PREDICTORS OF SUCCESS AT THE U.S. ARMY
OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

MATTHEW T. MORGAN, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY
B.S., Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 1997

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2010-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
**Predictors of Success at the U.S. Army Officer Candidate School**

Major Matthew T. Morgan

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

The U.S. Army Officer Corps is composed of officers with varying backgrounds, education, experience, commissioning source, and resources required to produce those officers. The Army has invested varying resources depending on the officer and commissioning source. The Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis has found that the Officer Candidate School In Service (OCS-IS) officer is the most resource intensive officer to produce because of the cost to replace an experienced soldier and their educational costs. Some may expect experience of OCS-IS coupled with the greater cost, would yield greater performance from that group when compared to Enlistment Option Candidates (OCS-EO). The central research question was: How does the performance, as demonstrated by Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) status, of OCS-IS candidates compare to OCS-EO candidates at OCS? DMG status is equally available to all OCS students. How do the following variables impact DMG status of OCS-IS and OCS-EO: (1) degree achievement, (2) time in military service, (3) military rank, and (4) combat experience. Results: This study found that OCS-IS students from the class of 2008, were more likely to earn DMG status than their OCS-EO peers. Among OCS-IS students, the variables: time in military service; and prior military rank; supported DMG list attainment. However, there some unexpected outcomes for both variables.
Name of Candidate: Matthew T. Morgan

Thesis Title: Predictors of Success at the U.S. Army Officer Candidate School

Approved by:

__________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Lloyd W. Sherfey, M.M.A.S., M.A.

__________________________, Member
Linda L. Lynch, Ph.D.

__________________________, Member
George E. Hodge, M.S.

Accepted this 11th day of June 2010 by:

____________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The U.S. Army Officer Corps is composed of officers with varying backgrounds, education, experience, commissioning source, and resources required to produce those officers. The Army has invested varying resources depending on the officer and commissioning source. The Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis has found that the Officer Candidate School In Service (OCS-IS) officer is the most resource intensive officer to produce because of the cost to replace an experienced soldier and their educational costs. Some may expect experience of OCS-IS coupled with the greater cost, would yield greater performance from that group when compared to Enlistment Option Candidates (OCS-EO). The central research question was: How does the experience of OCS-IS affect the performance at OCS, as indicated by Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) status? DMG status is equally available to all OCS students. How do the following variables impact DMG status of OCS-IS and OCS-EO: (1) degree achievement, (2) time in military service, (3) military rank, and (4) combat experience.

Results: This study found that OCS-IS students from the class of 2008, were more likely to earn DMG status than their OCS-EO peers. Among OCS-IS students, the variables: time in military service; and prior military rank; supported DMG list attainment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge many people that have made this research possible. First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my wife and children that have endured my time physically at home, but mentally at Fort Benning OCS. I would like to thank my research committee for their feedback, counsel, and mentorship. I am a better researcher for having worked with Lloyd Sherfey, Doctor Linda Lynch, and George Hodge. I would also like to thank the cadre at OCS. Specifically, Howard Galloway and Darryl Hollins have been extremely helpful. They were both a sounding board for my ideas in addition to their valuable feedback.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Commissioning Army Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioning Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlistment Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time in Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where to Compare Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measuring Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Development Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Evaluation Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longevity of Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement at OCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs Prior to OCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlistment Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Candidates Get to OCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-EO Candidate Selection Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-IS Candidates Selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs during OCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filled to Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs After OCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree Completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longevity in the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope Revisited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training at OCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS Syllabus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program of Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Candidate School Standing Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of Merit Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduation Requirements Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Military Graduate Policy Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS

Research Question ................................................................. 71
Secondary Questions.............................................................. 71
Findings .................................................................................. 71
Category ................................................................. 72
  Category of the Candidate .................................................. 72
  Description of Table Contents– How the Information was Displayed .................. 72
  OCS-EO ........................................................................ 73
  OCS-IS ........................................................................ 73
Degree Status ................................................................................ 74
  Complete ....................................................................... 74
  Pursuing ........................................................................ 75
  Further Differentiation ....................................................... 76
  Complete, OCS-IS ............................................................ 76
  Complete, OCS-EO ........................................................... 76
Time in Service ................................................................................ 77
  Years Service Grouping ....................................................... 77
  Ten to Fifteen Years of Service ........................................... 79
  Three to Seven Years of Service ........................................... 80
  More than Fifteen Years of Service ...................................... 80
  Seven to Ten Years of Service ............................................. 81
  Less than 3 Years of Service ............................................... 81
Rank ........................................................................ 82
  Most Likely to Earn DMG Status ........................................ 83
## Combat Experience

Most Likely to Earn DMG Status

Summary

## CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Purpose

Chapter Organization

Overview

Conclusions

Recommendations

Closing

## GLOSSARY

## APPENDIX A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

### Introduction

Kruskal-Wallis Test

Category of Candidate

Degree Status

Time in Service

Rank

Combat Experience

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APFT</td>
<td>Army Physical Fitness Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATD</td>
<td>Combined Arms Training Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWST</td>
<td>Combat Water Survival Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLG</td>
<td>Distinguished Leadership Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>Distinguished Military Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>Army Staff proponent for personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Resources Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LERP</td>
<td>Leadership Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEPS</td>
<td>Military Entrance Processing Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>Officer Candidate School. Unless otherwise noted, refers to the U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-EO</td>
<td>OCS Enlistment Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-IS</td>
<td>OCS In-Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEMA</td>
<td>Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OML</td>
<td>Order of Merit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>Program of Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA</td>
<td>Quality Assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officers Training Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMA</td>
<td>United States Military Academy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USAIC  United States Army Infantry Center
USAIS  United States Army Infantry School
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Sample Table</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Category of Candidate</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Degree Status</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Total Population, Time in Service</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>Category of Candidate</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>Degree Status</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9</td>
<td>Time in Service</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 10</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 11</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Ensuring the availability of sufficient numbers of trained, high-quality personnel in an environment of increasing deployments and armed conflict may prove to be one of the greatest personnel challenges faced by the U.S. military since the inception of the all volunteer force in 1973.

― GAO, Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army’s Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges

The Army has a shortage of officers in the senior Captain and Major ranks. In order to mitigate the risk posed by this shortage, the Army has increased the numbers of officers accessed, commissioned, to Active Component. The majority of this increase in the past decade WAS accomplished by expanding Officer Candidate School (OCS). Prior to the expansion of OCS in 1999, the school produced ten percent of the Active Component officers in a year. The expansion increased the annual percentage of OCS Active Duty commissions to account for forty percent of a fiscal year.¹

The growth in commissions and shift in percentages from ten to forty percent has placed the majority of the Active Component commissions at OCS, the most cost ineffective for the LONG-TERM needs of the Army.² There are two types of candidates at OCS: In-Service (OCS-IS) and Enlistment Option (OCS-EO). The cost to produce an officer by way of OCS In-Service (OCS-IS) is higher than any other source of officer


²Ibid., 8.
production. These In-Service Candidates have more military experience than do Enlistment Option (OCS-EO) Candidates. The purpose of this study WAS to compare the successful performance as measured by the Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) status between the two groups at OCS in the same classes. It was thought “this study would” help the Department of the Army determine if the performance of the In-Service Candidates is worth the cost “to develop” in terms of resources, and time.

**Personal Experience**

I was assigned to OCS, 3d Battalion 11th Infantry, for three years from April 2006 until July 2009. I served as a Company Commander, Battalion Operations Officer, and Battalion Executive Officer. One of my duties while serving as the Operations Officer and Executive Officer was to serve as a member on the Distinguished Leadership Graduate Board. The Distinguished Leadership Graduate Board was held for each graduating class the week prior to graduation. The Distinguished Leadership Graduate Board is composed of the top candidate from each platoon in the class, all DLGs. The candidate with the highest rank on the Order of Merit List (OML) for each of the four platoons in the graduating class competes in the board. Over the course of the two years I was a member of the board, I noticed a trend that three out of four candidates for each board “appeared to be OCS IS” in-service. This prompted me to wonder if the In-Services Candidates as a whole perform better than their college-option peers.

---

*Ibid., 8.*
Thesis Organization

This thesis begins by briefly covering the history of the commissioning of officers in the United States. The three primary sources of commission IS explored covering their mission, length, and the purpose they serve. The sources introduce the fact that there are varying levels of resources associated with each source of commissioning. The problem explored is the resource benefit analysis of commissioning officers. Is the performance of In-Service Candidates (OCS-IS) at OCS and in the Army worth the resources required to commission them?

The research question was: How does the experience of OCS-IS students affect their performance at OCS, as indicated by Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) status? Getting to this answer required the exploration of a few secondary questions. How does degree status affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does time in service affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does military rank affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does combat experience affect the performance of candidates at OCS? The four variables of degree status, time in service, rank, and combat experience were selected because they are the four most important indicators of military experience that could be measured.

A review of existing literature led to the categories for background understanding—Where to Compare the Groups, Cost to the Army, Training at OCS, and Performance Standards. The background understanding provided the framework to conduct a comparative analysis of the groups of candidates at OCS to determine if the variables WERE contributing factors in performance. The method used to determine the significance of the variables is described in Chapter 3, Research Methodology. The
method of analysis used was the same for each of the variables, which then led to a common framework for the findings. Following collection of the findings, conclusions were drawn to support answering the primary and secondary questions to this study. The conclusions, followed by recommendations for action and consideration regarding the performance of OCS candidates, are discussed in chapter 5.

History of Commissioning Army Officers

During the colonial period, each colony was protected by a colonial militia. The officers were generally elected from among the members of the militia by the members.4 When the Articles of Confederation were adopted by the thirteen colonies in 1781, the Confederation Congress was given the power to declare war, but the militias and officers of the militias were the responsibility of the colonies. In 1787, with the publishing of the Constitution, the new national government received sufficient authority to raise and maintain an Army. The Constitution also designated the President as the Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The duties of the President included the authority to commission officers.5 The states, former colonies, retained their authority to raise and maintain militias as well as commission officers.6


6McPherson, 12.
In March of 1802, Congress authorized the President to establish a Corps of Engineers at West Point to constitute a military academy to provide officers for the Federal Army. The militias’ desire for a more professional trained officer corps led to the establishment of several nonprofessional military colleges in the early 1800s. The first was Norwich University in 1819, the Virginia Military Institute in 1839, and the South Carolina Military Academy in 1842.

The Morrill Act of 1862, signed by President Abraham Lincoln, provided land for each senator and representative to establish colleges, that offered training in military tactics. In the late 1800s the state militias slowly began adopting the title of National Guard, modeled after the French Garde National, a citizen soldier unit. In 1879 the creation of the National Guard Association formalized the organization. The military training provisions of the Act were not useful until 1916 and World War I. In 1916, the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) formalized the application of the Morrill Act as a means to provide officers for the nation. The establishment of the Reserve Officers Training Corps was intended to provide Reserve officers for Active Duty during a time of need. Once the conflict that fueled the need for officers was over, the Reserve Officers would return to their civilian lives outside of the Army.

\*\*\*

\*Ibid., 15.

\*Ibid., 18.

9U.S.C. Title 7, Chapter 13, Subchapter 301.

10McPherson, 19.
The Militia Act of 1903 further defined state militias, National Guard and roles and standards they were required to meet. This was the beginning of providing a uniform standard for the commissioning of officers across the three components of the Army—Active Component, Reserve, and National Guard. The National Defense Act of 1916 further specified the military training provisions of the Morrill Act and the federal support for the National Guard. The Secretary of War in 1912 recommended the establishment of military training camps for college students. The camps opened in 1913, with the support of the Chief of Staff of the Army, and were the precursor to what is now known as OCS. These camps were conducted in the summer for the next four years until they were formalized in 1917, and became Officer Training School. The change was driven by the need for officers to support the growing Army for World War I. It took Officer Training School approximately ninety days to educate attendees, hence the term “Ninety-Day Wonder” that was applied to them. Graduates became the majority of the officers that led the U.S. Army in World War I.

The Secretary of War directed in November of 1918 the suspension of enrollment in Officer Training School; however, at the conclusion of the WWI, the summer camps were continued because of the great success. They became known as the Citizen’s


12 McPherson, 2.

13 Ibid., 30.

14 Ibid., iv.

15 Ibid., 50.
Military Training Camps (CMTC), which operated from 1921 to 1940 providing four weeks of military training to each trainee. Although the training continued, all graduates were not commissioned. The Reserve Officers Training Corps grew significantly and provided the bulk of the officers required for the Army.

World War II created a huge demand for officers that could not be met by the United States Military Academy (USMA) and the Reserve Officers Training Corp (ROTC). In July 1941, the modern OCS for Infantry was established at Fort Benning, Georgia. This was born from the model of the Citizen’s Military Training Camps. Other branches established branch specific OCS beginning with Field Artillery and Costal Artillery. Officers commissioned from the program came in as Reserve Officers and served on Active Duty for the period of conflict or war. Once the war ended, the Reserve Officers were subject to a reduction in force, and were released because they were no longer needed.

At the conclusion of World War II the need for officers was reduced significantly with the drawdown of forces. Many OCS programs closed, with many being discontinued entirely upon the conclusion of the war. In 1947, the Army closed the only OCS still in existence, Infantry OCS. A shortage of officers during the Korea Conflict forced the Army to open Infantry OCS at Fort Benning. The conflict forced the Army to expand the Infantry program to include twenty nine companies with one graduating each week.

16Officer Candidate School, Senior Officer Candidate Review Program (Fort Benning: Officer Candidate School, April 2009), 3.

17Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, Toward a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success, 40.
During the Korean Conflict, OCS produced over 7,000 Infantry Officers. In 1953 the program was once again contracted and was decreased to only two programs across the nation, Infantry and Field Artillery.\(^\text{18}\)

In the late 1960’s the nation again at war, this time in Vietnam. OCS quickly expanded to include five different battalions and produced 7,000 officers annually.\(^\text{19}\) With the drawdown of the conflict in 1973, the entire OCS program underwent reorganization. That reorganization began with the establishment of a single, branch immaterial OCS at Fort Benning in April of 1973 and ended with all other OCS programs merging in 1976 at Fort Benning. The result was a program very similar to the modern OCS.\(^\text{20}\)

OCS was largely unchanged from the period after Vietnam until the late 1990s. In the late 1990s, the program began an expansion to commission more officers to help fill shortages and projected shortages at the field grade level.\(^\text{21}\) The school expanded three times with the addition of a third training company in June 2000, a fourth in 2001, and finally a fifth training company in December 2005. This expansion that began prior to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom has proven critical to meeting the needs of the Army. OCS commissioned: 461 officers in 1995; 819 officers in 2000; 1056 in

---

\(^{18}\) Officer Candidate School, *Senior Officer Candidate Review Program*, 3.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

This equates to a growth almost two-fold in three years from 2005 to 2008.

**Commissioning Sources**

Before officers can be commissioned at the most junior level, candidates must complete training programs, some of which take up to 4 years. The military services use three types of programs that award commissions to officer candidates after they graduate from a program: (1) military academies, (2) Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), and (3) Officer Candidate School for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps or Officer Training School for the Air Force.²³

The U.S. Army has three components--the Active Component, Reserve Component, and the National Guard. There are three primary sources of officers for the Active Component, also known as commissioning sources: the United States Military Academy (USMA), the Reserve Officers Training Course (ROTC), and the U.S. Army OCS. The actual act of commissioning an officer involves the oath of office that the person swears or affirms to and becomes an officer. This act can only be accomplished after the completion of all other commissioning requirements of their commissioning source. In general, the commissioning requirements are the same for the three commissioning sources. Each of the commissioning sources have the same purpose, to produce officers, however each achieves it in a slightly different manner.

---

²² Officer Candidate School, “OCS Accessions Numbers” Spreadsheet received electronically by author, October 2009.

The United States Military Academy (USMA) is a four year program that provides cadets with bachelor’s degrees and commissions as military officers.\textsuperscript{24} The USMA provides officers to the Active Component of the U.S. Army only. USMA does not commission officers into the Army Reserves or the National Guard. The USMA curriculum is balanced between academic, leadership, military training, and physical fitness. The capacity of USMA is approximately 1,000 officers per year and this is a rather fixed capacity. The academy does have some minor capacity to adjust this capacity, but only in minor amounts and incrementally. “In return for their free tuition education, the graduates must serve on active duty for 5 years after graduation.”\textsuperscript{25}

The Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) is a program conducted at various universities and colleges across the nation. The ROTC provides officers for all three components of the Army: Active Duty, Reserves, and National Guard. There are two primary methods for commissioning officers. One method, the Four Year Method, requires the prospective officer to enroll in the university or college in a normal student capacity, while taking military classes in addition to their routine required classes for their major. The Four Year Method requires four years to complete, or as long as it is required for the prospective officer, Cadet, to earn their degree. The second method, Lateral Entry, WAS an option available to students that HAD already completed a portion of their college education. Lateral Entry students may enter the ROTC program as a college Junior. If the student has prior military service and has already attended Basic

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., 1.

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.
Training, they complete the final two years of the ROTC program in conjunction with the required time to complete their degree. If the prospective officer has not completed Basic Training or the equivalent, they may enter in the same manner; however, they must attend Basic Camp at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Lateral Entry students subsequently complete their final two years of ROTC while completing the required college courses for their degree.

The ROTC has the capacity to produce approximately 4,500 to 5,000 officers each year. This capacity can be increased; however, it is costly in terms of money and time. It takes a minimum of two years for the ROTC to increase their numbers of output, commissions, as this is the shortest period of time required for someone to earn a commission thru ROTC. Officers commissioned thru the ROTC must serve a minimum of three years on active duty, or six in the Reserve or National Guard if they are not commissioned to Active Duty. Officers that receive Army ROTC scholarships are typically required to serve a minimum of four years on Active Duty.26

“OCS is designed to augment the U.S. Army’s other commissioning programs.”27

The school is a twelve-week program conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia focused only on military training. OCS provides officers primarily for the Active Component; however, it does provide some officers to the Reserves and National Guard. Officers commissioned to the Active Component by OCS are required to serve a minimum of three years on Active Duty.

26Ibid., 2.

27Ibid.
OCS has the capacity to increase or decrease output for a given year with little cost or time required. The required output of OCS changes on an annual basis and provides the Department of the Army the ability to meet the operational requirements of the force. OCS is the only commissioning source that can expand or contract within a reasonable time. The capacity of OCS in 2007 and 2008 was 2,240, which was increased in 2009 to 2,720 Candidates.28

There are other commissioning sources for the Army, however, they serve a very specific purpose and do not produce commissioned officers for active duty. Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOC) produces Warrant Officers while there are fifty-four National Guard OCS programs around the country. Warrant Officer School produces commissioned warrant officers that serve as specialists in a specific field for the duration of their careers.

Commission Mission

The required number of Army officers to be commissioned each year varies based on attrition, retention, and changes to the organization of the force.29 The requirements for a given year are projected in advance, but are only projections and not exact. The requirement for an officer, lieutenant, is a requirement for the commissioning of an

28 Officer Candidate School, “OCS Accessions Numbers.” The capacity of OCS is capacity of the trainees. The capacity of 2,720 does not yield 2,720 officers in a given year. The school must account for attrition, historically 10 percent of a year. DA G1 provides OCS commission mission and the school must plan for a 10 percent over capacity required to meet the mission.

29 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G1 Personnel, Officer Candidate School and Reserve Officer Training Course Officer Accession Mission–FY 08-12, 9 June 2007.
officer. The total requirement for a given year is broken out by commissioning sources. Each source has a specific capacity to produce and a certain number of candidates in their programs working toward commissioning.

The general approach that the services use to meet their accession needs has been to first depend on the service academy and ROTC program. When these programs are unable to meet a service’s needs for newly commissioned officers, the service turns to its OCS / OTS program to bridge the gap. Conversely, during periods of drawdown, all of the commissioning sources may cut back on their numbers of officer candidates, but the OCS/OTS program provides the most immediate means for achieving the downsizing. Unlike the academy and ROTC programs that take up to 4 years to produce an officer, the OCS / OTS program can quickly expand or retract.\(^{30}\)

During the Fiscal Year of 2008 the Army needed to commission 7,770 officers in the Active Component\(^{31}\). In determining the breakdown of commissions by source, they began with the number of cadets in the program at the USMA. The number of cadets in the program at USMA scheduled to be commissioned in that year were subtracted from the requirement. The same methodology was applied to the ROTC. The remaining requirement not met by those two commissioning sources, was directed to OCS.

Once the commissions required thru OCS are derived, the Department of the Army tasks Recruiting Command to provide Enlistment Option (OCS-EO) Candidates to OCS. This number is derived based on historical trends and staff estimates from Recruiting Command. The remainder of the OCS requirement is provided to Human


\(^{31}\)U.S. Army Accessions Command, “Officer Accessions Review, 2Q FY 08,” Fort Monroe, 13 March 2008, received electronically by author October 2009. The total number of required officers is derived by adding the mission requirements for USMA, ROTC, and OCS.
Resources Command for selection from the Active Component force. These candidates are in-service, OCS-IS.

Candidate Variables

OCS candidates vary according to: OCS-IS or OCS-EO; level of college education; military experience; military rank earned; and years of combat experience. The most significant variable used in this study, was the differentiation between OCS-EO or OCS-IS status. All Candidates were either OCS-EO or OCS-IS.

Enlistment Option

Enlistment Option Candidates (OCS-EO) are officer candidates that enter OCS by enlisting in the Army to attend OCS to become an officer. All OCS-EO Candidates are required to have completed their college degree prior to enlisting in the Army. They enter as civilians through the accessions process, a screening process conducted by a military recruiter. At the end of the accessions process, following enlistment, they attend Basic Training moving into OCS. In some instances, officer candidates have been in another branch of service or previously served in the Army. At minimum, if a candidate has previously attended Basic Training or the equivalent, they will report directly to OCS upon enlistment. Most OCS-EOs have limited military experience of only ten weeks of basic training, however, they enter the service with other types of civilian work experience that the OCS-IO candidates do not have.

---

In-Service

In-Service Candidates (OCS-IS) are selected to attend OCS from the ranks of the active Army. They come from inside the military service, hence the term “In-Service.” They are selected by a Board conducted at Human Resources Command (HRC) in one of two ways. A Soldier may apply for OCS by submitting a packet to the Board for consideration, or a Soldier may submit a packet and attend a local board at Divisional level. The Division level boards select a number of Soldiers to be designated “Direct Select.” These Soldiers receive a direct endorsement, to attend OCS, from a general officer in a command position. In both cases, the application packets are reviewed by the HRC Board for selection or confirmation. OCS-IS Candidates are not required to have completed a college degree; instead they must have completed a minimum of 90 credit hours toward a specific degree prior to applying to OCS. This method allows for the candidate to complete their baccalaureate degree after being commissioned.

Differences

There are differences between the two groups OCS-IS and OCS-EO. These differences account for the differences in overall cost for the commissioning, which are not easy to measure. The most significant difference between the two groups is military experience. The OCS-IS Candidates have varying levels of military experience as a whole, but on average have at least five years of experience in the active component and

---

experience in combat. The OCS-EO Candidates have only ten weeks of military experience, with none being in a combat zone.

The differences do not stop at military experience. While the OCS-IS have a years of military experience and time in a combat zone, they lack baccalaureate degrees. The Army currently requires all commissioned officers to earn a baccalaureate degree before being promoted to the rank of captain. The promotion to captain generally occurs three to four years after being commissioned. The OCS-IS Candidates must either earn their degree while serving in a unit, or enter the Degree Completion Program. The degree completion program removes the officer from the operational force and places them in a student status for twelve to eighteen months to complete their degree. This is done at the expense of time to the operational force and is funded entirely by the Army. The Degree Completion Program is not available to OCS-EO Candidates as they require degrees prior to enlisting to attend OCS.

The most significant difference between the two groups of OCS students is their continuation rate. Continuation rate is the length of time the officer remains on active duty. The OCS-IS group has military experience prior to being commissioned that is included in their time toward retirement. An OCS-IS officer that entered OCS with ten years of service only requires ten more years of service to be eligible to retire. This group, OCS-IS, remain on active duty at extremely high rates between their date of commissioning and their eligible date of retirement. The group rarely serves beyond their
retirement eligibility date which occurs before twenty years of commissioned service.\textsuperscript{34} OCS-EO officers generally serve to complete their Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) but few remain past that initial obligation of three years.\textsuperscript{35} The differences in selection, education, experience, and longevity of service create differences in the cost, in terms of resources, to commission candidates from the two groups.

\textbf{Thesis}

\textbf{Premise}

The resources required to commission OCS-IS Candidates is high because their removal from the enlisted ranks creates a vacancy of an experienced leader that must be filled. Subsequent, to commissioning, an experienced leader is removed from the operating force for degree completion. The benefit gained by commissioning this group should be as great, or greater than the resources required to commission them. That is, the return on investment should provide greater value to the organization at a lower cost. This value is in terms of performance. This performance has been measured by the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) at various points in a career path.\textsuperscript{36} OEMA has not, nor has anyone else, studied the performance of these two groups at OCS. OCS is the first and only point in the officer career path, that the performance is measured objectively. The hypothesis is: OCS-IS Candidates perform better at OCS than

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success}, 10.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, Accessing Talent}, 7.
\end{flushright}
their OCS-EO peers based on their prior military experience, rank earned, and years of
service. Is the cost worth the benefit they provide the Army in terms of talent and
performance?

Impact

The impact of learning possible answers to the premise could assist the
Department of the Army, G1 Personnel, Director of Military Personnel Management
make decisions on when to allocating resources and for commissioning of officers. In the
2008 Key Strategic Issues List, COL Paul Aswell posed the following research topic:

Complete a review of the OCS selection process to identify the reason(s)
Enlistment Option OCS graduates have a low propensity for service beyond their
initial active duty service obligation (ADSO). Does the selection process
adequately screen candidates for the qualities of “officership”? How does the
performance of Enlistment Option OCS graduates in Basic Officer Leadership
Course II/III (BOLC) compare to their peers from other sources? What are the
reasons this population decides to become Army officer? Are there biases in the
branching and/or assignment process that impacts career satisfaction? What could
be done to market continuum of service to these officers after they have entered
the Army?37

The purpose of this study was to assist the Department of the Army Director of
Military Personnel Management learn possible differences in performance of the two
different groups of candidates at OCS. This QUESTION was not specifically posed by
COL Aswell in his request for research; however, it was considered a starting point to
begin to address the any performance differences between the two groups. The purpose
was supported by analyzing the performance of the two population groups at OCS over a
one year period of time from June 2008 to June 2009.

37U.S. Army War College, Key Strategic Issues List (New York: Strategic Studies
Research Question

The question used to focus this study was: How does the experience of OCS-IS affect their performance, as indicated by Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) status?

Secondary Questions

Subsequent subjects and questions were used to further frame the problem. How does degree status affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does time in service affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does military rank affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does combat experience affect the performance of candidates at OCS?

Degree Status

OCS candidates have varying levels of civilian education. Some have only 90 credit hours toward a specific degree, while others may have completed a baccalaureate degree or better. How does the performance, at OCS, of the two groups of candidates compare? The three descriptors for the variable of degree status are: OCS-EO complete, OCS-IS complete, and OCS-IS pursuing. Complete refers to the fact that the candidate already has a baccalaureate degree. Pursuing refers only to OCS-IS Candidates that have not earned a baccalaureate degree and are pursuing a degree.

Time in Service

Candidates at OCS have varying levels of time in military service. Time in service was measured in terms of years. What effect does varying lengths of time in service have on DMG performance among the two groups under study? Time in service is not only applicable to OCS-IS, but many OCS-EO Candidates have military time in service, which
is based on their having served previously, then become separated from the military to complete college degrees, and subsequently returning under the OCS-EO program. The categories for time are: less than three years, three to seven years, seven to ten years, ten to fifteen years, and greater than fifteen years.

**Rank**

Candidates arrive at OCS having earned various ranks in the military or civilian sector. Rank in the civilian sector does not translate to military rank. Previous military rank earned is an indicator of some level of leadership proficiency. How is the performance on the DMG affected by OCS EO and OCS IO who have previously earned varying levels of military rank?

**Combat Experience**

Candidates have varied levels of combat experience. How does combat experience affect performance at OCS among OCS EO and OCS IO students? There are four different categories within this variable: no combat experience, experience in OIF, experience, in OEF, or experience in both OIF and OEF.

**Background Understanding**

A common understanding of the background of the variables, previous research, specific training, and performance standards at OCS was necessary prior to answering the secondary questions. This provided, and will provide the setting of OCS helping to remove unnecessary variables.
Scope

This study included the performance of candidates in thirteen OCS classes only. It did not include information or data for National Guard OCS. The variable used to describe the two groups within this study was category of the candidates: In-Service or College-Option. OCS provided existing demographic data, class rosters, and DMG results on the classes studied.

Limitations of Study

This study was limited in that specific performance in each functional area and graded event for the OML was not used. Instead, the classification of a candidate as being a DMG was used as an indicator of performance. The top twenty percent of a given class that are eligible are designated as DMGs. There are situations and actions that disqualify a candidate from being a DMG, such as failing a test. The policy of twenty percent enacted in November of 2008.38 Prior to November of 2008, the policy was top thirty percent of a class. The policy was changed in order to make the policy consistent with other commissioning programs.

Summary

The U.S. Army has shown a constant need for officers throughout history. War, peace, and changes in the world have caused changes in the manner in which officers are commissioned. The Army has adapted to meet these challenges in various ways. Most recently, the Army has adapted by expanding OCS to fulfill a need for additional military

---

38 Officer Candidate School, Distinguished Military Graduate Policy Memorandum (Fort Benning, GA: Officer Candidate School, November 2008).
officers. The expansion of OCS has second and third order effects on the resources required, longevity of service, and experience of the officer corps. This study of level of performance among OCS candidates compared OCS-EO and OCS-IO using the variables: degree status; time in service; rank earned; and combat experience. This study provided a small glimpse of the performance of the groups at OCS that could assist decision makers in their understanding of the larger U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy.
The U.S. Army has made significant investments in its future, especially in its leadership. In particular, the Army has devoted billions of dollars to officer undergraduate-level education, world class training, and developmental experiences. Since the late 1980s, however, prospects for the Officer Corps’ future have been darkened by an ever-diminishing return on this investment, as evidenced by plummeting company-grade officer retention rates. Significantly, this leakage includes a large share of high-performing officers, many of them developed via a fully-funded undergraduate education.

— Casey Wardynski, Retaining Talent

The Army has a shortage of officers in the senior Captain and Major ranks. In order to mitigate the risk posed by this shortage, the Army has increased the numbers of officers accessed, commissioned, to Active Component. The majority of this increase in the past decade was accomplished by expanding OCS. Prior to the expansion of OCS in 1999, the school produced ten percent of the Active Component officers in a given year. The expansion increased the annual percentage of OCS Active Duty commissions to account for forty percent of a fiscal year.

The growth in commissions and shift in percentages from ten to forty percent has placed the majority of the Active Component commissions at OCS, the most cost ineffective for the long term needs of the Army. There are two types of candidates at OCS: In-Service (OCS-IS) and Enlistment Option (OCS-EO). The investment to produce

39Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, Developing Talent, 7.

40Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, Toward a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success, 7.

41Ibid., 8.
an OCS-IS officer is higher than any other source of officer. These In-Service Candidates have more military experience than OCS-EO. The purpose of this study was to compare the successful performance as measured by the Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) status between the two groups at OCS in the same classes. It was thought this study would assist the Department of the Army determine if the performance of the In-Service Candidates is worth the cost to develop in terms of resources, and time.

Literature Review

The literature review begins with previous studies in the field with regards to performance. The background covers the setting of OCS to provide the context of the study. This background provides understanding in the areas of: where others have compared the performance of the groups, differences in investment, training at OCS, and performance standards. Exploring where others have compared the performance of the groups provides the logic of why performance at OCS was chosen to study.

Subsequently, the investment of the Army for each group was explored based on the selection process, resources required at OCS, and post commissioning requirements for each of the types of candidates. After covering the differences in investment, the specific training at OCS is provided covering the training events, sequencing, and the methodology behind the training. Training is followed up with the standards, measures of performance, and how the candidates are evaluated. This will narrow the focus of the study and the variables that account for performance at OCS.

42Ibid., 8.
Literature Review Methodology

The literature was gathered in a few different manners all with the objective of finding what has been studied, written, or concluded in the field. The first method used to gather information was reaching out directly to the organization, OCS. In this contact they were asked for any studies, research, or articles on the subject. They were also asked if there was any specific area in which the field of research needed to be expanded. Darryl Hollins of OCS recommended exploring if there was a difference in performance between OCS-IS and OCS-EO.

While the Cadre of OCS were gathering the specific data used for the study, a comprehensive search for further information was conducted. This search looked for books, journal articles, Department of the Army publications, and other studies in the field. This was accomplished using two primary means–individual search using various search engines, and employing the help of the research librarians at the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth.

The individual search was conducted using EBSCOhost\(^{43}\) and DTIC.\(^{44}\) This search yielded numerous publications, articles, and references. Individual search words used were: OCS, Leadership, Army OCS, Commissioning Sources, Officer Candidates, libraries, schools, academic institutions, medical institutions, and corporations. This database service was accessed thru the Combined Arms Research Library.

\(^{43}\)EBSCOhost is an aggregator of premium full-text content. EBSCO Publishing's core business is providing online databases via EBSCOhost to libraries worldwide. EBSCO is used by libraries, schools, academic institutions, medical institutions, and corporations. This database service was accessed thru the Combined Arms Research Library.

\(^{44}\)DTIC is a repository of scientific and technical documents for the United States Department of Defense. This database service was accessed thru the Combined Arms Research Library.
In-Service, College Option, Enlistment Option, DMG, Success in the Military, and Leadership at OCS. These searches yielded over forty references of varying types and value to the study.

The research librarians at the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth employed the Center for Army Lessons Learned search engine to find references. The key terms they used were: Officer Candidate School, performance at OCS, College Option Candidates, In-Service Candidates, Prior Service Candidates, OCS policies, OCS SOPs, Training at OCS, Syllabus. This search produced over fifty references that were provided in bibliographic form for exploration.

Each reference was reviewed, which led to the categorization of the sources, by theme and importance. The categories were organized similar to the arrangement of the background. The importance and significance of each source helped prioritize them for use. The review of literature and sources, provided breadth and depth to the understanding of the topic, and what was not known, which helped narrow the focus and direction of this study to specific performance at OCS.

Research Question

The question used to focus this study was: How does the experience of OCS-IS affect the performance at OCS, as indicated by Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) status?

Secondary Questions

Subsequent questions used to frame the problem: How does degree status affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does time in service affect the performance
of candidates at OCS? How does military rank affect the performance of candidates? How does combat experience affect the performance of candidates?

**Background Understanding**

A common understanding of the background of the variables, previous research, specific training at OCS, and performance standards at OCS was required prior to answering the secondary questions. This provided, and will provide the setting of OCS helping to remove unnecessary variables.

**Where to Compare Performance**

The cost to the Army is in terms of risk, time, resources, experience, and actual cost in terms of money. This cost or risk was initially identified by the GAO-07-224. The study by GAO was to determine if the services were meeting their commissioning needs. Their report led to the Department of the Army G1 directing the OEMA to conduct further research on the topic. OEMA has determined the cost to commission in-service Candidates thru OCS to be more expensive to the Army than any other source of commission. The return on investment from this cost should be commensurate with the cost incurred to commission them. The return on investment is measured in terms of longevity in the military, promotion rates, service in key and developmental positions (KD), and selection to Command.45

---

Measuring Performance

The question that is drawn from this, how to measure the performance of the two groups across a career to determine if there is a difference? The OEMA conducted a study as part of their effort to develop and Army Officer Strategy to answer this specific question. Their study compared the two groups’ selection rates for Battalion Command, service in Key Developmental Positions as Majors, Officer Evaluation Reports and career longevity. The difficult part in the measurement of performance used by OEMA is that there are simply too many variables to establish a cause and effect relationship between their performance and category.

Officer evaluation reports (OERs) and selection rates to battalion and brigade command support our view that the Army resources each source of commission to attract different types of talent. Performance in key company grade positions, through the rank of captain, sorts nearly identically with our screening, vetting, and culling continuum. However, in the field grade ranks, there is a slight shift in that ROTC non-scholarship officers perform better than OCS-IS in battalion and brigade level S3/XO positions and are more likely to be selected for battalion and brigade command. In general, commissioning sources with higher screening, vetting, and culling thresholds increase the odds of producing talent matches for duties that the Army deems critical, particularly as job complexity increases.46

Battalion Command

The performance indicators used by OEMA are not truly objective, nor do these indicators offer the true picture. The indicator of performance of “selected for Battalion Command” is not a true indicator because of when this occurs in an officer’s career. Battalion command selection boards are conducted for lieutenant colonels with fifteen

46Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, Accessing Talent, 7.
years of commissioned service. The majority of the in-service officers commissioned through OCS are commissioned with five years of service already. With five years of service already, these candidates are eligible to retire at fifteen or less years of commissioned service. Therefore, these candidates are not selected for battalion command at the same rates as their peers with other commissioning sources or types because they choose retirement over battalion command. This also means that those with more than five years of service prior to being commissioned do not need to be promoted to lieutenant colonel to retire. Hence, the officers commissioned thru OCS-IS are largely underrepresented in the lieutenant colonel promotion results because they choose retirement over promotion.

Key Developmental Positions

Measuring performance based on Battalion and Brigade Operations Officer and Executive Officer positions is also not a true indicator. First, selection to serve in those positions is as much circumstance as it is selection. There is not a formal board, or measurement rubric to determine who fills the jobs. The selection is based largely on personality and timing. There is also a matter of timing for the OCS-IS. A large percentage of OCS-IS has greater than ten years of service when commissioned. That means that these candidates only need ten years until they are eligible to retire. Promotion

---

47 AR 600-3, Chapter 5 outlines the minimum time in service and time in grade requirements for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel as sixteen years time in service. The minimum requirement is based on Title 10 USC and DODI 1320.13. The minimum time in service is defined as commissioned service. This implies that everyone that enters OCS with four years or more service will be eligible for retirement before they are eligible for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel.
to Captain occurs at the three years of commissioned service, and promotion to major at nine and a half years. The same problem with evaluating battalion command thus plagues the performance measures of key and developmental jobs. These officers can retire at a larger rate than their peers. Therefore, these candidates choose retirement at twenty years of service over additional service obligations and promotions for the key jobs. The key jobs are indicated as key and developmental because they prepare one for the next echelon of service or command.\textsuperscript{48} These OCS-IS know they are probably going to retire before battalion command, and thus do not have a need to serve in the KD jobs.

**Officer Evaluation Reports**

Officer evaluations are not a true measure of performance because they are primarily subjective. The OER is composed of an evaluation of performance and potential.

Performance evaluations are assessments on how well the rated officer met duty requirements and adhered to the professional standards of the officer corps. Performance is evaluated by considering the results achieved, how they were achieved, and how well the officer complied with professional standards.\textsuperscript{49}

The assessment of an officer’s potential is a subjective judgment of the officer’s capability to perform at a specified level of responsibility, authority or sensitivity. Potential is normally associated with the capability to perform at a higher grade. However, the Army also assesses the officer’s potential for retention and increased responsibility within a specified grade.\textsuperscript{50}


\textsuperscript{50}Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 600-3, 37.
One officer can perform better than all others in the unit based on objective measurement tools. This same officer can be an introvert, while the unit commander is an extrovert. This difference in personalities could sway the commanding officers opinion of the junior officer being rated. Therefore the evaluations are not a true measure of performance.

Longevity of Service

Longevity of service is a good measurement rubric; however, it is not without fault. Career longevity can be directly linked to motivation for service, length of service prior to being commissioned, and job opportunities after retirement from the Army. This leads back to the question of how to measure and compare the performance between the two groups of candidates from OCS. This could be objectively done at the Career Course because they conduct objective testing for a majority of their performance measures. However, the majority of the OCS-EO Candidates have been found to separate from the Army at the end of their initial term of service, which is three years of commissioned service. This is the time they become eligible for attending the Career Course. Thus OCS-IS are more likely to be over-represented at the career course relative to their OCS-EO peers. There is also the problem of the fact that there are numerous Career Course schools and it is not valid to compare performance between students from two separate schools.

---

Measurement at OCS

This brings the measurement and evaluations of the two groups back to their source of commission. OCS is the first and only point in the career paths of the two different groups to measure and compare their performance. This is so because their career paths prior to and after OCS are different. The populations scatter across the Army to over sixteen different branch specific schools and over ten different Army Divisions for their assignments.

Costs

The exact cost to the Army cannot be specifically known. There are simply too many variables and the cost of each OCS candidate varies according to their educational background, military experience, recruitment options, and career longevity. However, comparing the differences between the two groups prior to OCS, during OCS, and after OCS provides contextual background and an insight to what potential cost are. The use of the term “costs” is a generic term for the purpose of this study. It was intended to serve as an encompassing term to cover opportunities lost, time lost, resources, and other variables in a “cost–benefit analysis” setting.

Costs Prior to OCS

Application Requirements

Army Regulation 350-51 is the governing document for Army OCS. The regulation is published by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and is intended for all three components of the Army–Active Component, Reserve Component, and the National Guard. The regulation prescribes the policies, eligibility requirements, and
administrative procedures for submitting and processing applications for OCS and for appointing OCS graduates as commissioned officers. The application requirements are:

a. Be United States citizens.
b. Achieve a General Technical Aptitude Test (GT) score of 110 or higher on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB).
c. Have a passing score on the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) or the American College Test (ACT) within six years of the application.
d. Pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) and meet the height and weight standards of AR 600–9.
e. Have a SECRET security clearance.
f. Have completed at least 90 semester hours of study from an accredited college or university and be able to complete a bachelor degree in 1 year or less (in-service only).
g. Achieve a score of 80 or higher on the English Comprehension Level Test (ECLT) / American Language Course Placement Test (ALCPT) if the applicant’s primary language is other than English.
h. Be of good moral character.
i. Have no convictions by civil or military courts.
j. Have not been previously dis-enrolled from officer candidate training.
k. Be at least 18 but less than 30 years of age at the time of enrollment.
l. Have completed advanced individual training (AIT) (enlisted personnel).
m. Have had a type “A” medical examination within 9 months of the date of the application and must meet procurement medical fitness standards prescribed in AR 40–501, paragraph 8–14, and possess a physical profile serial of at least 222221.
n. Have accumulated no more than 10 years of active Federal service when appointed as a commissioned officer.52

This regulation is applicable to both groups of candidates at OCS except where specified. The only significant difference between the two groups in the application requirements is the college credits requirement. While OCS-EO Candidates must have a baccalaureate degree to be eligible to apply, OCS-IS Candidates are only required 90 credit hours toward a specific degree.

Types of Candidates

In-Service

The In-Service Candidates (OCS-IS) are taken directly from the ranks of the enlisted force. This simply moves vacancy or shortage from the officer corps to the enlisted ranks. Each soldier or Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) that attends OCS must be replaced in the enlisted force. Each of these soldiers has attended Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training at a minimum. In some cases these candidates have upwards of ten years of experience in the Army that includes professional development schools and leadership experience. This cost cannot be measured easily but it can be understood that replacing a front line leader or manager with ten years or more of experience to include two or three professional development schools is costly. This is compounded with the fact that it takes not only money but time. There is a ripple effect that occurs when someone leaves the NCO ranks for commissioning.

Enlistment Option

Enlistment Option Candidates (OCS-EO) are candidates that begin the process as civilians and are recruited into the Army for the purpose of attending OCS to be commissioned. These candidates are required to already have a baccalaureate degree and vary from directly from completing college to having fifteen years of experience in a given career field. The cost incurred is based on the enlistment incentives and vary depending on the candidate. These costs can be as low as simply recruiting and enlisting

a candidate with no additional incentives, or as high as including college loan repayment up to $80,000. In this case, the cost is in terms of money and more easily measured for each candidate, however it would be extremely difficult to specify an exact cost for these types of candidates in general. There are as many different costs as there are candidates, and specifically identifying the cost for a group of candidates is difficult.

Education

There are costs incurred based on the education of the candidates. These costs will vary depending on the type, level, funding, and quality of the education. Types of education can be categorized as correspondence (also known as distance learning) and resident. The majority of the OCS-IS group has educational backgrounds that are of correspondence, distance learning, or in an education center on a military installation. The OCS-EO Candidates’ education is generally from large colleges and universities around the nation, and in some cases overseas that are resident courses.

Another cost variable in the area of education is the quantity of post High School Education the candidates have. OCS-IS Candidates are only required 90 credit hours toward a specific degree. OCS-EO Candidates are required to have their degree completed. All other factors remaining equal, one would reason that more education is better. The OCS-IS requirement for 90 credit hours being less than that of a degree is an acknowledgement that these candidates generally take college classes while on active duty in addition to their normal duties.

---


55 Army Regulation 350-51, 2.
Educational funding is a cost that varies between the two groups. OCS-IS Candidates educational costs are paid by the Army. The education of the OCS-IS group is funded by the G.I. Bill or the Tuition Assistance Program. Both programs are funded directly by the Army. OCS-EO Candidates pay for their education on their own or use student loans. These candidates incur the expense on their own and may or may not have remaining debt when they enter the Army. Some of these candidates do not have any student loan debt, and simply enlist without any Student Loan Repayment benefits. Others can have upwards of $100,000 in student loans depending on their university and length of education. Some of these candidates enlist based on incentives of student loan repayment up to $80,000.

Military Experience

Military experience varies among the candidates, but there is clearly a distinguishable difference between the two groups. OCS-EO Candidates generally have no prior military experience other than Basic Training.\textsuperscript{56} In some cases, these candidates served in the Army or another branch of the Department of Defense, separated and attended college to earn a degree, and return for the purpose of attending OCS. However, in most cases the OCS-EO group has only the ten weeks of Basic Training as military experience.

The military experience of OCS-IS population varies depending on their military occupational specialty, combat experience, rank attained, and level of military education. The premise of this study rests on the value of the military experience. These candidates

\textsuperscript{56}Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, \textit{Accessing Talent}, 6.
all have a minimum of Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training experience. On average this group has five years of service and has attained the rank of Sergeant. This is coupled with the fact that, on average, OCS-IS have also attended a minimum of one NCOES school\(^{57}\). This school, either Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) or the Warriors Leader Course (WLC) is a school designed to provide the junior leaders with the doctrinal foundation for being a first line leader in the Army. The doctrine, principles, and training framework for these schools are the same as the doctrine, principles, and framework of OCS.

The experience does not end with length of service and Professional Military Education. The OCS-IS Candidates also have the experience of being in charge of others in the military. In addition to leadership experience, the OCS-IS Candidates, for the period studied, on average have served in combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. The premise of this research is that this experience difference between the two groups leads to a difference in performance between the groups at OCS.

The cost associated with moving this experience from the enlisted ranks to the officer ranks is not a loss to the Army. The experience is simply moved from one level of management to another. However, the cost to replace that same experience in the enlisted ranks takes a significant amount of resources. Although it initially leaves a vacancy for someone only slightly junior to be promoted or step up in responsibility, that creates a ripple effect all the way back to the recruiting station and the need for another soldier.

\(^{57}\)Non-Commissioned Officer Education System School. This system is established in a manner that at each promotion in the NCO ranks, the soldier is required to successfully complete the Professional Military Education School commensurate with that rank.
The total replacement cost impossible to calculate, but it is easy to relate to the fact that a specific unit looses a leader with tenure when an NCO is selected to attend OCS. Depending on how good the NCO was, and their duties in the unit, this loss can be felt for months after they leave.

How Candidates Get to OCS

The cost of procuring the candidate is significantly different for the two groups. The difference is based on where the candidates come from, how they are selected or recruited to attend OCS, and the experience and background of the candidates. The entrance requirements are almost identical with one exception. Enlistment Option candidates are required to have completed their baccalaureate degree prior to applying for OCS. The entrance requirements are outlined in Army Regulation 350-51, *U.S. Army Officer Candidate School*.

Selection Process

There are costs associated with how the groups of candidates are selected to attend OCS. These costs are a direct result of how the groups apply, are vetted, and selected and where they come from. Where candidates come from is in regards to In-Service Candidates coming to OCS from U.S. Army units while the Enlistment Option Candidates attend OCS coming from the civilian sector.

OCS-EO Candidate Selection Process

Enlistment Option Candidates are students that enter OCS by way of the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS). OCS-EO begin as a civilian and enlist in the Army as a 09S (Enlistment Option OCS Candidate). After enlisting they attend Basic Training
and then report directly from Basic Training to OCS. In some cases these students have been in another branch of service or previously served in the Army. If a student (candidate) has previously attended Basic Training or the equivalent, the candidate will report directly to OCS. All Enlistment Option Candidates attend OCS without knowing their future branch of service. These Candidates are required to have completed their college degree prior to enlisting in the Army.

OCS-IS Candidates Selection

In-Service Candidates are selected to attend OCS by way of a Federal Selection Board. These Candidates are selected in one of two ways. First, a Soldier may apply for OCS by submitting a packet directly to the Federal Selection Board at HRC for consideration.\(^\text{58}\) Secondly, a Soldier may submit a packet and attend a local board generally held at Divisional level. These boards select a given number of Soldiers to receive a “Direct Select.”\(^\text{59}\) This means the Soldier has a direct endorsement from a two star equivalent commander to attend OCS. In either case, the packets are reviewed by the Federal OCS Board for selection and branching, or confirmation and branching.

Costs during OCS

Filled to Capacity

The marginal cost of training an OCS Candidate is the same regardless of the category of the Candidate. The school has an infrastructure that has been in place for a

\(^{58}\)Jorge Gomez, “More than One Way to OCS,” *Soldiers* (June 2007), 47.

\(^{59}\)Jim Tice, “Commanding generals can make OCS picks” *Army Times* (17 September 2007), 42.
number of years and requires only routine maintenance. The capacity of OCS is
determined by how many classes the school can conduct in a given year using the five
companies training. Each company has a capacity of training 160 candidates per class and
during the period studied OCS conducted 17 classes a year. This provides a training
capacity of 2,720 candidates for the year. Mr. Howard Galloway provided information
on the rates of class fills during the period that indicated the school was not operating at
full capacity. In short, OCS was not filled to capacity during the period studied, and
could have taken more candidates without having to adjust the number of classes or
incurring any additional expenses to the organization except the cost of food.

Fixed Cost

The fixed cost of training candidates at OCS does not change with the type of
candidate. The training conducted remains the same regardless of the category of the
candidate. The fixed costs of barracks space, beds, wall lockers, weapons, military gear,
and cadre have already been covered since the organization was established. There are
some costs associated with upgrading rifles, or getting new beds and furniture, however
these costs are not dependent on the category of the candidate. All candidates are
provided the same living accommodations, weaponry, and gear. The cost of training one
more candidate is only the cost of the food they are provided and the cost of pay and
benefits for that given candidate.

60 Officer Candidate School, “OCS Accessions Numbers.”
61 Ibid.
Base Pay

The pay while at OCS is the only real difference between the two groups of candidates: In-Service and College-Option. Pay is based on the rank of the individual and their time in service. OCS-EO pay, on average, is less than OCS-IS. This is a result of Enlistment Option Candidates having less than a year in the military and being paid at the grade of E-5, sergeant, while at OCS, or a base pay of $2,061.30 per month. The average In-Service Candidate has a rank of E-5, but has six years service in the Army.\(^{62}\) This equates to $2,583.90 per month.\(^{63}\) The actual pay for in-service is entirely dependent on the rank of the individual before entering OCS, and the years of service. In some cases it is entirely possible for an OCS-IS Candidate to be an E-8 with fifteen years of service with a base pay of $4,132.50 per month.

Costs After OCS

The career paths of the two groups after commissioning are nearly the same except for educational requirements and longevity. Educational requirements force the majority of the OCS-IS population into the Degree Completion Program while the OCS-EO Candidates are not required, nor eligible for this program. The longevity of a given groups’ career refers to how long the candidates serve after being commissioned. The

\(^{62}\) This average was calculated using the population of the study and averaging the pay grade and years of service for the OCS-IS population.

promotion requirements and key developmental position requirements are the same for all officers, regardless of commissioning source or the category of candidate.\textsuperscript{64}

Education Level

The application requirements for OCS have a second and third order effect for the officers once commissioned. All officers are required to have completed a baccalaureate degree prior to being promoted to captain. The OCS-EO population is required to have their degree prior to enlisting while the OCS-IS population is only required to have ninety hours toward a specific degree. This is an acknowledgement of the fact that a soldier that enlists in the Army after high school and serves continuously has little time while serving to earn a college degree. These candidates earn their college credits by taking classes in the evenings, or online thru the Army Education Centers. OCS-IS are also provided some college credit for selected military training courses they have completed. Military classes that have a direct correlation to a given college course, are authorized a number of college credit hours based on the level of training or education.\textsuperscript{65}

Degree Completion

After commissioning and prior to their promotion to captain, the OCS-IS population that does not have a degree are enrolled into the Degree Completion

\textsuperscript{64}Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, \textit{Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010).

\textsuperscript{65}Laura S. Jeffrey, “Hidden Credits,” \textit{Army Times}, February 2005.
Program. This program takes the lieutenant out of the operational force for twelve to eighteen months to complete their civilian baccalaureate degree. They apply and attend college classes toward their specified degree, while remaining on active duty and being paid their full pay and benefits. These lieutenants’ sole responsibility to the Army during this period of time is to complete their degrees. The Army pays for their tuition and books. The return required to the Army at the completion of their degree is an Additional Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) for the officer. This ADSO is in terms of a three to one ratio, meaning that a lieutenant that is in the Degree Completion Program for one year requires an additional three years of service to the Army.

**Longevity in the Army**

During the past decade of growth at OCS, the cost has second and third order effects on the Army Officer Corps. According to the GAO report, increasing commissions thru OCS creates an officer retention problem.

While these services’ OCS programs offer a means for increasing the numbers of newly commissioned officers in a relatively short period to address a change in end strength, it takes years to grow experienced leaders, which presents a different officer career management challenge—officer retention.

---


67Ibid.

68GAO-07-224, 3.
OEMA has found that increasing the commissions thru OCS in the late 1990s actually did little to fix the shortages in the captain and major ranks, and actually intensified retention problems.

Since the Army’s biggest officer shortages fall in the senior captain and major ranks, OCS-EO (Enlistment Option) and OCS-IS (In-Service) accessions do little to address those shortages and instead intensify retention problems at exactly the worst points in the officer career model.  

**Scope Revisited**

The marginal cost to commission an OCS-EO officer assumes that the marginal cost to recruit is $0. Therefore, the costs incurred for the additional mission includes accession costs, attrition, initial issue, enlistment bonus, tuition reimbursement/loan repayment, and O&M training dollars for the additional basic trainee and OCS candidate. In addition to these costs (less basic training), commissioning additional officers through OCS-IS requires that the Army bear the cost to replace the vacated NCO slot. Marginal cost calculations for OCS-IS include that “replacement cost.”

It would be difficult to determine the difference in cost between OCS-IS and OCS-EO across a career. However, it is well researched and documented by OEMA that the cost of producing an OCS-IS officer is the most expensive because of the many resource intensive variables involved. This study used the research of OEMA as a starting point to narrow the focus and compare the performance of the two groups of candidates at OCS.

**Training at OCS**

The training conducted at OCS is the same for all candidates regardless of their category, experience, education, or previous military rank. The two most important

---


70Ibid., 41.
published documents outlining the training at OCS are the Syllabus and the Program of Instruction (POI).

OCS Syllabus

The OCS Syllabus is published by OCS annually or when there is a significant change to the program. The document is authored by Darryl Hollins, the OCS Program of Instruction (POI) Manager. The document is intended for prospective and current students and provides them an overview of the major events and tasks of each week of training. The syllabus contains an overview by week, and then outlines the graduation requirements for the significant training events. These graduation requirements are also contained in the “Graduation Requirements Document” that is published annually. The “Graduation Requirements Document” takes precedent over the syllabus with regard to these standards as the syllabus is intended as only an overview and is not authoritative in nature.

Week 1: In-processing and Orientation. This week introduces the candidates to the standards, procedures, and regulations under which they will live for the next 12 weeks. Attention to detail is stressed as is efficient management of time. Key Tasks: Initial APFT, Obstacle Course, Combat Water Survival Test, Map Reading.71

Week 2: WTBD’s (Warrior Tasks and Battle drills). This week introduces candidates to Warrior Task and Battle Drills. The priority is to Train and execute selected individual warrior tasks in a field environment. All training will use the crawl/walk/run methodology. All training is conducted to familiarize / prepare candidates for Field Leadership Exercises and ultimately as future leaders in our Army. Key Tasks: Call for Fire, 5 Mile Foot March.

Week 3: Leadership. The week introduces the core dimensions of Army BE-KNOW-DO leadership doctrine and describes the importance of competent and confident leadership to successful Army operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. It provides the doctrinal foundation for all subsequent periods of instruction on the direct leadership actions of influencing, operating, and improving that will be discussed in subsequent periods of the leadership blocks of instruction. Key Tasks: Leadership Classes, 3 Mile Release Run, Leader’s Reaction Course.

Week 4: Tactics and Operations. This week introduces candidates to the characteristics of the offense, principles and characteristics of the defense. Candidates will use the application of classroom instruction to implement Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs). Key Tasks: Troop Leading Procedures, 7 Mile Foot March, 4 Mile Release Run.

Week 5: OPORD’s and Training Management. This week introduces candidates to the Operations Order (OPORD). It also provides candidates with an overview of the training management system to include: the training mission, principles of training. Battle focused training, mission essential task list development, and after action reviews are also focused on in this week. Key Tasks: Operations Order, Reading and Writing in the Army Style.

Week 6: History 1 and Branching. The OCS Candidate will understand the utility of Military History in today’s Army, and the major events in the military history of the United States from its colonial settlement through the Civil War. Key Tasks: Prep for Deployment.

Week 7: Field Leadership Exercise I. This week the candidate is introduced to leadership skills the candidate will need in a field environment. The candidate will also be introduced to the tactics, techniques, and procedures required to navigate from one point on the ground to another and given practical work on task taught during applied map reading. Key Tasks: Senior Officer Candidate Review, 7 Mile Foot March, Land Navigation.

Week 8: Field Leadership Exercise 2, SQD STX. This week the candidate will conduct familiarization and evaluated performance on selected individual and collective tasks training as a squad. Key Tasks: Field Exercise.

Week 9: Field Leadership Exercise 2, PLT STX. This week the candidate will conduct familiarization and evaluated performance on selected individual and collective tasks training as a platoon. Key Tasks: Field Exercise, 10 Mile Foot March.

Week 10: Recovery, History 2. This week candidates will learn to recover a unit from deployment. They will also gain an understanding of the causes, strategies,
events, and results of major combat and peacekeeping operations from WWI up to the present. Key Tasks: Graduation Run, Battalion Commander Social.

Week 11: Officership. This week provides candidates with the opportunity to explore leadership topics with senior officers who have experienced the same or similar situations. Topics include counseling, reception and integration, career advice, NCO-Officer relationship, and other subjects chosen by candidates. Key Tasks: Final APFT, Company 5 Mile Run.

Week 12: Graduation. Candidates take the oath of office and complete final preparation for graduation. Key Tasks: Commissioning Oath, Graduation.

The syllabus does not differentiate between OCS-IS and OCS-EO groups for training events. The training is conducted the same for all candidates groups. The premise of this study is that the OCS-IS Candidates would have an advantage at the training and evaluations because of their military experience. One example would be Field Leadership Exercise II. The OCS-IS group, having more military experience, should be more familiar with living in and leading soldiers in a field environment. The OCS-EO Candidates could be perceived to be at a disadvantage with a lack of experience in how the Army operates in the field. The OCS-EO group does have the experience of ten weeks of basic training and the previous seven weeks of OCS, however, the Field Leadership Exercise is their first opportunity to actually live and operate in the field as a unit.

Program of Instruction

The POI is stored and managed in the Automated Systems Approach to Training (ASAT) database that enables anyone with database access to reference the document. The POI has several audiences. The first audience is to the cadre of the school in which it provides them guidance, outlines, standards, and resources required for each specific training class and event. The second audience is adjacent OCS and ROTC programs. The
POI provides them the same frame of reference as the cadre, however, it enables them to compare how other units and schools with similar missions achieve their objectives. The third audience is the higher headquarters in the Department of the Army and TRADOC, Training and Doctrine Command. The POI provides the Department of the Army a consolidated list of the resources required for the program and justification for those resources. This is the manner in which the organization is funded annually.

The references are provided in the context that OCS is not the proponent for any single training task or skill. Each task trained at OCS has a proponent outside of OCS that outlines how the event is to be trained and to what standard. This is included in a Training Support Package (TSP). OCS merges the proponent provided TSPs across time and space, using the resources available and funded, and modifies the TSP to meet the intent of the training event. Each training event included in the POI has a doctrinal reference to an Army Publication. All of these Publications are included as part of the references for the POI.

**Performance Standards**

*Officer Candidate School Standing Operating Procedures*

The OCS SOP (Officer Candidate School Standing Operating Procedures) is a document published by the school annually. It is the authoritative SOP that governs the daily operations, conduct, and procedures of the Officer Candidates at OCS. The SOP is not all inclusive and the signed policy letters take precedence over the SOP when there is

---

72 Officer Candidate School, *OCS SOP* (Fort Benning, GA: Officer Candidate School, 13 March 2009).
a difference in opinion or practice. Annually the document is reviewed by the cadre and the students. Adjustments are made to the document as appropriate to ensure the SOP is relevant, and provides information as appropriate for the candidates. Adjustments to the document are captured in revisions. When recommendations are made to adjust the document they are agreed to by the leadership of the organization and the dismissal authority, next higher headquarters. Prior to being approved by the next higher headquarters, the document is reviewed by the installation Judge Advocate General and the Inspector General.

Order of Merit Memorandum

The OCS Order of Merit List (OML) is the listing that ranks the candidates in a class from best to worst based on performance. The listing includes an identifying number for each candidate, so the ranking is blind, and the scores for each event the candidates have completed at OCS. The events are categorized into three functional areas–Academic, Physical, and Leadership.73

Academic

The Academic area consists of seven functional lessons, eight tests, and 900 possible points. The tests are objective and are composed of multiple choice questions. There is not a variance in grading standards for these tests; they are uniform across the OCS classes. Each subject is taught by one instructor, or a team of instructors, that it is their job to teach that block of instruction. The students are provided a syllabus, advance

73 Officer Candidate School, OCS SOP (Officer Candidate School: Fort Benning, GA, 13 March 2009), 32.
sheets, and access to the slides that will be used during the first week of the course. This provides the opportunity for a student to read ahead, or prioritize their study time more efficiently.

If a student has a Bachelors degree in History, the candidate would perhaps prioritize their study time to focus on Tactics and Operations. The candidates are provided the material to be covered and allowed to study as they see fit for the respective classes. The students are given a block of instruction on a subject over a given period of time. This time is generally one week per subject. During the week, classroom lessons are reinforced by the cadre outside of the classroom. At the end of the week the students are tested on their knowledge of the material in a specific exam for that subject. The exams are not comprehensive, and are usually 30-50 multiple choice questions. The areas tested in the academic area are:

- Call for Fire Exam (100 pts)
- Tactics and Operations Exam (200 pts)
- Supply Exam (100 pts)
- Training Management Exam (100 pts)
- Leadership and Justice Exam (100 pts)
- Military Intelligence Exam (100 pts)
- History Exam 1 (100 pts)
- History Exam 2 (100 pts)

The candidate groups are instructed in the same manner during the blocks of instruction and the tests are proctored the same. All candidates receive the same instruction at the same time. The tests all have the same questions; however, there are

---

74 Officer Candidate School, “Company Commander In-Briefing” provided to author by e-mail November 2009.

75 Officer Candidate School, Graduation Requirements Document (Fort Benning, GA: Officer Candidate School, 1 November 2008), 8.
three or four different versions of each test. The difference between the tests is the sequencing of the questions to mitigate the risk of cheating.

Physical

The physical area is objective as well. Students take three Army Physical Fitness Tests during the course of OCS. The tests are: Initial, Mid, and Final APFT. The only ones that count toward the OML are the initial and final. The students are also required to complete two separate five mile foot marches, two separate seven mile foot marches, and one foot march of ten miles. These are “go”/“no-go” in nature and all students that complete them receive the same amount of points. The students conduct release runs of 3, 4, and 5 miles. These are individually graded events. The students must attempt the Combat Water Survival Test (CWST) and Obstacle Confidence Course. The tests included in the Physical Fitness area are.

Initial APFT, 300 pts (No extended points)
5, 5, 7 mi Foot Marches, 75 pts (25 pts each. Retest = 5 pts)
CWST, 50 pts for completion (-10 pts for each station not completed)
Bolton Obstacle Confidence Course, 100 pts
3 Mile Release Run, Go / No-Go (run time is tiebreaker for OML)
4 Mile Release Run, Go / No-Go
5 Mile Release Run, Go / No-Go
Final APFT, 300 pts

76 Ibid., 8.
77 Ibid.
Leadership

The leadership evaluations are modeled identical to the Army Officer Evaluation Report System. The cadre coach, teach, and mentor the Candidates to improve each individual’s knowledge, skills, and attributes in accordance with FM 6-22, Army Leadership.

The leadership evaluation program at OCS is based on the premise that leaders are developed by leading, using proven techniques that have been historically effective. It initially requires the Candidate to follow a prescribed format and moves gradually toward allowing individual initiative in problem solving. The instruction and practical application of leadership skills in OCS are closely coordinated with and reinforce the formal leadership instruction presented by the Infantry School.

Candidates are placed in leadership positions in garrison and in the field. The garrison leadership positions are rather simple, routine, and relatively free of stress. These positions provide the opportunity for the candidates to test their ability to follow instructions, communicate information as appropriate, and get their subordinates to the right place at the right time. These are a means for the candidate to lead in an environment with little stress.

The field evaluations are conducted in a complex, stressful, and dynamic environment. These provide the opportunity for the candidates to test their understanding of tactics, assessing complex situations, finding a solution, and leading their squad or

---

78 Officer Candidate School, “Leadership Evaluations Leadership Professional Development” (Officer Candidate School, 16 March 2006), e-mailed to author, November 2009.

79 Officer Candidate School, OCS SOP, 18.
platoon thru to completion. This tests the candidates’ leadership ability in a simulated combat environment.

The leadership evaluations are based on the Army Leadership manual, Field Manual 6-22. The candidates are evaluated against a published standard that is provided in chapter five of the OCS SOP. The OCS SOP also provides an outline of the duties and responsibilities for each leadership position in a garrison environment. The candidates are evaluated and provided feedback using a Leadership Evaluation Report (LERP).

The candidates leadership evaluations are organized into four areas—skills, actions, attributes, and values. The candidates’ interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills are evaluated. These skills broadly cover their skill in understanding a situation, conceptualizing a solution, communicating that plan to their subordinates, and leading it thru to accomplishment of the mission. The candidates’ actions in the areas of influencing others, improving the organization, and operating are evaluated. Candidates’ leadership attributes are evaluated with regard to mental, physical, and emotional attributes. This is to help them understand their intellectual capacity, physical readiness, and stability under pressure. The candidates’ adherence to the Army values is also evaluated.

---

80 Ibid., 18.
81 Ibid., 21.
82 Officer Candidate School, “Leadership Evaluations Leadership Professional Development,” 34.
83 Ibid., 35-43.
84 Ibid., 33.
Graduation Requirements Memorandum

The “OCS Graduation Requirements Memorandum” is published by the 199th Infantry Brigade Headquarters. The 199th Infantry Brigade Headquarters is the next level in the chain of command above the Commandant of OCS and as such, is the dismissal authority. The Commandant of OCS runs the schools daily operations and includes recycle authority. The dismissal of a candidate from OCS lies with the next level up in the chain of command, the 199th Infantry Brigade.

The memorandum is published for the cadre and students of OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia. Each year, or as the course changes, the document is updated and serves to provide a single document that unites the regulations and publications. The document is authoritative in nature, and provides further specificity where required outlining exactly what standards are required for a Candidate to graduate from OCS. In determining “success” at OCS, the document outlines the minimum requirements and also provides the basis for establishing the Order of Merit List. An enclosure to the document, the OCS Evaluation Points Criteria, provides the details in exactly how the grade book and Order of Merit list are calculated.

The Graduation Requirements for OCS are grouped into four categories. Those categories are: Academics, Land Navigation, Physical Fitness, and Leadership. In addition to meeting the requirements in the four areas above, the Candidates must also meet the professional “Standards of Conduct” outlined in the OCS SOP. Candidates must score a minimum of 70 percent on all academic tests and must pass the land navigation

85 Ibid., 32.
practical test. Candidates must meet the Physical Fitness Requirements that includes two APFT (Army Physical Fitness Tests), the Confidence Obstacle Course, Combat Water Survival Test (CWST), three separate Release Runs of 3, 4, and 5 miles, and complete all foot marches. Leadership requirements refer to the leadership evaluations of Candidates in both garrison and the field.  

86

There is a difference between the Graduation Requirements Document and the OML Memo. The Graduation Requirements Document indicates that Land Navigation is a separate, stand alone area. The OML Memo includes the Land Navigation as an Academic Evaluation. The difference between the two documents is that the testing and re-testing criteria are different for Land Navigation than the Academic tests. This is a result of a much higher failure rate at Land Navigation, than it does for any other Academic tests.  

87

Distinguished Military Graduate Policy Memorandum

The DMG Policy Memorandum prescribes the policy of Distinguished Military Graduate Honors and the requirements for it. Howard Galloway is the Battalion Personnel Officer (S1) and as such is the proponent for DMG Honors. A given candidate will be designated as a DMG if the meet the following criteria: Ranked in the top 20 percent of the overall course criteria based on the sum of the total points and if they are not disqualified by one of the items below:

86Officer Candidate School, *Graduation Requirements Document*, 3.

87Darryl Hollins, Phone interview with author, February 2010.
The following Candidates are not eligible for honors:
(1) Recycled Candidates (except for medical recycles).
(2) Candidates who fail any academic exam or require a retest on any event.
(3) Candidates who receive a Class I or higher disciplinary action (UCMJ).
(4) Candidates who must retest either the day or night land navigation exam.
(5) Candidates must be a first time GO with no retests in the following physical fitness requirements: foot marches, release runs, and any APFT. 88

The eligibility criteria are vetted annually by the cadre of the organization, as well as synchronized with the Reserve Officers Training Course for uniformity. The memorandum is published for the cadre of the organization and the candidates that attend the school. In the context of this study, being designated as a DMG equals “success” for a given candidate. Anyone who graduates OCS and is commissioned is successful. However, for the purpose of this study, “success” was defined as achievement of DMG status, as this provides only the top twenty percent of a given class.

In historical context, the designation of DMG was the determining factor for one to receive a Regular Army commission or “Other than Regular Army.”

During the 1990s, the Army disaggregated officer strength forecasts by commissioning programs. These include West Point (USMA), ROTC Distinguished Military Graduate, ROTC Non-Distinguished Military Graduate, OCS Distinguished Military Graduate, and OCS Non-Distinguished Military Graduate. Prior to the mid-1990s, the distinction between Distinguished and Non-Distinguished Military Graduate had been an important commissioning consideration. West Point officers and Distinguished Military Graduates from ROTC and OCS received a Regular Army commission, while officers who were not Distinguished Military Graduates received an “Other than Regular Army” (OTRA) active duty commission. In other words, all West Point officers were considered Distinguished Military Graduates, whereas only a small fixed share of each ROTC and OCS cohort received the same designation. 89

88 Headquarters, Officer Candidate School, Distinguished Military Graduate Policy, ed. Howard Galloway (Fort Benning, GA: Officer Candidate School, 2008).
89 Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, Retaining Talent, 38.
Determining the DMG status designated in the same manner that it is today with the same criteria. Historically, it was more significant to be designated a DMG and granted a Regular Army commission because it guaranteed a job on active duty. The designation of “Other than Regular Army” implied that the Army needed the officer to serve, but for a specified shorter period of time.

**Summary**

The literature review began covering the background and what specifically led to this study focusing on performance at OCS. OEMA has conducted research to compare the different commissioning sources, cost of commissioning, and the performance of the different groups of officers across a career. OEMA has conducted the most research in the field and is charged with setting the stage for an Army Officer Corps Strategy. The studies that exist, in comparing different commissioned groups, does not compare performance specifically at OCS, the first and only place where the measures are objective and on the same tasks.

The differences between the two groups of candidates, OCS-IS and OCS-EO, are explored covering experience, time in service, degree status, and rank. This sets the conditions to cover the training at OCS and reducing the variables that could account for differences in performance. Although the candidates have varying backgrounds, the training and evaluations at OCS are identical for all candidates regardless of category. All candidates are measured against published and known Army standards. These standards are objective and each candidate is evaluated in the same manner.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Army has a shortage of officers in the senior Captain and Major ranks. In order to mitigate the risk posed by this shortage, the Army has increased the numbers of officers accessed, commissioned, to Active Component. The majority of this increase in the past decade has been accomplished by expanding OCS. Prior to the expansion of OCS in 1999, the school produced 10 percent of the Active Component officers in a given year. The expansion increased the annual percentage of OCS Active Duty commissions to account for 40 percent of a fiscal year.90

The growth in commissions and shift in percentages from 10 to 40 percent has placed the majority of the Active Component commissions at OCS, the most cost ineffective for the long term needs of the Army.91 The cost to produce an officer by way of OCS-IS is higher than any other source of officer production.92 These In-Service Candidates have more military experience than OCS-EO. The purpose of this study was to compare the success of OCS candidates as measured by the Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) achievement. This will help the Department of the Army determine if

90Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso, Toward a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success, 7.

91Ibid.

92Ibid.
the performance of the In-Service Candidates is worth the cost in terms of resources, time, and fiscally.

**Research Method**

The research methodology used quantitative methods and was non-experimental. The study was ex post facto research attempting to determine if there is a common cause, variable, that led to the effect, or DMG status. The study relied on secondary sources for data that was composed of class rosters with demographic data for each candidate and the DMG rosters. The study was quantitative in nature by measuring and comparing the raw numbers and rates of DMG status based on the variables.

The data used for analysis was provided by Howard Galloway, the personnel officer of OCS. The author obtained informed consent from Mr. Galloway who acknowledged specifically how the data would be used and the purpose of the study. An oral history methodology was used in contact with Mr. Galloway using e-mail correspondence and phone calls to ensure the author had a clear understanding of the context of each database provided by OCS for analysis. The same methodology was used

---

93 Paul D. Leedy, *Practical Research Planning and Design* (Columbus, Ohio; Prentice Hall, 1997), 111.

94 Ibid., 226.


96 Ibid., 198.

for the correspondence with Darryl Hollins of OCS. Mr. Hollins provided informed consent that he understood the purpose of the study and how his information provided would be used. Darryl Hollins provided the context training context for the data. The data provided consisted of class rosters and DMG rosters for the classes in the scope of the study.

The class rosters were merged with the DMG status in a database that contained the entire population. Subsequently, the variables were studied to determine what and how to group within the variables. Once it was determined how to group within the variables, a query was conducted to determine the total population for each group within the variables and the DMG status of those same candidates. The groups within the variables were compared to determine how the variables affect the DMG status.

**Research Question**

The question used to focus this study was: How does the experience of OCS-IS students affect their performance, as indicated by Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) status?

**Secondary Questions**

Subsequent questions used to frame the problem: How does degree status affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does time in service affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does military rank affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does combat experience affect the performance of candidates at OCS?
**Degree Status**

OCS candidates have varying levels of civilian education. Some have only 90 credit hours toward a specific degree, while others may have completed a baccalaureate degree or better. How does the performance, at OCS, of the different groups of candidates compare? The three groups for the variable of degree status were: OCS-EO complete, OCS-IS complete, and OCS-IS pursuing. Complete refers to the fact that the candidate already had a baccalaureate degree. Pursuing refers only to OCS-IS Candidates that had not earned a baccalaureate degree and are pursuing a degree.

There were a few variables that were not explored within this study. The level of education was not explored in this study. The information provided did indicate a number of candidates had completed graduate level degrees and an additional group had at least begun working toward graduate degrees. Another area not studied was the quality of education and the discipline of the degree. The data indicated that some candidates had degrees from Ivy League schools, while others from universities that are strictly online and do not even have a physical campus. The discipline of the degrees ranged from the hard sciences, such as Physics and Chemistry, to the social sciences such as Sociology. These areas were not explored because the entire data set was not available for the entire group.

**Time in Service**

Candidates at OCS had varying levels of time in service. This time in service was measured in terms of years. How does the performance at OCS of groups with varying lengths of time in service compare? Time in service is a critical variable in military experience. The more time in service a soldier has the more military experience they
have. Time in service is not only applicable to OCS-IS. Many OCS-EO Candidates have military time in service. This was based on their having served previously, separated from the military to complete their degrees, and subsequently returning under the OCS-EO program. The different groups were: less than three years, three to seven years, seven to ten years, ten to fifteen years, and greater than fifteen years.

**Rank**

Candidates arrived at OCS having earned various ranks in the military or civilian sector. Rank in the civilian sector does not translate to military rank. Previous military rank earned is an indicator of them having demonstrated some level of leadership proficiency. How does the performance, at OCS, of groups within varying previously earned military ranks compare?

There were variables within rank that were not addressed within the scope of this study. Some of those variables are: promotion rate, Non-Commissioned Officer Education School (NCOES), and duty positions held. The promotion rate indicated the rate at which one is promoted. Some soldiers earn the rank of Sergeant First Class in the minimum time of seven years. Others never earn the rank and retire as a Staff Sergeant with twenty years of service. Education referred to the level of Professional Development Schooling the individual has successfully completed. The schooling is mostly dependent on the rank; however, one can earn the rank of Staff Sergeant without attending the NCOES appropriate for that rank. It was not assumed that rank, was an indicator of college education. Duty positions held indicates the jobs one has served in. With varying military occupational specialties, there are various duties required for promotion. These
duties are not the same across all occupations. The variance in duties is also a variance in experience. These variables were not explored in this study.

**Combat Experience**

Candidates had varied levels of combat experience. How does combat experience affect performance at OCS? There were four different groups within this variable: no combat experience, experience in OIF, experience in OEF, or experience in both OIF and OEF.

The scope of combat experience could be vast. The common definition of combat experience is the fact that the soldier served thirty days in a declared combat zone. The country of Kuwait was considered a combat zone for both OIF and OEF, yet the conditions were nothing like Baghdad or Kandahar. Combat experience also varied greatly based on the type of unit, location, and when candidates were located there. This study only explored whether the candidate had been to OIF, OEF, or both.

**Data Display**

The separate groups of each variable were analyzed in the same manner. Tables used to display the information and groups that remained the same throughout the five different variables.

**Data Analysis**

The analysis of groups within variables was conducted by measuring the group percentage share against a benchmark. The standard benchmark used for most of the variables was 24.8 percent. This percentage of 24.8 was used as a benchmark because that was the percentage of the entire population that earned DMG status. Any group with
greater than 24.8 percent of their population earning DMG status was better than average and thus more likely to be successful at OCS than the average. Any group with less than 24.8 percent of their population earning DMG status was less than average and thus less likely to be successful at OCS than the average. The further the percentage was away from the benchmark, indicated the strength of the relationship and a greater likelihood for success or not.

If there was a given group that 35 percent of their total population earn DMG status, that group was highly likely to be successful at OCS and earn DMG status. This is in comparison with the benchmark of 24.8 percent, which is the aggregate percentage. If another group had 23 percent of their population earn DMG status, that group was less likely than average to earn DMG status. The fact that this percentage was only 1.8 percent away from the benchmark and aggregate indicates that there was not strong difference between the performance of the sample group and the total of the classes.

Another comparison was conducted to compare the percentage share that a given group composed of the entire population with the percentage share that the same group composed of the DMG population. In this comparison the original percentage share became the benchmark. If the DMG percentage share was greater than that benchmark, then the group gained share and was more likely than the groups that do not gain. If the DMG share was less than the benchmark, then that group would be less likely to earn DMG status relative to the other groups.

An example of this type of comparison helped reinforce the first comparison. If the given group composed 40 percent of the entire population, then 40 percent becomes the benchmark. If the percentage share of those earning DMG status is greater than 40
percent the group would be more likely to be successful at OCS than groups that loose share. If the percentage share of those earning DMG status was less than 40 percent, then the group is less likely to be successful at earning DMG status than other groups.

Table Display

Each variable was displayed in the same manner for comparison. Table 1 depicts the format and further explains the cells.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>% of DMG</td>
<td>% of Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>74.9%</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

Column A. Column A contains the short title for the group within each variable.

Column B. Column B contains the total number of candidates in the population for that group.

Column C. Column C is the percentage of the total population that group represents.

Column D. Column D is the number of candidates from that specific group that earned DMG status.
Column E. Column E is the percentage of the total DMG population represented by that specific group.

Column F. Column F is the percentage of that group that earned DMG status.

In Table 1, Group 1 had 917 candidates, which represented 74.9 percent of the total population. This group had 193 candidates earn DMG status representing 63.7 percent of the total DMG population. The fact that 193 of 917 earned DMG status is 21.0 percent of that group. Comparing the group percentage of 21.0 to the aggregate of 24.8 percent means the group was less likely than average to earn DMG status. This group also lost 11.2 percent share of the DMG status indicating that group was less successful than group 2. This same method for comparison was used for each variable studied.

Variables and Categories

The information is described and compared using variables and groupings within those variables. The variables used were: category of candidate, degree status, time in service, rank, and combat experience.

Category of Candidate

There are two different categories of students at OCS: OCS-EO and OCS-IS. All OCS-IS Candidates had prior military experience. OCS-EO Candidates may have had prior military experience, but had a break in service in which they separated from the military, completed their degree, and returned to the Army as an OCS-EO Candidate.

Degree Status

The degree status variable refers to the completion of a baccalaureate degree. The candidates were either “complete” or “pursuing.” All OCS-EO Candidates must be
complete with their degree prior to enlisting in the Army. OCS-IS Candidates may be either complete or pursuing when they attend OCS.

**Time in Service**

Time in service refers to the military experience, in terms of years, of the candidate. The years service groupings used were based on natural breaks or changes in a career. The groupings for this variable were: less than three years, three to seven years, seven to ten years, ten to fifteen years, and greater than fifteen years. The first three breaks between groups were tied to the enlistment periods and natural promotion periods. The last separation for groupings, that of over fifteen years, was based on promotion to Master Sergeant and changes in the echelon of service and level of responsibility.

**Rank**

Candidates varied in rank from Specialist thru Master Sergeant. Higher rank may suggest a likelihood for success at OCS. OCS-EO Candidates were conditionally promoted to Sergeant upon beginning OCS. OCS-IS Candidates retained their pay grade and rank while in OCS. During the conduct of the OCS class students were referred to as candidates and their previous rank does not have any bearing on their duties in the class.

**Combat Experience**

Combat experience refers to whether or not the candidate had been deployed to a combat theater of operations. These deployments are primarily Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), or in some cases experience in both. The four groupings of this variable were: OIF, OEF, both OIF and OEF, or none.
Howard Galloway, the Personnel Officer at OCS, provided class rosters for the thirteen classes studied. Each class roster contained demographic data that included the general demographic of the candidates, civilian education, and military experience. The information contained in the database was provided by the students during the first week of class. The information was checked against other Army databases to ensure the vital information is accurate. The information cross-referenced was their name, sex, social security number, component, and OCS-IS or OCS-EO. The rosters were used by the company running the class, the staff at OCS, and Human Resource Command Accessions Branch. The class rosters provided the baseline information for the comparison of the categories differentiated in the study.

Distinguished Military Graduate Rosters

The DMGs for each class is designated as such by a memorandum at the end of the class. This memorandum certifies the status of the candidates and is signed by the company commander and forwarded to HRC. HRC Accessions Branch subsequently updates the given candidates Officer Record Brief (ORB) as appropriate. OCS provided the DMG memorandums for the thirteen classes of the study.98 These memorandums were one of the two most important references to this study. These memos provided the exact listing of candidates that indicated who was successful at OCS, and named on the

---

98Howard Galloway, Phone interview with author, February 2010.
DMG. The data contained in the memos was the factor that enabled the findings in chapter 4.

Summary

The findings of this study were based on comparative analysis. This was accomplished using the class rosters and DMG rosters for each of thirteen OCS classes from June 2008 to June 2009. The variables used to determine if they were a contributor to success are: category of candidate, degree status, time in service, rank earned, and combat experience. Each group was compared to a benchmark based on percentage share of the overall group, or based on the success rates for all groups within the variable. The table used to display results was developed using the same format for each variable.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The Army has a shortage of officers in the senior Captain and Major ranks. In order to mitigate the risk posed by this shortage, the Army has increased the numbers of officers accessed, commissioned, to Active Component. The majority of this increase in the past decade has been accomplished by expanding OCS. Prior to the expansion of OCS in 1999, the school produced ten percent of the Active Component officers in a given year. The expansion increased the annual percentage of OCS Active Duty commissions to account for forty percent of a fiscal year.\(^9\)

The growth in commissions and shift in percentages from ten to forty percent has placed the majority of the Active Component commissions at OCS, the most cost ineffective for the long-term needs of the Army.\(^1^0\) There are two types of Candidates at OCS – In-Service (OCS-IS) and Enlistment Option (OCS-EO). The cost to produce an officer by way of OCS In-Service (OCS-IS) is higher than any other source of officer production.\(^1^1\) In-Service OCS Candidates have more military experience than do Enlistment Option (OCS-EO) Candidates. The purpose of this study was to compare the success as measured by the DMG ratings based on performance between the two groups.


\(^{10}\)Ibid.

\(^{11}\)Ibid.
at OCS, both in the same class. The results would possibly assist the Department of the Army determine if the performance of In-Service Candidates will justify the cost to develop in terms of resources, time.

**Research Question**

The question used to focus this study was: How does the experience of OCS-IS students affect their performance, as indicated by Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) status?

**Secondary Questions**

Subsequent questions used to frame the problem: How does degree status affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does time in service affect the performance of candidates at OCS? How does military rank affect the performance of OCS candidates? How does combat experience affect the performance of OCS candidates?

**Findings**

The study population included 13 OCS Classes from June 2008 to June 2009. There were 1,866 candidates total in the population and 462 of them were designated DMGs. This accounted for 24.8 percent of the total population of the study. The DMG policy as of 6 November 2008 indicated that the top 20 percent of a class, if they are not disqualified, will be designated as DMGs. All classes that started prior to that date were under a policy that reflected 30 percent of a class, that was not disqualified, was designated as a DMG. The data included eight classes that were under the policy of 30

\[102\] Officer Candidate School, *Distinguished Military Graduate Policy*. 

71
percent, while the remaining six classes operated under the 20 percent policy. This accounts for the DMG percentage of 24.8 percent.

Category

Category of the Candidate

There were two different categories of candidates at OCS: OCS-IS and OCS-EO. How did the performance, at OCS, of the two different groups of candidates, OCS-EO and OCS-IS compare when considering their performance as indicated by DMG? How did the two groups compare in performance?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>% of DMG</td>
<td>% of Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-IS</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-EO</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td></td>
<td>462</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Description of Table Contents—How the Information was Displayed

Column A, “Group,” indicated the group of candidates.

Column B, “Total,” indicated the number of candidates in the total population of thirteen classes that fell into that grouping or category.

Column C, “% of Total,” is the percentage of the total population that was represented by the group.
Column D, “DMG,” is the total number of candidates of that specific group that were designated DMG.

Column E, “% of DMG,” is the percentage of the total DMG population that was represented for each group.

Column F, “% of Group,” is the percentage of that specific group, column A, that was designated DMG.

**OCS-EO**

There were 1039 OCS-EO Candidates, accounted for 55.7 percent of the total. In this population, 202 earned DMG status accounted for 19.4 percent of the group. This was less than the benchmark of 24.8 percent. Comparing the two groups of candidates, this was the lowest of the groups indicating that OCS-EO were less likely to earn DMG status. The 202 candidates of this group that earned DMG status was the equivalent of 43.7 percent of the DMG population. The DMG share of 43.7 percent compared with 55.7 percent of the total population indicated a loss in share of 12.0 percent. This indicated that OCS-EO Candidates were much less likely to earn DMG status than their OCS-IS peers.

**OCS-IS**

There were 827 OCS-IS Candidates, accounting for 44.3 percent of the total. In this population, 260 earned DMG status, 31.4 percent of OCS-IS. Comparing the two groups of candidates, OCS-IS was much more likely to earn DMG status. The 260 DMG candidates of this group were 56.3 percent of the total DMG population. This indicated
that OCS-IS Candidates were much more likely to earn DMG status than their OCS-EO peers.

**Degree Status**

Candidates arrive at OCS with varying levels of civilian education. How does the performance, at OCS, of the different groups of candidates compare? The three groups for the variable of degree status were: OCS-EO complete, OCS-IS complete, and OCS-IS pursuing. Complete refers to the fact that the candidate already had a baccalaureate degree. Pursuing refers only to OCS-IS Candidates without baccalaureate degrees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>% of DMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-IS</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>1324</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-EO</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td></td>
<td>462</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Complete**

The population of candidates that had completed degrees includes OCS-IS and OCS-EO. There were 1324 candidates that had completed a baccalaureate degree or
better, accounting for 71.0 percent of the total. In this population, 297 earned DMG status accounting for 22.4 percent of the “complete” group total. This was less than the benchmark of 24.8 percent which was the benchmark for the total candidates that earned DMG status. Comparing the two groups of candidates, complete and pursuing, this was the lower of the groups indicating that candidates that have completed their degrees are less likely to earn DMG status. The 297 candidates of this group that earned DMG status was the equivalent of 64.3 percent of the DMG population. The DMG share of 64.3 percent compared with 71.0 percent of the total population indicated a loss in share of 6.7 percent. This indicated that candidates had already earned a baccalaureate degree were less likely to earn DMG status than their peers that had not.

**Pursuing**

The population of candidates that did not have baccalaureate degrees consisted of only OCS-IS, resulting from the requirement that the baccalaureate degree be completed prior to enlistment as OCS-EO. There were 451 candidates that had not completed a baccalaureate degree, which accounted for 24.2 percent of the total. In this population, 134 earned DMG status which accounted for 29.7 percent of the “pursuing” group total. This was greater than the benchmark of 24.8 percent which was the benchmark for the total candidates that earned DMG status. Comparing the two groups of candidates, complete and pursuing, this was the higher of the groups indicating that candidates that who had not completed their degrees, were more likely to earn DMG status. The 134 candidates of this group that earned DMG status was the equivalent of 64.3 percent of the DMG population. The DMG share of 29.0 percent compared with 24.2 percent of the total population indicated a gain in share of 4.8 percent. This indicated that candidates
that had not earned a baccalaureate degree were more likely to earn DMG status than their peers that had.

**Further Differentiation**

Since there were two different groups, or categories, of candidates that had completed their degrees, further analysis would provide details on the group most likely to earn DMG status.

**Complete, OCS-IS**

There were 289 candidates that had not completed a baccalaureate degree, accounting for 15.5 percent of the total. In this population, 95 earned DMG status accounting for 32.9 percent of the “OCS-IS, Complete” group total. This was greater than the benchmark of 24.8 percent which was the benchmark for the total candidates that earned DMG status. Comparing the groups of candidates, this was the highest of the groups indicating that OCS-IS Candidates that had completed their degrees were much more likely to earn DMG status than their peers. The 95 candidates of this group that earned DMG status was the equivalent of 20.6 percent of the DMG population. This percentage share compared with 15.5 percent of the total population indicated a gain in share of 5.1 percent. This indicated that OCS-IS Candidates that had earned a baccalaureate degree were more likely to earn DMG status than all other peer groups.

**Complete, OCS-EO**

There were 1035 candidates that had not completed a baccalaureate degree, accounting for 55.5 percent of the total. In this population, 202 earned DMG status accounting for 19.5 percent of the “OCS-EO” group total. This was less than the
benchmark of 24.8 percent which was the benchmark for the total candidates that earned DMG status. Comparing the groups of candidates, this was the lowest of all groups indicating that OCS-EO Candidates were much less likely to earn DMG status than their peers of other backgrounds. The 202 candidates of this group that earned DMG status was the equivalent of 43.7 percent of the DMG population. This percentage share compared with 55.5 percent of the total population indicated a loss in share of 11.8 percent. This was the largest share lost of any groups and indicated that OCS-EO Candidates are much less likely to earn DMG status than all other peer groups.

Time in Service

Candidates at OCS had varying levels of time in service. This time in service was measured in terms of years. How did the performance, at OCS, of groups with varying lengths of time in service compare? Time in service is a critical variable in military experience. The more time in service a soldier has the more military experience they have. Time in service is not only applicable to OCS-IS. Many OCS-EO Candidates had military time in service. This was based on their having served previously, separated from the military to complete their degrees, and subsequently returning under the OCS-EO program. The different groups were: less than three years, three to seven years, seven to ten years, ten to fifteen years, and greater than fifteen years.

Years Service Grouping

The years service groupings used, were based on natural breaks or changes in a career. The first three breaks in groups, were related to the enlistment periods and natural points of promotion. The last separation for groupings, that of over fifteen years, was
based on promotion to Master Sergeant and changes in the echelon of service and level of responsibility. The grouping of candidates with less than three years indicated either a first term soldier, one enlistment, or an enlistment option candidate. The group of 3-7 years because most first term enlistments are for three years. The three-year mark is a time when a soldier must make a conscious decision to separate from the military or continue service. The three-year point is also the first point in a career that a soldier is eligible for promotion to Sergeant.

The seven-year mark is a general mark in which the soldiers’ second enlistment term is over. Again, the soldier must make a conscious decision to either separate or reenlist in the military. This seven-year point is also the earliest point in a career that a soldier can be eligible for promotion to Sergeant First Class. This assumes that all previous promotions were attained at the earliest opportunity.

The ten-year mark is when a soldier must decide to make an entire career of the military or separate. Any enlistment that is due after ten years requires a conscious decision to either separate within ten years of eligibility for retirement or reenlist for an indefinite period. The indefinite period takes them to retirement eligibility at twenty years of service.

The total population of the thirteen classes was 1866 candidates. Information on experience, time in service, only existed for 1,710 of that total population. There were 156 candidates, one OCS class, that there is not any record of experience in terms of time in service. The secondary question with regard to time in service was: how does time in service affect the performance, as indicated by earning DMG status, of candidates at OCS? What group of candidates is most likely to be successful?
Ten to Fifteen Years of Service

The group with ten to fifteen years of service was most likely to earn DMG status with 32.9 percent of the group earning that distinction. There were 219 candidates with less than three years of service. In this population, 72 were designated DMG, or 32.9 percent of the group. This is greater than the total benchmark of 24.8 percent, and less than the average benchmark of 26.8 percent. Comparing the five groups of candidates, the 32.9 percent of the group being DMG was the highest of the groups indicating that Candidates with ten to fifteen years of service were the most likely to earn DMG status.

The population of 219 candidates accounted for 12.8 percent of the total population. This 12.8 percent of the total population became a benchmark for the group and was compared to 17.2 percent, 72 candidates, of the DMG population. The difference of 4.4 percent was the greatest gain in percentage share among the groups. This also
indicated that the candidates with ten to fifteen years service were the most likely to earn DMG status.

Three to Seven Years of Service

There were 307 candidates who had three to seven years of service. In this population, 87 were designated DMG, or 28.3 percent of the group. This was greater than the total benchmark of 24.8 percent, and greater than the average benchmark of 26.8 percent. Comparing the five groups of candidates, the 28.3 percent of the group being DMG was the second highest of the groups indicating that Candidates with three to seven years of service were the second most likely to earn DMG status.

The population of 307 candidates accounted for 18.0 percent of the total population. This 18.0 percent of the total population became the benchmark for the group and was compared to 20.8 percent, 87 candidates, of the DMG population. The difference was a change in percent of 2.8 percent was a minor gain in percentage share. This also indicated that the candidates with three to seven years service were second most likely to earn DMG status behind only those with ten to fifteen years of service.

More than Fifteen Years of Service

There were 85 candidates with more than fifteen years of service, accounting for 5.0 percent of the total. In this population, 24 earned DMG status accounting for 28.2 percent of the group. This was more than the total benchmark of 24.8 percent, and more than the average benchmark of 26.8 percent. Comparing the five groups of candidates, the 28.2 percent of the group being DMG was the third highest of the groups indicating that Candidates with greater than fifteen years of service were more likely to earn DMG
status. The 24 candidates of this group that earned DMG status was the equivalent of 5.7 percent of the DMG population. The DMG share of 5.7 percent compared with 5.0 percent of the total population indicated a growth in share of .7 percent. This indicated that the candidates with greater than fifteen years of service were more likely than average to earn DMG status.

Seven to Ten Years of Service

There were 182 candidates with less than three years of service. In this population, 43 were designated DMG, or 23.6 percent of the group. This was less than the total benchmark of 24.8 percent, and less than the average benchmark of 26.8 percent. Comparing the five groups of candidates, the 23.6 percent of the group being DMG was the second lowest of the groups indicating that Candidates with seven to ten years of service were less likely than average to earn DMG status.

The population of 182 candidates accounted for 10.6 percent of the total population. This 10.6 percent of the total population became a benchmark for the group and was compared to 10.3 percent, 43 candidates, of the DMG population. The difference was a change in percent of .3 percent which was a small loss in percentage share. This also indicated that the candidates with seven to ten years service were only slightly less likely than average to earn DMG status.

Less than 3 Years of Service

There were 917 candidates with less than three years of service. In this population, 193 were designated DMG, or 21.0 percent of the group. This was less than the total benchmark of 24.8 percent, and less than the average benchmark of 26.8 percent.
Comparing the five groups of candidates, the 21.0 percent of the group being DMG was the lowest of the groups indicating that Candidates with less than 3 years of service were least likely to earn DMG status.

The population of 917 candidates accounted for 53.6 percent of the total population. This 53.6 percent of the total population became a benchmark for the group and was compared to 46.1 percent, 193 candidates, of the DMG population. The difference was a change in percent of 7.5 percent and was the greatest difference, and was a loss in percentage share. This also indicated that the candidates with less than 3 years service were least likely to earn DMG status.

Rank

Candidates arrive at OCS having earned various ranks in the military or civilian sector. Rank in the civilian sector does not translate to military rank. Previous military rank earned was an indicator of having demonstrated some level of leadership proficiency. How does the performance, at OCS, of groups within varying previously earned military ranks compare?
How does previous rank affect success at OCS?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>% of DMG</td>
<td>% of Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-EO</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1299</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most Likely to Earn DMG Status

There were 1299 candidates that had their rank indicated in the data provided by OCS. This population had 328 candidates that earned the DMG status that accounted for 25.2 percent of that population. The rank most likely to be designated as DMG from this group was previous Master Sergeants, MSG, in which 58.3 percent of them earned DMG status. This was three times more likely than those with a rank of Specialist, SPC, which was the least likely to earn DMG status with only 21.8 percent of that population earning DMG. Warrant Officers were also highly successful as 47.6 percent of them earned DMG status. Sergeants First Class and Staff Sergeants were successful in relation to OCS-EO and Specialists. Sergeants First Class earned DMG status 34.7 percent of the time, while 30.3 percent of the Staff Sergeants earned DMG status. This data indicated that the higher the previous rank attained, the more likely the candidate was to earn DMG status.
Combat Experience

Candidates arrived at OCS with varying levels of combat experience. How does the performance, at OCS, of groups with varying combat experience compare? There are four different groups in this variable: no combat experience, experience in OIF, experience, in OEF, or experience in both OIF and OEF.

How does the performance of those with combat experience compare with those without combat experience at OCS?

### Table 6. Combat Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>% of DMG</td>
<td>% of Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1519</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Most Likely to Earn DMG Status**

The candidates in the thirteen classes were categorized into four groupings for the analysis of combat experience. The candidates either had no combat experience, had experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), experience in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), or experience in both OIF and OEF. The group of 1866 had 347 candidates with combat experience accounting for 18.6 percent of the total population. The group most
likely to earn DMG status based on combat experience was the group that had experience in OIF. From this group with OIF experience, 30.2 percent of them earned DMG status. The group without any combat experience accounted for 70.9 percent of the DMG population and earned that distinction at a rate of 23.6 percent, the lowest of the groups, but only slightly less than the aggregate of 24.8 percent. It was evident that there was a slight advantage to those with combat experience.

Summary

The distribution across the groups was significant enough to indicate that one group was more successful at OCS than others in achieving DMG status. OCS-IS Candidates were more likely to be achieve DMG status than their OCS-EO peers. Candidates that had not completed their degrees were more likely achieve DMG status than those that had completed their degree, with the exception of OCS-IS that had completed their degrees. All candidates that had not completed their degrees were OCS-IS. Time in service was an indicator of achievement of DMG status at OCS. In general, the more time in service OCS candidates had, the greater their likelihood of achieve DMG status. Rank was similar, in that the more rank OCS candidates had earned, the more likely they were to earn DMG status. Combat experience was also an indicator of potential to achieve DMG status. Candidates with combat experience were more successful at achieving DMG status at OCS than their peers without that experience.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army has a shortage of officers in the senior Captain and Major ranks. In order to mitigate the risk posed by this shortage, the Army has increased the numbers of officers accessed, commissioned, to Active Component. The majority of this increase in the past decade had been accomplished by expanding OCS. Prior to the expansion of OCS in 1999, the school produced ten percent of the Active Component officers in a year. The expansion increased the annual percentage of OCS Active Duty commissions to account for forty percent of a fiscal year.¹⁰³

The growth in commissions and shift in percentages from ten to forty percent has placed the majority of the Active Component commissions at OCS, the most cost ineffective for the long-term needs of the Army.¹⁰⁴ There were two types of Candidates at OCS: In-Service (OCS-IS) and Enlistment Option (OCS-EO). The cost to produce an officer by way of OCS In-Service (OCS-IS) is higher than any other source of officer production.¹⁰⁵ In-Service Candidates have more military experience than do Enlistment Option (OCS-EO) Candidates. The purpose of this study was to compare the success as measured by the DMG status between the two groups at OCS in the same classes. This


¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.
will help the Department of the Army determine if the performance of the In-Service Candidates is worth the cost in terms of resources, time, and fiscally.

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to help the Department of the Army Director of Military Personnel Management understand the performance of the two different groups of candidates at OCS. This was accomplished in terms of the specific variables of degree status, time in service, rank earned, and combat experience.

Chapter Organization

This chapter was organized to provide a short summary, conclusions, and recommendations. The summary provides an overview of the study beginning with the setting and transitioning to findings. The conclusion will wrap up the findings and transition to recommendations. The recommendations were based on the findings and how to improve the study. Lastly, the recommendations will cover areas for further research.

Overview

The U.S. Army Officer Corps is composed of officers of varying backgrounds, education, experience, commissioning source, and resources required to produce those officers. The resources required vary according to the background of the officer and commissioning source. OEMA poses that the most resource intensive officer to produce
is an Officer Candidate School In-Service officer. In light of this theory, hypothesize that the more resources required to produce a given group of officers would yield greater performance from that group. Thus, the central research question was: How does the experience of OCS-IS students affect their performance, as indicated by Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) status?

The introduction provided a short history of the commissioning of officers. This provided insight to the variables that may affect performance of those groups. The literature review explored the setting and background of OCS to reduce the additional variables of performance. Training and performance standards at OCS were the same for all candidates regardless of category, rank, or experience. The research methodology used was comparative analysis of the different groups within the given variables. The tables and method of analysis were consistent throughout all variables. The variables explored were: category of the candidate, degree status, time in service, rank earned, and combat experience.

**Conclusions**

OCS-IS Candidates, as a group performed better than their OCS-EO peers. All four variables proved to be indicators of performance at OCS as indicated by DMG status. The variables of time in military service; military rank and combat experience supported DMG list attainment in a positive manner. Inversely, a lack of college degree also supported DMG status compared to those without degrees are OCS-IS. The variable

---

combat experience was positive for DMG list attainment, with the exception of candidates who had military experience in both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. It was unknown why this occurred.

Within the variable of degree status, OCS-IS Candidates that had completed their baccalaureate degrees, performed best while OCS-EO Candidates were the least likely to earn DMG status. The OCS-IS that were pursuing their degrees performed better than their OCS-EO peers. Degree status was an indicator of DMG attainment at OCS based on military experience.

Time in service was an indicator of DMG attainment for the study. The group most likely to earn DMG status was the group with 10-15 years of experience. The group least likely to earn DMG status was the group with less than three years of experience, OCS-EO. The ranking from most to least likely to earn DMG status with regard to time in service was: 10-15 years, 3-7 years, greater than 15 years, 7-10 years, and less than three years. It is unknown why the group with greater than 15 years time in service, the most military experience, did not perform better than the two groups with less experience.

Based on rank, the higher the rank earned, the more likely to achieve DMG status at OCS. Master Sergeants performed the best as a group, followed by Warrant Officers, Sergeants First Class, then Staff Sergeants. The group that was least likely to earn DMG status was the Specialists from the OCS-IS group.

Combat experience was an indicator of DMG status. The groups that performed the best were those with more experience in OIF, followed by those with more experience in OEF, and finally those without any combat experience. Combat experience
was an indicator for all groups except those with both experience in OIF and OEF. This group did not attain DMG status at the rate expected. It is not known why the group did not achieve DMG status at a greater percentage than those without combat experience, and inversely lower than their peers with experience in one operation. It is recommended that this is studied further to determine if this is a trend, or an outlier that could be a result from the sampling.

The conclusions drawn are based on the facts presented in the findings. The OCS-IS group, those with military experience, perform better at OCS than their OCS-EO peers.

**Recommendations**

This study was framed with “return on investment” in mind. The OCS-IS Candidates performance, “return,” indicated that it was better than their OCS-EO peers. However, it is almost impossible to determine the investment required to get that return. The findings in this study are not sufficient to recommend that the Department of the Army change the current policies or procedures for commissioning officers thru OCS. The first recommendation is to determine if further research in this area is necessary and worth the effort. This being the first specific comparison of the two groups at OCS indicates that it was not necessary in the past, or not worth the effort.

If further research is necessary, it is recommended that the study is replicated for an entire year group with all of the information included for all of the candidates. This should be done using information from OCS, ROTC, and cross-checked with the Total Army Personnel Database. This would provide a larger sample set, and the data used would be more complete and comprehensive. There were some variables used in this
study that information was not known on all of the population. This could have an impact on the results, although not enough to change the outcome, it could change some percentages slightly.

Secondly, it is recommended that the metrics used along a career path are revised or further developed. The effort in this area should provide more objective measures of performance for the groups and account for other variables. One of those variables is the fact that OCS-IS are eligible for retirement prior to reaching twenty years of commissioned service. This has a significant impact on their motivation, career path, and career decisions.

It is recommended that a study of similar nature is conducted to determine there are predictors of failure at OCS. Are there certain variables or categories within the variables that can be used as predictors of failure? What are the variables, groups, characteristics of the candidates recycled or removed from OCS? Is the group recycled or removed predominantly OCS-IS and this offsets the good performance? It is also recommended, concerning experience in OIF and OEF that this situation is studied further to determine the impact of experience in both campaigns.

Additional question would surround the topic of the rigor of OCS the screening process. What is the east that of acceptance, and who exactly is denied entry according to the variables represented in this study?

Closing

The variables of degree status, time in service, rank, and combat experience represented predictors of DMG attainment of OCS candidates within this study, which supports performance. The findings for this study indicated a clear difference in
likelihood for earning DMG status for OCS-IS Candidates as a group. However, the scope of this study was only thirteen classes, one year, and did not contain all of the variable information for the entire population. Each candidate at OCS had a different background which led to their individual performance measured by DMG attainment. A word of caution to avoid stereotyping candidates based on their candidate status, OCS-IS or OCS-EO.
GLOSSARY

APFT. The Army Physical Fitness Test consists of three events: push-ups, sit-ups, and a 2 mile run. The event is graded against a published standard categorized by sex and age categories (FM 21-20).

Candidate. A student who is enrolled in OCS (AR 350-51).

Centralized Selection List (CSL). A listing of command/key billet positions by type category approved by CG, AHRC to be filled by officers selected under the Centralized Command/Key Billet Selection System.

Chain of command. Applicant’s unit commander, intermediate commander, installation commander, and major Army commander (AR 350-51).

Degree Completion. Candidates that have not earned a Bachelor’s degree prior to attending OCS become “Degree Completion.” These candidates must compete their degree prior to be promoted to Captain.

Enlistment Option Candidate (OCS-EO). Candidates that do not enter OCS directly from another U.S. Army Unit. They may be from another branch or component of service or have enlisted in the Army under the “OCS Enlistment Option” enlistment. These candidates are often referred to as “College Option” Candidates. The terms are interchangeable.

Go. Refers to earning passing marks on a graded event. There are some events that are graded as a “go” / “no-go.”

In-Service Candidate (OCS-IS). Candidates that enter OCS directly from the Active Army enlisted ranks.

Key developmental positions. These positions are specified, by branch or functional area in DA Pam 600–3, and revised periodically. A key developmental position is one that is deemed fundamental to the development of an officer in his or her core branch or functional area competencies or deemed critical by the senior Army leadership to provide experience across the Army’s strategic mission. The majority of these positions fall within the scope of the officer’s branch or functional area mission.

Officer Candidate School (OCS). A 12–week course conducted at designated Army schools to train qualified persons to serve as commissioned officers in the U.S. Army (AR 350-51).
APPENDIX A

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

The entire data set that was used for the findings was provided to Dr. David Bitters of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He is a Statistical Analyst for CGSC. Dr. Bitters used Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and MiniTab to conduct analysis.\(^{107}\)

Kruskal-Wallis Test

The Kruskal-Wallis Test is essentially a one-way analysis of variance by rank. It compares differences among the mean ranks of the various clusters.\(^{108}\) A cluster is a statistical term for the grouping of the candidate based on the groups within the variables. The statistic used for this test is based on a Chi-square distribution with the number of degrees of freedom one less than the number of clusters. The Kruskal-Wallis test is used to determine whether differences observed in the response profiles of the various clusters could be explained by chance alone. A large value of the associated Chi-square statistic would suggest that this is unlikely.\(^{109}\)

---

\(^{107}\)SPSS and MiniTab are computer programs used for statistical analysis. The programs are often used in conjunction with each other and can provide descriptive statistics, bivariate statistics, and prediction for numerical outcomes.

\(^{108}\)Cooper, Schindler, 667.

\(^{109}\)Ibid., 507.
A statistical analysis was conducted based on the variable of the category of the candidate. The two groups were: OCS-IS and OCS-EO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Actual Mean Rank</td>
<td>Expected Mean Rank</td>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-IS</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>860.54</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS-EO</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>970.73</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Created by author using the output of SPSS and MiniTAB provided by Dr. Bitters.

Each table in Appendix A is formatted in same manner. Column A. Column A contains the short title for the group within each variable.

Column B. Column B is the actual mean rank of the total number of candidates in the population for that group. If this number is not close to the expected mean rank, Column C, then the distribution is said to be “skewed” and can either be positively skewed or negatively skewed.

Column C. Column C is the expected mean rank of the population assuming there is a standard distribution and the results are not skewed. This is the benchmark that the actual mean rank, Column B, is compared with. The greater the difference between Column B and C, the more skewed the results.
Column D. Column D is a title column containing information for the DMGs. The Count refers to the raw number of candidates from that category, in the group. The percentage indicates the percent that the raw number accounts for in the total group.

Column E. Column E is the number and percentage of candidates from each respective group that earned DMG status.

Column F. Column F is the number and percentage of candidates from each respective group that did not earn DMG status.

In table 7, OCS-EO had an expected mean rank of 970.73 and an actual mean rank of 1019. This indicates that the distribution of the group is skewed and is larger than the expected mean rank. The actual mean rank being higher than the expected indicates that the skewing is negative and the OCS-EO Candidates did not perform as expected. OCS-IS has an expected mean rank of 860.54 and an actual mean rank of 823. This indicates that the distribution of the group is skewed and is less than the expected mean rank. The actual mean rank being lower than the expected indicates that the skewing is positive and the OCS-IS Candidates performed better than expected for a standard distribution. The information contained in Columns E and F is similar and consistent with the information presented in Chapter 4. A chi-squared result of 34.767 and an asymmetric significance indicates that there is a strong relationship between the variable of category of candidate and the DMG status. The results are not by chance.

Degree Status

A statistical analysis was conducted based on the variable of degree status of the candidate. The two groups were: pursuing and complete.
In table 8, those pursuing degrees had an expected mean rank of 836.41 and an actual mean rank of 450. This indicates that the distribution of the group is skewed and is significantly less than the expected mean rank. The actual mean rank being less than the expected indicates that the skewing is positive and the group pursuing degrees performed much better than expected. Those complete with their degrees had an expected mean rank of 900.26 and an actual mean rank of 1377. This indicates that the distribution of the group is skewed and is higher than the expected mean rank. The actual mean rank being higher than the expected indicates that the skewing is negative and the group complete with their degrees performed worse than expected for a standard distribution. The information contained in Columns E and F is similar and consistent with the information presented in Chapter 4. A chi-squared result of 9.492 with an asymmetric significance of .002 indicates there is a strong relationship between the variable of category of candidate and the DMG status. The results are not by chance.

Table 8. Degree Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual Mean Rank</td>
<td>Expected Mean Rank</td>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuing</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>836.41</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>316</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>1317</td>
<td>900.26</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author using the output of SPSS and MiniTAB provided by Dr. Bitters.
A statistical analysis was conducted based on the variable of degree status of the candidate. The groups were: less than 3 years, 3-7 years, 7-10 years, 10-15 years, and more than 15 years.

### Table 9. Time in Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 3 yrs</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>881.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-10 yrs</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>856.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7 yrs</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>819.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 15 yrs</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>820.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 yrs</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>779.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author using the output of SPSS and MiniTAB provided by Dr. Bitters.

In table 9, with greater than 15 years of service had an expected mean rank of 820.72 and an actual mean rank of 85. This indicates that the distribution of the group is skewed and is significantly less than the expected mean rank. The actual mean rank being less than the expected indicates that the skewing is positive and the group with greater than 15 years of service performed much better than expected for a standard distribution. Those with less than 3 years of service had an expected mean rank of 881.30 and an
actual mean rank of 914. The distribution of the group is skewed and negative. The group
with less than 3 years of service performed worse than expected for a standard
distribution. The information contained in Columns E and F is similar and consistent with
the information presented in Chapter 4. A chi-squared result of 17.369 with an
asymmetric significance of .002 indicates there is a relationship between the variable of
category of candidate and the DMG status. The results are not by chance.

Rank

A statistical analysis was conducted based on the variable of rank of the
candidate. The groups were: Warrant Officer, Non-commissioned officer (SSG, SFC,
MSG), Conditional Sergeant, Sergeant (E-5), and Enlisted (E3-4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual Mean Rank</td>
<td>Expected Mean Rank</td>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>631.31</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG, SFC, MSG</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>751.45</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Sergeant</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>821.51</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant (E5)</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>826.77</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted (E3-4)</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>852.47</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author using the output of SPSS and MiniTAB provided by Dr.
Bitters.
In table 10, the Conditional Sergeants had an expected mean rank of 821.51 and an actual mean rank of 120. This indicates that the distribution of the group is skewed and is significantly less than the expected mean rank. The actual mean rank being less than the expected indicates that the skewing is positive and the Conditional Sergeants performed much better than expected for a standard distribution. The Sergeants had an expected mean rank of 826.77 and an actual mean rank of 523. This indicates that the distribution of the group is skewed and is lower than the expected mean rank. The actual mean rank being lower than the expected indicates that the skewing is positive and the Sergeants performed better than expected for a standard distribution. According to the table, the actual mean was better than the expected mean indicating that the performance was positively skewed for all groups.

The variable of rank is the only one in which the SPSS and MiniTab information is not consistent with the findings in Chapter 4. This is partly because of the manner in which the groupings were done in SPSS and MiniTab. The groupings in Chapter 4 were broken out by each rank individually, while the groupings in SPSS and MiniTab were more generic. The variable of rank is also the one in which there is the greatest room for error.

**Combat Experience**

A statistical analysis was conducted based on the variable of combat experience of the candidate. The groups were: yes and no. Yes indicated that the candidate had combat experience, while no indicates they did not.
Table 11. Combat Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean Rank</td>
<td>Mean Rank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>885.78</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1511</td>
<td>938.90</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>1152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author using the output of SPSS and MiniTAB provided by Dr. Bitters.

In table 11, the group with combat experience had an expected mean rank of 885.78 and an actual mean rank of 346. This indicates that the distribution of the group is skewed and is significantly less than the expected mean rank. The actual mean rank being less than the expected indicates that the skewing is positive and the group with combat experience performed much better than expected for a standard distribution. The group without combat experience had an expected mean rank of 938.90 and an actual mean rank of 1511. This indicates that the distribution of the group is skewed and is higher than the expected mean rank. The actual mean rank being higher than the expected indicates that the skewing is positive and the group without combat experience performed much worse than expected for a standard distribution. Columns D, E, and F present information that is similar and consistent with the findings in chapter 4. A chi-squared result of 4.934 with an asymmetric significance of .026 indicating there is a relationship between the variable of category of candidate and the DMG status. The results are not by chance.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Periodicals


Peters, Ralph. “Protect the commissioning sources.” *Army Times*, 27 April 1998.

Sabal, Dennis G., and Chad Lienau. “Building the officer Corps of the 21st century.” 

Sinnreich, Richard H. “Keeping Perspective on the Army's Leader Attrition.” *Army*, 
March 2008.


———. “OCS Grads Given Leeway on O-3 Education Requirement.” *Army Times*, 
March 2010.

———. “OCS entry now requires college degree.” *Army Times*, 26 October 2009.


“School turns NCOs into officers.” *Army Times*, 12 September 2005.

**Government Sources**

Congress, September 17, 1787.

Ford, Jeff. GAO-07-372R, *Military Personnel: DMDC Data on Officers’ Commissioning Programs is Insufficiently Reliable and Needs to be Corrected*. Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 

———. Army Regulation (AR) 350-51 *United States Army Officer Candidate School*. 


———. “Leadership Evaluations Leadership Professional Development” (Officer Candidate School, 16 March 2006), e-mailed to author, November 2009.


———. *Senior Officer Candidate Review Program* (Fort Benning: Officer Candidate School, April 2009).


**Other Documents**


105
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Lloyd Sherfey
DJIMO
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Linda Lynch, PhD
QA
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

George Hodge
CTAC
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Headquarters, U.S. Army Officer Candidate School
7470 Riordon Street
Building 2756B
Fort Benning, GA 31905