PRINCIPLES OF BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy and Joint Planner

by

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# Principles of Building Partnership Capacity

**Abstract**

The National Defense Strategy of the United States continues to place ever greater importance on the practice of building the capacity of partner nations. The role of the United States military in this endeavor will continue to grow for the foreseeable future. Thus, the central research question is: What are the core commonalities that make Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) efforts successful? The answer to this question provides six criteria to evaluate prospective BPC engagements and ten key considerations that BPC planners can utilize to increase the probability of successfully building a capacity in a partner nation. The secondary research question examines the characteristics of Joint BPC engagements (engagements involving two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander). The secondary research question provide six characteristics for the joint BPC planner to incorporate, in addition to the ten key considerations previously discussed, due to this unique type of military BPC engagement. With the ever expanding reliance on coalitions and the importance of regional security to combat global threats, BPC contributes to the overall deterrence capability of the United States. This thesis examines this significant Department of Defense mission and provides recommendations to assist decision makers with the evaluation of BPC engagements and planners with the development of both traditional and Joint BPC engagements.

**Subject Terms**

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

PRINCIPLES OF BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY, by Major Jason B. Terry, 98 pages.

The National Defense Strategy of the United States continues to place ever greater importance on the practice of building the capacity of partner nations. The role of the United States military in this endeavor will continue to grow for the foreseeable future. Thus, the central research question is: What are the core commonalities that make Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) efforts successful? The answer to this question provides six criteria to evaluate prospective BPC engagements and ten key considerations that BPC planners can utilize to increase the probability of successfully building a capacity in a partner nation. The secondary research question examines the characteristics of joint BPC engagements (engagements involving two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander). The secondary research question provides six characteristics for the joint BPC planner to incorporate, in addition to the ten key considerations previously discussed, due to this unique type of military BPC engagement. With the ever expanding reliance on coalitions and the importance of regional security to combat global threats, BPC contributes to the overall deterrence capability of the United States. This thesis examines this significant Department of Defense mission and provides recommendations to assist decision makers with the evaluation of BPC engagements and planners with the development of both traditional and joint BPC engagements.
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>Building Partnership Capacity</td>
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<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, *Foreign Affairs*

The upper echelons of the United States (U.S.) government recognizes the need and importance of Building Partnership Capacity (BPC). The true questions are not “whether” the U.S. should conduct BPC, but rather with whom should the U.S. conduct BPC, how these efforts should be designed, which organization should take the lead, and what are the responsibilities of supporting organizations. Additionally, confronted with ever shrinking resources, it becomes more critical to invest the limited assets that will be available for BPC in the most advantageous manner.

The purpose of this study is to illuminate key concepts in how BPC endeavors are evaluated and planned. Examination of doctrine and best practices from government and non-government sources results in six criteria that should be considered when evaluating the large number of potential BPC engagements. Second, this thesis further identified ten key considerations common to successful BPC efforts. This is a list of proven strategic and operational principles that can guide planners of BPC engagements towards a greater likelihood of success. Finally, given U. S. military capability to conduct joint operations and the synergies that result, there should be an element of joint planning in the execution
of the available BPC resources whenever sensible. This thesis identifies six characteristics of good joint BPC planning.

**Background**

Senior leaders consistently emphasize in strategic level documents the importance of BPC. Consequently, the whole-of-government tends to be involved in conducting or examining ways to build the capacity of our partner nations. What is often lacking, however, is the development of a coordinated approach of the multitude of engagements towards a comprehensive objective prior to initiating the endeavor. Poorly detailed, long term planning can lead to a mediocre job of managing and informing the expectations of the nations with whom we are building capacity. Inadequate expectation shaping on our part can result in unrealistic capabilities being the anticipated outcome of our BPC efforts and the perception that we failed to deliver on a promised capability. This is an environment where even the best BPC engagements will likely fail to meet expectations of the partner nation.

Of greater concern, organizations conduct operations and engagements and then look for ways to make minor adjustments to the engagement so they can categorize it as “BPC” rather than build a BPC effort from the beginning. The concept that any BPC

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1In addition to the epigraph at the beginning of this thesis, as recently as the May 2010 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, Secretary Gates states that the “strategic reality demands that the U.S. government get better at what is called ‘building partner capacity’: helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance.” The 2010 *QDR* discusses the importance of BPC in areas ranging from restructuring the force to leader development. Four of the five pillars of the 2008 *National Defense Strategy* discuss building the capacity of partner nations and one pillar, Promote Security, is dedicated to this effort. BPC is becoming a significant task for the U.S. military.
engagement is a valuable BPC engagement has contributed to the acceptance of this “task-to-strategy” flow (Manning 2009, 30). A significant failure that can occur from this practice is a lack of coordination between various organizations conducting engagement with a particular nation leading to multiple voices providing contradictory guidance to a nation. This thesis focuses on the military aspect of BPC and delineates the mechanisms within the Department of Defense (DoD) that can minimize the individual Services from conducting BPC engagements that are not nested. A recent European Command (EUCOM) engagement encountered this problem. EUCOM was building a capability with a partner nation to improve their light weight forces’ rapid deployment capability and not working with the same partner nation to develop complimentary airpower capabilities (both lift and attack). Realizing that the partner nation was receiving the contradictory message to build an airpower capability that was purely of use for air forces, EUCOM’s air component began discussions with the partner nation to conduct BPC ranging from developing organic lift and attack aircraft for the type of rapid deployable force being created to building aerial port and terminal air controller capacity to leverage coalition airpower if the assumption is another nation will provide that capability. The result was a comprehensive examination of airpower capabilities that supported both air and land force requirements. The initial lack of coordination and nesting in this example could have eventually created potential for contradictory capacity building engagements and missed opportunities for synergies.

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2 The author previously worked on multiple BPC engagements while working for the Directorate of Operations, United States Air Forces Europe.
With the primary research question providing an understanding of the
commonalities that make BPC efforts successful, it is possible to narrow the focus onto
BPC activities that involve two or more of the U.S. Military Services. The U. S. military
aggressively pursues the capability to conduct joint operations due to the synergies that
result from these types of operations. Given the ever increasing number of strategic
documents emphasizing the importance of the DoD accomplishing BPC to address global
security issues, it is logical to examine where joint operations and BPC engagements merge. Examination of the elements of good joint BPC engagements resulted in the identification of six characteristics that should be considered in addition to the ten key considerations of BPC when planning joint BPC engagements.

Another method for understanding the approach taken to understand this topic is to consider rebuilding classic cars. If a person were to decide to start a business rebuilding classic cars, they reasonably start with examining what other individuals have learned about successfully rebuilding classic cars. They might also sensibly decide to examine successful rebuilds of classic trucks and motorcycles for additional perspective. From this research, it is logical to assume that they would be able to accomplish two things. First, when confronted with ten potential cars to rebuild, and only enough money to purchase three, they would have criteria for which three cars have the most promise of resulting in a successful rebuild. Second, while accomplishing the rebuild of these three cars, they would have a list of key considerations that worked well for other individuals that have accomplished successful rebuilds. The primary research question provides the same criteria and key considerations relevant to BPC. Now, if this individual were to decide they wanted to start this business with a group of friends rather than as a single businessman, the same criteria and key considerations would still be valid. It would be reasonable, however, to also examine the successful characteristics of individuals going into business together, particularly in fields similar to the classic car rebuild business. The secondary research question provides the same characteristics relevant to joint BPC.
**Assumptions**

An assumption of this thesis is that the lessons of previous BPC engagements are applicable to engagements potentially in a different region and a future time. It is entirely possible that within the complex system in which nations interact with each other they may not repeat any action which might predict a certain outcome. For this thesis, however, the view was taken of an anonymous statement that has often been attributed to Mark Twain: “History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes.” It is assumed that although nations may not always act in a predictable manner, there are certain generalities in how people, nations, and cultures conduct themselves. Consequently, the study of these generalities is worthy of the effort in this thesis.

**Definitions**

The definition of Building Partnership Capacity is often debated and is slightly different depending on the source. The significant amount of emphasis placed on BPC in the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* resulted in the creation of a QDR Execution Roadmap. The *QDR Execution Roadmap: Building Partnership Capacity* definition of BPC is “Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners” (Department of Defense 2006b, 5). Understanding BPC, however, requires knowledge of a couple of other related terms as well.

Security Cooperation is defined on the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s website as activities conducted with allies and friendly nations to:
1. Build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests

2. Build allied/friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations

3. Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access

As a subset of Security Cooperation, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency defines Security Assistance as a group of programs, authorized by law, to provide defense articles and services in support of national policies and objectives. Types of programs that would be included in this group are Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and even Direct Commercial Sales. These Security Assistance programs “allow the transfer of defense articles and services to international organizations and friendly foreign Governments via sales, grants, leases, or loans to help friendly nations and allies deter and defend against aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens and help foster regional stability” (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2007).

A term often used in conjunction with BPC is Security Force Assistance. Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, defines Security Force Assistance as “unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority” (2008b, 6-14). Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* notes that “SFA is normally part of a larger security sector reform effort, while in other instances, SFA is not tied to reform but to building partner capacity” (2009a, v). The average reader is faced with multiple terms that are utilized to describe the multitudes of means by which the U.S. assists allies with improving both military and non-military capabilities.
When putting all these terms into context, the RAND Corporation was able to provide a suitable definition for BPC that successfully incorporates many of the concepts discussed in the monograph *A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships*. The RAND study team defined BPC as the art employed to describe “targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners” (Department of Defense 2006b, 5). In other words, BPC is the umbrella objective that draws on the elements of security cooperation with the goal to implement a multinational and multiagency approach to meeting strategic objectives (Moroney et al. 2009a, 4).

To serve the purposes of this effort, a simpler definition will suffice. Secretary Gates defined BPC in reference to security issues as being “helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance” (Gates 2010, 2). This thesis utilized Secretary Gates definition as it applies to strategic objectives related to security issues.

**Limitations**

A limitation of this thesis is the majority of research data available on the subject of BPC is lumped into “U.S. efforts” and not an individual U.S. organization’s contribution to the total “U.S. effort.” Consequently, available data is often for the total amount of funds contributed towards BPC efforts for a country, but not broken down by organization. An additional limitation is available data often reflects money, but not other resources such as man hours or U.S. equipment maintenance costs due to an engagement.
Delimitations

As delimitation, this study will primarily examine U.S. BPC efforts. Although some of the historical cases examined included the actions of other nations, the primary sources for current BPC activities were U.S. centric. Many other nations actively pursue partnership building capacity activities, but due to the limited size of this research effort the capacity building activities of other nations was deemed outside the scope of my research and is a recommendation for further study. Furthermore, this thesis focused on the military aspect of BPC. Although there is significant interdependence between different types of assistance being provided by the U.S. (e.g. building capacity in farming techniques can result in being able to sustain a larger land force and having surplus crops to trade for improved weapon systems) the scope of this effort will be reduced to efforts to improve capacity with regard to security. Finally, in the analysis of available literature produced by Combatant Command (COCOM), this document examined EUCOM. This is done to focus the research and examine a specific COCOM in greater detail.

Significance

This body of work is specifically designed to assist two groups of people: The decision makers charged with evaluating potential BPC engagements and the military planners charged with developing the COCOM’s engagements. The results of this thesis assist decision makers in determining which of the numerous potential BPC engagements are worthy of U.S. efforts. This determination increases in importance in a fiscally constrained environment. This thesis also provides military planners means to improve the effectiveness of the BPC engagements they develop. Finally, in contributing to the
academic body of work on the subject of BPC, this thesis illuminates nuances of this increasingly complex mission.

The intent is not every COCOM Commander read this or that it is even information that senior leaders at that level do not already possess. The “decision makers” for determining which military BPC engagement is selected or deemed too costly include numerous people from senior ambassadors and COCOM Commanders down to field grade staff officers. The bottom line is that recommendations of staff officers have weight. The manner in which a particular BPC engagement is envisioned, proposed and recommended through multiple levels of command to the final approval authority impacts the likelihood of that BPC engagement being selected. Emphasis placed on BPC in U.S. National Defense Strategy, and reflected in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, requires decision makers at all levels be educated on the considerations involved with conducting BPC.

The group of individuals referred to as “planners” within this document is also a relatively broad group of people. The specific country and regional experts for an area in which a planned BPC engagement occurs will likely intuitively consider many of the recommendations of this thesis, but even this group will benefit from the succinct manner in which this thesis identifies key considerations for planners. At some point, however, these expert military planners whom are specifically focused on a partner nation, will need to hand over execution of the engagement to assigned forces and that unit’s planners. This is not to suggest that COCOM architects of a BPC engagement will not continue to stay involved once forces are assigned, but rather to suggest that the group of individuals who need to be familiar with the art of planning BPC engagements is much
larger than just the country and regional experts. In this document, the term “planners” refers to this entire group of individuals.

The significance of this thesis in the advancement of scholarship in the field of military art and science is that it distills many of the common truths in the complex environment of building the capacity of partner nations and consequently provides tools to improve current efforts in this field. These tools assist in making informed decisions about BPC engagements in a resource constrained environment and improve coordination in the BPC engagements developed by the U.S. DoD. Finally, with the ever expanding reliance on coalitions and the importance of regional security to combat global threats, BPC contributes to the overall deterrence capability of the U.S.

**Summary**

This thesis examines the complex nature of BPC. Through the distillation of a large volume of material on the subject, the intention is to provide the BPC decision makers and planners a framework that assists in understanding the complexities of BPC. Chapter 2 of this thesis will highlight some of the most important works utilized in the construction of this framework.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides an overview of literature written on the subject of military BPC. This review of literature was designed for the purpose of examining the different organizations that shape U.S. BPC efforts and extract the aspects of these efforts that point towards successful engagements. The review also seeks occurrences of joint operations in BPC and the role joint operations played in planning the BPC engagements.

The field of professional writing on subjects relevant to BPC efforts is constantly growing. Additionally, numerous government reports relevant to the subject are available for examination. This review is grouped into either General Literature or U.S. Government Documents. General Literature is further sub-categorized into Historical Analysis, International Organizations, and International Corporations. U.S. Government Documents are divided into the sub-categories of Legislative Branch and Executive Branch. The Executive Branch category is then further delineated by Department of State (DoS), DoD, and Geographic Combatant Commands.

General Literature

General literature is defined as the enduring works on the subject of BPC in military matters that were written primarily from an academic perspective with no particular audience intended. Given that the term BPC is relatively new in origin, the majority of these works will refer to programs of a variety of names that focus on increasing a capability within a partner nation. The literature in this review considers Japan from 1869 to 1942 for some historical context. Other literature, such as The
Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for the 21st Century, utilizes a historical context in an attempt to distill lessons for current problems. Finally, this review also includes literature on foreign economic aid. Although economic aid and BPC engagements are significantly different, some of the lessons learned from operating in a foreign nation to provide economic aid are applicable to some types of BPC engagements. This review will start, however, with an examination of literature concerning the actions of Britain and France following the opening of Japan in 1869 through the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the HMS Prince of Wales and the HMS Repulse at the end of 1941.

Historical Analysis

Ian Nish provides a detailed description of the Japanese foreign policy objectives during the time of the Meiji Restoration in his two books Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka and Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period. Although this thesis narrowly focused on building partner nation military capacity, it is important to recognize that there is an aspect of foreign policy in all engagements between two nations. In Nish’s book Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942 he described the relative rise and fall of the Kasumigaseki, Japanese Foreign Ministry, from the reemergence of a consolidated Japanese nation in 1869 to the significant transfer of power in the foreign policy arena by 1937 to the Army General Staff or Miyakezaka. Nish’s examination of the works of the significant Foreign Ministers of this time period provided context for the foreign policy decisions that Japan was making at this time.

In his subsequent work, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, Nish establishes the conditions of Japan following the First World War and the foreign policy actions that guided the nation through the beginnings of the Second World War. This
second book focuses on the last third of the time period of foreign policy examined in the previously mentioned study and has the advantage of additional research material due to publication 25 years later than the aforementioned work. Nish adequately describes a rural society with burgeoning industry transitioning to a modern nation with ever increasing demands for imported resources (Nish 2002, 13). Japanese foreign policy during this time period is generally considered a failure, and by the 1930s Japan was a complex, unstable, and faction-ridden government that included the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy pursuing defense strategies neither complimentary nor at times even relevant to the other (Nish 2002, 176). With this understanding of Japanese history, French and British BPC efforts were examined.

Ample literature is available concerning the amazing speed with which the Japanese increased military capacity in a relatively short period of time. These works include *Japan: A Country Study* by Ronald Dolan and Robert Worden and *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* edited by Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millet. A few key points have been extracted concerning the literature reviewed on this subject. First, prior to the visit of Commodore Mathew C. Perry and the resultant commercial treaty with the U.S. in 1854, Japan was technologically underdeveloped when compared to Western nations due to two centuries of isolationism and the weakening feudal rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate (Perry 1996, 305). Throughout the latter half of the 1800s, the British Royal Navy and Royal Army provided significant training to the Japanese, including running a naval academy in Tokyo in the 1870s and accepting multiple officers for training abroad (Perry 1996, 314). By the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, seven principle
warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy were built in Japan and two were built in France (Perry 1996, 320).

At the turn of the century, some in France recognized the threat Japan might pose on western empires in Asia and began discussions with Britain to temper BPC efforts in Japan (Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 1971, 118). Nonetheless, in the seven years leading up to the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 an additional eight battleships built in Great Britain became part of the Japanese fleet (Perry 1996, 321). France, the nation with the largest air force following the First World War, sent a training expedition of 60 plus men and a selection of the latest French military aircraft to Japan in 1919 (Tagaya 2006, 182). Not to be out done, the British in 1921 sent a 33 man mission with a wealth of experience in naval air operations and the design and testing of naval aircraft to enhance carrier operations (Tagaya 2006, 186). Two clear truths are identified: (1) there was no shortage of Western countries eager to conduct BPC with the Japanese, and (2) the Japanese received significant assistance that facilitated its relatively quick transition into a world power. The nations conducting BPC with the Japanese addressed some short term national interests through military foreign sales, but were detrimentally affected by the long term application of the capacity built in Japan.

Although there is much literature similar to the type referenced in the previous paragraph that present historical accounts of nations providing assistance to other nations, there are fewer documents that actually attempt to apply historical context towards lessons for future engagements. One such document that does attempt to accomplish this feat is The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned for the 21st Century. The author of the fifth chapter of this document, Bertrand Collomb, deduces two key lessons from the Marshall
Plan that are as relevant today as they were in 1947. The first lesson is that doing something for the greater good is not necessarily mutually exclusive from doing well for yourself (Collomb 2008, 72). Collomb, referencing corporate strategies, notes that in the same manner Henry Ford raised salaries so his employers could purchase his cars, the Marshall Plan was based on the assumption that providing Europe with the resources to purchase goods from the U.S. was good for rebuilding Europe and stimulating the American economy (Collomb 2008, 72). Military BPC efforts can be viewed with a similar assumption that engagements to increase capacities that are within the national interests of both partner nations and the U.S. are good for increasing security of both the partner nation and U.S. national interests abroad.

The second lesson Collomb identifies is the role that each nation must take in a successful engagement. The author quotes George C. Marshall from the 30 June 1947 Congressional record as having stated, “It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for our Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. . . .” (Collomb 2008, 73). This same principle continues to hold true for today’s BPC engagements. If the partner nation is not fully engaged in the capacity being developed, it is not likely that an enduring capacity will result.

In the same manner lessons can be learned from similarities in historical context and applied towards today’s BPC engagements, there are lessons that can be drawn from engagements to provide foreign economic assistance that are also applicable to BPC. In the book *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-Or War*, Mary B. Anderson examined a series of historical examples to glean the lessons that can be reapplied to
effectively provide aid in the future. Anderson dedicated a chapter to understanding how these lessons improve planning, design, implementation, and monitoring of aid programs. The simple recognition of these four distinct areas is pertinent to how BPC engagements are conducted. Additionally, the importance of expectation management both with the partner nation and the parties conducting BPC is just as relevant today as it was during the execution of the Marshall Plan (Anderson 1999, 68). Anderson then discussed the importance of an analytical framework prior to conducting the engagement. In the construction of this framework, the importance of understanding the historical and current factors relevant to the engagement and the importance of building into this framework a method for monitoring or gathering metrics are addressed (Anderson 1999, 72). Finally, Anderson emphasized the importance of understanding that the engagement is dynamic and not static (Anderson 1999, 76). The framework that was built for the engagement needs to be routinely revisited and updated to reflect developments. These lessons are true when working with another nation to deliver aid or when working with a partner nation to build military capacity.

International Organizations

International organizations are also fluent in the discussion on building relationships with other nations. One such organization examined was the World Health Organization (WHO) due to its extensive experience and broad mission in dealing with increasing the health care capacity of numerous nations around the world. The WHO is the leading and coordinating authority for health within the United Nations system. It is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, coordinating development of norms and standards, articulating evidence-based
policy options, providing technical support to countries and monitoring and assessing health trends. Nearly 8,000 people from more than 150 countries work for the WHO in 147 country offices, 6 regional offices and the headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland (WHO 2007, 3). A 34-member Executive Board oversees 6 regional committees focused on health matters of a regional nature (WHO 2007, 6). As an international organization, the WHO collaborates with many partners to include other United Nations agencies, national governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector (WHO 2007, 2). The organization’s diverse staff includes doctors, epidemiologists, scientists, managers, and administrators with a 2006-2007 budget of approximately $3.3 billion (WHO 2007, 20). It is this type of diversity and large scope of operations that makes the best practices of the WHO worthy of examination.

Three principles were noted regarding the practices used by the WHO. The first principle is derived from the six point WHO agenda entitled Enhancing Partnerships and the goal of the WHO to “encourage partners implementing programmes within countries to align their activities with best technical guidelines and practices, as well as with the priorities established by countries” (Appendix B). This principle recognizes that at any moment multiple programs can be conducted within a country and speaks to the importance of aligning those programs both under a common practice or guideline as well as the interests of the partner nation.

A second principle espoused by the WHO in their six point agenda speaks to the importance of solid metrics. Under the section concerning Improving Performance, the “WHO plans its budget and activities through results-based management, with clear expected results to measure performance at country, regional and international levels”
(Appendix B). Not only does this principle recognize the need for results to be measurable and leadership assessed by the progress measured, but it also recognizes the need to measure the effects within the country, the region, and at the international level.

The final principle noted regarding the practices of the WHO as an international organization operating in the global environment is gleaned from the report *Technical meeting on strengthening health information systems in the European Region in the framework of the Health Metrics Network*. The report was the result of a March 2007 technical meeting conducted in Copenhagen on strengthening health information systems of the European Region in the framework of the Health Metrics Network. The Health Metrics Network is a global partnership intent on integrating accurate health information in countries through shared agreements. In addition to once again emphasizing the importance of metrics, a role of the Health Metrics Network in “the region could be to act as a convener and facilitator of meetings of experts and policy makers, bringing actors and interested parties together across various public and private sectors” (WHO, Regional Office for Europe, and HMN 2007, 8). In this case, the WHO recognized the role it could play in increasing the capacity of multiple nations in a coordinated manner and achieving a synergy by ensuring all nations involved met a common minimum capability that was compatible with the other nations involved. Furthermore, the WHO was able to work as a third party subject matter expert and facilitate discussions between multiple entities.

International Corporations

Many international corporations face challenges similar to those encountered by international organizations such as the WHO when operating globally. An examination of literature developed by international corporations was reviewed to assist in determining
the principles for success when attempting to build capacity in another country. Although it is pertinent to acknowledge international corporations take actions with the intent of seeking profit, many of these corporations need to improve a capacity of a nation as a pre-requisite to achieving the intended financial gains. One corporation that has been confronted with this challenge is VIACOM.

VIACOM is a multinational corporation headquartered in the U.S. that provides entertainment media for all ages. While providing various mediums of entertainment around the globe in 2007, the corporation earned $13.4 billion and is one of the largest media conglomerates in the world (VIACOM 2008, 2). The manner in which VIACOM conducts business with international partners contributes to success in the global market.

VIACOM publishes their Global Business Practices Statement, a collection of key policies and rules that apply to VIACOM employees and Board of Directors, to strive towards maintaining a lawful, honest, and ethical environment. One of the principles this statement recognizes is the importance of understanding the laws of both the partner nation and the U.S. (VIACOM 2009, 7). Furthermore, this statement strives to delineate for VIACOM employees the importance of avoiding conflicts of interest. The policies established by VIACOM stress that even “the appearance of a conflict of interest can undermine our integrity--and yours--in the minds of your co-workers, our clients and suppliers, our viewers and the public” (VIACOM 2009, 8). VIACOM also recognizes that given the wide variety of business situations, it cannot address all possible scenarios and must rely on their employees’ “sense of what is right and ethical, and expects (them) to act accordingly” (VIACOM 2009, 3). The issues of understanding and operating within the laws of the countries involved, avoiding conflicts of interest, and acting in an
ethical manner all speak to the more important issue of maintaining integrity in interactions. Part of the intent of these business practices is they assist in developing long term relationships. The specific interaction taking place with another multinational partner is often not as important as the long term relationship being built; a concept that is also often true in BPC engagements as well.

**U.S. Government Documents**

This section consists of a review of literature written for members of the U.S. government. Because this document examined U.S. BPC efforts conducted by the military, a significant amount of the literature reviewed falls within this category. This complex task was simplified by first examining documents written for the legislative branch followed by the executive branch. Within the executive branch, the category was further stratified into DoD, DoS, and Geographic Combatant Commands. Since BPC requires significant resources and the number of potential BPC partners exceeds the available resources, a significant effort was also made to examine literature relevant to the appropriation of DoD BPC resources.

**Legislative Branch**

Successful BPC engagements must be resourced appropriately. An examination of the elements that result in successful BPC engagements included the examination of some of the documents Congress uses to assist in determining the appropriate allocation of funds. Congressional reports created by the Congressional Research Service are an example of these types of documents.
The Congressional Research Service is a “think tank” that creates reports for members of Congress on a variety of topics relevant to current issues. The majority of reports will focus on providing raw data with some unbiased analysis. Some reports also identify key trends in the data being presented. Reports vary on subjects and include topics such as *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2008* and *Foreign Policy Budget Trends: A Thirty-Year Review*. The report *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-2008*, written by Congressional Research Service Specialist in International Security Richard F. Grimmett, is an annual report on government-to-government Foreign Military Sales transactions. Grimmet utilizes unclassified sources to conduct an item by item analysis of military sales conducted by nations around the world. His research indicates developing nations are the predominant recipient of Foreign Military Sales with the U.S. generally leading as the provider (Grimmett 2009, 7).

In the report *Foreign Policy Budget Trends: A Thirty-Year Review*, Congressional Research Service Specialist in Foreign Affairs Larry Nowels examined trends in the level of funding for U.S. foreign policy programs. Nowels delineated his research into categories such as humanitarian assistance, Political/Security Economic Assistance, and military assistance. Nowels research indicated that military assistance resources have generally increased since 11 September 2001, with the exception of Fiscal Year 2006 (Nowels 2006, 20). This notable decrease is the result of a shift in policy in the source of military assistance and not an actual decrease in the allocation of military assistance. The Bush Administration, with the backing of Congress, decided to fund $11 billion in programs to train and equip Afghan and Iraqi security forces with Defense Department
funds even though these activities were previously financed through funds which fall within the international affairs budget function (Nowels 2006, 20). If this $11 billion is added to the data analyzed, the trend for steady increase in military assistance is consistent and rising.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is also a source of documents for the Legislative branch in the form of Reports to Congressional Committees. GAO reports include topics such as the GAO Report to Congressional Committees, Section 1206 Security Assistance Program--Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and Implementation and have a significant amount of data relevant to military utilization of resources. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 was one of multiple funding streams available for BPC and was increased from $200 million to $300 million in the Fiscal Year 2007 budget. The afore mentioned report is an audit of Section 1206 spending conducted at the request of Senator Richard G. Lugar with the intent of examining how the State and DoD use criteria to select recipient countries and how they formulate, approve, and implement Section 1206 programs. The report was written by the staff of Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director of International Affairs and Trade, with key contributors including Muriel Forster, Assistant Director; Lynn Cothern; Howard Cott; Martin De Alteriis; Drew Lindsey; and Grace Lui. The GAO team conducted reviews of State and DoD guidance for submitting proposals for Section 1206 funding. The team also conducted interviews with State and DoD officials as well as the four COCOMs and 13 of 15 embassies involved with Section 1206 programs in Fiscal Year 2006 (GAO 2007, 7).

The Section 1206 audit determined programs were evaluated in the context of other security assistance programs provided to each country, proposals were prioritized
within their regions by DoS regional bureaus, and that Ambassadors considered the partner countries interests as well as the embassies’ strategic goals for the partner country (GAO 2007, 9). Section 1206 proposals were also specifically assessed on the ability to be completed by the end of the fiscal year, that they met legal criteria, and were nested in the objectives of the DoD Security Cooperation Guidance and the National Military Plan for War on Terrorism (GAO 2007, 13). The audit highlighted the importance of providing the COCOMs and embassies ample time to prepare proposals and ensuring embassies apply the same human rights vetting procedures applied to other programs (GAO 2007, 23). This audit is an excellent example of the high level of scrutiny that is placed on U.S. funding utilized to support the development of other nations.

Executive Branch

The Executive Branch, within the parameters of the law, design and conduct BPC. BPC is squarely in the arena of foreign affairs, the domain of the Executive branch. This section of the literature review is further delineated into the categories of DoS, DoD, and the Geographic Combatant Commander reviews. The State Department category involves documents produced by the State Department, as well as agencies whose efforts are normally led by the State Department. Consequently, many whole-of-government documents were also reviewed in this section.

The DoD sub-section refers to the military staffs and organization in the vicinity of the Pentagon. This section includes the literature concerned with the “Organize, Train and Equip” mission, as well as literature relevant to Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training grant funding, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, section 1206/1207 funding, the Global Peace
Operations Initiative, Counter-Threat Reduction and Warsaw Initiative Funding. Although a program like the Global Peace Operations Initiative is managed by the Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. DoS, in partnership with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and the Joint Staff, this program is included in this section of the literature review due to their mission of training and equipping peacekeepers to address security issues. The reality is some of the distinct lines that were drawn for the purposes of this literature review do not always appropriately represent the organizations discussed. Documents relevant to the Offices of the Secretary of Defense are also included in this section of the literature review.

The separate sub-section of Geographic Combatant Commander acknowledges the significant role the COCOMs play in shaping BPC. A review of the literature produced by the COCOMs provides insight into BPC at the level where the BPC planning actually takes place. Although a review of all the literature produced by all the COCOMs could prove useful, this literature review focused on a more manageable goal of examining EUCOM. The literature produced by a COCOM provides insight into the principles that a COCOM deems important to successful BPC planning, the role joint operations play in conducting BPC, and the capabilities a COCOM endeavors to build within other countries. A review of the Executive Branch, however, would be incomplete without first examining the overarching literature pertaining to all organizations conducting BPC within the Executive branch.

One document that influences all of the Executive Branch, as well as other organizations, is *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* last
published in March 2006. Although this document was published under a previous administration, there are some general principles that we can expect to stay consistent with this administration based on current rhetoric. Additionally, this document represents the “marching orders” of the Executive Branch for the last four years. Consequently, the impact of this document should be seen in current BPC operations. One general principle identified early in the document, as one of the two pillars of U.S. strategy, is the continued importance of coalition operations or a strategy of “confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies” (White House 2006, ii). This document further identifies “recent experience has underscored that the international community does not have enough high-quality military forces trained and capable of performing…peace operations” and the need to work “with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to improve the capacity of states to intervene in conflict situations” (White House 2006, 16). The document also clearly emphasizes the importance of “governance capacity” or the ability of partner nations to have the capability to secure the events occurring within their own borders. In summation, this document specifically delineates that BPC is within our national interests and that the Executive branch will execute strategies to accomplish this task.

Department of State

The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America declares the DoS draws on “all agencies of the government and integrates its activities with our military’s efforts” as well as “coordinate(s) United States Government efforts with other governments building similar capabilities.” The State Department plays a critical role in coordinating interactions between the U.S. and other nations. DoS utilizes ambassadors
and embassy staff in coordination with military liaisons and COCOM staff to directly shape the U.S. efforts to build partnership capacity.

State Department reports also provide a significant amount of data concerning BPC. One such example is the *State Department Security Assistance Report* that outlines the amount of funds provided to each country in the previous year, the estimate for the current year, and the requested funds for the following year. This report also categorizes different types of funds, for example “military assistance,” rather than provide a single large sum as seen in some Congressional reports. Of particular interest in this State Department report is the analysis, reasoning, and rationale provided for the data presented. For example, when addressing the funds being provided for assistance within Europe, the report explains that the “program elements include increasing Poland’s capability to participate in coalition efforts, and achieve a military modernization and reform plan.” This level of analysis is often missing in reports from other organizations. It also provides insight into how the State Department views a particular BPC effort and can be combined with information from other organizations for overall perspective of the issue.

The recently published *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* provides the DoS with a form of doctrine that can be used to guide decisions on stabilization and reconstruction projects in other nations (2009, 1-3). This document addresses the needs of missions that involve the transition of a nation from “violent conflict” to “peace” (United States Institute of Peace 2009, 1-4). Although not specifically addressing the full range of BPC issues, this document is significant in that it provides insight into the principles deemed relevant from a whole-of-government
perspective. It should be noted, however, that this document is merely a strategic tool and not a definitive source for any one agency nor directive in nature.

The document extracts the principles for successful stabilization and reconstruction into five purpose based end states. Each of these end states has a set of conditions that when met assist in achieving the end state. The five end states are:

1. Safe and Secure Environment: Ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence.

2. Rule of Law: Ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights, and ensures their safety and security.

3. Stable Governance: Ability of the people to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.

4. Sustainable Economy: Ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law.

5. Social Well-Being: Ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement (United States Institute of Peace 2009, 2-10).

Although there are some similarities in these stability and reconstruction end states with some of the BPC missions being conducted with the least developed nations, there may be little applicability to a higher end BPC mission. These five end states, however, have “cross-cutting principles” that should be applied by every person and to every activity (United States Institute of Peace 2009, 2-10). Given that the missions of
stabilization and reconstruction and BPC both involve increasing the capacity of another nation, many of the cross-cutting principles are applicable even when the actual end state being pursued may be slightly different for a BPC mission. The manner in which these end states can be applied to BPC is discussed further in chapter 4 of this thesis. The cross-cutting principles identified include:

1. Host Nation Ownership and Capacity: The affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities.

2. Legitimacy: The degree to which the host nation population accepts the mission and its mandate or the government and its actions; the degree to which the government is accountable to its people; and the degree to which regional neighbors and the broader international community accept the mission mandate and the host nation government.

3. Unity of Effort: A shared understanding of the environment. It refers to cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, even when the participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures.

4. Conflict Transformation: The strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. It requires reducing drivers of conflict and strengthening mitigators across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres while building host nation capacity to manage political and economic competition through peaceful means.

5. Regional Engagement: Encouraging the host nation, its neighboring countries, and other key states in the region to partner in promoting both the host nation’s and the region’s security and economic and political development. It has three components:

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comprehensive regional diplomacy, a shared regional vision, and cooperation (United States Institute of Peace 2009, 3-12).

A final area of the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction pertinent to successful BPC is the importance of a comprehensive approach. Both BPC and Stabilization and Reconstruction require a significant and consolidated effort to establish the permanent changes attempted to be made to a country. It is necessary for BPC planners to consider and revisit the aspects of a comprehensive approach throughout the planning and execution of a BPC engagement if the long term change envisioned is to be attained. Aspects of a comprehensive approach will also be discussed further in chapter 4, but as defined in the Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, elements include the following:

1. Interdependence
2. Cooperation
3. Prioritization
4. Nesting
5. Flexibility of Sequencing and Timing
6. Measurements of Progress

Department of Defense

The DoD has authored the majority of doctrine on the subject of BPC. Much of the doctrine on BPC continues to be revised and updated. One of the more current documents on the subject is U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1 Security Force Assistances, dated May 2009. This document focuses primarily on the brigade combat team and the individual advisors, but also provides good context as to how the Army envisions BPC
being accomplished. Joint and service specific doctrine will continue to be updated to reflect the changing theory and experiences of the DoD as a greater number of BPC engagements occur.

The overarching guidance within the DoD is the June 2008 *National Defense Strategy*. This document, like *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, was published under the previous administration, but includes similar guidance to that being provided by the current administration. The June 2008 *National Defense Strategy* will probably be updated some time following the 2010 *QDR* discussed later in this section. This defense strategy was, however, overseen by the current Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, and will likely have many similarities with the next defense strategy. Secretary Gates specifically acknowledges “the critical role our partners play…in achieving our common goals.” In building a strategy that is nested within the National Security Strategy, the DoD outlined five key objectives:

1. Defend the Homeland
2. Win the Long War
3. Promote Security
4. Deter Conflict
5. Win our Nation’s Wars

Four of these five objectives (all but Homeland Security) emphasize the importance of working with international partners.

The objective of “Win the Long War” emphasizes the value of working in conjunction with partner nations in our battle against terrorism around the world. A key component of this objective is recognizing that often “our partners are better positioned
to handle a given problem because they understand the local geography, social structures, and culture better than we do or ever could” (Department of Defense 2008, 8). The authors of this *National Defense Strategy* further assert that in “collaboration with interagency and international partners we will assist vulnerable states and local populations as they seek to ameliorate the conditions that foster extremism and dismantle the structures that support and allow extremist groups to grow” (Department of Defense 2008, 8). The significant conclusion from these statements is that although it may not be required to utilize partners to “Win the Long War”, it is definitely the most efficient and effective manner in which to accomplish this objective.

Two other objectives that specifically delineate the importance of conducting operations with partner nations in order to achieve success are “Deter Conflict” and “Win our Nation’s Wars.” The deterrence described in “Deter Conflict” requires credibility and the willingness to employ demonstrated military capabilities. The wide array of actors and threats has made deterrence far more complex than during the Cold War. The current defense strategy acknowledges that for the foreseeable future the “the global scope of problems, and the growing complexity of deterrence in new domains of conflict, will require an integrated interagency and international approach if we are to make use of all the tools available to us” (Department of Defense 2008, 12). The strategy to “Win our Nation’s Wars” recognizes that should this deterrence fail, “we must be prepared to act together with like minded states against states when they threaten their neighbors, provide safe haven to terrorists, or pursue destabilizing weapons” (Department of Defense 2008, 13). The objectives “Win the Long War,” “Deter Conflict” and “Win our Nation’s Wars” purposely note the importance of working with partner nations. The
implied assumption is the more capable our partners are, the more effective we will be in working together towards accomplishing these objectives.

Rooted in the requirement for the DoD to conduct BPC, the objective of “Promote Security” establishes that a stable international system that promotes peaceful change is the best means of providing security and preventing war. As such, the DoD has developed a strategy that “emphasizes building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term security” (Department of Defense 2008, 9). This strategy recognizes that the U.S. must build capacity within a broad range of nations. We must work to “build the internal capacities of countries at risk” of collapse by working “with and through like-minded states to help shrink the ungoverned areas of the world and thereby deny extremists and other hostile parties sanctuary” (Department of Defense 2008, 10). In addition to working with “at-risk” nations, “relations with the most powerful countries of the world are central to our strategy” (Department of Defense 2008, 10). The objective of “Promote Security” recognizes that the most powerful countries of the world are “important partners for the future and we seek to build collaborative and cooperative relationships with them. We will develop strategies across agencies, and internationally, to provide incentives for constructive behavior while also dissuading them from destabilizing actions” (Department of Defense 2008, 11). Finally, the current defense strategy of the U.S. approach for “Achieving our Objectives” includes “strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships” (Department of Defense 2008, 15). This document clearly delineates throughout the text the importance of BPC in our nation’s defense strategy.
The 2010 QDR continues to develop U.S. BPC capability by balancing changes to the existing force with development of the future force. The 2010 QDR emphasizes the growing importance of BPC in U.S. Defense strategy and notes that Security Force Assistance missions, categorized as the “hands on” efforts, will be the most dynamic in the coming years (Department of Defense 2010a, 26). When the document is taken in its entirety, the 2010 QDR is organized into six main areas:

1. Defense Strategy
2. Rebalancing the Force
3. Taking Care of Our People
4. Strengthening Relationships
5. Reforming How We Do Business
6. A Defense Risk Management Framework

These six areas are the bulk of the 105 page review of U.S. Defense strategy. All six of the 2010 QDR sections discuss the importance of BPC to U.S. Defense Strategy and the need for the DoD to continue to develop this capability. Within the category of Rebalancing the Force, the 2010 QDR identifies six key tasks to support enhancing the DoD’s BPC capabilities. These tasks include items as diverse as ministerial-level training to improving the processes for transferring material to partner nations (Department of Defense 2010a, 30). Within the category of Taking Care of Our People, the 2010 QDR recognizes the long term role of BPC includes developing future military leaders with an emphasis on “building partner capacity skill sets in its professional military education and career development policies” (Department of Defense 2010a, 54).
examines the continued development of BPC capability within the DoD and outlines adjustments to how the DoD currently conducts BPC.

One of the most honest and poignant critiques about current U.S. BPC capability within the DoD is reflected in the section of the 2010 QDR pertinent to Reforming How We Do Business. This QDR notes the need to reform security assistance and suggests “America’s efforts remain constrained by a complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, unwieldy processes, and a limited ability to sustain such undertakings beyond a short period” (Department of Defense 2010a 73). This statement emphasizes the importance of efforts to improve the complex system the DoD is currently operating.

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy contracted the RAND Corporation to develop a monograph that would provide an assessment framework to enhance the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s ability to determine which BPC engagements result in achieving the desired capability. RAND produced a monograph titled A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships, written by the RAND study team consisting of Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, and Gregory F. Treverton. The RAND study team conducted a workshop in May 2008 with the goal to design an assessment framework for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s BPC programs (Moroney et al. 2009a, 17). The workshop resulted in five key elements of a program-level assessment framework. These elements are strategic guidance, programs, stakeholders, authorities, and levels of assessment and specific roles (Moroney et al. 2009a, 48). Using these elements, the study team identified that a comprehensive framework for assessment was
lacking and provided recommendations to remedy the deficiency. Recommendations for improvement included moving the security cooperation assessment process away from self assessments by program managers and toward immediate assessments by COCOMs in a manner that is flexible enough to account for the differences across programs and providing the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ways to act as an integrator as well as look across all security cooperation programs to assure policymakers and the public that security cooperation efforts are efficient (Moroney et al. 2009a, 75).

Geographic Combatant Commands

The individual geographic COCOMs have significant influence in shaping the type of BPC engagements discussed in this thesis. In addition to the COCOM Commander’s oversight of all military BPC engagements within the specified region, quite often the planning of the engagement and the forces conducting the engagement will occur by individuals within the command. In order to conduct an in-depth review, (EUCOM) was the focus of this thesis.

EUCOM’s area of responsibility includes 51 countries with the mission to conduct military operations, international military partnering, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security in the defense of the U.S. forward. With regard to BPC, EUCOM states that it “builds partner capacity by executing security assistance and security cooperation programs using our 44 Offices of Defense Cooperation who work with their respective host nations, in close partnership with U.S. Embassy country team and under the direction of the U.S. Ambassador” (United States European Command 2010). EUCOM considers these efforts to include, but not limited to, foreign military sales of U.S. defense equipment, services and training, the management of the Foreign
Military Financing, International Military Education and Training grant funding, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, section 1206/1207 funding, the Global Peace Operations Initiative, Counter-Threat Reduction and Warsaw Initiative Funding (United States European Command 2010). EUCOM’s office of defense cooperation representatives oversee military-to-military programs and assist with the State Partnership Program - an initiative that partners countries with U.S. states (United States European Command 2010). All efforts to strengthen bilateral security relationships, enhance partner capacity and promote effective civil-military relations are conducted within the framework of the Ambassador's Mission Performance Plan and the command's Theater Security Strategy (United States European Command 2010).

EUCOM also has a significant role in the representing the U.S. within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the signatories of the treaty “separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” in order to achieve NATO objectives. (NATO Treaty 1)

Given the responsibility to NATO and the mission described in the previous paragraph, EUCOM has a significant amount of literature on the subject of BPC. This review highlights two documents produced by EUCOM and two documents written by individuals whom deal with BPC issues in EUCOM.

EUCOM’s *Handbook of Theater Security Cooperation Resources: A Primer on Theater Security Cooperation Resources in the U.S. Command* shows the emphasis that EUCOM places on the members of the command understanding Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) resourcing available in EUCOM. The document is designed for
Officers and members of the Headquarters U.S. EUCOM and Component staffs, Country Team members in the U.S. Embassies and Consulates, TSC Program participants, and Functional Administrators, Planners, and Resource Providers (Headquarters, US European Command 2009, 2). It provides readers with EUCOM Resource Allocation Guidance as well as a description of the different resource categories, the legal basis for the category and how the funding in each category relates to other funding.

The EUCOM Director of ECJ7, Brigadier General Jeffery E. Marshall is also the command’s liaison to the State Partnership Program and recently wrote the document “Skin in the Game: Partnership in Establishing and Maintaining Global Security and Stability.” Marshall outlined in this document the U.S. vital interests of global security and stability. Marshall contended that by sharing the burden of the common goal of regional and global security, or in other words, ensuring multiple countries have “skin in the game,” greater security and stability is promoted. Marshall goes on to argue that building partner capability is also about building relationships. It is notable, given Marshall’s position and responsibilities in EUCOM, that he viewed U.S. BPC as “fragmented and inefficient” due to numerous authorities, inflexible funding mechanisms, and fragmented planning and execution (Marshall 2009b, 1). Although this assertion was written well before the 2010 QDR, Marshall’s assertion is not significantly different than that of the QDR. Marshall’s recommended solution is to further develop organizations within the Geographic COCOMs capable of coordinating engagements to ensure they are harmonized and synchronized (Marshall 2009b, 1). In addition to emphasizing nesting, Marshall’s work highlights the importance of unity of effort in the complex BPC arena.
Colonel D. Lee Gabel, Chief of the J5 Black Sea Eurasia Division, wrote a policy paper concerning the assessment of TSC objectives. Gabel’s primary question, “How do we assess the impact of TSC with Ukraine?”, aims to develop a reasonable and effective assessment methodology. He noted that this methodology needs to take into consideration some of the unique aspects of TSC with Ukraine:

1. TSC with Ukraine is a long-term shaping operation that will take years or decades to conclusively achieve desired effects due to the significant imprint left on the Ukrainian military establishment from its Soviet heritage with little resemblance to a NATO-compatible military.

2. The assessment of Ukraine’s TSC endeavor is ambiguous due to the scale and complex nature of building the capacity of a partner nation. It is difficult to determine the complete effect caused by a single engagement. Numerous political, social, and economic factors can influence the endeavor and cast doubt upon the true effect of an engagement.

3. Ukraine’s TSC endeavor includes multiple programs with different implementation mechanisms and planning cycles. These programs include Foreign Military Financing grants, International Military Education, and Training (IMET), multinational exercises, and military to military contacts (Gabel 2007, 4).

Although his policy paper is focused on current partnership engagements with Ukraine, many of the issues Gabel addresses are relevant to any BPC engagement.

Gabel provided recommendations in how to both address the assessment issue and how to adjust TSC programs for Ukraine through the application of a sound assessment methodology. Gabel concluded assessment mechanisms must account for a variety of diverse programs and that a sound methodology requires long-lasting TSC objectives. He
recommended gauging short term progress as the best possibility of discerning how TSC programs should be changed and provided specific actions OSD, EUCOM, and the Country Team should take to establish a sound methodology and process for assessing TSC with Ukraine (Gabel 2007, 21). The establishment of sound methodology and process results in the development of Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) that informally suggest how to apply the assessment methodology to the Ukraine TSC program (Gabel 2007, 22).

Major Daniel Manning wrote *Small States and the Myths of Building Partnership Capacity* in the fall of 2009. Manning was previously assigned to the air force component of EUCOM, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, where he worked on multiple BPC engagements and was Former Chief of the Airpower Capabilities Team-Baltics, a 15 month engagement to assist the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in developing airpower capacity. This engagement was specifically designed to be the first step in partnering with the Baltic States to build capacity regarding a long term air power solution and only a small part of EUCOM’s overall TSC program for each of the partner nations. Although Manning’s paper does not specifically single out small states in EUCOM, it is applicable to EUCOM and included with the other literature in this portion of the literature review due to the author’s background in EUCOM BPC. It is of note that this paper addressed the issues of BPC in reference to small states and in the form of foreign aid. Much of the analysis is based on the assumptions that small states have an inherent need for security assistance and, unlike larger states or “great powers,” the majority of significant security decisions have a higher potential for fatal results. Not all
of the states EUCOM partners with meet Manning’s or others’ definition of a small state and a significant amount of EUCOMs BPC efforts include events that are not foreign aid.

Manning examined four hypotheses relevant to the potential for BPC to appreciably contribute to U.S. security. First, Manning examined military aid to small states going back to 1950 and was able to find no significant correlation between receiving military aid and participating in OIF or OEF coalitions (Manning 2009, 20). Second, in the small states that chose to support U.S. coalitions, Manning’s research was unable to demonstrate a correlation between recent U.S. military aid and the number of troops deployed in support of the coalition (Manning 2009, 21). Next, Manning examined the assertion that U.S. military aid positively influences the partner states national perceptions of the U.S. and concluded the “evidence does not indicate that U.S. military aid to small states significantly influences the population's opinion of the U.S.” (Manning 2009, 22). Finally, the impact of U.S. military aid upon improved governance within small states was examined. Manning’s analysis provided some support for the claim U.S. military aid improves the character of small state governments, but failed to reject the null hypothesis (Manning 2009, 24). Given the failure to reject any of the null hypotheses and demonstrate a correlation between the amount of U.S. money provided and the willingness of a small state to support U.S. objectives, Manning next examined BPC as a gift to the small state.

Manning asserted the U.S. has two specific interests in providing BPC as a gift. That the recipient will desire to reciprocate in the future and that the gift will result in the partner state possessing a force more interoperable with U.S. forces (Manning 2009, 25). Manning’s research concluded small states act primarily within their interests regardless
of BPC gifts, but BPC did result in greater interoperability. He therefore recommended the U.S. target military aid at nations most likely to find it in their national interest to support conflicts the U.S. will most likely be involved in (Manning 2009, 30).

Consequently, he further recommends the engagements be designed to “increase tangible interoperability and capabilities which supplement American capability gaps” (Manning 2009, 30).

**Summary**

This literature review captured only a few of the documents reviewed concerning the subject of BPC. The most pertinent of the documents reviewed were included in the reference list. The review has examined historical documents, current literature, and writings specific to EUCOM. Chapter 3 will explain the specific manner in which this thesis will determine the answers the primary research question of “What are the core commonalities that make BPC efforts successful?” and the secondary question of “What are the elements of a good joint BPC engagement?”
This thesis examines the subject of BPC in breadth through a review of relevant literature and examination of current doctrine. The U.S. BPC policies have numerous agencies influencing the “shape” of BPC and require a broad view. A wide net was cast over existing information available on the subject. In order to understand the specific characteristics of successful BPC endeavors with other nations, a single organization that successfully conducts BPC on a large scale was analyzed in depth. The organization chosen for specific review was EUCOM and was accomplished by a review of both EUCOM official literature relevant to BPC and literature written by individuals involved with EUCOM whom conduct BPC. When applicable, the role of joint operations in planning and executing BPC was noted.

A variety of sources of literature was reviewed in this examination of BPC. The review began with an examination of existing military doctrine. These documents provide the framework for how the military currently conducts BPC. More importantly, these documents provide the outline for the types of force structure, personnel, and equipment that are required to conduct effective BPC. Consequently, when the Commander in Chief places an emphasis on the military conducting BPC, these become part of the source documents for justifying the amount and type of resources the military must be allocated to accomplish the given mission. These documents are also significant in delineating the professional military advice the DoD provides Congress.

Congress also seeks professional advice from sources outside the military when making the determination for the allocation of resources for BPC missions. One of these
sources is independent reports commissioned by Congress on relevant subjects. The reports come from a multitude of organizations to include the GAO and the Congressional Research Service. A review of these reports, and the types of reports being commissioned, provided insight to the factors that influence Congressional decisions regarding resourcing U.S. BPC actions.

Lacking a National Security Strategy from the current administration, this thesis utilized the Military Education Research Library Network to review documents and speeches created by the current administration and relevant to national security issues. The unity of effort with regard to military BPC within the Executive branch, as compared to the Legislative branch, is noteworthy. This unity of effort allows for the Executive branch to make relatively significant changes in how it intends to shape BPC efforts in a shorter amount of time. Although the Executive branch may not have the type of military or diplomatic means that it would like to accomplish its’ BPC agenda, it does have the ability to begin application with the resources on hand. Consequently, significant effort was placed on understanding the multitude of organizations within the Executive branch that shape military BPC efforts.

We also must consider our ability to operate with our international partners. While we need our friends and allies to help us achieve our common objectives, building their capacities will require significant investments and commitment on our part. The exact manner and magnitude of our involvement, and the extent of the capabilities that we provide, will be dependent on our strategic choices, the scope of our partners’ specific and legitimate requirements, and our shared security and diplomatic objectives.

― General Norty Schwartz
Aerospace and Defense Finance Conference, 3 December 2009

One of the most commonly overlooked and underappreciated factors in the examination of the entities that shape BPC efforts are the national interests of the partner
nation. This is in part due to the complexity in how a partner nation shapes a BPC effort. Like the U.S., a partner nation rarely speaks with a single voice. Competing agendas both within the different military branches of the partner nation as well as the civilian government and corporations within the country add complexity to the equation before we even begin to examine the impacts of regional culture and history. Often this issue will be condensed into a simple concept that all capabilities developed by our BPC efforts must be within the national interest of the partner nation as well as our own national interests. Although this concept will suffice for the purposes of this thesis, it is worth noting that there is much debate within the U.S. when simply examining the capabilities that are within our own national interest.

An example of this debate might be the capability to control the skies over American ground forces. Control of the skies is generally accepted as within U.S. national interest, but there is significant debate over the amount of resources that should be dedicated towards this capability and the type and total number of weapons systems to procure. The same issues that the U.S. struggles with concerning 5th generation F-22 and F-35 purchases are faced by potential partner nations contemplating 4th generation fighter procurement. Complex capability discussions are also occurring in determining the future of blue water navies and the role of the main battle tank in our national interests. It is unlikely the U.S. could have a unified voice concerning national interests with regard to any one of these issues, let alone the security implications of air, sea and land capabilities combined. Similarly, it will be difficult for any one partner nation to communicate with a unified voice all the nuances of the capability they wish to build and how that capability will be incorporated within their national interest.
Finally, there are other entities that can shape a particular U.S. BPC effort that should be acknowledged. International organizations and corporations continue to wield greater and greater power in an arena traditionally consisting of individual states. The amount of influence these entities will have on a BPC effort between the U.S. and another nation varies. Additionally, the influence of other individual states in the region will also shape U.S. BPC efforts if the partner nation falls within that state’s sphere of influence. The significance of each of these entities, as well as others not identified in this thesis, can vastly vary on a case by case basis. Consequently, no specific method was designed to research all of the possible complex factors involved in two nations addressing issues of national security that often involve millions of dollars.

A simplified depiction of the most significant entities shaping BPC efforts was created and is displayed in figure 1. Even in the simplified format, the diagram involves multiple entities with influences on each other (many of these influences and relationships have not been depicted in order to focus on the most significant) and all attempting to influence this single BPC engagement. At any time there are numerous engagements occurring and between those engagements relationships are forming. Although the embassy and Ambassador of the partner nation have a very influential role in establishing the strategic direction for a partner nation, the single largest influence in a military BPC engagement is the COCOM. The COCOM can influence numerous aspects of a military BPC engagement to include setting objectives, ways, means, number of forces, and amount of resources allocated to a particular engagement. Particularly in the routine BPC engagements that involve training with equipment the partner nation already owns and the forces assigned to the COCOM, a significant role is played by the
COCOM. This central role is depicted in Figure 1 by the central position of the COCOM and the green container that represents the COCOMs ability to influence the overall size of the engagement.

![Diagram showing entities shaping United States BPC Efforts](image)

Figure 1. Entities Shaping United States BPC Efforts
*Source:* Developed by author.

In addition to conducting a broad review of the elements that shape BPC efforts in order to understand the basic key considerations that are common to all successful BPC efforts, this thesis also examined a single entity, EUCOM, that successfully conducts BPC. An in-depth review and comparison of the other COCOMs, although outside the available resources of this study, could reveal additional insight into the understanding of the BPC principles of a COCOM and is listed as one a recommendation for further
research in chapter 5. As a military organization, the examination of EUCOM helped to illuminate the second portion of my research question in determining the role joint operations play in the BPC environment. Furthermore, EUCOM has a wide variety of resources available for conducting BPC, as well as an equally diverse array of BPC partners.

EUCOM has a significant, albeit shrinking, number of U.S. forces available for conducting BPC operations. Consequently, it is possible in an examination of EUCOM to view how all three military services conduct BPC and the interactions between the services in planning and executing operations. Equally as important, EUCOM has a wide variety of partners. These partners range from militaries with technical capabilities on par with our own to militaries with undeveloped and neglected land and sea forces and virtually non-existent air forces. EUCOM’s engagement with these countries can be significantly influenced by NATO when dealing with member and prospective member nations. When procurement of weapons systems becomes part of the effort, international corporations will have significant interests involved. Additionally, the governments where these corporations are headquartered will also begin to take interest in the effort. Multiple nations may become involved if the BPC effort is also going to utilize NATO funding. Furthermore, EUCOM also must continually consider which neighboring nations have interests in what they consider their regional sphere of influence and how that nation may view or wish to shape the capability being built within a partner nation. In short, EUCOM is faced with a complex BPC environment.

This thesis accomplished an analysis of EUCOM by reviewing the literature EUCOM publishes concerning BPC efforts and previously published works by
individuals currently conducting EUCOM BPC efforts, examining the organizations and processes they have in place to conduct BPC operations, and interviews with key personnel within these organizations. By focusing on this historically very successful case it is possible to reveal aspects of BPC efforts that may have been missed in broad examination of the subject.

In summary, this chapter provided the framework for how available information on the subject of BPC was assimilated. The chapter outlined what information would be included in the study and what information would need to be reserved for future research. A discussion on how to accomplish a review that contained both breadth in understanding of the topic and depth in the details of one case study was accomplished. Chapter 4 will apply the research method described in this chapter in order to distill some key elements of the vast amount of literature available on the subject into a format that is easily comprehended without oversimplifying the complexities of BPC operations.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This thesis examined material that included historical references, current doctrine, and an in-depth look at EUCOM’s BPC efforts. The purpose of this research was to define the core commonalities that exist in successful BPC efforts and concurrently identify commonalities of successful BPC efforts planned from a joint perspective. In accomplishment of this task, this thesis has defined six core commonalities of successful BPC, ten key considerations BPC planners should strive towards for success, and six characteristics of joint BPC operations relevant to the joint BPC planner.

Chapter 4 is organized around the primary and secondary research questions. An examination of the primary research question “What are the core common elements of successful BPC?” results in a better understanding of two separate but closely related concepts. The first is the core commonalities of successful BPC engagements. In other words, this resulted in a list of common criteria present among successful BPC engagements. The resultant understanding is that engagements that possess the common characteristics identified in these criteria are more likely to result in a successful partnership capacity being attained. The second concept that results from the examination of the primary research question is the key considerations of successful BPC engagements. The resultant understanding of this concept is that BPC planners who strive to embrace these key considerations in their engagements, regardless of the partner nation or the type of BPC engagement chosen, are more likely to successfully build the desired capacity within the partner nation. The foundation established by the examination of the
primary research question allows this chapter to then focus on the narrow field of the secondary research question.

The secondary research question examines the joint aspects of BPC efforts of the U.S. The U.S. military continues to invest a large amount of resources towards achieving joint capabilities. To this end, this question examines what are the characteristics fundamental to successful joint BPC engagements? The examination of this question results in a list of six characteristics of successful joint BPC engagements. The resultant understanding is that planners of joint BPC engagements should attempt to develop these characteristics in their BPC engagements in addition to the Key Considerations of Successful BPC previously discussed.

Analysis of Primary Research Question

The examination of the core commonalities that make BPC efforts successful has two distinct aspects. First, the examination produces a list of criteria that successful BPC partners have in common. Second, the examination produces key considerations U.S. BPC planners should adhere to when building and shaping the engagement with the partner nation to increase the likelihood of success. The first aspect acknowledges that in a resource constrained environment, the U.S. is not capable of conducting BPC with every nation. This aspect assists in identifying those nations that are likely to successfully attain the capacity attempting to be built and are thus a likely candidate for a strong return on our investment. The second aspect assumes that the nation to be partnered with has already been determined, but the manner in which the U.S. partners with that nation can greatly influence the likelihood of successfully building the desired capacity. Both
aspects are derived from the primary research question of establishing the core
commonalities that make BPC efforts successful.

Common BPC Criteria

The literature referenced for this thesis and highlighted in the literature review
manifested core commonalities between successful BPC engagements. An examination
of these commonalities derived six criteria that should be considered when determining
which nations to build capacity in. These criteria are not equal in weight of importance.
Nor are these criteria a checklist that if adequately met ensure a successful BPC
engagement. These criteria are also not definitive guidelines that if not met pre-dispose a
nation as not being worthy of investing BPC resources. Given the complexities of
political interactions on the global level and the influences of these interactions on
regional players, it would be errant to assume that any single list could encompass all the
contributing factors in these types of international relations. These criteria are, however,
extcellent indicators of potential for a successful BPC engagement and should be
considered when determining the allocation of limited resources for BPC efforts by the
COCOM.

Within U.S. National Interests

The National Security Strategy, as well as other documents, has established that
conducting BPC is within U.S. the national interests. U.S. national interests are the

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[3] See pages 25-26 of this document for additional discussion on National Security
Strategy and U.S. interests. Collomb’s lesson’s from the Marshall Plan, page 15 of this
document, also discusses the complex relationship between U.S. and partner nation’s
national interests and recognizes the need for these types of interaction to be within the
U.S. national interest.
primary consideration when examining BPC candidates. The nuances of this criterion are slightly more complex than initially appears on the surface. Too often, BPC is seen as a “good thing” and consequently “more of a good thing” must be within U.S. national interests. The reality is that not every proposed BPC engagement is in the national interests of the U.S. Some capacities, although within the national interest of the U.S., may not be a cost effective use of limited BPC resources when compared to BPC engagements in a different part of the region or even a different capacity of the same partner nation. The determination of whether a capacity is within the U.S. national interests must also consider a longer term view rather than what is within U.S. national interest today. BPC efforts conducted by the British during the interwar period with Japan did not take a long term view.\(^4\) BPC should be a long term, recurring commitment to continue to build on a current relationship with a partner nation. Although many DoD BPC engagements can be designed to build a relatively finite capacity, the BPC engagement should simply be part of a long term relationship between the U.S. and the partner nation led by the DoS.

**Within Partner Nation’s National Interests**

The capacity being built must not only be within U.S.’s interests, but also within the interest of the partner nation if the capacity is expected to be maintained in the future without U.S. support. From the time of Thucydides, it has been understood that states will often act within their best interest. As noted in *Small States and the Myths of Building*  

\(^4\)This concept is expounded upon in BPC criteria #4. Further discussion on the BPC efforts of both Britain and France with Japan during the interwar period start on page 13 of this document. The business practices of VIACOM, discussion starting on page 19; also emphasize the importance of long term relationships for success.
Partnership Capacity, the interest of the partner nations still play a significant role in the development of a partner nation’s capacity. The partner nation must have an interest and commitment to the capacity being built if they are to be expected to truly attain the capacity and maintain the capabilities of that capacity for the long term without outside support. If a partner nation is to be responsible for a capacity that is part of a larger alliance capacity, those roles must also be clearly defined. For example, a nation may be responsible for building the capacity of a deployable force in support of NATO Article V actions, but it is acceptable to utilize NATO strategic lift assets for the movement of the forces. A deployable force without the capability to project that power on the surface does not appear to be within the national interests of the partner nation. The partner nation’s national interest, however, is that the nation is upholding their commitment to the NATO alliance and will expect NATO to do the same.

There are two traps that need to be avoided when examining the national interests of a partner nation. The first is assuming that because a partner nation possessing a capacity is within U.S. national interests, it is therefore within the national interests of the partner nation. A partner nation owning a capacity that is only within U.S. national interests may be of significant enough value to conduct the BPC engagement. Decision makers, however, need to consider the likelihood that the capacity to be built will atrophy once the U.S. completes the BPC engagement. The cost of resources required to build the

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5Discussion on the Small States and the Myths of Building Partnership Capacity starts on page 40 of this document. Collomb also addresses this issue on page 15 of this document.

6Ibid.
capacity may not justify the benefit of a capacity that will not be maintained following the current operation.

A second trap to avoid when examining the national interests of a partner nation is confusing the long term national interests of the partner nation with the short term interests within a current coalition. Coalitions, and to some extent alliances, are relatively short lived endeavors. Building specific capacities for a nation participating in a particular coalition; for example, high altitude mountain training for a partner nation participating in coalition operations in Afghanistan when that nation has no mountains within its national borders, may only be a worthwhile endeavor if it is reasonable to expect that nation will continue to deploy in support of coalition operations elsewhere.7 Once again, these items must be part of the decision maker’s cost benefit analysis when comparing potential BPC engagements.

Understand Effect BPC Effort has within Region

Every nation within a region has spheres of influence that may not be readily apparent when examining a capacity from a U.S. perspective. These spheres of influence and the regional balance of power need to be understood in order to determine the impact of improving the capacity of a nation in that region. For example, impact the potential partner nation’s development of a capacity might have on the balance of power between nations in this region needs to be considered. The 2006 National Security Strategy recognizes the need for coordinated engagement with multiple nations.8 Careful thought

7Ibid.

8The 2006 National Security Strategy is reviewed on page 25 of this document. Additional discussion on understanding regional implications and the relevance to BPC
should be given to possible unintended consequences on the relationship of the U.S. with another country in the region. This level of understanding needs to be attained prior to making the decision to engage in a particular BPC operation. The lack of understanding regional implication of U.S. actions directly contributes to not understanding the long term effect a BPC effort may have.

**Understand Long Term Effect BPC Effort has on U.S. Interests**

It is a reality of BPC that today’s partner nation may become tomorrow’s potential adversary. For example, during the interwar period in Japan, discussed previously in chapter two, Britain built considerable airpower capacity within Japan, only to have that same capacity used twenty years later in the sinking of *HMS Prince of Wales* and *HMS Repulse*. Therefore, the relative nuances of the long term nature of a capacity being built that should be considered. Even if it is relatively certain that a partner nation will not utilize a capacity against the U.S., it should also be considered what nations the partner nation may decide to export the capacity to. Consideration should also be given to whether BPC with the nation will influence other nations within the region to build similar capabilities and whom those nations will partner with in attempting to achieve on par capability. Additionally, the U.S.’s partnership with one nation should be examined with the reflection as to whether U.S. will be decreased with other regional nations. All of

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*Further review of literature on interwar BPC in Japan begins on page 13. The review of “Skin in the Game,” page 38, and VIACOM’s international business practices, page 19, examines some of the more positive aspects of long term relationships.*
these types of considerations point towards the requirement for a thorough analysis of the implications of conducting a BPC engagement.

The risks associated with building the capacity of a partner nation should not be viewed as a deterrent to conducting BPC engagements. The benefits from a number of successful BPC engagements have contributed to the overall security of the global community and far exceed the risks. These risks, however, emphasize the importance of making long term commitments to partner with nations and understand the implications of these commitments both in the region and the global security environment.

**Reasonable Capacity for Partner Nation to Attain**

Often assessing a nation’s reasonable capacity involves expectation shaping for both the U.S. and the partner nation. Partner nations frequently see the capacity that the U.S. possesses and deem that to be the appropriate capacity for their nation to build. In doing so, they often do not consider the national interests, resources and years of training and development the capacity is built on. The U.S. is often eager to attempt to build a complex capacity because the organization, training and equipping required to possess this capacity is familiar. Unreasonable expectations often create a dilemma for the BPC planner when developing the engagement.

For example, a former Soviet Bloc country deems it within their national interests to transition from Russian 4th generation fighter aircraft to U.S. 4th generation fighter aircraft. On the surface it may appear reasonable to both BPC countries that a partner nation that has been successfully operating 4th generation Russian fighters would easily be able to transition to the capacity to operate U.S. 4th generation fighter aircraft. This expectation can be particularly true for a partner nation that has a proud history of
successfully operating sophisticated military aircraft. What may be overlooked, however, is that the U.S. and Russian aviation programs are built on decades of significantly different methods of organizing, training, equipping, maintaining, and supplying logistics. This is not to say that one method is inherently better than the other, but simply that they are different. As such, building this capacity in a partner nation is far more complex and resource demanding than simply assisting in the acquisition of 4th generation U.S. fighters and providing orientation flights. Building this capacity also requires building the capabilities of organizing, training, equipping, maintaining and supplying logistics in a manner that supports U.S. 4th generation aircraft and the realization that the partner nation capacity will still likely, in many ways, be significantly different than the U.S. capacity.

In the decision to proceed on a BPC engagement it is important to ensure that the capacity is reasonable, necessary, and attainable. Complex capacities require the development of measurable milestones or can be separated into a series of nested BPC engagements towards a greater overall goal. Failure to properly shape expectations can result in unforeseen costs, the partner nation not maintaining the capacity in the long term or failure to obtain a capacity because a more reasonable capacity was not the goal of the engagement.

Capacity is Nested within Theater and Country Campaign Plan

As described by Marshall in the document “Skin in the Game,” engagements that are “one-offs” from the long term vision for a partner nation often appear to be very excellent ideas to meet an immediate need, but the U.S. and the partner nation often fail to sustain the capability following the immediate need being met (Marshall 2009b, 9). As
previously noted in the WHO agenda entitled *Enhancing Partnerships*, it is important to encourage partner nations to align activities within established priorities. The ability to maintain the capability that is being built will at some point need to be addressed. Consideration should be given to either developing a capacity within the Country Campaign Plan or adjusting the plan to incorporate and reflect the developed capacity.

**Key Considerations of Successful BPC**

The examination of the core commonalities between successful BPC engagements also derived ten key considerations that should be considered by BPC planners when they build aspects of the BPC plan and revise BPC engagements. Although each consideration is of importance, the circumstances of a particular engagement may deem certain considerations to be of greater value than others. These considerations have, however, proven to consistently be important when BPC in another nation and should always be considered when planning and conducting a BPC engagement. Even though the planners given the task to create and conduct a BPC engagement may have little input into the process that determined the partner nation and the capacity to be built, developing and conducting a BPC engagement that endeavors to adhere to these considerations greatly enhances the probability of a successful long term capacity being attained.

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*Review of the best practices of the WHO begins on page 17 of this document. Review of the *State Department Security Assistance Report*, page 27, discusses the importance of separate elements contributing to an overall program and “Skin in the Game,” page 38, specifically recommends nesting be accomplished to harmonize multiple engagements.*
BPC Starts and Ends with Diplomats

Although this thesis is focused on building military capacity, all engagements have an aspect of foreign policy that needs to be considered. The military BPC engagement is only a part of the overall partnering that occurs with a nation, but, as noted in the GAO audit of Section 1206, need to be nested with the priorities of the partner nation embassy. Due to the significant resources possessed by the DoD and the security requirement necessary for other capacity building efforts to be effective, the military BPC effort may at times be the priority for that particular partner nation. BPC engagements, however, tend to have a finite length of time and resources associated with them. Success requires long term commitments and relationships that are traditionally provided by the DoS, Ambassadors and embassy personnel. Understanding how a particular BPC engagement nests within the DoS plan for a partner nation and being able to clearly communicate that relationship to lead participants of the engagement is the first step of development.

Partner Nation Ownership of Capacity

The *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* specifically addresses the importance of the partner nation driving its own development needs and priorities. In developing the BPC engagement, the U.S. planners and lead participants

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11 Further review of this GAO report on Section 1206 funding can be found on page 23. Congress and the Secretary of Defense having concluded to allocate significant funds to BPC activities in Section 1206 and 1207 of the National Defense Authorization act, and in the case of Section 1207 transfer funds from the DoD operational budget to DoS, emphasizes the role DoS has in these activities.

12 This document is reviewed in greater detail beginning on page 26 of this thesis. A review of Collomb’s work on page 15 of this document also identifies the importance
should provide recommendations based on their expertise as to how a capacity should be built and attained. However, at every possible opportunity, the U.S. planners and lead participants should seek direction from the partner nation. Emphasis should be placed on the goal of achieving a coach/mentor relationship rather than simply giving instruction on how the U.S. operates. Focus should be on the objective of developing a capacity the partner nation owns and employs rather than a capacity that can be only executed with U.S. guidance.

Understand Historical and Cultural Context

The current *National Defense Strategy* clearly recognizes the importance of understanding “the local geography, social structures, and culture” with regard to partner nations (Department of Defense 2008, 8). During an engagement, failure to understand the history of a partner nation, and how that history has influenced the culture, can contribute to failure in appropriately identifying the required steps needed to attain the desired capability. Hundreds of years of history can influence the military culture that governs the decision making processes of that military. For example, there are some militaries in the world that do not possess effective logistics systems. When building a capacity for a country such as this, any part of the engagement that would involve procurement of a weapon system needs to either examine weapon systems that do not require significant logistic support or expand the engagement to include increasing logistic capacity. Not taking the additional time at the beginning of planning an

\[13\] Further review of the *National Defense Strategy* can be found starting on page 31 of this document.
engagement to consider the historical and cultural implications can result in wasted efforts and unforeseen costs to address issues not identified during initial planning.

Unity of Effort

The State Department defines unity of effort as cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, even when participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures (United States Institute of Peace 2009, 3-12). Unity of effort does not refer to or require unity of command. Although unity of command should be expected within the U.S. military aspect of a BPC engagement, there will be partner nation(s), embassy personnel, and many others with interests in the engagement. Unity of effort does require BPC planners to clearly communicate to all participants involved the objectives and expectations for an engagement. This dialogue requires input from both the U.S. and partner nation. Without a shared understanding of the operating environment and the objectives to be accomplished, it is doubtful that unity of effort will be attained.

Understand and Articulate the Big Picture

No one will be in a better position than the BPC engagement planner to understand and articulate to engagement participants how this event fits within the COCOMs Country Campaign Plan and overall Theater Campaign Plan. A proficient understanding of this concept adds focus to the planning of the engagement and addresses

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14A review of Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction begins on page 27 of this thesis. Additional discussion on the concept of unity of effort can be found in the discussion of WHO practices on page 17 and the review of the document “Skin in the Game” that begins on page 38.
the issue of expectation management identified previously by Anderson.\textsuperscript{15} Articulating the Big Picture to the U.S. and partner nation participants promotes open and honest discussion, shapes expectations of those involved, and contributes to the building of long term relationships.

\textbf{Legitimacy}

Legitimacy is a key cross-cutting principle identified by the State Department that in this context refers to the degree to which regional neighbors and the broader international community accept the BPC engagement and the partner nation government.\textsuperscript{16} The support of regional neighbors and the international community can be of some assistance in a BPC engagement, but the open contention of a BPC engagement by regional partners and the international community can completely derail a BPC engagement.\textsuperscript{17} A potential solution to this dilemma involves a combination of open communication and regional engagement. The document “Skin in the Game” notes “Since this is a partnership, both the US/coalition and the partner need to benefit from the relationship. Open, honest dialog about requirements, capacity and national will are vital to success” (Marshall 2009b, 5). This type of communication is achieved through a persistent strategic communication plan that clearly delineates both the objectives of the BPC engagement and the intended limitations of the BPC engagement. Leaving the intent

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{A review of Anderson’s lessons for improving planning, design, implementation and monitoring of aid programs occurs on page 16 of this thesis.}

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Legitimacy is one of five of the key cross-cutting principles and intricate to the Rule of Law end state discussed in the \textit{Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction} reviewed on page 27 of this thesis.}

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Manning also addresses the issue of legitimacy with regard to the population as noted in the review of his work on page 40.}
of a BPC engagement open ended allows potential detractors to suppose objectives that are possibly beyond the intent of the particular engagement and thus build support in the international community against the engagement. The issue of regional engagement is discussed in the next consideration.

Regional Engagement

If the third criterion of Understand the Effect BPC Effort has on a Region is accomplished, it becomes readily apparent where regional engagement will apply. There are cases where U.S. relations with a particular partner nation in the region may not allow for regional engagement, but there will likely be other countries in the region worth considering. Regional engagement can cover the spectrum from simply keeping other regional actors advised of the actions taking place to actively encouraging the partner nation, neighboring countries, and other key states in the region to partner in promoting the building of a partner nation’s capacity. The WHO Health Metrics Network demonstrates the manner in which an outside entity can bring forth a panel of experts that are capable of facilitating a regional engagement.\(^{18}\)

The development of an airpower capability in the Baltics is a good example of a BPC engagement that utilized this consideration.\(^ {19}\) Early in the BPC engagement, the regional partners were invited to participate in the first day of the discussions between the

\(^{18}\)Further information on the WHO’s Health Metrics Network can be found in the review of this organization’s Technical meeting on strengthening health information systems in the European Region in the framework of the Health Metrics Network reviewed on page 19 of this thesis. The 2006 National Security Strategy, reviewed on page 25, the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction starting on page 27, discussion of EUCOM on page 36, and the review of “Skin in the Game” on page 38 also discuss the importance of regional engagement.

\(^{19}\)The author of this document was a member of this BPC engagement.
U.S. and the partner nations on solutions to this problem. This allowed regional partners to openly discuss their concerns and potential solutions for the regional problem of what essentially would otherwise be an area of ungoverned skies (currently, Baltic Air Policing is provided by NATO allies). A regional partner explaining the intricacies involved with transitioning to U.S. 4th generation fighter aircraft provided credibility to the discussion that would not have existed in talks solely between the U.S. and the Baltic states.

The negative aspect of regional engagement, however, must also be discussed. As previously mentioned, BPC engagements must be in the national interests of the U.S. and the partner nation. During regional engagement, it should be expected that regional partners will act in a manner that supports their nation’s interests. This includes recommending capacity building solutions that are in the interest of the regional partner. An example of this from the aforementioned engagement with the Baltic Nations is that it became readily apparent that some members of regional parties were more interested in selling the 4th generation aircraft built in their country than developing a capacity appropriate for the Baltics. This can become increasingly complex when attempting to engage with a regional partner that often acts in a manner that is contradictory to U.S. national interests. Consequently, when the strategic environment allows, BPC planners need to develop methods that encourage regional partners to participate in BPC engagements. Foremost, however, BPC planners must maintain focus on the national interests of the U.S. and the partner nation.

**Measurements of Progress**

Measurements of progress are undoubtedly one of the most difficult and contentious part of developing a BPC engagement. As previously discussed in the RAND
monograph titled *A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships*, without measurements of progress it is difficult to assess the development of the capacity being built.\textsuperscript{20} BPC planners need to set a final goal with intermediate capability milestones tied to financial commitments to determine the effectiveness of BPC efforts. BPC participants will strive to meet defined measurements of progress. Consequently, poorly designed measurements of progress can lead participants on a circuitous route towards attaining the desired capacity. Measurements of progress need to be communicated to all lead participants in a manner that all involved understand how the measurements of progress contribute to the overall objective of obtaining a desired capacity. Any measurement of progress that cannot be directly linked to building the desired capacity is likely a poor measurement of progress and should be considered for elimination.

**Engage at Multiple Levels**

Effective BPC engages and considers multiple levels of civilian and military administration of the partner nation with which the U.S. intends to build capacity. The 2010 *QDR* initiative to “Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training” indicates an area previously lacking in U.S. BPC efforts and a plan to rectify this deficiency (Department of Defense 2010a 30). Similar to the consideration of Regional Engagement, the more ministries and levels of military that can be convinced this capacity is in their

\textsuperscript{20}The RAND monograph titled *A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships* is reviewed on page 35 of this thesis. Anderson’s discussion on the construction of an analytical framework prior to an engagement (page 16), the WHO’s improving performance principle based on results-based management (page 17), and Gabel’s recommendations for a Ukraine TSC program assessment methodology (page 39) all speak to the importance and difficulty of creating solid measurements of progress.
interest, the greater the probability of successfully attaining and sustaining a capacity.  

BPC efforts that are targeted solely at the lowest ranks of the country’s military ministries will need to overcome leadership’s tendency to resist change. BPC that is focused only towards the highest levels of a partner nation’s leadership may lack the resources, without additional U.S. BPC engagement, to permeate the capacity throughout the military organizations.

Seek Multiple Sources of Sound Multi-Year Funding

Understanding of funding is a required skill for BPC planners. As the Chief of the J5 Black Sea Eurasia Division, Gabel notes that Ukraine’s TSC endeavor requires multiple programs, with different implementation and planning cycles, and multiple sources of funding (Gabel 2007, 4).  

Two significant areas of concern are available funds and appropriate funds. Finding multiple sources of available funding can assist in reaching the goals of a BPC engagement. A BPC planner needs to carefully calculate the cost of the engagement and anticipate areas where an engagement might exceed the budget. Having multiple entities, preferably to include the partner nation, invested in the completion of the project will add complexity, but also adds to the number of parties with a vested interest in the BPC engagement achieving the desired end state.

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21In addition to the 2010 QDR reviewed on page 34 of this document, the National Defense Strategy, reviewed on page 31, discusses the importance of building the internal capacities of nations and the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, reviewed on page 25, notes the importance of building the capacity of governance.

22In addition to Gabel’s work reviewed on page 39, EUCOM’s Handbook of Theater Security Cooperation Resources: A Primer on Theater Security Cooperation Resources in the U.S. Command, reviewed on page 37, is specifically designed to assist the BPC planner with addressing the issue of funding BPC programs.
Ensuring that resources are derived from an appropriate funding source needs to also be of concern. BPC planners should seek legal consultation when they have concerns. Ignorance is never a valid defense and confusion with legal issues is sure to add frustration to any BPC engagement. BPC planners should actively seek to take responsibility for determining appropriate funding sources and not expect the assigned forces to be knowledgeable regarding such issues.

Analysis of Secondary Research Question

The secondary research question builds on the information found in the primary research question and further refines commonalities to planning successful joint BPC engagements. An examination of the fundamentals of successful joint BPC engagements provides joint BPC planners a list of characteristics that should be incorporated into planning and execution of joint BPC engagements. Although there was not significant data on joint BPC engagements, the data available on joint operations and whole-of-government partnering programs provided considerable insight. Many of the characteristics of joint BPC are common to all joint operations and simply reiterated here due to their unique aspects with regard to BPC.

It is not relevant whether the capacity being built is considered a joint engagement in the partner nation. Other nations’ militaries are developed around doctrine and Service roles that are often very different from the U.S. military system. It is the role of the BPC planners to develop the best capacity within the partner nation with the resources they have available. It will be at the discretion of the partner nation to determine if they

23 VIACOM’s best business practices, reviewed on page 19, and Marshall’s “Skin in the Game,” reviewed on page 38, address the importance of legal sources of funding.
execute this capacity in a joint manner. It is clearly within the BPC planner’s scope to
determine if the best resources available to build a particular capacity come from multiple
Services, but it is outside the planners’ influence in how the partner nation actually
employs the capacity. Consequently, the examination of joint BPC engagements within
this document refers to U.S. planners utilizing the resources of multiple Services to build
capacity within a partner nation.

The characteristics listed are the same terms utilized in the *Guiding Principles for
Stabilization and Reconstruction* as the fundamentals of a comprehensive approach. The
reason for this is twofold. First, these fundamentals are applicable and rightfully included
in a discussion on planning joint BPC. Second, the terms were specifically not changed in
order to facilitate communication with interagency partners. Recognizing the
applicability of these principles in joint BPC is the first step towards embracing whole-
of-government BPC. In essence, an attempt is being made to nest the proposals in this
thesis with existing DoS doctrine. Although outside the scope of this thesis, BPC requires
interagency cooperation. The explanation of many of the terms refer specifically to joint
BPC, but the concepts behind the terms apply equally well to a whole-of-government
approach to BPC.

Characteristics of Joint BPC Engagements

**Interdependence**

Interdependence is the fundamental requirement for joint BPC engagements. The
*Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* recognizes interdependence
requires that all actors break out of their stovepipes (United States Institute of Peace
2009, 5-30). Additionally, it must be determined what benefits the BPC engagement
gains by a joint effort. There is no requirement for a BPC engagement to be planned or conducted in a joint manner. Joint operations inherently add a degree of complexity. The synergies that can result from conducting joint operations far outweigh the complexity added, but does not justify making an effort joint purely for the appearance of “jointness”. Planners must examine the objectives required to accomplish the capacity to be built within a partner nation, analyze these objectives against the available resources within the COCOM, and then determine the appropriate services to task to accomplish the engagement. Only then, if it is determined that the objectives of a BPC engagement are best met by multiple Services, should an effort be planned as a joint BPC engagement.

Cooperation

Interdependence may necessitate two Services working towards building a partner nation’s capacity, but without cooperation the two Services are just as well to accomplish two separate BPC engagements. BPC planners should carefully examine means to utilize joint capabilities when developing joint BPC engagements. The *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* identifies “cooperation as enabling different actors to work cooperatively toward the same goal” (United States Institute of Peace 2009, 5-30). Cooperation can occur on items as basic as using mutual logistics and administrative resources to conducting joint operations. Operations that fail to cooperate can potentially miss opportunities to combine efforts and efficiently utilize resources.
**Prioritization**

BPC engagements that attempt to utilize cooperation between Services require prioritization of efforts. The *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* deems prioritization as “required because multiple competing demands on the ground cannot be met with the available time and resources” (United States Institute of Peace 2009, 5-31). The Service with the priority may shift throughout an engagement depending on the progress being made to build a capacity. However, a clear understanding of the priorities throughout the engagement is critical to smooth operations and eliminate conflict and confusion amongst the participants involved in the engagement.

**Nesting**

The *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* acknowledges that the short term stabilization goal must be nested in the long term United Nations goals (United States Institute of Peace 2009, 5-31). In a similar manner, BPC engagements are nested into the long term Theater and Country Campaign Plans and aligned with embassy strategic goals for a partner nation. Along with cooperation and prioritization, Service objectives must be clearly nested in joint BPC engagements. Planners need to be able to clearly communicate to lead participants how individual objectives support or impact other objectives and contribute to the overall capacity being built. A lack of nesting is an indicator of either poorly defined intermediate objectives or a lack of interdependence within the BPC engagement. In either case, adjustments should be made to rectify the situation.
Flexibility of Sequencing and Timing

In the same manner Gabel and Anderson recognize the fluidity of engagements with partner nations, the *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* realizes the need for this fundamental element of a comprehensive approach (United States Institute of Peace 2009, 5-31).\(^{24}\) BPC planners should also attempt to build flexibility in the sequencing and timing of meeting objectives. Joint BPC endeavors will undoubtedly be complex. Some objectives will be met sooner than planned and some objectives will take longer or even look different than originally planned. This becomes further complicated by multiple Services achieving different objectives at different rates. Any flexibility in the sequencing or timing of objectives that can be built into the plan and communicated to the participant leads will pay dividends in what will likely be a fluid process toward achieving the final goal of obtaining a capacity.

Joint Measurements of Progress

Measurements of progress is reiterated from the considerations of BPC previously discussed due to measurements needing to be coordinated through and in sync with Services.\(^{25}\) The *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* acknowledges the “best goals can be undermined by inadequate initial analysis” of the program (United States Institute of Peace 2009, 5-32). Additionally, the importance of a commonality of terms between Services involved also becomes critical. Although in a joint BPC

\(^{24}\)Gabel’s work is reviewed on page 39 of this document and Anderson’s work is reviewed on page 16.

\(^{25}\)Gabel’s examination of Ukrainian TSC programs, page 39, and the comprehensive RAND monograph, page 35, both highlight the importance of measurements of progress that can be easily understood by all involved.
engagement each Service may be striving towards separate but complementary intermediate objectives, it is also conceivable for separate Services to be building capacity towards the same measurement of progress. Once again, clarity amongst all participants on the definition of common terms and the intricacies of the measurements of progress are critical to eliminating confusion and conflict.

Summary

This chapter answered the primary research question of “What are the core commonalities that exist in successful BPC efforts?” and the secondary research question of “What are the elements of a good joint BPC engagement?” with the intent of providing recommendations for improving U.S. BPC engagements that focus on military capacities. From the primary research question it was possible to ascertain six Common BPC Criteria and ten Key Considerations of BPC. The six Common BPC Criteria should be considered when comparing multiple potential BPC engagements and assist decision makers in selecting BPC engagements that have a higher probability of attaining the desired capacity for the long term. The ten Key Considerations of BPC are fundamental tenants of BPC that planners should endeavor to incorporate within their engagement to increase the potential of a capacity being attained and sustained by a partner nation.

The examination of the secondary research question delivered six characteristics of joint BPC engagements. Due to the complex nature of both BPC and joint operation, planners of joint BPC engagements should endeavor to incorporate these six characteristics within their planning. The findings of chapter four, and the implications of those findings, will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. Although this thesis focuses only on the military aspect of BPC, much of the characteristics described in this
chapter also applies to whole-of-government BPC planning and will be discussed further in the Recommendations for Further Study section in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Introduction
The purpose of this research is to gain understanding of BPC and the complex nature in how the multitude of entities involved with BPC interact. Chapter 5 will examine the findings of chapter 4 and discuss the implications of these findings. Recommendations for further study and future action are also provided. These recommendations include expanding the scope of study to include the whole-of-government and increased emphasis on interagency doctrine and training.

Interpretation of Findings
The research conducted in this thesis resulted in the development of twenty-one tenants of BPC. The first six tenants are characterized as Common BPC Criteria and are depicted in figure 2. These Common BPC Criteria are intended to be utilized when examining multiple legitimate BPC engagements and are required to determine priority between engagements for either recommendation or decision.

The next ten tenants are the Key Considerations of Successful BPC and are depicted in figure 3. These considerations should be routinely revisited throughout the planning and execution process to improve the efficiency of a BPC engagement and the likelihood of successfully attaining the desired capability.
Common BPC Criteria

When examining multiple legitimate BPC engagements, these criteria provide considerations for determining priority between engagements.

1. Within U.S. National Interests
2. Within Partner Nation’s National Interests
3. Understand Effect BPC Effort has on Region
4. Understand Long Term Effect BPC Effort has on U.S. Interests
5. Reasonable Capacity for Partner Nation to Attain
6. Capacity is Nested within Theater and Country Campaign Plan

Figure 2. Common BPC Criteria

Source: Developed by author.
The final six tenants of BPC are the Characteristics of Joint BPC Engagements and are depicted in figure 4. The Characteristics of Joint BPC Engagements recognizes the increased complexity inherent in joint operations and therefore provides characteristics that should be considered in addition to the Key Considerations of Successful BPC. These characteristics should be revisited throughout the planning and execution process to improve the efficiency of a BPC engagement and the likelihood of successfully attaining the desired capability.
The implications of these findings are that improvements can be made to the manner in which the U.S. currently conducts BPC. The most significant areas for improvement are better coordination and communication between the entities involved with BPC and better education of those individuals involved in the planning and execution of U.S. BPC engagements. Additional study would enhance the understanding of the linkages between the entities involved in BPC.

Recommendations for Further Study

Despite identifying several characteristics of successful BPC engagements and considerations that, if applied, may improve the likelihood of success for a BPC engagement, there is much more research that could be completed in this area. First, it is
recommended there be a thorough examination of where BPC engagements fail. An analysis of the engagements that failed and the resultant contributing factors to that failure could illuminate additional considerations for BPC decision makers and planners. If an analysis of failed BPC engagements is completed, the results should be used to challenge the analysis of this thesis. Areas where it can be proven that criteria or key consideration were present and the BPC engagement still failed to attain the desired capacity should result in that tenant being scrutinized and consideration for either refuting the BPC tenant or recommendation for creation of a new criteria or key consideration.

Second, there was no literature reviewed that discussed building within a partner nation the ability to operate in a joint manner. The capability to conduct warfare as a joint force provides significant combat capability. Research on this subject would not only need to include the complexities of developing a capacity that the U.S. military still often struggles with, but also the strategic implications of such a powerful war fighting capacity.

Another area for further study is foreign BPC. This thesis focused primarily on the U.S. method of conducting BPC, but many other nations involve themselves with building the capacity of partner nations to varying degrees of success. A study of how other countries tackle this subject of BPC and the best practices of these nations could contribute nicely to the tenants described in this thesis.

Finally, the focus of this document was military BPC. It is acknowledged, however, that the whole-of-government is involved in U.S. BPC engagements. More research into how the whole-of-government interacts in military BPC and how the whole-of-government conducts BPC would contribute to the knowledge and practices for BPC.
planners. The best practices of the Department of Agriculture in building a partner
nation’s farming techniques or how the Department of Energy approaches improving a
partner nation’s techniques for cleaner energy or improved efficiency may be applicable
to the overall tenants of BPC. The BPC field of study has a good deal of room for further
study and further discussion.

**Recommendation for Action**

Much energy and effort has been placed into the development of U.S. BPC
capabilities. In order to improve the current state of U.S. military BPC efforts, actions
currently being taken range from improving the efficiency in how the engagements are
resourced to how the U.S. measures the effectiveness of the engagements. In order to
improve the future state of U.S. military BPC efforts, the DoD is incorporating
improvements in BPC into doctrine and aggressively incorporating interagency and
multinational concepts, to include language and cultural awareness training, into the
education of future leaders. The area of education is the most fertile ground for future
development in coordination between entities involved with BPC and planning better
engagements. Recognizing that the U.S. will, for the foreseeable future, operate in a
resource constrained environment, it is imperative that BPC planners be educated in the
most efficient manners to utilize scarce BPC resources in the most advantageous manner.
Consequently, the focus of this recommendation is on education.

In the same manner that there are Principles of War or Tenants of Airpower, there
are some basic principles of BPC. This thesis is an attempt to codify what those
principles are. These principles should be coordinated and agreed upon by the multitude
of U.S. agencies involved with BPC. Any attempt to consolidate and coordinate the
principles for a complex issue should include a fair amount of discussion, but a published and agreed upon list of BPC principles should be utilized by all those engaged in BPC. It is recommended that these tenants be included in the currently under development Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability Operations*. A fundamental premise of joint operations is an agreed upon doctrine by which the services operate. The whole-of-government needs to be educated on an agreed upon list of BPC principles that can be utilized to provide synergies and guide U.S. BPC efforts. To that end, this thesis recommends the principles listed in this chapter as a starting point for publication in U.S. doctrine and consideration for future whole-of-government doctrine.

Along with agreed upon doctrine, there needs to be additional interagency training and greater numbers of liaisons. Too often, interagency training in the military would equate to placing a large number of military members in a room and having a military instructor teach them about the “interagency.” Although a valiant first step, this training falls short of the military standard. The military does not teach joint operations by filling a room full of Air Force Airmen and having an instructor explain the intricacies of the Army and Navy. The military teaches joint operations by placing Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines in an environment similar to that which they will find themselves in future operations and challenges them. In a similar manner, all elements of the whole-of-government need to train together, through both formal education and practical exercises, to achieve a whole-of-government approach. The subject of this training should not be the “interagency,” but rather the future challenges they will face together with one of those challenges being BPC. It is continued development down this road that a true whole-of-government approach to the complex challenges of BPC will be found.
Conclusion

This thesis utilized the primary research question to discover commonalities among successful BPC efforts. The secondary research question focused on the concept of joint BPC engagement. The analysis of both questions illuminates what is successful in BPC to provide planners and decision makers with tools for understanding the complexities of BPC and building BPC engagements. To that end, principles of BPC consisting of three lists of criteria, key considerations, and characteristics of successful BPC engagements were deduced and provided with the intent of simplifying the BPC planner’s complex task. It will be at the discretion of the reader as to whether that intent has been met.

BPC is complex. Not a significant “bombshell” to end on, but never the less still true. Professional military officers cannot use the complexity of BPC as a scapegoat for not fully understanding this critical mission. The person who attempts to accomplish the task of BPC with the attitude of “We are just helping people, any help is an improvement, and how hard can it be?” does not recognize the importance or intricacies of BPC. This diminished view of the value of BPC will ultimately be reflected in its quality and execution, possibly inadvertently casting aspersion upon our military and nation. The intricacies of the systems that exist within the world and the understanding of the impacts of BPC actions on those systems require consideration and planning. It is the duty of the military members involved with a BPC engagement to take every possible action to ensure the partner nation attains the capacity being built. As good stewards of the nation’s resources, those involved with BPC engagements need to ensure they are operating as efficiently and effectively as possible. As part of the mission to improve
global security through building capacity, those involved with BPC engagements owe it to the future coalition members placing themselves in harm’s way to ensure the absolute best possible capacity is met. The U.S. is a leader in confronting those around the world that would attack freedom and human rights. Being a leader means doing good BPC.


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