Culture and Identity: Critical Considerations for Successful State-building Endeavors

A Monograph
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The attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, originating from Afghanistan, and the earthquake in January 2010 that devastated Haiti illustrate the different dangers that weak and failed states represent to the international community. While failed states are not new, globalization magnifies the effect they may have on the international community in a manner disproportional to their status and strengthen as nation-states. When the international community and the United States intervene in failed states to relieve humanitarian crises and/or reestablish stability, the donor nations often implement state-building programs to affect change in the failed state. However, after the departure of the donor nation, the failed state often fails to thrive or reverts to its previous form. This monograph argues that state-building efforts yield inconsistent results due to a failure to consider the culture and identity of the failed state when developing state-building policies and programs. Analyzing primary source documents, the US interventions into Haiti in 1915 and 1994 serve as a cross-temporal case study for this monograph. Research discovered some awareness of Haitian culture among political policymakers and military leaders, but no evidence exists of any definitive effort to develop or adjust US policies or programs based on this awareness. Achieving enduring success in state-building requires considering a new approach that incorporates culture and identity as critical considerations in these endeavors.
Title of Monograph: Culture and Identity: Critical Considerations for Successful State-building Endeavors

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Abstract

CULTURE AND IDENTITY: CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL STATE-BUILDING by MAJOR Paul James Hilaski United States Army, 96 pages.

The attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, originating from Afghanistan, and the earthquake in January 2010 that devastated Haiti illustrate the different dangers that weak and failed states represent to the international community. While failed states are not new, globalization magnifies the effect they may have on the international community in a manner disproportional to their status and strengthen as nation-states. When the international community and the United States intervene in failed states to relieve humanitarian crises and/or reestablish stability, the donor nations often implement state-building programs to affect change in the failed state. However, after the departure of the donor nation, the failed state often fails to thrive or reverts to its previous form. This monograph argues that state-building efforts yield inconsistent results because of a failure to consider the culture and identity of the failed state when developing state-building policies and programs. Analyzing primary source documents, the US interventions into Haiti in 1915 and 1994 serve as a cross-temporal case study for this monograph. Research discovered some awareness of Haitian culture among political policymakers and military leaders, but no evidence exists of any definitive effort to develop or adjust US policies or programs based on this awareness. Achieving enduring success in state-building requires considering a new approach that incorporates culture and identity as critical considerations in these endeavors.
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INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the likelihood of armed conflict erupting between the superpowers also diminished.¹ While the Cold War era was highly contentious, the international system, from the perspective of the developed world, was generally an orderly bipolar world. Over the last twenty years, however the conduct of foreign affairs in the international system has grown increasingly complex. This complexity is the result of an increase in independent agents, interests and a greater interdependence between and among them. Researchers are recognizing a trend indicating a steady increase in the number of nation-states struggling to govern their sovereign territory in this environment.² The inability of a state to effectively meet the needs of its population and govern its territory is a threat to the stability of the international community. Numerous authors and research institutes categorize these struggling states by ascribing to them a range of adjectives, which include weak, fragile, failing, failed, or collapsed. Considered together, these labels suggest a spectrum or continuum of incapacity and failure. Regardless of the label, all of these categories are implicitly negative. Nation-states that fall into one of these categories have a single commonality: For a multitude of reasons, each struggling state is generally experiencing a decline in its capacity to govern.


The United States and the international community have sought to reverse the growing trends of failed states by resuscitating these struggling states through state-building missions. These missions, as this monograph will discuss, have yielded inconsistent results. An understanding of the culture and identity within failed states is a fundamental consideration before intervention in order to change the outcome of these state-building endeavors. However, planners and policymakers often overlook this, when developing and implementing US state-building programs intended to assist failed and fragile states.

Throughout the 1990s, these struggling states most often gained the attention of the international community because the level of human suffering, stemming from political violence, human rights atrocities, and natural disaster, exceeded the capacity of the state’s resources and ability to provide aid to its citizens. When other nation-states intervened and assisted the beleaguered states it was primarily out of humanitarian concerns. Until recently, the United States, and most other industrialized nations, did not consider these struggling nations as potential existential security threats. This perspective changed shortly after 11 September 2001. In the words of Professor Stewart Patrick, the current director, and Kaysie Brown, the deputy director, of the International Institutions and Global Governance part the Council on Foreign Relations, the attacks of 9/11, demonstrated “…that transnational threats could in fact emanate from some of the world’s poorest and most dysfunctional countries.” With the publication of the 2002 National

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4 Ibid., 33.
Security Strategy, the United States formally recognized this new threat: “…America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”

Struggling states created a permissive environment in which transnational threats can flourish, and from which violence emanates due to the inability to govern adequately throughout their sovereign territory. This vulnerability may have created a situational surprise, but failing states are only a part of the national security challenge. The more difficult challenge is the cognitive acceptance, and humbling recognition, that despite being the world’s lone superpower, US national security is increasingly dependent on the internal stability of other nation-states. Recognizing and accepting the limitations of US hegemony is one of the first obstacles that US strategists need to consider as they develop plans to mitigate the risk posed by these struggling states.

The foremost challenge to developing a comprehensive national strategy that addresses the threat of failed states is educating the American public about why failed states represent a threat to national interests. This is necessary because the existence of a threat is perhaps not obvious to the average citizen. These states lack the capacity to conquer the United States in traditional nation-state conflict and, therefore, do not seem to pose an actual existential threat. The task of gaining and maintaining US public support for state-building efforts becomes more difficult because the source of the threats emanating from failed states is not a single, easily identifiable group or activity. Threats posed by failed states include, although not limited to,


\[\text{footnote}{Zvi Lanir, Fundamental Surprises (Ramat Aviv, Israel: Center for Strategic Studies, University of Tel Aviv, 1986), 25. http://www.praxis.co.il/white_papers.htm or http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/Fundamental_Surprise1_final_copy.pdf (accessed October 2, 2009). This study of surprise is the genesis of the concept for the author with respect to the difference between situational and fundamental surprise.}\]

\[\text{footnote}{Patrick and Brown, 33.}\]
obvious security concerns such as transnational terrorist groups. Other national security threats stem from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and drug trafficking, as well as public health threats like the pandemic spread of AIDS or a resurgence of malaria.

Whether threats from transnational terrorist groups, pandemic outbreaks, or WMD proliferation constitute a true existential danger to the United States is a question worthy of focused discourse. Such discussion is vital in order to determine if those activities truly represent threats to US national security and national interests. The outcome of such a future dialogue may determine that activities, like drug trafficking, pandemic outbreaks of disease or viral infections, illegal immigration or migration of refugees are no longer threats to US national security. This same discourse about threats to the US national security and the contemporary operating environment may also reveal a change to America’s national interests. However, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America dated March 2006 recognized transnational terrorist groups, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drug trafficking, and pandemic public health threats like the spread of disease as security challenges. This document remains unchanged as of spring 2010. Therefore, for the purposes of this monograph, they remain legitimate threats that the US government must defeat, deter, marginalize or mitigate in order to guarantee the continued security of the American public.8

Struggling states may exist as stable, yet fragile states or their failure may be so complete that the state essentially exists in name only. Somalia represents the latter, an extreme example of a collapsed state completely devoid of any central government. Regardless of where along this continuum of failure they fall, struggling states threaten international stability and by extension international security. Dedicated efforts to identify and analyze the number of failing states began

in 2005 with the creation of the Failed States Index. Analysis over the last five years indicates a general increase in the number of struggling or endangered states (see graph 1).⁹

![Graph 1: Failed States Index 2005-2009](image)


Although this increase in the number of failed states may represent a growing problem, when viewed in a broader historical context, the failed state phenomenon is neither new nor drastically changing. In other words, globalization highlights the effect that these struggling states have on the international community. Regardless of the explanation, the international community has endeavored to assist struggling states since the end of World War II.

Before implementing solutions, one must understand what causes these states to fail. While threats like transnational terrorist groups, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drug trafficking, and public health pandemics are themselves national security challenges, they are merely symptoms of the problem. Professor Francis Fukuyama, the author of ___________________

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The End of History and the Last Man and the Director of the International Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, suggests that the problem represents a lack of institutional capacity in these struggling states. The United States often uses state-building programs to remedy the lack of institutional capacity within struggling states. State-building is a term given to the current practice of rebuilding the institutions, economies, representative systems of governance, and security which together comprise the essential functions of a state. Failed-states theorists believe that restoring these functions is necessary to transform a failed state into “...a society at peace with itself and its neighbors,” often termed “democratization.” The lack of institutional capacity and the inability to transplant strong institutions to developing nation-states remains a critical challenge in state-building that the international community has not yet successfully overcome.

While not always called state-building in the years since 1945, the international community conducted approximately fifty-five state-building interventions. The success rate of these efforts is debatable depending on which operations one includes or excludes for consideration in the evaluated data set. However, even when including only a very narrowly
defined data set of nation-building missions, the success rate is sixty-eight percent, and only eleven of sixteen nations met the defined goal.\textsuperscript{15}

The United States has considerable experience in nation-building or state-building but has enjoyed limited enduring success. As the nineteenth century ended, the United States, an emerging power, began to take a more active role in international politics. In fact, over the last century, the United States undertook at least seventeen state-building endeavors. Unfortunately, only four out of seventeen of these state-building efforts led to the creation of enduring, stable states that remained peaceful for longer than ten years.\textsuperscript{16} Currently, of US state-building operations, the outcome of the two current state-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan remains uncertain.

It is important to recognize that several of the United States’s seventeen state-building efforts involved repeated deployments of American military forces to the same locations. Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic have each been the focus of a particular operation at least twice.\textsuperscript{17} Arguably, this need for repeated intervention suggests that earlier efforts failed to establish strong democratic national institutions capable of meeting the needs of the people or providing enduring stable governance. Common to all these state-building missions is their cost in terms of significant time, equipment, and manpower, as well as fiscal and intellectual resources.

\textsuperscript{15} James Dobbins et al., \textit{The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq}, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005), xxv.

\textsuperscript{16} Pei and Kasper, 4. In this article, the authors only identify sixteen nation-building attempts by the United States since 1900, however for this monograph the author assumes that Iraq was not included simply due to the time this article was most likely written and when Operation Iraq Freedom commenced. The four successful state-building endeavors identified in this article are Germany, Japan, Grenada, and Panama.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 4.
consumed. One may assume that the decision by a government to engage in state-building endeavors is not made lightly given the potential for loss of life, the political ramifications, and the fiscal costs associated with state-building. The logic justifying such an endeavor includes the analysis developed by experts from the RAND Corporation and the World Bank. Their findings and experiences demonstrate that “…interventions intended to consolidate and perpetuate a tentative peace are cost-effective.” Therefore, one may infer that intervening authorities hope to mitigate the costs by increasing regional and international stability that allows the failed state to return as quickly as possible to self-sufficiency and function in the international community.

Too often, given the low success rates and traumatic early failures, the perception of Western societies is that state-building missions seem to fail more often than they succeed. These failures routinely result in an expensive use of America’s limited national treasures: time, money, manpower, and lives lost. This contributes to the perception by the Western public that state-building efforts are too hard and waste resources because the conditions within the state changed little after the intervention and often required additional assistance and/or future re-intervention.

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19 James Dobbins et al., The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, 257-259; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War,” Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper (Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University, April 23, 2004), 5-9, 19-2. [http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC/Papers/Conflicts_230404.pdf](http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC/Papers/Conflicts_230404.pdf) (accessed February 24, 2010). Although Collier and Hoeffler are specifically examining the costs of civil war on the international community in areas of prevention, intervention, and post-conflict assistance, there are significant similarities in the desired ends between this and state-building. Although the costs are not identical, they are sufficient to demonstrate the costliness of such a venture with the hope creating enduring stability.

20 James Dobbins et al., The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, vi. Ambassador Dobbins references the public perceptions about the US and UN efforts in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Iraq prior to the Surge.
Because of the costs associated with these missions, a critical analysis is necessary to evaluate what is not working, and why efforts to assist failed states often continue to produce abysmal results. When developing state-building strategies, political leaders and policymakers fail to consider the ‘identity’ of the state. This shortcoming is compounded by the fact that a ‘state’s identity’ actually consists of multiple unique individual and group identities that overlap and compete with each other within the struggling state. Failure of most nation-building efforts stems primarily from the confluence of two factors. The first factor is failing to consider deep-rooted group identities through mere oversight or, even worse, discounting their importance. The second related factor is failing to understand that the level of development and experiences of these failed states usually differs significantly from that of ‘Western’ states.21

The “Western” world’s theoretical basis supporting the current nation-building concepts originated with the Renaissance and Enlightenment.22 These state-building strategies attempt to overlay ‘liberal democratic Western systems’ onto non-Western cultures. Such endeavors fail to gain the commitment of the assisted population because ‘liberal democratic Western systems’ are not culturally relevant concepts and activities to non-western cultures.23 Without accounting for the differences between the two cultures and their identities, Western state-building strategies will prove deficient in achieving enduring solutions to failed states.

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22 Ibid. 6-8.
The failed state phenomena is a trend that has increased since the end of the Second World War and at an even greater pace since the end of the Cold War. The increasing number of failed states has led to an increase in state-building missions over the same time period.\textsuperscript{24} At the same time the capabilities of the strong, stable and mostly Western states, in terms of available resources and will to meet the growing crisis, is not increasing in a manner proportional to the need. In recent years, a number of authors have written books and articles which suggest that the international system, maybe in a transition period.\textsuperscript{25} The nation-state currently remains the central actor within the community of nations, which comprises the international system. Failed-states, because of their inability to govern their territories or meet the needs of their populations, place demands on the international system, which include the disruption of commerce, humanitarian and ethnic crises requiring intervention, and their inability to honor debts. The growing number of struggling states places an increasing demand on the resources of individual states and the international system. In light of the fact that, neither the states nor the international system can afford to continue to expend their limited resources on failed states that do not improve it is logical to assume that over time current strategies for dealing with failed states will prove to be sustainable.

This monograph uses a case study methodology to illustrate how failing to consider culture and identity is a potential shortcoming of policymakers in the United States. The Foreign Policy of the United States (FRUS) Collection and selected Presidential Papers serves as the framework to gain understanding of American political considerations when conducting these

\textsuperscript{24} James Dobbins et al., \textit{The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building} (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), xvii; Pei and Kasper, 4.

interventions. This monograph examines the US approach to state-building in Haiti during the 1915 intervention, and then during the second intervention in 1994.

Before examining these different interventions, the next section first explores the failed state in its various manifestations. The research includes a review of the current literature studying the failed-state crisis. Next, the paper illustrates differences between various descriptive terms such as collapsed, failed, fragile and weak states, in an effort to demonstrate why precise language is important in understanding the scope of the problem when applying labels to individual states.

The next section examines the tasks presented in state-building literature that provide a broad conceptual guide of relevant activities for reviving or reestablishing a nation-state. Within the literature, two general categories of thought emerge as methods of approaching these tasks. The focus of one approach is capacity-building within the indigenous government, while the other advocates institution-building. The state-building activities that each approach outlines are remarkably similar, yet they differ over the proper role of government in a state as well as the breadth of its activities.

Because state-building normally occurs in a sovereign foreign county, it often mandates intervening in another sovereign state. Because the international community places considerable importance that nation-state sovereignty, this makes the issues and questions about sovereignty and intervention a necessary consideration when planning state-building operations.

26 James Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, xxiii; Fukuyama, 100-101; Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123-163. These authors represent the predominate views on state-building tasks. These tasks will be further examined in the subsequent state-building section.


28 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 2, Clause 7 (San Francisco, 1945) http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml (accessed December 9, 2009). The importance of sovereignty is evident in the founding documents of the United Nations, with Chapter 1, Article 2 defining
Considerable literature that explores the concept of sovereignty is available. This literature considers sovereignty and intervention as well as the moral and legal arguments and questions about US interventions into sovereign states from a legal perspective, diplomatic traditions of nation-state relations, as well as the implications relevant to the United Nations Charter, (Article 2, Item 7). However, this monograph does not explore the concept of state sovereignty as an inviolable absolute in international relations that requires consideration in state-building missions. Instead, this monograph simply accepts that the President of the United States decided to intervene in a struggling state. This assumption then sets the stage for a more in depth focus on the manner in which policymakers or planners considered or fail to consider the factors of culture and identity when implementing the directive.

The third section examines the concepts of culture and identity, particularly group identity in the nation-state. After exploring these concepts, the paper describes how they potentially affect behavior. This is the core conceptual issue of this monograph: The premise that identity and culture affect behavior suggests that a greater potential for success exists if

the relationship between the United Nations and each member state indicating there are limits to the UN’s authority of the member states.

29 Charter of the United Nations, “Chapter 1, Article 2, Clause 7.” This article restricts intervention by the United Nations member state in domestic matters within the member states.

policymakers consider identity and culture when developing political state-building policies and programs. This author contends that this failure to consider the concept of identity or culture contributes immeasurably to inconsistent results during state-building operations.31

After exploring the theoretical aspects of failed-state research and literature, approaches to assisting a failed state, and the conceptual ideas of culture and identity, the author examines these concepts with respect to a single country using cross-temporal analysis. The case study country chosen for this research is Haiti, with the cross-temporal analysis of the two US interventions into Haiti. The case study describes specific aspects of Haitian history explaining their effect on Haitian culture and identity as well, as how they contributed to state failure, which in turn led to the US interventions and state-building efforts in Haiti. The research on US interventions and state-building in Haiti will primarily focus on policy guidance. By examining diplomatic communiqués and/or public statements from the President of the United States, Cabinet-level or other executive branch officials this monograph will link how US state-building policies and programs did not or only marginally included considerations for Haitian cultural or identity.

Haiti as a case study is compelling because the United States has felt compelled by its national interests to intervene twice in Haiti, suggesting the existence of a continued systemic failure to thrive that was significant enough to require outside assistance. The 1915 intervention began when President Wilson ordered the US Marines to deploy to Haiti in an attempt “…to establish and to help maintain Haitian independence and the establishment of a stable and firm government by the Haitian people.”32

31 James Dobbins et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq, xxv.

The United States tried to enable the development of an enduring functional government based on US perceptions about the proper structure, nature and role of such a government.

Following the departure of the United States in 1934, the historical trend of traditional Haitian politics and culture reasserted itself revealing a propensity for the system to revert to the country’s previous state. While the pre-1915 anarchy that ravaged Haiti did not reemerge, individual freedom, economic opportunity, and a simple failure to thrive contributed to a steady slide toward instability. This progressive deterioration of the Haitian government suggests that the efforts of the United States were ineffectual.

More recently in 1994, President Clinton deployed US forces to Haiti for the second time in eighty years. Similar to the intervention of 1915, trying to create a stable environment, US forces had the mission:

...to restore democratic government to Haiti; to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians; to secure our borders; to preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere; and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments others make to us. 33

Yet, even after two interventions, Haiti, the second oldest sovereign nation in the Western hemisphere, remains a failed state.

This author analyzes whether the consideration given to the indigenous culture in developing and implementing the state-building policies in Haiti contributed in any way to the outcome in Haiti. The ultimate intent is to contribute to the discussion about failed states, state-building, and to provide considerations for developing an enduring method to improve the success rate for these operations.

It is useful to first review the concept of a nation-state. In doing so one can understand the expectations that population and the international community have of a nation-state. One can then see that failed states do not satisfy these expectations. The specific narrative describing the development of every nation-state is unique. Yet, common in the formation of states is the existence of a population that acknowledges and acquiesces to a state’s authority—the people must essentially surrender some individual freedoms. In return, the political system within a nation-state must provide the population with the essential functions of security, governance, conflict resolution and services—generally called public goods. A state and its society are the manifestation of such a contractual understanding. This relationship is what the seventeenth century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes outlined as the general concept of a state. However, to be enduring this social contract must be in the individual’s own self-interests. Such interests may be the satisfaction of an existential need, like those outlined in Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Foremost among these needs would be the state’s ability to satisfy second tier needs, which include safety and security for the individual, the family, and society. Robert I. Rotberg, a Professor of Political Science and History at Harvard University and widely published author on


US foreign policy, points out that providing security is the most critical public good that a
government provides to its populace.\textsuperscript{37} The idea that security is the responsibility of the state is
hardly new. In the early twentieth century, Max Weber, a German Professor of Sociology and
Political Economics writing, linked together the ideas of the state, violence and security. In his
1918 speech in Munich he asserted that:

\begin{quote}
...a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory....Specifically, at the
present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to
individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered
the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

A century later, the basic measurement of stability and security, within a state, still
remains tied to this concept regarding the state’s ability to monopolize violence within its
territory. The activities that reflect this relationship between the state, violence, and security
include five different tasks. The first of these tasks is border security. Defense of the state’s
territory comprises the second task. The third is the state’s responsibilities to protect the state and
the population against attacks on the institutions and social structures of the state. Providing the
population reasonable protection from crime is the fourth. Last is the establishment of a trusted

\textsuperscript{37} Robert Rotberg, ed, \textit{When States Fail: Causes and Consequences} (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004), 2-3, 28. Formerly a Professor of Political Science and History at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and currently President of the World Peace Foundation; Director of the Program
on Intrastate Conflict with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs part of the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University. Dr. Rotberg, succinctly reviews the concept of public goods,
stating that they are “…those intangible and hard to qualify claims that citizens once made on sovereigns
and now make on states.” These include expectations, obligations and influence the political culture
between the governed and the institutions; public goods comprise the foundational basis of the implicit
contract between the people and their government. Conceptually, to this author, this is not limited to a
formal Westphalian nation-state and the populace, but is easily expanded to include the bonds in segmental
societies where the population looks less towards a central government for these same public goods and
more towards an affiliated clan, tribe or extended familial group.

\textsuperscript{38} Max Weber, ‘Politik als Beruf,’ \textit{Gesammelte Politische Schriften} (Muenchen, 1921), pp. 396-
450. Originally, a speech at Munich University, 1918, published in 1919 by Duncker & Humblot, Munich.
Quoted in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Translated and edited), \textit{From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology},
judiciary that allows the redress of grievances between the citizens as well as the state to solve differences without resorting to violence.\textsuperscript{39}

Without security, the distribution of other public goods is unfeasible if not impossible. Failure to provide this basic service undermines the authority and confidence of the population in the state. The population’s decreasing confidence in the state’s ability to provide essential functions contributes to a corresponding decrease of popular support. Eroding popular support ultimately leads to the population voiding its commitment to the social contract about which Hobbes wrote and further contributes to the state’s decline from stability towards fragility or failure.\textsuperscript{40} If security is the principle public good expected by a population and provided by the state, one must then question how the numerous descriptive adjectives, such as fragile, failed, failing, weak, collapsed, stable, or resilient, quantify or qualify the security a state provides or how the terms relate to decreasing public support.\textsuperscript{41}

Dissecting Failed State Terminology-The Mystery of a Word

A succinct answer to the question, “How do the numerous adjectives describing struggling states quantify or qualify the security a state provides or the public support the state enjoys?” is that these adjectives do not provide explanation about the security of a state. From this author’s perspective, these terms lack an explicit habitual relationship to a universally

\textsuperscript{39} Rotberg, ed. \textit{When States Fail: Causes and Consequences}, 3.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 1, 3.

accepted meaning, which correlates to a unique, quantifiable assessment. Therefore, this author proposes that the loose, non-standardized definitions of these terms foster a weakness in the field and the literature addressing the failed state phenomena. As such, resolving this issue is a step toward improving the understanding of these struggling states. Furthermore, the absence of commonly understood language defining concepts categorizing struggling states contributes to both assessment and policy challenges. A professional lexicon containing terms that lack definitive meaning does not create understanding nor allow for objective comparison. Given the limitations caused by the declining resources available to assist struggling states, such an objective comparison could assist planners and policymakers prioritize to their efforts. Table 1 depicts how the different indices label the same states.\footnote{Wyler, 30-31. This table is reproduced from Table 6 in the CRS report.}

\footnote{Rice and Patrick, 5.}
Table 1: Comparison table depicting the use of different terms by index

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As an example of how the use of imprecise terms makes objective comparison more difficult, consider a comparison of Haiti and Somalia from Table 1 depicted above. The assessment of Haiti from four of the five indices categorizes Haiti as meeting the requirements of each index and thus earns Haiti the labels of ‘fragile,’ ‘rebuilding,’ ‘alert,’ and ‘failed and critically weak.’ These labels obviously indicate that Haiti, as a viable state, has significant problems.

The table labels Somalia similarly, with the single addition that under the column depicting the 2007 State Fragility Index, the table also categorizing Somalia as a ‘red state.’ Do these labels mean that policymakers and planners should devote greater resources and focus towards improving the conditions in Somalia? This author suggests that these labels have no
relationship to one another and therefore are inadequate to help determine the severity of a state’s incapacity and weakness.

By assigning a quantitative measurement to these terms, they would have a specific meaning. This specificity would then allow analysts and policymakers to make an objective assessment of one state compared to another. After determining a state’s importance in terms of US national security and national interests, an understanding of how Haiti and Somalia compare to one another may prove helpful for policymakers and planners in prioritizing the allocation of resources and effort committed to either or both states.\(^{44}\)

What the failed-state literature reflects is that scholars in the field develop their own definitions for the terms—fragile, failed, failing, weak, collapsed, stable, or resilient—for the purposes of their own individual research.\(^ {45}\) Therefore, the terms are unique to a specific project and lack universal applicability. Moreover, none of them is quantitative, so all insight is simply qualitative.

One of two exceptions in the literature is the descriptions and criteria established for failure and collapse given by Professor Rotberg in his edited volume *When States Fail*. The second exception is the description and criteria for states that are ‘critically weak’ ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ in the Brookings report, *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World*.\(^ {46}\) Professor Rotberg attributes the concepts of ‘strong,’ ‘weak,’ ‘failed,’ and ‘collapsed’ to those states which

\(^{44}\) Wyler, 23-31. Wyler presents examples of how various think tanks and indices each use the term weak states, but ultimately the writer and reader must determine for themselves its meaning rather than being tied to a specific set of criteria.


\(^{46}\) Rice and Patrick, 5; Rotberg, *When States Fail*, 5-9, 20-25.
score high or low respectively on the UNDP Human Development Index, Freedom House’s *Freedom of the World Report*, or other indicators like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. While this analysis provides indicators shared by failed states, all of the categories lack definitive performance metrics. Subsequently, the reader must make a decision about upper and lower limits of each category and is therefore inherently subjective.  

The Brookings report, *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* (hereafter the *State Weakness Index*), identifies numerous individual indices evaluating different aspects of nation-states. The *State Weakness Index* combines data from these separate indices in order to provide a more holistic assessment of state weakness. Ambassador Susan Rice, PhD, currently the Permanent US Representative to the United Nations, and a former foreign policy and advisor on national security affairs in the Clinton administration and Obama campaign, and Professor Stewart Patrick currently a Senior Fellow and Director, Program on International Institutions and Global Governance with the Council on Foreign Relations developed the *Weak State Index*. The authors created four overarching themes or ‘baskets’ labeled Economic, Political, Security and Social Welfare, and then grouped similar individual indices into each basket. Under this construct, the authors evaluate one hundred and forty-one developing countries that allow the countries to be rank ordered against one another. The authors divided, after analyzing and rank ordering, these countries into quintiles labeled as the Bottom Quintile, 2nd Quintile, 3rd Quintile, 4th Quintile, and Top Quintile. The authors then associate each of these to a descriptive term such as ‘failing’ and ‘critically weak’ for the Bottom Quintile, ‘weak’ for the 2nd Quintile, and ‘states

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48 Rotberg, *When States Fail*, 11-24. Professor Rotberg discusses the characteristics of a collapsed state, a failed state, and weak states. He provides examples of how the government with each of these states conducts itself, and for those states that have demonstrated improvement, he gives examples of how this improvement took place and why. However, he never states what criteria he used to decide which states he categorized as weak, failed or collapsed. His chart on pages, 23 and 24 shows the low performance of these states, but it is not evident why he labeled each group as he did.
to watch’ for the 3rd and 4th Quintiles. This study is notable because the authors’ are very selective in their use of the term ‘failed state.’ Specific to this index, ‘failed state’ is a subcategory within the category of ‘critically weak’ states. The authors only apply the term ‘failed state’ to the three lowest ranked states. These states were obvious and significant outliers to the general scoring trend in the *State Weakness Index.*

The *State Weakness Index* seems to be the sole effort within the field of failed state research that currently attempts to create a metric for weak states, associating a measurement to a specific term. The authors’, Rice and Stewart, failure to include more of the commonly used failed-state terms—fragile, failing, collapsed, stable, or resilient—into the study, limits the study’s ability to clarify the differences between the terms and be more precise in describing the nature of each Quintile. Still, the *State Weakness Index* represents a meaningful step forward to the study of struggling nation-states.

By establishing clear and widely accepted definitions for each failed-state term that reflects the different stages of instability, the urgency of each state’s needs, the labels begin to help frame the problem into manageable components. Without precise definitions, the researcher must subjectively decide which label best infers the appropriate level of severity onto a particular country. While this lack of consensus continues to exist, a general trend within the literature implies that each label depicts some degree of weakness or strength along a hypothetical continuum. Moreover, a state’s label and position on this continuum is not static. States may improve their condition: Labeling a state as failing does not imply that a state is doomed to eventual implosion and collapse.

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49 Rice and Patrick, 3, 5-10.

50 Kaplan, 5; Rotberg, *When States Fail*, 9-10; Wyler, 23-25. Even within a single political entity, in this case the US Government, the definitions are imprecise and vary between subordinate departments.
Although this monograph argues for the benefit of establishing a common linguistic frame of reference for assessing the stability of states with specific meaning assigned to each label, its intent is not to completely explore the complexity of this issue. For this paper, the broad term failed or collapsed state is sufficient to categorize states with some or all of the following deficiencies: The state is no longer capable of interacting in a constructive manner with the international community. A failed state is one that cannot provide public goods to its population, and no longer has a monopoly on force within its geographical borders. Within the state, the rule of law has broken down and the ‘rule of the jungle’ holds sway over the population and a state where intervention would be necessary to restore any semblance of governance. The less serious terms of frail, fragile, failing, or weak imply a nuance that is relevant to prioritizing the allocation of aid and other resources in an effort to prevent conditions from worsening and resulting in failure or collapse of the state.

It is important to understand that simply clarifying what the various failed-states terms mean is not a solution to the problem of failed states. It is a first step in better understanding the nature of the problem. However, to achieve true understanding about the severity of a state’s instability and take relevant actions toward each state, considering the unique context of each country is necessary. Every state has a unique culture, and identities that contribute to the state’s stability/instability as well as affecting potential state-building solutions. Only by considering the problem and the environment together can planners and policymakers develop a state-building program that provides a realistic possibility to create an enduring solution.

To gain an appreciation for what the incapacity of a failed state means practically, consider for example, the earthquakes that struck Haiti and Chile in January and February 2010. An examination of responses by each country provides an excellent illustration of the differences

51 Rotberg, *When States Fail*, 1, 5; Kaplan, 5.
between a failed state and a stable or resilient state. Haiti is by most indices categorized as a failed state in crisis. Likewise, most indices classify Chile as a stable or resilient state.⁵²

Even prior to the earthquake in January 2010, the Haitian government was unable to meet the immediate needs of its people. The earthquake magnified this incapacity to the detriment of Haiti’s citizens.⁵³ Based on this lack of capacity, it is reasonable to assume that the government could not have mounted an emergency response. The Haitian government’s lack of capacity may have led to a death toll exceeding the current estimate of two hundred and thirty thousand, if not for the international assistance currently pouring into Haiti.⁵⁴ While responding to a 7.0 magnitude earthquake probably would have challenged even the best-prepared nation from those generally classified as developed, a failing state may actually worsen the effects of similar natural disasters.⁵⁵

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⁵² Wyler, 26-31; Rice and Patrick, 43, 47; The Failed States Index Scores, “Failed State Index Scores 2009.”


⁵⁵ Perito, Haiti after the Earthquake, 4. “…the massive destruction and human suffering caused by the earthquake was due to the absence of good governance. The failure to establish and enforce building codes and zoning restrictions allowed the construction of flimsy, multistory buildings on unstable hillsides.”
Less than one month after the Haitian earthquake, a second massive earthquake rocked the Western Hemisphere. Centered just off the coast of Chile, on 27 February 2010, an earthquake with a magnitude measuring 8.8 on the Richter scale caused massive destruction in Chile. More than thirty days after this initial earthquake, Chile continues to suffer from its effects, as well as a series of ongoing aftershocks, many of which are almost as strong as the Haitian earthquake. Despite the challenging situation created by these earthquakes, Chile has not suffered the same tremendous loss of life or a nearly complete societal collapse as Haiti. Furthermore, the earthquake did not cause a complete paralysis of the Chilean government rendering it incapable of providing emergency services to its people. In fact, there seemed to be an over-confidence on the part of the Chilean government and the Chilean Red Cross that initially assessed, although now admittedly wrong, that the country did not require external assistance.


Even after the delay in acknowledging the scale of the devastation and quests for assistance, the Chilean government continues to lead and coordinate the relief activities. Newscasts from Chile showed the government mounting an emergency response to the afflicted areas, taking measures to safeguard the citizens and enforcing law and order. Arguably, Chile’s response may have had its inadequacies, and given the magnitude of the earthquake Chile needed some international aid to assist in its recovery. Yet less than a month after the initial earthquake, Chile declared an end to its state of emergency, and the government stated that it had entered a rebuilding phase of the recovery effort.

STATE-BUILDING: THEORY AND METHODS FOR RESUSCITATING FAILED STATES

When the government of a nation-state is no longer capable of exerting the political power necessary to maintain its monopoly on violence or performing the essential functions the society expects, and no alternative political system is ready to take its place, the state typically

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fails. A counter argument to state-building, is to possibly let the states fail, and allow a new entity to emerge. Jeffrey Herbst, Professor of Political Science and current President of Colgate University, points out in his essay “Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice,” that nation-states used to appear and disappear from maps with greater frequency than occurs at present. Yet in the present day, states stay in a condition of failure and remain on the regional maps even if a new entity does not emerge. The question that follows then is, “what happens after a state has failed or completely collapsed?” After all, it is not as if a void suddenly appears in that space and the people, land, and all the problems simply disappear. Typically, state failure leads to an intervention by Western states that mount a state-building mission to resuscitate the failed entity.

After state failure occurs, the international community often intervenes in an effort to assist the state, attempting to restore it to a level of functionality that allows the state to exercise sovereign control over its territory and provide public goods to the population. Gene Lyons, the Orvil Dryfoos Professor of Public Affairs and Professor of Government Emeritus at Dartmouth College, and Michael Mastanduno, the Nelson A. Rockefeller Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, provide a good working definition of intervention in their study of state sovereignty and international intervention. According to them intervention means, ‘the physical crossing of borders with a clear-cut purpose’ of carrying out some action within the territory of another sovereign nation-state.

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Typically, the nature of trying to restore the ability of a failed state to govern its territory involves direct intervention. Such an intervention may include the physical entry by the military forces of the donor nation(s) into another sovereign country. A larger more robust military force may be necessary to counter this threat if the environment is non-permissive, with one or more of the belligerent factions contesting the intervention. The force may be smaller if it is entering under a permissive environment with the consent of all the parties with a stake in the outcome.66

Further exploration into the discussion surrounding sovereignty and the legitimacy of intervention is outside the scope of this paper, but in planning and executing state-building it is a necessary consideration.

State-building Activities Conducted after Directly Intervening into the Failed State

After donor nation forces enter the failed state, state-building literature, describing the activities necessary to revitalizing a failed state, focuses on building government capacity, building government institutions, or a combination of the two.67 Professor Fukuyama clarifies the differences between building capacity and building institutions through his use of two phrases. The first phrase, ‘scope of the state’ relates to the number or breadth of government activities undertaken, perhaps formalized as institutions. The second phrase is the ‘strength of state power,’ which Professor Fukuyama defines as the ability of the state to develop and execute policies, and programs, and to enforce laws, or the capacity of the state.68 The difference between these two approaches is not mutually exclusive.

67 Donor nation is a generic term used in state-building literature to describe the nations assisting a failed state.
68 Fukuyama, 7.
Building capacity and institutions depend on one another for support. Although very simplistic, consider a state’s actions to raise revenue. A state must have revenue to function. The central state government decides to create an income tax to raise revenue. To this end, the government passes laws establishing a tax code and a collection and enforcement bureaucracy. By taking these actions, the state expands the scope of activities it is involved in; since before this income tax law, the state raised revenue a different way and did not monitor the wages earned by its citizens. This expanded scope also may require a new institution, perhaps named the State Revenue Agency, responsible for collecting the appropriate taxes, and enforcing the tax code if the population does not voluntarily comply with the code. Creating this institution and laws to implement the income tax reflects the ‘strength of the state,’ which is necessary to successfully expand the ‘scope of the state.’ The approach to state-building therefore is a matter of balance between building capacity and building institutions, and is prioritized by what the donor nation focuses its efforts on first.

The severity of the state’s failure—where the state is on the continuum of failure—will dictate a different approach to state-building in each situation depending on the conditions in the failing state. If the authority of the state and central government has completely failed, then the magnitude of the task will increase in difficulty. A completely failed or collapsed state will quite likely require building completely new institutions where none currently exists. Additionally, building the institutions alone is insufficient. Increasing the capacity of an institution to function properly in a manner that makes it trustworthy to the population, thereby adding to the stability and resilience of the government, will take additional time and effort. On the other hand, consider a state that has not failed, but one categorized as critically weak or fragile, but it is still at least marginally functional. In this case, the intervening donor state may focus its efforts more

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69 Ghani and Lockhart, 33.
on activities that build or expand the capacity within weak but existing government institutions rather than completely reconstituting a government.

Regardless of philosophical approach, whether the focus is capacity or institution building, the actual activities conducted as a part of state-building are remarkably similar. With few exceptions, the categories of state-building activities advocated by Ambassador James Dobbins, the former Ambassador to the European Community and current Director of International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND National Security Research Division, and his writing team in each of the four studies published by RAND on nation-building captures the general trend within nation/state-building literature.70

Establishing and providing security for the population remains the foremost task among these activities. The other activities, which follow the establishment of a secure environment, include humanitarian relief, providing the necessary immediate life-saving relief in terms of food, water, and shelter to slow and then end any ongoing crisis.

Developing governance is a second state-building activity. Governance is the capacity to provide and regulate utilities, reestablishing law enforcement, providing access to education and public health services to the population. Democratization, as another task, aligns closely with governance, but it focuses more on developing the political infrastructure required to actually hold elections and create a government. These activities might include developing political parties that are representative of the people and building an objective free press to assist in informing the population as well as holding the government accountable for its actions.

70 James Dobbins et al., The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, xxiii; Fukuyama, 100-101; Ghani and Lockhart, 123-163. Each of the other RAND studies uses the same framework presented in this volume. Professor Fukuyama presents an incomplete list, but his tasks do not significantly deviate from the RAND studies, and the Ghani and Lockhart book identifies ten functions that with the exceptions discussed in the body of the paper above also address the same concepts as the RAND studies.
Economic stability and development are very similar activities that state-building endeavors must consider. Economic stability focuses specifically on currency stabilization, inflation control, the government’s debt, and regulating commerce. Development is the activity that allows the country to grow and to create more opportunity for the citizens to improve their lives by decreased poverty and increasing job prospects. Development activities also reinvest in the country so as to improve and expand its infrastructure, thus expanding its ability to distribute public goods to the population.71

Professor Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, the co-founders of the Institute for State Effectiveness and consultants on state-building, posit a couple of exceptions to these tasks that seem to be outliers within the state-building literature. Ghani and Lockhart also include the ideas of “creation of citizenship rights through social policy,” and “formation of a market,” as functions of the state that should be included in state-building endeavors. 72 The intent behind both these activities is laudable as each focuses on developing a sense of inclusion with the state, as well as expanding opportunity so that the population feels connected to, and aligns their identity with, being a member of the state.

The authors do not address, even on the theoretical level, a possible timeline to implement what are potentially major cultural changes. After proposing these concepts of “creating citizenship rights through social policy” and “the formation of a free market” as functions of a state and necessary for state-building, they do not explain how they envisioned integrating these potentially foreign concepts into societies that focus less on individual rights and earnings than Western cultures.73 These concepts, from this author’s perspective, are ideas found within stable western states, which are so widely acknowledged that they are the accepted norm,

72 Ghani and Lockhart, 144-146, 149-156.
73 Ibid., 144-146, 149-156.
but within developing countries, such ideas may be an exception to the cultural norm. The intent of this observation is not to condemn the ideas of ‘creating citizenship rights through social policy’ and ‘the formation of a free market’ as wrong or unimportant. Rather, this monograph puts forth the position that, to be effective, the donor nation must operationalize state-building concepts such as ‘creating citizenship rights through social policy’ and ‘the formation of a free market’ into a plan that frames the state-building activities in a manner that is relevant to the intended audience.

State-building literature consistently touches on the concepts of building capacity and institutions through activities that include, establishing security, governance, humanitarian relief, democratization, economic stability and development as being necessary for success. Emphasis on these activities may reflect a growing understanding of how, with respect to these activities, states and their populations interact. It is equally interesting to discover that, with this increased understanding, certain expectations and themes are not simply ‘a Western point of view.’

Professor Rotberg discovered in his research that the expectations citizens have of their governments are nearly universal.

Since 2004, I [Professor Rotberg] have asked citizens from all countries what they demand from their governments; these 57 deliverables are then measured systematically and aggregated into five overarching categories: safety and security; rule of law and transparency; participation and human rights; sustainable economic development; and human development.74

It is interesting that these interviews reveal notable similarities between different populations in a multitude of countries. Yet, there are in fact differences that do exist between societies and cultures. Therefore, in order to accept these interview responses and compiled results as accurate, one must question whether these concepts, ideas and the physical

manifestations of them, in the form of states and governments, actually have the same meaning to
each person interviewed.

**CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN THE NATION STATE**

If we seek to understand a people, we have to try to put ourselves, as far as we can in that
particular historical and cultural background.

Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister

Who are these people?

Although Professor Rotberg’s cross-cultural international interviews suggest that certain
commonalities exist in all societies, societies differ because they emerge from different cultures.
Most US stability operations, and by extension state-building programs, occur in countries with a
different culture from that of the United States. Therefore, without considering this difference, it
would be rather foolhardy to undertake state-building activities—establishing security,
governance, humanitarian relief, democratization, economic stability and development—and
expect identical results in every instance.

The importance of understanding these foreign countries becomes critical to successfully
assisting in the development of a viable, stable nation-state. US policymakers need to consider,
when planning to intervene and implement a state-building program, the question of who exactly
are the people of this struggling state. Answering this question requires understanding the culture
and identities of the population. It further entails determining why culture and identity are
important, with respect to state failure and state-building, and how that may influence the
mission’s outcome. Culture and identity have similarities and contain overlapping ideas, but there
are also differences. In an effort to link these concepts and provide an understanding of how they

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75 Susan Brewer, “"As Far As We Can": Culture and US Foreign Relations,” in *A Companion to
American Foreign Relations*, Blackwell Companions to American History, ed. Robert D. Schulzinger
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2003), 15. This was from a 1949 address in New York the Prime Minister.

76 Yates, 32, 39.

77 Robert I. Rotberg, “Disorder in the Ranks.”
are interrelated, the next two sections of this paper will examine the broadest and most readily apparent concept, that of culture, then less obvious, but more important aspect of identity.

Culture—What we perceive from the outsider’s point of view

Culture is a broad umbrella term that includes the political, ethnic, religious, linguistic, familial, historical values and norms that comprise the generalized, but unique character of a nation-state. The word culture has various meanings in common everyday usages as well as in various academic fields. This leads to ambiguity.

For the purposes of this research and analysis, the definitions of culture offered by the political science and anthropological communities provide the most relevant understanding. Ken Booth, Professor of International Relations, quoting the eminent French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, wrote that “[a] culture is a set of patterns, of and for behavior, prevalent among a


79 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979), 14; Geertz, 4-5; Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/culture (accessed March 17, 2010). The Merriam-Webster Dictionary provides at least six different definitions for culture. 1. cultivation, tillage 2. the act of developing the intellectual and moral faculties especially by education 3. expert care and training (beauty culture) 4a. enlightenment and excellence of taste acquired by intellectual and aesthetic training 4b. acquaintance with and taste in fine arts, humanities, and broad aspects of science as distinguished from vocational and technical skills 5a. the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon the capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations 5b. the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group; also: the characteristic features of everyday existence (as diversions or a way of life) shared by people in a place or time (popular culture) (southern culture) 5c. the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization (a corporate culture focused on the bottom line) 5d. the set of values, conventions, or social practices associated with a particular field, activity, or societal characteristic (studying the effect of computers on print culture) (changing the culture of materialism will take time) 6. the act or process of cultivating living material (as bacteria or viruses) in prepared nutrient media; also: a product of such cultivation
group of human beings at a specified time period and which...presents...observable and sharp discontinuities.”

Professor Booth goes on to describe how culture nearly encompasses the breadth of human experience stating:

"Professor Ward Goodenough, a US anthropologist, takes the idea of culture and operationalizes it by describing what it means in terms of people actually interacting and functioning together in a given environment. He wrote, “...a society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believes in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members.”

This idea is extremely powerful and has a much broader application than simply within civil society. While it does not provide a framework or specific activities on a checklist to methodically research a society’s culture, if one adds to Professor Goodenough’s definition the idea that the culture also includes the things that one must ‘do’ in addition to know and believe, the definition becomes more than a generalized description. By linking beliefs, knowledge and actions to membership within a society this definition provides explanation for the behaviors and activities of any group, which envisions itself a part of that society. It is both a metaquestion, and

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81 Booth, 14.

82 Quoted in Geertz, 11.
an answer that leads to a greater understanding about what activities are significant and why they are important within the culture of any single group.  

Ethnocentrism is a second important concept of which to be aware as well as a bias one must guard against when analyzing and studying culture. Quite simply, ethnocentrism is viewing the activities within another state from the perspective that one’s own state is singularly important and at the center of everything; one relates all other states and activities against this central entity.

Similarly, states have their own interests and ethnocentric perspectives that influence how they interact with other states. The Cuban Missile Crisis provides a good example of this. The United States viewed the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba as violation of an exclusive US sphere of influence. Beyond a simple intrusion into the Western Hemisphere, by the Soviet Union, US politicians felt that this action and these missiles posed an existential threat towards America, if left unchecked. However, at the height of this crisis, US policymakers gave little consideration to Cuba’s view that the United States was an existential threat. Similarly, the Soviet view of the United States deploying missiles into Turkey received little consideration by the United States as a potential existential threat towards the Soviet Union, although the United States later removed the missiles honoring a secret condition in the formal settlement.

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83 J.L. Driver, “Metaquestions,” *Noûs* 18, no. 2 (May 1984): 299, 301. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215165](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215165) (accessed April 12, 2010). For those readers not familiar with the term metaquestion, J.L. Driver’s article, though a bit dated does a nice job of exploring this philosophical term. Essentially, a metaquestion is a question asked in response to another question, and is dependent upon the primary, what J.L. Driver calls a first order, question. The questions are dependent upon one another therefore to fully understand the metaquestion how it relates to the first order question must be understood as well.

84 Booth, 15.

This is not to condemn ethnocentrism, which is a very normal part of human behavior, but to recognize ethnocentrism as a bias which analysts and policymakers must be wary when developing state-building policies and programs. In addition to actively guarding against slipping into an ethnocentric bias while planning, it is also necessary to remember that the affected population and leaders within the failed state will interpret the situation and US actions through their own lens. It is unlikely that these two viewpoints are the same, since they originate from different cultures, thus creating the conditions for misunderstanding and miscommunication between all involved stakeholders. 86

For example, consider a non-American’s view of US culture. While there are many nuanced differences between the numerous different ethnic groups in the United States, on the whole it is viewed as a democratic, capitalistic, predominately Christian, English-speaking, wealthy, strong, Hollywoodesque nation-state. Obviously, these broad generalizations about the United States may lack accuracy. However, such a generalized view may in fact represent the image that other populations around the world perceive as the United States. This perception then affects how these states interact with the United States in the international arena. The reverse is also true that the perceptions of other states exist within the United States and influence how American diplomats interact with their international counterparts. What must be avoided is the tendency to mirror-image one’s own culture onto another culture believing that one’s own culture is a universally accepted norm. This behavior will automatically inject error into state-building plans, and significantly decreases the probability of achieving an enduring solution. Culture envelopes and molds each member of a populace thus contributing to the development of the individual and more significantly, to their group identities. Observing and understanding the

86 Booth, 15.
culture within failed states is important because such observation is a potential window providing the foreign observer insight into a population’s identities.

**Identity-Who we see when looking into the mirror**

The concept of identity in recent years has gained favor as a way of gaining understanding of non-western cultures. The US Army and Marine Field Manual *Counterinsurgency* published in 2006 references identity, or some variation of it, over forty times. This was a deliberate attempt to educate the US Armed Forces about how the enemy they faced in Iraq and Afghanistan was different from previous adversaries and required a different approach. Similarly, the foundational publication for reconstruction and stability activities, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, published in October 2009, also references the concept of identity nearly thirty times as a significant factor in reconstruction and stability operations. However, neither the field manual nor the stability and reconstruction guide actually addresses what identity is or why it is significant.

Identity is very similar to culture. Culture, as previously stated, is a part of the environment that shapes identity. The most significant difference between culture and identity is that culture is a facet of a group or society that an outsider observes and then begins to gain understanding about the society. Identity on the other hand, as well as being unique, is an internal aspect of both individuals and groups, and defines how they see themselves. Identity is the core essence that influences why people act and make the choices that they do. Compounding the challenge of gaining understanding about a foreign society, whose identity is unobservable, is the fact that identity is not a single unchanging entity. Anssi Paasi, Professor of Geography focusing on the influence of geography on people and societies, observed that there are many different
types of identity that including: ethnic, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, gender, caste, and multiple others, potentially all coexisting and overlapping on another simultaneously. 87

As important as an understanding of identity is to grasping understanding a foreign population, the planner and policymaker must realize that even gaining the best understanding possible, one’s understanding will always be incomplete and imperfect. 88 This is not to suggest that because an outsider will have only a flawed understanding of the identities in question that such an effort is wasted. Rather the intent here is to minimize the risk of situational surprise and to avoid fundamental surprise completely by ensuring that analysts, planners, and policymakers do not arrogantly believe that it is possible to achieve a perfect, omnipotent understanding of a foreign identity. 89 The problem with truly knowing the identity of a different group is that one has not grown up in that specific environment, lived in that culture, and inculcated it as a defining part of oneself. Therefore, a very challenging act for an outsider is to ever truly know the identities, of either individuals or groups within another population.

Furthermore, identity is not static. Identity changes over time and under the external influences acting upon it. 90 Therefore, even if one solicits the assistance of expatriates as cultural experts, gaining insight into a group’s identity is difficult. The problem is the same for these experts. The ability of such cultural advisors to understand and articulate to their clients the


89 Lanir, 25.

90 Isaacs, 206.
unique aspects of a society’s group identity is undoubtedly greater than that of a complete outsider. Still, one must remember that the understanding and knowledge of an expatriate regarding the identity of the population has a ‘shelf-life’ because the environment the expatriate knew has changed since their departure.

Identity is also relevant only to the immediate question or issue at hand at that moment, and only in that very specific context. This relevance exists for a finite period, because the influence that the numerous different intersecting identities simultaneously exert on a person or group changes over time and often with each different situation. One must further expect, similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma in game theory, the choices made by these co-mingling identities will be those that are most advantageous and best satisfies the self-interest of a person or group while also minimizing risk.91 A considerable portion of this examination of identity has focused on individual identity, which is important because people make up populations and societies.

However, with respect to states and state-building what is more important is how all these individual identities coalesce to create group identities. Harold R. Isaacs, former Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, quoting Arthur Koestler, a 20th century writer, explains how “…his [man’s] overwhelming urge to belong, to identify himself with tribe or nation and above all with his system of beliefs,” continues into the modern era because it is part of man’s biological preconditioning left over from the evolutionary process.92 The need to belong is an intrinsic part of the human experience. Because of this need, group identities will remain a factor in societies and by extension politics. Therefore, planners and

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91 James D. Morrow, “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment and Negotiation in International Politics,” in Strategic Choice and International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1999), 80-82. Professor Morrow explains the Prisoner’s Dilemma with respect to choices and interests, and while the text is specifically addressing international relations, with respect to identity issues, this author thinks it helps to illustrate the same type of dynamic with respect to different internal interest groups.
92 Isaacs, 26-27.
policymakers must always be aware of and consider the effect their actions will have on group identities and the influence of the group identities on the planned state-building activities. Erich Fromm, a twentieth century social psychologist exploring group identities, acknowledged that “primary ties” “…block man’s development as a free, self-determining productive individual.”

Yet, this same individual growth can contribute to feelings of disconnectedness, powerlessness, feeling insignificant and uncertain of one’s own role or meaning of life. “Primary ties” therefore offer an alternative to these uncertainties. Group linkages to the various identities of tribe, ethnicity, clan, religion, or others give the individual “…genuine security and the knowledge of where he belongs.”

Therefore, with respect to state-building activities, planners and policymakers must consider whether society has a stronger affinity towards individualism and individual identity or towards collective group identities, before making assumptions about how to implement the necessary state-building tasks and deciding on an envisioned end state.

Determining the underlying nature of a society’s identity, whether it is one based more on individual identity, such as in the United States, or a group-based identity will help in understanding how the society sees itself and what the society’s fundamental values are. These fundamental values in turn influence how the population makes decisions and organizes itself. Part of this self-organization, because it is directly linked to the evolution of these group identities, inevitably contributes to a ‘we-they’ syndrome. The ‘we-they’ syndrome causes group members to look inward for support and sameness while shielding the group from intrusion

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93 Quoted in Isaacs, 34-35.
94 Ibid., 34-35. Through this portion of his book, Harold Issacs presents significant foundational concepts that contribute to understanding how group identities develop and how the desire to belong leads individuals to seek inclusion and to assume group identities.
95 Isaacs, 212.
96 Ibid., 217.
by outsiders, who are not part of the group. As Professor Isaacs' points out this tendency of group
dynamics does not just distinguish one group from another, it is divisive.97

Divisiveness alone does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to cooperation between
different groups. However, the environment in which different groups exist influences how
groups learn to interact with one another. One type of group identity that is sometimes discernible
to an outside observer and is representative of the ‘us-them’ syndrome is ethnicity.

Ethnicity is difference. Strictly defined ethnicity is the “…characteristics, distinctive
cultural or sub-cultural traits that set one group off from others…different beliefs, values, and
patterns of behavior are also involved…race is often correlated with cultural or sub-cultural
distinctions.”98 Ethnicity contributes to the creation of unique identities. Different ethnic groups
often exist within a single state. Additionally, ethnicity adds to the difficulty in clarifying the
distinctions between the terms nation and state. Within the United States, it is common to read
and hear US citizens use the term ‘nation’ as a synonym for the concept of a ‘state,’ specifically
as a sovereign entity interacting within the international community; hence, state-building is often
called nation-building.99

The role of ethnicity in the formation of states remains a source of debate, between two
groups of scholars, within the field of political science, specifically in the sub-fields of state-
building and nationalism. One group of scholars, generally categorized as ‘modernizationalists,’
takes the position that with the expansion and formation of states, peoples’ identities will shift to
aligning more closely with the state as modernity touches peoples’ lives. After people’s identities

97 Isaacs, 217.
99 James Dobbins et al., Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo, xv-xvi.
shift, they will eventually grow beyond their ethnicity, and then the idea of ethnicity will disappear like a useless appendage.

The other group is comprised of scholars, ‘ethnicity supporters,’ who contend that ethnicity is a factor that will always be present in state-building and nationalism, and therefore must be studied and understood. The ‘ethnicity supporters’ criticize their modernization counterparts for either ignoring or marginalizing ethnicity as a minor obstacle to that will “…wither away as…modernization occur[s].”100 Walker Connor, Professor of Political Science, noted for his work on nationalism, counters the ideas of the modernists and questions the validity of this assumption because ethnic tensions have not subsided.101 Ethnicity will probably not become less important in the near future; people naturally gravitate towards others with whom they have a shared sense of belonging, reinforcing the ‘us-them’ syndrome. Because of the affinity between ethnicity and identity, state-building planners and policymakers must remain sensitive to the existence of ethnicity as a component of identity. These same planners and policymakers must realize that they cannot make a simple assumption about ethnicity based on observable race and skin coloring; the population may not align their identities through these same lenses. The consideration of ethnicity, particularly as a source of difference and potential violence, is a necessary aspect of identity analysis when developing state-building programs.

Specifically the development of state-building programs needs to consider the aspects of race, religion, languages, mythology, collective memories, or any other element that may set one

100 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 29-30; Harold R. Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975, 25. Both Professors Connor and Isaacs address the idea the a certain segment of academia and perhaps the general public have expressed the belief that as people modernize, science advances and knowledge increases that ethnic and tribal identities will simply disappear, but so far this has not happened.

101 Walker, 35.
group apart from the other and prove divisive to state-building efforts.\textsuperscript{102} Planners and policymakers must work to suspend their judgment about the importance, validity or rationality of how a particular population identifies with or values any specific ethnic factors. The fact is that to a certain segment of a failed-state’s population ethnic factors like, race, religion, language, mythology or others are a part of their identity and reality. State-building programs that fail to consider ethnicity diminishes the prospects of achieving an enduring solution. Even worse than not finding an enduring solution for a particular failed state is failing to consider these ethnic factors, and the potential they possess to create the necessary conditions for future or renewed strife.\textsuperscript{103}

As with individual identities, the form and expanse of a group identity may not be discernable to an outsider who is unfamiliar with the group dynamics within the failed state. Group identity within the nation-state context is the collective identity shared by a specific population that contributes to their willingness or lack thereof to take political actions.\textsuperscript{104} Those actions will support the group, and reinforce its beliefs and identity. At the same time, they may not be the actions or activities desired by the donor nation endeavoring to assist in the rehabilitation of the state. Implementing a state-building program that lacks cultural relevance with the population groups and runs counter to the various group identities and increases the likelihood that such state-building efforts will not prove enduring.

In an attempt to understanding the significance of culture and identity within a population, consider the state-building efforts in Haiti by the United States. Although the best


\textsuperscript{103} Bell and Freeman, 11.

\textsuperscript{104} Kim, 16-19.
intentions guided US state-building efforts in Haiti, the outcome has been one of mixed results that have only slowed a general and continued decline toward state failure.
CASE STUDY: STATE-BUILDING IN ACTION

Haiti - A Continuum of Failure

The culture and identity of the current state of Haiti originates in its early colonial period. From its colonial origins, several themes emerge in Haitian culture that continues into the present day. The first of these cultural norms that Haitians learned from their colonial masters is that authoritarian or oligarchic rule is a normal and acceptable method of governance. This directly correlates to another relevant environmental condition, Haitians lack familiarity or experience with democratic processes. Dovetailing these cultural aspects and reinforcing them is the demonstrated behavior within Haitian culture that accepts violence as an acceptable method of achieving political goals. Violence has a strong association with the last colonial legacy in Haiti, divisive ethnicity. Deep ethnic divisions contribute to sustaining an enduring caste system between Haitians. These facets of Haitian culture were instrumental in the development of unique Haitian identities which affect how Haitian society functions. An abbreviated review of Haitian history will help to illustrate the origins of these facets of Haitian culture and identity. This author’s intent is to help the reader understand 1) how deeply ingrained certain aspects of a society’s identity are and 2) because of this circumstance why it is important to consider the impact culture and identity may have on state-building endeavors.

Haiti - An Abbreviated Historical Review

Originally, part of the Spanish colony, Hispaniola, the Spanish crown ceded control of the western third of the colony to France in 1697. The French established plantations on the island, which by 1789 was the most profitable of all France’s colonies, if not the entire world.  

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Caribbean. Saint Domingue, the original name of the French colony, exported the equivalent amount of sugar to Europe as that of all the British colonies combined. The colony was also the world’s leading coffee grower. The cost of creating this prosperity was considerable and made possible in large measure by an enormous slave population. The French plantation owners continued the Spanish tradition of importing slave labor after the indigenous populations in the Caribbean had died off in the three hundred years following the discovery of the New World by importing hundreds of thousands of slaves to Haiti. When the revolution began, the Haitian population consisted of five distinct groups, laying the foundation for future ethnic divisions and the unofficial caste segregations within Haitian society. James C. Leyburn, former Professor of Sociology, identified and labeled three of these groups in his 1941 study, The Haitian People. He formally identified three groups, grands blancs, petits blancs, and gens de couleur. The slave

106 James G. Leyburn, The Haitian People Caribbean Series, 9 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), xliii; Harold Palmer Davis, Black Democracy-The Story of Haiti, 2nd Edition, Revised (New York, The Dial Press, 1929), 22-26. Professor Davis records that 1791 exports from Haiti included 177,230,000 lbs, coffee 73,944,000 lbs, cotton 6,820,000 lbs, indigo 1,009,000 lbs, molasses 29,000lbs, and dyewoods 6,788,634 lbs, the estimated value of which in 1929 exceeded $50,000,000. The total estimated value of non-export goods including buildings, lands, slaves, and livestock was $193,500,000.


108 Davis, 4, 9, 12-13, 23-24, 305-306. Professor Davis explains that estimates of slave populations from official census are generally unreliable because underreporting the number of slaves they owned in order to reduce the head tax then owed to the French Government best served the interests of the plantation owners. The official memoirs presented to the ministers of marine are a better source for estimating imports of slaves. From these memoirs, the estimate of the slave population in 1754 was 230,000; Professor Davis states that a conservative estimate for 1798 would have been not less than 450,000. While this is an enormous number of slaves, more striking is the mortality rate since estimates place the total number of slaves imported in a little over one hundred years, since Spain ceded Haiti to France, at over 1,000,000 souls.

109 Leyburn, 16-20. These three groups roughly equate to upper class privileged whites, all other whites middle and low class, and free people of color. The upper class whites included the plantation owners, wealthy merchants and high state officials; Davis makes a distinction here (see note 77) that important state officials almost exclusively received appointments from the French Crown and had no real connection to the colony. The middle and lower class whites were comprised of the average merchants, artisans, planters with small farmers and few slaves, and any number of ne'er-do-wells. The free people of color make up an interesting group. This group included both mixed race mulattoes, having one white parent and one parent of African descent, typically father and mother respectively, as well as former slaves, now freemen of colour, all of whom were French citizens also. This class of free people of color also
population, which numbered nearly half a million people, comprised a fourth group, although Haitian society did not officially recognize them as a class.\textsuperscript{110} The last group consisted of the colonial assembly. This was a select group of French-born white bureaucrats appointed by the French Crown to govern the colony. In the conduct of their duties, these bureaucrats accepted little or no input from the colonists.\textsuperscript{111} The behavior of these colonial bureaucrats and the plantation masters together establishes the basis for normalizing authoritarian rule.

If not for the French Revolution erupting in 1789, the status quo in Haiti may have continued into the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. However the ideas promulgated by the Estates-General and subsequently the National Assembly proclaiming the “Rights of Man and Citizens” led the \textit{gens de couleur} to agitate for equal political freedom and rights as French citizens.\textsuperscript{112} The issue came to a climax when, in 1791, the National Assembly directed that colonial assemblies should admit free men of color as legitimate representatives. The furore of white colonist over this declaration led the governor-general to suspend the colonial assembly. The result was an outbreak of violence when the \textit{gens de couleur} came to believe that it was the only means of forcing the white minority to recognize these rights.\textsuperscript{113} Before the \textit{gens de couleur} took any action, the slaves rose up in open revolt in August 1791.\textsuperscript{114}

Without recounting the entire revolution as it unfolded over the next fourteen years several significant outcomes are worth noting because these outcomes contribute to the current

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{111} Davis, 26-27.
\textsuperscript{112} Davis, 29-35; Leyburn, 16-22.
\textsuperscript{113} Davis, 34-35; Leyburn, 22-23.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
environment in Haiti. The first outcome is a tradition of violence to create change. The violence and atrocities committed by whites, revolutionary slaves and mulattoes was almost legendary. Professor Leyburn stated, “...[t]he Reign of Terror in France was decorous by comparison.”

Out of this violence and destruction, two significant and lasting results emerged. First, the majority of the white colonists, not massacred by the revolting slaves during the initial insurrection and, who had the means to leave fled the colony. Second, the long-term, albeit probably unintended, consequence of this violence was the destruction of the agricultural infrastructure that made the colony so profitable. Without being able to effect change through political discourse, Haitians learn that violence is an acceptable method to create change. Unfortunately, because of the massacres and exodus by the remaining white colonists that followed the successful revolution, the gens de couleur and the former slaves never had to learn how to reconcile their differences with their adversaries after the fighting ended—the norm became a winner-takes-all environment.

A sense of national pride in being Haitian was the second major outcome from the Haitian revolution for independence. This pride stemmed from the fact that Haiti gained its independence through a successful slave revolution. Instrumental in gaining their independence was the defeat of the European French armies sent by Napoleon to re-conquer the colony and to reinstate French authority. This defeat of French forces contributed to a sense of pride in Haitian identity that remained unchallenged until the US intervention in 1915.

\[115\] Davis, 36-37, 42; Leyburn, 23.
\[116\] Davis, 89-90, 92; Leyburn, 33.
\[118\] Davis, 86; Leyburn, 30.
\[119\] Leyburn, xi.
A tradition of political governance that was rooted less in the principles of representation, fairness and equality than personal influence, power, and might, as a basis of governing authority was the third legacy of the Haitian revolution. In the two years after the revolution, 1804-1806, Haitian governance consisted of the authoritarian rule by General Dessalines, a former slave turned General-in-Chief of the Haitian forces who received the surrender of the French in 1803. Following another short revolt, resulting in the death of Emperor Dessalines, two of Dessalines’ former subordinate generals, Christophe ruling the North, and Pétion the South, geographically divided Haiti between themselves. Reinforcing the tradition of authoritarian rule and using violence as the method of creating change.

Christophe continued to govern in much the same way as Dessalines, as an absolute dictator. Despite a lack of personal freedom among the population, Christophe’s rule was efficient and the Northern Haitian Kingdom benefited from it. Commerce and trade resumed with other foreign states resulting in a treasury surplus of more than six million dollars. The southern Haitian Republic however, although enjoying significantly greater freedom and nascent democracy, did not flourish economically like the North.

The reunification of Haiti followed the death of Christophe, with the election in 1818 of Pétion’s successor General Jean-Pierre Boyer, an educated mulatto and former military leader, as president of the republic for life. Boyer ruled for twenty-five years, until 1843. Despite his best intentions, Boyer’s efforts to return Haiti to economic prosperity and freedom failed miserably.

120 Davis, 83, 91-92.
121 Davis, 96-98.;
122 Leyburn, 49, 51.
124 Davis, 114.
125 Leyburn, 72-79.
The benefits of this freedom did little to improve the lives of the populace who in the end became little more than serfs tied to the land by law, with overall production declining on parcels of land that grew smaller with each passing generation.126

If Haiti, as an independent state, had a golden age, it may have been during Boyer’s ill-fated reign. Boyer has the dubious honor of being the last Haitian leader to rule over a united island, including the former Spanish colony on the eastern portion of Hispaniola. His presidency represents the longest single era of peace and stability known in Haiti, until the 1915 intervention by the United States. After Boyer’s presidency, over the next seventy-two years, twenty-two different heads of state ruled Haiti. Only a single head of state served out his prescribed term. Of the remaining twenty-one, one resigned, a mob dismembered one, explosives blew-up one in his palace, one was poisoned, three others died while in office, and after ruling from between three months to twelve years, revolutions deposed the other fourteen.127

Boyer departed into exile following the Revolution of 1843 by mulatto élites who agitated for agricultural reforms and intended to change the country’s agricultural system back to one with plantation-style forced labor. These same élites perceiving they had a mandate, by virtue of their education, wealth, and most importantly lighter-skin color, assumed they would permanently control the government.128 Acting under this misperception, they sought to extend this control to the army, by wresting the power of the “prevailingly black” army away from the black élites.129 This effort led their ouster in the Revolution of 1844 and the elevation of black élites to the presidency.130 One of the stated objectives of the new black-led government was to

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126 Leyburn, 65-73, 75.
127 Leyburn, 89.
128 Ibid., 80-84, 89.
129 Leyburn, 84, 89.
130 Ibid., 90.
decrease the influence of the light-skinned mulattoes in government. These former military, now turned political leaders succeeded in this objective, and after 1843, the majority of the presidents were black military leaders, typically generals in the military.\textsuperscript{131}

This near obsession with skin color illustrates the last significant outcome of the original Haitian Revolution, the evolution of distinct classes into an almost a fixed caste system.\textsuperscript{132} These classes are both economic with vast differences between rich and poor, but also between ethnic groups based on when they achieved their freedom. One group, \textit{Anciens libres}, generally inclusive of lighter-skinned mulattoes, was free before the revolution. The other group, \textit{nouveaux libres}, is those people freed after the revolution, typically representative of former black slaves.\textsuperscript{133} So fixed are these caste identities in Haitian culture of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, that despite black leaders controlling the government for most of the time; they could not effectively change or erase them.\textsuperscript{134} Additional caste distinctions were reinforced by a perception of superiority by élites urban residents over their rural countrymen.\textsuperscript{135}

The ensuing hundred years after independence helped to create a culture of authoritarian rule usually led by Haitian army generals as the normal method of governing Haiti. During Haiti’s first one hundred years of independence, generations of Haitians also internalized as normal the use of violence, which typically coincided with another ambitious army officer, seeking to be president. Lastly, even before independence the Haitian population developed a highly sensitized consciousness about ethnic differences stemming from skin coloration. The

\textsuperscript{131} Leyburn, 101. So successful in sowing seeds of suspicion and discontent with the light-skinned mulattoes that in the seventy-two years preceding the US intervention, mulatto élites ruled only eight of those years.
\textsuperscript{132} Leyburn, 47-49, 80-84.
\textsuperscript{133} Dash, 7, 31.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 97.
\textsuperscript{135} Dash, 98.
result of this sensitivity left Haitian society ethnically divided and stratified despite having a high degree of being racially homogeneous. These historical events and trends created the Haitian operational environment in 1915 when the first of two US interventions occurs. The question is when President Wilson ordered the Navy and Marine Corps to intervene in Haiti did any of the State Department or Department of the Navy planners consider Haiti’s history and culture before trying to implement the policy as articulated by Secretary of State Lansing:

The government of the United States considers it its duty to support a constitutional government. It means to assist in the establishing of such a government… in an effort to aid the people of Haiti in establishing a stable government and in maintaining domestic peace throughout the Republic.136

**US Interventions into Haiti**

**The 1915 Intervention**

Secretary of Legation and American Chargé d’Affaires at Port du Prince Robert Beale Davis, Jr. submitted his memorandum for record, documenting the conditions in Haiti on the eve of the US intervention, to Secretary of State Lansing in January 1916. Secretary of Legation Davis in his memorandum describes the cycle of continued violence, which since independence has come to be the hallmark of Haitian politics.137 The most current episodes of violence, which began with the overthrow of President Zamor in November 1914, found the government destitute

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without any treasury funds, mounting debt and negligible revenues. Violence continued to increase in 1915 with Haitian Army factions competing for power. As Secretary of Legation Davis reported, these nearly endless cycles of revolution reached a climax in July 1915 with the murders of President Sam, the current president, and former President Zamor and the forced entry by an armed mob into two foreign Legations.\textsuperscript{138} The continued deterioration and lack of legitimate authority to enforce law and order, and the potential of British or French forces landing in Haiti to protect their interests, led United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing to request the landing of Marines in Haiti.\textsuperscript{139} The purpose directed by Acting Secretary of the Navy Admiral William S. Benson in a telegram to Rear Admiral (RADM) William B. Caperton, US Navy, Commander of the Cruiser Squadron dated 28 July 1915, “…was to protect American and foreign interests…”\textsuperscript{140} RADM Caperton, after assessing conditions in Haiti over the next five days, reports back to the Secretary of the Navy that the threat of random mob violence from an ethnic-political group called the Cacos remained undiminished.\textsuperscript{141} While the threat posed by the Cacos remained, the elections necessary to reestablish the government could not occur. Establishing enduring stability in Haiti would be impossible without first disbanding and divesting the Cacos of their informal power.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 318.
\textsuperscript{139} United States Department of State, “Haiti,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Address of the President to Congress December 7, 1915, 475.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 42. Professor Schmidt explains that a “caco army” was a group of part-time military adventures and conscripts recruited and loosely organized by local military strongmen. Typically, a candidate desiring to be president would raise a Caco army in northern Haiti, in and around Cap Haitien, the site of the original revolution beginning. One may also assume given that this ‘army’ was raised in the Northern area that it is largely comprised of black nouveaux libres since during and after the revolution this region was originally heavily populated with slaves from the plantations.
\textsuperscript{142} United States Department of State, “Haiti,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Address of the President to Congress December 7, 1915, 477.
Shortly after this, the mission changed when Secretary of State Lansing instructed Secretary of Legation Davis to inform the Haitian Congress and government officials that as per their request the United States would guarantee support to the elected government. This guarantee of US protection came with two caveats. The first caveat was that whoever the Congress nominated and elected as President must be able to quell the factional infighting. The second caveat was the expectation by the United States that the Haitian government would entrust the United States with control of its customs revenues and managing the finances of the Haitian Republic. In the final paragraph of his instructions outlining the planned US procedures for assisting Haiti, Secretary of State Lansing expressed what he envisioned as the end state for this intervention writing:

The government of the United States considers it its duty to support a constitutional government. It means to assist in the establishing of such a government, and to support it as long as necessity may require. It has no design upon the political or territorial integrity of Haiti; on the contrary, what has been done, as well as what will be done, is conceived in an effort to aid the people of Haiti in establishing a stable government and in maintaining domestic peace throughout the Republic.

RADM Caperton reinforced this position in the 9 August 1915 proclamation to the Haitian people made on behalf of the President of the United States Woodrow Wilson stating:

I am directed by the United States Government to assure the Haitian people that the United States has no object in view except to insure, to establish and to help maintain Haitian independence and the establishment of a stable and firm government by the Haitian people.

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143 United States Department of State, “Haiti,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Address of the President to Congress December 7, 1915, 478-479.

144 Ibid., 478-479.

145 United States Department of State, “Haiti,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Address of the President to Congress December 7, 1915, 480; US Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, 65.
Every assistance will be given to the Haitian people in their attempt to secure these ends. It is the intention to retain the United States forces in Haiti only so long as will be necessary for this purpose.\textsuperscript{146}

To these ends, the United States ratified a treaty with Haiti and attempted, under the terms of the treaty, to assist Haiti in ending its militarism and becoming a more functional modern functional state.\textsuperscript{147}

1915 State-Building Efforts in Haiti

The United States established programs and practices to provide security, governance, democratization, economic stability, and development as part of the American program of ‘economic and domestic rehabilitation,’ in Haiti.\textsuperscript{148} Surprisingly, these programs and practices were quiet similar to current state-building activities discussed in the previous section on state-building in this monograph.\textsuperscript{149}

The United States, as previously stated in policy communications from the President and Secretary of State, had no intention of retaining Haiti as a US possession or keeping US forces in Haiti indefinitely. However, the need to establish a secure environment that provided law and order throughout Haiti led initially to the deployment of two thousand Marines to Haiti.\textsuperscript{150} Recognizing the need to find an enduring solution to Haitian domestic security led to the inclusion of Article X, guaranteeing the creation and training of the Gendarmerie d’Haiti by the

\textsuperscript{146} United States Department of State, “Haiti,” \textit{Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Address of the President to Congress December 7, 1915}, 481.

\textsuperscript{147} United States Department of State, “Haiti,” \textit{Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Address of the President to Congress December 5, 1916}, 319-320, 328-332.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 320, 361.

\textsuperscript{149} James Dobbins et al., \textit{The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building}, xxiii. Refer to pages 28-29 of this monograph for state-building activities.

United States, in the 1915 US-Haiti Treaty. The Gendarmerie-d’Haiti, a national constabulary force, answered to the Haitian President through the administration of the Minister of the Interior. In due course, the number of US Marines providing security in Haiti decreased as the Gendarmerie d’Haiti grew in terms of both size and capability. The proclamation disbanding the Haitian police and military and transferring their responsibilities to the Gendarmerie d’Haiti, indicates that enforcing law and order had degenerated to the point that each town and community had its own ‘private police force. Furthermore, the chief of each section then enforced laws based on local custom and his personal authority. The intent of creating, training, and empowering the Gendarmerie-d’Haiti, was to provide Haiti with a professional law enforcement organization that could guarantee stability and equal protection under Haitian law to the population.

Although well intended, this policy was made with little regard for the historical precedent that most Haitian leaders, backed by military force, traditionally institute authoritarian rule. This is a cultural norm reinforced for over one hundred years emanating from French pre-revolutionary governance through Haitian Revolution, and into the era of Haitian independence of the 19th and 20th centuries. Consolidating and centralizing power by dismantling the army, eliminating the Caco ‘threat’ and giving control of a robust national police force to the president—in a country where no precedent existed for respecting the rule of law—worked well only as long the United States occupied Haiti. While the US Marines developed a professional,

152 Ibid., 335-336.
154 Schmidt, 42; US Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, 79-82, 512-513, 517; United States Department of State, “Haiti,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: with the address of the President to Congress December 5, 1916, 311.
and initially apolitical, force capable of maintaining public order and supporting the elected government, the occupation did little to address the cultural paradigm of autocratic rule.\textsuperscript{155} Shortly after the US Marines departed, the ‘Haitian political system’ reverted to a state similar to that of before the US intervention.\textsuperscript{156}

President Stenio Vincent, elected fairly in 1930 under US supervised elections, and then again in 1934 through the first unsupervised elections since 1915, oversaw the transition from US assisted governance back to Haitian sovereignty in 1934.\textsuperscript{157} Almost immediately following the departure of the US Marines, President Vincent influenced the electorate to pass two sweeping plebiscites. The first plebiscite shifted fiscal authority away from the legislature and gave it to the executive branch.\textsuperscript{158} The second plebiscite in 1935 passed a new constitution granting the executive branch nearly absolute power over the judiciary and legislative branches of the government.\textsuperscript{159} Within a year after the departure by US forces following the nineteen-year occupation and efforts to ‘economically and domestically’ rehabilitate Haiti, the country, although stable, was again demonstrating its potential to revert to a modernesque feudal state.\textsuperscript{160}


\textsuperscript{156} Greene, “Chapter 6—Haiti Historical Setting; Politics and the Military 1934-1957”; Schmidt, 233.

\textsuperscript{157} Dash, 14-15.

\textsuperscript{158} Greene, “Chapter 6—Haiti Historical Setting; Politics and the Military 1934-1957.”

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{160} Pezullo, 80-81; Schmidt, 233. Similar to the victory over the French in 1804, following the withdrawal of the US Marines in 1934 with the encouragement of President Vincent, Haitians destroyed critical infrastructure, destroying bridges and tearing down telephone lines ‘celebrating’ their second independence. Schmidt, writing about the state of Haiti nearly forty years after the occupation cites Marine Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr, head of the US military mission to Haiti from 1958-1963, who describes how most of the Occupation-built infrastructure was nearly in a state of ruin.
US efforts at the other state-building tasks met with similar success during the US occupation, but accomplished little that proved enduring after the withdrawal. In accordance with the treaty, the US appointed a Financial Advisor to work with the Finance Minister to reform the Ministry of Finance, the Haitian public accounting system, as well as working with the a US nominated General Receiver to manage Haitian customs revenues. Reforming the Haitian Ministry of Finance and safeguarding Haiti’s revenues from its commodities exports accomplished the state-building task of economic stabilization by retiring Haitian debt ahead of its planned schedule as well as stabilizing Haitian currency. These advancements did not prove enduring however owing to a decrease in commodity exports and depression of global trade markets because the Great Depression which caused a global economic contraction. Lastly, with the departure of the US Marines, confidence that Haitian institutions would remain solvent and self-sustaining waned. The tendency of the Haitian government to revert to its pre-intervention norms continued to assert itself. Ultimately, over the subsequent decades corrupt ruling cliques gained greater power and used Haiti for their own personal profit. Economists and political scientists eventually labeled Haiti’s form of government a kleptocracy.

Research for this monograph, found two primary source references suggesting that Haitian culture was a consideration during this state-building endeavor. The first was near the beginning of the US intervention in Haiti in 1915 and 1916. This is the only instance in official US government foreign relations correspondence that addresses a concern about Haitian culture. This single reference to Haitian culture called into question a Haitian law allowing Haitian

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creditors to attach one-third of a government employee’s salary, even without a court order. The issue of ‘attachments’ became contentious when RADM Caperton acting in his capacity as the Commander, US Forces in Haiti and Haitian waters tried to introduce a direct deposit-like system for paying government employees in an effort to reduce corruption and graft in the government. The telegrams sent between RADM Caperton and US Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels do not indicate who in the Haitian government raised this objection. However, the explicit threat was that if US authorities disallowed attachments, Haitian Government officials and judges threatened to publically denounce the United States for its failure respect for Haitian law or customs. After negotiations between the Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Borno and the US Minister to Haiti Arthur Bailly-Blanchard, Blanchard reported by telegram to US Secretary of State Lansing that it was impossible to repeal the law allowing attachments by executive decree. His telegram further indicated that the Haitian government, presumably the legislature, could not make attachments impossible under the law. RADM Caperton resolved the matter by issuing a military order to the Banque Nationale de la République d’Haiti to honor only those injunctions issued by a court judgment.

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163 United States Department of State, “Haiti,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: With the Address of the President to Congress December 5, 1916, 346. The use of the term attachment leads this author to understand that attachment is similar to a garnishment order on someone’s wages.

164 Ibid., 341-342, 345-346; US Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, 39. The proclamation by RADM Caperton to the Haitian people expresses his official position as the Commander, of US Forces in Haiti and Haitian waters. In this same proclamation, RADM Caperton announces the imposition of martial law and in accordance with his instructions and interpretation of international law assumed the power and responsibility for all government functions in Haiti.

165 United States Department of State, “Haiti,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: With the Address of the President to Congress December 5, 1916, 346. The official communications do not indicate who the Haitian officials hoped to influence. Based on this author’s reading about Haitian politics, a reasonable assumption would be that the politicians and the judges were hoping to influence the Haitian public to demonstrate, protest or riot against the US Marines.

166 Ibid., 347-348.

167 Ibid., 347-348.
The other reference to Haitian culture, which suggests that at least some US leaders tried to understand and considered the Haitian culture and identity while implementing state-building activities, came from testimony given before the US Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo. Specifically, the testimony of US Marine Corps Brigadier General (BG) Smedley D. Butler on October 21, 1921 presented the general’s perspective on Haiti and the US mission. During the course of the US Senate hearings, BG Butler described his understanding of the environment with respect to his duties as the first commander and organizer of the gendarmerie from its conception in October 1915 until BG Butler’s departure in March 1918. BG Butler testifying:

…[m]y object down there was to do what they [Haitian leaders] wanted not to make out of Haiti an America but to make out of Haiti a first class black man's country and instead of importing our style of architecture down there to develop a style of architecture suited to the colored man and to the country…. What we wanted was clean little towns with tidy thatch roofed dwellings. That is what the country can afford and that is what it ought to have and then there would never be any temptation to anybody to grab it either.168

BG Butler’s testimony suggests that he recognized a difference between US and Haiti cultures and environments. He also states what he thought was necessary for the United States to succeed in its state-building efforts in Haiti. Specifically this meant not trying to make Haiti into a ‘little’ America something that, by his estimate, was outside the potential for transformation.

However, it is not clear, from this research, if BG Butler’s insights to reflect a shared understanding of the environment or contributed to any efforts to conduct state-building activities within the limitations of the system. Official US government documents reveal no reference to Haitian culture, or identity as a consideration by policymakers when the Secretary of State Lansing and President Wilson directed the US Navy and Marine Corp to intervene in Haiti “…in

168 US Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, 518.
an effort to aid the people of Haiti in establishing a stable government and in maintaining
domestic peace throughout the Republic.” 169

In the sixty years between the departure of US Marines from Haiti in 1934 and the second
US intervention in 1994, the environment in Haiti had deteriorated to a point where the country
was on the verge of a major humanitarian crisis.170 After the departure of the US Marines in 1934,
the Haitian political system reverted to its previous form of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian
rule. Although the turmoil of the constantly changing presidency that existed before the 1915 US
intervention decreased after the withdrawal of the US Marines, the Gendarmerie-d’Haiti, renamed
in 1928 as the Garde d’Haiti began asserting greater influence in national politics by supporting
or withdrawing its support for the president.171 This arrangement led the army to arrange for new
elections in 1956 that resulted in the election of François ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier as president.
Following his election ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier proceeded to consolidate power and ruled Haiti as an
absolute dictator for the next fifteen years until his death in 1971. Before his death, ‘Papa Doc’
aranged for new national presidential elections that resulted in the unanimous election of his son,
Jean Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier as the next president. ‘Baby Doc’ ruled Haiti until 1986, when
his own excesses and a waning economy contributed to popular uprisings and ‘Baby Doc’s’
departure in self-imposed exile.172 The power vacuum created by ‘Baby Doc’s’ departure led yet
again to the Haitian military intervening and establishing a new government.173 In 1990, four

169 United States Department of State, “Haiti,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States with the Address of the President to Congress December 7, 1915 Foreign Relations of the

170 Pezzullo, 111,114,117, 137-138, 142, 244, 259-263. Ralph Pezullo’s entire book, Plunging into
Haiti, provides a detailed account of the international and internal political environment of Haiti following
the forced exile of ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier in 1986 up to the 1994 intervention by the US and UN
multinational forces.

171 Ibid., 81.

172 Ibid., 109, 113.

173 Ibid.
years after pressuring ‘Baby Doc’ to step down as President-for Life, Haiti held new elections resulting in the election of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former Salesian priest turned political activist and presidential candidate. President Aristide’s five year term was shortened to seven months following a September 1991 coup d’état, after he lost the support of the Haitian armed forces. The United Nations General Assembly condemned the coup, as did the President of the Security Council who also expressed support for the Organization of American States in their efforts to find an amicable solution and restore the legitimately elected government to power.174

The Security Council in July 1994, following two and one-half years of negotiation and broken agreements, passed Resolution 940.175 This resolution authorized member states under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to form a multinational force for the purposes of “…facilitating the departure of the military coup leaders…” and restoring President Aristide and the “…legitimate authorities of the Haitian government…”176

The 1994 Intervention - Operation Uphold Democracy

Eighty years after the first US intervention of 1915, deteriorating conditions in Haiti resulted in nearly anarchical conditions that contributed to the deaths of thousands of Haitian citizens and created a humanitarian crisis causing Haitians to escape from the country in small
boats across the ocean.\textsuperscript{177} In accordance with UN Resolution 940 the United States as the lead nation led a twenty-eight nation coalition intervention into Haiti with the purpose of removing the military coup d’
\'etat leadership and returning power to the elected Aristide government.\textsuperscript{178} Elements of the United States’ 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division conducted an air assault operation to seize Port-au-Prince International Airport as part of Operation Uphold Democracy in September 1994. This was the second time in the twentieth century that the United States intervened in Haiti in order to stabilize and improve the country.\textsuperscript{179}

This intervention was different from the 1915 US intervention in several ways. Foremost, this time the United States was only the lead nation of a multinational force entering Haiti. The second significant difference was the Haiti’s government. Although viewed as illegitimate the government continued to rule Haiti and continued to seek a negotiated settlement for returning the government to an elected democracy. The stated objectives of the UN resolution were to restore Haitian democracy, provide security, stabilize the country, create a new police force and professionalize the Haitian armed forces.\textsuperscript{180} Overall, these objectives were very similar to the end state and treaty goals of the 1915 US intervention.\textsuperscript{181}

The role of the United States in achieving these goals was however significantly different. While in 1915, the US occupied and directly participated in the governance of Haiti for nineteen years, with respect to the 1994 intervention, the declared policy and directed actions of

\textsuperscript{177} Walter E. Kretchik, et al, 24.


\textsuperscript{179} UN Security Council, Resolution 940 (1994).

\textsuperscript{180} David M. Malone and Sebastain von Einsiedel, “Haiti,” 174-175.

\textsuperscript{181} United States Department of State, “Haiti,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Address of the President to Congress December 7, 1915, 480-481.
the Clinton administration for US forces in Haiti was not to conduct state-building activities or act as a police force for Haiti. Yet, when US forces entered the country, the conditions turned out to be far worse than originally anticipated leading the United States to take a greater role than initially planned within the overall UN operation. US political guidance to the military and the actual conditions on the ground put US commanders in a difficult situation. Interviews with senior US leaders of the initial entry force, JTF-190, reflect a situation where they could see and were aware of tasks, both state-building and humanitarian-focused, that if accomplished would improve the lives of the Haitian people and assist in accomplishing their mission of regime change. On the other hand, the orders and guidance given to these leaders limited their actions to only conducting those state-building tasks necessary to support US operations.

US policy waivered and changed with respect to what the administration hoped to accomplish and how to affect this after numerous special interest groups worked to influence the

184 Cynthia L. Hayden, ed., Oral History Interviews JTF-190 Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps & Fort Bragg Training Support Center, 1995); E.D. McGrady and John S. Ivancovich, 14. This author based this generalization on this volume of nearly fifty interviews that reflect this paradox of recognizing a problem, while the leadership was given orders that limited their activities to address these problems.
Clinton administration.\textsuperscript{186} American public opinion regarding nation-building particularly after the tragic experience in Somalia, created within the administration a “… preoccupation with the day-to-day public consumption of his [President Clinton’s] decisions and superseded any concern for political realities in Haiti, statesmanship, or a need to maintain US commitments to its international partners.”\textsuperscript{187}

Despite evolving policy by the Clinton administration, that contributed to operational challenges once US forces entered Haiti, the question of this monograph remains did the administration consider Haitian culture and identity during policy development. Author Ralph Pezzullo, son of US Special Envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, wrote in his conclusions after studying the complex problem that is Haiti that the Clinton administration ‘…turned a blind eye to 190 years of Haitian history. They didn’t understand the Haitian people or their culture, and they were unprepared for the deep currents of distrust and fear that run through Haitian politics.”\textsuperscript{188}

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) also analyzed Operation Uphold Democracy studying how policymakers and planners considered the historical, political, social, and legal aspects of Haitian culture while planning and executing operations once on the ground. The CNA report very specifically points out that US forces were not in Haiti to conduct nation-building.


\textsuperscript{187} Pezzullo, 188, 277.

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 274.
Once on the ground simply creating a secure environment and even accessing local services, like water, electricity, solid waste disposal and sewage services, to support US forces required some level of nation-building operations. With respect to considerations for culture, the CNA report concluded that at a minimum there were three cultural perspectives, or identities intersecting in this operation. These identities were foremost Haitian identities and culture, the US military culture, and the culture of American society. The CNA report offers a general overview that US forces, excepting the Marines, had a significantly incomplete understanding of Haitian culture, its legal, political and social systems as well as Haiti’s historical roots. While this did not prevent US forces from accomplishing their assigned tasks, it probably limited the overall UN effort from instituting meaningful change in the environment. The CNA report concludes, interestingly enough, that military planners do consider the culture of another country when military forces plan an operation. However, the report caveats this in its acknowledgement that the focus of military planning is often on facts related to who, where, and what, “which sometimes comes at the expense of building relations between the facts.”

From the perspective of policy development, the CNA report suggests that the administration had an incomplete understanding of the Haitian culture and identity. Dr. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Kreiger/Eisenhower Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at John Hopkins University and is also of Haitian descent, a member of the Haiti discussion panel during the CAN 1995 Annual Conference, from which this report was written, highlights the administrations incomplete understanding through his explanation about how the Haitian people viewed the military and the police. Dr. Trouillot explained how from the Haitian perspective the separation of the roles of the military and the

189 E.D. McGrady and John S. Ivancovich, 11, 13, 28-29; Ziek, 372.
190 E.D. McGrady and John S. Ivancovich, 8, 21.
191 Ibid., 3, 19-21, 27.
192 Ibid., 22.
police had over time blurred and were one and the same. This perspective led to a difference in expectations between US forces operationalizing the task of creating a safe environment, but not conducting any civil policing activities and the Haitian people, who given the lack of combat and warfighting activities by intervention forces, believed US forces were not in the country as invaders, but to police the country.\footnote{Ibid., 33-34.} Dr. Trouillot expressed his opinion that the permissive entry by US forces was good because it minimized the perception of the intervention as a foreign invasion.\footnote{E.D. McGrady and John S. Ivancovich, \textit{33}.} A better understanding of what this meant to the Haitian people may have resulted in different policy guidance, orders and forces deployed if the administration had included civil policing as a specified part of the US forces mission.\footnote{Ibid., 6-13; US Army 10th Mountain Division, \textit{10th Mountain Division, Operation Uphold Democracy: Operations in Haiti: Planning, Preparation, Execution, August 1994 thru January 1995} (Fort Drum, NY: 10th Mountain Division and Fort Drum Training and Audiovisual Support Center, 1995), 2-2 to 2-7. This book provides an overview of the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division’s activities conducted with respect to Operation Uphold Democracy, it includes the assigned mission of the division, key tasks and commander’s intent none of which reflects a specific requirement for policing Haiti, and only tangentially includes state-building tasks.}

Since Operation Uphold Democracy was only sixteen years ago, the number of available primary source government documents that may help to understand how the Clinton administration made the decisions it did and what other factors were an influence are still limited. The Department of State has not yet published the \textit{Papers related to the Foreign Relations of the United States} for the Clinton administration, nor has there been any declassified documents posted on The National Security Archive website maintained by George Washington University. Further documents may be available to researchers in the collections of the Clinton Presidential Library, but if there is relevant, material available it is not readily apparent using the library’s search engine. Lacking these sources, this author opted to search the public record documents from archives in the State Department, and the White House websites, both of which include

\footnote{Ibid., 6-13; US Army 10th Mountain Division, \textit{10th Mountain Division, Operation Uphold Democracy: Operations in Haiti: Planning, Preparation, Execution, August 1994 thru January 1995} (Fort Drum, NY: 10th Mountain Division and Fort Drum Training and Audiovisual Support Center, 1995), 2-2 to 2-7. This book provides an overview of the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division’s activities conducted with respect to Operation Uphold Democracy, it includes the assigned mission of the division, key tasks and commander’s intent none of which reflects a specific requirement for policing Haiti, and only tangentially includes state-building tasks.}
press briefings and Congressional testimony records, as well as the National Archives and Records Administration, and The Public Papers of the Presidents, part of the American Presidency Project.\textsuperscript{196} Searching through the aforementioned sources revealed two particularly interesting documents that may help illuminate the consideration given to Haitian culture and identity when developing the US policy towards Haiti and directing planning for the US intervention in Haiti.

The first document, published by the US Department of State, contains excerpts from the State Department daily press briefing on 26 October 1994, by Mark Schneider, Assistant Administrator for Latin America, US Agency for International Development (USAID). Mr. Schneider expressed, in his statement and during the question and answer portion of the press briefing, knowledgeable insight into the problems of Haiti and how they relate historically to Haitian culture and identity. Mr. Schneider, in the course of the press briefing addressed how the US and Haitian governments as well as the UN intended to try to solve these problems, many of which date back to the Haitian Revolution. Yet what these solutions did not address, and to be fair one must acknowledge that this was only a press briefing and not a fully developed policy document, was how the proposed solutions would succeed given a Haitian culture and identity that tended to counter the solution concepts.

From the multiple proposed solutions, an example of the solutions clashing with Haitian culture is in area of environmental restoration and agricultural production. Mr. Schneider identified that the historical problem of environmental destruction is a part of Haiti’s inability to

\textsuperscript{196} The American Presidency Project, “The Public Papers of the Presidents,” \url{http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/} (accessed February 12, 2010). The American Presidency Project was established in 1999 at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and the archive contains 87,758 documents related to the study of the American Presidency.
be self-sufficient in agricultural production.\textsuperscript{197} Part of the solution outlined expressed the need “…to continue to expand sustainable agricultural practices. We have to do more to protect the watersheds.”\textsuperscript{198} Based on the literature discussing the environmental destruction and agricultural practices in Haiti, one may assume that Mr. Schneider is suggesting the need to institute a reforestation program to protect the watersheds from continued massive soil erosion.\textsuperscript{199} What such a solution does not address is changing the cultural norms of the Haitian population that contributed to this environmental decline.

The poor agricultural practices by the Haitian peasantry that have contributed to depleting the soil of nutrients are the first of these unaddressed norms. Because of these poor agricultural practices, the search for arable land led many Haitian peasants away from the coastal lowlands and into the interior of the county. To make the interior lands usable for agriculture, the peasants had to clear away more trees, leading to increased soil erosion.\textsuperscript{200}

The other norm and far more devastating to Haiti is the practice of harvesting trees to make charcoal. Charcoal supplies seventy percent of Haiti’s energy. The demand for charcoal over the course of two hundred years, and even more intensely since 1954, has led to almost the complete deforestation of Haiti.\textsuperscript{201} While the solution expressed by Mr. Schneider is well intentioned, it does not address how to implement the solution or a plan to provide a substitute


\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{200} Leyburn, 199; Dash, 37-38.

\textsuperscript{201} Dash, 37-38.
energy source in an attempt to change the Haitian practice of harvesting trees to make charcoal for fuel. While this press briefing indicates that some members in USAID had a good understanding of the environment and the problem, it does not demonstrate that Haitian culture or identity were a consideration when assisting the government of Haiti to develop enduring solutions.

The second document that provided additional insights into the factors and considerations that contributed to the development of US nation building policy for Haiti was testimony given by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 9 March 1995. Deputy Secretary Talbott makes an insightful observation when he observes that Haiti is, “…a country still struggling to banish the ghosts of its past. Its people must learn new habits and new ways of working together as they try to overcome a long history of social polarization, political instability and institutionalized brutality.”

This statement suggests that the deputy secretary understood that Haitians faced a struggle to change their identities in order to modernize the society and country and to move away from the political violence, repression, corruption, and an overall abuse of power that had become a normal part of Haitian culture since the Revolution. Despite this understanding, Deputy Secretary Talbott did not address how US forces and agencies would assist in changing these cultural norms.

For instance, Deputy Secretary Talbott testified that the US Justice Department would serve as the lead agency for implementing law enforcement reforms in Haiti. He did not address how US efforts at instituting rule of law reforms intended to undo a lifetime of learned behaviors by judges, potential police force candidates, and the public. Representing perhaps the most apparent example of rule of law reforms, the potential police candidates had experienced


throughout their lifetime in Haiti, only the idea that might makes right, and the use of force to enforce authority was perfectly acceptable. The US Justice Department program for developing a permanent new police force planned initially to screen candidates to eliminate potential human rights violators, and then using entrance exams and taking a merit-based approach enroll up to three hundred fifty trainees into a five-month police academy. The Justice Department and its UN partners planned to repeat this process until the new police force included four thousand new academy graduates. When considering the impact of culture in state-building activities, this author questions whether this approach to building a new police force proposed by the Justice Department can really change an identity and culture learned and reinforced over a lifetime through attendance of a five-month course, and limited mentoring from the six hundred International Police Monitors (IPM) working throughout the country.

These examples suggest that some of the policy makers and planners involved with the 1994 intervention into Haiti had an understanding of Haitian culture and identity. Yet, the implementation of the state-building activities did not seem to incorporate this understanding into the planned programs in an effort to achieve an enduring change. Perhaps the greatest indicator of this is evident by President Aristide’s actions after reassuming the presidency. Operation Uphold Democracy achieved its objective of restoring the legitimately elected government of President

203 Dash, 14, 16-17; E.D. McGrady and John S. Ivancovich, 34, 39. The continued violence by authorities against the Haitian people was part of the justification for the 1994 intervention. Additionally, as this monograph has demonstrated this use of violence for personal advancement is also an accepted societal norm that pre-dates the Haitian Revolution. Walter E. Kretchik, “Haiti’s Quest for Democracy: Historical Overview,” Capacity Building for Peacekeeping, eds. John T. Fishel and Andrés Sáenz (Washington D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press and Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 25-26. Professor Kretchik provides a counterpoint commenting on the overall improvement in policing with the continued assistance of the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti. However, in his essay, he acknowledges that Haitian culture played a role in discouraging the police force to discipline its own members who participated in illicit behavior. Professor Kretchik further acknowledges that the police force was unable to quell the political violence that seems a normal element of Haitian society.

204 Talbott, 185-189.

205 Ibid.
Aristide to power.\textsuperscript{206} President Aristide, to his credit, relinquished the presidency to his handpicked successor President Préval in 1996.\textsuperscript{207} Regardless of this apparent democratic progress, Haiti once again reverted to rule by presidential decree after postponing the November 1998 elections.\textsuperscript{208} The Préval government finally scheduled and held new elections in 2000; the presidential contest resulted in Aristide winning the presidency for a second time. Entering the presidency a second time with promises of continued reforms, improved infrastructure and judiciary system, President Aristide soon began to exhibit the same “…winner takes all…” attitude and behaviors of previous Haitian regimes.\textsuperscript{209} Reminiscent of 1915 and 1994, violence and lawlessness increased from both repressive pro-Aristide paramilitary supporters and anti-Aristide militias, until President Aristide found himself surrounded and isolated in Port-au-Prince. The United States, France, the UN, and OAS pressured internationally President Aristide to step down as president and on 29 February 2004, Aristide departed Haiti for exile.\textsuperscript{210} The cultural norm of political violence and corruption in Haiti proved strong enough to make Aristide, a former priest and democracy advocate as well as a victim of political repression by the Duvalier regime, crave more power and gravitate towards authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{211}


\textsuperscript{207}Ballard, 335-340; Robert I. Rotberg, “Clinton was right,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, no. 102 (Spring 1996): 137. \url{http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149265} (accessed April 5, 2010).


\textsuperscript{209}Malone and von Einsiedel, 182-185; Pezzullo, 271; Kretchik, “Haiti’s Quest for Democracy: Historical Overview,” 28.

\textsuperscript{210}Malone and von Einsiedel, 183-184; Kretchik, “Haiti’s Quest for Democracy: Historical Overview,” 28.

\textsuperscript{211}Pezzullo, 271.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Culture is more often a source of conflict than of synergy. Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster.

Professor Geert Hofstede

Considering the culture and identity of a failed state is necessary when developing and implementing US state-building programs to achieve meaningful enduring improvement in failed and fragile states. This assertion implies that the United States, when developing and conducting state-building programs, has consistently failed to consider the identity of a country during each intervention where the United States intended to create peace and stability for the people. Using the 1915 and 1994 interventions into Haiti as case studies, the author demonstrates that US policy and programs either failed to consider or only marginally considered culture and identity when developing state-building programs. Additionally, the Haiti case studies show the strong influence that the culture and identities of a failed state have on its society and contribute to its resistance to change. The attempt during each Haitian intervention to reform the police force and eliminate the violence typically associated with Haitian politics demonstrates the difficulty created by the influence of culture and identity in a society to implement enduring change. As the Haitian case studies further demonstrated, after the donor nation(s) departed, the influence that culture and identity has on the society also contains the potential to undo the state-building activities allowing the failed state to revert to its previous systems and norms.

No demonstrable proof exists that an approach to state-building that considers culture and identity would prove more successful or enduring than traditional approaches to state-building, nor in the course of this research could a positive example case study be found that supports this

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212 Geert Hofstede, “Geert Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions,” http://www.geert-hofstede.com/ (accessed 2 May 2010). Professor Geert Hofstede, Emeritus Professor at Maastricht University, is a Dutch social scientist with experience researching cultural values and behaviors for over forty years.
concept. Regardless, in the case of Haiti, simply intervening in a failed state and working to establish security, develop infrastructure, institutions and a modern economy, typical state-building tasks, that are fundamentally different from the culture and identity of Haitian society has not proven completely successful either.213 The fact that enduring success has evaded most state-building efforts despite the time and resources dedicated to these endeavors suggests that some other factor(s) must be influencing the society and environment within the failed state that the current approaches to state-building have not accounted for yet.214 One must therefore question whether future state-building endeavors can afford not to consider the impact of culture and identity within a failed state before developing policies and implementing state-building programs.

When a state has failed or is struggling through post-conflict reconstruction, in addition to providing aid, the United States often assists in state-building endeavors in an effort “…to leave behind a society at peace with itself and its neighbors.”215 In 2005, the United States institutionalized its efforts to provide this assistance to failed or post-conflict states when the US State Department established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstructions and Stabilization (S/CRS). According to the S/CRS, “failed and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest

213 James Dobbins et al., The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, xxiii; Fukuyama, 100-101; Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123-163. These authors represent the predominate views on state-building tasks that were examined in detail earlier in the monograph.

214 Pei and Kasper, 4; James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 2; James Dobbins et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq, xxv. Dr. Pei’s article includes US examines 200 US interventions since the Spanish-American War in 1898, and of these identifies sixteen of these interventions as nation-building efforts. The four successful state-building endeavors identified in this article are Germany, Japan, Grenada, and Panama. Ambassador Dobbins excludes US Cold War interventions into Korea, Vietnam, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Lebanon and Panama as state-building efforts. The statistics change depending on which of these endeavors the researcher chooses to include or exclude. Taken together the literature and statistics suggests that successful institutionalized approached to state-building efforts remains elusive.

national and international security challenges of our day.” The creation of the S/CRS and a more unified approach by the US Government represents a tremendous effort to change the manner that the US Government is trying to meet the challenges of the failing states.

Ambassador John E. Herbst, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability within the Department of State, is leading US efforts at forging a new instrument to address failing states. Part of this process led to the creation of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). The CRC is an organization comprised of interagency personnel from within US Government departments as well as private American citizens, all of whom have critical skills essential to reconstruction and stabilization activities within a failing state. In the January 2010 issue of Prism, Ambassador Herbst outlined a list of careers and professional skills, such as engineers, lawyers, judges, economists, and city planners that presumably the Ambassador identified as vital to the efforts of the S/CRS. From a strategic perspective, it is critical to include both historians and anthropologists in the CRC to provide insight into the culture and identity of a failed state before beginning the implementation of more tangible state-building programs.

Successful integration of culture and identity as state-building considerations would draw heavily on expertise in the academic fields of history and anthropology. Ethical concerns expressed by the American Anthropological Association (AAA), about the use of anthropological and cultural research and its impact on the research subjects in conjunction with military forces and operations has limited the involvement of anthropologists in working with the US


government. This is a legitimate concern among these professionals that policymakers and planners should not simply ignore. However, the expertise that this discipline provides about culture and identity is critical to long term success in state-building and to ensuring that inadvertent and harmful missteps resulting from sheer ignorance are avoided. Therefore, senior leaders from the State Department and Department of Defense should work to reach an agreement with senior and leading academic experts in the AAA and the anthropological community as a whole. Such an agreement must address what research is permissible for anthropologists to provide to the government and permissible uses by the government of such research. The State Department and the Department of Defense should also establish grants and fellowships as incentives to building academic partnerships particularly within the anthropology community.

New programs that focus on the social sciences could be modeled after or incorporated into the...
National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate (NDSEG) Fellowships, the National Defense Education Program, all of which currently focus on ‘hard sciences’ or consider expanding the Fascell Fellowship Program currently offered by the State Department. Without improved understanding into these foreign cultures and identities, policymakers and planners are limited to their own knowledge and a trial and error methodology; certainly, in the twenty-first century there is a better approach.

However, if the cultural expertise the anthropological community provides is unavailable, planners and policymakers must still consider the culture and identity of a society when developing plans and programs. There are numerous models and methodologies available, which through a series of questions leads one to a greater understanding of a foreign culture and identities. One model is the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP), developed at the US Army War College, and designed to understand the environment before attempting to implement a solution (See Appendix A). A second model for achieving expanded cultural understanding is the 9-Step Cultural Methodology taught by the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) (See Appendix B). Although not a methodology for

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219 US Department of Defense, “National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate (NDSEG) Fellowships,” http://ndseg.asee.org/ (accessed May 1, 2010); US Department of Defense, “Science, Mathematics And Research for Transformation (SMART) Scholarship for Service Program,” http://smart.asee.org/ (accessed 1 May 2010); US Department of Defense, “National Defense Education Programs,” http://www.ndep.us/Programs.aspx (accessed May 1, 2010); US Department of State, “Fascell Fellowship Program,” Careers Representing America, http://careers.state.gov/students/programs.html#FFP (accessed May 1, 2010). The Department of Defense programs currently focus on the ‘hard’ sciences, but the recognized need for these hard science skills and these programs can easily serve as a model for other programs focused on the social sciences of anthropology, history, or sociology. The Department of State Fascell Fellowship, the focus of which is firsthand exposure to a foreign culture, may also serve as a model for an expanded unified DoD/DoS program.

220 Kim, vii-viii.

analyzing culture, analysis of the linguistic divisions within a country is another tool available to strategic level policymakers and planners as well as operational level planners to identify different group identities existing within a country. Linguistic divisions help to define group identities as well as potential lines of conflict that threaten or may threaten state-building endeavors. Increasing the proficiency in understanding a foreign language also provides insight into a society’s culture and identity through their literature, myths and oral traditions.

The methodology used is significantly less important than making the consideration and evaluation of culture and identity a habitual practice before and during any interventions into a foreign country. As Kim notes:

…resilience of the group’s culture, grounded on the strength of a common identity with a shared sense of purpose and values, can determine how flexible the collectivity is to either resisting, succumbing or adapting to forces that challenge the shared purpose and values…. There will be no one right answer, but if we hope to formulate more effective strategies and policies then we must make the effort to make them more answerable to cultural factors. The very lack of a definitive cultural analysis requires a multiplicity of efforts. Different approaches will emphasize different factors…. Their sum, however, can provide the sort of comprehensive analysis that can get us closer to the truth even if we can never get to the final truth.223

The overall intent of state-building efforts is to establish a new and enduring civil society, as the norm within a failed state—to move the society from its current state to the desired state envisioned by the donor nation(s). The donor nation(s) contribute tremendous national resources in terms of money, time and people to assist failed states in transitioning into more stable and capable entities in the international community. Yet, shifting from one state to another implies the need for change. Enduring change necessitates that people or societies internalize the behaviors necessary to bring about the desired change as a part of their identity. Failure to consider culture


223 Kim, 27.
and identity while planning or implementing state-building programs decreases the probability of successfully influencing a failed state’s society to internalize changes, that are not originally a part of the society’s group identities or self-narrative, into their culture. If these state-building efforts fail and/or require additional missions, as seen in Haiti, the previous expenditure of time, money and lives will have been wasted effort. The steady increase in failing and failed states requiring assistance combined with the pressures of an interdependent global financial system that continues to exhibit signs of fragility, necessitates planning and implementing state-building endeavors correctly the first attempt. Therefore, if policymakers and planners truly hope to mitigate the threat posed by failed states they must understand and incorporate the culture and identity of the failed state into state-building policies and programs. Without such insight, regardless of the national resources invested, the plan or policy will likely prove unrealistic and infeasible yielding less than optimal results.
APPENDIX A—Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP)

Developed at the US Army War College, the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) is one systematic and analytical approach to the vital task of viewing the world through many lenses. The framework provides a specific way to get at the complex issue of how culture figures into strategic and political behavior. Policymakers and strategists tend to view situations through their own cultural and strategic “lens” with insufficient consideration and calculation of the “other’s” perspective and interests. How should we approach the task of appreciating and understanding the different lenses through which other people, groups, societies, nations, and regions view themselves and the world? Cultural proficiency at the policy and strategic levels means the ability to consider history, values, ideology, politics, religion, and other cultural dimensions and assess their potential effect on policy and strategy. The ACFSP identifies basic cultural dimensions that seem to be of fundamental importance in determining such behavior and thus are of importance in policy and strategy formulation and outcomes. Every other society reflects a unique combination of the basic cultural dimensions, which are identity, political culture, and resilience.

Identity or the basis for defining identity and its linkage to interests - Identity is perhaps the most important of the ACFSP dimensions. It ultimately determines purpose, values and interests that form the foundation for policy and strategy to attain or preserve those interests.


225 Kim, vii, 26.
**Political Culture**, or the structure of power and decision-making - Political culture is comprised of a political system, political tradition, political institution, decision-making, faith and religion, and strategic culture. Political culture consists of the set of values, beliefs, traditions, perceptions, expectations, attitudes, practices, and institutions that a particular society harbors about how the political system and processes should operate and what sort of governmental and economic life should be pursued. Some factors that contribute to the formation of a particular political culture include historical experience, religious tradition, collective values, founding principles, geographical location and configuration, strategic environment (for example, relative vulnerability or security), economic capacity, and demographics. Political culture also forms two key supporting instruments of its expression that are of interest for policy and strategy: political system and strategic culture. Political system refers to how political power is organized, with particular emphasis on identifying and understanding the basis for power, its distribution, and hierarchy. Consideration of political system includes examination of the role of history, class, religion, race, ethnicity, gender, geography (physical, social, and cultural), demography, and power fault lines that determine power centers, connections, and operations. The ACFSP defines strategic culture as the concept that considers how cultural factors affect strategic behavior. It is the unique collective perspective rooted in historical experience, memory of that experience, and collective values that leads to particular policy and strategy formulations and outcomes. Strategic culture thus both enables and constrains actions and reactions regarding strategic choices, priorities, security, diplomacy, and the use of force.

**Resilience** or the capacity or ability to resist, adapt or succumb to external forces - Resilience is the response to globalization, openness to transnational institutions, and coping with environmental pressures, and refers to the capacity or ability of a culture to resist, adapt, or succumb to external forces. Resilience is a test of the culture’s stability and coherence and a measure of the endurance of its identity and political culture. Thus, it can help aid in
understanding either the permanence or changeability of the values and interests that determine a particular culture’s strategy and policy.

This framework, while not providing a step-by-step methodology, gives the user three dimensions to analyze, as well as the sub-elements that comprise each dimension when evaluating a foreign culture.
APPENDIX B – UFMCS 9-Step Cultural Methodology

Another method for gaining increased cultural understanding is by using the 9-Step Cultural Methodology developed and taught by the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS). The most simplistic version of this analysis is a simple two-entity (X and Y) analysis, but is flexible enough to incorporate a larger number of separate groups and identities in a state, although it grows increasingly complex with each additional entity analyzed. The 9-Step Methodology depicted in Figure 1 is from the Red Team Handbook.

Figure 1: Nine-Step Methodology


The sequence of steps depicted represents a Red Team ‘best practice,’ but this is not the only sequence. The steps are not all-inclusive, but use a series of questions to guide the user.

through researching a foreign culture. Steps 1 and 9 are analytical steps using the information collected in step 2 through step 8. The last step is step 9 and step 1 must occur first, but thereafter each situation may present information or opportunities in such a way as to alter the sequence.

**Step 1 - Establish a base line of understanding by examining the four ways of seeing:**

**How X views itself.** This must be the first step of any cross-cultural analysis.

*What do we fundamentally believe about our motives, our values, and ourselves?*

**How Y views itself.** The next critical step is to identify what our “object believes about itself”.

We must be careful not to allow our personal judgment to color this analysis. If for instance, they believe they are God’s chosen group - whether we believe “they are”, or not, is not germane at this time.

**How X views Y.** The next step is to address ‘how we view them’ as well as identify disconnects between ‘how we view them’ and ‘how they view themselves’ – these are the critical friction points that cultural analysis and planning must address. Our treatment of the object group must be consistent and ‘fair’ based on how they view themselves versus how we view them.

**How Y views X.** In turn, we need to understand how they view us versus how we view ourselves, our actions, and information campaign must focus on closing the gap between their perception of us and how we want to be viewed.

**Step 9 - Conduct a cognitive analysis.**

In what ways does the collected data (steps 2-8) shape how ‘the other society’ thinks about:

- Geography?
- History?
- Religion?
- Significant emotional events in the life of the country?
- Economics?

**Step 2 - What defines the Social System?**

Roles of family and tribe.
Roles in ascribing status: region, education, religion, etc.

Is status a birthright or achieved through action (social mobility)?

What are the common child rearing practices, and how do they differ by gender and class?

From which side of the family does descent originate?

What is the nature of marriage in society: who decides, what are the power relationships internal/external to the married unit, monogamy or polygamy?

Is there a nuclear family or extended family units?

What is the social contract in each state? What do the citizens expect the state to provide and in return for what? Is this contract intact?

Is the society pluralistic, synergetic, or assimilatory?

**Step 3 - What are the sources of power? For example: Charisma, Violence, legal basis, etc.**

Do the powerful live ‘for’ or ‘off’ politics?

What is the role of patronage, what characterizes a patron?

Are politics used for religious purposes or religion used for political purposes?

What are the key institutions in the social structure, how did the leaders of those institutions acquire their role?

How do state bureaucracies relate to other elements of the social structure – tribe, religion ethnicity?

**Step 4 - What are the critical narratives of the cultural history?**

What do people believe about themselves and where they came from?

What are the stories taught in school?

What are the key myths associated with social control?

What are the societies’ origin myths?

What role did colonialism play?

How does strength of nationhood and citizenship relate to a core concept?

**Step 5 - What is the role of the formal and informal economy?**
Is what would be termed bribery and corruption in the West endemic? If so, what do locals consider corrupt?

Do the elites own wealth, or own power that in turn accumulates wealth?

How is the economy fundamentally different or similar to our own?

Who pays what for individual health care?

What is the nature of home ownership? Elderly care? Investments?

What goods and services does the informal economy provide? How big is the informal economy versus the formal economy? If it is large – why?

**Step 6 - What Cultural forms and Semiotics are endemic to the society?**

What do they celebrate, what are the symbols associated with those celebrations, how does this reflect a different perspective than the West (rituals, ceremonies, etc)? Any rites of passage, degradation, enhancement, renewal, conflict reduction, or integration?

How do they sanction societal members? What is the role of criticism/alienation?

Who are the heroes – what stories are told about them, what traits emphasized?

What is the role of emotional outburst – restrained, accepted, gender specific?

**Step 7 – What sociolinguistics are evident?**

What is the nature of routine greetings and farewells?

What are the concepts that translate only with difficulty? Identify and attempt to understand them.

What US concepts present difficulty to linguists attempting to translate into the native language?

Such a difficulty may indicate that the underlying logic of the concept may be foreign as well.

What is the role of exaggeration and overstatement?

**Step 8 - What are their core emotional beliefs?**

For what reasons would people in the society kill someone?

On behalf of the state?

To restore personal or family honor?

As appropriate vengeance? (Rule of law – rape, murder, incest, etc)

To what degree do they value human life?
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