STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JAMES T. CONWAY
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

BEFORE

THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

THE 2010 POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

FEBRUARY 25, 2010
**General James T. Conway Commandant of the United States Marine Corps Before The Senate Armed Services Committee on The 2010 Posture of the United States Marine Corps**

**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

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**ABSTRACT**

**SUBJECT TERMS**

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**REPORT (SAR)**

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Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide a written report for the record on the current posture of the Marine Corps. My pledge, as always, is to provide you with a candid and honest assessment. On behalf of all Marines, their families, and our civilian employees, I want to thank you for your concern and continued support.

This brief statement contains a summary of our near-term focus and enduring priorities, an update on your Marine Corps today, a discussion of the challenges we see ahead, and our vision of the future. In addition to any testimony you wish to receive from me, I have directed the Deputy Commandants of the Marine Corps to meet with you as individuals and members of your respective subcommittees, and to provide you any other information you require. Our liaison officers will also deliver copies of 2010 U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and Programs to the offices of each member of the committee. This almanac and reference book contains detailed descriptions of all our major programs and initiatives. We hope you will find it useful.

I. YOUR MARINE CORPS

We believe that Americans expect their Marines to be ready to respond when our country is threatened; to arrive on the scene on short notice anywhere in the world via the amphibious ships of the United States Navy, as was necessary when a disastrous earthquake recently struck Haiti; and to fight and win our Nation’s battles. The public invests greatly in the Marine Corps. In turn, our commitment is to uphold their special trust and confidence and provide them the best return on their investment.

Characteristics. Your Marine Corps is a young force that provides great value to the Nation.

- The average age of a Marine is 25 years old.
- Almost half of the enlisted force — 84,830 Marines — is between the ranks of private and lance corporal (pay grades E1 - E3).
- Almost 70 percent of your Marines are on their first enlistment, and some 30,000 have been in uniform for less than a year.
- The ratio of officers to enlisted Marines is 1:9 — the lowest of all the services.
- More than 136,000 Marines (67 percent) are in deploying units — what we call the Operating Forces. Nearly 30,000 Marines are forward deployed, forward based, or on training exercises around the world.
- For 6.5 percent of the baseline 2010 Defense budget, the Marine Corps provides:
  - 17 percent of the Nation’s active ground combat maneuver units
  - 12 percent of the Nation’s fixed wing tactical aircraft

1. As of 23 December 2009.
2. As of 1 December 2009, the percentage of Marines on their first enlistment was 68.6 percent, and the number of Marines with less than one year on active duty is 29,032.
3. Authorized endstrength of 202,000 = 21,000 officers + 181,000 enlisted Marines = 1:9.
4. 6.5 percent of DoD budget represents FY10 USMC Green dollars and Direct Blue (Navy) dollars.
• 19 percent of the Nation’s attack helicopters

**Expeditionary.** The Marine Corps is the Nation’s naval expeditionary, combined-arms force-in-readiness. To Marines, expeditionary connotes fast, austere, and lethal.

• Expeditionary means rapid deployment by air or sea to respond to crises of temporary duration. For example, within 24 hours of the speech by the President of the United States in December announcing the current strategy in Afghanistan, the lead elements of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina were en route to Afghanistan.

• Expeditionary means being efficient and effective while operating in an austere environment — a task-organized force that is manned and equipped no larger or heavier than necessary to accomplish the mission.

• Expeditionary means being prepared for decisive action — to be lethal, if necessary — but also possessing the lesser-included capabilities for security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief.

• In summary, the term expeditionary to Marines goes to the very heart of our service culture, core values, and warrior ethos. Service as part of an expeditionary force means embracing a Spartan way of life and regular deployments on foreign soil in furtherance of our Nation’s interests.5

**Organization.** The Marine Corps is the only general-purpose force in the Department of Defense that is trained and equipped as the Nation’s first responders.

• We organize in Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). Under a single command element, the MAGTF integrates three major subordinate elements: (1) Ground Combat Element, (2) Aviation Combat Element, (3) Logistics Combat Element. Each element of the MAGTF is complementary, and Marine Corps forces are most effective and best employed as MAGTFs within the joint or multinational command structure.

• MAGTFs are adaptive, general-purpose rapid response forces. They are multi-capable, transitioning seamlessly from fighting conventional and hybrid threats to promoting stability and mitigating conditions that lead to conflict. For example, in 2003, after completing a conventional, 350-mile attack over land from Kuwait to Baghdad, I Marine Expeditionary Force — a 60,000-Marine-plus MAGTF — was able to transition quickly to security and stability operations.

**Near-Term Focus.** We understand the economic challenges facing our country and the hard decisions Congress must make. We thank you for your unwavering support. This report discusses the near-term focus of the Marine Corps:

• The current fight in Afghanistan and the responsible drawdown in Iraq

• Readiness and reset of equipment

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• Modernization of the MAGTF
• Preparing for the next contingency and the uncertainties of the future

**Enduring Priorities.** Through the future years defense plan and beyond, we are focused on:

• Providing the Nation a naval expeditionary force fully prepared for employment as a MAGTF across the spectrum of operations
• Remaining the most ready when our Nation is least ready
• Providing for our Marines and their families

II. IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

**Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.** Since testimony before your committee last year, the Marine Corps has transferred authority for Anbar Province to the U.S. Army and is near completion of a responsible drawdown from Iraq.

• From 2003-2009, our force levels in Iraq averaged 25,000 Marines.
• As of February 19, 2010, there were 159 Marines in Iraq. By spring of this year, our mission in Iraq will be complete and your Marines will redeploy.

**Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.** In Afghanistan, the mission has expanded.

• As of September 23, 2009, there were more Marines in Afghanistan than in Iraq.
• By March 2010, there will be more than 18,500 Marines in Afghanistan, and by mid-April, that number will grow to a robust MAGTF of 19,400 personnel with equipment, and will be commanded by a Marine two-star general.
• Your Marines have already had success and have made a difference in some of the toughest regions of Afghanistan, primarily Helmand Province in the South — formerly a Taliban stronghold, and the source of the highest volume of opium production in the world. However, more work remains to be done.

**Summary**

• Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the Marine Corps to fight as a second land army. Although we have been successful in our assigned missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, that success has come at the price of degraded readiness for our designed missions. The Marine Corps will always do whatever the Nation requires. But, as Congress has authorized and resourced, the Marine Corps is trained, organized, and equipped for our primary mission as a force in readiness.

• The harsh environments and tempo of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through eight years of combat have accelerated wear and tear on our equipment. The enemy’s weapon of choice
— the improvised explosive device or IED — has forced us to increase the weight of our personal protective equipment and the armor on our vehicles.

- The distributed nature of operations has shown us that our legacy tables of equipment were inadequate. The required type and number of ground vehicles, radios, and other major end items of equipment have significantly increased. In our infantry battalions, for example, the number of tactical vehicles has almost doubled while the number of radio sets has grown sevenfold. Our preliminary estimates indicate that the cost of restructuring the Marine Corps’ tables of equipment would be $5 billion over FY 2012 through FY 2015.

- The amount of equipment that has been damaged, destroyed, or has reached the end of service life from accelerated use has increased, and the cost associated with fixing or replacing this equipment has increased significantly.

- Based upon the Marine Corps current analysis, our estimated reset cost is $8 billion. The $8 billion consists of $3 billion requested in the FY11 OCO and an additional long term reset liability of $5 billion upon termination of the conflict.

- Equipment on hand at home station to support training has been seriously degraded. Particularly worrisome is our capacity to respond to other contingencies.

- We are institutionalizing the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan in training, education, organization, doctrine, and capability development. One of the ways we are doing this is through the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned.

- The current operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to an exponentially increased need for intelligence collection assets down to lower levels of command. The Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISR-E) provides support to the MAGTF in this operating environment by organizing all of the intelligence disciplines, sensors, and equipment and communication architecture into a single capability that is integrated and networked across all echelons.

III. Readiness

1. Personnel Readiness

Our people — the brave men and women who wear our uniform and the spouses, children, and the parents who support them — are our most valuable resource. In 2009, your Corps lost 65 Marines to enemy action in combat. We also lost 52 Marines who died by suicide — this serious issue, which will be discussed later in this report, has my personal attention.

Endstrength. Current authorized endstrength is 202,100 Marines in the active component and 39,600 Marines in the Selected Reserve.

- During fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps requested and received authorization to grow 27,000 additional personnel by the end of fiscal year 2011.

- We completed our growth during fiscal year 2009 — two years ahead of schedule. We attribute this to four factors: quality recruiting, exceptional retention, reduced personnel
attrition, and a great young generation of Americans who want to serve their country during wartime.

- With this personnel increase, we will improve training, upgrade readiness, and enhance the quality of life for all personnel and their families. The goal is to build the equivalent capacity of three Marine Expeditionary Forces — the largest MAGTF and principal Marine Corps warfighting organization.

- We are continuing to shape the Marine Corps with the right mix of units, grades, and occupational specialties.

**Quality**

- **Recruiting.** In fiscal year 2009, we exceeded goals in numbers and standards for the active component and the Selected Reserve. The active component accessed 31,413 personnel, and the Selected Reserve accessed 9,627 personnel. In fiscal year 2010, our goal is to access 27,500 enlisted personnel in the active component and commission 1,800 new officers.

- **Enlistment Standards.** One of the Department of Defense standards for new recruits is that at least 90 percent will possess a high school diploma. The Marine Corps has chosen to maintain a higher standard; our goal is a high school graduation rate of 95 percent. In fiscal year 2009, for our combined active and reserve components, the high school graduation rate of our recruits exceeded 98 percent.

- **First Term Reenlistments.** In fiscal year 2009, 8,011 first-term Marines reenlisted, meeting 109.2 percent of our goal. This represented a retention rate of 33.7 percent, exceeding our traditional retention rate of 24 percent. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, 5,194 first-term Marines have already reenlisted — 77 percent of the goal for the entire year.

- **Subsequent Term Reenlistments.** In fiscal year 2009, 7,985 Marines who had completed at least two enlistment contracts chose to reenlist again. This number represented 107 percent of our goal and a 78.6 retention rate — the highest in history. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, 5,685 Marines who had completed at least two enlistment contracts chose to reenlist again — 82 percent of the goal for the entire year.

- **Officers.** The quality of officers accessed and retained remains high. In one example, the share of Marine-option United States Naval Academy candidates in the top third of their graduating class greatly exceeded representative levels in 2008. The number of Naval Academy graduates who chose to become Marine Corps officers last year was 270 — the highest number in history for the second year in a row.

- In fiscal year 2009, our officer retention rate was 93 percent and during fiscal year 2010, we expect officer retention to remain stable.

**Reservists.** The Marine Corps Reserve is a full partner in the total force. As of January 2010, there were 39,164 Marines in the Selected Reserve and another 55,233 in the Inactive Ready Reserve. Marine Forces Reserve includes 183 training centers in 48 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
The extensive contributions of the Reserve have reduced deployment requirements for the active component, thereby improving the health of the total force. More than 54,000 Marines from the Selected Reserve and the Inactive Ready Reserve have mobilized and deployed in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM, or other operational commitments around the globe.6

“Every Marine into the Fight.” The majority of your Marines joined the Corps after our Nation was already at war. They expect to train, deploy, and fight because that is what they believe Marines are supposed to do. As such, the 2007 “Every Marine into the Fight” initiative adjusted personnel assignment policies so Marines serving in non-deploying units or the supporting establishment would have the opportunity to deploy. At the same time, we monitor carefully the frequency and duration that units and individual personnel spend deployed.

- To date, 73 percent of the available Marines have deployed in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, or other operational commitments around the globe.

- Individual Deployment Tempo. We measure individual deployment tempo on a two-year sliding scale — the number of days deployed out of the previous 730 days. In the last seven years, we have seen a twentyfold increase in the individual deployment tempo of Marines in the active component. In October 2002, the number of Marines who deployed for at least 120 consecutive days in a two-year period was 4,845. As of January 2010, 100,760 Marines had deployed for at least 120 consecutive days.

- Unit Operational Tempo. The metric we use to measure unit operational tempo is the ratio of “deployment to dwell” — months deployed to months at home station. We limit the duration of deployments for units and individual Marines to no more than seven months for battalions and squadrons. Higher headquarters units deploy for one year.

- Our goal is to achieve a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio in the active component and a 1:5 ratio in the reserve component. Our reserve units are currently operating at a ratio that more closely approximates a ratio of 1:4, while many of our active component units, on average, are nearing the goal of 1:2 (see Table 1).

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<tr>
<th>MAGTF Element</th>
<th>Average Ratio (Months Deployed : Months Home Station)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command Element</td>
<td>1 : 1.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground Combat Element</td>
<td>1 : 2.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviation Combat Element</td>
<td>1 : 2.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics Combat Element</td>
<td>1 : 1.79</td>
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6. As of 3 January 2010.
7. As of 18 November 2009.
The subordinate units most frequently deployed are Intelligence Battalions, 1:1.01 (Command Element); Infantry Battalions, 1:1.78 (Ground Combat Element); VMU Squadrons, 1:1.10, and Attack Helicopter Squadrons, 1:1.28 (Aviation Combat Element); and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Companies 1:1.30 (Logistics Combat Element).

**Suicide Prevention.** The number of Marines who have died by suicide in recent years is shocking and unacceptable. **This issue has my personal attention, and we have multiple programs at work to reverse this trend.**

- **Causes.** Our studies have shown that regardless of duty station, deployment, or duty status, the primary stressors associated with Marine suicides are problems in romantic relationships, physical health, work-related issues, such as poor performance and job dissatisfaction, and pending legal or administrative action. Multiple stressors are typically present in a suicide. This is consistent with the findings of the other services and civilian agencies.

- **Deployments.** We analyze suicides monthly and annually for combat-related trends such as the number of deployments and dwell time. Although it is reasonable to assume that one or more deployments may cause an increase in suicides, to date, we have been unable to establish a direct correlation between deployments and suicides.

**Civilian Employees.** Civilian employees are a vital part of the Marine Corps. In fiscal year 2010, civilian federal employees will number more than 25,000. Through initiatives in management and career development, the Marine Corps is dedicated to maintaining a civilian workforce with the leadership skills and technical competencies necessary to meet the challenges of today as well as those of the future.

- Traditionally, civilian employees have served primarily in the supporting establishment. Now, more than ever before, they are deploying with the operating forces and serving in positions traditionally occupied by active duty Marines. For example, we are in the process of hiring more than 260 tactical safety specialists, who will each rotate on deployments with the operating forces. We are also participating in DoD’s program to build a deployable Civilian Expeditionary Workforce.

**Families.** While we recruit Marines, we retain families. More than 45 percent of your Marines are married, and we believe that investing in military families is critical to the long-term health of the institution. When Marines know that their loved ones at home station have access to quality housing, healthcare, child development services, and education, they are better prepared to face the rigors of deployment and more inclined to stay in uniform when they return home.

- **Family Readiness Programs.** Our baseline budget in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for family programs is $399 million per year. We have reformed our family readiness programs at every level of command at all of our installations. As an example, we have created more than 400 full-time positions for family readiness officers down to the battalion and squadron level.
• **Child Care.** Today, we are currently meeting 64 percent of potential need for child care spaces. To meet the DoD standard of 80 percent of potential need based on the current population, we would require approximately 3,000 additional spaces. With your support, we have programmed an additional 2,615 spaces that will open over the next 18-24 months.

• **Families with Special Needs.** With an increase of $11 million for the Exceptional Family Member Program in this year’s baseline budget, we have made great strides improving the programs that support special needs family members. Enrollment is now mandatory and more than 8,900 exceptional family members are in the program. The Marine Corps assigns a caseworker to each family, who assists during relocation, deployment, and life events. In addition, the Marine Corps now underwrites the cost of up to 40 hours of respite care per month for families in the program. To date, the Marine Corps has provided more than 250,000 hours of respite care.

**Wounded Warriors.** About 9,000 Marines have been injured or fallen seriously ill while serving in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM or ENDURING FREEDOM. We are deeply committed to their care as well as the welfare of their families. Since activation in April 2007, the Wounded Warrior Regiment has provided a wide range of non-medical care for the injured and ill. The Marine Corps now also has wounded warrior battalions at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune.

• **Infrastructure.** The Marine Corps is investing $50 million from the 2009 Overseas Contingency Operations supplemental for the construction of resource and recovery centers at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune. These recovery centers will provide spaces for counseling, physical therapy, employment support, financial management, and other training and outreach programs in support of our wounded.

• **Outreach.** With a 24-hour call center for wounded Marines and their families, the Wounded Warrior Regiment has contacted 99.4 percent of all Marines (7,654 out of 7,703) who were wounded since the beginning of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, in order to determine their health status. We also maintain a toll-free number to the medical center in Landstuhl, Germany for families to contact their loved ones who have been wounded.

• **Recovery Care.** The Marine Corps has 42 recovery care coordinators, who coordinate non-medical services for Marines and their families during recovery, rehabilitation, and transition.

• **Mental Health**

  • **Traumatic Brain Injury.** Naval medicine remains at the forefront of researching and implementing pioneering techniques to treat traumatic brain injury. One technique, Hyperbaric Oxygen Treatment, is showing great promise. We anticipate a study to begin this spring that tests the efficacy of this revolutionary treatment. The Marine Corps has a formal screening protocol for Marines who suffer concussions or who are exposed to blast events in theater.

  • **Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).** We are attentive to the mental health of our warriors and we are dedicated to ensuring that all Marines and family members who bear the invisible wounds caused by stress receive the best help possible. We developed the
Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC) program to prevent, identify, and holistically treat mental injuries caused by combat or other operations.

- With the increased workload, we do have concerns about the capacity of mental health care in military medicine. Operational support and current treatment facility demands continue to stretch our mental health professional communities, even though DoD has taken many steps to increase mental health services. Our shortages of mental health professionals are a reflection of Nation-wide shortages of this specialty. We are actively engaged in discussions about possible solutions.

2. Equipment Readiness

We have sourced equipment globally, taking from non-deployed units and strategic programs to support our forces in theater. As a result, the amount of equipment remaining for non-deployed units to use for training and other potential contingencies is seriously deficient.

- For example, while the overall supply rating of Marine Corps units in Afghanistan is near 100 percent, the supply rating of units at home station is less than 60 percent.
- Additional equipment is being procured with supplemental funds, but the production rates are too slow to meet our requirements for new equipment orders.

**Equipment Reset.** As mentioned previously, the distributed and decentralized nature of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown us that our legacy, 20th century tables of equipment are significantly inadequate. Moreover, the tempo of operations has accelerated the wear and tear on equipment. Also, the diversion of equipment in theater from Iraq to Afghanistan has delayed reset actions at our logistics depots in the United States.

- Our preliminary estimates indicate that the cost of restructuring the Marine Corps’ tables of equipment would be **$5 billion** over FY 2012 through FY 2015.
- In light of the continued high tempo of operations in Afghanistan, and the delay in reset actions due to the diversion of equipment in theater, we estimate the cost of reset for the Marine Corps to be **$8 billion** ($3 billion requested in the FY11 OCO and an additional $5 billion reset liability upon termination of the conflict).

**Aviation Readiness.** All Marine Corps aircraft in support of overseas contingency operations are exceeding programmed rates, and are thus consuming service life at a rate sometimes three times higher than that scheduled for the lifetime of the aircraft. (See Table 2.) This will eventually result in compressed time lines between rework and, ultimately, earlier retirement of the aircraft than originally programmed.

- It is critical that our aviation modernization programs, discussed in the next section of this report, continue to receive the support of Congress.
- The majority of our legacy platforms are at the end of their service life and most of the production lines are closed.
Table 2. Fiscal Year 2009 USMC Aircraft Utilization Rates
Overseas Contingency Operations

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<th>OCO Rates (Hours/Month)</th>
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Note: Programmed rates are defined in the Weapon System Planning Document and are based on the projected dates an aircraft will be replaced by a new platform or reworked to extend its service life. Programmed rates include monthly flight hours and the associated logistical support required for each aircraft.

Strategic Prepositioning Programs

- Marine Corps prepositioning programs trace their origins back 30 years, when the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraqi attack on Iran, and the deepening civil war in Lebanon collectively brought to the forefront the limitations of strategic airlift to respond to no-notice contingencies. The solution — the Secretary of Defense testified in 1980, and Congress agreed — was prepositioned combat equipment, ammunition, and supplies afloat on commercial vessels underway or docked in strategic locations. The Marine Corps developed three squadrons of maritime prepositioned ships and, in 1982, began prepositioning equipment and ammunition underground in Norway.

- The first real test for these programs was in 1991, during Operation DESERT SHIELD. In 2003, in Kuwait, the Marine Corps downloaded 11 vessels from all three prepositioned squadrons and moved 648 principal end items from Norway in preparation for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Without this capacity, the Marine Corps would not have been able to move half of the entire operating forces — more than 60,000 fully equipped Marines — halfway around the world for a 350-mile attack on Baghdad.

- When completely loaded, Marine Corps prepositioning vessels today carry more than 26,000 pieces of major equipment including tanks, wheeled tactical vehicles, and howitzers, as well as the necessary supplies to support the force.
When measured against authorized allowances, the percentage of major item equipment (Class VII) currently present in the prepositioned fleet is 94 percent; the percentage of supplies currently present is in excess of 99 percent.\(^8\)

In Norway, the current percentage of on-hand major end item equipment (Class VII) measured against authorized allowances is 47 percent; the percentage of on-hand supplies is 78 percent.\(^9\)

It is important to note that these programs are not just a strategic war reserve. Marine Corps prepositioning programs support forward-deployed training exercises and, along with the amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy, the steady state requirements of the combatant commanders. For example, using the equipment positioned in Norway, the Marine Corps provides security force assistance to partner nations in U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command.

In summary, Marine Corps prepositioning programs are vital to the Nation and they require the continued funding and support of Congress.

3. Infrastructure

Bachelor Housing. Our number one priority in military construction is barracks. In years past, due to fiscal constraints, we had focused on operational concerns. We now have a program under way that will provide adequate bachelor housing for our entire force by 2014. Table 3 depicts Marine Corps fiscal year 2011 investment in new barracks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>FY11 Investment</th>
<th>New Barracks Spaces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Twentynine Palms, CA</td>
<td>$53.2 million</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Lejeune, NC</td>
<td>$326.6 million</td>
<td>2,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherry Point, NC</td>
<td>$42.5 million</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Pendleton, CA</td>
<td>$79.9 million</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCB Hawaii, HI</td>
<td>$90.5 million</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCB Quantico, VA</td>
<td>$37.8 million</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$630.5 million</td>
<td>5,016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Data as of 18 February 2010. To clarify any misperceptions, these are not the formal readiness percentages the Marine Corps uses in separate reports to Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. The readiness percentages in those reports are a measurement against MARES reportable items, a more select range of equipment.

9. Data as of 18 February 2010.
• The Marine Corps is committed to funding the replacement of barracks furnishings on a seven-year cycle and to funding the repair and maintenance of existing barracks to improve the quality of life of Marines.

Summary

• **Our equipment shortfalls are serious and the impacts on readiness have been significant.** Our non-deployed units do not have the required amount of equipment they need to train or support other contingencies. Moreover, the harsh environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, the tempo of operations, and our employment as a second land army since 2004 has accelerated wear and tear on our equipment and delayed the reset activities necessary to prepare for the next contingency.

• We estimate that the cost of restructuring the Marine Corps’ tables of equipment from FY 2012 through FY 2015 would be **$5 billion** and the cost to reset for the Marine Corps will be **$8 billion** ($3 billion requested in FY11 OCO and an additional $5 billion reset liability upon termination of the conflict).

• **Iraq and Afghanistan have not adversely affected personnel readiness or the resiliency of the force.** The Marine Corps continues to recruit and retain the highest quality people. Your Marines want to make a difference; they understand being a Marine means deploying and fighting our Nation’s battles. Indeed, the Marines with the highest morale are those currently in Afghanistan.

• The Marine Corps has achieved its goal of 202,000 active duty personnel and has done so with no compromise in quality. However, the Marine Corps has not achieved the correct mix of skills and pay grades. Continued funding will be needed to balance the force correctly.

• Our personnel growth has outpaced our growth in infrastructure, and your continued support is needed to provide the additional barracks, messing, and office spaces required.

IV. MODERNIZATION OF THE MAGTF

Our modernization effort is not merely a collection of programs but a means of aligning the core capabilities of the MAGTF across the spectrum of present and future security challenges. All of our procurement programs are designed to support the full range of military operations.

The Individual Marine. *Marines* are the heart and soul of your Corps. The trained, educated, and physically fit Marine enables the Corps to operate in urban areas, mountains, deserts, or jungles. However, we are concerned about weight. Depending on the enemy situation, and including helmet, body armor, individual weapon, water, ammunition, and batteries, the weight of gear for a Marine on foot-patrol in Afghanistan can average 90 pounds. There is a delicate balance between weight and protection, and we continue to pursue the latest in technology to provide Marines with scalable protection based on the mission and threat.

Tactical Vehicles. The Marine Corps currently has a total ground tactical vehicle quantity of nearly 47,500. Over the next ten years, we plan to replace about 50 percent of that total.
We are planning, programming, and budgeting toward a balanced fleet of vehicles. Our chief considerations are mobility, survivability, payload, transportability, and sustainability. Our goal is a portfolio of vehicles that is able to support amphibious operations, irregular warfare, and operations ashore across the range of military operations. We envision a blend of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles, Marine Personnel Carriers, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), and replacements for our High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs).

**The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)** is the number one modernization program in the ground combat element of the MAGTF. The requirements of the current and future security environment have driven the research and development of the critical capabilities associated with the EFV. The Marine Corps has not taken a myopic view of the EFV; we are well aware of the fiscal realities and developmental challenges associated with such a revolutionary vehicle. We are, however, convinced that national security demands the capabilities of the EFV and justifies the costs. This vehicle will save lives and enable mission success across an extremely wide, and highly probable, range of operational scenarios.

**Fire Support.** We are modernizing Marine Corps land-based fire support through a triad of weapons systems — a new and more capable 155mm howitzer, a system of land-based rockets, and a helicopter-transportable 120mm mortar. Each of these is extremely accurate. This accuracy is critical in counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare because accuracy reduces the instances of civilian casualties and collateral damage to local infrastructure.

- **The Lightweight 155mm Towed Howitzer** (M777) weighs about half of the cannon it is replacing and fires projectiles to a range of 15-19 miles. Our Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Afghanistan has 15 of these howitzers at three different locations, which have collectively fired more than 600 rounds since April 2009.

- **The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System** (M142 HIMARS) provides high-value rocket and missile fire in support of ground forces. Each system carries six rockets or one missile. Like our new lightweight howitzer, HIMARS has proven itself over the past year in Afghanistan, delivering long-range precision fires.

- **The Expeditionary Fire Support System** is a rifled 120mm mortar, internally transportable 110 nautical miles by both the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53E helicopter. This will be the primary indirect fire-support system for helicopter-transported elements of the ground combat element. A platoon equipped with these new mortars recently deployed with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

**Marine Aviation.** Marine pilots are naval aviators; they are trained to fly from the ships of the U.S. Navy or from expeditionary airfields ashore in support of Marines on the ground. We are in the midst of an unprecedented modernization effort. By 2020, we will have:

- Transitioned more than 50 percent of our aviation squadrons to new aircraft
- Added 5 more operational squadrons and almost 100 more aircraft to our inventory
- Completed fielding of the tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey and the upgraded Huey (UH-1Y) utility helicopter
- Updated our entire fleet of aerial refuelers to the KC-130J model
- Fielded the upgraded Cobra (AH-1Z) attack helicopter and the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35B)
- Fielded an entirely new family of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
- Introduced a new model of the heavy-lift CH-53 cargo helicopter

**The Joint Strike Fighter.** The Marine Corps is on track to activate the Department of Defense’s first operational Joint Strike Fighter squadron in 2012. Although our investment in this program may seem high, it is important to note that the Marine Corps has not bought a fixed-wing tactical aircraft in 11 years, and that the Joint Strike Fighter will ultimately replace three different types of aircraft currently in our inventory.

- The short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) variant (F-35B) of the Joint Strike Fighter will be transportable aboard the amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy; it will be able to operate under the same austere conditions as does the AV-8 Harrier; it will be able to carry more bombs and loiter overhead longer than does the F/A-18 Hornet; and it will be a better electronic warfare platform than our legacy EA-6 Prowler.

**The Osprey.** We are very pleased with the performance of the tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey. The Osprey provides greater speed, more range, and enhanced survivability compared to other rotary wing platforms. It flies more than twice as fast and carries three times the payload at more than six times the range of the medium-lift helicopter it is replacing.

- Osprey squadrons have completed three successful deployments to Iraq and one aboard ship. One squadron is currently in Afghanistan. We are nearing delivery of our 100th operational aircraft, and at a current build of 30 Ospreys per year, we are replacing our CH-46E medium-lift helicopter squadrons at a rate of two squadrons per year.

**Logistics Command and Control.** *Global Combat Service Support System — Marine Corps* is the cornerstone of our logistics modernization strategy.

- The program is a portfolio of information technology systems that will support logistics command and control, joint logistics interoperability, secure access to information, and overall visibility of logistics data. It will align Marine Corps logistics with real-world challenges, where speed and information have replaced mass and footprint as the foremost attributes of combat operations; it will replace 30-year old legacy supply and maintenance information technology systems; and it will provide the backbone for all logistics information for the MAGTF.
V. Vision

The current transnational struggle against violent extremism will not end anytime soon. Other threats — conventional and irregular — will continue to emerge and the complexity of the future operating environment will only increase. As we look to the future, we believe we must refocus on our core competencies, especially combined-arms training and operations at sea with the United States Navy.

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. We believe the report from the Quadrennial Defense Review offers an accurate and informed analysis of the challenges in the future security environment, particularly with respect to growing complexity of hybrid threats and the spread of advanced anti-access capabilities.

- We concur with the overarching need for a comprehensive and balanced approach to national security — a whole of government approach.
- We agree with the need for a U.S. military that is balanced in capabilities for irregular warfare and conventional conflict. For the Marine Corps, we have always believed in such a balance. Our equipment and major programs, and our means of employment as an integrated MAGTF, reflect our commitment to be flexible in the face of uncertainty. **One hundred percent of our procurement can be employed either in a hybrid conflict or in conventional combat.**
- Finally, while our current focus is rightly on today’s fights, we believe it is critical that we do not underestimate the need to maintain the ability to gain access in any contested region of the world.

Seabasing and the Navy-Marine Corps Team. With oceans comprising about 70 percent of the earth’s surface and the world’s populations located primarily on the coasts, seabasing allows our Nation to conduct crucial joint operations from the sea.

- Seabasing is a capability and a concept. It is the establishment of a mobile port, airfield, and replenishment capability at sea that supports operations ashore. In effect, seabasing moves traditional land-based logistics functions offshore.
- From the sea, U.S. forces will be able to conduct the full range of military operations, from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to irregular warfare and major combat operations. Sea-based logistics, sea-based fire support, and the use of the ocean as a medium for tactical and operational maneuver permit U.S. forces to move directly from sea to objectives ashore.
- There are misperceptions that the United States has not conducted an amphibious operation since Inchon during the Korean War in 1950. Since 1982, our Nation has conducted more than 100 amphibious operations. For example, the Navy-Marine Corps Team has been on the scene in Bangladesh (1991), the Philippines (1991), Liberia (1996), and East Timor (1999).
  - After 9/11, U.S. amphibious forces, from a seabase, led the first conventional strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
In 2004, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit was on station in Southeast Asia to support the relief efforts after the Tsunami.

In 2005, from a seabase in the Gulf of Mexico, the Navy and Marine Corps supported recovery efforts after Hurricane KATRINA.

In 2009, off the coast of Somalia, when pirates boarded the Maersk Alabama, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit and the USS Boxer were on station to support the counterpiracy operations.

Last month, with Haiti’s airfield overwhelmed and their seaport disabled by wreckage following the earthquake, the USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit provided a significant and sustainable delivery of food, water, and other supplies without the logistical burden ashore.

**Seabasing — Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Enhancements**

- Critical to seabasing are the logistics vessels of the Maritime Prepositioning Force. As discussed in the Long-Range Plan for Naval Vessels, we have restructured our Maritime Prepositioned Force (Future) program and will enhance the current capabilities of each of our three existing Maritime Preposition Force Squadrons.

- One mobile landing platform (MLP), one Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship, and one Lewis and Clark class (T-AKE) cargo ship will be added to each squadron of the MPF.

- The MLP will interface with the LMSRs, which are being added to each MPF squadron from FY09-11, thus providing the capability to transfer cargo while at sea and making each MPF squadron highly responsive to demands across the full-spectrum of operations.

In summary, as the security environment grows more complex, so does the value of amphibious forces.

**Expeditionary Operations in the Littoral Domain.** The littoral domain is where the land and sea meet. This is where seaborne commerce originates and where most of the world lives. Littorals include straits — strategic chokepoints that offer potential control of the world’s sea lanes of communication. The Navy-Marine Corps team and the vitality of the amphibious fleet is critical to overcoming anti-access challenges in locations along the coastlines of the world where there are no American military forces or basing agreements.

- The QDR emphasized the need for U.S. naval forces to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, while adding capability and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies. Amphibious forces are perfectly suited for engagement and security force assistance missions, as well as humanitarian missions such as are ongoing in Haiti. In short, the strategic rebalancing directed in the QDR places high demands on our amphibious forces.

- Given the fiscal constraints facing the Department of the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and I agreed that 33 amphibious ships represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship requirement we established in a letter to the committee on 7 January 2009.
• We currently have a 31-ship force in the U.S. amphibious fleet. The Long-Range Plan for Naval Vessels projects a 33 ship amphibious inventory in the near-term.

• With a robust inventory of amphibious ships the Navy-Marine Corps team will be able to:
  • Better address the growing steady state combatant commander requirement for theater security cooperation, forward presence, and crisis response.
  • Strengthen our Nation’s relations with allied and partner countries through peacetime engagement and training exercises.
  • Better ensure our Nation is ready to respond with humanitarian assistance when disaster strikes anywhere around the globe.
  • In the event of major conflict, improve our response time to gain theater access with combat forces without having to rely on basing agreements with foreign governments.
  • Finally, to clarify any misperceptions about the numbers of amphibious ships cited in the 2010 QDR Report, those numbers of ships are neither shipbuilding requirements nor targets; they are simply statements of the amphibious ship numbers across the FY 2011-2015 future years defense program.10

Training, Education, and Professional Development

• “Two-Fisted Fighters.” The QDR Report calls for increased counterinsurgency capacity in the general purpose forces of the United States.11 The Marine Corps has long recognized the special skills required to operate with host nation forces and among local populations. Evidence of this dates back to the Marine Corps publications of Small Wars Operations (1935) and the Small Wars Manual (1940), both comprehensive texts on counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare. Today, through standing Marine Corps organizations such as the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning and the Center for Irregular Warfare, and programs such as the International Affairs Officers Program, we continue to build capacity in foreign language, and regional and cultural skills.12

• Leadership Development. We recognize the need for a diversity of skills and specialties, and our standing guidance to promotion, command, and special selection boards is to give due consideration to personnel with special skills and non-traditional career patterns.

• Marine Corps University. Annually, a percentage of Marine Corps officers from the rank of captain through colonel attend year-long resident courses in professional military education

12. Each year, the Marine Corps selects officers for the International Affairs Officer Program, which consists of two professional tracks: Foreign Area Officer (FAO), and Regional Area Officer (RAO). The International Affairs Officer Program provides graduate-level study and language training for nine geographic areas. There are 329 international affairs officers on active duty (262 FAOs, 67 RAOs). The officers in this program possess advanced knowledge and expertise in the language, culture, and political-military affairs of a given region. Since 2008, the Marine Corps has doubled the number of accessions in the FAO program, and accessions will continue to increase through 2015. Moreover, the Marine Corps provides mid-grade officers (major – lieutenant colonel) for the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands Program. Our current requirement is to provide 63 officers — three cohorts of 21 officers each.
at Marine Corps University in Quantico. The Marine Corps University is regionally accredited to award postgraduate degrees and, in 2009 alone, University schools awarded 200 master’s degrees.  

- Facilities are an integral part of supporting professional military education. To that end, the Marine Corps fiscal year 2011 military construction budget request includes funding for additions in Quantico to the General Alfred M. Gray Research Center and the Staff NCO Academy. These projects will support our plan to upgrade the infrastructure of the Marine Corps University.

- **Acquisition Professionals.** The Marine Corps has an active acquisition professional program in place to meet the need identified in the QDR “for technically trained personnel — cost estimators, systems engineers, and acquisition managers — to conduct effective oversight.”

There are about 520 acquisition billets in the Marine Corps — 400 are entry and mid-level positions filled by enlisted Marines and officers, and 120 are senior-level acquisition professional positions filled by field grade officers who oversee our major ground and aviation programs. Our acquisition professional officers are members of the Defense Acquisition Community; they possess Level II certification, four years of acquisition experience, at least 24 undergraduate credit hours in business.

**Future Realignment of Marine Forces in the Pacific.** The governments of the United States and Japan have agreed to invest in a realignment of forces that will result in Marine Corps forces postured in the Pacific for a long-term presence on Japan, Guam, and Hawaii. Critical requisites to the implementation of this realignment are:

- Japanese construction of a replacement for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma that meets both operational and safety requirements.
- An appropriate force laydown that supports the operational requirements of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.
- Adequate available airlift and sealift within theater to transport Marines to training areas and partner countries.
- Adequate training areas and ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands that can maintain readiness as well as support security cooperation with our regional partners.
- An enduring, sustainable “live where you work,” base on Guam that maximizes operational effectiveness, minimizes encroachment, accommodates future development, and provides a quality of life on Guam commensurate with any other U.S. base.
- Continued political and financial support by the governments of the United States and Japan.

Refined planning and staff interaction processes within the Department of Defense have made significant contributions to our efforts to align these requirements. Planned and executed

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13. The Marine Corps also has a separate, voluntary graduate education program, through which officers attend Naval Postgraduate School and other secondary institutions to obtain advanced degrees. There are 300 officer billets in the Marine Corps that require master’s degrees. The Marine Corps also maintains an active fellowship program.
properly, this realignment effort will result in an enduring solution that provides forward deployed combat ready Marine forces to uphold our Nation’s commitment to the security and stability of the Pacific region.

**Energy and Water Initiatives.** We believe energy and water are two of our Nation’s most valuable resources. We are focused on improving our stewardship at our installations and on the battlefield.

- **Our Installations.** We have already gained efficiencies and achieved savings at all our major installations. We have three major goals:
  1. From 2003-2015, reduce energy consumption by 30 percent
  2. Through 2020, reduce water consumption by 2 percent per year
  3. By 2020, increase the use of alternative energy at our installations to 50 percent of the total energy consumed

- **On the Battlefield.** Operations in Afghanistan have forced us to reevaluate energy and water distribution and usage in expeditionary environments. We believe the future security environment will again require the Marine Corps to operate over long distances in austere environments, and we are actively pursuing a wide range of solutions to:
  - Lighten the combat load of our Marines and Sailors
  - Reduce our overall footprint in current and future expeditionary operations
  - Lessen energy consumption and dependence on fossil fuels
  - Achieve resource self-sufficiency in expeditionary environments

**CONCLUSION**

As a naval expeditionary force in the form of an elite air-ground team, the Marine Corps is ready and willing to go into harm’s way on short notice and do what is necessary to make our country safe. America expects this of her Marines. In the complex and dangerous security environment of the future, the Marine Corps stands ready for the challenges ahead. We appreciate the continued support of Congress. Thank you again for this opportunity to report on the posture of your Marine Corps.