EXPLORING THE JIMP CONCEPT: LITERATURE REVIEW

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for Chair, Knowledge and Information Management Committee

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Abstract

This literature review explores the scientific, military and academic literature relevant to the Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) construct, with particular emphasis on the public aspects.

This review contains several chapters. The first two chapters provide an overview of the project and describe the method and results of the search. The third chapter describes the JIMP construct at a theoretical level. The fourth chapter explores the many different elements within the JIMP context, in terms of both interagency and public perspectives. The fifth chapter explores some of the challenges and potential barriers to a fully realized JIMP capability. In contrast, the sixth chapter shows some of the enablers of JIMP capability, and describes examples of success attributed to JIMP activities. The final two chapters attempt to link the JIMP construct to other relevant theoretical frameworks, as well as exploring research and theory development opportunities for future research.
Résumé

Le présent document examine les publications scientifiques, militaires et universitaires qui traitent du concept IIMP (interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public), en mettant l’accent sur les aspects publics.

Le présent document comporte plusieurs chapitres. Les deux premiers chapitres donnent un aperçu du projet, et ils décrivent la méthode utilisée et les résultats de la recherche. Le troisième chapitre décrit le concept IIMP sur le plan théorique. Le quatrième chapitre examine les différents éléments de l’environnement IIMP, des points de vue interorganisationnel et public. Le cinquième chapitre examine certains des obstacles potentiels à une pleine capacité IIMP. En revanche, le sixième chapitre décrit certains facteurs qui facilitent la mise en place d’une capacité IIMP, et il donne des exemples de succès attribuables aux activités IIMP. Les deux derniers chapitres tentent de lier le concept IIMP aux autres cadres théoriques pertinents, et de déterminer quels travaux de recherche et de développement théorique devraient être entrepris.
Executive Summary

Exploring the JIMP Concept: Literature Review
Andrea L. Brown; Barbara D. Adams; DRDC Toronto CR 2010-021; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; February 2010.

Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) – Toronto is currently conducting an applied research program (ARP) exploring the Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP) construct. This ARP is in response to the Canadian Forces’ adoption of a more coordinated, whole-of-government, comprehensive approach to operations, which incorporates JIMP aspects. A key goal of the DRDC Toronto ARP is conceptual clarification of the public and interagency aspects of the JIMP capability, and how this capability may be optimally achieved, focusing on implications for the development of knowledge, education and training tools for the tactical commander. To promote this goal, this literature review explores the scientific, military and academic literature relevant to the JIMP construct, with particular emphasis on the public aspects.

This review contains several chapters. The first two chapters provide an overview of the project and describe the method and results of the search. In all, more than 60 primary articles were reviewed. The third chapter describes the JIMP construct at a theoretical level. The JIMP construct is at a relatively early stage of development, and the construct continues to evolve.

The fourth chapter explores the many different elements within the JIMP context, in terms of both interagency and public perspectives. There are obviously many different players within the JIMP context. At the interagency level, the Canadian Forces must work with many different government departments, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). At the public level, relationships with members of the local public, both domestic and international, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the media are all relevant.

The fifth chapter explores some of the challenges and potential barriers to a fully realized JIMP capability. A range of challenges are discussed, including organizational factors, differences in the availability of resources, information sharing, and the potential for duplication of effort. The roles of differing principles and values and pre-existing expectations (in the form of social stereotypes) are also considered. Media coverage can also impact on how JIMP players interact, as can the unique characteristics of individuals working within the JIMP domain.

In contrast, the sixth chapter shows some of the enablers of JIMP capability, and describes examples of success attributed to JIMP activities. Historical analyses have shown that aspects of the JIMP approach have been a part of past campaigns, and there appear to have been many positive achievements in the current Afghanistan campaign. Organizational structures and processes, as well as policies, training and education, are all potential enablers of JIMP capability.

The final two chapters attempt to link the JIMP construct to other relevant theoretical frameworks, as well as exploring research and theory development opportunities for future research. In particular, social identity theory, intergroup contact theory, and theories of acculturation are all
relevant to understanding how to fully implement the JIMP construct. The final chapter presents recommendations about future research that could further promote JIMP capability. A critical need is for more theoretical development of the JIMP construct. In particular, greater clarity around what the JIMP concept represents from the perspective of all relevant parties is needed. There are many research areas that should be pursued, including teamwork and collaboration within the JIMP context, attitudes and values, culture, stereotyping, and measurement efforts in order to attempt to quantify progress toward full JIMP capability.
Sommaire

Andrea L. Brown; Barbara D. Adams; DRDC Toronto CR 2010-021; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; février 2010.

Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) Toronto a établi un programme de recherche appliquée (PRA) qui examine le concept IIMP (interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public). Ce PRA fait suite à l’adoption par les Forces canadiennes d’une approche coordonnée, exhaustive et pangouvernementale à l’égard des opérations qui incorpore les aspects IIMP. L’objectif principal du PRA de RDDC Toronto est de clarifier les aspects interorganisationnels et publics de la capacité IIMP, et de déterminer la façon optimale d’atteindre cette capacité, en mettant l’accent sur le développement d’outils de connaissance, de formation et d’éducation pour les commandants tactiques. Pour promouvoir cet objectif, le présent document examine les publications scientifiques, militaires et universitaires qui traitent du concept IIMP, en mettant l’accent sur les aspects publics.

Le présent document comporte plusieurs chapitres. Les deux premiers chapitres donnent un aperçu du projet, et ils décrivent la méthode utilisée et les résultats de la recherche. En tout, plus de 60 articles de fond ont été examinés. Le troisième chapitre décrit le concept IIMP sur le plan théorique. Le concept IIMP est à un stade de développement relativement précoce, et il continue d’évoluer.

Le quatrième chapitre examine les différents éléments de l’environnement IIMP, des points de vue interorganisationnel et public. Évidemment, il y a de nombreux joueurs dans l’environnement IIMP. Au niveau interorganisationnel, les Forces canadiennes doivent travailler avec différents ministères et organismes fédéraux, y compris le ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI), la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC) et l’Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI). Au niveau public, les relations avec les membres du public (à l’échelle nationale et internationale), les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) et les médias entrent en ligne de compte.

Le cinquième chapitre examine certains des obstacles potentiels à une pleine capacité IIMP. Divers problèmes sont examinés, y compris les facteurs organisationnels, les écarts dans la disponibilité des ressources, le partage de l’information et le risque de chevauchements. Le rôle joué par divers principes/valeurs et les attentes initiales (sous forme de stéréotypes sociaux) est également examiné. La couverture médiatique peut également avoir un impact sur les interactions entre les différents joueurs, tout comme les caractéristiques particulières des personnes qui travaillent dans l’environnement IIMP.

En revanche, le sixième chapitre décrit certains facteurs qui facilitent la mise en place d’une capacité IIMP, et il donne des exemples de succès attribuables aux activités IIMP. Les analyses antérieures ont montré que certains aspects de l’approche IIMP ont fait partie des campagnes militaires du passé, et cette approche semble être à l’origine de nombreux résultats positifs dans la campagne actuelle en Afghanistan. Les structures et les processus organisationnels, ainsi que les politiques, la formation et l’éducation, sont tous des facteurs susceptibles de faciliter la mise en place d’une capacité IIMP.
Les deux derniers chapitres tentent de lier le concept IIMP aux autres cadres théoriques pertinents, et de déterminer quels travaux de recherche et de développement théorique devraient être entrepris. En particulier, la théorie de l’identité sociale, la théorie des contacts intergroupes et la théorie de l’acculturation sont toutes pertinentes pour comprendre comment mettre pleinement en œuvre le concept IIMP. Dans le dernier chapitre, on trouve des recommandations sur les travaux de recherche qui devraient être entrepris pour promouvoir encore davantage la mise en place d’une capacité IIMP. Il faudrait surtout développer davantage, sur le plan théorique, le concept IIMP. En particulier, il faudrait établir plus clairement ce que le concept IIMP représente du point de vue de toutes les parties concernées. De nombreux sujets devraient faire l’objet de recherches, y compris le travail d’équipe et la collaboration dans un environnement IIMP, les attitudes et les valeurs, la culture, les stéréotypes, et la mesure des progrès accomplis dans la mise en place d’une pleine capacité IIMP.
# Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................................... I

RÉSUMÉ........................................................................................................................................................ II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... III

SOMMAIRE ................................................................................................................................................... V

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................ VII

LIST OF FIGURES.......................................................................................................................................... IX

LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................................................... X

1. PROJECT OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................ 1
   1.1 BACKGROUND AND SCOPE............................................................................................................ 1
   1.2 WORK ITEMS ................................................................................................................................ 1
   1.3 DELIVERABLES ............................................................................................................................... 1
   1.4 ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................................... 1

2. METHOD AND RESULTS ..................................................................................................................... 5
   2.1 MINDMAP AND KEYWORDS .............................................................................................................. 5
   2.2 DATABASES ...................................................................................................................................... 5
   2.3 SELECTION OF ARTICLES .................................................................................................................. 6
   2.4 REVIEW OF ARTICLES ....................................................................................................................... 7
   2.5 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT ............................................................................................................. 7
   2.6 LIMITATIONS..................................................................................................................................... 7

3. DEFINING JIMP .................................................................................................................................... 9

4. THE JIMP CONTEXT .............................................................................................................................. 13
   4.1 ENACTING JIMP IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS .............................................................................. 13
       4.1.1 Command Structures that Support JIMP................................................................................... 14
       4.1.2 Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) ......................................................................... 16
       4.1.3 Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A)................................................................ ...... 16
       4.1.4 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)...................................................................................... 17
       4.1.5 Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)............................................................................. 20
       4.1.6 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Function........................................................................... 21
   4.2 INTERAGENCY ASPECTS OF JIMP ................................................................................................... 24
       4.2.1 Department of National Defence (DND) .................................................................................... 25
       4.2.2 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) ............................................................. 25
       4.2.3 Canadian Police Agencies....................................................................................................... .26
       4.2.4 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) ............................................. 26
       4.2.5 United Nations (UN)............................................................................................................ ...... 28
   4.3 PUBLIC ASPECTS OF JIMP ........................................................................................................... 28
       4.3.1 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).................................................................................. 28
4.3.2 Local Populations ................................................................. 30
4.3.3 Canadian Public ............................................................... 31
4.3.4 Media ................................................................................. 34

5. CHALLENGES TO JIMP CAPABILITY ........................................ 37
   5.1 Organizational Factors ....................................................... 37
   5.2 Principles/Values .............................................................. 41
   5.3 Availability of Resources ................................................... 43
   5.4 Media Coverage ............................................................... 44
   5.5 Culture .............................................................................. 44
   5.6 Information Sharing .......................................................... 45
   5.7 Duplication of Efforts ....................................................... 46
   5.8 Stereotypes ...................................................................... 47
   5.9 Individual Differences ...................................................... 47

6. PROMOTING JIMP CAPABILITY .................................................... 51
   6.1 Successful JIMP Approaches .............................................. 51
   6.2 Enablers of JIMP Capability .............................................. 53
      6.2.1 Organizational Factors – Structures and Processes .......... 53
      6.2.2 Policy ........................................................................ 55
      6.2.3 Training and Education .............................................. 56

7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS RELEVANT TO JIMP ................. 59
   7.1 Social Identity Theory ....................................................... 59
   7.2 Intergroup Contact Theory .............................................. 60
   7.3 Acculturation ................................................................. 63

8. RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. 67
   8.1 Introduction .................................................................... 67
   8.2 Conceptual Clarification .................................................. 68
   8.3 Potential JIMP Research Areas ......................................... 71
   8.4 Conclusion ..................................................................... 78

REFERENCES .................................................................................. 79

DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................... 85
List of Figures

Figure 1. JIMP framework (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008) .........................................................10
Figure 2. Conceptual representation of Afghanistan campaign plan (St-Louis, 2009) ....................14
Figure 3. Battle group 2021 model (Ruff and Godefroy, 2008) ....................................................15
Figure 4. Rot 0 Kandahar PRT table of organization and equipment ...........................................19
Figure 5. CIMIC core functions (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008) ............................................22
Figure 7. CIMIC organization for a given task (Longhurst, 2007) ..............................................23
Figure 8. CF military ethos (CFLI, 2003) ..................................................................................32
Figure 9. Civil-military relationship (CFLI, 2003) .......................................................................33
Figure 10. Pettigrew’s (1998) reformulated contact theory ............................................................62
Figure 11. Variety of intercultural strategies in dominant and non-dominant groups .................64
List of Tables

Table 1. Acronyms...........................................................................................................................................2
Table 2. Keywords........................................................................................................................................5
Table 3. Databases used..............................................................................................................................6
Table 4. Preliminary JIMP research agenda (Gizewski, 2008)................................................................67
1. **Project Overview**

1.1 **Background and Scope**

Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) – Toronto is currently conducting an applied research program (ARP) exploring the Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP) construct. This ARP is in response to the Canadian Forces’ (CF) adoption of a more coordinated, whole-of-government, comprehensive approach to operations, which incorporates JIMP aspects. Indeed, the capacity to be "JIMP-capable" is now cited by the Director of Land Concepts and Doctrine as an important enabler for the Army of Tomorrow operating concept of adaptive dispersed operations, and a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex land environment (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). Of the JIMP dimensions, the "public" aspects pose some of the greatest challenges for the CF, in terms of interfacing with non-military players. This project will focus on the public aspect of the JIMP paradigm, with an emphasis on the implications for training and education for the tactical commander.

A key goal of the DRDC Toronto ARP is conceptual clarification of the public and interagency aspects of the JIMP capability, and how this capability may be optimally achieved, focusing on implications for the development of knowledge, education and training tools for the tactical commander. To promote this goal, it will be important to undertake a review of the literature (scientific, military and academic) relevant to the JIMP concept. The goal of this review is to familiarize the research team with the relevant literature, as well as to begin to articulate the meaning of the JIMP concept within the complex CF environment, with particular emphasis on the public aspects.

1.2 **Work Items**

The following work items were undertaken:

- Attended a start-up meeting at DRDC Toronto in June 2009.
- Worked with the Scientific Authority to define the scope of the investigation.
- Conducted appropriate research and analysis including document review to produce a comprehensive literature review within the scope described above.

1.3 **Deliverables**

- Monthly progress reports describing research activities (completed and planned).
- Draft of the literature review.
- Final literature review to be submitted.

1.4 **Acronyms**

The following table presents a list of acronyms used throughout the report.
Table 1. Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Long Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2RCR</td>
<td>2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D + C</td>
<td>Diplomacy, Development, Defence, Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSO</td>
<td>Afghanistan NGO safety office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Applied Research Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIC</td>
<td>All-Source Intelligence Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFB</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFLI</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Leadership Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSO</td>
<td>Canadian Governance Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIP</td>
<td>Community involvement project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMTC</td>
<td>Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORA</td>
<td>Centre for Operational Research and Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRDC</td>
<td>Defence Research and Development Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBO</td>
<td>Effects-based operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engr Ops</td>
<td>Engineer Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FST</td>
<td>Field Support Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Long Form</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAP</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human immunodeficiency virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Policy Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIMP</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Multinational Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAF</td>
<td>Kandahar Airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRT</td>
<td>Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCDORT</td>
<td>Land Capability Development Operational Research Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTS</td>
<td>Multiteam systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBG</td>
<td>Optimized Battle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>Other government agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGD</td>
<td>Other government department</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentor and Liaison Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPP</td>
<td>Operational Planning Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFI</td>
<td>Personal fear of invalidity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POMLT</td>
<td>Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNS</td>
<td>Personal need for structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPCLI</td>
<td>Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRICIE</td>
<td>Personnel, Research &amp; Development and Operations Research; Infrastructure and Organization; Concept, Doctrine and Collective Training; Information Management; and Equipment, Supplies and Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial reconstruction team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSEPC</td>
<td>Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Long Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTL Coy</td>
<td>Patrol Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTL PL</td>
<td>Patrol Platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>Public volunteer organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT-A</td>
<td>Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Method and Results

2.1 Mindmap and Keywords

To begin, a Mindmap was generated to provide an illustration of the major constructs and other research areas relevant to the JIMP construct in the interagency and public domains. This process involved a brainstorming session with all members of the research team, and relied on their cumulative knowledge and experience with the pertinent scientific, psychological and military domains. From the Mindmap, a set of keywords was developed to focus the literature search. The team established a number of core concepts and then, for each core concept, established primary keywords, as shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Concept</th>
<th>Primary Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JIMP</td>
<td>Whole of government, 3D, Three Block War, multinational operations, enhanced interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Land Futures, Personnel, Research &amp; Development and Operations Research; Infrastructure and Organization; Concept, Doctrine and Collective Training; Information Management; and Equipment, Supplies and Services (PRICIE), United Nations (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Public volunteer organization (PVO), Non-governmental organization (NGO), international organizations (IOs), CIMIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>CF, coalition, Army, Navy, Air Force, hierarchical, rank, specialty, civilian, lateral, arms (e.g., infantry), force, crew, detachment, squad, troop, unit, battalion, armament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The core concepts were the most important words used in the search as they represented the broad constructs relevant to military individual readiness research. The primary keywords ensured sampling of literature from several different domains within the core construct, and their use was guided by what emerged from the core concepts. For example, for the core concept of “JIMP,” primary keywords such as “whole of government” and “three block war” emerged. The primary keywords were used to further focus the results of the core concept search. This had the result of narrowing the search to the most relevant articles.

2.2 Databases

As shown in Table 3, the following databases were the most relevant for searching the scientific, academic and military literature relevant to the JIMP construct.
Table 3. Databases used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Database</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PsycINFO</td>
<td>The PsycINFO database is a collection of electronically stored bibliographic references, often with abstracts or summaries, to psychological literature from the 1800s to the present. The available literature includes material published in 50 countries, but is all presented in English. Books and chapters published worldwide are also covered in the database, as well as technical reports and dissertations from the last several decades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTIS</td>
<td>National Technical Information Service is an agency of the US Department of Commerce’s Technology Administration. It is the official source for government sponsored US and worldwide scientific, technical, engineering, and business related information. The database contains almost three million titles, including 370,000 technical reports from US government research. The information in the database is gathered from US government agencies and government agencies of countries around the world.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISTI</td>
<td>Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information houses a comprehensive collection of publications in science, technology, and medicine. It contains over 50,000 serial titles and 600,000 books, reports, and conference proceedings from around the world.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public STINET</td>
<td>Public STINET is available to the public, free of charge. It provides access to citations of unclassified unlimited documents that have been entered into the Defense Technical Information Center reports collection, as well as the electronic full-text of many of these documents. Public STINET also provides access to the Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals, Staff College Automated Military Periodical Index, Department of Defense Index to Specifications and Standards, and Research and Development Descriptive Summaries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRDC Research Reports</td>
<td>DRDC Defence Research Reports is a database of scientific and technical research produced by and for Defence Research and Development Canada. It is available online at pubs.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/pubdocs/pcow1_e.html.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Storming Media</td>
<td>Storming Media is a private company that resells reports published by the Pentagon and the US federal government. Storming Media has a vast collection of reports published on the military. Topics range from biochemistry to readiness to military strategy to ethical decision-making. It is available online at stormingmedia.us.</td>
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2.3 Selection of Articles

The search of the databases generated more than 150 titles and abstracts. The research team reviewed these and scanned each for relevance. Priority was given to those articles that represented the core concepts, and higher priority was given to articles that discussed multiple core concepts than to articles that addressed only a single core concept. Some of the articles retrieved were relevant to the topic and potentially helpful to elucidating some aspect of the JIMP concept, but did not have either the relevance or quality necessary to be a primary or core article. These were classified and used as secondary articles. Once titles and abstracts were ranked according to relevance, the research team obtained as many of the primary articles as possible. Overall, the references comprised books, journal articles and technical reports from the behavioural sciences, military, and related domains.
2.4 Review of Articles

Once final articles were obtained, researchers began to review and write on the articles that pertained to various sections of the report. After reviewing approximately 25 articles and chapters, the research team developed a broad outline of the major issues. This outline was used to further categorize the applicability of the other articles and to focus the review of the remaining obtained articles. In all, more than 60 primary articles were reviewed.

2.5 Structure of the Report

Chapter 1 of this report outlines the background and scope, work items and deliverables for this project. Chapter 2 describes the method used to initiate the review and to find and choose the articles for this review. Chapter 3 defines and explores the JIMP concept. Chapter 4 explores the many different aspects of the JIMP context, including the interagency and public aspects of JIMP. Chapter 5 addresses existing challenges to the evolution of JIMP capabilities. These include issues such as differences in organizational culture, principles and values, and social stereotypes that may influence how diverse parties may view each other. On the other hand, Chapter 6 discusses some of the positive impacts of JIMP instantiation, and discusses enablers of JIMP. Chapters 7 and 8 explore relevant theoretical constructs and possible research areas that might assist further development of the JIMP construct.

2.6 Limitations

This report has several key limitations that are important to note. The major limitation of this report is that the current state of the JIMP literature is relatively underdeveloped. This is, in part, a product of the recency of the construct, and reflects the fact that many of the current initiatives have yet to be described in print form. Moreover, the scope of the review prevented giving adequate attention to all relevant areas. These limitations aside, it is hoped that this review provides a good overview of the current approach to JIMP, and the relevant research and theory.
3. Defining JIMP

This chapter works to define the meaning of the JIMP construct and to push this construct further; following this, the chapter explores how the JIMP framework is instantiated in current operations in Afghanistan.

No single element of national power is, on its own, sufficient to deal with all of the complexities of failed and failing states. (Capstick, 2006, p. 1)

In today’s security environment, conflict is often multidimensional in nature (Gizewski, Rostek, & Leslie, 2008). Conflicts are becoming more dynamic, uncertain and challenging. Battle lines are no longer clearly defined and enemies are often widely dispersed. Solving such conflicts requires the military to bring together instruments of national power and influence in a comprehensive, timely and coordinated manner. Moreover, it is increasingly recognized that approaches to resolving conflict will no longer reside exclusively within the military domain, but will increasingly require more integrated approaches.

In an International Policy Statement (IPS) released in April 2005, Canada stated that it would take a 3D + C (Diplomacy, Development, Defence, Commerce) approach to intervention on the international stage (St-Louis, 2009). An attempt to establish Canada’s global engagement priorities, the IPS is premised on the assumption that Canada’s security is linked to peace and development abroad and that global challenges must be addressed through multilateral cooperation and engagement with civil society (Patrick & Brown, 2007). The central theme of the IPS is that Canada should adopt a whole of government approach to global challenges. In particular, the IPS states that diplomacy, defence and development efforts should be integrated to synchronize efforts in order to improve effectiveness and maximize the impact of Canadian contributions (St-Louis, 2009). In 2006, the federal government formally ratified this approach under the term “Whole of Government” (St-Louis, 2009). The ultimate goal of a “whole of government” approach is to use military, political and humanitarian/development instruments in a more synchronized and effective manner to achieve security, development and peace in conflict-affected countries (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). Such an approach requires a range of governmental players to coordinate their actions toward the service of common goal.1

Moreover, the emphasis on “whole of government” approaches, or on the “Comprehensive Approach” to operations, which extends beyond instruments of government, has been argued to provide “…a valuable opportunity to implement a Canadian Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) strategy” (Vandahl, 2007, p. 1). JIMP, then, is an integration framework for resolving complex problems, which represents the means by which the whole of government or comprehensive approach can be operationalized (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). The emergence of JIMP signals recognition of the need to simultaneously consider a range of contexts when conducting integrated operations. Each of the terms involved in the JIMP framework are

1 Several other trends and terms are relevant to understanding this integrated approach, including “Comprehensive Approach” and “3-D” (defence, diplomacy and development). Although these terms are generally not unique to Canada, they have developed and evolved within a uniquely Canadian context.
descriptors that identify the categories of players that inhabit the broad security environment (Gizewski, Rostek, & Leslie, 2008). A graphic of the JIMP framework is shown in Figure 1.

![JIMP Framework](image)

**Figure 1. JIMP framework (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008)**

As can be seen in Figure 1, the JIMP framework can be described as follows:

At the core of the JIMP framework is the CF as a unit working jointly (e.g., combining air, land and sea elements). “Joint” warfare involves integrating and synchronizing national military elements and supporting organizations (Vandahl, 2007). This joint CF, however, needs to work in tandem with other agencies.

“Interagency” operations involve multiple governmental departments (OGDs), and other government agencies (OGAs). These agencies include host nation government departments, government agencies from support nations, and international government bodies such as the UN (Leslie, Gizewski & Rostek, 2008). Although collaborating with other agencies has the potential to provide reinforcing synergies, such collaboration can also be more complicated, from the military’s perspective, than integrating joint operations, because of differences in culture, capabilities, communication, command, and control (Vandahl, 2007).

Operations are typically conducted within a multinational context as well. “Multinational” refers to multiple nations being involved in a resolution to a situation (Vandahl, 2007). As few nations have the resources and capabilities to successfully undertake missions on their own, nations working together will ensure a unified effort, greater efficiency in resource constrained environments, and potentially, coalition credibility.

“Public” includes domestic and international societies, host nation populations, media agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public and private volunteer organizations (PVOs), international organizations (IOs), private security firms hired to
support the government, and commercial interests involved in reconstruction and/or development programs (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008).

In viewing CF operations within a JIMP context, the CF force package operates with multinational and interagency partners to achieve unity of purpose and effort. This must be done while considering the requirements of public trust and support, which are necessary to give the operation legitimacy (Department of National Defence, 2007). Gizewski, Rostek, and Leslie (2008) have argued that although the “Joint” and “Multinational” aspects of the JIMP framework are already well established, the “Interagency” and “Public” aspects pose greater challenges for the CF, primarily because they require interacting with non-military entities. Some experience has been gained dealing with interagency and public organizations through Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) efforts, which will be discussed in more detail below.

For the CF to become “JIMP-capable,” it will require adopting a comprehensive approach to operations that allows all of the players to interact effectively (Gizewski, Rostek, & Leslie, 2008). Furthermore, JIMP capability will require the CF to adopt an approach to problem solving that requires the coordination of all of the relevant players in the operating environment (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). However, although the Army proposes the implementation of a JIMP strategy (e.g., The Army of Tomorrow – Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution, Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020), Vandahl (2007) has argued that the Army does not currently have a formal and coherent methodology for doing so. However, there is good evidence, both in the literature and in our discussions with one of the primary advocates of the JIMP approach, that there is both considerable support for the JIMP construct as well as concerted efforts aimed at systematizing governmental approaches to JIMP (on the parts of both the CF and other departments). This issue will be elaborated in greater detail throughout this report.
4. The JIMP Context

This chapter explores the many different elements of the JIMP framework.

4.1 Enacting JIMP in Complex Environments

Modern military environments are becoming more and more complex. Conflicts now involve ethnic, religious, ideological and material drivers, and military power alone will not fully achieve national objectives (Department of National Defence, 2007). In these environments, enacting a JIMP framework is most critical. Missions in complex security environments require the coordinated and collaborative efforts of all instruments of national and coalition power and influence (e.g., diplomatic, economic, military) in order to achieve effective results (Department of National Defence, 2007).

In Afghanistan, the JIMP framework is being expressed in the design and execution of the current campaign plan. The strategies to rebuild Afghanistan were laid out in the Afghanistan Compact, and in Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy (ANDS). The Afghanistan Compact is an agreement made between the international community and the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, in which the international community agreed to help the government of Afghanistan rebuild the country (House of Commons, 2007). The strategies set out in these agreements are built on the three critical and interdependent areas or “pillars” of activity, namely Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and Economic and Social Development (Capstick, 2006), as follows:

- Security is defined as a fundamental prerequisite for achieving stability and development in Afghanistan (Afghanistan Compact, 2006). Therefore, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and partner nations agreed to provide strong support to the Afghan government to establish and sustain security and stability, to strengthen and develop the capacity of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the Afghanistan National police (ANP), and to expand its presence throughout Afghanistan.

- Democratic governance and the protection of human rights are defined as the cornerstone of sustainable political progress in Afghanistan (Afghanistan Compact, 2006). To that end, the Afghan government and the international community made commitments to ensuring justice reform, revitalizing the civil service, fighting against corruption, and making state institutions work for the people in Afghanistan (Capstick, 2006).

- Economic and Social Development aims at improving infrastructure and natural resources, education, health, agriculture and rural development, social protection and economic governance and private sector development (Afghanistan Compact, 2006). The reconstruction of these areas will help to achieve a reduction in poverty, an expansion of employment and enterprise creation, and an improvement in the well-being of all Afghans.

The role that the CF is playing in each of these pillars is outlined in Figure 2.
To date, the CF has deployed units to support each of these three pillars. The CF battle group and Operational Mentor Liaison Team (OMLT) are working to provide security in Afghanistan, the Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A) has been working to promote governance in Afghanistan, and the CF is leading the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar to rebuild the province. The OMLT, SAT-A, and PRT are all elements of an innovative interaction with the local population (St-Louis, 2009), and are examples of the JIMP framework instantiated. Each of these aspects of JIMP is described in more detail in the sections that follow.

4.1.1 Command Structures that Support JIMP

Developing full JIMP capability will ultimately require modifications in all levels of operations (i.e., strategic, operational and tactical).

Canada’s army is working towards a sustained, cohesive, and collaborative approach to future land force development (Ruff & Godefroy, 2008). One aspect of this evolving army is the evolution toward optimised, infantry-centric, affiliated battle groups that work in a formation context. Central to this evolution is the Army of Tomorrow Battle Group 2021 study. The study is designed to investigate and determine the feasibility of an Optimized Battle Group (OBG) designed land force for the Army. Figure 3 lays out the Army of Tomorrow Battle Group 2021 model.
As can be seen in the figure, JIMP capabilities are incorporated right into the model of the Battle Group (BG) 2021. For instance, the BG 2021 model includes a JIMP-capable headquarters in which Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) representatives are located within the headquarters. CIMIC is also included as part of the combat support company.

To conduct the study, the Optimized Battle Group was formed from the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment (2RCR). To date, the 2 RCR BG has taken part in the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) Exercise MAPLE GUARDIAN series as well as month-long field counter-insurgency exercises at the Joint Multinational Readiness Centre in Hohenfels, Germany. The Battle Group 2021 study investigates two key questions: 1) What is the optimal mix of capabilities to be grouped together in battle groups to meet the challenges of the contemporary operating environment and future security environment? and 2) What is the most effective force generational course of action to generate the optimal mix of capabilities? These questions are being investigated within a JIMP context and the results will be used to inform a series of decision points relevant to Army Expansion (Ruff & Godefroy, 2008).

Initial data collected for this study have been argued to provide support for the effectiveness of this instantiation of the JIMP concept. More specifically, Ruff and Godefroy (2008) found that “the integration of intelligence personnel and influence activity/information operations personnel (i.e., CIMIC, Psychological Operations or (PsyOps)) into the BG is invaluable in improving its overall operational effectiveness, and…it is becoming clear that this capability needs to be established in a more permanent fashion” (p. 17).
4.1.2 Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT)

The Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) consists of a group of ISAF soldiers organized in multidisciplinary teams to train members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) (Department of National Defence, 2009a). OMLT members are working to help build a domestic security force that is capable of supporting the Afghan government (Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), 2007). With the ultimate goal of establishing conditions for the transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghan national security forces (Department of National Defence, 2009c), OMLT has been mentoring ANA members in order to increase the proficiency and professionalism of the ANA (Davis, 2007). In Kandahar Province, the OMLT comprises about 200 Canadian soldiers who deliver training to ANA units, advise and sometimes supervise ANA soldiers, and act as models for the skills and attitudes they teach (Department of National Defence, 2009c). OMLT goes with the ANA on joint operations with the Canadian battle group that is deployed with Joint Task Force Afghanistan. Not only do they help to plan and execute operations against the Taliban, but they also help to mentor Afghan counterparts on aspects of professional soldiering such as combat service support, training, intelligence and personnel administration (PPCLI, 2007).

The OMLTs are also responsible for liaising between the ANA and ISAF at the provincial level, which ensures that ANA receives the resources and information required to conduct joint operations with ISAF task forces and that ISAF is aware of the state of the ANA’s operational capability (Department of National Defence, 2009c).

In September 2007, OMLT formed a sub-unit called the Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (POMLT) to train, advise and monitor the Afghan National Police (ANP). The POMLT was developed jointly with Afghan authorities, the Afghan national security forces, and Joint Task Force Afghanistan (Department of National Defence, 2009a).

The OMLT provides a good example of the CF working within the JIMP framework, particularly in terms of the Multinational aspect. Not only do OMLT members work very closely with their ANA counterparts, OMLT leaders are also working to help promote Afghan solutions in an Afghan context rather than simply mimicking the Canadian system (Davis, 2007). For example, LCol Eyre, the OMLT commanding officer, provided his team with a reading list so that they could understand the history of Afghanistan and foster cultural awareness (Davis, 2007). In fact, LCol Eyre stresses that OMLT members must grasp the culture, history and language of Afghanistan in order to effectively mentor the ANA (Eyre, 2007). This includes understanding the importance of societal networks, the role of family, principles of Pashtunwali, and differences in agendas and ethical boundaries between Afghan and Canadian culture.

4.1.3 Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A)

Supporting the Governance pillar described in the Afghanistan Compact, the Canadian Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT-A) was comprised of a team of strategic planners assigned to the Afghan Presidency to assist in development (Capstick, 2006). The mission statement of the SAT-A was:

“To conduct credible and accountable capacity building operations in direct support of the senior leadership of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan that ensures strategic coherence and results in good governance, peace and security in support of the Afghan Compact” (House of Commons, 2007, p. 44).
An example of the interagency aspect of the JIMP framework, the SAT-A was a collaboration between the CF, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The SAT-A was made up of a small group of military members (air, naval, and land), a defence scientist, and a CIDA member all working in consultation with the Canadian Embassy (St-Louis, 2009). Having almost no role in security, but military led, the team applied generalist military planning skills to help solve civilian problems (Capstick, 2006) and took directions from the Senior Economic Advisor to the President, the Canadian Ambassador, and the Head of Aid (Vandahl, 2007).

The SAT-A team worked to support the economic, social, and governance development in Afghanistan. Team members worked with the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, the World Bank, and the UN Development Program to enhance training and professional development of current and future Afghan civil servants, pass on strategic planning skills and techniques to Afghan counterparts, and develop public communications capabilities (Capstick, 2006). By all accounts, the strategic advisory team was deemed to be fairly successful.

In 2008, the Strategic Advisory Team was disbanded when the Canadian government decided to civilianize the SAT-A effort (St-Louis, 2009). Consequently, responsibility for SAT-A was transferred to CIDA, which contracted the responsibility out to a Canadian private consulting firm called CANADEM. CANADEM, a Canadian non-governmental organization (NGO)\(^2\), maintains a roster of 10,000 development experts (Davis, 2008), and established the Canadian Governance Support Office (CGSO) in lieu of the SAT-A (St-Louis, 2009). There appear to be somewhat mixed assessments about the impact of the evolution from SAT-A to CGSO. Dr. Nipa Banerjee (2008), who served as the head of Canada’s development and aid program in Kabul from 2003 to 2006, notes several potential downsides resulting from the loss of Department of National Defence (DND) leadership:

> “The value added of a DND team lay in the deployment of disciplined teams, well-trained and supervised to deliver at the operational levels. Based on my personal experience, such high standards are not expected from civil servants or contracted civilian personnel, and even less encouraged.”

Another challenge noted by Banerjee (2008) and in the literature is the challenge of getting civilians to agree to be posted in areas with security challenges and danger. The increased costs of CGSO and the reduced number of advisors being provided to the Afghan governments are also noted as indicators of this organization’s decreased effectiveness relative to the SAT (St-Louis, 2009).

### 4.1.4 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

Supporting the Reconstruction pillar of the Afghanistan Compact, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are teams of military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction subject matter experts who work to support reconstruction efforts in unstable states. PRT teams work in areas of conflict where security is unstable, and this support facilitates the work of other agencies. Without PRTs, for example, NGOs are not able to operate effectively (Scoppio, Idzenga, Miklas, & Tremblay, 2009).

\(^2\) The involvement in of CANADEM, an NGO and private consulting firm, suggests the involvement of the Public aspect of JIMP in this context, in addition to the Interagency aspect noted above.
Originally implemented by the United States military, PRTs were initiated in Afghanistan to address the need to *de facto* rebuild the country and its institutions (from the federal level through to local villages) while also conducting a counterinsurgency campaign (Chief Review Services, 2007). PRT tasks include monitoring security, promoting the policies and priorities of the national government, and facilitating security reform (Vandahl, 2007). The PRT also provides support to the Provincial Governor, Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), line-ministries and the central government (Capstick, 2009).

In total, there are 25 PRTs throughout Afghanistan (House of Commons, 2007). Although other military systems also have their own form of PRTs, Canada is currently responsible for the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT; Government of Canada, 2009). The KPRT works to facilitate an interdepartmental approach to enable Afghans to help Afghans (House of Commons, 2007). The 330-person KPRT consists of diplomats, corrections experts, developments specialists, Canadian police (including Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)) and the military. The KPRT works on projects with long-, medium-, and short-term impacts on development and reconstruction, in addition to providing support for alternative livelihood programs, rural rehabilitation, and public infrastructure projects (Capstick, 2009). Quick impact projects are carried out to respond to the immediate needs of the Afghan people and long-term projects are carried out to foster sustainable benefits for the Afghan people.

Although the composition of the civilian component of the PRT reflects the interagency aspect of JIMP, the PRT also works within the joint and the public aspects of the JIMP framework (e.g., in terms of the latter, in supporting long-term development goals, and in working with local populations through CIMIC activities). Thus, it is important to note that the philosophy of the PRT is to help enable Afghans to decide on the work that needs to be done in their country and then to do the work for themselves; PRTs do not do the work for the Afghans (House of Commons, 2007). This allows locals to take ownership of local projects and develop their capacity to conduct future work. The structure of the first PRT is shown in Figure 4.
The first rotation of the KPRT consisted of a military headquarters (PRT HQ), a composite force protection group (Patrol Company (PTL Coy); Patrol Platoon (PTL PL)), a field engineer section (Engineer Operations (Engr Ops); improvised explosive devices (IED)/Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD); (Fd) Section)), a CIMIC and PsyOps/Intelligence Operations (IO) cell, an Intelligence cell split between Kandahar Airfield and the PRT (All-Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC)/Field Support Team (FST)), and a combat service support group split between the KPRT base and the Kandahar Airfield (KAF) (Combat Service Support (CSS); PRT Sp; KAF Sp; Convoy Escort). Subsequent rotations of the KPRT have changed in composition to reflect the changing security situations in Southern Afghanistan (Chief Review Services, 2007). However, it is worth noting that the composition of the KPRT has remained predominantly military.

An example of work done by the KPRT was the safe destruction of 1,600 pounds of munitions and other explosives found around Kandahar City. These munitions would have been used to make improvised explosive devices (IEDs; NATO, 2009). The KPRT worked with Kandaharis and the ANP to identify and safely destroy the munitions. An example of how KPRT supports the JIMP framework can be seen in the response by Lieutenant-Colonel Carl Turenne, Commanding Officer of the KPRT (NATO, 2009):

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3 Unfortunately, more recent structural diagrams of PRTs were not available.
“This safe destruction of IEDs is a demonstration of the greater trust that Kandaharis are placing in the local security forces, and underlines the importance of cooperation with the locals.”

In 2007, an evaluation of the CF/DND participation in the KPRT mission was conducted in accordance with the Chief Review Services work plan. The evaluation was conducted to assess the importance of the KPRT mission to national strategy and to evaluate the risk of mission failure or loss of life due to KPRT composition issues (Chief Review Services, 2007). This evaluation showed that:

“international consensus amongst key participants is that the PRTs have credibly performed their mission to help extend the authority of the national government to the provinces. They have facilitated development of a stable and secure environment, and, through military presence, enabled security sector reform and reconstruction efforts.” (p. 26)

However, the Chief Review Services (2007) evaluation also identified a number of challenges facing KPRT rotations in Afghanistan. Issues identified in PRT post-operation reports include the lack of linkage of projects to a higher goal or plan, lack of common reporting, lack of information sharing, and lack of coordination of NGOs in theatre (Vandahl, 2007). Gizewski and Rostek (2007) also note that inconsistent mission statements, unclear roles and responsibilities, and ad hoc preparation have been problematic for PRTs.

### 4.1.5 Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

Created in 1996 in coordination with the NGO community, the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is a humanitarian assistance team consisting of military personnel and capable of being mounted quickly in the event that the Government of Canada requires a military contribution in responding to natural or human-made disasters (Department of National Defence, 2008; Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). DART was designed to complement domestic and international organizations dedicated full-time to relieving pain and suffering of troubled people. Only when a disaster is of such a large scale as to overwhelm these organizations will DART be deployed. Operations are generally conducted for 40 days. The CF has 200 personnel ready to deploy with DART within 48 hours to any location in the world (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007).

DART addresses the secondary impact of disaster, such as the spread of sickness and disease (e.g., dysentery, typhoid) that can occur when large populations are displaced and living in crowded conditions. The primary capabilities of DART are (Department of National Defence, 2008):

- Primary medical care;
- Production of purified drinking water;
- Limited engineering capabilities; and
- A command and control structure that allows for communications between DART, the host nation, IOs, NGOs, aid agencies, and DND.

Comprised of highly trained personnel designated from several CF units, DART consists of:

- An operational-level element, which is responsible for strategic-level liaison with Canadian and affected national officials, IOs, and NGOs;
- A tactical-level element, which coordinates on-site tasking priorities;
- An engineer troop;
- A medical platoon;
- A defence and security platoon; and
- A logistic platoon.

In 1998, DART was deployed to Honduras in the wake of Hurricane Mitch to help the sick, the injured, and displaced Hondurans (MacVicar, 2005). The DART company consisted of an operational platoon, a tactical platoon, a medical platoon, an engineer troop, a logistics platoon, and technical trade soldiers. DART was also deployed in 2005 to the Ampara region of Sri Lanka to provide assistance to those who had been displaced by earthquake-generated tsunamis (Department of National Defence, 2008). Although DART consists of a military team, its goal is to provide assistance to local populations in need; hence, DART may be seen as a military structure that supports the public aspect of JIMP. Likewise, the DART program is also an example of how the CF can work with NGOs to provide assistance to those in immediate need.

4.1.6 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Function

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a military function that supports a commander’s mission by establishing and maintaining cooperation and coordination between the military and the civil actors in an area of operation (Department of National Defence, 2009d). Thus, like DART, CIMIC may be seen as a military structure that supports the public aspect of JIMP. Longhurst (2007) describes CIMIC as the:

“primary link between the military and [local civilians and international organizations]. It works to coordinate and to elicit cooperation from, and with, the civilian dimension, in order to help ensure the overall success of a mission.” (p. 57)

As noted earlier, a CIMIC cell may be one component of the organization of a PRT (see Figure 4). However, the Canadian military has been conducting CIMIC operations since World War II (Longhurst, 2007). Early CIMIC activities consisted primarily of providing humanitarian assistance in the form of immediately needed physical goods (e.g., drinking water, food, and shelter; Longhurst, 2007). CIMIC personnel also often undertake small projects that could be completed during a single tour or rotation (e.g., the building of a playground). These projects are funded both by the military and by the contributions of deployed soldiers themselves.

In August 2000, the Chief of the Land Staff initiated a new approach to CIMIC (Longhurst, 2007). At that time, it was acknowledged that CIMIC could play a role as a force multiplier and an Action Directive was issued that CIMIC was to become a reserve capability. CIMIC is now the primary link between the CF and the civil dimension of an operation (e.g., local population, local officials, international organization workers). According to Leslie, Gizewski and Rostek (2008), the CIMIC function provides an institutionalized foundation from which the JIMP concept can evolve, especially with respect to the interagency and public components within the tactical domain. Figure 5 outlines three core CIMIC functions.
The first CIMIC core function relates to liaising with civil actors (e.g., civilian populations, civilian authorities, and civilian agencies). This involves networking with local populations, in order to gather informal information. The role of the CIMIC operator is also to promote an understanding of what Canada aims to achieve in a theatre of operations, such as Afghanistan, and to offset incorrect information at the local level. The overall goal is to work to build relationships with the local population in order to promote the highest possible levels of force protection. The second CIMIC core function, the coordination of civil support to military forces, includes a number of activities, including facilitating the commander’s mission (Peabody, 2006). One common role of the CIMIC operator, for example, in Afghanistan, is to be the liaison between tribal leaders and CF commanders in order to arrange shuras. Lastly, as part of the third core CIMIC function, CIMIC personnel help to promote coordination of CF support to civil actors. These duties require the CIMIC operators to work with civilian authorities, civilian agencies, allied and other military forces, IOs, UN agencies, and NGOs (Longhurst, 2007). The structure of a typical CIMIC unit is shown in Figure 7.
The standard CIMIC unit consists of 13 members: liaison officers or operators who conduct assessments, arrange and monitor projects, and liaise with civilians in the area of operation; drivers who play a security role; and HQ staff who handle coordination of operations, planning, liaison with the force commander, evaluation of assessments and projects proposals, and information management (Peabody, 2006).

The importance of CIMIC can be seen in the positive perceptions of local people as a result of successful projects (Peabody, 2006). When locals hold positive views of the CF, there are resulting benefits for the CF. Locals who have been “won over” by the CF are more likely to provide the task force with information, which can ultimately save the lives of CF soldiers. Friendly locals can also result in fewer security incidents and attacks, and consequently make operations easier, in part, because locals can help provide critical information that would provide heightened security for CF personnel. Major Caldwell (2005), Officer Commanding of a light armoured vehicle III company in Afghanistan, stated:

“I believed that the giving of aid would lead to security, which could lead to information. That is, information and intelligence may give us more security in the future and or may provide us with details in order to conduct direct action operations. Again, the greatest asset we had to try and develop was the trust of the local people.” (Caldwell, 2005, p. 151)

While in Afghanistan, it is crucial that CIMIC units continue to build upon trusting relationships with locals in order to obtain information about opposing military forces in the area of operation (Longhurst, 2007). Such relationships are built through holding regular meetings (or shuras) with the mayors, police chiefs, governors, village representatives, villagers, teachers, directors and students; through conducting quick, high-impact, and beneficial projects (e.g., road repairs and construction, providing desks to schools); by donating school and medical supplies; and by distributing ISAF News to local villages and communities.
When in Bosnia Herzegovina, CIMIC was among the busiest elements in the battle group (Longhurst, 2007). CIMIC operators talked to local communities to identify infrastructure priorities. Projects were then filtered against CIDA criteria and prioritized for the commander’s approval. Community improvement project funds were then allocated to priorities as much as possible. Projects were put out to tender (a minimum of 3 bids were required per project from independent contractors). A CIMIC operator then interacted weekly with the chosen contractor throughout the project.

Through the years, CIMIC teams have learned a number of lessons to improve mission effectiveness. Lessons learned by CIMIC personnel include the need to consult with the local population rather than just the local authorities, the need to blacklist contractors who demonstrate poor performance, the importance of maintaining liaisons throughout a project to ensure quality control, and the importance of the development of the local ownership concept (i.e., transparency, involving recipients in the process, and using agencies rooted in the host country) (Peabody, 2006). Also noted is the need to work closely with Intelligence to avoid situations in which CIMIC members inadvertently show support for a local person who is actually engaged in unscrupulous activities. For example, photo opportunities involving publicly giving a cheque to a local charity could be problem if the local person accepting the cheque is a criminal in the eyes of the local citizens. Such events, obviously, can undermine the credibility of a mission and undermine relationships with the local public.

As can be understood from this section, the CF has a number of different structures in place that work to enact the JIMP framework. Of particular importance for this review is how the CF is working to support the interagency and public aspects of JIMP, through structures such as the OMLT, BG 2021, SAT-A, KPRT, CIMIC, and DART. These CF structures are working to coordinate players in troubled areas and, subsequently, to improve collaboration and cooperation among various agencies, organizations, and governments. The next section of this report will provide a summary of the various interagency and public groups that the CF is working with to enact the JIMP framework.

4.2 Interagency Aspects of JIMP

“When you have CIDA, DFAIT, RCMP and DND working together 24 hours a day, seven days a week, where you roll out of your bunk and you are at work, this idea of working in a coherent, coordinated way is intrinsic.” (Stephen Wallace, Vice-President, CIDA, interviewed in Parkins & Thatcher, 2006)

The attacks of 9/11 underscored the link between development and security, and underline the need for a more integrated approach to preventing conflict and to conducting post-conflict operations (Patrick & Brown, 2007). The need for development and security to be integrated is especially true in Afghanistan where the contemporary operating environment has required many groups to work together to collectively use their strengths and capabilities. In order for Canada to meet its obligations, there is a need for military and non-military personnel to work in Afghanistan. At this time, there are more Canadian civilians working in Afghanistan than ever before (Government of Canada, 2009). Working closely with the CF, 98 civilians are working in Kandahar and Kabul as diplomats, development specialists, correctional officers, and police officers. This section will discuss some of the civilian agencies, both Canadian and international, that the CF is working with in Afghanistan, namely the Department of National Defence (DND), the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA), Canadian police departments, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), and the United Nations (UN).

4.2.1 Department of National Defence (DND)

According to the DND website, “The Department of National Defence (DND) works collaboratively with the Canadian Forces (CF) to ensure the security of Canadians.” In particular, the DND has responsibility for constructing and maintaining all defence establishments, and for all research related to the defence of Canada (Department of National Defence, 2009b). The defence policy set by the DND influences the nature of the CF by assigning missions, and by identifying the roles and the tasks to be undertaken by the CF [Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI), 2003]. To that end, it is important to note that DND leadership, both military and civilian, have increasingly been calling for the adoption of the JIMP framework in its operations (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007).

DND has a history of working with civilian agencies (Patrick & Brown, 2007), including CIDA and DFAIT. DND has been reported to engage DFAIT and CIDA as equals in Afghanistan, although cultural differences between organizations are an obstacle to cooperation. Cultural differences between organizations will be discussed in more detail later in this review. While in Afghanistan, DND is focused on the requirements of peacekeeping and stability operations, which require alignment and cooperation with other non-military government departments.

4.2.2 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) administers the bulk of Canada’s development assistance program (CIDA, 2009). CIDA’s mandate is to reduce poverty, promote human rights, and support sustainable development.5 The five main areas that CIDA has a focus on include education, environment, good governance, health and human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), and private sector development (Patrick & Brown, 2007).

CIDA has worked in fragile states for a long time. However, CIDA is restricted by Official Development Assistance-eligible activities (Patrick & Brown, 2007). These restrictions mean that CIDA cannot mobilize the necessary resources to establish stability, law, and order in volatile environments. CIDA also lacks the professional expertise and resources needed to coordinate multiple departments in security matters, such as police deployments, transitional justice, and peace support operations. Therefore, CIDA acknowledges that progress in fragile states requires greater collaboration with other departments (e.g., working with DND and RCMP for security sector reform; Patrick & Brown, 2007). To this end, CIDA works in concert with its development partners, fragile states and countries in crisis, and the Canadian population and institutions (CIDA, 2009).

4 http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/about-notresujet/index-dnd-eng.asp

5 Although, as a government agency, CIDA can be considered an interagency group from the perspective of the JIMP framework, its mandate (as well as the mandate of other groups that fall within the interagency aspect, such as the UN) also reflects concerns that are associated with the public aspect of JIMP (e.g., development assistance), often associated with NGOs.
CIDA is currently working in Afghanistan to contribute to the international development and reconstruction effort (House of Commons, 2007). Working through other international organizations (e.g., World Bank, UN Development Program), CIDA has 20 staff in the field and 70 working in Canada on the Afghanistan Task Force to support Afghan government-approved national programs and projects (House of Commons, 2007; Wallace, 2007). Personnel were selected for this project based on their understanding of the link between development and security, conflict dynamics, and basic poverty alleviation (Wallace, 2007). In the 2006/2007 fiscal year, CIDA delivered $139 million worth of projects across the three pillars of the Afghanistan Compact (e.g., demining, basic education).

### 4.2.3 Canadian Police Agencies

Civilian police from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other Canadian police agencies, known as Canadian Civilian Police (CIVPOL), have been deployed to international peace missions around the world for two decades (RCMP, 2008b). Generally, CIVPOL assist in rebuilding and strengthening police services in countries that have experienced conflict.

Since August 2005, CIVPOL have been deployed to work in the KPRT (RCMP, 2008a). Currently there are 30 Canadian police officers from seven police agencies deployed in Afghanistan, with this number expected to increase to 50 by the fall of 2009 (RCMP, 2009). Together with the CF, CIVPOL is working to support the Economic and Social Development pillar in Afghanistan (Capstick, 2007). The primary role of CIVPOL is to monitor, advise, mentor and train the ANP (RCMP, 2008a). To do this, CIVPOL officers conduct joint patrols with KPRT military officers to liaise with the ANP at police stations and check points, to provide basic training (e.g., first aid, IED awareness, searching of suspects), and to distribute equipment and uniforms to ANP.

CIVPOL are also working in Kabul and Kandahar at the Police Reform Unit to assist in providing logistical and training support to ANP guarding Kabul city gates, to aid in implementing projects to upgrade ANP police stations and check points, and to assist in coordinating the development and training of Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (RCMP, 2008a). In this sense, their role appears to overlap to some extent with the role of POMLT personnel. However, a recent article on the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) website by CF Captain Nick Arakgi (2009) suggests that while current POMLT personnel in Afghanistan are a mix of infantry soldiers (from 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment and 2 Military Police Unit from CFB Petawawa) CIVPOL personnel function in a civilian capacity. However, Arakgi does note the close connection among these elements:

“A constable from the Durham Regional Police and a Royal Canadian Mounted Police corporal, members of the civilian police (CIVPOL) contingent of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, also patrol regularly with the POMLT.”

This suggests that the POMLT and CIVPOL functions have some similarities, but seem to offer military versus civilian perspectives, respectively.

### 4.2.4 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) formulates and implements policies on foreign affairs and international trade, promotes international trade and commerce, and manages Canada’s missions worldwide (DFAIT, 2009). As already noted in this report, DFAIT, as
a government agency, is involved in promoting the JIMP framework in that it contributed to the SAT-A prior to its being civilianized. DFAIT also works with CIDA to enhance security sector reform in failed states.

DFAIT is also contributing to the JIMP framework through the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START). Located within DFAIT, START was created by the Canadian government in 2005 to address coordination challenges in fragile states (Patrick & Brown, 2007). Made up of existing capacities, personnel, and units in the Canadian government, START is a standing interagency mechanism intended to provide a platform for prompt, government-wide crisis responses, such as coordinating military and civilian activities in post-conflict operations. Its mandate includes reaction to crises (e.g., ensuring greater coordination across government agencies in post-conflict operations) and prevention of crises (e.g., looking ahead to prevent incipient crises). In terms of its organizational structure, START is comprised of an executive office and 4 different subgroups, as follows:

- Conflict prevention and peace-building group
- Humanitarian affairs and disaster response group
- Peacekeeping and peace operations group
- Mine action and small arms group

In their efforts to examine policy coherence toward fragile states, Patrick and Brown (2007) engaged in extensive consultations with Canadian government officials, academics and think tank members. These interviews identified START’s placement within DFAIT and staffing as hurdles to fulfilling its mandate (Patrick & Brown, 2007). There is also debate over how much control the START office, which is located in DFAIT, should have in directing Canadian involvement in countries that are in crisis. To deal with this criticism, the Federal Cabinet created a START advisory board. The advisory board is composed of representatives from a range of government departments and from the Privy Council Office who are mandated to endorse START activities. With respect to staffing, START personnel have predominantly been seconded from the foreign ministry. Problems arise when personnel are seconded to START from other ministries because these ministries do not tend to regard START as an interagency body.

Through their research, Patrick and Brown (2007) were also able to identify practical impacts of START. Interviewees regarded START as being successful in creating a more flexible funding structure to finance crisis activities that other departments would not have been able to fund (e.g., due to funding guidelines) or would not have had the desire to fund. START was also identified as having strengthened coordination among different agencies, although more so during high-profile or crisis situations than during conflict prevention or peacekeeping situations.

Patrick and Brown (2007) also identified some barriers to START being a fully integrated initiative. Specifically, interviewees noted that there are few rewards for pursuing interdepartmental coordination and that there are pressures within single agencies to demonstrate quick results.

“While there is little inherent resistance to collaboration among working-level officers, the time pressures set by senior management rarely allow for adequate whole of government consultation and planning.” (Patrick & Brown, 2007, p. 68)
Until each contributing agency views START as an important independent initiative, rather than as a means for promoting their own agency or as a temporary engagement to be ended quickly, Patrick and Brown argue that START may fall short in its ability to support the JIMP framework.

4.2.5 United Nations (UN)

The United Nations (UN) is an international organization committed to maintaining international peace and security and to promoting social progress, improving living standards and improving human rights (UN, 2009). The UN is best known for peacekeeping, peace building, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance projects.

Following the end of the Cold War, UN involvement expanded from monitoring ceasefires to solidifying fragile truces, building capacity and legitimacy of states as they emerge from conflict, holding elections, and demobilizing and reintegrating combatants (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). With the increased complexity of such peace missions, the question of coordination between agencies and organizations has become a key focus for those involved. The trend is toward greater integration of international efforts and greater recognition of the need for collaboration between relief, development and security organizations.

4.3 Public Aspects of JIMP

“In an era in which irregular threats are on the rise, and in which global media ensure that operations often unfold before a wide audience, attention to the civilian on the ground and the informational and moral aspects of operations is evermore important to success. So also is a capacity to enhance awareness, communication, and, if possible, coordination and cooperation with such groups.” (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008, p. 15)

As can be inferred from the above quote, the public aspects of the JIMP framework are important to attaining mission success. Public aspects of JIMP (domestic and international publics) include host nation populations, media agencies, NGOs, PVOs (public and private volunteer organizations), IOs (international organizations), commercial interests involved in reconstruction and/or development programs, and private security firms to support the government (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007).

The future operating environment requires the CF to work collaboratively and maintain positive relationships with NGOs, local populations, the Canadian population, and the media. In this section, we will discuss each of these groups, in particular, and their role in the JIMP framework.

4.3.1 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

A key aspect of effectively implementing the JIMP framework, particularly in crisis- or conflict-affected states, involves the CF’s ability to work with NGOs. In its broadest terms, an NGO is an association based on the common interests of its members. An NGO has no governmental status or function, and is not created by a government, nor does it have an agenda set by a government (SIL International, 1998). NGOs are typically involved in aid and relief, in addition to developing human resources (e.g., promoting education) and addressing community issues (e.g., adult education). Maintaining neutrality, impartiality and independence are crucial conditions for many NGOs and their freedom of action and safety are tied to these concepts (Peabody, 2006).
There are several ways in which interactions between militaries and NGOs have been challenged in recent years. Winslow (2005) has identified several sources of tension between these 2 parties, including organizational structure and culture, the ways in which they accomplish tasks, how they define success, their abilities to exert influence and control information, and their control over resources. Over the past decade, NGOs have been facing increasing danger when working in the field. Whereas NGOs were traditionally rarely targets in fragile states, some have argued that in current operations, they are more often targets than are soldiers (Fraser, 2006). There were 122 aid workers killed in 2008, most of them local aid workers (CBC News, August 19, 2009). In Afghanistan, the most dangerous country for aid workers in the world, there are over 800 international and indigenous NGOs at work (Olson, 2007). The increased levels of danger have caused some NGOs to cease operations and some international NGOs have opted to work mostly through local NGO partners. As most of the aid workers killed in recent years were Afghan nationals, local NGOs also seem to face high risks. This has resulted in NGOs and other humanitarian aid agencies becoming increasingly dependent on foreign and local militaries for protection.

At the same time as NGOs have been required to be increasingly dependent, however, there is also conflict driven by the assumption of new roles and responsibilities by the military. Some NGOs argue that the increasing insecurity within some countries is the result of donor countries having merged their security, relief, reconstruction, and development efforts, as is the case in Afghanistan (Olson, 2007). During the early days of the coalition, military officers wore civilian clothes and drove unmarked vehicles to engage in reconstruction work. The military also initiated “hearts and minds” aid projects that were designed to win the locals’ goodwill towards foreign troops, and tasked PRTs to establish security and undertake reconstruction. Many NGOs believe that such actions have changed the public’s perception of NGOs from being politically neutral to being an arm of the foreign military presence (Olson, 2007). These concerns have created a dilemma for NGOs committed to political neutrality and independence.

“Historically, humanitarian NGOs have been more insistent on separating military and humanitarian responses, so that if war resumes they can access needy civilians on all sides. At the same time, development-oriented NGOs have always been more open to working with governments, recognizing the necessarily political nature of much of their work. However, many of the largest international NGOs in Afghanistan are now multi-mandate agencies involved in both relief and development, and so face serious dilemmas as to what their role should be with respect to the government, the foreign military, and donors.” (Olson, 2007, p. 5)

Recently, major NGOs in Afghanistan have formed networks in order to coordinate approaches and undertake advocacy with foreign donors and militaries to respect “humanitarian” space (Olson, 2007). Discussions on how to separate political/military responses from humanitarian responses have resulted in some improvements in communication between NGOs and the military in the field. Furthermore, CF pre-deployment training is increasingly including NGO representatives as speakers to allow soldiers to better understand NGO perspectives (Scoppio et al., 2009). However, there remain a number of barriers (related to organizational culture and organizational goals) that

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6 Although framed in slightly different terms, these issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
could hinder the abilities of the CF to work with NGOs. The barriers that NGOs and militaries face in working together in the field will be discussed in detail later (Section 5) in this report.

4.3.2 Local Populations

A critical “public” aspect of JIMP involves interactions with local populations. As noted by Longhurst (2007), “Whenever a military force deploys somewhere, whether it is for a peace support operation, for humanitarian assistance, or for warfighting, there is always a civilian dimension to consider” (p. 57). An effects-based operation (EBO) approach considers the interaction with the local population as an important concept of the mission. Effect-based operations must consider a full range of cumulative effects during a mission, including first-, second- and third-order effects. For example, disrupting the electric grid (first-order effect) can lead to disrupting petroleum deliveries to the airfields (second-order effect), resulting in a disruption in the air operations (third-order effect) (Rehak, Lamoureux & Bos, 2006). Although many of the efforts of the CF military system in Afghanistan are directed toward the enemy, these actions also have critical impacts on Afghan locals. Winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population is critical to gain overall support for the mission.

In Kandahar province, thousands of Afghans have been displaced by fighting, bombings, and poppy crop eradication without provisions being made for food, shelter or medical aid (MacDonald, 2007). Subsequently, the level of human suffering in Kandahar has increased as a consequence of military campaigns and political neglect. This makes it difficult for the Canadian military to win the support of the locals in order to succeed in their stabilization and counterinsurgency missions. In fact, some authors have argued that the military campaigns and political neglect have: “sparked a negative chain reaction whereby the local populations of Afghanistan are being driven straight into the arms of the resurgent Taliban” (MacDonald, 2007, p. 10). Establishing a positive relationship with the Afghan population is essential in order to separate the insurgents from the non-insurgents. There is also a clear sense in which some of the primary goals of the Afghan campaign (e.g., promoting democracy and support for local governments rather than the Taliban) will be dependent on the quality of life that locals are experiencing:

“In the end, the host nation population will base their support for the new government upon the perception of improvement to their standard of living – that is, with respect to employment, the availability of food, water, electricity, and education, and to responsive and responsible government.” (Horn, 2006, p. 11)

However, establishing a consistently positive relationship with the local public can be difficult for a number of reasons (Horn, 2006). In complex situations such as Afghanistan, there are so many factors that are difficult to control, and there is often little latitude in the attitudes of local people because of the nature of the situation that they face. Horn (2006), for example, notes that although coalition forces must demonstrate that they are capable of providing a secure environment in order to maintain goodwill with the local Afghan public, it is difficult if not impossible to stop all acts of violence (especially violent acts by small groups of committed fanatics). Of course, the result will often be that the relationships among military players and the local public will be harmed if military systems implicitly promise a higher level of security than they can deliver consistently.

Another critical feature of the relationship among JIMP players and local publics is its sheer complexity. Whereas many relationships rely on interpersonal goodwill, this is simply not enough, and a range of other factors (e.g., social norms and economic factors) will also greatly influence
this relationship. For example, coalition troops in Afghanistan are committed to eradicating poppy fields. Unfortunately, poppies are a viable and profitable crop in an otherwise barren and hostile environment. Poppy crop eradication programs tend to impact the poorest farmers who often do not have a viable alternative crop and are left with the choice of growing poppies or continuing to live in poverty (House of Commons, 2007). In such environments, eradicating poppy fields is seen as destroying their livelihood. This, of course, does not help foster positive relations with the locals.

Moreover, as coalition forces are increasingly becoming the targets of IED and suicide bomber activity, soldiers must take the necessary actions to protect themselves. Unfortunately, these actions can have a negative impact on the local population (Horn, 2006). For example, convoys driving aggressively down the centre of the road force local traffic to move to the shoulders. Such actions run the risk of alienating Afghan locals and may ultimately push them to be more supportive of the Taliban (Horn, 2006). Coalition forces appear as a force of occupation, due in part to the defensive actions they have been forced to use to ensure their own safety.

A shift in military thinking from conducting war fighting operations to working with the public in order to win wars can be seen in recent media reports. In July 2009, US Forces, working with Afghan forces, began a new offensive aimed at pushing the Taliban out of Afghanistan’s Helmand Province (CBC News, July 2009). According to US Marine spokesperson Captain Bill Pelletier, the focus of Operation Khanjar was not killing the Taliban but rather winning the local population over. Furthermore, Captain Pelletier stated that “it is important to engage with the key leaders, hear what they need most and what are their priorities.” This focus on working with local population leaders is evidence of the increased importance of the public aspect of JIMP operations from the military’s perspective.

Despite these challenges, the CF is trying to establish positive relations with local publics. As already discussed, the KPRT and CIMIC rotations are working with locals to understand their needs and to work to promote measures that may address these needs. However, relationships with Afghan civilians can also be impacted by CF soldiers’ understanding (or in some cases, lack of understanding) of Afghan culture. Understanding Afghan social conventions and authority structures is critical to building trust and confidence with local populations (Okros, 2008). The impact of culture as a barrier to effective JIMP implementation will be discussed in more detail later in this report.

4.3.3 Canadian Public

The “public” aspect of the JIMP framework relates to relationships with the Canadian public as well as with local host nation populations. An effective implementation of the JIMP framework requires the CF to have the support of the Canadian public for its missions. In order to maintain public support, CF goals and actions must reflect Canadian values. There are a number of fundamental values that the Canadian public aspires to reflect (CFLI, 2003), such as democracy; peace, order, and good governance; and the rule of law. In fact, the role that Canada plays in the international arena is founded on the Canadian values of diplomacy, human security, international stability and viable international relations. The CF military ethos is shown in Figure 8.
Canadian values, expectations and beliefs are fundamental to determining the ways and means of military functions (CFLI, 2003). It has been stated that “military values must always be in harmony and never in conflict with Canadian values” (CFLI, 2003, p. 30). Figure 8 depicts the components of the CF ethos and how it shapes military professionalism. This figure highlights the role that Canadian values play in shaping the values of the CF. That is, the values, expectations and beliefs of Canadians are argued to shape the CF philosophy of service, which in turn shapes CF values.

The CF values, together with the identity of military professionals and the responsibilities inherent in the profession of arms, further shape the CF’s relations with the Canadian public (see Figure 9).
The societal imperative depicted in Figure 9 relates to the fact that the CF is subordinate to civil authority and to the requirement that the CF’s ethics and missions must reflect societal norms and values. In order for the CF to reflect Canadian norms and values, the CF must be integrated into Canadian society. The functional imperative relates to the fact that the CF must maintain professional effectiveness. These two imperatives establish the overall framework for civil-military relationships in Canada (CFLI, 2003).

The perceptions that Canadians hold of the military have a strong influence on the CF in terms of missions undertaken and allocations of resources (Horn, 2005). Whereas the Canadian public displayed ambivalence and a low level of interest in the CF during the Cold war, Canadians have paid increasing attention to the CF in recent years (CFLI, 2005). On the one hand, CF-related scandals (e.g., the Somalia affair) have resulted in public concern and increased scrutiny of the CF. On the other hand, successful peace-support operations and the associated cost in terms of soldiers’ lives have resulted in public appreciation and support.

With respect to Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, the House of Commons (2007) conducted an inquiry to examine various aspects of the mission. This inquiry involved interviews with diplomatic, development and military personnel and their families in Kandahar and Canada. One of the areas of focus for these interviews involved perceptions of the Afghanistan mission. It was found that Canadians generally have an incomplete understanding of what the CF is doing in Afghanistan. This report concluded that the Canadian government and media have not been effective in providing Canadians, and Parliamentarians, with adequate information about the CF’s mission.

Despite this lack of available information, however, there is also good evidence that the Canadian public’s support for CF troops is high. A recent Ipsos Reid poll found that 82% of Canadians are “proud of the men and women who serve in Canada’s Armed Forces” (Ipsos Reid, July 2009). This approval can be seen in how Canadians show their support for troops. For instance, in 2007, over 20,000 people signed a petition to rename the stretch of Highway 401 from Trenton, Ontario to
Toronto the “Highway of Heroes” in remembrance of Canada’s fallen soldier heroes (CTV.ca, 2007). This petition was initiated after it was observed that residents, police officers and firefighters had spontaneously started to gather to salute and wave flags on overpasses while motorcades carrying the bodies of fallen soldiers killed in Afghanistan made their way from Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Trenton to the coroner’s office in downtown Toronto. This gathering on the “Highway of Heroes” continues as Canadians pay their respects to soldiers who have died in the line of duty. There is also a “Support Our Troops” campaign in which Canadians can buy merchandise (e.g., t-shirts, water bottles, car magnets) to openly show their support of troops overseas. Money raised from this campaign goes to support CF Personal and Family Support Services.

Although members of the Canadian public are presently very supportive of Canadian troops themselves, it is important to note that they seem to be somewhat less supportive of the mission in Afghanistan. Recently, only 43% of Canadians said that they support the military operation in Afghanistan, whereas 52% oppose the military operation (Angus Reid, July 2009). In addition, 51% of Canadians said that they would like to see the withdrawal of troops before 2011, 33% said that they would like to see the removal of troops in 2011, and only 7% said that they would like to see troops remain in Afghanistan after 2011 (Angus Reid, May 2009). This suggests that the attitudes of the Canadian public toward the current mission in Afghanistan are multi-determined.

4.3.4 Media

The media plays an important role in the public aspect of the JIMP framework, as the media controls the flow of information (e.g., national and international stories) available to the public (e.g., both local/in theatre and Canadian). From the perspective of the Canadian military, media stories also have the potential to influence the public’s opinions, beliefs, and attitudes toward the CF and toward their missions (Horn, 2005).

With today’s technological advances, members of the public are now able to access real-time news coverage of any event 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (Horn, 2005). The power of this type of news coverage was first recognized during Operation Desert Shield (which become Operation Desert Storm), in which US military forces responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The timely and pervasive coverage of this conflict by Cable News Network (CNN) forever changed the role of the media in covering military interventions, and showed the power of the media to change public perceptions toward military operations. This power is now known as “the CNN effect,” and the impact of this instantaneous news access has created challenges for the military. Such coverage can influence or incite negative and possibly violent reactions (Horn, 2005). Furthermore, such reports can impact peacekeeping mandates, as well as strategic and national policies and aims.

Over the past decade, the military-media relationship in Canada has been strained (Ball & Febbraro, 2009). This strain can be seen in the CF’s increasing scepticism of the media (Slobodian, 2005). Military personnel argue that some reporters have selective hearing, have an agenda, or do not understand the military issues at hand when asking questions of military personnel (or presumably when criticizing the actions of military personnel). Consequently, unfair and damaging reports can be released about the military. Although some of the themes picked up and given emphasis by the media have benefited the CF (e.g., inadequate equipment woes), more dramatic and less flattering themes (e.g., the Somalia affair, CF hazing rituals) have often taken precedence over more flattering themes (e.g., CF successes at building schools and setting up water...
purification sites; MacKenzie, 2005). During their inquiry into the mission in Afghanistan (House of Commons, 2007), the Committee heard that media reports concentrated almost entirely on exciting combat stories, tragic deaths of Canadian soldiers, and ramp ceremonies. Excluded from these reports were the more representative stories about how Canadians military personnel are advising the Afghan government, training and mentoring the ANA, building roads and canals, and sending medical outreach teams to rural villages to visit mothers and babies. This selective reporting affects the information provided to the Canadian public and, in turn, their perceptions of the CF and what it is doing overseas.

Media coverage of terrorist activities also impacts military-media relations. Although the media’s preferred policy on terrorist activities is self-restraint, terrorists do try to manipulate and exploit the media for their own ends (Dunne, 2008). When media do cover spectacular terrorist events, security forces must intervene to provide the media (and consequently Canadian and international publics) with accurate information.

The tension between these two systems is clear, and it is important to understand both perspectives. Taking the perspective of the media, McKenzie (2005) states that the media is convinced that CF leadership is sensitive to and rejects criticism. There is also a sense in which the media and the military have been pitted against each other, one supporting honest and open reporting of “the truth” (i.e., the media), and one pushing for only opportunistic media coverage or less than full disclosure of “the truth” (i.e., the military system). Subsequently, there is now pressure on the CF to be even more transparent and accountable (Horn, 2005). However, when militaries allow greater transparency in allowing/supporting media coverage, this can also have negative consequences on several levels (Ball & Febbraro, 2009). For example, media images that show the negative side of military action (e.g., families who have had their homes bombed by allied attacks) can lead to a loss of public support for a mission. Furthermore, transparency in the media can also create security issues. That is, transparency of military actions makes it possible for both sides of a conflict to anticipate the actions of the other side.

The media’s main argument against the CF seems to be the lack of transparency provided by senior CF leadership. After the transition from Cold War operations to peacekeeping operations, the CF was unaccustomed to being scrutinized by outsiders, and “Canadian military brass frequently went for cover and demonstrated that they had little experience with public accountability and no apparent aptitude for making themselves understood by the Canadian public” (Off, 2005, p. 92). However, more recently, lower-ranking CF personnel have been allowed to speak with reporters on matters pertaining to their experiences and expertise, which has improved relationships between the media and the CF (Off, 2005). Although some members of the media seem to have had reservations about the quality of military leadership in Ottawa, media perceptions of CF personnel serving in the air, sea or land environment do seem to be somewhat more positive:

“I am always gratified to hear members of the media extolling the virtues and qualities of the young men and women they encounter when they visit operational units. To some it comes as a surprise because they assume soldiers were all cookie-cutter automatons who could hardly wait to kill something or someone. Discovering well-educated, confident, compassionate and disciplined young Canadians in uniform provides sceptical members of the media with a welcome shock.” (MacKenzie, 2005, p. 80)

However complex past relationships among military systems and the media have been, however, improving relations with the media are in the best interests of the CF. As noted by Horn (2005):
“The media can be a strategic enabler. It can communicate the initial objective and the end-state to an international audience; it can be used to conduct psychological operations (it has often been said that the trust is often the best message to achieve the aim); it can provide a barometer of operational success and support; and it can even provide an intelligence function.” (p. 8)

Maintaining positive relations with the media is crucial for the CF to effectively implement the JIMP framework. The relationship between the media, the CF and the Canadian public is tightly entwined. Therefore, positive relations between the CF and the media (e.g., increased transparency) will likely result in positive media reports of CF activities, which, in turn, will likely improve public opinion of the CF. From the military’s perspective, positive public opinion will result in increased funding and mission support from the federal government, which will assist the CF in implementing JIMP.
5. Challenges to JIMP Capability

In order for the JIMP concept to be fully instantiated, several barriers will need to be overcome. Many of these barriers have already been touched on in the report (e.g., culture, organizational goals, and principles/values). This section will discuss the barriers in more detail.

5.1 Organizational Factors

At the organizational level, a range of factors have the potential to impact JIMP operations. These factors include differences in organizational culture, structure, maturity and goals. Each of these issues is discussed in the sections that follow.

Organizational Culture - Organizational culture can be understood as “a pattern of shared assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to these problems” (Schein, 1992; cited in English, 2004, p. 18). Individuals in an organization learn and internalize the rules and patterns of behaviour prescribed by the organizational culture (Duffey, 2002).

Cultural differences between organizations can act as barriers to working effectively in a JIMP capacity (e.g., Winslow, 2005). Personnel working within political, humanitarian, and military organizations working together in the field interpret the world through the lens of their own organization’s culture. A lack of understanding among people from differing organizational cultures can result in misunderstandings, poor coordination, and even opposition between organizations (Duffey, 2002). Furthermore, being unfamiliar with the organizational cultures of other groups can encourage negative stereotypes.

Research conducted by Stewart, Wright, and Proud (2004) provides some evidence of differences in military and NGO organizational culture. The researchers were interested in potential differences in organizational culture that might underlie some of the tensions and difficulties between NGOs and the military. To examine these potential differences in organizational culture, the researchers had United Kingdom (UK) armed forces personnel and representatives of UK-based NGOs complete questionnaires to identify and explore differences in values, attitudes and beliefs between the two groups. Questions were designed to explore respondents’ perceptions of their own organization, as well as their own individual approaches to working. Significant differences were found on issues relating to organizational practices and procedures, and pragmatism. For instance, compared to NGO personnel, military respondents expressed significantly stronger support for the need for a clear chain of management (command), were more likely to agree that training was an important part of organizational life, and emphasized the importance of technology. Stewart, Wright and Proud (2004) concluded from these results that differences in organizational culture between militaries and NGOs might underlie differences in the ideologies and behaviour of individuals within each group. They went on to state that these fundamental differences are likely to “cause significant rifts in both individual and organisational relations” (p. 16).

Additional differences have been noted between militaries and humanitarian organizations with respect to management styles. Militaries tend have a command framework with unity of command, a structured chain of command that allows for fast and efficient decision making, and clearly
defined areas of responsibility; as systems, militaries are large and robust (Rubinstein, 2003; Winslow, 2005). Humanitarian organizations, on the other hand, often have less defined, flattened hierarchies and tend to have more collegial command structures that allow for equal contributions from a range of players (rather than a strict chain of command).

Personnel working within these structures, whether military or humanitarian, often have differing views about the legitimacy of the values underlying their actions. Rubinstein (2003) notes that for humanitarian organizations, legitimacy of action is determined by the care-based ethical principal that anyone who needs assistance has a right to get it, regardless of politics, religion, or ethnicity. For militaries, legitimacy of action is determined by political processes and international law. These differences in the definition of legitimate action (e.g., actions that must be done versus actions that conform to a mandate) can create tensions and discord between militaries and humanitarian organizations in the field. From the perspective of humanitarian personnel, when military personnel fail to act when local people are suffering, this may indicate that they do not share the same care-based ethical values. Similarly, the insistence of some humanitarian organizations to attempt to intervene in situations where their safety and security cannot be assured may seem misplaced or even irresponsible in the eyes of some military personnel. Another way of framing this problem is that personnel within each system are guided and constrained by different organizational cultures. These cultures each put specific constraints on actions and behaviour, and each member of these cultures must adhere to these constraints in order to continue to serve within a specific system.

In the end, these differences in organizational culture (and specifically, how these differences are perceived) have the potential to undermine the collaborative relationships required to work as an effective team within the JIMP framework.

Organizational Structure - Several organizational structures can also impose barriers within the JIMP framework. These structures implicate the power relationships, required behaviours, patterns of decision making, and communications among members of an organization (Ambrose & Schminke, 2003). Given differences in organizational structure and functioning, it is not surprising that working with non-military organizations can be a challenge for military personnel. As stated by Colonel Bernd Horn (2006):

“[Non-military organizations] are not all normally accustomed to military directness of manner, nor to command structures. In addition, ironically, they are most often not as flexible, and tend to be more bureaucratic and risk-aversive than the armed forces. Approval mechanisms, communications, and organizational methodologies all vary, and dealing with them requires both patience and tolerance.” (Horn, 2006, p. 9)

Working with the military can also be a challenge for non-military organizations. For example, non-military personnel in the KPRT reported that CF personnel were very impatient and initially quite inflexible (Chief Review Services, 2007). On the other hand, the CF personnel reported other non-military KPRT participants as being too centrally driven and Ottawa-focused in their decision making processes, resulting in what they perceived to be mission delays.

Olson and Gregorian (2007) argue that several structural barriers can impede the ability of militaries, government agencies, humanitarian organizations, and developmental agencies to coordinate their efforts effectively. Specifically, Olson and Gregorian argue that rigid organizational structures, stovepiping of departments, physical distances between HQ and field operations, the different mandates of intra-organizational divisions, and bureaucratic and daily
operational constraints can stifle innovation within and between organizations and, ultimately, may promote maintenance of the status quo rather than enable new forms of collaboration. Such structures are said to contribute to (Olson & Gregorian, 2007):

- weak knowledge management within organizations and agencies;
- inadequate methods of identifying and incorporating lessons learned;
- poor planning methodology and management capacity;
- unconnected programs and projects due to a lack of interaction between national authorities and those working in the field to implement the programs; and
- lack of transparency and accountability.

Clearly, differences in organizational structure may impose challenges in working to meet the collaboration and cooperation objectives of the JIMP framework.

**Organizational Maturity** - An organization’s maturity level is the extent to which it has consistently employed processes that have been documented, managed, measured, and controlled (Scoppio et al., 2009). The CF, by virtue of its experience in the contemporary security environment, such as the mission in Afghanistan, is considered a mature organization in such operations. That is, the CF has developed processes to train and deploy its members for such operations and has already captured lessons learned from previous operations. On the other hand, governmental departments (e.g., DFAIT, CIDA) whose involvement in operations like Afghanistan is more recent tend to have less organizational maturity because their processes have been developed more recently.

Scoppio et al. (2009) note that more mature organizations are often less flexible in changing their processes than are less mature organizations, whereas less mature organizations often provide more flexibility than more mature organizations provide. There is also a sense in which the differing levels of maturity can be problematic if the more experienced party sees its experience as offering valuable “lessons learned” that should be adopted without question by the new organization. This territoriality, of course, could lead to conflict and resentment if more mature organizations are seen as trying to impose their will on the less mature organizations or when working together in the field. Organizational maturity, then, can act as a barrier to effective JIMP implementation when mature organizations are inflexible, and may limit the ability of organizations to engage in collaboration and cooperation.

**Organizational Goals** - Organizational goals can also be the source of discord between groups, which can impact JIMP effectiveness. Winslow (2005) describes some of the differences in organizational goals between non-military and military organizations:

“NGOs and the military are often seen as being at odds with each other concerning their basic goals that guide their action (alleviate human suffering vs. preparation for war), approaches to violence (non violence vs. controlled use of violence), their approach to nationalism (internationalist vs. strongly nationalistic) and decision making styles (decentralized vs. hierarchical).” (Winslow, 2005, p. 6)

These differences in goals have the potential to harm the ability of military and non-military entities, such as NGOs, to collaborate. Differences in how time frames are perceived represent another potential source of conflict. Military tours usually last for 6 months, whereas NGOs are often the first to enter an area and the last to leave. In fact, it is unusual for NGO workers to be in
an area for less than 12 months, and some development workers may remain in an area for years. These differing time frames can create tensions between militaries and humanitarian agencies (Winslow, 2005).

Other core differences are also evident in the literature. Humanitarian and relief groups make decisions based on the principles of neutrality and humanitarian needs, whereas diplomatic, political and military decisions are guided by the principle of UN-endorsed partiality (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). On the other hand, military personnel do not tend to see humanitarian assistance as a politically neutral activity even though they do see it as a tool for terminating conflict, cementing peace, and relieving suffering (Gordon, 2006). Similarly, there are also differences in how each organization defines success. Humanitarian agencies define the success of a mission in a long-term context (e.g., all human suffering has been alleviated in the area). Militaries define success by the mission that has to be accomplished in the short-term, or the number of casualties (Winslow, 2005).

These differences in goals also permeate how these organizations view most interactions. For example, militaries and humanitarian organizations have different goals for civil-military meetings. For the military, civil-military meetings are aimed at enhancing impacts, and deciding on a functional division of labour and realizing synergies in the work whenever possible. For NGOs, on the other hand, civil-military meetings are often about mutual understanding and awareness, building reliable lines of communication, and sometimes reducing the harm they perceive being caused by the military’s involvement in relief work (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). The agentic and perhaps even instrumental stance of military personnel may hinder collaborative efforts, just as taking the time to build mutual understanding and awareness may slow down collaborative processes.

Discrepancies in other goals may make it difficult for agencies and organizations to understand each other, and may put personnel fundamentally at odds with each other. For instance, the willingness of military personnel to use force to inflict harm makes it difficult for some NGO personnel to work with military personnel (Winslow, 2005). Conversely, some military personnel may be unhappy to be engaged in peace operations if they believe that taking part in such operations may dull their “warrior’s edge.”

The attributions that diverse personnel make about the goals of the other party are key influences on this process. For example, it is possible to imagine a seasoned NGO worker extrapolating from the military systems’ limited mandate to assumptions that the military personnel who execute this limited mandate are simply less personally committed to alleviating long-term suffering of the local population. In actuality, it may be more accurate to believe that the two parties simply have different roles, and function under different organizational mandates and are subject to different constraints.

This review suggests that a range of obvious differences related to organizational factors will impact on the diverse players within the JIMP domain. It will be important to find a way to manage some of the real differences (e.g., the differences in the time frames of military personnel vs. NGO personnel). However, there is a clear sense in which effort should be directed not just at the actual differences, but at the perceptions that JIMP personnel have about these differences. In a very real way, the causal attributions that personnel make about other parties are just as likely as the actual differences to decrease the ability of JIMP personnel to work collaboratively. If they fail to truly understand the “lens” of the other party, then both real and imagined differences that emerge in
interactions with members of other organizations will tend to grow, and may even become self-
perpetuating. This suggests that working to understand how best to help diverse JIMP partners to
understand the lens of the other party will be critical to future collaborative efforts.

5.2 Principles/Values

The principles and values of the individuals and organizations conducting JIMP operations will
also have a major impact on collaborative efforts. When these principles and values diverge, they
could negatively affect the ability of diverse parties to work collaboratively. All organizations and
agencies involved in the field have tasks to complete and methods for completing these tasks that
reflect the principles and values of the organization. For instance, humanitarian agents are
concerned with protecting people, basic human rights, and the security of people on both sides of a
conflict (Winslow, 2005). In order to achieve these goals, relief workers often live in the midst of
local populations and incorporate local cultural modes into their methods for accomplishing tasks.
Militaries, on the other hand, have typically been concerned with security and maintaining
objectivity, and have been required to direct their force against one party in a conflict. Similarly,
organizations with different values may have different concepts of what constitutes peace and
approaches to achieving peace (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). In the military, peace is generally
achieved by winning wars. Humanitarian organizations, however, view peace as requiring the
rooting out and amelioration of the underlying causes of conflict. Furthermore, organizations often
have different ideas or assumptions about the cause of the conflict and about how conflicts should
be resolved (Olson & Gregorian, 2007).

These differences in principles and corresponding methods can lead to discrepancies in how
civilian personnel and military personnel conceptualize the strategic goals of a mission. For
instance, relief workers may want soldiers to become more actively and deeply involved, rather
than remaining on the periphery and worrying only about security concerns. However, in the view
of military personnel, such actions could have political and military implications. Even within
humanitarian agencies, NGOs have their own mandates that can differ from those of other NGOs
and can result in an inability to collaborate with each other, which can also be frustrating for the
military (Winslow, 2005).

Although the military and NGOs may have different values and methods, there is a perceived
overlap, and the blurring of lines of organizational responsibility has created apprehension for
those expected to work within the JIMP framework. Specifically, Winslow (2005) argues that the
increasing involvement of militaries in humanitarian and development activities risks undermining
the concept of humanitarian action. Mixing the mandates of militaries and NGOs runs the risk of
locals perceiving humanitarian workers as enemy agents, which in turn may jeopardize the
personal safety of such workers:

“If humanitarian agencies are to regain the trust of the Afghans it remains of crucial
importance that they continue to demonstrate their distance from the military forces. For
their part, the military forces need to understand and respect this strategy and refrain from
using humanitarian symbols and projects.” (Strand, 2007, p. 12)

Some NGOs also question the ability of the military to deliver aid in military zones. Whereas aid
agencies have been working in the field for decades, developing “best practice” models for aid
delivery, militaries lack experience and expertise in aid delivery, which can result in chaos and
confusion (Farhoumand-Sims, 2007). Many NGOs have also criticized the military’s use of aid as a
tool for gaining favour or for delivering punishment (Peabody, 2006). They believe that aid should be unconditional and that militaries providing aid can also generate mistrust of aid workers within local communities.

However, not everyone agrees that the military should refrain from engaging in humanitarian projects. CIMIC operators, for instance, who have worked in Kabul, believe that humanitarian projects are an essential element of CIMIC. Such projects:

“allowed [the CIMIC team] the flexibility to do something quickly that had dramatic impact upon the local community. To simply go to meetings and try to build friendships without being able to pragmatically help solve the issues can create frustration and distrust on the part of the local inhabitants. Small gestures, such as the donation of school desks to the local schools, or the construction of a community well, are inexpensive to implement, and the results are not only beneficial to the community, but also to the military force regarding force protection by virtue of the goodwill the projects generate.” (Longhurst, 2007, p. 61)

In addition, it has been argued that there are instances in which professional agencies cannot or will not work in an area and, therefore, militaries are needed to deliver humanitarian aid (House of Commons, 2007). In Kandahar province, few NGOs or aid agencies other than the World Food Programme are present to help Afghans because of security reasons. Therefore, the aid must be provided through other means, often requiring military system intervention.

However, many representatives of donor countries and senior ISAF commanders are sceptical of a link between the work of the PRTs and increased insecurity in Afghanistan. They argue that security problems are not new in Afghanistan, and that Western humanitarian workers “simply represent a soft and politically rewarding target for insurgents” (Gordon, 2006, p. 48). This scepticism is also reflected in the humanitarian community. A survey conducted by CARE and the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (CARE/ANSO, 2005; as cited in Gordon, 2006) found that only 5% of 50 agencies interviewed identified “blurring of the lines between military and humanitarian actors” as significantly affecting security in the region. Additional reasons for NGOs facing higher security risks in the field include engaging in culturally inappropriate behaviour and the increase in the number of Afghan NGOs and businesses that has served to blur the line between humanitarian and commercial activity (Gordon, 2006). The increased insecurity felt by NGOs in crisis zones may not be due to specific actions of the military or of the NGO personnel, but rather to the perceived positive outcomes of the attacks. More specifically, a study by the London-based Overseas Development Institute found that perpetrators of attacks on NGOs benefit from the attacks by gaining access to economic resources, by removing a perceived threat to control in a local area, and/or by making potent political statements (CBC News, August 19, 2009).

Lastly, there are clear indications in the literature that members of the development community are ambivalent about the “whole of government” agenda and about the quest for coherence that is often emphasized:

“Integration carries potential risks for development agencies, which worry that their core agenda, including poverty alleviation and long-term institution building, will be subordinated to more immediate security and political imperatives.” (Patrick & Brown, 2007, p. 131)
These fears can be framed in terms of the members of diverse agencies worrying that their core values will be compromised or usurped if they work collaboratively with other parties. These real and/or perceived differences in core principles and values will need to be better understood through future research.

5.3 Availability of Resources

Another potential barrier to fully developed JIMP capability relates to the availability of the necessary resources. One issue noted in the literature relates to real and/or perceived competition for resources. There are obvious differences in resource allocation between humanitarian organizations, militaries, and other Canadian government agencies. Humanitarian organizations (e.g., NGOs, donor government agencies) in the field are competing with each other and other network players for financial resources, status, power, recognition, and influence (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). Accordingly:

“The humanitarian scenario is one of diffuse authority among a range of players unwilling, for a variety of often cogent reasons – competition for media salience, competition for resources, fragmented missions, perceived national interests, among others – to cede controlling authority of organizational action to any other single network player.”

(Stephenson, & Schnitzer, 2000, p. 214)

This competition among humanitarian organizations creates barriers to successfully coordinating aid delivery.

Whereas humanitarian organizations are competing with each other for resources, the CF typically deploys with ample and valuable resources (e.g., food, medical supplies, fuel). Such an imbalance of resources can create barriers between militaries and humanitarian organizations (Winslow, 2005). For example, there are situations in which NGOs would like militaries to share their resources, but military personnel may feel that assisting aid organizations could jeopardize their ability to fulfill their mission goals. In other situations, military systems may be willing to share their resources, but NGOs are often wary of using military assets for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, as NGOs may perceive that such actions will compromise their neutrality.

With respect to other Canadian government departments, all departments may not receive sufficient resources to support the programs that they have committed to administering in crisis- or conflict-affected states. For example, Jorgensen (2008) reports that CIDA “failed to focus its efforts and resources on supporting programs aimed specifically at Kandahar to help Afghans make the connection between Canada’s security operations and Canadian reconstruction support” (p. 29). Such discrepancies in the nuances of resource allocation are bound to create animosity among the many JIMP players.

Problems also arise with inconsistencies in the differential resources available to different military rotations. Anderson (2007) argues that such inconsistencies have the potential to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of militaries in the eyes of local populations. Specifically, Anderson, a CIMIC operator, discusses differences in the levels of funding to different CIMIC rotations (2007). Although previous rotations had funding to pay for local projects, resources in Anderson’s rotation were considerably more limited. When meeting with community leaders, Anderson was not able to immediately offer assistance and he recounts the following situation:
“This did little to placate a group of people who were seeing the pace of change brought about by foreign soldiers slowing considerably. I’m not saying they were ungrateful - far from it - but they knew we were there to help them, so they didn’t understand why we wouldn’t have unlimited credit on our reconstruction credit card.” (p. 170)

Such confusion as to the resources available can create problems between the CF and the Afghan people it is trying to help.

5.4 Media Coverage

Media coverage can also represent another source of conflict among JIMP players. Media coverage is directly tied to the level of influence that militaries, humanitarian organizations, and government agencies may exert over governments and over public opinion. Negative coverage can mean the end of a career or the end of funding (Winslow, 2005). As NGO funding is often dependent on favourable press coverage, NGOs must compete for press coverage in order to publicize their work and get contracts (Rieff, 1999; as cited in Winslow, 2005). This means that the most successful NGOs are sometimes the ones that are the most adept at getting media coverage through a variety of means (e.g., going into very insecure areas, or staging public events that elicit media attention). This dependence on favourable press coverage in order to ensure funding creates an environment in which NGOs compete with each other for media attention. NGOs have also been known to use the media to exaggerate the acuteness of a problem in order to get more funds and resources (Winslow, 2005).

Such exaggerations in the public forum can create tensions between the NGOs and militaries because military commanders are left to explain disconnects between the information they had reported and the information being given by the NGOs to the media. According to Delaney (2001; as cited in Winslow, 2005), for example, humanitarian agencies exaggerated the acuteness of problems in Kosovo, leaving the commander to explain the discrepancies between the reported local situation (e.g., number of refugees) and international press reports. Having NGOs soliciting the press for their own ends has been viewed as distasteful by military personnel (Winslow, 2005):

“The theatrical demeanour of these organizations, their tendency to go into dangerous situations, and their disregard for cooperation with other groups are particularly irritating to peacekeepers. This sort of competition is particularly galling when a group places its pursuit of publicity above the goals of the overall peacekeeping mission.” (Pollick, 2000, p. 60; as cited in Winslow, 2005)

The resulting tensions between NGOs and militaries can build barriers between the organizations, which impacts their ability to work together in the field.

5.5 Culture

The Oxford Dictionary of Current English (2001) refers to culture as: “The arts, customs and institutions of a nation, people or group.”

Among the many groups involved in JIMP operations (e.g., the military, humanitarian organizations, local populations), many different levels of culture are relevant. First, groups, and their individual members, are shaped by the unique cultural frameworks within which they function (Duffey, 2002). The cultural framework provides the context in which beliefs and actions are
constructed, expressed, interpreted and understood. The framework is the basis for which group members: "(1) base expectations about what motivates others; (2) learn the “correct” way of responding to challenges in their environment; and (3) develop emotional responses to their experiences" (Rubinstein, 2003, p. 3). In fact, culture shapes the ways in which people view and deal with the world (Rubinstein, 2003).

Second, the nuances of culture in the host nation will also impact on JIMP operations. The success of JIMP operations is based in part on maintaining good relations with the local population, which requires CF personnel to understand the local population’s culture and to respect local cultural traditions. In fact, Heiberg and Holst (1986; as cited in Duffey, 2002) have argued that the relationship between peacekeeping forces and the local population is a “decisive element determining the operation’s success for failure” (p. 150). Duffey (2002) further argues that operations that:

“…prescribe processes based on the outsider’s own cultural assumptions about conflict and conflict resolution and which fail to consider the cultural framework within which the conflict is embedded, diminish the chances of a culturally appropriate and effective intervention.” (p. 152)

This suggests that using one’s own cultural lens when conducting operations within a unique or different culture will greatly diminish the potential for an effective operation or intervention. It is critical that military forces and other players within the JIMP context are sensitive to cultural differences in the host nation. Understanding the local culture brings consent and legitimacy to the operation (Duffey, 2002). Consent is promoted when all parties are understood and made shareholders in the peace process, and an intervention is seen as legitimate when the international community understands and supports the local resources and institutions.

Unfortunately, diplomatic, humanitarian, and military personnel often lack insight into the local culture (Duffey, 2002). This can lead to cross-cultural misunderstandings. Cross-cultural misunderstandings are often attributed to differences in thinking and reasoning between groups (Rubinstein, 2003). Such differences can be problematic. For instance, misunderstandings can result in one or the other group attributing to the other ill will, deceitful, motivations, or lack of competence. Consequently, these attributions can chill relations between and among groups.

Within Afghanistan, for example, there are number of cultural nuances in play. The importance of the tribal system, the focus on honour, and the perceived impact of the betrayal of honour are all critical subtleties that may be lost to those outside of or unfamiliar with the Afghan culture.

5.6 Information Sharing

The ability to exert influence is tied to the ability to control information (Winslow, 2005). Both military and non-military organizations have access to information when in theatre. For example, the CF in Kosovo collected information on returning refugees, population distribution, medical facilities, water supply, schools, civil authorities and shelter distribution (Delaney, 2001; as cited in Winslow, 2005). However, there are barriers to organizations sharing information with each other. For instance, NGOs can be reluctant to share information with militaries when they perceive that sharing such information could endanger confidentiality agreements (Winslow, 2005). In addition, militaries can be reluctant to accept information from NGOs because such information would likely
be packaged in a non-military manner. From the military perspective, then, the information that other organizations might share would not be in a military form.

In their analysis of the nature of civil-military cooperation, Ball and Febbraro (2009) also note other nuances of information sharing. They points out that relief workers are often able to form good relationships with members of the local public, by virtue of their humanitarian roles and because of the longer time frame of interactions. This can result in them having information that would be useful to the military. One important barrier, however, is that NGOs may be most reluctant to share this information with the military, as they may perceive that doing so would violate the need to display neutrality. They notes Dallaire’s assertion from his Rwanda experiences (Dallaire, 2003) that NGOs refused to give relevant information to personnel working as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), but gave it to international news media instead. Such reluctance to share information with the military system, of course, has the potential to hinder both military effectiveness and, ultimately, the already strained relationships among NGOs and military personnel.

A further barrier to organizations sharing information is the fact that organizations are often unaware of what other organizations are doing (Winslow, 2005). However, attempts have been made in past operations (and presumably are being made in current operations) to ensure that military and non-military organizations are aware of each other’s actions. As noted in the literature, however, information sharing is only an antecedent of coordination. In exploring PRTs from the American perspective, McNerny et al. (2005) have argued that “…real coordination is more than information sharing, it is integrated action.” This suggests that parlaying information that is shared into a truly coordinated approach will be key to JIMP efforts.

5.7 Duplication of Efforts

One of the goals of the JIMP framework (and of the associated “whole of government” approach) is to remove overlap and duplication among government agencies. In theory, these approaches should make Canadian government agencies more efficient by increasing the chances for achieving interoperability and collaboration among key players (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008).

The duplication of tasks could create barriers to interoperability and collaboration. However, there is evidence of some duplication of efforts within government departments. For instance, DFAIT, DND and CIDA “have continued to generate independent political, security, and economic analyses, making it difficult for officials to see the interconnections between these realms and achieve a common situational awareness” (Patrick & Brown, 2007, p. 74).

Duplication of tasks can also create animosity between groups. As noted earlier, militaries engaging in humanitarian tasks have been criticized by NGOs. NGOs argue that militaries undertaking the same tasks as civilian agencies blurs the lines between military and civilian targets (Peabody, 2006). Furthermore, NGOs argue that PRT assistance duplicates NGO services, but that these PRT services are less effective and efficient than NGO services (Gordon, 2006). Consequently, NGOs feel that both their security and their ability to build trust with local populations are compromised (Peabody, 2006). There is some evidence in the literature that duplication (real or perceived) could hinder progress toward JIMP capability. This suggests that, in the future, clear delineation of roles and responsibilities of JIMP partners may be critical.
5.8 Stereotypes

At the interpersonal level, one of the biggest challenges that JIMP players are likely to face comes from stereotypes. Stereotypes are the generalizations that are held about groups of people. Our stereotypes are based on the knowledge, beliefs and expectations we hold about a group (Kunda, 2000). They guide our expectations about group membership and can colour how we interpret group members’ behaviours and traits (Kunda, 2000). The problem with stereotypes is that they are typically applied indiscriminately to every member of the group, often independently of any observed behaviour or direct experience with the individual. Stereotypes are presumptive expectations that specific group members will behave in a certain way, even without any evidence that this is the case. Given the potential for variance within any group, of course, this means that expectations of stereotyped group members will be somewhat (or wholly) inaccurate.

The available literature suggests the potential dangers of social stereotypes within JIMP contexts:

“Aid workers may consider the military arrogant or dominant and they may blame soldiers for a lack of true commitment and argue they should establish closer contact with the people rather than staying in the camp…The military, on the other hand, may blame aid workers for being an uncoordinated, self-interested group of arrogant money-spenders that drive around in expensive cars and send impressive pictures to their constituencies without actually accomplishing much.” (Eide et al., 2005; as cited in Olson & Gregorian, 2007, p. 16)

These a priori expectations, then, are likely to have very negative implications for potential collaborations between military personnel and NGOs.

The study conducted by Stewart, Wright and Proud (2004) discussed earlier also provides evidence that members of NGOs and military systems do seem to have different perceptions and stereotypes about their own organizations versus other organizations. The researchers had military and NGO participants write 10 statements describing their perceptions of NGOs and of the UK armed forces. When asked to provide statements describing their perceptions of NGOs, NGO respondents listed features related to the moral roots of their organization, funding issues, or primary means for working in other countries. Military respondents, on the other hand, described NGOs as being “well-meaning,” focused on the political elements of NGOs, and discussed the moral drivers of the organization. When asked to provide statements describing their perceptions of the UK armed forces, military respondents described themselves as being professional and well respected, and discussed the structure and processes of the armed forces. NGOs described military personnel as being professional and well respected, but they also emphasized the limited scope of the mandate of military personnel and their relative lack of training and experience in humanitarian areas.

The problem with stereotypes, of course, is that although they may represent generalized tendencies, they are not necessarily accurate for every member of the group (Kunda, 2000). Negative expectations, attitudes and beliefs about potential partners, particularly those that are inaccurate, can make collaboration difficult.

5.9 Individual Differences

The potential for good collaboration among the members of diverse organizations often depends to a large extent on the personalities of field personnel (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). As noted by Horn (2006, p. 13), “the force of personalities on the ground in theatre make local arrangements work
with varying degrees of success.” Although fully instantiating JIMP capability will require the creation of new structures and procedures, it is important not to overlook the ability of individual players working within the JIMP network to build strong and positive relationships through the sheer force of their interpersonal acumen and skills. The ability to connect with other people, to anticipate what they care about, and to be able to influence them to work cooperatively, are perhaps some of the most important potential strengths of the JIMP system.

At the interpersonal level, then, the ability to invoke a cooperative stance and to create a positive team atmosphere is a critical asset to developing JIMP capability. Possessing a range of interpersonal skills is likely to be critical, as different domains are likely to challenge interpersonal skills in unique ways. For example, a “crusty” but seasoned CF commander may be effective in situations that require a firm hand and the ability to inspire confidence in other people. On the other hand, a “kind and gentle” approach may be the only way to make progress in other collaborative situations. Within the JIMP context, it seems important to recognize that not every team member needs to have every skill, but as a whole, the team must have the ability to balance out the rough spots that can occur when collaborating with other parties.

Cognitive ability could also impact the ability of personnel to work collaboratively in a JIMP setting. As discussed by Thompson (2008), cognitive ability has been positively related to job performance, team performance and decision making. Teams with overall higher levels of cognitive ability have been found to be more adaptable, to be more able to restructure the team configuration after communication breakdown, and to show better performance after team restructuring (LePine, Colquitt, & Erez, 2000; as cited in Thompson, 2008). These results suggest that individuals with lower cognitive ability would have a more difficult time working effectively in team, and therefore in JIMP-related, settings.

An individual’s cognitive style could also act as a barrier to JIMP capability. Cognitive styles impact the ways in which a person seeks out information, derives meaning from the information and engages in problem solving (Thompson, 2008). Cognitive styles that could impact an individual’s ability to successfully engage in JIMP operations include personal need for structure, personal fear invalidity, and neuroticism.

**Personal need for structure.** Personal need for structure (PNS) refers to one’s preference for structure and clarity (Thompson, 2008). People with high PNS prefer simplicity, precision, and structure and are uncomfortable with ambiguity and grey areas. Researchers have found high PNS to be positively related to:

- Greater reliance on stereotypes when faced with ambiguous behaviour
- Higher confidence in assessments of others
- Higher in-group identification and favouritism
- Reduced ability to empathize with others.

Thompson (2008) suggests that individuals with high PNS “may be more likely to quickly form negative initial impressions of dissimilar others, impeding their ability to contribute constructively and adaptively in multinational coalitions” (p. 5). These findings suggest that individuals with high PNS would have difficulty working in JIMP operations. Specifically, high PNS individuals would rely on stereotypes and have difficulty understanding the perspectives of others involved in JIMP operations (e.g., humanitarian workers, local civilians).
Personal fear of invalidity. Personal fear of invalidity (PFI) refers to one’s concern with the possibility of making errors (Thompson, 2008). High PFI is positively related to greater information seeking before making a judgment about others. Thompson (2008) suggests that people with high PFI may be less likely to base actions on stereotypes. The reduced use of stereotypes, especially negative stereotypes, could help to make JIMP-operations successful. However, Thompson also argues that those with high PFI may also be less likely to commit to a decision. An inability to make decisions could negatively impact on JIMP effectiveness.

Neuroticism. Neuroticism refers to a person’s confidence, calmness, stability, and emotional resilience (Thompson, 2008). Research on neuroticism has found it to negatively impact perceptions of degree of similarity to self and to heighten sensitivities to threat. Low neuroticism, on the other hand, is related to higher levels of group social cohesion and lower levels of conflict in teams (Thompson, 2008). These results indicate that individuals with high neuroticism would find working in a JIMP environment difficult. That is, those higher in neuroticism would have higher levels of conflict in working with others and would feel more threatened by others. These attributes would make working with others in the field difficult.

Other personality attributes that promote the ability of field personnel to work effectively with others have been identified. With respect to civil-military relations, Major Longhurst, a CIMIC officer for Land Forces Western Area, identified traits or attributes that make for a good CIMIC operator (Longhurst, 2007). These traits include loyalty, honesty, ethical behaviour, courage, diligence, fairness, responsibility, selflessness, maturity, dedication, personableness, understanding, flexibility, resourcefulness, fitness, the ability to acknowledge military and civilian policy and procedures, and decisiveness. Davis (2007) also identified patience, professional competence, and self-reliance as necessary personality attributes for working in the OMLT. With respect to interagency relations, open-mindedness, risk-accepting, being a lifetime learner, patience, honesty, openness/transparency, cultural awareness, personality, and experience (i.e., operational and conflict resolution experience) were identified as necessary attributes for working successfully in a whole of government setting (CFLI, 2008).

As a whole, then, a range of individual differences that are likely to influence the emergence of full JIMP capability have been identified in the literature.
6. Promoting JIMP Capability

Despite the barriers to enacting JIMP, there are many examples of how JIMP-related initiatives have already been successful. This chapter will discuss some of these successful outcomes and the JIMP enablers that are likely to be most relevant to full JIMP capability.

6.1 Successful JIMP Approaches

It is important to note that there is a clear sense in the literature that although the JIMP acronym is relatively new, the approaches inherent in executing JIMP are not wholly new. For example, a historical analysis of JIMP undertaken by Hrychuk and Gizewski (2007) includes sources such as books and chapters about the use of comprehensive approaches relevant to the Marshall Plan and in diverse operations such as those carried out in Lebanon/the Dominican Republic, Cambodia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

The Marshall Plan is cited in the Hrychuk and Gizewski (2007) paper as well as in other sources as an excellent example of successful collaborative effort on a huge scale. This plan is also called the European Recovery Plan. The Marshall Plan was named for George Marshall, the US Secretary of State when it was initiated in 1947. The Marshall Plan involved the US providing aid to assist with the rebuilding of Europe after the end of World War II. Although not predominantly a military effort, this plan is often cited as “one of the seminal histories of postwar cooperation and development” (Hrychuk & Gizewski, 2007, p. 5). One of the distinguishing features of the plan’s implementation was that it received a strong endorsement from a number of different components (initially governmental, but then morphing into more public support). This core agreement among key players about the goals of the plan is cited as one of the key factors in its success (Hrychuk & Gizewski, 2007).

After exploring implementation of comprehensive approaches in a range of historical accounts, Hrychuk and Gizewski (2007) concluded with some important observations. As a whole, the authors argue that although there is some historical evidence of successful comprehensive approaches, there are also some common problems that occur during the execution of collaborative approaches, as follows:

- Inadequate coordination at the pre-planning and planning stages of missions;
- Problems resulting from inadequate understanding about the complexities of each diverse player;
- Failure to develop and use concrete and established mechanisms and processes rather than ad hoc measures.

This analysis is a particularly important one, as it describes common problems in a range of historical JIMP situations. These problems (and presumably many others) will need to be addressed before the JIMP construct can be fully instantiated.

On the other hand, as the JIMP framework evolves, it will also be important to stay focused on the potential benefits that can emerge from new forms of collaboration. The benefits of working collaboratively can already be seen in Afghanistan. For example, efforts by the Afghanistan
government, NGOs, the UN, DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP, and coalition forces to work together have resulted in the following:

- With enhanced security measures in effect, more than half a million people have received 15,000 metric tonnes of food; 350,000 children have received polio vaccinations; thousands of adults (80% of whom are female) have received literacy training; and returnees from Pakistan have been processed through the Daman Encashment Centre (Jorgensen, 2008). In Kandahar alone, CIDA was able to distribute food to over 200,000 people in 2006 (Wallace, 2007).
- Afghan and Canadian security forces have worked together to oversee security for the construction of roads and 500 culverts (Jorgensen, 2008).
- CIDA and the CF have worked together to ensure that infrastructure projects (e.g., dams, bridges) are built in areas with the necessary stability and security (Jorgensen, 2008).
- After security forces engaged in combat operations to clear areas of Kandahar of the Taliban, NGOs, IOs, and Afghan government agencies followed to establish schools (Jorgensen, 2008).
- Canadian security forces teamed with Canadian experts in institution- and capacity-building to coordinate successful elections (Jorgensen, 2008).

Successful JIMP-related initiatives can also be seen in CIMIC rotations. For instance, during his time as second-in-command of a CIMIC detachment in Kabul, Captain Mark Anderson’s (2007) team worked to identify the needs of the community and what CIMIC personnel could do to coordinate help. To do this, the team visited local leaders at mayors’ meetings and visited schools, medical clinics, and hospitals. Their primary roles were to act as a liaison between military, civilian and NGO personnel and to provide reports to CIDA on the projects that had been completed by previous rotations. However, military and civilian members of the camp also raised money for the local community by asking family members in Canada to hold fundraisers, and they also held trivia nights at the camp. In total they were able to raise $24,000. The CIMIC team combined this money with funds raised by previous CIMIC rotations and funds provided by the embassy to:

- Build a six-room school;
- Deliver 13 quality of life distributions (distributing clothes, shoes and bedding);
- Deliver 230 new desks and 175 repaired desks (many repaired by soldiers on their free time);
- Install 28 classroom tents in school compounds;
- Resurface 9 km of roads;
- Drill 23 wells and refurbish 11 wells;
- Deliver school supplies; and
- Help two orphanages with school supplies, toys and food.

Furthermore, JIMP-related activities conducted by the KPRT from August 2006 to January 2007 resulted in the KPRT being able to (House of Commons, 2007):

- Repair local clinics, administer first aid and health care to rural Afghans, and provide support to Afghan hospitals;
Provide equipment to Afghan security forces, assist in building infrastructure (e.g., police stations), and mentor Afghan soldiers and police officers;

- Repair 16 schools, open 2 schools, and provide hundreds of tents to act as portable classrooms; and

- Pay students and teachers to begin the cleanup of Kandahar Technical College.

Obviously, JIMP-related initiatives seem to have had a positive effect in past operations, and some objective indicators seem to show evidence of positive impacts. It is important to note, however, that it is difficult to know how much credit to attribute to the distinct aspects of JIMP within both the more current and historical examples. Put another way, as there is no clear way to quantify the degree and type of JIMP-like activities, it is impossible to argue that JIMP capability was uniquely responsible for these successes. Nonetheless, it is clear that some of the structures created specifically in order to instantiate JIMP capability have proven to be successful in some ways.

The following section will discuss enablers that have contributed to the success of JIMP-related activities.

### 6.2 Enablers of JIMP Capability

#### 6.2.1 Organizational Factors – Structures and Processes

Within the Canadian government, Ottawa has espoused the importance of whole of government approaches in its strategies and activities in Afghanistan, Haiti, and the Sudan (Patrick & Brown, 2007). Current government efforts using a “whole of government” or comprehensive approach are intended to optimize service delivery. Such initiatives are intended to improve coordination among domestic and international operations. These whole of government and international initiatives should help support the migration to a JIMP framework. Such JIMP-enabling initiatives include:

- **Coordination.** During a workshop surveying the dynamics of interagency and civil-military coordination in Afghanistan and Liberia, civilian and military participants provided Olson and Gregorian (2007) with a number of examples of effective coordination they had experienced while in the field. Olson and Gregorian argue that these examples provide a checklist to help promote coordination efforts when in the field:
  - “Informality and ‘face-to-face’ time;
  - Getting ‘straight information’ from someone you trust, not agency ‘propaganda’;
  - Transparency and horizontal relationships amongst agencies/people;
  - Time – learning how to coordinate takes time and is a learning process;
  - Inclusiveness – all key stakeholders involved early in the process;
  - Sincere motives to improve program impacts (vs. funding, competition, credit, egos);
  - Good negotiation skills, ability to articulate arguments and win over others;
  - Common knowledge of the issues amongst participants;
  - An ability to accept criticism from others;
When internal consensus on key issues exists within agencies and networks;
When higher decision-makers allow for flexibility and negotiation at the field level;
Continuity of service and less turnover of field personnel.” (p. 27)

Recently, the NATO Defence College convened a research seminar to discuss the best methods for contributing to a comprehensive approach to crisis management (NATO Defense College, 2008). The seminar was attended by more than 80 participants from over 30 NATO and Partner nations. The core messages and themes from the NATO seminar help to reinforce and build on the coordination ideas presented by Olson and Gregorian (2007). These themes included:

- The need for continued dialogue and exchanges between military and non-military actors to establish trust and understanding.
- Flattened, network-based inter-organizational structures (rather than traditional hierarchical institutional structures) will help to handle the high level of complexity in comprehensive approaches.
- The need to coordinate efforts through regular consultation, rather than having one organization taking the lead.
- Pro-active coordination between military, government agencies, international organizations and NGOs needs to occur before a crisis emerges.
- Transparent threat/risk perceptions and analyses will help to identify overarching “common” or “shared goals” among military and non-military organizations.

**Integration.** The adoption of a common, secure communications backbone and lexicon across the federal government would help to enable the JIMP framework (Vandahl, 2007). Distributing plans and knowledge across the federal government would leverage the skills and capabilities already in existence in many government departments. Providing formal JIMP courses and exercises through the CF College could help to overcome hurdles. An ongoing review of training initiatives (Hall, Thomson, & Adams, 2009) relevant to the interagency aspects of JIMP suggest an increased availability of integrated training, and more focus than ever on helping the many different players within the JIMP context to achieve better understanding of other parties. However, even these integration initiatives are still at a relatively early stage.

**Intelligence sharing.** This is a challenging aspect of achieving fully enabled JIMP capability. Unless the diverse players are able and willing to share information, they will only be privy to one small part of the puzzle within complex operations. There are currently existing initiatives that seek to promote intelligence sharing within the whole of government approach. These approaches operate within domestic and international realms, reinforce horizontal integration, and provide for the integration of communications and coordination technology (Vandahl, 2007). These initiatives include the following:

- The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre “provides increased information sharing and integrated intelligence analysis and threat assessments for [the Government of Canada], which are distributed within the intelligence community and to relevant first responders” (Vandahl, 2007, p. 18). This centre also develops liaison arrangements with foreign intelligence organizations, thus promoting more integrated international intelligence communities.
- Marine Security Operations Centres brings together civilian and military resources [e.g., Canadian Border Security Agency, Coast Guard, DND, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), RCMP, Transport Canada] in order to respond to marine security threats (Vandahl, 2007). This information is also linked to US authorities responsible for maritime security issues.

- NGO-Military Contact Group. In the UK, the NGO-Military Contact Group has been established as a method for the military to manage relations with the humanitarian community (Gordon, 2006). In Kabul, the NGO-Military Contact Group has allowed NGOs to interact with CIMIC and civil affairs commanders. This contact enables NGOs to advocate on specific issues, discuss practical problems, and attempt to introduce respect for humanitarian principles. Unfortunately, it has been argued that NGOs are not engaged with Contact Groups early enough to influence military responses and strategies, which can generate annoyance within the NGO community. A similar group set up between NGOs and the CF could help to facilitate the JIMP framework.

As a whole, then, a range of structures and processes have been created to further JIMP capability. A key goal of future research will be to understand the unique contributions of these systems to heightened JIMP capacity.

### 6.2.2 Policy

Detailed and coherent policies around the JIMP construct are another important enabler. The available literature indicates a need for more established policies relevant to the JIMP framework. An excellent paper by Travers and Owen (2006) provides a cogent analysis of Canada’s 3D policy in Afghanistan. The first part of this paper briefly traces the history of 3D and its conceptual development. The second part explores Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, and the final section discusses some of the challenges that remain. As a whole, Travers and Owen (2006, p. 10) argue that although the 3D approach requires integrated policies,

> “Canada’s definition of 3D policy is exceptionally broad. It currently encompasses a wide range of security, governance and development tasks, with little direction on specifically how these are to be integrated.”

Another complication concerns the conceptual clarity (or lack thereof) around what the construct is actually intended to achieve. Currently, discrepancies in how diverse players view the same issues seem to have hindered integration and slowed the development of coherent policy. This is also true, Travers and Owen argue, of the institutional perspective, for example, in the flow of information from Ottawa to the field.

Other authors have also argued for the importance of coherent policy as an antecedent to more fully enabling JIMP capability. For example, Longhurst (2007) suggests that the CF should establish standard policies and procedures for the following:

- **Humanitarian assistance.** Policies for humanitarian assistance (HA) should be established that are agreements between the CF and aid agencies to work together to provide HA. Such agreements would effectively organize the collection and distribution of HA, remove the military from the mandate of distributing necessary items (e.g., food, shelter), and provide security to civilian operations working in the area.
- **Humanitarian assistance projects.** Policies and procedures for humanitarian assistance projects (HAP) should be established in which a specific amount of funds is set aside for the CF to deliver HAP. This would allow the patrols to influence their environment and would allow the military to distance itself from the logistical requirements of HA. In addition, such a policy would inject money into the local economy and positively impact the local population. As noted by Longhurst (2007) “Local inhabitants are much more motivated to improve their own situation if they are provided with economic opportunities, rather than simply receiving handouts from the military” (p. 63).

- **Community improvement projects.** A standard agreement should be made with CIDA or the Canadian Embassy to provide CF task force commanders (e.g., CIMIC task force commanders) with funds to be used for community improvement projects (CIPs). The CIPs would be decided by the community and, therefore, would increase locals’ support for the CF presence.

These three examples of how the JIMP framework could be more fully instantiated through the creation of new policy reflect the fact that progress toward developing policy that would help to define how JIMP collaboration will actually occur is still relatively modest. Nonetheless, this area has been identified as one that is particularly lacking (e.g., Hrychuk & Gizewski, 2008), and is certainly one that is likely either receiving, or will imminently receive, more attention.

### 6.2.3 Training and Education

Training and education that will better assist JIMP players to work collaboratively is a key enabler of fully developed JIMP capability. This problem can be framed in at least two ways. In the long term, the CF will need to ensure that the training that CF personnel receive puts them in a mindset that is amenable to achieving JIMP collaboration. As the required roles of military personnel in the new operating environments have changed, pre-deployment training will need to reflect these changes. In particular, Gizewski, Rostek, and Leslie (2008) state that military training needs to shift from traditional warfighting roles (e.g., policing and security) to include non-warfighting functions (e.g., development projects). This represents a cultural shift in how military personnel conceive their own roles and responsibilities.

These internal shifts in the self-perceptions of military personnel must be accompanied by training that helps them to further develop their interpersonal skills during their interactions with external players. These include skills such as effective communication, management, teamwork, cultural awareness, negotiation, and conflict resolution (Scoppio et al., 2009).

One way that personnel can learn to cooperate and work with personnel from different agencies in theatre is by training together. In addition to NGOs and OGAs, Gizewski, Rostek, and Leslie (2008) argue that collective training must include OGDs, IOs, and public volunteer organizations to engage in the coordination aspects of the JIMP framework before involved in a crisis situation.

However, the literature suggests that one of the key problems with instantiating the JIMP construct is that JIMP players have typically been joined together only when they are “on the ground,” where there are high demands on their time and high levels of stress. These situations are clearly not the best circumstances for learning how to collaborate. Hence, pre-deployment training will be critical. There has been a strong movement to attempt to remedy this situation by bringing JIMP players together much earlier in the process, even during pre-deployment training sessions (e.g., Exercise Unified Ready). There have been (and continue to be) several efforts intended to bring the various
JIMP players together, including military, NGOs and OGDs (Scoppio et al., 2009). In fact, Scoppio et al. found that OGD and CF personnel reported such interagency exercises as being highly beneficial for pre-deployment training.

Despite these positive results, however, a number of impediments to integrated training have also been noted, including the negative impact of force generation cycles, a lack of leadership in guiding training, and a lack of available OGD personnel available (and/or willing to serve) on PRT teams (Chief Review Services, 2007). In addition, these training exercises should be designed in partnership by CF and OGD personnel to help ensure that they are mutually beneficial and realistic, and independent evaluations should be conducted to assess whether these objectives have been met. Scoppio et al. (2009) also suggest that a coordinating body should be established to oversee and direct a unified, interagency approach to training and education. Despite these challenges, learning more about the people that one will work with (and/or about the organizations that will be involved in JIMP operations) seems critical to promoting better collaboration.7

Given the focus of this review (the “p” or public aspect of JIMP), it is also critical to address training within this domain to the extent possible. Unfortunately, the focus in the available literature was primarily directed toward the interagency aspects. The forms of training most directly related to the public aspects of JIMP are CIMIC training and PsyOps training. Both occur at the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario. CIMIC training focuses on communication skills training, as well as on interest-based negotiation techniques. This course focuses on interactions with personnel from OGDs, as well as with the local population. The training that members of the CF PsyOps cell receive also focuses very specifically on interactions with the local public during operations. More generally, many aspects of the CF training and education system focus on basic communication, problem-solving, negotiation, and decision-making skills. Although indirect, this training also seems likely to facilitate interactions with members of the local public, as well as with other aspects of the public aspect of JIMP, such as NGOs. The relationship between education/training and interactions with the public are discussed further in the recommendations section.

7 Additional information about the training aspects of the interagency JIMP environment is available in another report (Hall, Thomson & Adams, 2009).
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7. Theoretical Frameworks Relevant to JIMP

The problems currently faced in instantiating the JIMP framework are perhaps not unique. Sociologists and psychologists have been conducting research for decades to understand and ultimately predict how diverse groups will interact and how collaboration and cooperation amongst these groups can best be facilitated. This section includes a discussion of some theoretical frameworks that are particularly relevant to the JIMP construct, including social identity theory, intergroup contact theory, and acculturation theory.

7.1 Social Identity Theory

Social identity refers to an individual’s knowledge that she or he belongs to a certain social group or status on which she or he places some value (Tajfel, 1982). Tajfel and Turner (1986) argued that belonging to a common group enhances the degree to which people see themselves as similar to other members of the group (Tajfel, 1982). The more a person identifies with the in-group, the more the person will feel distinct from out-group members (Tajfel, 1982). Feeling oneself to belong to one specific group (“in-group”) versus another group (“out-group”) is sufficient to elicit discriminatory behaviour and attitudes in favour of the in-group at the expense of the out-group (Turner & Haslam, 2001). Research has shown that events or occurrences that make a social categorization salient can enhance in-group biases (Turner & Haslam, 2001). For instance, conflict with members of an out-group tends to enhance one’s favour of one’s own in-group. Conversely, events that reduce the salience of social categorization (e.g., focusing on individual factors rather than group factors) will reduce in-group bias.

Understanding the construct of social identity seems key to fully instantiating the JIMP framework in operations. Within the JIMP context, one of the major challenges is that the many different players come from different backgrounds, and have somewhat different goals. The social identities of those involved in field operations will have an impact on the effectiveness of fully integrating JIMP personnel. Organizational identification is a specific form of social identity and represents “the degree to which a member defines himself or herself by the same attributes that she or he believes define the organization” (Dutton et al., 1994; quoted in Lee, 2004, p. 626). Individuals who identify with their employing organization tend to choose activities that are congruent with organizational identity and values (Cheney, 1983; cited from Lee, 2004). For example, organizational identification has been shown to relate to extra-role behaviours and cooperative behaviour.

Within the JIMP paradigm, the issue of organizational identity clearly takes on even more importance (Adams, Thomson, Brown, Sartori, Taylor, & Waldherr, 2007). When working among organizations, issues of identity may influence the ability to build positive collaborative relationships with the members of other agencies or organizations. Individuals within a given organization must interact with personnel belonging to other organizations. The quality of these interactions will be influenced by whether they see these other individuals as belonging to the same category as them, or as belonging to a different category. An additional challenge that must be considered within the JIMP context is that individuals often have multiple roles and might “wear many different hats.” In these situations, the multiple identities that they must take on may sometimes conflict.
A key challenge within the JIMP context, then, involves the fact that different players may be guided by different identities, and these identities may not necessarily be internally coherent. For example, some military personnel have noted that when making difficult ethical decisions in operations, they were driven by the societal norms that forced them to take on a peacekeeper identity when the demands of the situation actually seemed to require more of a warrior identity. Similarly, for NGO personnel to identify their most important role as being related to preservation of the human quality of life may be discrepant from the salient identity of military personnel who see their primary role as being related to defence and security.

Within the interagency context, perhaps the ideal is that the members of the JIMP team come to see themselves (at least to some extent) as members of the larger group, in accordance with a shared overarching identity. A key question, then, is how to get JIMP players “on the same page” in terms of being willing to work cooperatively (without in-group/out-group biases hindering collaboration) while maintaining the unique identities necessary to promoting healthy diversity of perspectives and views. Similarly, when working with the public, some level of perceived shared identification is likely to facilitate better cooperation and communication between the military and the public domain. For instance, being able to see the perspective of a local person and to empathize with the choices that they make is an important requirement for truly connecting with them. Whether within the interagency or public domain, social (or organizational) identification is a theoretical construct that is clearly critical to understanding interactions within the JIMP domain.

7.2 Intergroup Contact Theory

The effectiveness of JIMP operations is dependent on positive interactions among the people working together. Negative preconceptions against other team members working in other agencies or organizations may greatly diminish the effectiveness of the operation. As such, understanding how to reduce prejudice seems critical to promoting maximal collaboration. Since World War II, there has been much research conducted to understand the potential for intergroup contact in reducing intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Although a number of theories about intergroup contact have emerged, Allport’s contact hypothesis (1954; as cited in Pettigrew, 1998) argued that the key to reducing prejudiced attitudes and behaviour was simply to bring people together. This contact would facilitate more positive attitudes and interactions. Allport’s contact hypothesis also specified the specific situational conditions necessary for intergroup contact to effectively reduce prejudice. Allport held that intergroup contact will have positive effects on social interactions when the following conditions are met (Pettigrew, 1998):

- Equal status. Both groups within the situation must feel that they have equal status.
- Common goals. Groups must come into contact to engage in an active, goal-oriented effort.
- Intergroup cooperation. Working together to attain the common goals must be an interdependent effort without intergroup competition.
- Support of authorities, law, or custom. Contact will have more positive effects and be more readily accepted if it is socially sanctioned.

Under these conditions, Allport’s formulation of contact theory predicts, contact will yield positive benefits for both attitudes and behaviour.
Although there is empirical support for intergroup contact theory, there has been much criticism of the theory. A wide body of research has explored the assumptions of contact theory, and the theory has been both supported and criticized by researchers and theorists that have followed. One of the most prominent criticisms, made by Pettigrew (1998), notes that Allport’s original theory does not discuss the processes by which contact with other groups actually changes attitudes and behaviour. Furthermore, the original theory does not specify how effects generalize beyond the immediate contact situation. To address these criticisms, Pettigrew proposed four interrelated processes that can promote attitude change during contact:

- **Learning about the out-group.** Learning about the out-group should correct negative views (i.e., improve intergroup attitudes and stereotypes) and, subsequently, contact should reduce prejudice.
- **Changing behaviour.** Behaviour change is often a precursor for attitude change. If people engaging in new situations are required to behave positively (even despite their negative attitudes), emitting such behaviour (e.g., acting as if the out-group were accepted) may result in attitude change.
- **Generating affective ties.** Emotions play a critical role in intergroup contact. Anxious encounters between groups can spark negative reactions, whereas positive encounters (e.g., empathy, intergroup friendships) can spark positive reactions.
- **In-group reappraisal.** Optimal intergroup contact provides insights about in-groups and out-groups. Such contact can reshape one’s view of the in-group.

These processes provide an important account of exactly how intergroup contact can positively change attitudes.

In addition to describing the psychological processes by which intergroup contact can reduce prejudice, Pettigrew (1998) also reformulated Allport’s hypothesis in several ways. First, he added another key condition, namely friendship, to the previous four. This indicates the importance of taking a longer-term perspective when thinking about the impact of intergroup contact.

Pettigrew also more specifically identified the processes underlying changes in perceptions as the result of intergroup contact. These include decategorization, salient categorization and recategorization, as shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10. Pettigrew’s (1998) reformulated contact theory

At the point of initial contact, this model argues that the first step is decategorization. This involves minimizing the salience of the differing categories to which individuals from diverse agencies or organizations might belong, and focusing instead on liking the individual. Within the JIMP context, for example, decategorization could occur if team members were perceived to be individuals rather than representatives of their respective agencies or departments.

The next stage is one of salient categorization. At this stage, once contact is established, the parties interacting should then view each other as representatives of out-groups. At this point, the stereotype change literature suggests that attitudes are most likely to change when the individuals are seen to be typical rather than atypical members of the group (e.g., Weber & Crocker, 1993). At this stage, then, the goal is to have people categorize the other members of the “team” as different from them, and as representatives of out-groups, but to begin to have more positive attitudes toward them.

The next stage requires recategorization. With extended contact, group members begin to view themselves as part of a common larger group. This larger view includes an inclusive category that highlights similarities and obscures the “us” and “them” boundaries.

Pettigrew’s (1998) reformulation of Allport’s hypothesis highlights the importance of two other factors. First, prior attitudes and experiences influence the likelihood that a person will seek intergroup contact and the outcome of any contact. These include factors such as propensity to have prejudicial attitudes, values, intergroup anxiety and perceived threat when interacting with other groups. Second, societal and institutional norms structure the form and impact of intergroup contact. For example, some social structures (e.g., the former system of apartheid in South Africa) could limit the potential for change even if individual contact with out-group members occurred frequently.

Given its importance, a wide range of past research and more recent research has explored the ability of intergroup contact to lower prejudice. An authoritative review by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) presents the results of a meta-analysis of 515 studies related to intergroup contact theory.
Intergroup contact was defined as having experienced face-to-face interaction with members of clearly defined groups. The studies included in the meta-analysis ranged across a variety of groups, situations, and societies (e.g., racial, ethnic, age, mental health). Results indicated that greater intergroup contact is generally associated with lower levels of prejudice (mean $r = -.215$). Furthermore, intergroup contact effects also generalized beyond participants’ immediate situation. Although attitudes toward out-group members in direct contact generally became more favourable, attitudes towards out-group members in other situations (even in the absence of direct contact), and attitudes toward out-groups as a whole all became more positive. This suggests that the positive impacts of contact may “spread” to other domains. Pettigrew and Tropp also found that although positive intergroup contact effects were strongest when the ideal conditions were met (e.g., equal status, common goals), these conditions were not always critical to reducing negative attitudes. Even some studies in which these conditions were not met showed significant inverse relationships between contact and prejudice. The ability for contact to reduce prejudice even in the absence of equal status and common goals is argued to be related to mere exposure effects (e.g., Zajonc, 1968).

As a whole, then, intergroup contact theory seems to offer a relevant theoretical framework for understanding the JIMP context. It suggests that collaboration will be most successful under certain conditions (e.g., equal status, the presence of common goals), but that collaboration can also be successful in the absence of such conditions, through mere exposure. Intergroup contact theory also suggests that contact with members of other groups is helpful at alleviating some of the prejudices that are the result of ignorance or lack of accurate information about the members of other groups.

### 7.3 Acculturation

It is also possible to view JIMP operations from a broader perspective, namely in accordance with theories about acculturation, or culture change. These theories stem from an anthropological perspective, and address how individuals, families, communities, and societies change as the result of contact with other cultures. Acculturation occurs when two or more groups are in contact, and the term refers to “changes that occur as a result of contact between cultural groups” (Berry, 2004, p. C54). Such contact will have consequences for both groups. According to acculturation theories, how groups will change when encountering groups from other cultures depends on their position relative to these groups. When two different groups come together, some are intrinsically more dominant than others. The acculturation strategy that results from contact between the two groups is dependent on two processes. The first dimension (called cultural maintenance) relates to the motivation to maintain their own culture and identity versus their motivation to seek relationships with other groups. The second dimension relates to the level of intercultural contact that the initial group wants to have with a new group that they encounter. Depending on where they fall on these two dimensions, dominant and non-dominant groups tend to adopt different strategies when they come into contact with another group, as shown in Figure 11.
Berry (2004) describes 4 different processes that non-dominant groups may undergo, as follows:

- Assimilation occurs when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural heritage and instead seek interaction with the other culture; members identify with the dominant culture.
- Separation occurs when individuals value holding onto their original culture and wish to avoid interaction with the other culture; members continue to identify with their non-dominant culture.
- Integration occurs when members are interested in both maintaining their original culture and in being a part of the dominant culture; members identify with both cultures.
- Marginalization occurs when members have little interest in maintaining their original culture and have little interest in being part of the dominant culture (often for reasons of discrimination); members identify with neither culture.

However, the acculturation strategies of dominant group members are also unique, as follows:

- Melting Pot occurs when assimilation (of the non-dominant group) is sought by (or imposed by) the dominant group.
- Segregation occurs when separation is demanded and enforced by dominant groups (e.g., through legislation).
- Exclusion occurs when marginalization is imposed by the dominant group.
- Multiculturalism occurs when cultural diversity is an objective of the larger society as a whole.

Although non-dominant groups traditionally experience greater impacts from such contact, dominant groups also undergo changes. It should be noted that non-dominant acculturation terms
cannot be used when the dominant group enforces certain forms of acculturation or constrains the choices of the non-dominant group. As Berry (2008, p. 331) has argued:

“Integration can only be ‘freely’ chosen and successfully pursued by non-dominant groups when the dominant society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards cultural diversity.”

Furthermore, integration can only occur when both the dominant and non-dominant groups mutually accommodate each other (Berry, 2008). That is, integration requires the non-dominant group to adopt the basic values of the dominant group, and the dominant group to adapt national institutions (e.g., education, labour) to better meet the needs of the non-dominant group.

This framework can also be applied to the JIMP construct. In the context of current operations, for example, local NGOs could be an example of non-dominant groups, with militaries such as the CF serving as a dominant group. This suggests that the stance of each of these groups toward the other group will influence the degree of change that each group actually undergoes when working collaboratively.

As a whole, then, these 3 theoretical frameworks offer a different perspective for understanding the JIMP context. Undoubtedly, there are many more theoretical frameworks that are relevant to this complex situation. For the future, it will be important to attempt to narrow down the most relevant and/or most helpful frameworks and to “mine” them and the methodologies that they use to assist further conceptual development of the evolving JIMP framework.
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8. Research Recommendations

This chapter explores several research areas that could be pursued to further develop understanding of the JIMP context with particular focus on the public domain.

8.1 Introduction

As can be gleaned from the current review, a range of literature from many different areas is relevant to the JIMP problem. A few articles look specifically at the role of the JIMP framework in the CF. On the whole, however, literature specifically addressing the JIMP construct is still relatively underdeveloped, and there are no available controlled studies that directly explore its actual impact.

Despite the relatively few articles available, however, it is clear that the CF is actively working to understand how research can be used to help further the JIMP construct. For example, Gizewski (2008) provides an excellent research agenda for developing a JIMP-enabled land force. He describes several ongoing Land Capability Development Operational Research Team (LCDORT) initiatives, as shown in Table 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Topic</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historical analyses of events</td>
<td>Considers historical examples (past and recent) of JIMP-like collaborations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyses of structures and processes</td>
<td>Army’s Battle Group 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual work: Elaboration of the “P” in JIMP</td>
<td>Aimed at defining the term “public” and understanding how interactions with public should occur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of key players</td>
<td>Developing an inventory or databases that describe organizations within the interagency and public domains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of enabling “hardware” (technologies)</td>
<td>Identifying technology that could assist JIMP operations to link military and civil counterparts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of education and training methods/tools</td>
<td>Identifying how members of the JIMP community should be trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of social network analyses</td>
<td>Understanding how different JIMP organizations interact/how influence is shared, and the merits of different network configurations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures of effectiveness</td>
<td>Developing solid, reliable metrics that can capture progress on instantiating JIMP capability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows the priorities of the LCDORT section, and identifies some past and ongoing efforts that are addressing these gaps. Specifically, a preliminary historical analysis has been
completed (Hrychuk & Gizewski, 2008). Current effort is also being directed at attempting to understand the structures and processes required to facilitate JIMP, through Battlegroup 2021, and more broadly. Gizewski indicated the need to further elaborate the concept of the “P” in JIMP, and indicated that a current project at LCDORT is aimed at creating a simplistic database that includes the JIMP players within the current Afghanistan operation. The only other work that Gizewski has identified in personal communication was participation by Dr. Katherine Banko at the Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) on a NATO panel working to create measures of JIMP effectiveness. It will obviously be important to follow the many different lines of research within all branches of the DRDC research system as they develop over the next few months and years.

One question for researchers conducting the current JIMP applied research program at DRDC Toronto is how to “frame” the research program. This will require making decisions about what aspects of JIMP research can best be supported, given the expertise available within the Toronto laboratory versus that available through other DRDC laboratories and beyond. The sections that follow explore how DRDC Toronto research efforts could be framed and present specific ideas and research questions that could be explored.

8.2 Conceptual Clarification

It is clear that the JIMP construct is one that will require considerable conceptual development as it moves forward and continues to evolve. For example, foreign policy specialists have argued that “Canada’s approach remains halfway between an empty metaphor and an actual strategy” (Travers & Owen, 2008, p. 686). Given its relative recency, this observation is perhaps not surprising.

Ironically, one current challenge that analysts, theorists and researchers face in attempting to understand the JIMP construct is that it appears to have captured the imagination of the Canadian government and of many departments such as the CF. There is a sense in which it appears to be a relatively simple construct, and one that seems difficult to argue against. However, it is unclear whether the parties most interested in instantiating JIMP truly have a common vision of what they mean by “JIMP.” One potential danger is the “bandwagon effect,” wherein a construct that receives widespread acceptance by influential bodies is then pushed quickly toward instantiation, perhaps even without the time needed to fully develop its underpinnings. Because the JIMP construct has yet to be fully and clearly defined, there are imminent dangers in moving ahead until there is more clarity around what the concept represents from the perspectives of all relevant parties. The theoretical underpinnings of the construct will need to be fully elaborated before it can serve as an adequate base for future research and development efforts.

In our view, some of the key attributes of the JIMP context have yet to be fully dimensionalized. Of course, some of the key requirements of the JIMP context are obvious (e.g., the need for diverse players from a range of different agencies and organizations). Although there is a clear recognition in the available literature that instantiating the JIMP framework will require doing business in a very different way, the unique characteristics of this framework seem yet to have been clearly defined. In our opinion, a key contribution of the DRDC Toronto research program should be to explore and identify the factors that make the demands of the JIMP framework distinct from the demands of previous operations or conflicts. In our view, from the perspective of the CF, the key conceptual issue that must be addressed is “What distinguishes the requirements of the JIMP context from those within previous theatres of operations”? We would argue that although the
JIMP construct has a great deal of intuitive appeal, there is a sense in which the discrete attributes that distinguish it from previous operations are yet to be fully articulated.

Given the psychological expertise within the Collaborative Performance and Learning section at DRDC Toronto, we would argue that one of the main thrusts of a future DRDC Toronto program of JIMP research should be to help frame the construct from a psychological perspective. Although the JIMP construct has received support within the CF system, a serious danger is that the construct may evolve without adequate inclusion, framing and reframing of the problem from a range of perspectives. At the very least, these perspectives should include all forms of psychology (e.g., social, cognitive, organizational), sociology, anthropology, political science, and history, and thus, should be informed by a variety of disciplines. Although the current CF JIMP literature does emphasize the importance of capturing a range of perspectives, it is unclear whether will be any sustained and systematic efforts to ensure that this will occur. Given the need for strong conceptual grounding of the JIMP construct, then, DRDC Toronto should be at the forefront of ensuring that social-psychological perspectives (and other perspectives that DRDC perceives to be important) are represented.

There is also a sense in the available literature that some of the key challenges of instantiating the JIMP paradigm may be in danger of being underemphasized. For example, the JIMP framework is being cast as being evolutionary rather than revolutionary (Gizewski, Rostek, & Leslie, 2008). Historical analyses of JIMP-like aspects of past operations quite correctly point out the JIMP-like nature of efforts in past campaigns (Hrychuk & Gizewski, 2008). From our perspective, however, there is also a very real danger in underemphasizing the radical shifts (cultural, structural and otherwise) that would need to be achieved for full JIMP capability. Using historical analyses and showing the continuity between what excellent military leaders have always been able to do (e.g., to build strong collaborative relationships with diverse partners when required) is a very worthy effort. It is clearly important to recognize past successes that have given rise to JIMP capability in some military personnel.

However, these observations should in no way minimize what will be required to instantiate the JIMP framework. The problem remaining is how to begin to conceptualize what the personnel who functioned in previous JIMP-like environments “had” that allowed them to perform collaboratively. The future JIMP context will require that a wider range of personnel than ever before must be able to work collaboratively. For the CF, the challenge presented by JIMP in 2009 (and beyond) is how to instantiate a particular stance and way of thinking within a broad range of military personnel, both commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers. In our opinion, it is difficult to imagine a paradigm shift more radical than the type required to become fully JIMP enabled.

The terminology and language used to capture the JIMP construct might also need to be adjusted as the concept evolves. For example, Gizewski and Rostek (2007) state that the joint and multinational aspects of JIMP are more familiar to the CF than the interagency and public aspects of JIMP. In our opinion, however, what seems more likely is that these aspects can simply be performed at an adequate level without full JIMP capacity. The CF does appear to have made considerable strides in being more coordinated among military players from different nations. However, it seems very premature to argue that the multinational aspects of operations have been even somewhat adequately “covered off.”
Although certainly framed from primarily a CF perspective, at least implicitly, the current conceptualization of JIMP seems to run somewhat counter to the true inclusive spirit of JIMP. From our perspective, the “M” in JIMP is presumably not just about working in multinational military coalitions and alliances, but in theory, should also include the CF’s ability to work with both military and non-military players of all diverse cultures. As the conceptual clarification of the JIMP concept proceeds, it might also be important to consider a more inclusive term to replace “JIMP.” The JIMP construct (and particularly the joint and multinational components) seems most relevant when applied exclusively to the military context. The term “comprehensive approach” may be better suited for conceptualizing the nature of the diverse collaboration necessary.

As the JIMP construct evolves, it will be important to simultaneously consider a wide range of levels, all of which are relevant to understanding this construct. The first is simply the interpersonal context, or understanding the relationships among individuals. It seems important to critically assess the hypothesis that the nature of the bonds among individuals in the JIMP context will necessarily be predicated on the same factors as in other interpersonal relationships. Indeed, it will be necessary to more fully understand the interpersonal dynamics in play when attempting to build relationships with members of the local public, and those that bind people working interdependently within current operations (e.g., the military working with OGDs or NGOs). Another relevant level of analysis is the intra-organizational level. The individuals that work within a given system are influenced by the practices and norms within the system. These systems can either promote or hinder the emergence of JIMP capability. As such, this level will need to be understood as well. Another critical level relates to the intersections among organizations (i.e., the inter-organizational level). This will require understanding the impact of the organizational representatives who are “boundary spanners,” whose role is to forge relationships with the members of other diverse organizations. How these individuals function (and indeed, how their organizations support them) will be critical to understanding how best to promote JIMP capability within the larger system. Of course, there are many more levels of analysis that are relevant to the JIMP problem, including political, historical and sociological perspectives to name only a few. However, the interpersonal, intra- and inter-organizational levels seem to represent a good frame for the efforts of DRDC Toronto researchers.

As conceptual work proceeds, some aspects of the JIMP construct will need to be more fully explored. One obvious example is the need for additional clarification of what the “P” in Public represents from the perspectives of multiple JIMP players. Although there are some unambiguous elements included in the “P,” there continues to be some ambiguity regarding this category. There are different perspectives, for example, regarding whether local government falls into this category or into the interagency category. As such, working to create better understandings based on conceptual clarification will be key.

Failing to clarify what is meant by the term “JIMP” from the perspectives of the many different players who will be expected to collaborate in JIMP environments could have a number of important implications. First, a key requirement for implementing the JIMP framework is “buy-in” from the relevant players charged with instantiating JIMP. If the depiction of how JIMP would work does not appear to be realistic in the view of these personnel, instantiation could fail to progress in an ideal way. This suggests that more effort will need to be paid in order to further develop the conceptual aspects of the JIMP construct.

However, it may be that, rather than representing a stagnant, clearly identifiable entity, the JIMP construct may be a dynamic, multi-faceted entity – a moving target that defies universal definition.
In the end, it may be that the conceptual clarification of JIMP, and of its various aspects, will consist simply of an examination of the ways in which the construct has been used in different contexts, by different players, and over time. Still, it may be possible to arrive at a “working definition” of JIMP and its various components, a definition which can serve as a useful heuristic when developing, for example, practical training or education tools that work well in specific contexts. Such a working definition of JIMP would need to be understood by the various JIMP players in order to ensure effective communication.

### 8.3 Potential JIMP Research Areas

There are obviously a range of possible research activities that could be conducted to support the development of JIMP capability. These activities range from basic research that seeks to understand the theoretical underpinnings of the JIMP construct (and related issues) to more applied research and development aimed at supporting the JIMP framework in real-world contexts. This section explores some basic research ideas, as well as more applied research areas that could assist the evolving JIMP construct.

**Social Identity** - Understanding the construct of social identity seems key to fully instantiating the JIMP framework in operations. Within the JIMP context, one of the major challenges is that the many different players come from different backgrounds, and have somewhat different goals. The social identities of those involved in field operations will have an impact on the effectiveness of fully integrating the required JIMP capabilities.

One of the possible foci of future research is the potential role of identification in instantiating the JIMP context. As suggested earlier, the promulgation of a common overarching identity is one of the ways to begin to break down the barriers among diverse parties within the JIMP context. The challenge of instantiating the JIMP framework, then, relates to how the diverse members of the JIMP team should be understood. In our opinion, it seems unrealistic and ineffective to attempt to eliminate the differences in perspectives of each team member. Rather, the ideal seems to be to create a diverse team (and to capitalize on the positive aspects of diversity), while promulgating a strong overarching identity.

For example, one might simultaneously be a member of the Canadian military, as well as a person who is representing the UN on a peacekeeping mission. How these different (and sometimes incongruent) identities are managed could have very important implications for interpersonal interactions within the JIMP context. This is relevant to interactions both with members of other agencies (e.g., OGDs, NGOs), as well as those with members of the local public. The following types of research questions could be pursued:

- What are the best ways to develop shared identification within the JIMP context?
- How can CF personnel best build relationships with members of the public?

In this sense, then, it is possible to frame the ideal goal of JIMP as having people “on the same page” and working toward a common goal. Viewing this same example from a social psychological perspective, another way to frame the goal of JIMP is to have diverse team members share a strong overarching sense of identification as united members of “Team Canada.”

**Intergroup Contact Theory** - The effectiveness of JIMP operations is dependent in part on the interactions between the people working together in the field. The prejudices held for those
working for other agencies or organizations work to diminish the effectiveness of the operation. Understanding how to reduce such prejudices is, therefore, in the best interests of all those involved in the operation.

The exact processes by which groups move from negative attitudes and beliefs about an out-group to being motivated to see themselves as the members of a larger shared group are critical psychological processes that need to be better understood within the JIMP domain.

**Acculturation Theory** - It is also possible to view JIMP operations from a broader perspective, namely in accordance with theories about acculturation. This framework can also be applied to the JIMP construct. In the context of current operations, for example, local NGOs or OGDs could represent examples of non-dominant groups, with militaries such as the CF serving as a dominant group. An example in the context of training (e.g., pre-deployment training exercises such as Exercise Maple Guardian, Exercise Unified Ready, or workshops on the CF’s Operational Planning Process (OPP)) is joint training that includes CF personnel as well as members of OGDs and/or NGOs. In this context, the OGDs and NGOs could represent the non-dominant groups (as they are in the numerical minority relative to the CF) and the CF could represent the dominant group. This suggests that the stance of each of these groups toward the other group will influence the degree of change that each group actually undergoes when working collaboratively. For instance, in pre-deployment training, OGDs and NGOs may be encouraged to adopt the planning process used by the CF (i.e., OPP), either without taking into account their own approaches to planning (assimilation), or alternatively, by incorporating some of their own planning approaches into the collaborative planning process (integration). In the former instance (assimilation), only the OGDs/NGOs change their planning process, and the CF does not; whereas in the latter instance (integration), both the OGDs/NGOs and the CF change their planning processes, to develop a new and unique integrated planning process.

**Teamwork and Collaboration** - The teamwork literature also provides a considerable body of information relevant to instantiating the JIMP framework. Imagining the many diverse players as a large team (or a “meta-team”) is one way to conceptualize the many different JIMP partners. A key challenge in instantiating the JIMP framework, then, is how diverse individuals can be integrated into a highly diverse team, when each person is likely to have different values and goals and team members are likely to come from diverse cultures.

Another need for future research is to understand the optimal nature of collaboration within a JIMP environment. One of the purported features of JIMP is the breakdown of “stovepiping” such that responsibility is shared rather than residing in one unitary body. In some reports, the JIMP framework is perhaps cast somewhat idealistically as one in which every agency or department has an equal role. For example, Hrychuk and Gizewski (2008, p. 17) describe the following JIMP context:

“...all actors in an integrated peace support operation must take an equal share of responsibility for creating a viable solution. If only one partner assumes responsibility, and thereby takes the lead in mission planning and execution, the integrated partnership will falter. But if all players assume equal responsibility and involvement in planning, unity of effort may be achieved.”

This depiction of the JIMP framework instantiated seems to assume that equal partnership would be optimal. However, given the varying expertise of the many JIMP players, and the shifting demands within the JIMP context, it is unclear whether a wholly egalitarian approach could
actually be used (or indeed, whether it should be used). In environments where security was a grave concern, for example, it may be unrealistic to expect that the military players would not necessarily have the lead role. Similarly, in a serious humanitarian crisis, NGOs may be better equipped to guide the necessary efforts, with other players in a more supporting role.

- What is the nature of collaboration (e.g., power structures) necessary to instantiate the JIMP framework?

- What type of collaborative model will be optimal (e.g., egalitarian vs. non-egalitarian)? Will one model fit all situations and all stages of operations?

One of the requirements for the longer term, then, will be to articulate the nature of the collaboration that needs to occur. For collaborative efforts to be maximally effective, it will be necessary to clearly outline responsibilities at each stage of a conflict. To this end, it might be helpful to review the teamwork/collaboration literature to understand what kinds of structures would be most conducive to optimal JIMP collaboration. This also suggests that it may be helpful to think about the JIMP framework as being at least somewhat context-dependent.

One kind of team particularly relevant to the current review, however, is a team of teams. In the literature, these teams have been described as multiteam systems (MTS; e.g. Marks, DeChurch, Mathieu, Panzer, & Alonso, 2005). The formal definition is:

“…two or more teams that interface directly and interdependently in response to environmental contingencies toward the accomplishment of collective goals. MTS boundaries are defined by virtue of the fact that all teams within the system, while pursuing different proximal goals, share at least one common distal goal; and in so doing exhibit input, process and outcome interdependence with at least one other team in the system.”

(Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001; cited in Marks et al., 2005, p. 964)

Theorists studying multiteam systems (MTS) argue that they are more than simply large teams, but that the key issue in MTSs relates to how team members allocate their efforts to the subteam in addition to the larger team as a whole. Clearly, from the perspective of the CF in the JIMP context, how a team of teams will be able to work together under competing goals is a critical issue to understand in more detail.

**Attitudes and Values** - Another challenge to the emergence of effective JIMP capabilities are the different attitudes and values held by different parties. It will be important to recognize that the various parties within the JIMP framework will continue to have very different goals and priorities even if a higher level of integration and coordination can be achieved for particular purposes. For instance, NGO organizations seem likely to continue to emphasize humanitarian values above other issues, whereas personnel within military systems may at least initially maintain their focus on security issues. The key, of course, will be to learn how to assign roles and responsibilities such that each team member feels that their attitudes and values are both respected and protected while working in a coordinated way to promote the overarching goal of the team.

- What diverse values and attitudes pose the most risk to achieving JIMP?

- How can diverse team members maintain their core attitudes and values while working as part of a larger team?

Within the JIMP context, the impact of the fundamental attribution error could be pronounced. The fundamental attribution error occurs because people tend to explain the causes of their own
behaviour in terms of situational influences. On the other hand, people tend to overestimate the role of dispositional factors (e.g., “he’s just that kind of person”) while underestimating the role of situational factors when making attributions about others’ behaviour (Ross, 1977). In the interplay among NGOs and military systems, for example, it seems easy to imagine an NGO member believing that all military personnel are cruel and callous because they have not been given the authority to intervene in a humanitarian crisis, whereas military personnel might see NGO personnel as “bleeding hearts” who do not care about military rules of engagement and the chain of command. Understanding the attitudes, beliefs and expectations of other JIMP players would be an important contribution.

Culture - Culture is a broad term and many studies could be conducted to understand the impact of culture in a JIMP context. For instance, cultural training will have an impact on how CF and other agency personnel adjust to working in troubled states and how they deal with the local public. Those who have a fairly good understanding of a nation’s culture prior to deployment should be better prepared for the mission and may be able to build better collaborative relationships. It would, therefore, be beneficial to conduct interviews with CF soldiers post-deployment to find out how effectively they think they worked with locals in the field, to identify the successes (and the reasons underlying the successes), to identify the challenges they faced when dealing with locals, and to identify aspects of pre-deployment training that were missing but would have been useful in the field.

Another aspect of culture that could be researched is organizational culture. As discussed earlier in this report, differences in organizational culture can act as barriers to effective collaboration in a JIMP environment. It would, thus, be beneficial to build on Stewart et al.’s (2004) study by examining CF and NGO perceptions of organizational culture. CF and NGO personnel who are involved in international projects could be asked to provide descriptions of their own and other organizations’ culture. Results from these questions could identify the aspects of organizational culture that act as barriers to effective JIMP operations, as well as identify similarities that could help foster cooperation between organizations.

Stereotypes – As noted earlier in this report, one key factor likely to impact with JIMP environments are the social stereotypes that are in play. This is true within every part of the JIMP framework. At the public level, for example, understanding local Afghans’ stereotypes of CF personnel would be very relevant to optimizing their interactions. As the goal of current operations is not just to “win the war, but to win the peace” (Hrychuk & Gizewski, 2008), understanding the potential stereotype-related barriers that might affect relationships between each party would be very helpful. This issue could be approached by working to understand the attitudes, beliefs and expectations of local Afghans about CF members.

Similarly, stereotypes that CF personnel hold about the members of host nations will also have an impact on how they interact with members of the local public. As noted by Kunda (2000), our stereotypes affect our behaviours towards others, which may, in turn, affect their reactions to us. For example, CF soldiers who hold stereotypes that the local population is lazy will treat individuals in line with this expectation. CF soldiers could be interviewed prior to deployment to understand their stereotypes before they interact with local populations. The impact of these stereotypes could be assessed by interviewing the soldiers again after deployment. At that time, comparisons could explore the ability of different CF members with differing stereotypes to interact with members of local populations.
Stereotypes are relevant at the interagency level as well. It was noted earlier in this review that stereotypes of other agency and organization personnel can act as a barrier to the JIMP capability (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). To that end, research could be conducted to identify the stereotypes that CF personnel hold for OGD or NGO personnel and vice versa. Again, interviews conducted pre- and post-deployment will help to identify the stereotypes that were most detrimental to effective cooperation and collaboration in the field. Deployments that require working with fewer organizations may result in greater interdependence and subsequent motivation to inhibit stereotypes. Furthermore, as noted by one humanitarian aid worker (Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006), smaller communities working together can result in better coordination. It would, therefore, be interesting to identify changes to organizational stereotypes for CF and OGD/NGO personnel engaged in large-scale versus small-scale missions. Thus, potential research questions could include:

- What stereotypes do CF personnel have about local populations?
- What stereotypes do members of local populations have of CF personnel?
- What is the impact of social stereotypes within the JIMP environment?
- How can negative stereotypes best be reduced within the JIMP environment?

To begin to address these issues, a more specific review of the literature relevant to social stereotypes, particularly in relation to the public domain, may be helpful.

Capturing the “Public” Perspective – It is clear that there are currently a number of inherent challenges to fully implementing a JIMP approach. There are several obvious barriers related to problems in sharing information, duplicating efforts, and varying resources being available to JIMP players.

One of the persistent messages that experienced CF personnel have given in relation to the JIMP construct is that even though it is still evolving at the conceptual level, diverse personnel are typically able to “sort it out” on the ground. Unfortunately, these perceptions are anecdotal, and it remains unclear how these efforts are perceived by the various players, or by the local public. One of the most important future research areas relates to understanding the complex dynamic among all JIMP players and the local population (or public). The literature suggests that the current humanitarian space represents a critical context that must be better understood. Having NGOs and humanitarian workers from the NGO side working concurrently (and sometimes cooperatively) with military CIMIC personnel has the potential to make it very difficult for members of the local public to know exactly how to interact with people in these different roles.

Another goal of future research could be to attempt to understand how local members of the public within a host nation perceive the impact of JIMP efforts. It seems important not to assume that having multiple players involved within the JIMP context is actually of benefit to local people. Similarly, it also seems important to critically assess the assumption that instantiating JIMP will improve the critical performance measures from the perspective of the local population (e.g., more effective aid and better quality of life). It seems important to understand this problem from a range of different perspectives. Understanding how local Afghans perceive the coordination (or lack thereof) of the humanitarian aid that they receive, for example, would be crucial. Similarly, how local populations interpret the roles/responsibilities and the strengths/weaknesses of the many different JIMP players would also be important.
Although the pragmatic challenges of collecting this kind of data would be immense, it seems important that some attention is given to capturing the views of the local population within JIMP contexts. This could be accomplished, in part, by gaining access to some of the local public polling currently occurring within at least some areas of Afghanistan.

**Promoting Knowledge and Understanding Among JIMP Players** - Understanding each of the parties in a diverse team is a critical antecedent to true collaboration. As Hrychuk and Gizewski (2008, p. 29) have argued, “Such understanding must not be superficial, but rather extend to the motivations, and objectives of each participant, as well as their respective strengths, weaknesses, capabilities and limitations.” They argue that this understanding must begin, ideally, before “crisis or engagement.”

One of the challenges of instantiating the JIMP construct is to be able to mentally visualize the many other types of players that are relevant within this space. One of the key ways to attempt to instantiate fully developed JIMP capability is through the identification and creation of the tools necessary to actually link diverse players. One obvious example could be the development of information management tools. These tools would allow access to a common operating picture and collaborative, secure planning capabilities Vandahl (2007).

- What collaborative tools could further JIMP implementation?

As the JIMP construct evolves, there will likely be increasing emphasis on the collaborative tools that can support JIMP capability.

One of the key issues, it seems, is simply that personnel from different teams or organizations may not fully understand the beliefs and expectations of the other parties. One way to address this issue is to create training tools/operational tools that could be used “on the ground” to provide quick and easy access to the other party. Essentially, this tool could literally represent the construction of a relatively crude “map” of the other parties’ way of thinking.

Although it would obviously not be possible to capture every individual nuance, it would be possible to depict the broad patterns of common interests, values, and perhaps even the thinking processes of other team members.

- “Think like an NGO.”
- “Think like a military leader.”
- Represent differences in belief (and/or constraints) using scenario examples – predict what the other party would think and do.
- What are the constraints on the other party’s behaviour (e.g., at organizational level, situational level)?
- Interlace with video showing actual responses and thought process of NGOS and military leaders.

At the more developed end of the spectrum, it would even be possible to create a scenario-based tool showing a typical humanitarian assistance situation, and this scenario could be completed from any number of different perspectives. This could require CF personnel, for example, to work through this scenario while attempting to simulate the thinking process of an NGO member. Or, this could also be completed from the perspective of a local Afghan person required to interact with
a CF personnel. Pragmatic tools that could assist JIMP personnel to better understand the other players within the JIMP domain could be a very important contribution.

**Training** - Further research exploring training related to the “P” in public would also be helpful. Due to the scope of this review, it was impossible to understand current CF efforts aimed at training for public aspects, and specifically for interacting with the local public in a host nation.

Other training that is particularly relevant to this issue is the training that CIMIC personnel receive. This training seems to be relevant to learning how to build relationships with members of the local population, and how to navigate within unfamiliar interpersonal domain. A more specific review of the CIMIC training course could provide very rich information in this regard. Similarly, members of the CF PsyOps cell also receive extensive training relevant to understanding and exerting influence over members of the local public in current operations. This training could also be explored in more detail in future research.

**Study of JIMP-Like Problems in Associated Domains** - The challenges that the CF faces in articulating and implementing the JIMP framework, of course, are not unique. It might be fruitful to explore how the military systems of other nations are progressing as they develop their comprehensive approaches. Another possible research activity could be to identify contexts in which similar challenges have been identified and/or overcome. Although the JIMP context, by its very nature, poses many unique challenges, it seems unlikely that there are no known correlates within the business domain. Domains in which interoperability among diverse players have had to be addressed (e.g., security, disaster response, etc.) are potential candidates that could be explored further.

Similarly, it might also be fruitful to think beyond the military domain, and to imagine other contexts in which complex systems have faced similar challenges of diversity, and the need to ensure unity of effort despite diverse goals and values. Large multinational organizations, and the strategies that they employ to ensure collaboration and coherence, might be helpful.

**Measures of JIMP Capacity (e.g., JIMP Baseline Study)** - One of the keys to working to fully instantiate JIMP capability will be the ability to objectively track progress made toward this goal. This will require articulation of what a fully developed JIMP capability would actually “look like” once implemented. The problem, of course, is that it might not be possible to fully articulate this vision, as the concept is still evolving.

Moreover, the sheer complexity of the JIMP concept would make measurement at a range of different levels necessary. Travers and Owen (2007), for example, argue that the success of the 3-D approach would need to be measured both in terms of the overall goals, as well as through the level of actual policy co-ordination, and through both national and international channels. Unfortunately, there appear to be few available tools that can be used to measure the success of JIMP framework initiatives. For example, McNerney (2005) notes that there are no clear metrics for measuring PRT performance. Of critical importance at the first stage, however, could be the identification of what measures would be the most critical indicators. McNerney (2005) suggests that PRTs can be measured by their ability to improve tactical-level coordination, build relationships, and build capacity. However, he notes that these are not ideal measures, and that more robust measures are needed to more effectively determine the effectiveness of the PRT program and individual PRTs. Therefore, tools to measure the success of the JIMP framework need to be identified or designed.
Given the diffuse and “hard to quantify” nature of the transition that will be required, one of the challenges would be to capture some of the subtle cultural shifts that will need to occur for full JIMP capability. Psychologically, one way to operationalize these shifts is from the evolution of the self-identity of CF members as it moves from more of a warrior mentality to roles that require more of a collaborative or diplomatic approach. The evolution of the JIMP construct as it is instantiated in the attitudes, beliefs and expectations of CF members and all other relevant players will need to be tracked. From a research perspective, getting “baseline” data and taking a longitudinal approach to track instantiation of the JIMP perspective at the psychological level could be a unique contribution of DRDC Toronto that seems unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. As the emergence of JIMP capability is still at a relatively early stage, one of the major contributions of future research could be helping to plot the progression of JIMP capacity.

**Does JIMP Promote Optimal Performance?** - Another important emphasis of future DRDC research efforts should be to help to promote critical thinking around the JIMP construct. As with any construct that captures interest and attention, there are potential “bandwagon” effects, wherein critical perspectives are not actively sought and cultivated. For example, one obvious danger is that there is an assumption, even in the absence of empirical data, that instantiating JIMP will necessarily lead to increased performance and effectiveness. Intuitively, although it might seem clear that having a broader range of perspectives on a given problem might yield positive benefits, the teamwork literature does not consistently support this assumption (for a review, see Kerr & Tindale, 2004). For example, there is good evidence that groups working together do not always optimally use all of the information available to them. Groups often fail to effectively pool information during group discussion, and individual preferences can determine the information that receives focus during group discussion. Clearly, this biased sampling of information could have serious consequences on decisions made within a JIMP context. As a whole, then, it will be important to undertake research that attempts to show the conditions under which JIMP collaboration will be most effective, and the factors that influence this effectiveness.

### 8.4 Conclusion

As the JIMP construct and framework are refined, it will be important to ensure collaboration with key people shaping this construct. One of the current challenges is the complexity of the JIMP context, and the need to capture the perspectives of economics, anthropology, sociology, psychology and many other related fields. In our view, DRDC Toronto is in a key position to help to further the JIMP construct, and to help both inform and shape the debate around how the construct is instantiated.

In this sense, the efforts to refine and understand the JIMP construct must themselves be comprehensive. They need to take the best knowledge and experience from a range of domains, and attempt to integrate this knowledge and experience in a way that captures the unique perspectives in play.
References


Vandahl, E.S. (2007). No more leading from behind: Implementing a JIMP strategy to compliment the Canadian whole of government initiative. Canadian Forces College.


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This literature review explores the scientific, military and academic literature relevant to the Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) construct, with particular emphasis on the public aspects.

This review contains several chapters. The first two chapters provide an overview of the project and describe the method and results of the search. The third chapter describes the JIMP construct at a theoretical level. The fourth chapter explores the many different elements within the JIMP context, in terms of both interagency and public perspectives. The fifth chapter explores some of the challenges and potential barriers to a fully realized JIMP capability. In contrast, the sixth chapter shows some of the enablers of JIMP capability, and describes examples of success attributed to JIMP activities. The final two chapters attempt to link the JIMP construct to other relevant theoretical frameworks, as well as exploring research and theory development opportunities for future research.

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