Meeting Canadian Forces Expansion Goals through Retention

A Monograph

by

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Meeting Canadian Forces Expansion Goals Through Expansion

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Service as a member of the Canadian Forces (CF) in 2010 is a very demanding undertaking. The commitments the CF is fulfilling, both domestically and internationally, have placed a tempo on the CF that has not been witnessed in the decades since the Korean War. The recent publication of the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) identifies personnel as the key resource to success in meeting defense commitments.

The Government of Canada has pledged funding to the Department of National Defence (DND) to allow it to modernize, reorganize and expand the CF to meet its security responsibilities. The growth and expansion of the CF has been ongoing since early 2006. In the intervening period there have been huge successes realized in CF recruiting efforts; thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen have been enrolled. However, despite a large increase in recruiting, the corresponding growth of the CF has been somewhat slow due to a high level of attrition.

Attrition in the CF manifests itself in two broad groups; those recruited that never complete their basic occupational training, and those who are completely trained. Countless surveys and studies have identified macro reasons why individuals decide to cease their employment with the CF, many of which point to a breakdown in commitment to the organization as a result of not having individual needs adequately met.
Abstract

EXPANDING THE CANADIAN FORCES THROUGH RETENTION by LCol Michael A. Nixon,
Canadian Army, 47 Pages.

Service as a member of the Canadian Forces (CF) in 2010 is very demanding undertaking. The commitments the CF is fulfilling, both domestically and internationally, have placed a tempo on the CF that has not been witnessed in the decades since the Korean War. The recent publication of the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) identifies personnel as the key resource to success in meeting defense commitments.

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This monograph takes a different approach to looking at what motivates (or not) members of the CF to continue to serve. By focusing on two theories of motivation tied to the needs of today's modern soldier, some specific recommendations are offered as to where CF Leadership should look to focus effort to strengthen and modernize the social contract with CF members so that they remain motivated to serve, thus meeting the needs of both the institution and the individual.
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<td>Armed Forces Council</td>
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<td>AMOR</td>
<td>Annual Military Occupational Review</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<td>CFPAS</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System</td>
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<td>CFLRS</td>
<td>Canadian Force Leadership and Recruit School</td>
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<td>CFRG</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Recruiting Group</td>
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<td>CMP</td>
<td>Chief of Military Personnel</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defense</td>
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<td>FRP</td>
<td>Forces Reduction Program</td>
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<td>H and A</td>
<td>Honours and Awards</td>
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<td>Intermediate Engagements 25</td>
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<td>IPS</td>
<td>Indefinite Period of Service</td>
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<td>NCM</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLQ</td>
<td>Primary Leadership Qualification</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Regular Force</td>
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<td>Reserve Force</td>
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<td>SCONVA</td>
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"This is a career with adventure. This is a great opportunity for Canadians to get fit, to learn and to lead. This is a great opportunity to defend Canada at home and abroad."

- General Natynczyk, Chief of Defence Staff

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Overview

"Fight with the Canadian Forces" is the key recruiting slogan used in the contemporary Canadian Forces (CF) recruiting campaign, a campaign that is in full swing in order to grow the size of the Force over the next few years to 100,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen. Indeed, the Federal Budget in 2005 can be viewed as the resourcing start point for this period of expansion. The Budget represents the most significant investment in the military in the previous 20 years. It provided the Department of National Defence (DND) with nearly 13 billion dollars in new funding over 5 years (out to 2010) and outlined a longer-term commitment to expand, fix and transform the CF. The real issue was that there were too few resources both human and material in Canada's operational naval, land and air forces, to meet strategic defence objectives, a situation caused in part by directed personnel reduction in the 1990s. However, an increase in recruiting is not the full solution to the expansion question; the more difficult question to answer is how can retention of currently serving CF personnel be positively influenced to support expansion?

As the Cold War drew to an end, the CF totaled approximately 89,000 Regular Force (RF) personnel. In 1994, the CF's “Defence White Paper” established a new RF target strength of less than

1 "Fight with Canadian Forces" does not refer only to combat, but refers to fighting fear, hunger, poverty, etc. The recruiting slogan has resonated well with the Canadian Public thanks to an effective advertising campaign.


60,000 to be reached by 1999. This reduction goal was realized by 2000 through the aggressive implementation of the Force Reduction Program (FRP), which saw approximately 14,000 military personnel take early release or retirement. While the reductions were necessary to match the size of the CF with its missions and funding, they significantly reduced the flexibility of the Force to meet unforeseen new commitments; indeed the effects of the FRP are still being felt across the CF today.

The world changed on 11 September 2001, and Canada joined in the effort to fight terrorism globally. The operational initiatives that followed in the early part of the decade placed a huge strain on the CF; there were not enough resources to meet new strategic defence objectives. As the US military has identified, it is difficult to sustain a military force while in a state of persistent conflict.

"In 2006, the federal government committed funding to support the growth of the CF to 68,000 Regular Force personnel and 26,000 Primary Reserve personnel. This decision was made to help sustain international operations in coming years and to support the CF contribution to security at the February 2010 Olympics in Vancouver. In 2009, the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) provided the additional resources needed to expand the Forces to 100,000 (70,000 Regular Force and 30,000 Primary Reserve). Now, the CF is engaged in a vast and dynamic recruiting campaign with an aim to grow the Forces" to the right size to meet defence objectives. This need to "right size" the CF is based on a balance between the resources required and what is affordable from the Federal Budget perspective.

The investment and transformation strategies were necessary to satisfy operational commitments, and were designed to meet distinct incremental goals over successive years with a forecast end state for

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transformation in 2011. However, finalizing "transformation" is not simply a question of completing changes to the structure. What is more important, and indeed difficult, is filling the structure with trained personnel, both new recruits and fully trained members at all rank levels. A new structure that remains unfilled is not transformative; it is simply a hollow force.

In order to meet transformation expansion goals, the CF Recruiting Group (CFRG) has had to enroll up to 7,800 people per year over the past three years, representing what is required to realize true growth to meet the final goal of 100,000 personnel by fiscal year 2027-2028, as indicated in Figure -1.

![Figure 1 CF Growth Projections](https://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/1/recruitm-recrutem-eng.asp)

A key variable in any attempt to forecast enrollment goals is the rate of attrition. CFRG has based their projections on historical attrition data, which will require adjustment as attrition rates change over time, and the "health" of individual occupations are reviewed.

While the recruiting effort has enjoyed a degree of success in the sense that goals have been more or less met, the effect of attrition continues to have a negative impact on both the growth and quality of the Force. In fact, the impact of attrition prompted the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public

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9 The CF uses the Annual Military Occupational Review (AMOR) to assess the ability of each occupation in the CF to meet its operational objectives with sufficient numbers of trained personnel. The AMOR is conducted annually and is the benchmark for setting recruiting and training goals for each occupation in the CF.
accounts to recommend in 2006 that the Department of National Defence (DND) establish a target for the maximum acceptable rate of attrition of its trained effective strength (TES) and monitor the performance of the package of measures it has instituted to meet that target. In response to this recommendation, DND elaborated on the difficulty of setting a precise attrition percentage that would apply to the total force, since some of the smaller more specialized occupations would be more negatively impacted by a percentage that might be acceptable to a larger occupation. Rather than setting a specific aggregate attrition target, the Department opted to employ specific indicators designed to identify negative trends early enough that appropriate actions could be taken to minimize impact. What is not indicated in the response is clarity on what is meant by "appropriate actions."

To help lighten the burden on CF members in today's high tempo climate, a degree of "civilianization" has occurred. Many CF training institutions now employ civilian instructors in what were traditionally military billets. On operations, civilian contractors have taken over many administrative responsibilities to free up CF personnel for more traditional military tasks. While this approach has been successful, it does not negate the fact that more uniformed personnel are required to meet commitments.

As can be seen in table 1, when attrition is factored into the equation, real growth of the CF is slowly occurring.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2004-2009</th>
<th>RF Strength</th>
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<tr>
<td>As of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 09</td>
<td>65,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 08</td>
<td>65,251</td>
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11 Major John Vass. Retention in the Canadian Forces, 35.

Table 1 Regular Force Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tr>
<td>30 Sep 08</td>
<td>64,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 08</td>
<td>64,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 08</td>
<td>64,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 07</td>
<td>63,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 06</td>
<td>62,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 05</td>
<td>61,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 04</td>
<td>61,394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the growth is coming at an enormous training cost when one looks at the number of experienced individuals departing versus new recruits coming in. While it is necessary to have "new blood" injected into the CF, loss of too much experience will have a damaging impact on overall operational effectiveness; a newly recruited and trained private does not replace a warrant officer (WO) with 20+ years of experience.

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines attrition as "a reduction in numbers usually as a result of resignation". For the profession that is the CF, this reduction is felt both quantitatively and qualitatively with the loss of both fully trained soldiers, and those still in the initial training phase of their career. In order to positively affect attrition rates, it is therefore necessary to accept the fact that there is no panacea for motivating members of these two distinct groups to continue to serve. One must identify what elements can be leveraged to motivate each group, separately as well as collectively. Reliance on legacy motivational practices is not sufficient; new approaches must be adapted and existing practices updated; in other words, motivational innovation is necessary.13

How can retention of CF personnel be positively impacted to support CF expansion? The question can become complicated when looking at such factors as the national economic climate, gender issues and medical conditions (to name but a few) which each could be the topic of an individual monograph. Therefore, this paper will focus at a macro level in dealing with key strategies to improve

13 For the purposes of this study, the Quantitative Group refers to new members of the CF, those recruited and within the training system that prepares them for operational duty at a unit. The Qualitative Group refers to those that are finished their entry level training and are filling Trained Effective Strength (TES) positions.
retention since regardless of the specific details, there is a large degree of consistency in the macro factors impacting retention over time.14

New approaches to motivating members of the CF to continue to serve, combined with updates to existing strategies, based on sound theories, will have a positive impact on retention in the CF. With improved retention, CF expansion and transformation will be facilitated to allow the CF to best meet Canada’s national security objectives for the future.

Methodology

Prior to discussing retention strategies, it is first necessary to establish the CF as a profession in order to have an appreciation for what sets it apart from wider Canadian society. This appreciation is essential to understanding why Canadians join the military profession in the first place, as well as what specific professionally related motivational tools might work. Next, an examination of the impact that attrition is having on the CF transformation / expansion initiative is necessary to provide clarity on the scope of the challenge.

The discussion of motivation looks at why Canadian citizens have served their country in the past, and introduces two theories of motivation: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory and Victor Vroom's Expectancy Theory. These theories help to develop recommendations on how today's military leadership can actively and positively influence the modern soldier's motivation to continue to serve.15

The impact of loosing members of the CF due to voluntary attrition is approached from two perspectives. First, a brief look at those members of the CF who are at the front end of their careers is necessary. This group, who will form the base of the CF in the future and are representative of the current recruiting effort, can be viewed as the "quantitative question."


15 For the purposes of this monograph, reference to "leadership" will refer specifically to Armed Forces Council (AFC), and generally to all senior leaders in the CF. AFC meets to advise the CDS on matters concerning the command, control and administration of the CF and to help make decisions regarding key issues.
Next, the "qualitative question," embodied by those members of the CF who are considered fully trained and at, or approaching, a gateway in their career is studied. It is this second group that receives the majority of attention in this monograph since the very existence of the quantitative question depends on there being a quality base from which to expand the CF. Their exit gateway may be marked by the end of an existing obligatory period of service, or may simply be linked to when they qualify to receive a military pension; for most, this is at the 20-25 years of service point.

Once the environment has been framed from these resource perspectives, the question of motivation is approached theoretically, and then specifically focused on members of the CF. The motivation question is answered in part by looking at data obtained from recent CF Exit Surveys, as well as the impact that some modern retention initiatives may (or may not) have had on reducing attrition.

Having identified the macro factors that contribute to attrition, the study focuses on ways to motivate serving members to continue to serve. Data used includes an analysis of current recruiting/attrition rates, a detailed study of motivational theories and an examination of the reasons CF personnel release. In addition, both broad and specific recommendations on how attrition can be addressed are provided. The recommendations identify practices that are currently working but may require modernization, and suggest new initiatives that should be employed.

CHAPTER 2

FRAMING THE ENVIRONMENT

Military systems, especially the small-unit subsystems which are expected to bear the burden of killing, are categorically different in nature and function from the modern business corporation and its subsystem. No one expects anyone to die for IBM or

16 Colonel Steve Bowes, Commander Combat Training Centre, in his address to Formation Leadership, January, 2009.
17 CF Exit Surveys are conducted periodically to identify trends, attitudes and reasons for voluntary release from the CF.
General Motors, but the expectation that one will do one’s duty, even unto death is very real in the military and becomes ever more vivid as one moves closer to combat.  

-Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage, Crisis In Command

**The CF as a Profession in Today's Society**

The CF as an institution considers itself as a profession. The contemporary phrase “The Profession of Arms” suggests all members are categorized the same, with a common purpose and ideals. An individual becomes a member of the “The Profession of Arms” by swearing the Oath of Allegiance and adopting the uniform of their service, an external sign of his or her distinctiveness in the Canadian Society. Thereafter, they demonstrate their professionalism by fully embracing the CF Military Ethos, training and developing, and serving their country in difficult situations. This view of the CF as a profession is somewhat broader than Samuel Huntington’s position that the categorization of military members as professionals is reserved only for the full time officer and that not non-commissioned members (NCM) or reserve force officers and NCMs who are only temporarily employed on full time military service, subject to many of the same conditions as their regular force counterparts, are not professionals. Huntington's somewhat restrictive view has been expanded by the CF by stating all “Canadian soldiers are members of the Profession of Arms by virtue of the obligations they assume, the military ethos which governs their service, and the functions they fulfill.”

Indeed, CF members develop and apply specific skills, which come from a theory-based body of knowledge. Moreover, they perform their duty for the good of society, self-regulating through a value-based code of ethics, ensuring that their roles and standards are accepted as legitimate by the society that

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they serve, all of which are characteristics of a profession. However, the CF as a profession differs from most other professions in that the organization and its members accept that they are subject to being lawfully ordered into harm's way, under conditions that could lead to loss of life. In no other profession in Canada, (except perhaps in isolated cases, certain emergency services) can a member of a profession be legally ordered to perform a function that could result in personal bodily injury.

Service in the CF is a voluntary choice since mandatory military service / conscription has not existed in Canada since WWI. This means the membership knowingly accepts the risks and hardships that come with the profession. What motivates the members of the CF to serve Canada? Is it simply a question of patriotism or are the reasons more personal and individually based as opposed to some inherent ideal that is collectively embraced? Are the factors that motivate one to serve during peace time the same as those that are present during periods of operational deployment or indeed conflict? Do those that volunteer for service in today’s CF indeed know what they are getting into?

On becoming soldiers, we have not ceased to be citizens.

-Sir Oliver Cromwell

The CF is meant to be a reflection of Canadian Society, and indeed it is directly subordinate to the lawful direction of the civil authority. The fabric of Canadian society has transformed over the past thirty years. It has become much more diverse and pluralistic, and therefore it can be assumed that the fabric of the CF has changed as well, although perhaps not to the same degree as society at large from a

22 Ron Dickenson and Tony Joyce. Military As A Profession, An Examination. (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002), 17.

23 The National Defence Act of Canada, (Ottawa: Governement of Canada, 1922), Art 33. (1). “The regular force, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and non-commissioned members thereof are at all times liable to perform any lawful duty.”


25 Canada's use of conscription in WW1 was necessary to sustain the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France. However, the degree of controversy surrounding the Government's decision to institute conscription nearly divided the country.

The changes have been more value based, and are tied to the generation of the modern soldier, a soldier born in the late 1980s. Some of the ideals possessed by the modern soldier are drastically different from those of days past. The biggest area of change is that of social conscience. A study conducted by Air Canada indicated that while Canadians continue to exhibit a strong social conscience, the emphasis has shifted from the collective, where it resided in the past, to the individual. It is necessary to understand and accept this type of change in order to appreciate the diversity of the “individuals” that constitute the modern CF. This understanding and appreciation will assist leaders in identifying the key motivational factors necessary to retain the modern soldier.

Notwithstanding societal changes, there are many similarities between today’s soldier and his predecessors as well, especially in times of conflict or high operational tempo. The reasons why a soldier will engage in and sustain combat have changed little throughout modern history. A study conducted during and immediately after Operation Iraqi Freedom confirmed that United States soldiers much like soldiers of the past fight primarily for each other. In addition, several service personnel interviewed during the study cited ideological reasons such as liberation, freedom, and democracy also as important factors in combat motivation. However, this paper’s focus is not on combat motivation; rather, it is aimed at the broader question of motivation to continue to serve. Regardless, as will be demonstrated, the two can be confused by leadership.

On the opposite side of the spectrum from combat service is peacetime service. The individuals who make up the armed services of a country are a direct representation of the society they serve and thus are motivated in their careers by many of the same factors that motivate all citizens, be it in the private or

public sector. This is not to profess that there is no difference in serving the military and serving a civilian company. A comparison between the two is indeed difficult to draw as indicated in the opening quotation to this chapter. What might be called a managerial technique in the private sector is known as leadership in the military environment. In many ways the two concepts, management and leadership, are interrelated and must exist together if one is to be a strong leader, or manager. Regardless of the differences between a private sector company and the CF, what is important to an individual in ensuring his or her level of motivation is maintained is to a certain degree common to all regardless of the career he or she has selected. The requirements of job security, satisfaction, and fulfillment are necessary to meet basic human needs, and to motivate as identified in Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Based on this theory, the fulfillment of these needs is as important to a CF member during peacetime service as it is to their civilian counterparts, regardless of career differences.

The range of military activities the CF could be involved with in the modern world is very broad, from peace support operations (e.g., humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, traditional peace keeping operation, etc) to war fighting. War fighting itself includes a range of activities from high intensity conflict to the more contemporary type of operations that CF personnel are engaged with on a daily basis in Afghanistan. Therefore, although the CF has not been engaged in high intensity conflict in recent years, it is still definitely operating across the complete “Spectrum of Conflict” (Fig 1) from peace to war fighting.

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33 Stephen J. Robins and Nancy Langton, P 149.

The factors that motivate an individual to continue to serve vary depending on where on the spectrum of conflict the individual and indeed the collective CF are operating.

![Figure 2 - Spectrum of Conflict](image)

Those factors involved in war fighting are different from those that are paramount during peacetime service. Too often leadership focus is more on traditional conflict based uniquely military motivational factors during peacetime service rather than on what is important to the individual. A re-emphasis of individually based motivational factors is necessary if the CF is to have the most effectively motivated military possible. A highly motivated force during peace time should provide for a more capable force during times of crisis, as well as minimize the number of soldiers who seek voluntary release.

The CF is operating across the complete spectrum of conflict at the same time: while a portion of the force is deployed on operations (primarily in Afghanistan), others are involved in peace support operations, while still others are either in a reconstitution phase (having just returned from an operational deployment) or are in a preparation phase in order to deploy to an operational theater. The reconstitution

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36 Harry Kriesler in an interview with Dr James McPherson (University of California at Berkley, Oct 2008) [on line] Accessed 15 November, 2009. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnyWooq9qjdU. An interesting interview with Dr James McPherson, professor of military history at Princeton University. In the discussion, he describes how his research of Abraham Lincoln as Commander and Chief, shows the fundamental reasons that motivate a soldier to fight, even when faced with overwhelming odds.
phase is when both the individual member and his or her unit are meant to have a degree of “down time” (ie: protected from deployments from home station). Unfortunately, this does not always hold true in today’s high tempo climate. Never in the CF’s recent history is so much being accomplished by so few, and the likelihood is that tempo will increase, or at best stay the same. This high level of tempo is itself a factor that if mismanaged, can be a critically de-motivating.

An example of the challenge(s) is evident in the human resources required to support a single operation, that being Task Force Afghanistan. Maintaining the 2,500 CF personnel supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Operation in Afghanistan requires a pool of approximately 12,500. While this number may seem rather high, it includes those deployed, those training to deploy, and those who have recently deployed and are in 12 month non-deployable period that immediately follows a deployment.37

This tempo is negatively impacting retention rates. According to a recent Departmental study, the CF can expect an attrition rate of approximately 9.2% per year for the next three years (out to 2012) of the Trained Effective Strength (TES) which amounts to more than 6,500 losses through attrition per year, an increase from the traditionally experienced 4% attrition rate.38

To manage the complexity and challenge of meeting the Canadian Land Force commitments, the Canadian Army adopted a tool known as Managed Readiness to both prepare the right force mix for operations, but equally to ensure that a degree of down time is built into the rotational construct to ensure individuals and formed units have a break from the high tempo that comes with preparation for and deployment on operations.39 The full impact on motivation of this management approach to meeting national operational and training objectives will be discussed later; suffice it to say that manipulation of


39 While Managed Readiness is the readiness tool used by the Canadian Army, both the Navy and Air Forces as the other Force Generating Elements of the CF use similar methods.
resources to meet defence commitments is a complicated and difficult process. If resources are limited, regardless of the reason, budgetary or otherwise, there will be a corresponding limit to what can be achieved, despite the efficiency of the tools being used to manage the resources.

It is within this environment that CF finds itself in 2010. A high tempo for all elements of the CF, coupled with an expansion plan that places additional burdens on the force, such as the requirement for additional foundation level training instructors, has placed a stress on the CF not experienced in decades. The key to meeting the challenge lies with two groups within the CF, the new personnel recruited and entering the CF, and those that form the TES or the trained element of the CF.

**Theories of Motivation**

It is necessary to know what it is the members of the CF expect from the profession, as well as whether or not their needs are being met, in order to ensure that they are properly motivated. There are two contemporary theories of motivation that can facilitate understanding of the individual needs of today's service member. Both theories are fundamental to leadership’s understanding of how to impact retention. The two theories are Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory and Victor Vroom’s Expectancy Theory.\(^{40}\) Both of these theories focus on understanding two types of individual needs, intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic needs are those needs that are internal to one’s self and cause people to behave in a certain way so as to meet their intrinsic needs. Satisfaction of intrinsic needs makes them feel good inside; it is this good feeling that causes their behaviour. If intrinsic needs are ignored or not met, then the individual will not be content with his job, and by extension will not be motivated to continue in that job. Extrinsic needs are those that are external to one’s self; examples of which are rewards achieved through job performance (promotions, bonuses, etc). An individual will behave in a certain way to achieve these extrinsic rewards.

\(^{40}\) Stephen J. Robins and Nancy Langton. P 155.
Intrinsic and extrinsic needs can be mutually supporting, meaning that the meeting of one type of need can positively influence the other type. An example would be someone who received a letter of commendation for a job well done, if in fact completing the job itself made him feel good. The feeling of satisfaction he would have from completing the job would be intrinsic, whereas the receipt of the letter would be extrinsic, but each would support the other.

In order to properly motivate the members of the CF to continue to serve, leaders should be able to correctly identify what individual members are looking for from the profession (both intrinsic and extrinsic), to motivate them to continue to serve within the profession. Consideration of the two motivational theories is necessary in order to define the individual motivational needs that must be met to result in a highly motivated individual who will be less likely to leave the organization of which he or she is a member.

“The first quality of a soldier is the ability to support fatigue and privations; valour is only secondary. Poverty, privation, and misery are the school of the good soldier.”

- Colonel Conrad H. Lauza

Hierarchy of Needs

Abraham Maslow provides one of the better-known theories of motivation. His hypothesis is that within every individual there exists a hierarchy of five needs, these needs are:

- **Physiological** – including hunger, thirst, shelter, and sex and other basic bodily needs.
- **Safety** – including security and protection from physical and emotional harm.
- **Social** – including affection, feeling of belonging, acceptance and friendship;
- **Esteem** – including self respect, autonomy, achievement, status, recognition and attention; and
- **Self-actualization** – achieving one’s highest potential, and self-fulfillment.

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Maslow’s theory maintains that as each need becomes satisfied, the next highest in priority becomes the most motivationally dominant. Therefore, to properly motivate an individual, it is necessary to recognize which needs have been satisfied and those that the individual is currently transfixed upon.

"These soldiers are well trained, well equipped, and fully prepared for this deployment."

-General Ray Henault

Within the CF, the first two levels of needs could be considered to be fairly well satisfied from an institutional perspective. Training, food, shelter, equipment and fair salaries and bonuses are very well established in today’s CF. A trained private earns more than thirty two thousand dollars per year, and is also provided with monetary compensations for employment requirements that take him away from his home. His salary, much like that of his counterpart in the US military, is higher than the national average. Additionally, extra payment for unique qualifications and specialized training are also recognized by increases to basic salary. Furthermore, the CF provides its members with excellent personal equipment with which to fulfill their mission(s). Canadian field force soldiers are provided with sufficient environmental clothing and equipment to allow them to operate effectively in climates that range from minus sixty to plus fifty degrees celsius. Although shortages do exist in some areas, the normal approach is for these shortfalls to be addressed in the fastest time possible. For example, the initial units of Canadian soldiers to deploy to Afghanistan were not provided desert camouflage clothing. The standard issue green clothing was all that was available. The shortfall was rectified quickly, and now all deploying personnel are issued both camouflage patterns prior to deployment. Notwithstanding shortfalls in collective equipment experienced in the 1990s, the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) has made


44 Carla Tighe Murray, Evaluating Military Compensation (Washington, DC: CBO, June 2000) 14. In the US Military, salaries are high in comparison to all civilian workers of the same age and education, level (75% percentile)

reequipping the CF a key pillar to transformation.\textsuperscript{46} This commitment clearly indicates the importance placed within the profession on looking after basic needs, regardless of negative media reports that have from time to time suggested otherwise. \textsuperscript{47}

Therefore, it can be assumed that for the majority of service members, basic needs are met. Because these basic needs are met (according to Maslow’s theory), focus within the CF should be in the areas of social, esteem and self-actualization needs when considering what is necessary to motivate its members to continue to serve. Each area will be considered separately.

**Social Needs**

I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed presence of a comrade”. \textsuperscript{48}

-Kellet, *Combat Motivation and Behaviour*

In a military context, the social needs of an individual can be best defined as needing to belong to a team with strong group affiliation. The CF, with its small structure, has consistently focused on fulfilling this need. Within the Canadian Land Forces for example, the regimental system provides an excellent framework within which its members feel part of a closely-knit team, indeed almost a family. When a unit deploys on an operation or training activity the “Regimental Family” looks out for the members that are left behind. In this context, the members of the family extend to include the dependents of the soldiers that are deployed.

This feeling of belonging that the regimental system provides also embodies several other concepts that positively motivate the individual. Such elements as group cohesion and esprit de corps


\textsuperscript{47} Scott Taylor, P 125.

positively support the individual’s human need to feel an integral part of his or her unit. 49 The concept has been embraced by the US military as well, where only formed and trained units are deployed to mission areas. Tough lessons learned during the Vietnam War revealed that rotating individuals, as opposed to formed units, had a negative impact on cohesion and thus degraded overall effectiveness.

**Esteem Requirements**

Maslow’s fourth need is that of individual esteem. Soldiers must feel as if they are making a positive contribution to the unit with which they are serving. This provides them with the essential internal esteem elements of self-respect, autonomy, achievement as well as the external esteem elements of recognition and attention.50 In today’s “multimedia” world, soldiers receive feedback on how their actions and contributions are being viewed, reported and received by the society that they serve almost immediately. If the message is positive, it will help to meet their esteem needs; if negative, the opposite will be true. Leaders must be conscious of the impact of this feedback, and should do what they can to influence the image being created and reported.51

The CF, in the past, had a fairly comprehensive system of both recognizing and assessing individual performance. Periodic assessments and annual reports are the means by which formal evaluation of performance is provided, while such items as various command level commendations are presented to service personnel to recognize above average performance. The recipients are awarded with an item to be worn on their uniform (such a small gold bar to signify having been awarded a CDS Commendation) or a simple certificate. Regardless, they receive recognition for service.

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50 Stephen J. Robins and Nancy Langton, 149.

51 Leaders have the responsibility to consistently promote the positive image of their subordinates to ensure their esteem needs are met. This can involve a number of methods, from being trained to effectively speak to media personnel, to ensuring that the actions of one’s subordinates are always in line with the commander’s intent and are preformed in a consistently professional manner.
Although these methods of assessing and recognizing high achievement may have been sufficient at one time, the changes to societal values mentioned earlier indicate that expectations of the individual have changed. As well, during the preparation for the Standing Committee on Veteran’s Affairs (SCONVA) hearings, completed in 1999, it was identified that a perception may exist amongst some CF members that the Honours and Awards (H and A) program is slow, bureaucratic and not well understood. This has spurred an initiative to make the system more familiar to the members, by creation of such things as a dedicated web site to review various awards presentations and citations. The question that remains is whether or not increased awareness is enough given the realities of the expectations of today’s soldier brought on by changes in values, or does the H and A system require an “overhaul”? Linked to the H and A program, for external esteem factors, is the system of promotions within the CF. Much like in a private sector company, competition for promotion with the CF can be very tough, especially when pressures of changes in size to the force structure are applied. This aspect of motivation will be covered in more detail under the Expectancy Theory of Motivation.

**Self-actualization**

"Be all that you can be”. 1980s US Army recruiting slogan

If a soldier’s need(s) for self-esteem is satisfied, he will focus on the inherent need to become what he or she is capable of. Self-actualization includes growth, achieving one’s maximum potential, and seeking self-fulfillment, within the parameters of one’s employment. 52

In order to realize self actualization, CF soldiers have a variety of means available. One example is by seeking specialized training. For example, an infantry soldier who volunteers for Joint Task Force Two selection is most probably trying to realize his full potential; an armour officer who enrolls in a voluntary continuing education program, despite an already hectic schedule, is likely focused on the need

52 Stephen J. Robins and Nancy Langton, 149.
for self-actualization. Another good example is the current Officer Professional Military Exams (OPME) exams. The exams are designed “to inform, to provoke independent thought and to enhance the officer's knowledge base for decision-making within the CF.” For officers they are a mandatory part of career development, whereas participation for NCMs is voluntary. They provide a good means of mental challenge for all ranks. Enrollment in the OPME program by a non-commissioned member is exemplary of someone that is highly motivated to excel through personal challenge, in order to achieve their full potential.

The last three needs, social, esteem and self actualization, are all intrinsic needs. They exist within the individual soldier to different degrees. In order for motivation to be high, these three needs must be satisfied to the greatest extent possible. The ability of the CF to meet these intrinsic needs must be maximized. Changes in force structure, which will be explained later, have created an environment where quite possibly the conditions do not exist for the membership to have their intrinsic needs, under Maslow’s Theory, realized.

**Expectancy Theory**

One of the most widely accepted motivation theories today is Victor Vroom’s “Expectancy Theory”. In summary, it states that an individual’s tendency to behave in a certain way depends on the strength of an expectation that the behaviour will be followed by a given outcome and on the attractiveness of that outcome to the individual. In more practical terms, Expectancy Theory states that an

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53 JTF2 is the Special Operations Force component of the CF. Its members are recruited from the three services and if they successfully complete the screening and training required, join the component for a fixed period, and in some cases permanently.

54 Taken from the CANADIAN FORCES MDS [on line] Accessed 15 Nov 2009. http://www.CanadianForcessj.forces.gc.ca/studies/engraph/studies/pempowhat_e.asp Though CANADIAN FORCES MDS develops the program, the Office of Continuing Studies at RMC delivers the program.

55 Victor Vroom, *Work and Motivation* (New York; John Wiley Press, 1964). Vroom’s theory has been embraced by modern civilian industry as the basis for individual motivation. Its applicability within a military environment is evidenced by its concentration on the needs of the individual’s and how they are satisfied via his or her employment.
“employee will be motivated to exert a high level of effort when he or she believes that the effort will lead to a good performance appraisal; that a good appraisal will lead to organizational rewards such as a bonus, a salary increase or a promotion; and that the rewards will satisfy the employee’s personal goals.”

The theory focuses on three relationships;

**Effort-performance relationship** - The idea perceived by the individual that his or her level exertion would lead to good performance.

**Performance-reward relationship** - The thought by the individual that performance at a particular level will lead to achievement of his or her desired outcome; and

**Rewards-personal goal relationship** - The belief that an organization will reward performance in such a way to satisfy an individual’s personal goals or needs and that the awards are attractive to the individual.

Vroom’s theory can help one understand why some soldiers are motivated to work hard to complete tasks, while some are not. For example, in any given unit, there is a diverse group of individuals, each looking for something different from their performance level. Some are highly motivated and take on extra work, while others barely perform to the minimum level. Is this a result of individual personalities, or a difference of individual expectancies?

Today's CF leadership must not lose focus on the expectancies of the members of the CF. While it is difficult to consider the diversity of what will be motivationally important to CF membership, it is nonetheless essential to widen the aperture beyond the collective, according to Vroom's theory.

**Theory Utility**

Maslow and Vroom focus on the needs of the individual. To make full utility of their theories, CF leadership must reconcile the needs of the individual with the needs of the organization. A balance

must be struck between satisfying individual needs and the requirements associated with transforming and
growing the CF. The two will at times be at odds. For example, to grow the CF, the intake of recruits has
been increased, placing a strain on the instructor cadre by increasing their tempo. If the instructor cadre is
performing at a higher level because of this increase in tempo, but are receiving neither recognition nor
compensation for the increased work, their level of motivation to continue to perform will be negatively
affected according to Vroom's expectancy theory. Likewise, their esteem requirements will not be met if
they do not receive recognition for their contribution to attaining the organizational objectives, under
Maslow's theory.

The CF leadership challenge is to find a degree of balance where the needs of the individual are
respected while the organizational objectives are attained. There is no single solution to this challenge,
but there are areas of focus, based on the portion of the CF being considered, that will have a positive
impact on motivation.

The Recruiting Approach / the Quantitative Question

The CF used the 2005 federal budget as a launch pad for a renewed recruiting campaign that
focused on a projected period of growth rather than on sustaining the existing size. Then Chief of
Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier recognized the massive challenge that CF expansion would
pose, but was confident that the challenge could be met with the requisite resources. In the years since
2005, projected funding for expansion has been to a degree curtailed, calling upon redoubled efforts and
ingenuity in lieu of any systematic capital investment in training.

57 The budget also included capital procurement funding for equipment and infrastructure as well, and was
not simply a question of personnel (see Figure 3).
http://www.casr.ca/ft-column2.htm
59 Ibid.
Looking at the period 2005 - 2008, CFRG performed stellar work recruiting new members to the CF. The ranks of recruiting staffs across the country were increased both numerically and in the quality of the recruiter.\(^{60}\) Furthermore, the process of actually recruiting an individual and getting him or her to the CF Recruit and Leadership School (CFRLS) was streamlined, to include relaxation of entry requirements, offering of signing bonuses to certain occupations, and development of an online application system that helped cast the recruiting net much wider within the country. No longer does an individual interested in a possible career with the CF need to meet with a recruiting staff member to start the process. This has opened the CF entry door much wider to those living in remote locations; they can self-apply rather than having to wait for the once a quarter visits to their region by a recruiter.\(^{61}\)

The success of the Recruiting Campaign clearly indicates that young Canadians are motivated to a degree by the sense of adventure that a military career provides.\(^{62}\) However, increased intake of personnel by CFRG is only the first part of the challenge. If recruiting standards are relaxed to increase the intake of recruits, and training standards are maintained, it is likely that the attrition rate for recruits during basic training will be high.\(^{63}\) This statement is validated by the numbers for those recruited for fiscal year (FY) 2008.

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\(^{60}\) Formerly viewed as a less than desirable employment for career progression, work within CFRG now has much more prominence for it members.


\(^{63}\) Defence R&D Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, *Review of Attrition and Retention Research for the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa, DND Publication, October 2008), 9.
The initial recruiting goal for CFRG in 2008 was 8,021 which was subsequently adjusted to 7,995 with a total of 6,768 actual new personnel recruited and processed for commencement of basic training, representing 84.6% of the goal. Table 2 indicates numbers recruited versus the number that actually showed up at CFLRS versus those that completed their entry level training. A review of this data shows that while 92.5% of those recruited actually showed up for basic training, only 69.8% were successful representing nearly a 30% attrition rate during the entry level training period. Further attrition occurs when the graduated recruits move off to their specific occupational training. For example, the attrition rate for armour crewman undergoing initial occupation specific training at the Armour School during the same FY was an additional 8.3%.

Two reasons for this level of attrition are age and education. The increase in the recruiting effort has opened the door for both younger and less educated recruits than has been the norm since the 1980s. Younger recruits lack the maturity to be able to adapt to the military lifestyle, and those with lower levels of education, such as less than high school equivalency, lack the commitment to see the task of completing their training through to graduation. There are other reasons for this high rate of entry level attrition, namely physical fitness and frustration. The physical fitness dynamic refers to a lowering of entry level fitness standards and the frustration dynamic refers to the tension caused by a recruiting system that can generate new trainees faster than the training establishment can accept them to begin their basic training course.

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64 Statistics provided by CFLRS on 23 Nov 2009 from CFLRS, POC Major Gilles Panneton, email address gilles.panneton@forces.gc.ca

65 Defence R&D Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, Review of Attrition and Retention Research for the Canadian Forces (Ottawa, DND Publication), 21.

66 This can be seen in the details of table one. The attrition rate for officer recruits is lower. On average, officer recruits tend to be older since they must have a minimum level of education to enroll as an officer.
In 2008, a new recruit arrived at the CFLRS to begin his basic training course. He was recruited under new guidelines adopted in 2006 when recruiting was increased to support expansion; for example, he did not have to pass an enrollment physical fitness test. The new approach is focused on getting recruits enrolled; getting them fit rests with CFLRS. On arrival, the new recruit weighed in at just under 400lbs. He was not able to keep up with his platoon at even the most basic level of physical exertion, and was subsequently placed in a remedial physical fitness platoon to get him into good enough physical condition to be successful on the actual recruit course. By mid 2009, nearly a year after arriving at CFLRS, the recruit was still in the remedial platoon and had lost more than 100lbs, causing some to joke that CFLRS should run its own Canadian version of the popular US television series "The Biggest Looser". Indeed, the elimination of entry level fitness standards prompted such headlines in national media as "Canadian Armed Forces Stretched, Reduce Standards for New Recruits; Join the Army, Not a Gym!" While this incident is profound, the situation is not unique. CFLRS is home to several hundred recruits, who are in a holding pattern. Some are recovering from injuries so that can rejoin training, some are not physically fit enough to safely begin training, and still others are being processed for release. In all cases they place a resource bill on CFLRS that could otherwise be used for conducting recruit training.

When CF personnel leave early in their career, their reasons include the requirement to maintain high physical fitness standards, personal and family issues, and dissatisfaction with their chosen military occupation. In many cases the individual feels disenfranchised with the CF in the sense that they were not given a clear enough explanation or overview of what to expect as a member of the CF.

The entry level retention issue is not complicated. Reductions in standards for recruiting have allowed CFRG to increase recruit intake numbers, while at the same time reduced standards have meant

67 A case study example on training challenges presented by LCol Steve Whelan (Commandant CFLRS) at the Combat Training Centre Command Seminar, Quebec City, Feb 2009.
that attrition levels for entry level recruits have increased. Some solutions will be discussed near the end of Chapter Three.

**The Experience Drain / the Qualitative Question**

A look at the steady state population profile provides a useful tool assessing the long term impacts of policy decisions on attrition.\(^{70}\) In an attempt to maintain accurate situational awareness of the health of the CF, by occupation, the AMOR process is used. An annual review is conducted, normally in the October to February time frame, to look at trends from the previous calendar year in order to project growth requirements out five years. By studying attrition and recruitment (real and projected) a degree of accuracy on which occupations need what number of new members to maintain operational effectiveness is determined.

The Chief of Military Personnel (CMP) a CF Major General, is the functional authority for military personnel issues, and is responsible for ensuring sufficient trained personnel. Given that basic occupation training can require from between two and seven years (depending on the occupation) there is a necessity to forecast needs well in advance.\(^{71}\)

The most recent AMOR for which accurate data is available is the 2008 AMOR completed in early 2009, the details of which are kept from general distribution as they could point to vulnerabilities. Rather than attempt to illustrate the utility of the process by drilling into the numerical details of each occupation, a general look at the AMOR aim based on a single occupation will serve to show the utility; the single occupation will be armour crewmen.

\(^{70}\) Defence R&D Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, Review of Attrition and Retention Research for the Canadian Forces, 39.

As part of the CF Expansion plan, the Armour Corps is meant to grow by approx 300, to an end state of 1941 by 2011.\textsuperscript{72} For 2008, the forecast required intake for armour crewman was 320. This number was based on forecast attrition within the Armour Corps as well as the need to meet Corps expansion goals. Based on actual recruiting successes, intake of crewman was 216, or 68\% of the goal. Of those enrolled 82 completed the basic occupational training, representing 26\% of the original goal. During the same period, the Corps lost 63 crewmen through attrition with the most common source being retirement. In the end, the Armour Corps grew by 19. At 2008's rate of growth it will take the Corps nearly 16 years to meet its final goal.\textsuperscript{73}

More important than the question of shear rate of growth is the question of loss of experience. The majority of new members of the corps that represent growth are inexperienced and require close supervision while they gain experience to be effective crewmen.\textsuperscript{74} Those that can provide the supervision are members of the same rank group (Sgt - WO) that are releasing. This dynamic has been caused in large part to CF reductions that occurred in the 1990s, as mentioned in the introduction. During "The Decade of Darkness" recruiting was reduced and early retirement was encouraged to shrink the CF.\textsuperscript{75} Shrinkage 10 - 15 years ago has resulted in a large number of seasoned NCMs approaching the 20 - 25 year retirement window, just as the CF is trying to grow. As the graph at figure 3 shows, this situation applies equally to nearly all occupations in the CF.

\textsuperscript{72} The number 1941 includes only those serving in armour specific field units. It does not include those employed in Army training establishments or other CF units.

\textsuperscript{73} Data provided by the Crewman Career Management Office, NDHQ Ottawa, on 2 Feb 2010. Point of contact, Maj Martin Boule, email Martin.Boule@forces.gc.ca

\textsuperscript{74} There are some that join with experience, mainly Component Transfer (CT) from the Res F, or by Occupation Transfer (OT) from another CF occupation.

While the data contained in the graph is from the 2006/07 time frame, one need only extrapolate the statistics forward three years to see where the CF is currently; there is a high number of experienced NCMs currently in the 18 - 22 year service bracket that either qualify now, or soon will qualify for a military pension. Force reductions in the 1990s have left a significantly inadequate back fill in experience behind them. While the dilemma is not constant across all occupations, the vast majority have been affected, both in terms of qualified personnel to man operational units and the various training facilities across the CF.

A good example of where this shortage of experience is being felt is with the experience level at the Army's combat arms training institution, the Combat Training Centre. Traditionally, instructors at the Centre are posted for a three - four year period, during which they receive their own career training, and also instruct as trainers on courses for which they previously had completed themselves. Their credentials as instructors are meant to be reinforced by experience actually functioning in the position at an

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operational unit. For example, an armour reconnaissance patrol commander instructor at the Armour School would be expected to not only have previously completed the course himself, he would have been employed as a patrol commander at his regiment. With the loss of experience, this dynamic has changed. At present, it is common to have instructors teaching students without any personal operational experience.

Focus on retention of the quality base of the CF, represented by those fully trained and part of the Trained Effective Strength of the force is essential to the CF being able to meet expansion goals while at the same time maintaining its historic high level of effectiveness. The drain of experience through attrition is a key area where CF leadership must apply energy to foster retention; there are no alternatives.

CHAPTER 3
DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Early Retention / the Easier Part

While unfortunate, there is an inevitable reality surrounding the high percentage of new recruits who never actually become fully trained members of the CF. While the CF continues its aggressive recruiting campaign, attrition rates for entry level personnel will remain high, unless changes are made to enrollment standards and / or the contractual limitations for release during basic level occupation training.

Enrollment standards have been relaxed, but training standards remain, for the most part unchanged. In order to change the trend, a fundamental review of all entry level training is required to determine where standards could be adapted to permit a higher level of success. While such an approach intuitively suggests a risk that quality would be impacted, it is a risk worth taking. Entry level training is about indoctrination of personnel into the CF, on completion of which they are not qualified to be employed within an occupation. Standards for occupational training are where quality assurance truly lies. In other words, reduction of entry level or basic level training would have a marginal impact on the quality of the final product.
In addition to reviewing training standards, contractual commitments between new recruits and the CF is an area that is not formalized. A new recruit who arrives at CFRG with the knowledge that he can decide to leave with very little warning will have a tendency to depart when the going gets tough. Allowing a recruit to easily terminate his or her basic training with little or no ramifications does not correspond to the needs of a force that is trying to expand. The policies that were adequate when the CF was focused on a steady state may not be applicable during a period of focused growth.

CFRG field recruiting staffs have a commitment to ensure that those they recruit know what it is they are about to undertake. A recruit who decides to opt for a Voluntary Release to quit basic training early on in the process because he "had no idea how difficult it would be", is representative of either a misinformed recruit, or someone who employed selective listening when being interviewed by the recruiter.

Finally, it would seem obvious that CFRG could simply increase its recruiting goals. This would result in a corresponding increase in the number of successful soldiers, sailors and airmen that complete their basic level occupation training. While this course of action seems straight forward, the reality is that both CFRG and CFLRS are working at maximum capacity. Therefore, without a huge investment in personnel, material and infrastructure, there is no option to surge the recruit training process to a measurable increase in throughput.\(^{77}\)

**Retaining the Experience Base / the Harder Part**

In order to maximize a positive impact on retention of members who make up the Trained Effective Strength of the CF, the social contract that exists between the profession and its members must be reviewed and updated. While overall responsibility for review and update of the social contract rests

\(^{77}\) As discussed by LCol Steve Whelan (Commandant CFLRS) at the Combat Training Centre Command Seminar, Quebec City, Feb 2009. CFLRS is working at maximum capacity. Indeed, the Canadian Forces Language School was forced to give up its share of accommodation at St Jean PQ, to allow for the expanded training requirements of CFLRS.
with Armed Forces Council, in practice, the office of the Chief Military Personnel would function as the lead. Underpinning the requirement for the review and update is recognition that practices which were sufficient during the downsizing of the CF in the 1990s are inadequate in 2010 while the CF is focused on expansion. The Chain of Command must make strengthening the bond between the CF and its members a priority. Indeed this concept of strengthening the Social Contract was indicated as a priority by the Armed Forces Council (AFC) as early as 2001.\textsuperscript{78} While there have been some initiatives that could be considered focused at strengthening the contract over the past nine years, increases in attrition would indicated that these efforts have been inadequate; a projected attrition rate of more than 9% by 2012, up from 4% in the late 1990s is telling indeed.

How does the CF strengthen its social contract with its members? Chapter four details some initiatives that will serve this purpose.

CHAPTER 4
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
SUMMARY /RECOMMENDATIONS

Entry Level Retention

As already alluded to, the issue of retaining CF members who are at the front end of their career as recruits is an easier challenge than are those who are trained and make up the quality base of the CF. With CFRG performing stellar work recruiting, and CFLRS working at maximum capacity training new recruits, there is very little room to increase the intake numbers. Therefore, the focus of retention for this group must look at two specific areas. First, entry level contractual agreements must be reviewed with a purpose of increasing the commitment of the individual. Requesting and being granted VR must not be a given for new recruits. Next, there must be a review of recruit training standards for recruits. This review

must cover everything from the minimum acceptable standards grant enrollment, to the actual performance objectives while completing occupational basic training. Such a review will determine if the standards today are meeting the need in terms of retention. Perhaps standards are too high for minimizing attrition, or perhaps they are too low for guaranteeing quality. In either case, an effective review will ultimately have a positive impact on retention; either a more capable recruit will be enrolled, or those enrolled will have a better chance of successful completion of basic level occupational training.

**Trained Effective Strength Retention**

The much more complex area for retention focus is on the quality of the CF; those that are occupation qualified and are members of the TES. With respect to this group, there are two broad areas that must be addressed to ensure the highest level of motivation among CF members. The first and most obvious is control of operational tempo. The 2002 Auditor’s General report found that CF members often cited conditions of work, including workload, as a contributing factor to dissatisfaction with the military. Conditions of work and family concerns, which include the amount of time spent away from family, were the two most common reasons given for leaving the military. This is an issue that is evident within most modern armed forces and will likely never be fully resolved; there never seems to be enough resources to meet the task requirement and the result is that the resources that are available become overworked and over stretched causing a negative impact, in this case lack of motivation to continue to serve.

The second area to be addressed is more individually based and deals with a refocus on individual needs based on motivational factors. Both areas are outlined and some fundamental recommendations for change are made.

**Tempo Control /Corporate Needs**

The CF is, at present, tasked to such a degree that the membership is experiencing a tempo that has been unequalled in recent decades. This high level of activity is further exasperated by a force structure that is expanding, placing higher demand on the profession to conduct individual training in order to maintain the right ranks and qualification to produce a capable deployable force. In order for the current level of operational activity to be sustainable, changes are required to ensure resources can meet demand over the long term. This increase in tempo has contributed to an increasing annual voluntary release rate that was 4% in 2004, to one projected to be over 9% by 2012.\(^{80}\) Ideally, the profession should be striving for a voluntary release rate of 0%. The conditions should exist where each and every CF member desires to remain as part of the team. This approach, while somewhat idealistic, should be part of the foundation of CF retention policy. The first step to reducing tempo should involve a review of the way the CF meets its task to determine where changes can be made in favour of reducing tempo. Such an effort would involve close coordination with Minister's office, since any changes to commitments would ultimately be a political decision, based on the best military advice of the CDS. The review must consider both resources available and operational commitments to optimize the resource to task ratio. Furthermore, the review must establish firm limits of what can be accomplished with the resources available; it is a question of balancing what is achievable, in terms of operational tasks, based on the optimal use of the force.

**Increase the Resource Pool and / or Reduce the Task Requirement**

In a theoretical sense, increases to size of the field force would reduce the impact of high tempo on the individual and would reduce the number of tasks that the already stretched force is achieving, because mathematically there would be more resources to meet demand. To achieve this in practice

\(^{80}\) ADM (IM) Presentation, 15 June 2004, National Defence Base Commander’s Forum
would require a comprehensive defence policy review. This review would provide the basis in
determining what it is that the CF must achieve. From this requirement, a resource bill could be
calculated. Once calculated, recruitment would be focused on increasing the correct resources (in terms
of military occupations) to meet the requirement and / or the tasks that are not deemed essential visa vie
the defence policy could be eliminated.

Adoption of this recommendation will not reduce tempo over the short term since it is a
complicated and lengthy process. However, reduction in training and preparation for operational
deployments could be achieved rather quickly. These reductions could come from reducing non-essential
pre deployment activities, not specifically related to upcoming deployment. The training / preparation
phase of the managed readiness cycle should represent less than one third of the time, with the balance of
the time being shifted to the reconstitution phase.

**Review of Operational Deployment Lengths**

Based on the Rand Corporation Study mentioned earlier, and the new approach that the United
States Military has adopted, the possibility of adjusting operational task lengths should be explored.
Longer, but fewer operational deployments may lessen the impact of high operational tempo on the
individual opposed to the current six month standard tour length. Conversely, it is possible that a shorter
(three month) rotation option would be a better approach to foster retention. Perhaps there is no one
standard solution, but rather a mix of tour lengths over a period of time could be the answer.

To determine the best approach for defining operational tour lengths, there are a few steps that
can be easily taken. For example, a closer look at how similar sized and tasked forces, such as the
Australian Defence Force, approach tour lengths may provide insight to better options. As well, asking
the CF membership, via a Force wide survey, will also give an indication of what the optimal tour length
is from their perspective. Regardless, review of tour lengths must be an ongoing process. Factors such as
living conditions deployed, level of hazard within the theatre and the prospects for mid tour leave will all
be variables that will help define the proper tour length for a given operation.
Individual Needs

A discussed earlier, in order to maximize the motivation of the membership of the CF, focus on certain areas of individual needs and expectancy must be fulfilled. The two types of needs, intrinsic (inherent to the job) and extrinsic (external to the job), must be met. Challenge, responsibility and a sense of doing something worthwhile are examples of intrinsic rewards, while examples of extrinsic rewards include such things as pay, promotions opportunities and benefits. In order for members to be satisfied and motivated in their careers, both types of expectancies must be addressed, remembering as well that the two types can be mutually supporting.

The key areas of individual needs, which will be addressed in order to make recommendations for the best level of individual motivation, are, honours and awards (a program review), career advancement and assessment issues, and salary (including pay and benefits) Each will be briefly put into context with recommendations for improvement following immediately thereafter.

Honours and Awards Program

At present, many of the high recognition awards such as the Officer of Military Merit (OMM) and the Member of Military Merit (MMM) are reserved for senior members of the CF. The level of substantiation required to present such an award normally means an individual has to serve for many years before the requirement of the award can be satisfied.

Prior to expanding the scope of the H and A program, a change in philosophy is required. It must be recognized that an expansion would not lower the level of respect for the system; rather it should be viewed in a positive light as a means to recognize outstanding individual contributions and as a way to satisfy one of the extrinsic expectations of the CF membership.

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Show me a republic, ancient or modern, in which there have been no decorations. Some people call them baubles. Well it is by such baubles that one leads men.

-Napoleon I, Remark on establishing the Legion Of Honor, 19 May 1802.

It is not within the scope of this paper to suggest detailed changes to the CF H and A Program. Suffice to say that the current system is far too rigid to allow for the right level of recognition. First, the current awards available to CF members must be reviewed in terms of the criteria for presentation with a view to expansion. Specifically, the rate of presentation should be increased to allow for more annual awards such as the OMM and MMM to be presented. Second, a series of new awards should be instituted to provide the means of better recognizing exceptional individual performance at all rank levels. This is not to say that such an award would be presented to all members, rather it would be reserved for the top percentile based on performance, to maintain the intrinsic value of the award.

One philosophy is to establish a military merit award that would be presented to the top five percent of each rank level, by occupation or classification. Beginning at a junior rank level of corporal (cpl), the award could be in the form of a medal. Subsequent attainment of the same level of performance at a different rank level would be recognized by presentation of a clasp to the medal. This type of recognition would ensure that good performance was recognized, even if not resulting in a promotion.

Recently, the CF has begun to improve in this important area. Two new medals awarded for service in the Face of the Enemy (The General Service Cross and the General Service Medal) were approved and became part of the H and A program in late 2004 and new medals for bravery were added in 2006. However, more work is required to provide more recognition outside of traditional combat recognition. It is time to re-engineer the H and A Program to ensure the recognition expected is actually offered, thus positively affecting individual esteem. Recognition of individual achievement is essential in order to ensure that individual self-esteem needs are met. It must be modernized and adapted to meet the expectations of today's CF member.
Career Advancement Issues

Junior Leader Training

Expansion of the CF in recent years has led to an increased requirement for leadership training. As the RF element of the CF attempts to reach its projected end-state TES of 70,000, there has been a corresponding increase in the requirement of more junior leaders. For 2009, the emphasis for leadership training was placed on the Primary Leader Qualification (PLQ) series of courses. Traditionally, completion of PLQ would be followed by a period of time at one's home unit, where the new skills obtained during the course could be honed. Promotion would then follow based on where the individual placed on the selection for promotion list. Expansion demands have changed the dynamic significantly.

The Chief of the Land Staff issued direction to army leadership in early 2009 that drastically changed the process for promotion of junior leaders for the Army. Specifically, he directed that all PLQ graduates would be promoted to master corporal upon graduation, regardless of where they sat on the promotion list. In essence, this new approach negated the existing promotion list which had been based on merit. Furthermore, not all corporals selected for PLQ training were available to be qualified. The tempo caused by repeated deployments on operations meant that many had to skip the course in favour of deploying; resulting in those lower on the promotion list potentially being promoted in advance of those higher on the list, provided they successfully completed their PLQ. While it is still too early to tell what numeric impact this decision has had on retention of junior leaders, the two theories of motivation tell us there will be a negative impact on both the human needs of esteem and self-actualization. CF leadership must make well informed decisions concerning how best to meet expansion needs. Specific consideration

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83 PLQ is the first level of leadership training. It prepares candidates to assume the role of small unit leader. For example, a deputy section commander in an infantry battalion, or a vehicle crew commander in an armour regiment.

84 CLS (also known as the Army Commander) issued this direction to Army Leadership at his January 2009 Orders Group. Despite leadership's objections, the new policy was adopted to the degree possible across the Landforce.
in the areas of training, service contract review and performance assessment must be afforded to avoid situations that become counterproductive.

**Individual Training vs Operational Deployments**

Current NCM training begins when a member enters the service. It is geared early on to providing a basic trained individual to function as a member of a team. If that individual succeeds in his or her career at the basic level, and demonstrates the right level of leadership, chances of being selected for leadership training are high. However, in today’s CF it is becoming more difficult to ensure that the right individual is matched up with the correct course at the proper time. The level of operational tempo is the over-riding factor in causing this difficulty.

Again, as indicated in the previous section, the needs of an expanding force cannot be considered in isolation. Individual training requirements during a period of expansion must balance the needs of the CF with those of the individual. While there is no single solution to achieving this balance, there are three independent but linked initiatives that would help. First, individual training must be given a degree of priority over operational deployments. This is not to say that in all cases it will be the priority, but as a rule, CF Leadership must place a higher requirement on individual qualifications to ensure the long term health of the CF. Placing the priority on operational deployments over individual training is shortsighted. Next, a comprehensive review of detailed individual training requirements must be conducted to ensure that the CF is indeed training to need. The current AMOR is not sufficient in determining this need; it is too general and not conducted often enough. A quarterly approach to requirement review would provide the CF with a much more accurate appreciation of the need, and thus avoid wasting resources training beyond need. This type of review is not an easy task to initiate and commitment from all CF Branches and Corps would be necessary of it to have utility.

Finally, a first principles review of all courses must be conducted to ensure that the training being delivered is meeting the needs of the modern force in today's operating environment. The CF has neither the human or material resources available to conduct outdated / unnecessary training.
CPAS Development

Under the leadership of the Chief of Military Personnel, the CFPAS evaluation system must be further developed to better differentiate between performance and potential. Those achieving high performance must be recognized for it. However, if an individual is lacking in potential, but performs his or her job with excellent performance, then he or she must be made aware that although a high performer, chances of advancement are limited. This may seem counterproductive to motivation development, when in fact it is not. Advancement rewards could be replaced with more trades related training to improve on the member’s performance skills in order to make them a master of the requirements of their current rank, without focusing on potential for promotion. This area then could be tied to H and A. A soldier who masters his or her profession, but is not scored high in potential for rank advancement, could be given recognition in terms of monetary benefits (performance bonuses) and / or the creation and awarding of high performance insignia. Such insignia would be an indication of the high level of skill the solider achieved within his or her area of expertise. An approach such as this would help satisfy the Rewards-Personal Goal relationship aspect of the Expectancy Theory as well as the Esteem factor of the Hierarchy of Needs Theory.

Contract Review

The existing terms of service within the CF follows a system of blocks of guaranteed service. Once basic training is complete, an individual is given a Variable Initial Engagement of three to nine years, based on the training requirements of his occupation.85 If at the end of this period he or she is performing to an acceptable level, a second BE is offered. At the six-year point, consideration is given for offering a 25-year contract to the member, known as an Intermediate Engagement 25 (IE 25). Following or in place of an IE 25, an offer of a contract to age 55 or Indefinite Period Of Service (IPS)

85 The VIE applies more to NCMs. Officers typically serve the first nine years of their career on a Short Service Engagement (SSE). The two become relatively the same at the conversion to IE25.
could be possible if the member is selected. If not selected, he could be offered the alternative of a Continuing Engagement (CE) for a period of 5 years. The rate of offering IPS or CE is based on the needs of the service, and comes with a potential penalty. For example, a member who accepts an offer of IPS and subsequently decides to take his release will be penalized when he receives his annuity.86

The current system was developed prior to understanding the full impact of expansion. While there have been updates, more is required to permit the TOS system to support retention. For example, while it is understandable that an individual must be held accountable to the terms of the contract, and is subject to a pension penalty for not honoring the contract, there should be a system of rewards for those that do honour the contract. A slight augmentation to the individual's pension would go a long way to enticing him to fulfill contract commitment and perhaps to even extend those commitments beyond the contract. While such a change would require amendments to the Pension Act, it is possible and must be explored as an option to motivating those with experience to stay with the CF for as long as possible and as long as they are beneficial to the organization.

**Salary (Including Pay and Benefits)**

CF personnel salaries are very good when compared to the national average. For example, an average Canadian's annual salary in 2007 was $38,010.87 By comparison, a fully trained private has an annual salary of $46,236.88 In addition, CF members are compensated for work related travel, receive housing assistance funding in certain areas of Canada, are provided with full medical and dental health


care coverage and receive additional allowances for training duty, operational deployments and specialty qualifications. Therefore, it can be assumed that while a global increase in the current pay and benefits package may have a positive impact on attrition (money does "talk" in some cases), the benefit would not correspond to the impact that such an increase would have on the defense budget. However, there is merit at looking at a wider application of the signing bonus program currently in place.

At present, CF members in severely undermanned occupations potentially qualify for signing bonuses. For example, an individual with a diploma in communications technology could possible qualify for up to a $20,000 signing bonus to join the CF as a communications specialist. The difficulty with the CF bonus plan is its selectivity, and when it is applied. To be most effective, the program should have a wider application and be applicable to those that are nearing a gateway in their career. Tied to possible pension increases for those that choose continued service over release, a comprehensive re-signing bonus program would positively affect retention. However, care in program development would be essential to target those groups where the impact would be the most beneficial to the CF - a "global" re-signing bonus program would lose impact over time; it would be a given. In other-words, such a program would be rather surgical in its application; the costs for which would fluctuate based on the health of the CF in a given year.

The actual mechanics of how to make a signing bonus package attractive are broad and could be combined with other extrinsic rewards. For example, an additional fixed period of service could be offered, together with a signing bonus.89 Another option might be to provide a period of stability for the individual in which he would be guaranteed a period of protection from deployments for a period longer than the current 12 months following a deployment. Regardless of the method or approach, the terms of service policy should provide the member with a degree of confidence that the good work he is doing is

89 Signing bonuses have been employed in specific occupations where specific skill sets are required. In this case, the program of bonuses would be employed globally, with the difference being the financial amount of the bonus.
valued by the organization to the degree that it is willing to make concessions to keep him as part of the team.

CONCLUSION

A career in the CF today is a high tempo experience. The level of tempo is due to both an increase in operational deployments in recent years, as well as an aggressive effort to increase the human resource levels available to fully meet the increased demands of the CFDS in coming years.

The personnel resources necessary to meet CF Strategic Defence commitments have been identified as a key pillar to CF success.

![Figure 4 - CF Funding Breakdown by Key Pillar](image)

As indicated in figure 3, personnel costs make up more than half of the defense budget. Therefore, the importance of maximizing output from such a huge commitment cannot be overstated.

To ensure that the members of today’s CF are motivated to continue to serve their country in meeting the challenges that the increased tempo presents, a review of some fundamental individual motivational factors is necessary. Realizing that the modern soldier is a reflection of his or her generation and that his individual needs are partially tied to the values of the generation are the first steps to developing a clear understanding what an individual's human needs (both intrinsic and extrinsic) are. The ability to satisfy these needs is a challenge for all leaders in today’s CF.

As a profession, the CF adequately satisfies the basic needs of its members, however, human motivational theories indicate that satisfaction of basic needs is not enough to truly motivate. Individuals must receive recognition for their efforts, together with the confidence that there is potential for them to excel in their profession. Such recognition will satisfy their intrinsic needs because it will cause them to feel good about their accomplishments, while at the same time satisfying their extrinsic needs by recognizing their efforts. To satisfy these esteem and self actualization motivational factors there are some areas where the CF can improve.

First, a systematic change to the CF Honours and Awards program is required. The program must be structured to meet the expectations of today’s modern soldier. It should be expanded to better identify exceptional performance in today’s high tempo environment, and must not be viewed as being rigid, meaning it should not be used as exclusively as it has been in the past. An expanded system would increase the methods available to leaders to recognize the performance of their subordinates, thus providing them with a motivational tool to satisfy key individual motivational needs, satisfying both intrinsic and extrinsic needs.

Next, the system of recognizing both the work that CF members do, as well as their potential to excel in their field, needs to be further refined. The CFPAS system was created to separate performance from potential. Concerted effort to continue to develop the system as it was intended must remain a focus. The ability to rate individuals based on their own individual performance will satisfy their extrinsic needs (assuming they have performed well) for the recognition they would receive, while at the same time supporting satisfaction of intrinsic needs, by reinforcing the good feeling they would have from meeting the challenges of their job.

Thirdly, the current CF TOS policy requires review and update. Ideally, the policy should look to increase the attractiveness of new periods of service for those entering a possible pension gateway in their career. For example, a sergeant approaching the 20 year point should be enticed to choose continued service over release.
Focus on the three areas mentioned above will assist greatly with improving the motivation level of the CF membership. High motivation will positively affect morale, improve synergy and ensure that the CF is well prepared to meet its modern challenges, by ensuring that loss of trained personnel through unnecessary attrition is minimized.

The ability of leaders to increase the motivation level of the CF membership will be tied directly to the tempo within which the profession is operating. At the present time, the CF is “doing more with less” more than it ever has in the past. Trying to complete or manage too many tasks with too few resources will continue to have a negative impact on the motivation level of the members, despite the ability to satisfy individual needs. Continuous operational deployments in the current frequency and length will perpetuate the high levels of voluntary attrition. The members will grow weary of the burden and the profession will continue to lose skilled and capable soldiers, sailors and airmen through voluntary release, a situation that could be considered akin to wasting of resources. The leadership element within the CF has a responsibility to both the society they serve, and the personnel that they lead to ensure that this does not happen; it is a key responsibility that one accepts when becoming a leader within the CF.

The Social Contract between the CF as a profession and its members must be strengthened. While such a statement is easy to make, it is not easy to action. While there is no panacea for reducing attrition within the CF, there are many different areas that can be a focus for strengthening the contract. This monograph has made some specific suggestions of where these changes or modifications can occur; perhaps some are being implemented at present, or soon will be. In any case, CF Leadership, as represented by AFC, must remain fully cognoscente that a balance between the needs of the CF and the needs of its members is the best way to keep the Social Contract strong.
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