Achieving Operational Adaptability:
Capacity Building needs to become a
Warfighting Function

A Monograph
by
LTC Eric L. Walker
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 2010

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
### Title and Subtitle
Achieving Operational Adaptability: Capacity Building needs to become a Warfighting Function

### Authors
Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Walker, United States Army

### Publisher
School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)
250 Gibbon Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134

### Distribution / Availability Statement
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

### Abstract
America’s security depends on developing a flexible and adaptive military that can integrate the threat or use of force with stability and partnership activities in complex operating environments. As a learning organization, the U.S. Army must examine its current doctrine and conceptual frameworks to determine if they sufficiently represent the logic behind the application of land power and the vision outlined in the recently updated Quadrennial Defense Review and Army Capstone Concept. This monograph proposes an additional warfighting function: capacity building. The current six warfighting functions include movement and maneuver, fires, command and control, intelligence, sustainment, and protection. The warfighting functions originated in the 1980s and represent a functional analysis of conventional maneuver operations when current and future operational requirements necessitate a more comprehensive doctrinal mental model for the balanced application of land power. Aspects of military theory, learning theory, doctrine, operational design, and military history support this recommendation by highlighting the importance of comprehensive doctrinal mental models when thinking critically and developing concepts. Making capacity building a warfighting function ensures that future U.S. Army leaders and planners visualize and balance the full spectrum of their responsibilities and capabilities during the operations process. Otherwise, the U.S. Army will continue to utilize a doctrinal mental model focused primarily on conventional maneuver warfare that potentially contributed to operational shortfalls in Iraq.

### Subject Terms
Warfighting functions, capacity building, operational adaptability, design criteria, land power, design, learning organization, operations process

### Security Classification of:
- **U**

### Limitation of Abstract
- **U**

### Number of Pages
- **U**

### Responsible Person
Stefan J. Banach
COL, U.S. Army

**Phone Number (include area code)**
913-758-3302
Title of Monograph: Achieving Operational Adaptability: Capacity building needs to become a Warfighting Function

Approved by:

______________________________  Monograph Director
Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.

______________________________  Monograph Reader
James Tennant, COL, SF

______________________________  Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Stefan J. Banach, COL, IN

______________________________  Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
Abstract


Eight years of persistent conflict and increasing engagement requirements across the globe have followed the end of the Cold War. Appropriately, leaders and theorists recognize the professional military obligation and importance of adapting military power and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. America’s security depends on developing a flexible and adaptive military that can integrate the threat or use of force with stability and partnership activities in complex operating environments. As a learning organization, the U.S. Army must examine its current doctrine and conceptual frameworks to determine if they sufficiently represent the logic behind the application of land power and the vision outlined in the recently updated Quadrennial Defense Review and Army Capstone Concept.

This monograph contributes to organizational learning by proposing an additional warfighting function, capacity building, to the current list. The current six warfighting functions include movement and maneuver, fires, command and control, intelligence, sustainment, and protection. The warfighting functions originated in the 1980s and represent a functional analysis of conventional maneuver operations when current and future operational requirements necessitate a more comprehensive doctrinal mental model for the balanced application of land power. Aspects of military theory, learning theory, doctrine, operational design, and military history support this recommendation by highlighting the importance of comprehensive doctrinal mental models when thinking critically and developing concepts. Making capacity building a warfighting function ensures that future U.S. Army leaders and planners visualize and balance the full spectrum of their responsibilities and capabilities during the operations process.

The U.S. Army’s experience in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq demonstrates that conventional maneuver capability does not adequately represent or achieve the broad range of strategic ends required of a land power force. As a vital purpose and role, the U.S. Army also supports the success of others in generating stable environments and developing self-sufficiency.

The capacity building warfighting function should be defined as the related tasks and systems that support the strengthening of political, economic, and security institutions of foreign nations or the U.S. government as a means of furthering U.S. policy objectives. The scope of this function includes the pre-existing U.S. Army tasks associated with stability and civil support operations; training, advising, and assisting others across the rest of the warfighting functions; and civil military operations. Adding capacity building facilitates three improvements in doctrine. First, the addition provides a more comprehensive representation of land power within the force. Second, it supports the U.S. Army’s vision of operational adaptability and further codifies existing irregular warfare capabilities and doctrine by decentralizing stability and civil support operations. Finally, this addition captures a relevant, theoretically valid, and historically critical function of the U.S. Army that simplifies the framework of U.S. Army’s tasks represented in Field Manual 7-15: The Army Universal Task List. Otherwise, the U.S. Army will continue to utilize a doctrinal mental model focused primarily on conventional maneuver warfare that potentially contributed to operational shortfalls in Iraq.
# Table of Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1  
Capacity Building ........................................................................................................................ 7  
Military Power ............................................................................................................................. 9  
Theoretical Underpinnings ............................................................................................................. 12  
  Learning Organizations ............................................................................................................. 15  
  Doctrine ..................................................................................................................................... 18  
  Design........................................................................................................................................ 23  
Military History of Capacity Building .......................................................................................... 27  
  U.S. Post-conflict Operations in Germany ................................................................................ 28  
  U.S. Post-conflict Operations in Japan ...................................................................................... 31  
  U.S. Capacity Building in Korea ............................................................................................... 34  
  U.S. Capacity Building in Vietnam ........................................................................................... 37  
  U.S. Capacity Building in OIF .................................................................................................. 41  
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 45  
Recommendations ......................................................................................................................... 47  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 51
Introduction

Those that fail to adapt lose, and the nations they defend with them. Organizational adaptation thus is a vital and continuing professional military obligation.

Huba Wass de Czege and Richard Hart Sinnreich, 2002

Our own regulations, bureaucratic processes, staff relationships, and culture complicate the ability of our soldiers and leaders to achieve synchronized nonlethal effects across the battlespace. Our traditional training model, still shuddering from the echo of our Cold War mentality, has infused our organization to think in only kinetic terms.

MG Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army, 2006

I believe our ability to help other countries better provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of America’s global leadership in the 21st century, and a critical part of protecting our own security.

Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, 2010

Eight years of persistent conflict and increasing engagement requirements across the globe have followed the end of the Cold War. As highlighted by the above statements, leaders and theorists recognize the professional military obligation and importance of adapting military power and capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. Since the 1980s, the U.S. Army has developed an unrivaled conventional maneuver warfare capability and an experienced operational force. Despite earning a healthy reputation for adapting while in combat, the U.S. Army’s

---

transformation is not complete. Doctrine must evolve, and training models require refinement. The U.S. Army must balance its capabilities, especially large-scale conventional maneuver operations, against a broad spectrum of current and future requirements for land power.\(^5\)

America’s security depends on developing a flexible and adaptive military that can integrate the threat or use of force with stability and partnership activities in complex operating environments. The recent *Quadrennial Defense Review* published on 1 February 2010 and the *Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability in an Era of Persistent Conflict* published on 21 December 2009 highlight this shift and have updated the capabilities required of the U.S. Army. Specifically, the *Quadrennial Defense Review* states “we must prepare for a broad range of security challenges on the horizon – ranging from the military modernization programs of other countries to non-state groups developing more cunning and destructive means to attack the U.S. and our allies and partners.”\(^6\) The *Army Capstone Concept* states the Army must develop operational adaptability and become “proficient in the fundamentals and possess common understanding of how to combine joint, Army, interagency, and multinational capabilities to assist friends, to protect and reassure indigenous populations, and to identify, isolate, and defeat enemies under uncertain and dynamic conditions.”\(^7\) As a learning organization, the U.S. Army

---


\(^7\) U.S. Department of Defense, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The Army Capstone Concept – Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict (21 December 2009)*, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf (accessed March 18, 2010): 16. According to the *Army Capstone Concept*, operational adaptability includes competency in combined arms while performing defeat and stability mechanisms; the ability to integrate joint, interagency, and multi-national assets; the willingness and flexibility of thought to adjust rapidly; the ability to maintain initiative by developing the situation through action; and comfort with ambiguity, decentralized execution, and collaborative planning.
must examine its current doctrine and conceptual frameworks to determine if they sufficiently represent the logic behind the application of land power and the vision outlined in these new documents.

A study of U.S. Army operations over the last seventy years reveals the challenge of writing doctrine for full spectrum operations and exposes the origin of the warfighting functions. This monograph contributes to organizational learning by proposing an additional warfighting function, capacity building, to the current list. The current six warfighting functions include movement and maneuver, fires, command and control, intelligence, sustainment, and protection. The warfighting functions originated in the 1980s and represent a functional analysis of conventional maneuver operations when current and future operational requirements necessitate a more comprehensive doctrinal mental model for the balanced application of land power.

Aspects of military theory, learning theory, doctrine, operational design, and military history support this recommendation by highlighting the importance of comprehensive doctrinal mental models when thinking critically and developing concepts. Making capacity building a warfighting function ensures that future U.S. Army leaders and planners visualize and balance the full spectrum of their responsibilities and capabilities during the operations process.

---

8 “The Army’s operational concept is full spectrum operations: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.” U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations, 3-1.


10 In the 1980s, TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9 established seven Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) which have now become the warfighting functions. On page 73, TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9 defined BOS as “the major functions occurring on the battlefield, performed by the force to successfully execute operations (battles and engagements) by the Army.” On pages 2-3, TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9 states that the functions do “not apply to actions short of war” and that they represent “the domain of combat activities that can be performed by a force at the tactical level of war.” These statements highlight that the creation of the BOS focused on the functional analysis of combat activities which parallels the U.S. Army’s emphasis on maneuver warfare. Unites States Department of Defense, TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9: Blueprint of the Battlefield, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1990.

11 “The Army’s model for the exercise of command and control is the operations process. The operations process consists of the major command and control activities performed during operations:
Field Manual 3-0: Operations defines the warfighting functions as “a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.” This definition highlights how functions assist commanders in visualizing, describing, and directing operational and training concepts because the warfighting functions doctrinally represent the capabilities and purpose of the force. Regrettably, the definition of warfighting functions assumes that the functions represent all of the requirements and capabilities of the force when they neglect the tasks, people, organizations and processes that represent stability and civil support operations – two of the four categories that constitute the full-spectrum operational concept.

Furthermore, the current warfighting functions do not adequately represent how the U.S. Army has supported others across the spectrum of conflict. Security force assistance, civil military operations, and stability tasks are just a few examples of relevant military responsibilities that do not fit within the current warfighting functions. The U.S. Army’s experience in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq demonstrates that conventional maneuver capability does not adequately represent or achieve the broad range of strategic ends required of a land power force. As a vital purpose and role, the U.S. Army also supports the success of others in generating stable environments and developing self-sufficiency.


13 U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations, 3-7. The tasks listed under the four categories of full spectrum operations are not contained within the warfighting functions.

14 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates highlighted the historical existence and importance of capacity building by stating that “helping other countries better defend themselves or fight beside us – by providing equipment, training, or other forms of support – is something the U.S. has been doing in various ways for nearly three-quarters of a century.” Gates, “Gates calls for Building Foreign Troops’ Capacity.”
the operations process: planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations and training.\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process} also focused on combat power as the essence of the U.S. Army’s capabilities.\textsuperscript{16} This monograph argues for an expanded paradigm of power by focusing on land power and by arguing for an additional warfighting function – capacity building.\textsuperscript{17} Otherwise, the U.S. Army will continue to utilize a doctrinal mental model focused primarily on conventional maneuver warfare that potentially contributed to operational shortfalls in Iraq.

Adding capacity building facilitates three improvements in doctrine. First, the addition provides a more comprehensive representation of land power within the force.\textsuperscript{18} Second, it supports the U.S. Army’s vision of operational adaptability and further codifies existing irregular warfare capabilities and doctrine by decentralizing stability and civil support operations.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15}“Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs synchronize the warfighting functions in accordance with the commander’s intent and concept of operations.” U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process}, 1-12.

\textsuperscript{16}“Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions.” U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process}, 1-12.

\textsuperscript{17}Thomas S. Kuhn, \textit{The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}, 3rd Ed. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Thomas S. Kuhn’s book on paradigms exposes the significance of shared beliefs in scientific or professional communities. According to Kuhn, paradigm shifts result from an emergence of anomalies, crisis over the legitimacy of previous beliefs, and resolution of the crisis with the establishment of a new paradigm. This monograph argues that the military is a professional body with a warfighting function paradigm that needs adjustment with the addition of the capacity building function because of its existence in history, prevalence in current operations, expected presence in the future, and compatibility with recognized military theory.

\textsuperscript{18}“Because the unique nature of local conditions will demand that the lowest echelons have access to the array of combined arms and joint capabilities necessary to deal with the uncertainty of the future operational environment, the Army must decentralize competency in full spectrum operations as well as the ability to effectively transition between offensive, defensive, and stability, or support operations must exist at the lowest possible echelons.” This monograph argues for the addition of capacity building so that the warfighting functions represent full spectrum operations. U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Army Capstone Concept}, 39.

\textsuperscript{19}The Army Capstone Concept defines operational adaptability as “a quality that Army leaders and forces exhibit based on critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and decentralization, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and an ability to make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation.” U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Army Capstone Concept}, 16; \textit{FM 3-0} defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a population.” U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Field Manual 3-0: Operations}, Glossary-8.
Finally, this addition captures a relevant, theoretically valid, and historically critical function of the U.S. Army that simplifies the framework of U.S. Army’s tasks represented in Field Manual 7-15: The Army Universal Task List.

The first section of the monograph defines the capacity building function and proposes defining land power with an expanded list of warfighting functions. The second section examines military theory to review land power responsibilities in war and correlates those responsibilities to the attributes of a learning organization, doctrine, and operational design. The third section analyzes the existence of capacity building in five case studies by utilizing four evaluation criteria that originate from design theory: logic, function, form, and application. The five case studies – World War II-Germany, World War II-Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq – expose the critical presence of the capacity building function. The final section summarizes the findings of the monograph, provides a graphic for operational adaptability, and recommends three changes in doctrine. These recommendations include focusing U.S. Army doctrine on land power to include the capacity building function versus combat power and the current warfighting functions, decentralizing stability and civil support tasks into the warfighting functions, and consolidating the Army Universal Task List into a functional construct.

In 2008, the capacity building concept emerged in doctrine. Capacity building joined many other concepts, like full spectrum operations, stability operations, security sector reform and security force assistance, that might have been in practice or doctrine, but did not have appropriate emphasis through the 1990s. These concepts emerged from a renewed understanding in the last ten years that the U.S. Army has responsibilities in supporting others during combat,

---

crises, post-conflict environments, and peaceful military engagement. This monograph argues for redefining capacity building as a warfighting function in order to enhance the U.S. Army’s conceptual understanding and adaptive application of land power across the full spectrum of its responsibilities.

**Capacity Building**

If we will persist in thinking out tactical problems in terms of Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, then we shall render our minds rigid to all new ideas. To persuade our minds to become flexible and recipient we must think in functions.

J.F.C. Fuller, “Tactics and Mechanization,” 1927

As a profession, the US Army has the responsibility to maintain a body of knowledge for emerging practitioners to use as a guide. J.F.C. Fuller argues for the utilization of functions so that the military practitioner thinks with an open mind. This monograph concurs with J.F.C. Fuller’s premise, but argues for an expanded list of functions so doctrine does not limit or negatively influence comprehensive thinking during problem solving. Utilizing lists during problem solving can limit creativity and prompt mechanistic techniques, but employing insufficient lists in military doctrine can be even more damaging to comprehensive thinking. Adding capacity building to the current warfighting functions ensures the functions not only

21 The *Quadrennial Defense Review*, *Army Capstone Concept*, and *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* highlight the need for the U.S. military to improve its doctrine across the spectrum of conflict. Specifically, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* states that “despite considerable historical experiences with these activities [security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities], the U.S. military has allowed doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting them to lapse.” U.S. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0*, 30.


represent conventional maneuver operations, but also represent the U.S. Army’s responsibilities in supporting others.

The capacity building warfighting function should be defined as the related tasks and systems that support the strengthening of political, economic, and security institutions of foreign nations or the U.S. government as a means of furthering U.S. policy objectives. The scope of this function includes the pre-existing U.S. Army tasks associated with stability and civil support operations; training, advising, and assisting others across the rest of the warfighting functions; and civil military operations.

At first glance, the capacity building function appears to dilute the combat capabilities of the U.S. Army by adding additional requirements. This argument disregards historical precedence, ignores current operations, and conflicts with the Department of Defense’s guidance on stability operations and irregular warfare. The capacity building function does not necessarily add to U.S. Army requirements. It restructures and decentralizes its current tasks and responsibilities within doctrine to ensure that leaders and planners adequately conceptualize full spectrum operations when utilizing the warfighting functions.

---

24 In addition to understanding the definition of capacity building as a function, the term “capacity” refers to both the qualitative ability to do something (capability), as well as the quantitative amount of that capability. The capacity building function includes activities that facilitate the development of capability (skill), will, or volume of skill in others. In the opinion of the author, deep understanding of the political and cultural context of the operational environment assists the military practitioner in enabling the will of others. Will cannot be given or trained, but legitimate, respectful, and appropriate support can engender success, self-sufficiency, and motivation. The scope of activity represented by capacity building includes a range of military support to others from humanitarian assistance and civil security to nation building. John DeJarnett, “Toward a Nation Building Operating Concept,” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 09-10, 1.

The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, stated on 3 March 2010 that “military leaders at all levels must be completely frank about the limits of what military power can achieve, with what risk, and in what timeframe.”

For U.S. Army leaders and planners to understand, discuss, and integrate the full spectrum of land power in support of strategic objectives, the U.S. Army must ensure that its doctrine represents the entire spectrum. Expanding the warfighting functions to include capacity building enables the U.S. Army to visualize and evaluate the allocation of resources and efforts across the full spectrum.

Conventional maneuver warfare should always have the highest priority of effort within the military because no other department in the executive branch has this responsibility. However, assessing operational risk becomes difficult when the doctrinal warfighting functions do not represent the full spectrum and the movement and maneuver function cannot be compared with capacity building efforts along the functions.

Next, the monograph examines military power in order to justify the focus on land power. Afterwards, critical aspects of military theory, learning organizations, doctrine, and operational design reveal how expanding the warfighting functions improves doctrine’s ability to describe land power. These concepts also contribute to the examination of the five case studies.

**Military Power**

Military power cannot, by itself, restore or guarantee stable peace. It must, however, establish global, regional, and local conditions that allow the other instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—to exert their full influence.

*Field Manual 3-0: Operations, 2008*

Currently, joint doctrine indirectly relates military power with the joint functions since both concepts represent military capabilities. However, the U.S. Army directly utilizes the

---

warfighting functions to represent combat power and defines combat power as “the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit/formation can apply at a given time.” Field Manual 3-0: Operations states “commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power” and “apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.”

In January 2009, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) stated that military activities, even in war, “may extend beyond defeating enemy forces in battle, [and] to be an effective policy instrument, joint forces must provide political leaders a much wider range of competencies than just dominance in combat.” The Army Capstone Concept states “Army forces must be prepared to assist friends, reassure and protect populations, and identify, isolate, and defeat enemies.” Additionally, Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process states that leaders need to “project their understanding beyond the realm of physical combat.” Since the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Army Capstone Concept, and Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process highlight the necessity for competencies beyond the “combat” moniker, and language represents thought, this monograph will utilize the term “land power” to represent the capabilities of the U.S. Army instead of “combat power.”

28 Joint Publication 3-0: Operations references the importance and breadth of military power, but does not directly connect military power to the joint functions. “Combatant commanders use the capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as alliance, coalition, and interagency relationships and military assistance enhancements in theater as the basis of military power.” Also, “joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help joint force commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (Change 1: 13 February 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf/search="jp 3-0", (accessed 27 March 2010), I-4, I-5, and III-1; The U.S. Army’s definition of combat power exceeds the joint doctrine’s definition: “The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.” U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, 98; U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations, 4-1; Ibid.

29 U.S. Department of Defense, Army Capstone Concept, 8.

30 U.S. Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, 1; U.S. Department of Defense, TRADOC PAM 525-3-0: Army Capstone Concept, 7; U.S. Department of Defense, Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process, 3-2; Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning is not as current as the
The U.S. Army’s beneficial use of the warfighting functions to describe land power because of their compatibility with design and joint doctrine.\textsuperscript{31}

Comparing the essence of the Army’s current warfighting functions with the vision of the Army Capstone Concept reveals that the functions focus on the last purpose – identify, isolate, and defeat enemies. The other two purposes – assist friends and reassure and protect populations – are not sufficiently represented. The proposed definition of capacity building ensures the warfighting functions support the Army’s new vision of operational adaptability. Across the globe, the U.S. Army assists and influences friends, partners, and disadvantaged populations during combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities, but the U.S. Army’s current warfighting functions do not adequately frame those efforts.\textsuperscript{32}

Before military professionals make significant changes in doctrine – such as adding another warfighting function - detailed analysis, review, and debate should shape the evolutionary or transformative change. Culturally, military professionals pride themselves in nesting future initiatives and changes within recognized military theory, relevant historical continuities, recent experience, and future threat templates. The following review of military theory, learning organizations, doctrine, and design theory sets the stage for examining the five case studies that highlight the historical existence of the capacity building function. One of the preeminent dictums from the past that should shape the warfighting functions includes the relationship between the military power and national policy.

\textsuperscript{31} “The Army’s warfighting functions are fundamentally linked to the joint functions. They also parallel those of the Marine Corps.” U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations}, 4-3.

\textsuperscript{32} U.S. DoD, \textit{Capstone Concept for Joint Operations}, 14. According to the \textit{Capstone Concept for Joint Operations}, combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction are the four categories of activities that represent what the military currently executes and will execute in the future.
Theoretical Underpinnings

War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.

Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*33

Many argue that Carl Von Clausewitz remains the premier military theorist of all times.34 Multiple references in this monograph include Clausewitz as a base source: *Field Manual 3-0: Operations*, the *Army Capstone Concept*, and the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*. In his work, *On War*, Clausewitz exposed the ultimate nature and dynamic of war, the relationship between politics and war, and the importance of the commander’s genius. Clausewitz’s theories reveal three important points for the argument for the capacity building function - the diverse nature of war, the challenge of balancing relevant capabilities, and the commander’s responsibility for communicating feasibility, requirements, and risk to policy makers.

First, Clausewitz states “war is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” Based on the context of the situation, military professionals have “to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies [violence, reason, and chance], like an object suspended between three magnets.” This metaphor directly applies to the U.S. military’s diverse requirements during full spectrum operations. Functions and force structure must be adapted as the context changes.35

The *Army Capstone Concept* highlights the importance of contextual understanding and decentralized capabilities within the force in order to quickly transition across the spectrum. According to *Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process*, “throughout the conduct of full


34 Colin Gray states that Clausewitz “is not beyond criticism, naturally, but most scholars and soldiers agree that his great achievement was to draft a general theory of war and strategy that was good enough to be both highly plausible and superior to the theories of all his rivals.” Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), kindle location 331.

35 Clausewitz, 89; Ibid.
spectrum operations, commanders exercise command and control to integrate the other warfighting functions … to synchronize the activities of forces in time, space, and purpose.”

Since the warfighting functions represent land power, Clausewitz’s metaphor theoretically necessitates that the warfighting functions need to represent all of the responsibilities and capabilities of the U.S. Army. 36

Second, Clausewitz highlighted the dual nature of war by describing a spectrum between ideal war and limited war. He stated that focusing on ideal war, “a clash of [conventional] forces freely operating and obedient to no law but their own… would result in strength being wasted, which is contrary to other principles of statecraft.” 37 Clausewitz’s description of “ideal” war matches the U.S. Army’s predisposition to focus on conventional maneuver warfare. Additionally, the balancing act currently underway within the Department of Defense matches Clausewitz’s warning about wasting resources for the “ideal” war.

Last year, Secretary Gates stated that the defining principle of the National Military Strategy was balance in three areas: “between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies, between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency …, and between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done.” 38 Clausewitz’s description of the balance between ideal war and limited war matches Secretary Gates’ challenge of ensuring the services develop, refine, and manage capabilities relevant to current and future requirements.

Since the warfighting functions focus on conventional maneuver warfare, they appear to focus on

---

37 Clausewitz, 78.
an “ideal” war when the U.S. Army needs to manage a full spectrum balance required in the contemporary operating environment.

Finally, Clausewitz states that since “war is part of policy, policy will determine its character.”\textsuperscript{39} Clausewitz highlighted his belief in the subordination of the military to policy makers by stating “the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities.”\textsuperscript{40} Since policy makers have historically required the military to perform activities outside of conventional maneuver operations, the warfighting functions warrant expansion so that they facilitate the U.S. Army commander’s visualization of comprehensive approaches.

Comprehensive approaches expose the importance of a military commander’s genius. According to Clausewitz, genius includes a blend of intellect and temperament that maintains awareness of the “entire political situation” and knows exactly how much can be achieved “with the means at his disposal.” Clausewitz wrote that it is the responsibility of the commander to keep the politicians informed on the reality of war. This responsibility requires an “inquiring rather than the creative mind, the comprehensive rather than specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children, and the safety and honor of our country.”\textsuperscript{41}

Bearing in mind Clausewitz’s theories, applying land power will occur in a unique political context, will differ from the “ideal” war, and will support policy. Therefore, the U.S.

\textsuperscript{39} Clausewitz, 606.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 608. Paret notes that this citation is the most significant change from other interpretations of Clausewitz’s work that utilized the second edition of \textit{On War}. Translating the original edition of German text, “so bleibt … nur ein gutes Mittel übrig, nämlich den obersten Feldherrn zum Mitglied des Kabinetts zu machen, damit dasselbe Theil an den Hauptmomenten seines Handelns nehme,,” on the internet results in the following interpretation: “thus… only a good means remains to make i.e. the highest field gentleman the member of the Kabinets so that the same Theil takes on the main moments of its acting.” The author of this monograph concurs with Paret’s assessment of Clausewitz’s initial intent in his writing. Yahoo! Website, \textit{Babel Fish}, http://babelfish.yahoo.com/translate\_txt (accessed 27 March 2010).

\textsuperscript{41} Clausewitz, 112.
Army must maintain comprehensive warfighting functions that address these challenges. Currently, the warfighting functions focus on generating combat power to conduct conventional maneuver operations. According to military theory, this mental model is insufficient and potentially degrades the commander’s ability to advise policy makers on the application of land power. The following section reviews the significance of mental models in learning organizations to highlight the importance critically analyzing and updating mental models, like the warfighting functions, within doctrine.

**Learning Organizations**

Organizations break down, despite individual brilliance and innovative products [or operational concepts], because they are unable to pull their diverse functions and talents into a productive whole.


The diversity of the U.S. Army’s functions relate directly to the learning challenge inherent in organizations highlighted by Peter Senge in *The Fifth Discipline*. Since 1994, the U.S. Army has officially pursued developing a culture and internal practices that typify a learning organization. Senge claims that five disciplines are required within a learning organization: systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, building shared vision, and team learning. For this monograph, systems thinking, mental models, and building a shared vision provide insight to the U.S. Army’s current practices.

In October 2009, General Martin Dempsey, the commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), stated in a speech “as part of implementing the *Army Capstone Concept*,

---


44 Senge, 6-9.
we have embarked on a campaign of learning in TRADOC.” In the forward of the Army Capstone Concept, he stated that it “provides a foundation for a campaign of learning and analysis that will evaluate and refine the concept’s major ideas and required capabilities.” The essence of this new vision requires the U.S. Army to absorb new information and feedback; reflect on current processes, procedures, and capabilities; and reframe or change as required to achieve success. General Dempsey’s guidance and vision have generated a significant learning effort within TRADOC to define and clarify the capabilities required of the U.S. Army that represents the organizational vision outlined by Senge.45

In his book, Senge stated that learning organizations have to manage two types of learning: adaptive and generative. Adaptive learning relates to survival and adjusting to a changing environment, but generative learning enhances the organization’s ability to create.46 Even though the Army Capstone Concept overtly focuses on operational adaptability, which parallels adaptive learning, the U.S. Army constantly participates in generative learning.

Generative learning in the U.S. Army includes critically analyzing force generation, doctrine, and education processes to field an adaptive force which represents some of the purposes of TRADOC.

Senge believes that “systems thinking is a discipline for seeing wholes, seeing interrelationships rather than things, and seeing patterns of change rather than static snapshots.” Senge adds that mental models – “deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action,” define


46 Senge, 14.
understanding at the individual and organizational levels. The combination of systems thinking with the recognition, critical review, and adjustment of organizational mental models sets the stage for a learning organization to not only change how it thinks, but also how it acts. 47

For the U.S. Army to be successful with ill-structured problems, it has to conduct systems thinking and maintain effective mental models. According to the Army Capstone Concept, “future leaders and their organizations must think in terms of friends (partners and allies), enemies, and the people.” Also, when developing security institutions, “Army leaders and Soldiers must be aware of relevant cultural, social, political, and ethnic dynamics and place indigenous leaders and systems at the center of their efforts.” These examples demonstrate the U.S. Army’s operational requirement for systems thinking. Recently, the U.S. Army incorporated this challenge in doctrine by successfully updating one of its critical mental models, the Army operational concept – full spectrum operations, from lessons learned in Iraq. In the spirit of General Dempsey’s campaign of learning, this monograph recommends updating the warfighting functions in the same way the U.S. Army updated its operational construct. 48

As highlighted above, the U.S. Army typifies the attributes of a learning organization by sustaining an organizational vision to conduct adaptive and generative learning, routinely conducting systems thinking, and maintaining doctrinal mental models designed to manage operational complexity. Since learning and change never stop, the U.S. Army must continually examine and adjust its doctrinal mental models to remain relevant over time.

47 Ibid., 68; Ibid., 8.

48 “Ill-structured problems are the most interactive. They are also complex, nonlinear, and dynamic—and therefore the most challenging to solve.” U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process, 2-4; U.S. Department of Defense, Army Capstone Concept, 8; Ibid., 25; In 2005, Field Manual 1: The Army defined the Army’s operational concept with “four fundamentals—combined arms, joint interdependence, full spectrum operations, and mission command.” In 2008, the U.S. Army published Field Manual 3-0: Operations which streamlined its operational concept with only one topic - full spectrum operations. In the opinion of the author, the consolidation of the concept to one mental model increased fidelity on stability operations made the operational concept more useable and relevant. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Army Field Manual 1: The Army, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2005.
Field Manual 3-0: Operations defines doctrine as “a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force…doctrine focuses on how to think—not what to think.” 49 The next section examines the doctrinal history of the warfighting functions, compares the utility of the Army operational concept – full spectrum operations with the warfighting functions, and exposes some current shortfalls with the warfighting functions. In the spirit of focusing on how to think, this monograph recommends adding the capacity building function in doctrine to ensure that military practitioners comprehensively scope the application of land power when designing operational or training concepts.

**Doctrine**

When we think about the possibilities of conflict we tend to invent for ourselves a comfortable vision of war… conflict that fits our understanding of strategy and tactics, a combat environment that is consistent and predictable, fightable with the resources we have, one that fits our plans, our assumptions, our hopes and our preconceived ideas. We arrange in our minds a war we can comprehend on our own terms, usually with an enemy who looks like us and acts like us. This comfortable conceptualization becomes the accepted way of seeing things and, as such ceases to be an object for further investigation unless it comes under serious challenge as a result of some major event – usually a military disaster.

General John R. Galvin, 1986 50

General Galvin’s critique against a “comfortable” vision of war in the 1980s highlighted the U.S. Army’s reluctance to represent low-intensity conflict in doctrine. Doctrine is a collection or calcification of lessons learned from previous experience, military theory, historical continuities, and threat estimates relevant to future warfare. The culture of the U.S. Army and the


50 General Galvin argued that “the defense of our homeland and the protection of our democratic ideals depend on our ability to understand, and our readiness to fight, the wars of the future. Let us get our young leaders away from the grindstone now and then, and encourage them to reflect on developments outside the fortress-cloister. Only then will they develop into leaders capable of adapting to the changed environment of warfare and able to fashion a new paradigm that addresses all the dimensions of the conflicts that may lie ahead.” This monograph seeks to uncover the capacity building dimension and expand the warfighting function paradigm. John R. Galvin, “Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm,” Parameters 16 (Winter 1986): 2.
vision of its leaders impact the generation of doctrine at the time of its writing – the warfighting functions are no exception. This section of the monograph examines the doctrinal development of the warfighting functions since Vietnam and relates them to full spectrum operations.

After Vietnam, the U.S. Army narrowly focused its doctrine and training on conventional maneuver operations against the Cold War Soviet threat. In 1976, General William E. Depuy updated the U.S. Army’s cornerstone doctrine, *Field Manual 100-5: Operations*, based on a European scenario named an “active defense.” Even though Vietnam had just occurred, the chapters on Stability Operations, Military Operations against Irregular Forces, Situations Short of War, and Unconventional Warfare from the 1962 and 1968 versions of *Field Manual 100-5* were removed entirely. Since DePuy made this significant shift, the U.S. Army has struggled to represent the application of land power across the spectrum of conflict in doctrine.51

In the 1980s, TRADOC updated *Field Manual 100-5: Operations* on two occasions and focused its content on countering Soviet capabilities and doctrine. The Soviet threat and those that patterned their military forces after them presented a consistent enemy template for the U.S. Army. These updates transitioned the institutional thinking of the Army to multiple new concepts: AirLand Battle, the operational level of war, an initiative-oriented readiness posture, and the synchronization of close, deep, and rear battles.52

---


Most significantly for this monograph, the U.S. Army published *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5: Blueprint of the Battlefield* (hereafter called the *Blueprint*) in 1988. The 1990 version of the *Blueprint* prescribed seven tactical battlefield operating systems (BOS) to frame future training and planning for combat operations. This construct has been slightly updated over the last twenty years, but it essentially remains unchanged and now resides in doctrine as the six warfighting functions. The decision to conduct functional analysis of conventional maneuver operations matched the U.S. Army’s doctrinal focus in the 1980s, but as the Iraq case study will reveal, this limited perspective negatively impacted U.S. Army performance in full spectrum operations.  

In 2008, the doctrinal update of Army operational concept – full spectrum operations transformed the U.S. Army’s mindset from one predisposed to think only in offensive and defensive terms to a more comprehensive paradigm. This update to the Army operational concept redefined stability and civil support operations and increased their importance. The expansion of the definition of stability operations improved the military practitioner’s understanding of land power responsibilities in post-conflict and counterinsurgency environments.  

The full spectrum operational concept still serves as an important doctrinal mental model within the force. This model assists military practitioners in considering three important perspectives of the operational environment: offense (what am I doing against the enemy to maintain the initiative), defense (what am I doing to reduce the chance of surprise or counter-attack), and stability or civil support (what am I doing to transform the environment to enable

---

53 U.S. Department of Defense, *U.S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9*. In the original *Blueprint*, operational and tactical level functions were included in the original publication.; U.S. Department of Defense *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations*. The U.S. Army maintained a focus on the tactical level functions, the battlefield operating systems, until February 2008 with the publication of *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations*. At that time, the seven battlefield operating systems became six warfighting functions by dividing mobility/countermobility/ survivability into the warfighting functions of movement/maneuver and protection. Coincidentally, the current warfighting functions also now match the operational level functions originally listed in the *Blueprint*.

security and stability self-sufficiency in order to reduce military requirements in the future).

These perspectives inform the entire force - from the private to the general. Even though the four categories of full spectrum operations include subordinate tasks, they do not adequately frame planning and resourcing – that is the role of the warfighting functions per *Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process*.\(^{55}\)

Another deficiency with the current warfighting functions includes the platypus effect as described by David Green in *The Serendipity Machine: A Voyage of Discovery Through the Unexpected World of Computers*. Early in the 18\(^{th}\) century, the discovery of the platypus challenged the categories of animal life recognized and utilized by scientists in Europe. Scientists resisted changing their categories for years. At first, they believed the platypus was a fabrication. Later, they resisted change since they were cognitively wedded to their arbitrary system.

According to Green, when anomalies do not fit in a categorization system, the scientist has to either dilute the meaning of the pre-existing categories or create a new category to accommodate the anomaly.\(^{56}\) The recent emergence and increasing importance of civil military operations, security force assistance, and security sector reform challenge the U.S. Army’s warfighting function categories in the same way.

Recently, the U.S. Army has struggled with organizing these emergent tasks under the current warfighting functions because the essence of the tasks does not match the purpose represented by the current functions. From 1990 to 2008, U.S. Army doctrine maintained civil military operations under the combat service support function. In February 2009, *FM 7-15: Army Universal Task List* categorized civil military operations under the command and control warfighting function. In December 2009, the *Army Capstone Concept* categorized civil military operations and security force assistance tasks under the movement and maneuver warfighting


function. In March 2010, the recently published *Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process* placed civil affairs activities back under command and control and related security force assistance as “a logical sequel to restoring minimum civil security” under stability operations.\(^{57}\)

This organizational behavior results from the cognitive inability to correlate the essence of these tasks with the current warfighting functions.

Despite U.S. Army doctrine’s implied interoperability between the Army’s operational construct – full spectrum operations and the warfighting functions, the warfighting functions do not represent the essence of stability and civil support operations. Expanding the warfighting functions to include the capacity building function would appropriately nest security force assistance, civil military operations, and stability and civil support tasks within doctrine and represent all of the capabilities inherent in full spectrum operations.\(^{58}\) Additionally, this addition would ensure that warfighting functions do not represent an “ideal” or “comfortable” war, but one that the U.S. Army will find itself fighting in the future.

*Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process* introduces the concept of design that paves the way for future learning and doctrine refinement. Even though “design” risks classification as the latest buzzword in the U.S. Army lexicon, its emergence in *Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process* marks a significant milestone in the U.S. Army’s journey as a learning organization. The following section reviews the definition of design, describes three ways that the U.S. Army designs in accordance with design theory, and describes four design-related evaluation criteria examining the case studies. Essentially, this monograph argues for the reframing of the

---


\(^{58}\) According to the *Army Capstone Concept*, the U.S. Army also organizes its “required future capabilities by warfighting functions for combat developers to consider.” U.S. Department of Defense, *Army Capstone Concept*, 31.
warfighting functions. U.S. Army doctrine must remain theoretically valid, historically relevant, and appropriately comprehensive so that its leaders and planners are guided to think comprehensively.

Design

You never go to war with the organizations you are given. You always change them in stride to account for the conditions you find. Policy comes late. Organizations are not perfect. Materiel has to be adapted, and it works because of our leaders.

General Martin Dempsey, Speech, 13 May 200959

Adding “design” to U.S. Army doctrine institutionalizes adaptive and generative learning within the force. It is not a mere coincidence that the recent publication of Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process includes a chapter on design and focuses on the functional analysis of combat power throughout the manual. Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process defines design as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.”60 The U.S. Army represents a unique brand of designers – they create concepts for coercive and persuasive applications of land power, generate force structure for operational requirements, and maintain a professional body of knowledge.

Klaus Krippendorff’s book, The Semantic Turn, reveals four concepts that can serve as evaluation criteria to examine the application of land power. The following paragraphs define these concepts (logic, function, form, and application) and relate them to U.S. Army doctrine and practices. Since form and function originated as the first two design concepts, they are examined before the others.

---


In 1896, an architect named Louis H. Sullivan wrote an article, “The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered,” that codified the concept of “form ever follows function” in design theory. Sullivan’s article concentrated on the design of tall buildings in urban centers, but he highlighted that the fine art of creating or designing artifacts should always serve to bridge the gap between form and function in order to maximize the benefit to society. His revelation provides a profound perspective on human creativity and continues to contribute to design theory. For the purpose of this monograph, form represents the structure of an artifact and function represents the purpose of an artifact. Form and function relate to the US Army because the structure of units and organic functional competencies are two critical considerations when designing the application of land power.

In *The Semantic Turn*, Krippendorff added to Sullivan’s design principles because “today’s world is more complex, more immaterial, and more public than the world out of which this dictum grew.” According to Krippendorff, the dictum, form follows function, does not question the purpose of the function, where the function comes from, or the legitimacy of those who defined the function. Krippendorff adds to this dictum by stating that “meaning matters more than function” and that “one always acts according to the meaning of whatever one faces.” Krippendorff’s definition of meaning correlates with *Field Manual 5-0’s* emphasis on logic in design - “the operational approach provides the logic that underpins the unique combinations of

---

61 Sullivan declared that his statement, “form ever follows function”, is a “pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things physical and metaphysical, of all things human and all things superhuman, of all true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that the life is recognizable in its expression.” Louis H. Sullivan, “The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered,” *Lippincott’s Magazine*, March 1896, http://academics.triton.edu/faculty/fheitzman/tallofficebuilding.html (accessed 28 March 2010).

62 Klaus Krippendorff, *The Semantic Turn: A New Foundation for Design Enquiry* (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2006), 6. Krippendorff describes artifacts as a range of items in increasing levels of artificiality: products; goods, services, and identities; multiuser systems/networks; projects; and discourses. This monograph recommends an addition to military doctrine that equates to a change in discourse.

63 Ibid., 5, 6 and 49.
tasks required to achieve the desired end state.” This monograph utilizes logic to represent the rationale, the why, behind creating artifacts. Logic includes understanding the relationship between current and desired conditions, and how a transformation can occur between these two states. Previous students in the School of Advanced Military Studies program have successfully utilized form, function, and logic as evaluation criteria for analyzing artifacts.

The last criteria, application, originated from Krippendorff’s definition of affordance: “the perception of one’s ability to do something with what is sensed.” Application represents the utilization of artifacts after they are created, or the how they are employed, because their use might be different from their initial design. This criterion relates to the U.S. Army because its field units often execute functions different from their initial design in support of the logic of the overall operation. The strength of the linkages between the logic, function, form, and application of artifacts can expose the effectiveness of the design and the need for change.

These criteria – logic, function, form, and application – also parallel two other mental models that already exist in military doctrine. In 1989, Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. created a widely used and recognized mental model on strategic theory that focuses on ends, ways, and means. In 2008, *Field Manual 3-0: Operations* updated its mental model of battle command to include four categories - understand, visualize, describe, and direct. All three of these mental models rely on

---


65 Previous School of Advanced Military Studies monographs by Edward Hayward and Derek Jones utilized these criteria to respectively analyze design philosophy and terrorist networks. Edward P. W. Hayward, “Planning Beyond Tactics: Towards a Military Application of the Philosophy of Design in the Formulation of Strategy” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 07-08; Derek Jones, “Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 09.

66 Krippendorff, 43.


holistic thinking as represented by the circles in the following figure:

![Figure 1: Holistic Model Crosswalk](image1)

Additionally, the following figure correlates them linearly:

![Figure 2: Linear Model Crosswalk](image2)

The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George W. Casey and a design theorist, Jamshid Gharajedaghi indirectly support these design criteria. In an article titled “The Army of the 21st Century,” General Casey stated “once the mission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly and continuously adapt – tailoring force packages and quickly readjusting training, staffing and equipping – to ensure units have all of the tools necessary to succeed.” In his book, Systems Thinking, Gharajedaghi stated that organizations achieve success by fostering a “self-renewing capability to spontaneously create structures and functions that fit the moment.”

---

69 Graphic created by author.
70 Graphic created by author.
Utilizing these design criteria enables leaders and planners to correlate the logic, function, structure, and capabilities of land power with strategic theory and battle command.  

In each of the five case studies, the unique nature of the logic, the intended function, the form, and the actual application of land power reveal the existence and significance of the capacity building function in major operations over the last 70 years. Utilizing the same criteria frames capacity building from a designer’s perspective and highlights how a functional analysis contributes to operational adaptability and U.S. Army application of land power.

**Military History of Capacity Building**

The ability to adapt to the reality of war, its political framework, and its technical and industrial modes, and to the fact that the enemy also consists of adaptive human beings, has been the key component in military effectiveness in the past and will continue to be so in the future.

The Joint Operating Environment, 2010

The U.S. Army has a recent history of supporting external political and civilian institutions (such as the Bosnian government in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996-2004), the state of Kosovo (1999-present), the state of Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina, the Afghanistan government after the removal of the Taliban (2002-present), and the Haitian government in a political crisis (1994-1995) or after an earthquake (2010-present)). The current warfighting functions do not adequately represent the full spectrum of these missions, tasks, or responsibilities. This monograph does not examine these obvious examples of the capacity building function, but focuses on the following large-scale conventional operations to expose the existence and importance of capacity building across the entire spectrum of conflict: WWII – Germany, WWII – Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. An evaluation of these


case studies exposes the military’s tendency to prioritize doctrine development for conventional maneuver operations when history and the current operational environment warrant a more comprehensive doctrinal perspective.

The next section examines the logic, function, form, and application of land power in the post-conflict phase of operations in Germany. Despite a long history of military government and occupation requirements before WWII, Earl F. Ziemke states in his book, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, “neither the U.S. Army nor the government accepted it as a legitimate military function.” Nonetheless, during the conduct of WWII, military planners began to understand the nexus of U.S. policy, “to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world,” and the requirement for land power to significantly support U.S. policy after conventional victory. Lessons learned during the North African campaign and the invasion of Italy forced the War Department to expand “its policy on planning for future operations to include preparations for food, health, housing, and security of civilian populations.”

**U.S. Post-conflict Operations in Germany**

Although other agencies are preparing themselves for the work that must be done in connection with relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas, it is quite apparent that if prompt results are to be obtained the Army will have to assume the initial burden.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Secretary of War, 10 November 1943

Even though the entire country mobilized for war and the U.S. government was predisposed to civilian control in occupied territory, President Roosevelt highlighted the strategic importance of the U.S. Army’s contribution to stability after conventional victory. General

---

73 To demonstrate previous experience in occupations, Ziemke highlighted that the “U.S. Army conducted military government in Mexico in 1847 and 1848; in the confederate states during and after the Civil War; in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba after the Spanish American War; and in the German Rhineland after WWI.” Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, Army Historical Series, (Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1975), 3; Ibid., 445.

74 Ibid., 22.
Dwight D. Eisenhower and subordinate allied leaders responded to the context of the situation and demonstrated visionary leadership by dedicating a significant investment of scarce staff resources against the requirements for establishing peace after victory. The military began planning for post-conflict operations two years before the surrender of Germany, and by April 1944, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces had 72 post-hostilities studies in development.  

In addition to the planning in multiple operational-level headquarters, the Secretary of War established the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in 1942, the U.S. Army established a Civil Affairs Division in 1943, and the U.S. Army began a Civil Affairs Training Program that provided direct commissions to civilian applicants to prepare for post-conflict responsibilities. The civil affairs training program enabled the U.S. Army to field 250 European civil affairs detachments in addition to 200 provisional detachments drawn from the combat troops just after V-E day.

Furthermore, American generals created, disseminated, and implemented the draft plan for post-conflict operations, Operation ECLIPSE, in occupied territory before Operation OVERLORD officially transitioned to Operation ECLIPSE on V-E day – 8 May 1945. The American zone in Germany consisted of 40,000 square miles, 1,400 miles of boundaries, 16 million Germans, and over half a million displaced people. After conventional victory, American forces soon quickly faced a complete breakdown of civilian governance, cities in ruin, no existence of law and order, desperate displaced people, and rampant crime. Through the contributions of American tactical units, displaced personnel returned to their origins, the German military was disarmed, the Nazi Party was essentially dissolved, and essential services were


76 Ziemke, 7, 17, and 269.
restored. Additionally, the U.S. Army formally established a military government in August 1945. 77

The U.S. Army maintained a military government until the 1949 handover to the State Department. Over those four years, the U.S. Army fielded a Civil Affairs organizational structure that provided support to the development of the country and organized, trained, and fielded a 38,000 man constabulary force that served for two years in the American zone. The U.S. Army’s role as the primary authority for the rule of law, legitimate use of force, and nation building enabled Germany’s transition into a viable and legitimate nation state. The U.S. Army initially facilitated this transition with tactical forces, but also selected and trained forces for a long-term capacity building role that ensured the U.S. government reached its strategic objectives. 78

Some critical factors played into the successful resurrection of Germany: unity of command in the U.S. government, a homogeneous German culture, and a devastated population that needed to cooperate for survival. 79 Moreover, solid linkages between logic, function, form, and application of U.S. Army land power supported U.S. policy. U.S. policy included the employment of the U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany because the U.S. government understood that the rehabilitation of Germany into a peaceful ally required supervision and the threat or use of force. The logic behind U.S. policy required the U.S. Army to conduct stability operations to include the function of capacity building. The U.S. Army tactical units adapted to the new mission as soon as they achieved conventional victory, but the U.S. Army also generated organizational structure, as evidenced by the military government, constabulary force, and civil affairs units, for their new mission set before the Germans surrendered.

78 Ziemke, vii; Gott, 26-28.
79 Gott, 29-30.
On the other side of the world, U.S. forces faced a similar problem as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz slowly cinched the noose around mainland Japan. Post-war policy planning for Japan began in the State Department in 1941, and General MacArthur was making occupation preparations, known as Operation BLACKLIST, in May 1945. U.S. Army operations in Japan provide another example of land power performing the capacity building function in support of U.S. policy.

**U.S. Post-conflict Operations in Japan**

The Allied Occupation of Japan was perhaps the single most exhaustively planned operation of massive and externally directed change in world history.

Robert E. Ward, American Political Scientist

On 26 July 1945, the Potsdam Declaration from Harry Truman, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin demanded Japan’s unconditional surrender. This document represented Allied policy development since 1943 and set the stage for the complete demilitarization and democratization of Japan. On 6 and 9 August 1945, two atomic bombs were respectively dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This generated Japan’s unconditional surrender on 15 August and President Truman’s immediate announcement of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s new mission as Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) with responsibility for occupying Japan. The transition from conflict to stability operations was quick, but General MacArthur welcomed the challenge and quickly entered the country on 30 August even though his forces were outnumbered a thousand to one.

---


The Japanese military was still capable of defense, but the combination of the atomic attacks and internal conditions weighed on the Japanese emperor’s decision to surrender. Allied bombing campaigns had left approximately 9 million people homeless and 3 million people displaced across East Asia that needed repatriation. Japan was approximately ¾ the size of Iraq or California, possessed approximately 3.6 to 4.3 million armed troops, and suffered from insufficient food, raw materials, and inadequate industrial production capabilities. General MacArthur and his staff organized and implemented all actions for the Japanese occupation based on basic plans and preparations from Washington. Just before General MacArthur arrived in Japan, he received this policy guidance:


As the only Allied power engaged in the planning for postwar Japan, the U.S. government issued two other policy directives, but they only provided more specifics on the Potsdam Declaration and the initial guidance cited above. General MacArthur remained in charge of SCAP for the duration of the Allied occupation that lasted until 28 April 1952, a total of 6 years and 8 months. Before the end of 1945, the U.S. Army deployed more than 350,000 troops throughout Japan as security forces and members of observation teams. General MacArthur also established General Headquarters (GHQ) SCAP to control forces in Japan and another to command U.S. Forces in the Far East (GHQ FEC) to command forces on the Korean peninsula.

would end when Japan’s military is disarmed, Japanese war criminals are prosecuted, human rights are established, reparations are paid, and a peacefully inclined and responsible government is established.; Cavaleri, 20; Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*, (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 8.

83 Cavaleri, 21-22; Finn, 28.
84 Finn, 29.
Initially, SCAP established fifty-three locations around Japan, co-located with Japanese government field offices, to monitor food distribution, taxes, and implementation of SCAP policies.\(^{85}\)

Much like the transformation in Germany, Japan remains an ally in the current world order because of the U.S. Army’s operational adaptability after the conclusion of conventional maneuver operations. General MacArthur mobilized and transformed maneuver units into an effective land power force that enforced, supervised, and supported the transformation of the Japanese regime into a democratic government.\(^{86}\) The close linkage between U.S. policy, the employment of land power in the role of capacity building, the modified task organization of U.S. Forces, and the successful execution of occupation contributed to U.S. success in Japan.

In his book, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976*, Andrew Birtle highlighted the nature of Germany and Japan that facilitated successful occupations – “modern, industrialized, and ethnically cohesive nations with strong bureaucratic, political, and social institutions.”\(^{87}\) Birtle assessed that the occupations occurred in peaceful environments, reflected short time periods because of the homogeneity of the societies, and were positively impacted by the dramatic defeat of each country that pushed them towards acceptance of American ways as superior methods. Nonetheless, the U.S. Army performed the capacity building function in both of these instances, and the linkage between the logic, function, form, and application of land power contributed to overall success.

In the next case study, U.S. Army operations in Korea mimicked the capacity building efforts in Germany and Japan from 1945 until Kim Il Sung invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. U.S. military presence and assistance on internal security quickly transitioned to major...
combat operations, resource support, and advisory assistance for Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) conventional operations. U.S. Army operations in Korea provided another example of capacity building as a critical component of land power in support of U.S. policy. Yet, this example of the capacity building function exceeded occupation responsibilities and included supporting an ally during major combat operations. The Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) trained, advised, and assisted the ROKA during conflict and transformed them into a legitimate military force.88

**U.S. Capacity Building in Korea**

In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak….Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores.

President Harry Truman, Memoirs, 195089

At the conclusion of WWII and the eruption of the Cold War, Russia and the U.S. divided the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel that solidified into an international border. From 1945-50, the U.S. Army served as a military government and advisor force to assist South Korea’s transition from a Japanese colony to an independent nation. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge served as the commander of U.S. forces in Korea and provided support in good governance, security, economics, and reform that paralleled the efforts in Germany and Japan. Additionally, Lieutenant General Hodge supervised the institutional development of indigenous police, a national defense agency, a coast guard, and a constabulary force.90

---


90 Griess, 72; Birtle, 86; Sawyer, 8-26.
On 15 August 1948, the U.S. Army military government officially relinquished autonomy to the ROK government. By 2 April 1949, most remaining forces withdrew except for 500 battalion-level advisors - the official establishment of the KMAG. With the KMAG, U.S. policy towards South Korea included sustaining and expanding South Korean internal security capacity while incidentally deterring attacks from the north. Later that year, the ROK began a phase of successful counterinsurgency operations against communist guerrillas that continued, despite the invasion in June 1950, until 1955.91

After North Korea’s invasion, the KMAG provided vital support within the Pusan perimeter. At times, the KMAG advisors had to influence the ROKs to sustain resistance, and some officers speculated that their efforts provided the necessary time for U.S. aid from Japan to arrive. General MacArthur’s defense at Pusan and decisive counterattack at Inchon saved the remnants of the ROK and the KMAG before their defeat at the hands of the North Koreans. Through the summer of 1950, the KMAG not only became advisors in combat, but they began the reconstitution and development of the ROKA which later significantly contributed to ROK operations on the advance to the Yalu.92

The KMAG task organization grew in size to 1953 members by January 1952. As the war stalemated along the 38th parallel, the KMAG focused their energy on improving ROK capacity as a viable military force. Capacity building efforts included training in warfighting functions to include mechanized maneuver, artillery fires, and sustainment training. Over the course of the war, KMAG assisted in the transformation of the ROKA from a 50,000 member constabulary force to a 450,000 man Army. On 13 July 1952, the Communists attempted one more military offensive by attacking with five armies against a ROKA salient. General Maxwell D. Taylor, commander of the Eighth Army, reinforced the sector with U.S. forces and ordered a

---

91 Sawyer, 34, 43, and 96; Birtle, 89.
92 Sawyer, 140 and 154.
counterattack with the ROK II Corps. After the ROKA recovered some of the ground, the attack stalled, and on 27 July 1953, the Korean War ended after three years of hostilities.\textsuperscript{93}

From 1945 to 1953, the U.S. Army supported U.S. policy and strategic objectives by performing the function of capacity building. The U.S. maintained a unique organizational structure, the KMAG, to perform this function during peace and in the crucible of war. During this period, the U.S. Army and civilian personnel also supported the UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea that fed and clothed 4 million refugees, established health care facilities that treated nearly 3 million civilians, and provided over 60 million inoculations.\textsuperscript{94} To this day, U.S. Forces, Korea share security responsibility with the ROK military with the intent to transfer entire responsibility in 2012.\textsuperscript{95} The linkage between the logic, function, form, and application of land power on the Korean peninsula demonstrated how capacity building was a relevant and successful function across the spectrum of conflict.

Soon after the Korean War ended, U.S. Army involvement in South Vietnam included a Military Assistance Advisor Group (MAAG) that mirrored the efforts in Korea. However, over the next 20-years, U.S. Army involvement in Vietnam grew from a MAAG to a war that resulted in more than fifty-five thousand American deaths. To this day, historians, military professionals, and pundits debate over the lessons learned from this conflict and the reasons why the American effort resulted in defeat. Nevertheless, balancing capacity building efforts focused on South Vietnamese counterparts with conventional operations against the Vietcong insurgency and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) represented the land power challenge of the Vietnam War.


\textsuperscript{94} Birtle, 111.

U.S. Capacity Building in Vietnam

After first pursuing a strategy based on conventional military firepower, the U.S. shifted course and began a comprehensive, integrated program of pacification, civic action, and economic development. The CORDS program, as it was known, involved more than a thousand civilian employees from USAID and other organizations, and brought the multiple agencies into a joint effort. It had the effect of, in the words of General Creighton Abrams, putting “all of us on one side and the enemy on the other.” By the time U.S. troops were pulled out, the CORDS program had helped pacify most of the hamlets in South Vietnam.


Three phases describe the Vietnam War: an advisor phase, the period under the command of General William C. Westmoreland, and the period under General Creighton W. Abrams. Throughout the conflict, the application of land power consisted of maneuver, firepower and capacity building efforts. U.S. policies of containment, gradualism, and Vietnamization forced the generals to optimize the application of land power in all three phases. In an attempt to overcome limited ground forces and constraints from Washington DC, the generals delivered enormous amounts of firepower against the North Vietnamese Army throughout the conflict. Nonetheless, the combination of the U.S. government’s failure to address the political context of South Vietnam, the military’s inability to isolate South Vietnam from the North, the lack of support for the war in the U.S., and the resilience of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese led to the defeat of the U.S.

In the advisor phase of 1954-1964, the U.S. strategy focused on applying land power to support the South Vietnamese Army in the development of internal security and national defense.

---

98 Birtle, 380-1, Perry, 141.
Multiple MAAG chiefs struggled with poorly trained military counterparts, ineffective police forces, and cultural barriers as they advocated for an integrated politico-military campaign. Over time, civilian agencies and military representatives debated the prioritization of nation building and pacification with the execution of a military campaign. Balancing these efforts and making an assessment on the overall feasibility of success became the crux of the Vietnam War.  

From the beginning, U.S. military support expanded as the Vietcong and NVA threat increased. In 1961, MAAG-V began providing advisors to South Vietnamese battalions engaged in combat operations. In 1962, the Pentagon created a new command, Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV), to oversee the advice and assistance provided to the South Vietnamese Army. Simultaneously, Special Forces built the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) which trained 50,000 paramilitary forces before assignment under the command of MACV. By 1964, U.S. forces in Vietnam increased to 16,000 men.  

In this phase, U.S. government support to South Vietnamese President Diem resulted in an indirect endorsement of his political apparatus. President Diem’s regime suffered from inadequate government programs, corrupt officials, and illegitimate practices. Both Diem and U.S. advisors perceived the unrest in the countryside as a security problem when the Vietcong were conducting a socioeconomic revolution in concert with guerrilla warfare. Additionally, the gains achieved in the advisor phase were significantly disrupted with the assassination of Diem. The U.S. government’s inability to effectively address good governance in South Vietnam, disrupt the flow of support from the north, and isolate the threat of the North Vietnamese Army complicated the conflict and allowed the Vietcong and NVA to strengthen over time.  

---

100 Birtle, 308-313 and 321.  
101 Ibid., 315-16.  
102 Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An, (University of California Press, Berkley: 1972), 60, 66, and 95; Birtle, 305 and 319; “From 3,000 guerrillas in 1959, the Viet Cong grew to 30,000 full-time regulars and 80,000 militiamen by 1965. To these, North Vietnam was rapidly adding thousands of regular soldiers and tons of military supplies.” Birtle, 323.
The advisor phase ended in 1964 when General Westmoreland assumed command of MACV. General Westmoreland assessed the situation as dire and acquired approval to expand the conflict to 543,000 men by 1968. In 1965, the U.S. consolidated most pacification activities under MACV with a deputy civilian in charge of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). Despite the consolidation, General Westmoreland focused U.S. combat power against the enemy’s major forces and bases, and the South Vietnamese, with American assistance, executed pacification operations. The U.S. Army also supported numerous pacification efforts, the Marine Combined Action Platoon (CAP) concept and numerous other adviser efforts with the South Vietnamese. Still the result was a stalemate.103

The year of 1968 included two significant milestones in the Vietnam War. First, the North Vietnamese executed the Tet Offensive that marked their most significant operation to date. This operation negatively influenced American resolve because the scope of the operation did not match the U.S. government’s reporting on the war. Despite the fact that this operation resulted in significant tactical losses for the Vietcong and NVA, they did not lose resolve and rebuilt their conventional and insurgent capabilities over time. Second, General Abrams assumed command of MACV and shifted the U.S. strategy to a priority of pacification. From 1968 to 1973, U.S. forces decreased in size and transitioned to a concept of “Vietnamization” under President Richard M. Nixon. Some argue that General Abram’s change in emphasis did not necessarily change the substance of the U.S. military’s campaign because the military’s focus still prioritized the isolation of the battlefield over winning the allegiance of the Vietnamese people. Nevertheless, the U.S. military’s support to South Vietnam focused on enabling them to become

103 Birtle, 325 and 366; “As in World War I on the Western front, the War in Vietnam was a stalemate and had been a stalemate since the early months of the conflict.” Spector, xvii.
an independent and self-sufficient nation state. This policy change required the function of capacity building.\textsuperscript{104}

For the U.S. Army, the balance and management of limited land power between maneuver warfare and capacity building efforts represented the military challenge in this conflict. U.S. Army leadership played a critical role in understanding and communicating the status of the situation, managing the balance between maneuver warfare and capacity building efforts, developing and applying the correct force structure, and advising the policy makers on a strategy from a military perspective. Similar to preceding case studies, the linkages between logic, function, form and application of land power exposed the presence and importance of the capacity building function. However, U.S. political and military leaders failed to ensure the linkages addressed the scope and complexity of the problem necessary to transform the environment in support of U.S. policy. After U.S. forces departed in 1973, South Vietnam fell to an NVA offensive led by tanks and field artillery in 1975.\textsuperscript{105} The fall of South Vietnam revealed the importance of land power leaders to articulate the status and path for South Vietnam to become a legitimate and self-sufficient nation state for the U.S. military to successfully support U.S. policy.

In a similar fashion, the final case study on Operation Iraqi Freedom highlights how the capacity building function became a critical component of U.S. strategy after the U.S. almost succumbed to strategic failure. In this case, military leadership inadequately framed the problem and the scope of military responsibility from the beginning. Nonetheless, the U.S. Army adapted successfully while in conflict, and Iraq currently appears to be developing into self-sufficient nation state.

\textsuperscript{104} Birtle, 366-367 and 371.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 327.
The problem was simply this: The war plan was seriously flawed and incomplete. Invading another country with the intention of destroying its existing government yet without a serious strategy for providing security thereafter defies logic and falls short of proper professional military standards of competence. It was in fact unconscionable.


Operation Iraqi Freedom has received enormous amounts of scrutiny since the failure to uncover WMD and the inadequate execution of the post-conflict phase. Nonetheless, the U.S. military’s ability to transform its approach in 2007 appears to be a significant milestone in the ongoing seven-year operation. According to the Army Capstone Concept:

As the conflict in Iraq morphed into a violent communal struggle, it became clear that coalition forces had to reframe the problem and adapt. As a result of reframing the problem, Army forces refocused their efforts on consolidation to include area security operations, military support to local governance and rule of law, and the development of capable and legitimate security forces.

Operation Iraqi Freedom includes three phases: the conventional warfare phase, the post-conflict phase, and the surge phase. The U.S. military’s culture and predisposition towards conventional maneuver warfare influenced the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment during the first two phases. The third phase reflects how the U.S. military dramatically changed its tactics and mindset towards a new purpose that included capacity building function – supporting and enabling the Iraqi people, Iraqi security forces, and government to succeed as legitimate and self-sufficient entities.

From the beginning, the U.S. strategy included removing the Saddam Hussein regime and enabling a legitimate and self-sufficient Iraq. The conventional warfare phase began after 9-11 when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld requested General Tommy Franks to develop a Commander’s Concept for operations in Iraq in November 2001. In his book, American Soldier,


General Franks highlighted that the military focused on the execution of a decisive operation and “regime removal.” Even though Secretary of Defense assigned Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay Garner under General Franks in January 2003, General Franks wrote “Washington needed to get ready for the occupation and reconstruction – because combat operations just might be over sooner than anyone could imagine.” This statement highlighted the military’s predisposition to focus on combat portion of the operation even though Garner worked for General Franks.108

After months of training and preparation for conventional maneuver warfare operations, offensive operations began on 17 March 2003. The U.S. military demonstrated superior movement and maneuver, fires, and sustainment functions in its march from Kuwait to Baghdad. In less than 19 days, the U.S. military entered Baghdad after defeating numerous Iraqi Army and Saddam Fedayeen elements along the way. President George W. Bush declared victory on 1 May 2003 and stated “our Coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.”109

The post-conflict phase began in disarray. General Martin Dempsey commented on the experience in a speech in April 2009 - “but when you get to Baghdad and your mission has changed to establish a safe and secure environment in Baghdad, that’s not exactly what we were prepared for…whatever we tell you now, that’s not what we were prepared for…nor did we have an organization suited to do it.” Additionally, multiple strategic-level decisions occurred in April-May 2003 that indicated poor planning and coordination. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) decided against collocating its headquarters with the military and established itself in Saddam’s palace. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority


replaced Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner and ORHA after only three weeks on the ground. Even though General Franks planned to redeploy V Corps to Europe, V Corps became the Combined Joint Task Force-7 headquarters for Iraq in June 2003. Furthermore, the de-Baathification of the Iraqi society became U.S. policy which created a pool of disenfranchised Sunni Arabs that later fueled an insurgency. These events indicated poor civil-military coordination, a lack of force disposition planning and preparation for requirements after the conventional warfare phase, and inadequate contextual understanding.110

During the post-conflict phase, 2003-2007, the U.S. Army achieved varied successes across the country, but it often depended on individual leadership and slow organizational adjustments. In 2006, Major General Peter Chiarelli, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, disseminated lessons learned from Iraq that began to expand the U.S. Army’s warfighter focus in his article “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations.” Also, Brigadier General Aylwin-Foster, a British officer that served in Iraq with U.S. forces, published a scathing article against the warfighter culture of the U.S. Army and its ill-conceived practices. Over time, the U.S. Army assessed its performance and adjusted by creating a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Military Transition Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and counterinsurgency doctrine. The criticality of the linkages between the logic, function, form, and application of land power drove adaptation and learning, but organizational changes and the importance of capacity building emerged slowly.111


The post-surge phase began when President Bush announced a new way forward in Iraq on 10 January 2007. The surge included moving U.S. forces from large and heavily fortified military bases to Joint Security Stations and Combat outposts amongst the population. Subsequently, the violence in Iraq has declined to record levels, Iraq has conducted a reasonably peaceful election, and the U.S. military plans to downsize and transition to a new operation titled Operation New Dawn in the summer of 2010. These changes highlight expanded U.S. military understanding and execution of responsibilities that include the function of capacity building.112

The Army Capstone Concept states that the “essential elements of successful operations in Iraq included a keen understanding of the situation, integration of all arms and joint capabilities, the development and integration of indigenous forces, and military support to governance and development.”113 So far, the U.S. government’s surge was a success on multiple levels. It publicly acknowledged the failure to manage the occupation phase of the war, re-oriented the U.S. military to focus on enabling Iraqi ownership of their country, and reduced the importance of protecting U.S. forces for support to the Iraqi population. This shift enabled the narratives of both the Iraqi people and the U.S. to be mutually supporting by accommodating the perspectives of both sides and acquiring a suitable vision for all parties.

This final case study demonstrated the strategic importance of the U.S. Army’s ability to perform the function of capacity building. At all times, the U.S. Army needed maneuver and firepower capabilities, but in this complex environment the U.S. Army had to integrate capacity building efforts in order to generate peace and transition occupation and security responsibilities.

--


113 Department of Defense, Army Capstone Concept, 12.
to other entities. Again, the linkages between the logic, function, form, and application of land power included the function of capacity building and unique organizational structures for the U.S. Army to support U.S. policy effectively.

**Conclusion**

The United States must retain the capability to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations in a wide range of environments. In order to ensure that America’s Armed Forces are prepared for this complex mission, it is vital that the lessons from today’s conflicts be further institutionalized in military doctrine, training, capability development, and operational planning.

*Quadrennial Defense Review, 1 February 2010*

The U.S. Army sits at a critical juncture where it must recognize and process relevant lessons learned into doctrinal constructs that maintain continuity with history, remain theoretically sound, and provide a guide for the future that enables critical thinking, flexibility, and adaptation. This challenge has haunted militaries since before Napoleon. The *Quadrennial Defense Review* and the *Army Capstone Concept* highlight a vision and a requirement for land power beyond just the execution of battles. Since the current warfighting functions only represent functional analysis of large-scale conventional maneuver operations - a “last resort” application of land power - they need to be updated. 114 Functional analysis assists large organizations in designing operational plans, capability development, and training programs. As a learning organization, the U.S. Army must ensure that its doctrinal mental models, especially its functional paradigm, remain relevant and comprehensive enough to represent its broad scope of responsibilities.

This monograph examined five aspects that support the addition of the capacity building function to the current warfighting functions: military theory, organizational learning theory,

114 “In my view, if we have learned nothing else from these two wars of ours [Iraq and Afghanistan], it is that a flexible, balanced approach to using military force is best. We must not look upon the use of military forces only as a last resort, but as potentially the best, first option when combined with other instruments of national and international power,” Mullen, “Landon Lecture Series Remarks.”
doctrine, operational design, and military history. First, the review of military theory highlighted the requirement for comprehensive doctrine that addresses the diversity of war, the importance of balancing capabilities, and the necessity of developing comprehensive approaches. Next, the examination of organizational learning theory, doctrine, and design revealed that the U.S. Army must continually review and update its doctrinal mental models to ensure they are relevant and effective. Finally, the five case studies revealed that capacity building has been a strategically significant responsibility of the U.S. Army.

Since the warfighting functions are the primary doctrinal mental model in *Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process* to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations, they need to include capacity building to represent the full spectrum of the U.S. Army’s responsibilities. As professional designers of doctrine, force structure, and operational concepts for the application of land power, U.S. Army leaders and planners need the warfighting functions to help them think comprehensively. To overcome the conventional maneuver operation focus of the current warfighting functions, the capacity building warfighting function should be defined as the related tasks and systems that support the strengthening of political, economic, and security institutions of foreign nations or the U.S. government as a means of furthering U.S. policy objectives.

Adding capacity building to the warfighting functions improves the U.S. Army’s concept of land power, decentralizes stability and civil support responsibility within the force, and enhances the doctrinal representation of operational adaptability and irregular warfare competencies. Even though this monograph argues for the addition of the capacity building function, the author believes that conventional maneuver warfare should always remain the primary capability of the U.S. Army. Expanding the functions assists military leaders and planners assess operational risk and prioritize resources and efforts to support U.S. national policy.

While this monograph focused on the U.S. Army’s responsibilities as the preponderant land power agency within the Department of Defense, expanding the functional paradigm of land
power would influence the entire joint force. Adopting capacity building as a relevant warfighting function would potentially transform the U.S. military’s paradigm of military power. The expanded warfighting function paradigm would also improve the integration of full spectrum military activities with joint, interagency, and multi-national efforts. One approach to integrating the efforts of multiple organizations in complex environments includes comprehensive functional analysis. The following doctrinal recommendations solidify the findings of this monograph into tangible results.

**Recommendations**

The argument for the addition of the capacity building function includes three changes to doctrine. First, the U.S. Army should recognize that land power, versus combat power, better represents its responsibilities across the full spectrum of responsibilities. Historically, war has included many significant activities outside of the scope of combat that were essential to the U.S. Army’s successful support to U.S. policy and strategy. Utilizing land power to represent the responsibilities of the US Army and adding the capacity building function to the warfighting functions ensure that the U.S. Army utilizes a comprehensive doctrinal mental model during the operations process.

Second, adding capacity building to the current warfighting functions decentralizes the capabilities necessary for operational adaptability and irregular warfare. In the opinion of the author, the U.S. Army’s recent emphasis on operational adaptability correctly sets a path that comprehends and accommodates the width of the full spectrum of military operations while maintaining a focus on the basics: combined arms warfare, initiative, decentralization, integration, and support to others. Moving the stability and civil support tasks from the Army operational construct to the warfighting functions supports one of primary tenets of operational adaptability - decentralization. Adding the capacity building function also supports irregular warfare by solidifying the U.S. Army’s responsibility to engage and positively influence
indigenous populations. The U.S. Army’s ability to enable indigenous, legitimate institutional development represents the fundamental nature of stability operations and irregular warfare. Operational adaptability and irregular warfare require improved integration with others, enhanced understanding of operational risk, and decentralized transitions across the spectrum of conflict in complex environments – adding the capacity building function conceptually represents these capabilities.

The following graphic demonstrates how the warfighting functions serve as a critical mental model in the design of land power with the addition of the capacity building function:

![Operational Adaptability Diagram](image)

Figure 3: Operational Adaptability

The last recommendation includes simplifying the Army Universal Task List. Currently, the Army Universal Task List represents the full spectrum of activities and responsibilities of the U.S. Army. The Army Universal Task List consists of four major components: the warfighting functions, the full spectrum operational concept, operational themes, and tactical mission tasks.

---

115 Graphic created by the author.
Unfortunately, these four constructs complicate critical thinking about planning, training, and land power responsibilities. Reorganizing the Army Universal Task List into a comprehensive functional construct can further enable design thinking within the U.S. Army and enhance its ability to understand, visualize, describe, and direct land power across the full spectrum of operations. The following graphic represents the reorganization of the Army Universal Task List with civil military operations, security force assistance, stability operations, civil support operations, and certain operational themes under the capacity building function. Additionally, offensive and defensive tasks are reorganized under the movement and maneuver warfighting function. This recommendation consolidates and simplifies the organization of the Army Universal Task List:

---

Figure 4: Recommended Army Universal Task List

---

116 Graphic created by author.
All three recommendations depend on the addition of capacity building as a warfighting function. This change has the potential to enable enhanced critical thinking and improved designs of training, planning, and operations. The U.S. Army, as a complex-adaptive system (including the relationship of capabilities, doctrine, mental models, experience, history, and theory), has the responsibility to ensure that its warfighting functions truly support operational adaptability and the capabilities necessary to support U.S. policy. Adding the capacity building function reframes the warfighting functions into a more relevant and effective doctrinal mental model for the force. Without the capacity building function, the U.S. Army will continue to utilize a deficient mental model focused on conventional maneuver warfare that potentially limited the military’s planning, preparation, and execution for stability operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The contemporary operating environment requires a more holistic doctrinal perspective.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Hayward, Edward P. W. “Planning Beyond Tactics: Towards a Military Application of the Philosophy of Design in the Formulation of Strategy” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 07-08.

Jones, Derek. “Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 09.


McCready, Kenneth O. “Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany.” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 94-95


Schifferle, Peter. “*The Ia Drang Campaign 1965: A Successful Operational Campaign or Mere Tactical Failure?*” Monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, AY 93-94.


