outlined the initial policy for the war in Afghanistan as a demand for retribution for the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The speech signaled a change from administration policy relating to terrorism. The president’s address to Congress formed the basis of the Bush Doctrine. The policy from 2001 to 2002 informed the decision not just for retribution, but also asserts the willingness for offensive or pre-emptive action when faced with a national security threat involving terrorism. A revelation from Alexander Moens’ book The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush illustrates this point. Days after 9/11, in discussions with his advisors, Bush “. . . wanted to tell the American people what was ahead. He discussed with Hughes and Rice how to word his determination to take the war to the places that gave free haven to Al-Qaeda.”² Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also articulated the new policy in a 6 November 2001 speech indicating the United States would find and “root” out terrorist networks wherever they are to prevent threats to the American way of life and people.³
Additionally, during his State of the Union Address delivered 29 January 2002, President Bush detailed America’s new policy when he said, “And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security. We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.” Still, another example of the policy during the initial period is President Bush’s commencement address delivered at West Point 1 June 2002. In this speech he said, “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.” Consequently, the policy in effect during the initial period from 2001 to 2002 actively sought to counter threats to American security. Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Professor John Lewis Gaddis summarizes the initial policy by writing “The Bush Administration intended that a demonstrated capacity for retaliation, pre-emption, and/or prevention in Afghanistan . . . would convince al Qaeda that the United States could not be run out of the Middle East.” The speech given on 20 September 2001 merely indicated a new resolve to take action to deter and defeat threats to the nation.

The policy highlighted served the primary objective of keeping the United States and the American people safe, which addressed the core interest of physical security. As mentioned in chapter 1, physical security equates to protecting the U.S. physical territory and people from attack. Stephen Biddle, in an article on post 9/11 strategy also echoes the importance of addressing the security interest when he writes, “The freedom and safety of the American people have always been the country’s primary national interests.”

Policy, as defined in chapter 1, provides the guidance for strategy while also indicating the overall objective. Analysis demonstrates that for the initial period the overall objective was the preservation of the core U.S. national interest of security. By
defeating the Taliban, presumably, al-Qaeda loses a sanctuary, preventing further attacks against the U.S. President Bush’s policy statements also offer the guidance for the initial strategy as offensive action to eliminate existing or future threats to American security. In *Rumsfeld’s War*, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith reflected that once 9/11 required a description as a war it necessitated a war strategy. Using the methodology detailed in chapter 3, an exploration of the strategy implemented to fulfill the policy becomes necessary. The initial military action was admittedly impressive, running from 7 October 2001 through 9 December 2001, however, the combat operations that followed highlights an error in strategy development.

First, using the ends, ways, means and risk construct, as outlined in chapter 3, evidence indicates that the operational military actions were independent of any long-term strategic planning for the region. The question of “what next?” did not receive attention throughout the planning process. What happens when the Taliban is overthrown and al-Qaeda is fleeing? Asking such a question is part of the art in strategy formulation. For this paper the defined end found in the initial policy on the War on Terror, as stated by President Bush is, “. . . direct every resource at our command every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war--to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.” President Bush told the nation what we wanted to do, left how we were going to do it to military planners and outlined the national resources detailed to support the effort. Missing was an analysis of the risk associated with the strategy. From 2001 to 2002, the risk was essentially the answer to “what next” with respect to the declared end, the ways and the designated means. James Holcomb’s
article on managing strategic risk indicates, “Once a strategy is developed, the most
important strategic skill and the true mark of strategic ‘genius’ is accounting for potential
change and recognizing actual change in a timely enough manner to adjust the strategic
variables and thereby ensure a valid strategic equation oriented firmly on achieving the
political objectives at hand.”15 In effect, the opportunity cost of managing Afghanistan in
the post-Taliban environment was a strategic failure of the initial war in Afghanistan. The
limited military strategy was militarily effective but not linked to a properly developed
national policy for the region. The remaining instruments of national power, diplomatic,
 informational and economic, received scant attention to fill the void in a post-Taliban
environment, which created imbalance in the strategy. President Bush in conjunction with
his advisors believed a response to 9/11 warranted quick retaliation as a new approach to
threats, however, assumed once accomplished equilibrium returns in favor of U.S.
national interests.16 Further explaining the strategy Professor Gaddis writes,

It was free-market thinking applied to geopolitics: that just as the
economic constraints allows the pursuit of self-interest automatically to advance
collective interest, so the breaking up of an old international order would
encourage a new one to emerge, more or less spontaneously, based upon a
universal desire for security, prosperity, and liberty. Shock therapy would produce
a safer, saner world.

Some such therapy was probably necessary in the aftermath of September
11, but the assumption that things would fall neatly into place after the shock was
administered was the single greatest misjudgment of the first Bush
Administration.17

Analysis of literature demonstrates that the initial strategy relied exclusively on
military counterterrorism activity utilizing minimal soldiers. The special operations
forces conducting counterterrorism were complemented with conventional infantry
units.18 Both types of forces focused on counterterrorism operations such as Operation
Anaconda. On its face, the initial strategy over an extended period proved impractical, poorly resourced and lacking long-term risk analysis. As a result, a revised strategy emerged to manage Afghanistan as U.S. focus shifted to planning for Iraq. Indeed, the initial tactical successes in Afghanistan arguably contributed to what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently described as strategic failure. Unquestionably, the initial strategy revolved around counterterrorism operations and hence proved largely ineffective as a strategic initiative. Counterterrorism represents offensive actions conducted at both the operational and tactical levels of war that may or may not bear success to the overall strategy. Individual targets became high value targets and seen as the source of enemy strength. U.S. military and intelligence agencies viewed enemy leadership targets as a center of gravity or the single source of enemy strength that when lacking would bring their collapse. President Bush’s first counterterrorism advisor, retired special forces and joint special operations command Army General Wayne A. Downing summarized succinctly the strategic failure of the initial war period, which focused on military counterterrorism tactics when he said, “This is not a war. What we are faced with is an Islamic insurgency that is spreading throughout the world, not just the Islamic world.” He described it as a political struggle; therefore, the military cannot solve the problem on its own. “The military has to be coordinated with the other elements of national power.”

Robert Cassidy expresses similar thoughts in his article “The U.S. Military and the Global Counterinsurgency.” Cassidy indicates the U.S. characterization of the war as a war on terrorism limited our strategy based upon a restrictive definition, which in turn formed the U.S. strategy. The strategy employed “limited” means to achieve ends,
because of a failure to define it as an insurgency. He also writes “Terrorism is neither an enemy nor an objective, but a tactic or method.” The initial war strategy lacked completeness. Initial policy was a declaration to defeat terrorism, as a result, the strategy created focused on a method. Analysis reflects terrorism is a tactic or a method. Therefore, the initial strategy focused on counterterrorism, which is necessarily also an operational tactic or a method. As indicated, al-Qaeda and the Taliban focus on ideology; however, al-Qaeda uses terrorism as a tactic. Therefore, counterterrorism as a strategy failed to achieve the policy objective. Counterterrorism during the initial period was the method or the way to achieve the limited end, or the objective defined as defeating terrorism. In addition to minimal conventional forces, the means utilized consisted of a small contingent of CIA officers and special operations forces.

From inception, the war in Afghanistan reflected poor nesting with a comprehensive national strategy because it relied too heavily on the military instrument of power while neglecting the other elements. Its punitive nature resulted in a political vacuum that necessitated immediate exploration to answer “what next?” Even with the success of tactical operations, observers questioned the initial strategy and some of the president’s advisors believed an alternative approach necessary. Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, writing for the Congressional Research Service describe the fluidity of the post-Taliban Afghanistan environment when they offer, “While war is always about the organized use of violence to achieve political ends, the character of a given war may change dramatically over time. Since 2001, the character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved markedly, from a violent struggle against al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters, to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency effort.” The rapid nature of the initial phase of the
war highlighted the lack of strategic “genius” to anticipate changes in the environment which necessitated a comprehensive modification in strategy from one based on limited operational actions to one based on a deeper, broader understanding of the region.

Regarding this, Alexander Moens writes, “It appears that Bush had not thought enough about what would become of Afghanistan after the Taliban and al-Qaeda had been defeated, but had focused entirely on Operation Enduring Freedom.”31 To address the changing dynamics after the Taliban abdicated, the Bush Administration enacted steps to resolve the governance vacuum by introducing a broader strategy not singularly focused on counterterrorism operations or the military instrument of power.

The initial strategy reflected other deficiencies, particularly when analyzed using the Lykke methodology. Similar to the above discussion regarding an error in the overall definition of the end, the policy’s objective directed action to defeat terrorism. However, as indicated, actions to defeat terrorism are inherently tactics or methods, not necessarily integral components of strategy. Harry Yarger’s work on strategic theory suggests that getting the ends or the objectives right is the key to strategy formulation.32 He writes, “Too often in strategy development, too little time is spent on consideration of the appropriate objectives in the context of the desired policy, national interests, and the environment. Yet it is the identification and achievement of the right objectives that creates the desired strategic effect.”33 In his article, “Schools For Strategy: Teaching Strategy For 21st Century Conflict,” Colin Gray parallels this theme and summarizes related research when he suggests the balance between ends-ways-means is sometimes lacking and fancier ways can direct means and even the policy to justify their employment.34 Moreover, he suggests preferred means can mold ways, which then directs
ends.\textsuperscript{35} Review here demonstrates a disconnect between the traditional structure of policy guiding strategy and strategy consisting of the appropriate end, supported by proportional ways and means. When analyzing the initial period from 2001 to 2002, a vague policy regarding the primary objective restricts the supporting strategy employed, favoring limited operational actions with limited forces assigned counterterrorism missions. Evidence to substantiate the imbalance between the ends-ways-means with respect to policy in favor of fancier variables is in Alexander Moens’ book on President Bush’s foreign policy. When considering military options in the days after 9/11, Moens wrote that “Upon hearing about the existing military plans,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Your plans are neither imaginative nor creative’.\textsuperscript{36} The study also finds the Secretary of Defense preferred new and exciting solutions to complex challenges in the form of limited but effective applications of special forces to accomplish policy and strategic objectives; which demonstrates the potential for imbalance between the strategic variables.\textsuperscript{37} The Bush Administration eventually recognized these difficulties and pursued actions to address further issues. An examination of events after 2002 demonstrates the administration’s recognition of the challenges in the environment.

Because of the Taliban’s demise the United Nations met on 5 December 2001 and formed the Bonn Agreement; establishing an Afghan Interim Authority.\textsuperscript{38} To secure the interim authority the United Nations established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Both the formation of the interim authority and ISAF mark the foundation of the intervening years that saw increasing changes, new organizations and scarce resources to accomplish limited objectives. A more formal articulation of U.S. strategy,
particularly regarding Afghanistan, is President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy. The strategy specified in this document involved continuing “. . . to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists.”

The Interim Afghan Authority convened an assembly in June 2002 to draft a permanent constitution and establish timelines for national elections. Elections subsequently held in October 2004 elected the president and in September 2005 voted in Parliament and provisional offices. Additional elections were held 20 August 2009 that re-elected Hamid Karzai as President of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The contentious nature of the election process is outside the scope of the thesis; nonetheless, the intervening years and current 2009 strategy present the backdrop of significant environmental changes. These changes included the creation of ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), structural command and control changes and a government in transition trying to build both capacity and linkages to the Afghan population. Following the study’s methodology, providing context to the intervening years is now fundamental.

First, the Bonn Agreement established the legitimacy of ISAF via United Nations Security Council Resolution 1378. Second, a series of leading nations ran ISAF until 9 August 2003 when “NATO assumed responsibility for the ISAF mission.” In succeeding stages, ISAF, under NATO, assumed control for security of the entire country. However, prior to ISAF’s expansion, Combined Forces Command-
Afghanistan (CFC-A) served as the conventional force headquarters for security operations and U.S. OEF forces. In parallel was a separate command structure for special operations forces, who reported to U.S. Special Operations Command. As ISAF grew in structure and capability it gradually assumed control over the regional commands (RC) North, South, East, West and Capital, each with a lead nation manning the RC headquarters. Under a construct involving multiple nations, with multiple reporting mechanisms and an emerging ISAF headquarters, the U.S. strategy for the war undoubtedly became confused. Not every country was operating under the stated U.S. strategic objective of preventing Afghanistan from hosting terrorist elements, while attempting to build a fledgling nation’s capacity. In 2006, ISAF’s stated mission was “ISAF conducts operations in partnership with GIRoA and in coordination with OEF, UNAMA, and the international community in order to assist GIRoA to defeat the insurgency, establish a secure environment, extend viable governance, and promote development throughout Afghanistan.” In his article on post-Taliban governance and American Policy, Kenneth Katzman describes the articulated mission as an effort, “... to build an Afghan government and security force that can defend itself as economic growth and development takes hold.” However, during the intervening years, achieving the mission proved difficult.

In his work on Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, Christopher Koontz captures the changing environment and difficult situation succinctly. He indicates the initial campaign, though, “impressive” was the entry point in a long struggle to establish an Afghanistan democracy to counter extremist Islam. The small but targeted military effort grew into a complex difficult to coordinate structure among the United States the U.N.
and NATO. The changing nature of the environment also required a new command structure (CFC-A) and strategy. To compound this, limited resources, troops and units rotating in and out of theater exasperated command and control, hence, fulfilling policy and strategy objectives.50

Additionally, according to the Bowman and Dale article, “ISAF planned a five phase operation consisting of assessments, expansion, stabilization, transition, and then redeployment.”51 The phases required the development of GIRoA capacity, which necessitated growth of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Simple enough and arguably nested with the capacity building strategy, unfortunately due to “national caveats” ISAF operations were limited in operational employment to meet the objectives.

Bowman and Dale further write:

National caveats frustrate commanders on the ground because they inhibit commanders’ freedom to apportion forces across the battlespace--to move forces freely. With caveats, the “whole” of the international force, as some observers have suggested, is less than the sum of its parts. Even more damaging, ISAF officials note, is the impact caveats can have on ISAF’s relationship with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) counterparts. For example, ISAF advisory teams that are unable to accompany ANSF counterparts on offensive operations quickly lose both Afghans’ respect, and their own ability to shape and mentor the Afghan forces.52

Trying to pursue a strategy of capacity building became complicated due to ISAF restrictions imposed by troop-contributing nations. The above point avoids highlighting a particular failing, but rather illustrates the complexity of the challenge necessary to fulfill the strategic objective during the time period. Of equal importance was the changing U.S. command structure and reporting mechanisms.

CFC-A was the headquarters until ISAF geographically expanded. LTG David W. Barno commanded CFC-A from October 2003 to May 2005.53 Following Barno’s tenure,
LTG Karl Eikenberry commanded CFC-A until its disestablishment on ISAF’s assumption of control. Under CFC-A was the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-180, which later became CJTF-76. Additionally, the ANSF training command, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) reported to the CFC-A. From January 2007, until August 2009, Generals Dan McNeill (USA) and then David McKiernan (USA) respectively headed ISAF forces. Many command and control changes increased operational complexity; therefore, a more detailed explanation of the force structure and missions conducted is relevant to clarify the environment.

During the initial phase of the war, ground forces operated under the command and control of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command Forward (CFLCC-F). GEN Tommy Franks, Central Command Commander at the time acknowledged the limited command and control capacity of CFLCC-F and established the previously mentioned CJTF-180. Under CJTF-180 fell Combined Task Force Mountain, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force and the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF). In May of 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declared major combat operations over in Afghanistan; yet, CJTF-180 regularly performed major combat operations directed against insurgents. Examples of these operations are Operation Mountain Viper, Operation Mountain Resolve and later Operation Mountain Storm. In addition, in early 2002, the Interim Afghan Authority established The Afghan National Army (ANA). At first NATO trained the ANA. Then CJTF-180 assumed the mission and tasked the Civil Military Operations Task Force to execute the mission. The CMOTF evolved into the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A). OMC-A then morphed becoming CSTC-A. CSTC-A established Task Force Phoenix to handle
increased ANA recruits as a result of political decisions to rapidly grow Afghan military capacity. Analysis reflects CFC-A originated to provide much needed command and control for Operation Enduring Freedom forces. Further operational complexity resulted from different focuses for the forces operating in Afghanistan. For example, special operations forces operating under OEF conducted counterterrorism and foreign internal defense. Concurrently, conventional OEF forces conducted offensive operations in support of counterterrorism and performed counterinsurgency. ISAF, however, did not conduct counterterrorism or foreign internal defense, focusing only on counterinsurgency.

Arguably, three distinct force structures performing operations with different emphasis in the same area of operations increases operational complexity based upon different command and control arrangements. The study also finds the insights of LTG Barno during the intervening years attests to the challenges his command faced but developed a strategy to maximize success with on hand resources.

Koontz further notes “The unexpected insurgency in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad diverted resources and attention from Afghanistan. As a result, LTG Barno believed that Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan was not a major priority for U.S. Central Command; the Army Staff; the Joint Staff, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense.” Nevertheless, LTG Barno devised and implemented a strategy based upon five components. The components were: defeat terrorists, secure the population, designate units to own areas for their tour length, conduct reconstruction while fostering sound governance and work with regional partners and the international community. Battlefield success and command vision permitted the new counterinsurgency approach.
LTG Eikenberry assumed command from LTG Barno in May 2005 and continued similar efforts, with limited resources.

The above analysis signifies the disjointed structure and mission understanding from both the U.S. side and the NATO side. Compounding the situation was the difficulty of establishing the Afghan Interim Authority and governmental functions. In an article in *Military Review*, LTG Barno expressed his concern about improving central governance. “On balance, however, the nationwide writ of the provisional government in Kabul was tenuous at best, and increasing security concerns threatened to undermine both international support and the nascent political process.”

Moreover, complicating strategic efforts in Afghanistan was the conscious drawdown of resources to enable the future Iraq war. A deteriorating situation that lacked a sound, resourced strategy was becoming tenuous. LTG Barno also illustrates the difficulty with strategic efforts by indicating:

> Unfortunately, the U.S.-led military coalition was not well postured to counter the rising threat. Coordination between the military and interagency partners was hampered by a U.S. Embassy and military headquarters separated by over forty kilometers. Unity of effort suffered; the military command and control situation was in flux; our tactical approach was enemy-focused and risked alienating the Afghan people; and the substantial draw of operations in Iraq had put severe limits on the availability of key military capabilities for Afghanistan. To make matters more difficult, the American military leadership was rotating, and the first U.S. ambassador since 1979 had departed with no replacement. Clearly, without a significant change in course, Afghanistan was at risk.

While these comments illustrate the strategy for Afghanistan was at risk, further synthesis demonstrates that the U.S. and NATO leadership realized vulnerabilities and pursued measures to improve the situation. Beth Cole and Emily Hsu subsequently writing about stability and reconstruction, express a similar sentiment. “Seven years of incoherent
approaches and competing priorities across the U.S. government, its global partners, and the Afghan government might be the Achilles heel that undermines our success.”

One of the beneficial findings of the study explains the difficulties faced by NATO, based upon the Afghanistan mission that helped the organization develop strategically and operationally. NATO planner, Diego Ruiz explains the development by writing, “The more fundamental transformational impact of 9/11 has been the review of the political and military paradigms underpinning NATO’s post Cold War strategy that led the Alliance to agree to conduct military operations without geographic limitations.”

Through internal force generation analysis and planning operations, the Afghanistan experience has expanded NATO’s capabilities. In addition to running the Afghanistan headquarters, NATO now sees itself as a greater strategic partner of not just Europe, but North America. Mr. Ruiz summarizes with “...the Alliance’s operational engagement in Afghanistan has been truly a transformational event.”

Pursuit of measures to improve the situation included ISAF’s growing role, eventually assuming all of Afghanistan, and concerted approaches to understand the environmental complexity. Analysis of the current period from 2006 to 2009 explains the focus for improvement. The current period for the study, from 2006 to 2009 is distinguishable by the closure of the Bush Administration and the beginning of the Obama Administration.

Understanding the mounting challenge, in early 2007, the Bush Administration completed a review of Afghanistan policy against the backdrop of significant 2006 casualties, which were the highest since the invasion. His administration requested between $7 and $8 billion for reconstruction and security. The administration also
extended troop deployments and sought more international support for the GIRoA.\textsuperscript{72}

From mid-2006, the administration sought ways to combat the growing Taliban militia and speed efforts to build infrastructure. Findings indicate that the escalating violence, which began in 2006, surprised some U.S. officials and commanders and is attributable to an absence of security forces or governance in rural areas.\textsuperscript{73} To combat escalating violence, OEF and NATO forces implemented more pre-emptive actions and infused development work, followed by a steady troop build-up.\textsuperscript{74} In his white paper on post-Taliban governance, Kenneth Katzman discusses the perception of the ongoing deterioration seen in 2008. “Despite the additional resources put into Afghanistan, throughout 2008, growing concern took hold within and outside the Bush Administration. Statements as the one in September 2008 by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman ADM Mike Mullen saying, “I’m not sure we’re winning.” reflected the pessimism within the administration.\textsuperscript{75} Additional attempts to counter the level of violence, through unified command and control, included making GEN David McKiernan head of U.S. Forces Afghanistan, in conjunction with his role as ISAF commander, and strategy reviews by the administration and other government agencies.\textsuperscript{76}

The study’s examination of the intervening years clarifies the complex environment and represents the catharsis for the current period. By applying the same methodology used to view the initial policy and strategy from 2001 to 2002 to the current period from 2006 to 2009 a determination of similarities or differences is possible. Prior to the determination, the study must highlight the policy and the associated strategy for the current period.
Shortly after assuming office, President Obama asked political transition consultant and mid-East analyst, Bruce Reidel, to conduct an interagency policy review regarding Afghanistan. On 27 March 2009, President Obama announced the results of the review. The president indicated the new policy linked Afghanistan to Pakistan with the objective to, “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.” In his address at West Point, given 1 December 2009, President Obama reiterates a similar policy and he specifically introduced the policy’s justification, citing national interest. He stated, “Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.”

Literature analysis indicates the policy’s objective with respect to both the threat and the reason for addressing the threat. The policy of the current period, like the policy from the initial period, focuses on the core national interest of physical security.

President Obama expressed the security interest in both his March and December speeches. In March 2009, the president referenced intelligence, specifying al-Qaeda planning, conducted from Pakistan, resulting in risk to the Afghan government and threats focused on killing as many Americans as possible. The president’s December 2009 speech also emphasized the risk posed by the threat. He said, “. . . as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.” President Obama’s policy statements offer the guidance for the current strategy, resulting in a combined whole-of-government approach for Afghanistan.
After reviewing GEN McChrystal’s assessment, the administration conducted a deliberate analysis not just of Afghanistan but the region as a whole. Ambassador Holbrooke, the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan described the policy review as extremely thorough. “. . . This has been the most thorough, the most detailed, the most careful and methodical policy review I’ve ever participated in.” The latest review is a continuation of the studies conducted near the end of the Bush Administration; with both administrations seeking to confront the deteriorating conditions in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration explained its Afghanistan strategy in December 2009; however, the study must analyze the current strategy using the Lykke methodology. Dissecting material indicates the new strategy re-defines the operational environment and the enemy based upon previously inadequate attempts with a solution in the form of a new strategy. The initial strategy struggled to achieve results due to its operational focus which necessitated the current strategy as a reaction to the shortcomings of the initial strategy. Further delineating, the refined strategy resulted from a better understanding of the operational environment and the effects coalition actions have on the environment. Therefore, an explanation of the current stated strategy for Afghanistan needs inspection.

A brief review reiterates the initial strategy from 2001 to 2002 was principally operational not strategic. It specified a limited end with identified ways and means, but it did not link to any specific national policy for the region. Analysis suggests it struggled, or failed due to poor linkages and too few resources. Supreme evidence of this is our continual involvement and recent admission of a new strategy and commitment for its success. Strategist John Collins asserts that “Well-conceived strategies closely connect
threats, objectives, policies, tactics, forces, and other strategies. Unrealistic requirements and discontinuities within or between any of those categories cause risks to soar and increase prospects for failure.”\textsuperscript{82}

In his 1 December 2009 speech President Obama indicated the specific objectives (ends) included efforts to, “deny al-Qaeda a safe haven . . . reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government . . . and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.”\textsuperscript{83} Additionally, the president outlined the ways to achieve the ends. The recognized methods specify targeting the Taliban, growing Afghanistan capacity, pursuing a more robust civilian strategy and collaborating with Pakistan due to its linkages to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{84} Moreover, his speech outlined the resources dedicated to accomplish the objectives. The means for the strategy include surging both military and civilian structure to the region, and the associated funding necessary for the increased presence.\textsuperscript{85}

Further reflecting the totality of the new strategy and its approach using all instruments of national power is the State Department’s approach to the region. Drafted after the president’s 1 December 2009 address, the Department of State published a complementary Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. The Department of Defense also endorses the State Department’s strategy as an equally necessary and effective effort to address the region. Defense Secretary Robert Gates explains the deeper, broader approach towards fulfilling the president’s policy objective by writing, “This goal cannot be completed through military efforts alone, but must be accompanied by the political, economic, and diplomatic efforts outlined in this plan.”\textsuperscript{86}
From the above, evidence reflects that the new strategy for Afghanistan is more encompassing than the initial strategy seen from 2001 to 2002. The strategy also addresses risk by answering what next. By addressing Pakistan in addition to Afghanistan, the current strategy mitigates risk. During his December 2009 interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, Ambassador Holbrooke enumerates Afghanistan’s linkage to Pakistan and underscores that current policy addresses both countries by the following:

It is obviously true that the people who did the attack were driven east into Pakistan, and that is why we now talk about Afghanistan and Pakistan as an interrelated situation. And, I will state right up front that success in one country requires success in both. We will not be able to succeed in Afghanistan unless our Pakistan policy is equally successful.87

Therefore, on the surface, the current strategy appears to fulfill the criteria established by the Lykke methodology. The current plan of action is the by-product or the reaction to an initial strategy that focused on operational tactics, but neglected civilian and governance concerns. The development or growth of ISAF, in conjunction with CFC-A attempted to address the realities of the situation; however, did not receive appropriate resources. Importantly, neither the initial strategy nor subsequent actions during the intervening years, proved successful in large part due to the reallocation of resources to address Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The study’s inquiry, following a sequential methodology, reveals several findings. A review of the policy and strategy for the initial period from 2001 to 2002, then analysis of the intervening years, followed by a review of the policy and strategy for the current period, provides the answers to the study’s problem statement and research questions.
The initial policy from 2001 to 2002 informed strategy by declaring the U.S. views terrorism as a threat requiring response or pre-emptive action. As a result of the policy, the strategy initially employed used limited ways and means to fulfill the objective of defeating terrorism. In comparison, the policy of the current period specifies as the objective, actions to defeat a specific enemy, al-Qaeda, in a specific region. The policy links to strategy by clearly defining the ends, ways and means to achieve the policy objective and demonstrates a whole-of-government approach utilizing all instruments of national power. In comparison with the initial strategy and its use of limited ways and means, the current strategy utilizes a broader approach involving more government agencies from inception. Similarities found in both policies and their subsequent strategies identify the core national interest of security as the nexus for their development or modification. Moreover, a review of the changing environment during the intervening years reflects its demonstrable affect on strategy. The initial strategy proved ill suited to the challenges of the environment. Both the complexity of and changes in the environment during the intervening years necessitated additional policy and strategy reviews; resulting in the current strategy. Scrutinizing the material also finds the changing environment did not affect the national interest served by the war in Afghanistan. As indicated, the interest addressed with both policies remained constant. Lastly, chapter 5 addresses whether or not the remaining research question relating to the operational environment informing or shaping strategy needs explanation.


5 George W. Bush, (Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy at West Point,) http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.print.html (accessed 2 May 2010).


10 Ibid.

11 Professor John Lewis Gaddis references omitting proper planning for a post-Taliban Afghanistan in his 2005 *Foreign Affairs* article as does General Downing’s summary of the environment when he addresses the need for more than just military power in *Foreign Affairs Understanding the War on Terror*.

12 Bush – Address, 186.


14 Evidence to substantiate the lack of risk analysis or asking, “what next” is found in Alexander Moens’ *The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush Values Strategy, and Loyalty*, 143-144 as well as John Lewis Gaddis’ 2005 article in *Foreign Affairs*, 2-15.

Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2008), 75.


17Ibid., 7-8.


19Ibid., 31.

20ADM Mullen’s address to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 4 March 2010. In his speech, he discussed the implication of tactical actions and their relationship to strategic success. A tactical success does not always fulfill the strategic objective.

21Rowan Scarborough’s book, Rumsfeld’s War The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander explains the preferred method of using limited or special operations forces as key to the initial the initial strategy, 9-10. Additionally, Michael E. O’Hanlon’s article, “A Flawed Masterpiece,” in Foreign Affairs Understanding the War on Terror reiterates the preferred usage of special operations or limited troops for the initial war strategy, 190.


24Ibid., 431.


26Ibid.


28Katzman, 8.
Moens, 143-144.


Moens, 143.


Ibid., 48-49.


Ibid., 42.

Moens, 130.

Scarborough, 9-10.

Ibid., 8.


Katzman, 10.

Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 9.


Ibid.

Ibid., 18.

Ibid.

Ibid., 15.

Ibid.

Katzman, 21.


52 Ibid., 16.


55 Koontz, 1-11.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.


61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Koontz, 5.

64 Ibid., 170. Col. Mansager, CFC-A staff officer comments on one of the five pillars. He reflects that units who own areas increases presence versus previous arrangements that saw units moving from bases out to different areas to conduct operations then returning to bases. Designating areas increased identity for both units and Afghans.

65 Ibid., 6.

66 Barno, 87.

67 Ibid., 87-88.


70 Ibid.


72 Ibid.

73 Katzman, 24.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid., 25.

76 Ibid., 26.


78 The White House, Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

79 The White House, Remarks by The President On A New Strategy For Afghanistan And Pakistan.

80 The White House, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan.


83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.
Ibid.


87 Holbrooke.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

An extensive examination of research material that included books, articles, testimony, transcripts, white papers and speeches led to several discoveries relevant to the study that address the problem statement and answer the research questions. First, chief among the discoveries is a lack of clarity regarding policy. Even though the analysis uncovered numerous examples of policy type statements, the explanation of policy concerning Afghanistan is not perfectly clear. Policy rarely stipulates in a simple manner such as, “The policy of the United States with respect to Afghanistan is. . .” Lacking this specificity, policy statements that do not conspicuously address objectives or provide clear guidance require inference using additional material.

A second discovery relating to policy is the distinction between the policy from the initial period and the policy from the current period. Original policy focused on countering threats through action and if necessary pre-emptive action. In comparison, the policy from the current period focuses more narrowly by addressing al-Qaeda.

A third discovery relates to the nature of the strategy during the initial period from 2001 to 2002 in comparison to the current strategy. The initial strategy afforded many opportunities to search for declared ends, ways and means, and the incorporation of the instruments of national power; however, outside of a few sources, expressions of these key requirements to strategy formulation are rare. In contrast, the strategy for the current period closely aligns with the strategy formulation methodology the study followed. Accordingly, the Lykke model proved sufficient to analyze the current strategy based
upon its common terminology that specifically addresses ends, ways, means and accounts for risk

A fourth discovery involves the discussion of national interests. Upon analysis, gleaning the national interest(s) policy and its associated strategy pursues or protects affords potential for additional research to clarify whether or not policy and strategy accurately pursue national interest(s). Are all policies, hence strategies designed to protect or pursue a core national interest?

For example, in chapter 1, the United States’ core national interests were defined using three separate headings. Primary or, “core” U.S. national interests are physical security, the promotion of values, a stable international order and economic prosperity. In order, they represent protecting the U.S. physical territory and people from attack, promoting core American values and facilitating or countering attempts to hinder American economic prosperity. Stratification of the interests delineates vital interests, important interests and peripheral interests. Both strategies frame the war in Afghanistan as an effort aimed at ensuring a vital national interest, the security of the American people. Noted strategist John M. Collins, however, further defines a vital interest when he writes:

The only vital national security interest is survival--survival of the State, with an “acceptable” degree of independence, territorial integrity, traditional life styles, fundamental institutions, values and honor intact. Nothing else matters if the country is exterminated as a sovereign entity.

Both approaches in the two periods referenced in the thesis stipulate that the Afghanistan war pursues our vital national interest. Through actions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States will prevent terrorist sanctuary and proportionately enhance security for the United States. A question for further research, however, particularly relevant to the
overall discussion of national strategy, is whether or not the interest served in Afghanistan is actually vital or merely an important national interest.

Additionally, the study’s examination of the intervening years reveals an incredibly complex environment that changed over time particularly from 2002 up through 2006. Initial command structures proved lacking in many respects and transformed over the timeframe of the study. The challenges of command and control between OEF, and ISAF structures in conjunction with a morphing insurgency revealed areas for improvement which were captured by GEN McChrystal’s assessment and the Obama Administration’s policy and declared new strategy.

In consequence, while the current strategy closely resembles the Lykke methodology, the initial policy that informed the initial operational strategy better resembles an attempt to define the vital interests at stake in Afghanistan. To illustrate, President Bush in his 20 September 2001 address to Congress and the American people stated, “The civilized world is rallying to America’s side. They all understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next.” He also explains that “Terror, unanswered, cannot only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments.” Reflecting John M. Collins description of a vital national interest, President Bush also declares, “This is not, however, just America’s fight. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.” In effect, President Bush summarized all core U.S. interests and implies the vital nature of the threat, a threat that precipitated the initial war in Afghanistan.
Strikingly, with the initial strategy, exploration finds a policy that prescribed strategy, but a strategy that devolved into operational military actions and initially failed to incorporate all instruments of national power. In contrast, the current period reflects a more fundamentally sound policy in conjunction with an equally sound strategy. They attempt to mitigate the residual effects of the initial period and intervening years by factoring in not just Afghanistan but the region. They also specify the inclusion of the instruments of national power. Here, the study addresses the remaining research question: is there evidence of the operational environment informing or shaping strategy?

Addressing the remaining research question, investigation suggests the operational environment informed the final revised Afghanistan strategy. GEN McChrystal’s thorough and appropriate initial assessment of the operational environment illuminates the question. In his summary, GEN McChrystal specifies a commitment to a counterinsurgency approach that must, “Improve effectiveness through greater partnering with ANSF . . . Prioritize responsive and accountable governance. . . . Gain the Initiative . . . Focus Resources.” Based upon his experience he “. . . became increasingly convinced of several themes: that the objective is the will of the people, our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem, the Afghans must ultimately defeat the insurgency, we cannot succeed without significantly improved unity of effort, and finally, that protecting the people means shielding them from all threats.” He further explains that the deteriorating situation is beyond current strategy and under resourced capabilities; therefore, a new population centered, properly resourced approach is necessary to ensure an opportunity for success.
Moreover, GEN McChrystal establishes the relationship between external factors and Afghanistan. In his August 2009 assessment, he indicates Afghan insurgents linked to support structures throughout Pakistan present challenges. He also demonstrates that success in Afghanistan also rests upon engagement with India, Iran and Russia. GEN McChrystal further identifies four key components of a new strategy: building Afghan capacity in both military and government, improving governance, re-gain the initiative-reverse the insurgencies momentum, and prioritizing resources to affected population areas. These four components closely resemble the strategic ends explained in President Obama’s 1 December 2009 address on the new way forward in Afghanistan. In his speech, President Obama specified the objectives (ends) for the new strategy are to, “deny al-Qaeda a safe haven . . . reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government . . . and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.” Via GEN McChrystal’s detailed analysis of the operational environment, the study suggests the operational environment had an impact or informed strategy. However, material reviewed for the thesis omits conclusively answering the secondary question. Whether or not the operational environment or operations themselves informed or shaped strategy is an area for additional research.

After examination of literature, analysis and answering the study’s research questions several areas emerge as clear opportunities for supplemental research and discovery. These areas include exploration of national interests corresponding to stated policy and associated strategy. Where the United States historically implements a strategy in response to policy determining the level of and the specific national interest being
pursued or protected is worthy of greater analysis. Second, a detailed study of operational environments and their relationship to strategic formulation is an area for pursuit. Will a pattern emerge indicating complex operational environments compel strategic re-assessments? Alternatively, do strategy revisions accurately reflect the operational environment or shape policy and strategy to reflect what is realistically feasible to achieve? Will exploration in this area demonstrate the historical process of policy setting broad guidance for strategy, and strategy constructed to achieve the policy and as part of the formulation necessarily account for the operational environment? A third area for additional research involves the intervening years.

The study demonstrates the complexities, difficulties and changing environment during these years. The literature reviewed in the study, though, examines unclassified material. As a separate study, future analysis of the intervening years regarding command and control relationships, operations plans and orders derived from classified material will prove helpful. The thesis capitalized on available literature and induced relationships between major elements; however, a study of classified material potentially permits deeper examination.

Regarding the study’s significance to strategy and its relationship to policy, the strategy during the initial war period from 2001 to 2002 and the strategy for the period from 2006 to 2009 share one important trait: they both are reactive. The initial strategy resulted from vague policy in response to the attacks of 9/11. Strategy is a proactive process. By its nature, strategy is not reactive. In their article in Military Review, Thomas Johnson and M. Chris Mason assert that, “Strategy is not crisis management. It is its antithesis. Crisis management occurs when there is no strategy or strategy fails. Thus, the
first premise of a theory of strategy is that strategy is proactive and anticipatory.” The study reveals the current strategy is reactive due to the failings or struggles of the initial strategy. As evidenced by the nature of the war today, the approach is reactive. The war is a counterinsurgency. The initial strategy never identified counterinsurgency as a way to achieve the ends and therefore not resourced with the appropriate means. Operation Iraqi Freedom merely exasperated the incomplete nature of the strategy. Similarly, two full strategy reviews were only necessary to address the nature of the war as a counterinsurgency.

Furthermore, the initial strategy from 2001 to 2002 the current strategy, and coalition actions in the intervening years failed to properly state and define the nature of the conflict. Do we truly understand the enemy? If we do, the findings in the study omit stipulating the description of the enemy. The initial strategy’s operational actions conducted mainly by the military proved insufficient to combat the terrorist enemy. The new whole-of-government strategy rectifies the issue; but does not specifically label the enemy as anything other than an insurgency. Comparing our misunderstanding of the enemy in Vietnam with the same for Afghanistan, Johnson and Mason explain the error in their recent article in *Military Review*. “Similarly, in Afghanistan, the enemy has created a pervasive national discourse, in the case of religious jihad. Senior U.S. and NATO officials, however, continue to misread the fundamental narrative of the enemy they are fighting, determined in this case to wage a secular campaign against an enemy who is fighting a religious war.” Compounding these phenomena is the counterinsurgency approach to the conduct of the war. In an interview with an area expert, retired GEN Volney F. Warner, asks the interviewee a direct question regarding
the effectiveness of our population centric counterinsurgency strategy. The interviewee responded with “I reject COIN as a workable solution over the long run unless the United States wants to rent Arab and Pashtun for the foreseeable future . . . We continuously fail to realize that combating terrorism requires reacting to our enemies in terms they can understand and fear.” In essence, the initial reason for the war in Afghanistan was to combat terrorism. It morphed into nation-building, however, the struggle inevitably returns to focus on defeating an elusive enemy that is arguably fighting a religious war, while we are fighting a secular counterinsurgency. Future study of the conflict must address whether or not a counterinsurgency strategy is appropriate to combat a religiously motivated enemy.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the strategies studied is nearly impossible to assess. As such, describing the appropriate end is equally daunting. While we say we want to “disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaeda . . . ,” we also recognize to do so, requires a stable Afghanistan government, but are equally cognizant that the requirement is precarious based upon the Afghanistan environment. James Stephenson, Richard McCall and Alexandra Simonians illustrate this difficulty in their article on the challenges of peace-building when they wrote,

What we have failed to understand is that once an authoritarian state collapses or is overthrown, there is no societal institutional underpinning or coherence left. In the absence of functioning institutions that reflect a working consensus within society, particularly those diverse in their ethnic and/or sectarian makeup, the potential for reemergence of violent conflict should be anticipated. In conclusion, the study is valuable as an exploration of the linkages between policy and strategy. The initial policy was not expressly clear and pursued a broad objective. Therefore, the associated strategy lacked balance and initially failed to
incorporate all instruments of national power. Conversely, the current specific policy tends to reflect a strategy that adjusted for the environment. What is significant for the study, or any study on strategy is the challenge of defining objectives and then identifying the methods and resources to fulfill the objective while simultaneously ensuring the strategy adheres to policy guidance and galvanizes all instruments of national power. Complex environments often require complex solutions. Perhaps, the accepted strategy formulation methodologies currently in effect and widely practiced need updating to include additional variables. Examples of additional variables to complement the accepted blueprint consisting of ends, ways, means and risk include detailed resources, time, political will, national commitment and a true analysis of whether or not a policy and its strategy address a vital, important or peripheral interest. Likewise, if the policy and associated strategy attempts to account for the national interest, defining the policy in clear, specific and succinct terms improves the policy’s connection with strategy.


3Ibid., 9.


6Ibid.

7Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 2-1.

11 Ibid., 2-10.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 2-2.

14 The White House, Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan; Address to the Nation, West Point, NY.


18 Ibid., 1-1.

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