The experiences of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) since August 1992 have begun to put a human face on the concept of employing the US Army as a power projection force in operations other than war. Less than six weeks after sending more than 6000 soldiers and their equipment to southern Florida for Operation Andrew Relief, the division was alerted for deployment to Somalia. Approximately 90 days after its first troops had arrived in Florida, elements of the division began to leave the division’s garrison at Fort Drum, New York, for Operation Restore Hope.

Tactical and operational lessons learned from Operations Andrew Relief and Restore Hope will be analyzed and reported in Military Review. This article examines activities associated with those two deployments at the strategic level and at the boundary between the strategic and operational levels of Army activities. Where activities in the domestic operation helped to prepare the division for deployment overseas, the relevant experiences are highlighted.

The intense period of activity to be analyzed in this article produced a number of challenges. They have been grouped around three kinds of strategic and doctrinal issues: mission planning and deployment; the inherent complexity of operations other than war, and preparations for similar missions. Analysis of the challenges can—and should—influence the development of Army policy and doctrine. How the Army responds will reflect its adaptation to the implications of conducting operations other than war with a power projection force.

**Operational Contexts**

On 31 August 1992, the 10th Mountain Division began to deploy to southern Florida. The division’s mission was to conduct disaster relief operations in support of civil authorities in Florida, thereby assisting in the recovery from the effects of Hurricane Andrew. Relief operations drew to the
A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War

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region personnel from the active and reserve components of all the services, from other federal government departments and agencies, from state and local governments, from non-governmental service organizations, and from religious organizations, as well as thousands of contractors. Division personnel worked closely with representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Transportation, with members of the Red Cross, the United Way, and the Salvation Army, and with tens of thousands of individual volunteers, all of whom were committed to helping the citizens of southern Florida recover from the hurricane. When the division became the operational headquarters for all active and reserve Army units providing relief services in the operation (the ARFOR) near the conclusion of the operation, total assigned and attached strength exceeded 12,000.

Less than six weeks after returning from Florida, the division was alerted for operations in Somalia. The division’s mission was to serve as the headquarters for all Army forces in Somalia (the ARFOR), and to conduct military operations to provide security for operations in support of the relief effort being conducted in Somalia. The commander’s intent was to ensure that relief supplies could get to those who needed them. The division planned to accomplish its mission by monitoring lines of communications, providing security for the storage and distribution of relief supplies, developing effective coordination with coalition forces and non-governmental organizations, and establishing liaison with local clan leaders, elders, and UN forces.

In December 1992, 90-odd days after deploying to Florida, major elements of the division were again on the move, this time into a region in which the populace suffered from a combination of natural and man-made problems. Warlords and faction leaders (sometimes the same individuals,
sometimes not) were in a state of endless conflict. Bandits and warlords drove farmers from their fields, then stole the relief supplies that were intended to offset the decline in agricultural production and commerce in the country. Somali citizens, displaced by years of civil war, had been pouring into camps established by relief agencies to prevent mass starvation. The forms of a society as we know them had disappeared. There was no justice system, no police force, no transportation system, no electricity, no infrastructure to speak of. Nearly all markets had ceased to operate. Schools were closed and businesses operated sporadically. Somalia was in chaos.

US and other national forces entered Somalia, under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, to “establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” US and coalition forces were to break the cycle of starvation in

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Somalia by ensuring that humanitarian relief operations could be conducted without interference. The division identified 49 non-governmental agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, CARE, Save the Children, Doctors without Borders, and Irish Concern operating in the country. They were the only agencies in Somalia trying to feed the starving and care for the sick and dying. It was their selfless, sometimes heroic, efforts that the division and its coalition partners were there to support.4

During Operation Restore Hope the division was assigned the area of operations shown on the map in Figure 1. The size and composition of the forces for which the division assumed command or operational control in Somalia are shown in the chart in Figure 2.

This article identifies and discusses some of the significant challenges that the division encountered during the conduct of two operations other than war, one domestic, the other in a frequently hostile, sometimes lethal operating environment.

Mission Planning and Deployment

This section covers five issues integral to mission planning and deployment: planning assumptions, parallel planning,5 mission and end state development, force caps, and “mission creep.” Note that both of the operations other than war described in the paper were initiated as crisis-response operations. Some of the challenges described below are directly related to that circumstance.

Planning assumptions

As planning assumptions take shape at the strategic and operational levels, they should be communicated early and often to operational commanders. Courses of action at the strategic level are frequently expressed simply, generally in terms of alternative task organizations with the associated troop ceilings. Operational commanders need a clear mission statement for the operation; the desired end state, conditions, and measures of effectiveness; strategic-level intelligence preparation of the battlefield,6 and applicable planning constraints, including troops available.

There obviously will be times when the information required for operational planning will not be available, in the desired detail or at all, when the commander needs it. In such situations the operational-level commander will have to provide the restated mission, the intent, and the intended end state for approval at the strategic level. The strategic planner must then remain alert to political or diplomatic developments that could change the operational commander’s planning assumptions, and notify him as soon as such changes appear possible. In operations other than war, it is imperative that strategic, operational, and tactical-level commanders reach closure quickly on exactly what each is trying to accomplish. This link is currently missing from our crisis action planning process.
Parallel planning

Parallel planning implies concurrent planning and simultaneous coordination among planners from the strategic to the tactical levels. Even though the XVIII Airborne Corps was clearly the division's next higher headquarters early in the planning process, the division staff maintained contact with four headquarters to determine the forces required and the mission to be accomplished. Parallel planning is especially necessary in the early days of crisis response planning, when headquarters tend to filter information as it travels to subordinate commanders.

By the time the division was alerted on 30 November for possible deployment to Somalia, strategic analysis for the operation had been in progress for some time. Had strategic planning been conducted as parallel planning, the joint task force commander and his Army component commander would have had opportunities to influence task organizations, mission statements, intelligence requirements, and end state conditions. Instead, decisions related to those planning functions were made at the strategic level with little input from those who would carry them out. The manner in which force caps were established is representative of this process. Planning at the operational and tactical levels was constrained by the force cap even before missions or courses of action had been established. Army operational and tactical planners were plagued by the consequences of this part of the planning process until well after units had reached Somalia.

Early parallel planning also would have provided access to the strategic aspects of intelligence related to preparation of the battlefield. The information needed by subordinate commanders includes more than classical intelligence data. The operational commander needs a synthesis of data from all Army operating systems for his own use and for analysis by the planning staff. This information should not be filtered out between headquarters. It should be flashed to the operational and tactical headquarters simultaneously to facilitate detailed planning at all levels. A deeper appreciation of the needs of a division staff that has assumed the ARFOR role may help to improve this aspect of crisis action planning.

Other information required during an operational commander's preparation of the battlefield for operations other than war includes, but is not limited to, non-traditional categories such as:

- Continuous, real-time information on diplomatic and political aspects of the proposed operation;
- Identification, location, and intent of local military organizations, militias, guerrilla bands, and irregular armed groups (in Florida, the gangs; in Somalia, the warlords and factions);
- Intent of the population regarding the proposed intervention, whether known or assumed for planning;
• Status of current or proposed coalition operations and forces, as appropriate;
• Detailed information on terrain, weather, disease and other aspects of the country, comparable to the information available in State Department country handbooks;
• Identification, location, and intent of non-governmental organizations; and
• Number, location, and intent of refugees inside and outside the country.

Some of the information listed above may be available during the planning process. Some of it, however, can only be obtained once on the scene. In Florida, the intent of the local gangs and the division’s plans for the security of the force had to be balanced against the need to help people who truly required assistance. The problem in Somalia was quite different. If it was the intent of the factions to oppose the introduction of coalition forces, then combat operations could have been required upon arrival. If the population was believed to be at worst neutral, the initial task organization and mission of tactical forces would reflect that assessment. Lives hang in the balance of such assumptions.

Parallel planning would help close the gap in our crisis-action system related to end state planning. In both operations, division plans officers were required to identify and define the conditions believed essential to meet the military end state. Operational planners first had to obtain and understand the political, economic, and social objectives of the operation. Only then could the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force Mountain — Restore Hope Troop List</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 87th Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Kismayo (10th Division Artillery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Battalion, 14th Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Aviation Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force 5th Battalion, 10th Division Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3-SS Aviation (Assault)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GY-188 Aviation (Assault)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-17 Recon Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-168 Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Co. (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3-5Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Co. (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Division Support Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210th Forward Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>710th Main Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300th Supply Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Chemical Company (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Signal Battalion (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110th Military Intelligence Battalion (-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations Support Element/</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th PSYOP Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Teams/88th Civil Affairs Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>41st Engineer Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>10th Military Police Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>611th Military Police Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Division Troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>711th Postal Company (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129th Postal Company (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160th Personal Services Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>280th Military Police Detachment (CID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Military Police Detachment (CID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Finance Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Public Affairs Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Public Affairs Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Target Acquisition Detachment (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Liaison Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long Range Surveillance Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>548th Supply and Services Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th Engineer Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Heavy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>642d Combat Support Equipment Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63d Combat Support Equipment Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>720th Military Police Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>51st1st Military Police Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>97th Military Police Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Moroccan Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Paratrooper Battalion (Belgium)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.

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military conditions that would be required to support the strategic end state be identified and a plan developed to meet them. The planning process would have been more efficient had parallel planning—concurrent planning and simultaneous coordination of the various strategic alternatives—been authorized at the time that the division received its warning order.

Mission and end state development

Army mission planning begins with the definition of what is to be done and a description of the conditions that will indicate that the mission has been completed. Officers and senior noncommissioned officers are well trained in the procedures for developing such guidance at the tactical level. At the strategic and operational levels of command, however, mission definition and the development of end state conditions pose significant challenges to all those involved in developing them.

End state definitions and end state conditions are necessary, but not sufficient, for operational planning for operations other than war. The final set of information that the operational commander needs is the measures of effectiveness for the conditions. Simply stated, measures of effectiveness allow the commander to assess progress toward establishing the conditions essential to reaching the end state. Operational and tactical commanders need to know the non-military features of the conditions and how to measure them in order to take them into consideration as they plan for, conduct, and evaluate the effectiveness of operations. Consequently, there appears to be a requirement for a process to develop measures of effectiveness for operations other than war which reflect diplomatic, political, and strategic aspects of such operations.

The reasons for this requirement are fairly obvious. Domestic operations will always have political features that the military does not necessarily consider in tactical and low-level operational planning. Operations outside of the United States will have political dimensions significantly different from those associated with a domestic relief operation. The diplomatic implications of operations in a foreign country involving coalition forces must be clear to senior Army operational commanders from the outset of planning. All of these non-traditional dimensions of operational planning will be important in domestic and foreign operations other than war. Efforts to disarm the populace in Somalia show how the end state, necessary conditions, and measures of effectiveness—the latter ranging from strategic to tactical—become integrated into end state planning and execution.

Commanders at the operational level provide the essential link between strategic aims and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield. The relationship applies equally to operations other than war. In Florida the division considered end state conditions for each of its areas of involvement (food distribution, water supply, shelter, and similar relief functions) and determined what needed to be accomplished prior to handing off the function.
to local governments or relief organizations. In Somalia, operational-level planners established end state conditions for each mission in terms of the commander's intent, expressed early in planning as ensuring that relief supplies could get to those who needed them. The ARFOR commander had to provide guidance to tactical commanders for disarming the warlords and the general civil population; assessing and dealing with varying levels of criminal activity in the his area of operations; managing the availability of relief supplies, and coordinating the availability of UN peacekeepers. These represent the kinds of conditions which had to be met if the non-governmental organizations were to safely resume operations after the Army departed.

End states, conditions, and measures of effectiveness should be developed cooperatively at all operational levels and, as appropriate, in conjunction with State Department specialists. Once established, the conditions must be evaluated periodically, using the agreed measures of effectiveness. Operational commanders should be prepared to redefine end states, conditions, and measures of effectiveness in conjunction with the State Department in light of experience on the ground. Early and continuous dialogue among strategic, operational, and tactical commanders could streamline the process of defining and managing end states, their essential conditions, and measures of effectiveness associated with each condition, to the benefit of commanders on the ground in operations other than war.

**Force caps**

The term "force caps" describes a planning constraint developed at the strategic level. A force cap, based on political and economic realities, identifies the number and types of units available to conduct an Army operation. Once force caps have been established, commanders and staffs at all levels must understand that they exist and be able to account for the forces within the cap. For Operation Restore Hope, the force caps had been developed rapidly, early in the operation, and were not adjusted to reflect the situation on the ground as the operation began. Significantly, the caps failed to acknowledge the large number of personnel required to support operations in a "bare-based" environment like Somalia, where nothing could be purchased, acquired or seized to support the Army contingent at the time the division deployed.

Tactical planners tend to use worst case scenarios to define force requirements. The differences between supply and demand for units had to be managed carefully at the operational level during planning for deployment to Somalia. This was particularly important because the ARFOR staff was fully engaged at the same time in developing mission statements, assessing unit capabilities, and developing preliminary time-phased deployment lists. It was not immediately apparent to the staff that a cap existed; the staff was not sure which forces were included in the numbers they received, and any leeway that the staff might have had for deploying additional forces was not clear. As a
consequence of the convergence of the cap and these planning requirements, and with no slack in the planning schedule, operational force planning at the division took more time than it should have.

Force caps made planning difficult at the operational level for deployments to both Florida and Somalia. To support the mission in Florida all division leaders—brigade, battalion, and company commanders, and their command sergeants major or first sergeants—deployed ahead of their units to conduct reconnaissance and to assess requirements within their assigned areas of responsibility. It was not until these division personnel had been in Florida for several days that force requirements were completely known, although the division did start to deploy forces while the on-scene assessment was in progress.

Deployment to Somalia had been scheduled to begin on 19 December 1992, ten days after D-day. On D+1, however, it was decided that the first elements would deploy on D+2, to arrive on D+3 (12 December). From that beginning, missions assigned to the ARFOR during deployment remained in a state of flux. The following incident is representative. On D+12, as the lead element of what would become an entire battalion task force was en route from the United States to its planned destination (Baledogle airfield), it was diverted in flight to Kismayo, over 300 miles farther south, to operate with Belgian forces.

The types of forces deploying from the United States and their deployment sequence changed for a number of reasons: increasing troop strength commitments from coalition forces, changes in intelligence estimates, and the availability of airfields and seaports. Because each change to the force structure or task organization required detailed justification from the ARFOR staff, the hastily-developed force caps, established at the strategic level with little input from the operational level, plagued the ARFOR staff until well after all division and attached forces reached Somalia.

In both operations, deployment preparation and execution succeeded because commanders and staffs remained flexible and focused on the commander’s intent. Force protection was established as essential to the division’s success during deployment to Somalia. Equipment began deploying rapidly, many times before the exact mission or transportation availability was known. Forces and equipment levels had to be evaluated continuously as the situation changed. The same flexibility was needed during operations on the ground. If a unit or set of equipment was not required in theater, even if it had just arrived, it was redeployed. In a force projection Army, staffs and leaders must remain flexible if they are to find solutions to the planning uncertainties that will inevitably arise during execution of the operation.

Mission creep

Mission creep is a phenomenon that must be considered in operations other than war. In Florida, division soldiers built and repaired schools, established polling sites for elections, helped to clean up neighborhoods and
parks, and were otherwise involved anywhere people needed help. None of these activities was identified in the mission; they evolved naturally as an outgrowth of the division's mission and the desire of individual soldiers to do whatever they could to alleviate the suffering of fellow citizens.

In Somalia, the initial mission for Army personnel was to provide a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. While the mission did not include rebuilding the country, many American and allied soldiers performed a number of tasks generally associated with nation assistance: revitalizing local governments and security forces, rebuilding and repairing schools and orphanages, teaching English in schools, building and repairing roads, and similar tasks. These activities were undertaken in addition to removing mines, disarming warring factions, and remaining fully ready and capable of conducting full-scale combat operations.

If it is true that the less clear the mission the greater the potential for mission creep, then some change can always be expected in operations such as Restore Hope. Broad mission statements with unclear end states may be necessary in a crisis; they certainly provide the maximum flexibility to the operational and tactical commanders. However, if it is important to the US government and the US Army to conduct a limited operation and rapidly redeploy, then a clear mission statement with end state criteria is an absolute requirement.

Each of the operations had a turning point at which US forces began to disengage. In Florida, the opening of schools created a sense of normalcy. Within weeks of school opening, all Army forces had redeployed. In Somalia, access to the main roads was essential if non-governmental organizations were to conduct relief activities. Access to those roads was symbolized by opening the “Somali Road,” which linked the humanitarian relief sectors throughout the country. With the Somali Road open, Army forces were able to redeploy, leaving support units and a quick reaction force to continue operations with the second UN force, UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

**Complexity of Operations Other Than War**

The complexities inherent in operations other than war made both of these missions unusual. Such operations are complex for soldiers to carry out and difficult for leaders and staffs to synchronize. The involvement of soldiers in local communities, whether removing trees blown down by Hurricane Andrew or delivering food to refugee camps in Somalia, ensured the success of both operations. In Florida it was necessary to limit the type and amount of help our soldiers could provide; individual soldiers of all ranks became ambassadors for the Army and US government. In Somalia, individual soldiers and units found it difficult to determine who the enemy was. Soldiers who were well trained and ready to take the initiative, while acting with compassion and restraint, ensured that each mission was accomplished.
following paragraphs describe some of the complexities that will be inherent in future domestic or foreign operations other than war.

Adapting standard battlefield operating systems

One of the division’s first planning tasks was to establish the context within which planning would be performed. The Army’s standard seven battlefield operating systems—maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility, survivability, and combat service support—were used as the basis for developing the nine operating systems used to synchronize operations in Somalia.

The new operating systems were established early in the planning process, well before forces were deployed. The air defense system was removed from the doctrinal list, since there was no air threat, and the remaining six standard operating systems were focused on requirements for peace enforcement operations. Three new operating systems were created: external coordination, force protection, and information dissemination. The resulting nine systems were used throughout the operation, beginning with pre-deployment planning, to analyze and synchronize ARFOR operations in Somalia.

The first operating system added was external coordination. Coordination with other governmental and non-governmental organizations appeared during planning to be essential to success. The division established coordination procedures with the State Department, humanitarian agencies through their participation in the civil military operations center, elders in each village and town, and emerging security committees in the local communities. Coordination was also important to the success of our coalition operations and to the support provided by logistics contracting (LOGCAP) efforts in Somalia. Force protection was added as a separate operating system because of its importance in each mission we accomplished. The force protection operating system included a constant review of the rules of engagement and the building of limited infrastructure in the theater where no infrastructure existed for the support of our soldiers. Finally, information dissemination became the ninth operating system. The first part of information dissemination focused on the Somali people. It included the print media, radio, interpreters, and direct contact with elders in each community. The second part of this operating system involved the accurate and timely dissemination of information to worldwide media representatives. The third part emphasized dissemination of information to ARFOR soldiers. All commanders were to ensure that their soldiers understood their roles in the operation, and that each knew how individual success contributed to unit success.

Joint and combined operations

Although operations with other service and coalition forces were absolutely essential for these operations, they clearly added to operational complexity. When the JTF headquarters established by the commander of the
I Marine Expeditionary Force became the division's higher headquarters, upon notification of deployment, liaison teams from Fort Drum moved immediately to Camp Pendleton to conduct parallel planning with the JTF. While in Somalia the division coordinated daily with Marine Corps forces concerning operations throughout the country.

Operations with forces provided by the more than 20 nations that responded to the UN appeal, while adding to the complexity of ARFOR activities, were extremely successful. The ARFOR served as the command and control headquarters for the 1st Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, Royal Moroccan Forces, 1st Belgian Parachute Battalion, and for a short time, the 1st Canadian Airborne Battle Group. Each of these forces worked well with 10th Mountain Division units, demonstrating once again the potential inherent in coalition operations. Other coalition forces operated as adjacent units and conducted operations throughout the theater. The success of these coalition operations can be attributed in large measure to the exchange of liaison officers and to a detailed understanding of ARFOR requirements and coalition capabilities.

Liaison teams with foreign language capability, tactical satellite communications equipment, and transportation joined each force assigned to the ARFOR. Each coalition force in Somalia not only had a tactical force conducting operations on the ground, but also a national headquarters organization that communicated with their defense establishments or, as appropriate, directly to national political leadership. These circumstances meant, for example, that ARFOR provided two liaison teams to the Moroccan forces, one directly to the tactical unit assigned to the ARFOR, in this case in Baledogle, and the other to the Moroccan national headquarters in Mogadishu.

The ARFOR developed an extensive checklist to help integrate coalition forces into its operations. The checklist, which covered all staff functions and all battlefield operating systems, helped to establish a dialogue between the ARFOR and the responding coalition unit scheduled to operate under ARFOR tactical control. Subjects ranged from personnel accountability procedures to organizational matters to combat service support issues to communications capabilities to their understanding of the rules of engagement. The checklist review process identified the expectations of the ARFOR headquarters and helped to identify assistance that the coalition force might require.

Significance of social structures

Operations in Somalia were characterized by the presence of 21 clans and sub-clans in the division's area of operations, banditry throughout the country, operations with joint and coalition forces, support of non-governmental agencies, the need to conduct political negotiations, the complications of disarmament, and the essential daily coordination with UNOSOM and the State Department. Activities required to reinstate Somali self-governing local councils
illustrate some of the effects of social structures on the other aspects of operations in that country.

Each of the clans and sub-clans in Somalia has its own leadership and unique goals for the future of Somalia. Although many of the clans are related—some even have common leaders—their ultimate goals were usually based on what appeared to be best for their specific clan or sub-clan. Soldiers, leaders, civil affairs teams, and negotiators had to deal with many different clans and elders in each town and village in Somalia.

Banditry and its link to self-appointed governments throughout the country made stopping the bandits a high priority for the division. Local security forces had to be organized once banditry had been reduced and security for the non-governmental organizations had been established, in order to relieve coalition forces of the responsibility to provide security for relief operations.

In order to establish local security forces, local councils and governments not linked to the bandits had to take control in each community. One successful technique was to identify the elders of each community and empower them to once again control their communities. These councils of elders could then establish security forces which would protect the community and the relief providers. Company and battalion commanders, as well as their attached civil affairs teams, became negotiators and advisors to these emerging local governments.

Before the councils could be organized, however, it was often necessary to decide from among multiple claimants who were the rightful local elders. Somalis are very territorial and clan-oriented, yet determining which clan was the right group to govern a community became a difficult proposition. Inter-clan fighting and changes of the ruling class spanned centuries of Somali history. Sometimes a series of meetings, often over a period of many weeks, helped to produce a functioning local government; sometimes it did not. What was important was to keep the process going.

Army leaders at all levels conducted negotiations and informal discussions with Somalis on many issues besides local government. Political negotiating skills were tested during direct negotiations with warring clans and factions. Senior Army leaders conducted talks with warlords, most of whom who had spent the preceding months or years devastating their country. Social structures in Somalia exerted a profound influence on mission planning and execution.

Non-governmental organizations

The real heroes of operations in Somalia were the non-governmental organizations conducting relief operations throughout the country. These organizations could not be dealt with as if they were parts of a larger, homogeneous group. Each had a specific agenda, its own operating procedures, and its own preferred level of assistance. Most provided unique types of relief; many provided more than one service or operated in more than one area of the country.
Close coordination with each organization and an effort to understand its uniqueness helped the Army to support the needs of all such groups.

Civil-military operations centers were established throughout the country to coordinate military operations with those of the non-governmental organizations. The central civil-military operations center in Mogadishu was jointly sponsored by UNOSOM, the Unified Task Force (the JTF), and the US State Department. Participants met daily at the central civil-military operations center to share intelligence information, discuss current operations from military and civilian perspectives, and provide a forum for humanitarian agencies to request military support for their operations. Each humanitarian relief sector in Somalia developed its own humanitarian operations center, which served as the focal point for coordination among the non-governmental organizations, town leaders, and the military in that relief sector. This management concept should be evaluated and recorded for use in similar operations. The map on page six identifies the humanitarian relief sectors in the ARFOR area of operations.

**Disarming the populace**

As operations progressed, the ARFOR assumed the added responsibility for disarming some of the Somalis, which quickly proved to be a very demanding task. Plans took considerable time to develop and could not be enforced uniformly throughout the country. Some weapons had to remain in the hands of Somalis who needed them either to protect their own people or to guard non-governmental organizations or other groups. Authorized weapon storage sites, established at the political level, allowed Somalis to retain considerable numbers of weapons and amounts of ammunition. Disarmament was complicated by frustrating talks with Somalis and by the difficulty encountered in developing an effective process. Any future mission of this type must take into account the extraordinarily complex and difficult process of disarming the citizens of the country if that is part of the mission.

**Coordination with the State Department and UN personnel**

Interaction with the State Department and UNOSOM was of paramount importance throughout the Somalia operation. Ambassador Robert Oakley, who was assigned as the US Special Representative there, and the ARFOR commander regularly coordinated the efforts of State Department personnel and military operations in the ARFOR area of operations. The Ambassador's support for ARFOR operations was superb, and he played a key role in communicating with the leadership of the Somali clans. The ARFOR followed his lead in operations and fully supported State Department operations. Unfortunately, there were not sufficient State Department personnel in Somalia to work in every humanitarian relief sector. Army leaders and civil affairs teams filled the void.

Planning for the turnover of operations to the United Nations and interaction with UNOSOM made daily coordination with the UNOSOM...
a necessity. As transition drew near, the ARFOR staff also coordinated with representatives of the forces that were to serve under UNOSOM II. The support and quick reaction forces that remained after the division left Somalia were placed under the operational control of the US Central Command. Tactical control of those US Army units remained with the commander of US forces in Somalia.

**Common features of the two operations**

Operations in Florida provided a preview of the complexity the division would encounter in planning for, deploying to, and operating in Somalia. Although the two locales and their inherent requirements were fundamentally different, many of the planning factors used during hurricane relief operations in Florida were applicable to planning for and operating in Somalia.

- The division was in Florida to support the operations of private volunteer organizations (Red Cross, Salvation Army) and not to replace them. A similar relationship developed with the non-governmental relief organizations in Somalia.
- Operations in Florida confronted the world of politics. Individual community governments, state governments, and the federal government did not always have the same end state in mind for the community. Competing expectations, which were evident also in Somalia, have to be understood by the force on the ground.
- The path to interagency coordination is not always a smooth one, whether in domestic or foreign operations. Many of the division's missions were assigned by FEMA through their Defense Coordinating Officer to the JTF headquarters in Miami. The process for coordinating with FEMA is sometimes difficult for soldiers to understand. The division eventually colocated its major and subordinate unit headquarters with the leaders of the local communities: city managers, mayors, and others. This decision enhanced direct contact between the military and the communities, which accelerated responses to requests for assistance. FEMA was kept informed of all operations, as appropriate.
- Joint operations were the norm in Florida, and the ARFOR task force there included a special-purpose Marine Corps task force. Operations in Somalia were joint from the outset. Coalition forces added the complexity of combined operations.
- Special operating forces disaster assistance teams, civil affairs units, and psychological operations units were used extensively in Florida. Civil affairs and psychological operations units later played key roles in Somalia.
- The division headquarters had the opportunity to serve as an ARFOR headquarters for the first time in Florida, which provided experience for assuming a similar role in Somalia.
- Division staff sections synchronized and then carried out a variety of non-standard missions in both operations.
• The quality of maps complicated both operations. In Florida the best maps available were road maps produced by rental car companies. In Somalia the difficulty arose from the fact that data from the Russian maps used by ground forces did not match data taken from the US maps that were used by pilots. The differences made it impossible to use map grids for fire support. The common system of latitude and longitude markings on both kinds of maps had to suffice until updated maps could be printed.
• The drawing of military boundaries and assignment of unit areas of responsibility was a lesson well learned in Florida. The experience helped commanders and staffs to understand that when assigning unit areas in operations other than war, they should consider superimposing military boundaries on existing civilian political boundaries. In Florida, a brigade-sized headquarters collocated and dealt directly with a city government. The same principle was followed in Somalia, where the areas being served by non-governmental organizations and historical clan boundaries were added to the equation. For instance, the boundary for Army forces operating in Baidoa was adjusted so that the unit area of operations corresponded to the area served by the non-governmental organizations that worked there. In Marka, the unit's sector was modified to take into account traditional affiliations between clans in the Lower Shabeelle River Valley. Other boundaries were adjusted as required.

Planning and Training for Operations Other than War

To the extent that the experiences of the 10th Mountain Division are representative, operations other than war promise to be exceptionally complex to plan and carry out. Some have suggested that the Army should develop special units, trained and equipped for operations other than war, particularly for peace support operations. This section addresses that suggestion in three respects. The first deals with the suitability of standard Army training programs for such operations. The second looks at the adaptability of soldiers to tasks outside their specialty areas, and the third considers the implications of experiences in Florida and Somalia for Army institutional training.

Are current Army training programs suitable for operations other than war?

The issue has two distinct parts. Some believe that the training Army units receive to carry out their wartime missions will not prepare them for operations other than war. Others believe that placing Army units into operations such as those in Florida and Somalia will cause warfighting skills to deteriorate because of the dissimilarities between the requirements of the two kinds of activities. The division's experience to date finds that neither concern is warranted.

Individual and small unit training prepares soldiers well for the kinds of missions recently encountered in Florida and Somalia. At the squad, section, platoon, company, and even battalion levels, division units conducted specific tasks that could readily be accomplished because of standard battle-focused
training. Intermediate staffs performed all of the tasks inherent in commanding, controlling, sustaining, and employing their units in field operations. The division staff performed planning and coordinating functions that are part of the peacetime and wartime missions of the headquarters. The challenges of assuming the missions of an ARFOR headquarters were met without exception, albeit they required a great deal of work by the officers and noncommissioned officers in the staff. The headquarters exercised the decisionmaking process daily, conducted deliberate and crisis action planning, and conducted ARFOR current operations. Individuals, units, and staffs continued to perform as integral parts of a well-trained, cohesive organization in both operations without special situation-related training.

The corollary issue relates to the presumed inability of units to perform those parts of their individual and unit annual training requirements known as mission essential tasks. The belief is that tactical units employed in operations other than war, particularly peace support operations, will lose their fighting edge. Again, experience indicates the contrary. In Florida and Somalia, within each battlefield operating system, the division conducted missions that were derived directly from mission essential task lists, as the following examples indicate.

- Infantry battalions, companies, platoons, and squads conducted their mission essential tasks daily in Somalia. Infantry units conducting humanitarian operations were flexible enough to shift rapidly from assisting refugees and
Performing nation assistance tasks to conducting full-scale combat operations. They conducted combat operations at night and in urban environments. Units provided security for humanitarian agencies, operated checkpoints and roadblocks, conducted cordon and search missions, and performed convoy security operations. Patrolling, defensive operations, and offensive operations were all conducted by infantry units during Restore Hope.

- Aviation units in Florida provided lift support and served as a command and control headquarters for relief efforts. In Somalia, they provided lift and attack support during Restore Hope.
- Engineer units in Florida had plenty of work cleaning up debris and doing construction. In Somalia, they built bridges and roads and conducted countermeine operations.
- Military police in Florida established liaison with local police forces and conducted traffic control throughout the area of operations. In Somalia, they provided area security, convoy escort, and law enforcement support.
- Signal units set up an entire mobile subscriber communications grid in Florida that provided voice communications until civilian phone systems were restored. In Somalia, the 10th Signal Battalion provided theater communications support with over 600 personnel assigned from 12 different signal battalions.
- In Somalia our counterintelligence agents were our major source of the intelligence information that shaped maneuver operations.
- Combat service support units provided services and support for both operations. They supported relief efforts in Florida and the work of non-governmental organizations in Somalia. In Somalia, they did the jobs that they had been trained for, and did them in an extremely austere environment, over extended distances. Individual and unit training programs had prepared them well for these operations.
- Special operating forces—psychological operations, civil affairs, and operational teams—provided exceptional support during both operations.
- Obviously the troops did not perform all of their mission essential tasks every day. They do not do so under normal training conditions either. Unit operations in Florida, but particularly in Somalia, provided frequent opportunities to review and practice most mission essential tasks.

Can soldiers adapt readily to duties for which they were not specifically trained?

An answer is evident from the following representative examples:
- The military intelligence battalion operated a life support center for homeless people in Florida.
- Air defense soldiers served as helicopter door-gunners in Somalia, and they augmented the transportation assets of the infantry battalions.
- The division artillery headquarters formed the staff for Task Force Kismayo, and directed the activities of two infantry battalions (one US and one Belgian) during operations in Kismayo.
Army units must retain the versatility that allows them to be employed in whatever manner is most appropriate for the current operation. The tasks encountered during recent operations other than war are not so different from tasks that soldiers are already trained to do that we need to develop new mission essential tasks for such operations. Nor have our soldiers lost the knack for improvising, and for transferring knowledge and skills to tasks other than those for which they were specifically trained. One of the key elements the Army brings to operations other than war is an ability to organize for the mission, arrive ready to go to work, and adjust as requirements change.

What are the implications for institutional training?

The complexities highlighted in this article—and many more like them—should start to make their way into our institutional training programs. Leader development programs at noncommissioned officer schools and at officer professional courses should begin to address such topics as negotiating skills, cultural considerations, and managing rules of engagement. A sense of the complexity of operations other than war should be introduced at combat training centers and in other training exercises. However, none of these suggestions can be allowed to detract from the principal purpose for which the Army exists and trains. Army soldiers and units must maintain their warfighting ethic and continue to focus on combat-oriented skills.

Specific training in operations other than war should be focused at the staff and senior leader level. Staffs at all levels can conduct training to plan these types of operations. Leader training is needed to focus on such requirements as negotiations, UN operations, integration of all services and coalition forces, interagency operations, and operating with non-governmental organizations. Staffs and leaders in units with short-notice deployment missions need to continue to conduct routine staff exercises based on trouble spots throughout the world. Such exercises enhance staff performance and provide insight into areas where operations may occur. Predeployment training should include situational training exercises focusing on rules of engagement for all forces to be deployed. Theater-specific training will be required to identify cultural issues, dangers unique to the region, other participants in the operation (military and civilian), and the types of operations that may be conducted.

During training and planning activities, units should try to enlist the help of experts who have served in the area previously or who have conducted similar operations. Lists of regional specialists, functional experts, linguists, experienced negotiators, former commanders and key staff officers, whether active or retired, should be readily available to contingency force units.

To provide another perspective on US Army training requirements, consider an alternative concept for preparing for operations other than war. The Polish army has more than 30 years of extensive experience in peacekeeping operations. Every Polish soldier who deploys on a peacekeeping mission is a
volunteer from his parent unit. The Polish peacekeeping school at Kielce trains each provisional peacekeeping unit formed from the volunteers.

Members of the US Army (including a 10th Mountain Division representative) visited Poland in June 1993 to tour their peacekeeping training center. The general belief of the US team was that US Army units do not require a specific training center for these operations. What works well for the Polish army is not necessarily required for US Army units.

Our unit training for operations other than war should continue to focus on mission essential tasks. We must find innovative ways to integrate the experiences of recent operations into our training and include operations other than war in staff and leader training in units and schools. We should consider adding to that training topics such as coalition warfare, negotiations, civil disarmament, extensive urban operations, operating with non-governmental organizations, interagency operations, coordinating with State Department and UN personnel, and dealing with the complexity brought about by operations other than war. Experience to date indicates convincingly that the Army requires neither special units nor pre-operational team-building training to prepare for operations other than war.

**Conclusion**

This article has focused on three common themes identified during operations other than war conducted by the 10th Mountain Division since 1992: mission planning and deployment challenges, the complexity of operations other than war, and the training and preparations required for future such operations. We also have gained a great deal of experience in other aspects of a power projection Army that were not discussed in detail. The challenges for the Army include the following:

- **Parallel planning.** Our crisis action procedures need to involve operational and tactical commanders and planners from the outset of a deployment planning process. Operational and tactical planners must have access to data provided to strategic planners and decisionmakers. An 18-hour alert requirement does not mean that required planning information should be held until units are within 18 hours of leaving their garrisons.

- **Anticipate and prepare for complexity.** Our combat training programs prepare our soldiers and leaders to deal with complex situations. They also need time to acquire, understand, and prepare to react to intelligence information related to preparation of the battlefield. They need information on indigenous forces in their destination area as well as access to information on friendly forces involved in the operation. This information includes the roles and concepts of operation for the non-governmental organizations, the structure and contributions of coalition forces, and the roles of organizations such as the UN and the State Department.
• **Flexibility and adaptability.** The Army must remain prepared to carry out missions that do not fit into the definition of mission essential tasks or that fall outside of doctrine. Our units must maintain the versatility required to meet diverse challenges, shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role to another rapidly and efficiently.

• **Battlefield operating systems.** Each operation should be analyzed to determine which battlefield operating systems can be used most effectively. Additional systems should then be defined and developed, based upon the mission at hand, and used as the basis for planning and operations.

• **Operations as an ARFOR headquarters.** In many circumstances a division headquarters can assume the role of an ARFOR headquarters, provided that the number of Army and coalition ground forces in theater remains within the command and control ability of a division headquarters.

• **Force management.** A power projection Army will require that operational and tactical commanders manage the deployment sequence of forces in order to build combat power in theater to support the concept of the operation. When a division is tasked to become an ARFOR headquarters, a staff element must be identified to manage strategic-level force structuring processes to ensure that forces required are identified and deployed in the proper sequence. This requirement is critical to success if the society at the destination indicates hostile intent toward the intervention.

• **Deployment means.** Revitalization of our strategic lift, both air and surface, is essential to provide the capability to move and sustain a power projection Army.

• **Command and control of all Army forces in theater.** During Restore Hope, the JTF Support Command consisted of Army forces drawn primarily from the division. The support command was not, however, under the direct command and control of the ARFOR commander. Division support organizations are sized to manage the support of division forces. Some alternative must be developed to preclude detaching an organic division unit to constitute a JTF support element.

• **Implications of follow-on tasks after an operation other than war.** The long-term consequences for readiness, training, and the quality of life for soldiers and their families created by maintaining a major element of the division on detached operations—for example, rotation of units to support operations in Somalia—is of growing concern to the division and to the Army.

• **Rules of engagement.** The development of effective rules of engagement was a key feature of the operation. The process by which they were developed, promulgated, and managed, and particularly the effectiveness of coalition operations using the rules of engagement, should be developed as a model for future operations.

• **Liaison requirements in coalition operations.** There was an extensive requirement for liaison officers to support higher headquarters, coalition
forces, and civil-military operations requirements. Many of those who performed liaison duties were drawn from division elements whose battlefield systems were not fully engaged in the operation. This solution met the requirement for liaison teams during operations in Florida and in Somalia, where operating environments were predominantly friendly or neutral. Some other solution will be required in an environment that demands full operation of all standard battlefield operating systems.

* Operations in bare-based environments. Somalia confronted the Army with an environment devoid of infrastructure from which US forces could purchase required goods and services. The acquisition of the “Force Provider” or similar systems will greatly enhance our power projection capability by providing the required protection in environmentally hostile locales for deployed forces.

These subjects all will require a great deal of study. Their significance derives from the need to prepare the Army for its next deployment. In most instances solutions designed to meet the test of combat will also satisfy requirements for operations other than war. The Army’s challenge is to debate and study the issues raised in the aftermath of domestic and foreign operations other than war so that subsequent missions can benefit from the experiences of the 10th Mountain Division (LI). The US Army War College and the Army school system can make significant contributions to meeting the challenges identified in this section.

The tasks ahead of us were described a number of years ago by the noted British historian Michael Howard. In a speech entitled “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” he described the opportunities and challenges that armies face during peacetime:

I am tempted to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. . . . Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.  

Our doctrine is about right. The United States Army should remain versatile enough to adapt to any situation. We can do that best by discipline, flexibility, and foresight, hallmarks of an Army trained and ready for combat.

NOTES

1. Florida National Guard units were kept under the command and control of the state to support the law enforcement mission in Florida, which federal forces cannot do by law. The doctrinal designation “ARFOR” defines the responsibilities of the division with respect to all organic and attached Army units in the joint task force area of operations. The 10th Mountain Division was designated the ARFOR for Andrew Relief and Operation Restore Hope.

2. The division’s mission statement: “Task Force Mountain deploys, serves as ARFOR, and conducts military operations in Somalia to secure the airfield in Baledogle as well as other key installations and to provide...
security for operations in support of relief distribution sites in assigned humanitarian relief sectors in order to
provide secure passage of relief supplies."
3. The Charter of the United Nations, dated 26 June 1945, provides for several types of operations. Chapter VI identifies "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," which imposes very restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) for forces assigned, usually limiting the forces to basic self-defense and use of force to disengage from hostile acts. Chapter VII provides for UN "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," and as such provides ROE that allow offensive operations, giving commanders flexibility to implement governing Security Council Resolutions. The difference between these two types of operations is extremely important to commanders on the ground and this difference will guide the rules of engagement. UNITAF ROE followed the guidelines of Chapter VII, as do the ROE for UNOSOM II. DA PAM 27-24, p. 3-5 to 3-8; The Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945.
4. The 10th Mountain Division (LI) was alerted on 30 November 1992, began deployment to Somalia on 11 December, and served as the Army forces headquarters (ARFOR) in a joint task force (JTF) under the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) until relieved on 4 May 1993. Most division personnel and equipment began to return to the United States at that time. Support units and a reinforced infantry battalion remained in Somalia, under the operational control of the US Commander in Chief, Central Command (CINCCENT), and under the command of the commander, US Forces, Somalia. The detached division units provide logistics support and the quick reaction force for UNOSOM II. The battalion has been replaced twice. The fourth rotation is in the planning stage.
5. The concept of parallel planning calls for the simultaneous development of mission essential information at all levels in the planning chain during crisis response operations. Parallel planning implies that any risks assumed by developing such information through rapid successive approximations is preferable to the alternative: withholding crisis response information from lower planning echelons prior to a predetermined date, time, or event. In one sense a violation of the principles of the chain of command, this concept illustrates what Michael Howard might have had in mind when he asserted that it is "flexibility, both in the minds of the Armed Forces and in their organization, that must be developed in peacetime." "Military Science in an Age of Peace," The RUSI Journal, 119 (March 1974), 7.
6. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a systematic and continuous process that describes the tactical environment and the effects of that environment on operations and what the enemy can accomplish. FM 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 14 June 1993, Glossary 4.
7. XVIII Airborne Corps was the division's higher headquarters early in the planning process. The JTF (I Marine Expeditionary Force) assumed that role shortly after the division was notified of the operation. The division staff also worked on a daily basis with Army Central Command (ARCENT) and Forces Command (FORSCOM).
9. The construction of the Somali Road was one of those accomplishments that received little notice in the media. Approximately 2100 km in length, it was built or improved by US Army Engineers (1100 km), and USMC and US Navy Seabee units (1000 km). The Somali Road connected all the humanitarian relief sectors in Somalia. Its completion and security were integral to end state planning conducted by the JTF and the ARFOR.
10. FM 100-5 describes battlefield operating systems as, "The major functions performed by the force on the battlefield to successfully execute Army operations (battles and engagements) in order to accomplish military objectives directed by the operational commander." FM 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 14 June 1993, Glossary 1.
11. LOGCAP is the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program. The primary contractor in Somalia for this program was Brown and Root, which hired Somali workers to provide services to US forces.
12. Colonel Mark Hamilton deployed to Somalia to help the ARFOR and UNITAF headquarters establish a disarmament policy and a workable plan to disarm the factions. His help was instrumental in designing a workable program, although the program was never completely enforced.
13. The Defense Coordinating Officer provides the link between FEMA and the military task force assigned to an operation.
14. Mr. Andy Natsios (US Agency for International Development expert on Somalia) and Colonel John Abizaid (Commander, 3-325 Infantry during Operation Provide Comfort) contributed significantly to our preparation. Colonel Mark Hamilton (experienced negotiator in El Salvador) joined the division and provided essential help during negotiations with the warlords and factions. The generous efforts of these individuals are representative of the kinds of support that can be made available to units with rapid-deployment missions.

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