Adapting the Doctrinal Discourse on Campaign Planning to the Reality of Current Conflicts

A Monograph
by
MAJ Mark C. Andres
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 2010

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
### Joint and Army Campaign Planning

Joint and Army campaign planning doctrine, based on the example of the 1991 Gulf War, is losing relevance to the nature of current conflicts. Current doctrine emphasizes a centrally planned joint campaign that efficiently utilizes scarce military resources against a similarly organized and relatively homogeneous conventional foe. This logic, however, does not reflect the nature of the conflicts that the United States currently wages. The transition between Phase III and Phase IV of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrated the limits of current campaign planning doctrine: deprived of relevant guidance from higher headquarters and without doctrine to support lower level campaign planning, Army and Marine units failed to secure the gains of major combat operations after the fall of Baghdad. Eventually, commanders down to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level planned campaigns nested through purpose to the Joint Force Commander’s campaign plan. Unfortunately, neither the Joint Staff nor the Army captured these successful adaptations in the latest versions of campaign planning doctrine. Thus, the gulf between campaign planning doctrine and the reality of current conflicts remains unresolved and the relevancy of campaign planning doctrine continues to diminish. Both the Army and the Joint Staff must recognize the necessity of nested campaign planning and change current doctrine to provide commanders of BCTs, divisions, and corps doctrine that empowers them to plan and execute campaigns that employ all elements of national power in ways that achieve strategic objectives.
Title of Monograph: Adapting the Doctrinal Discourse on Campaign Planning to the Reality of Current Conflicts

Approved by:

______________________________  Monograph Director
Mark T. Calhoun, LTC (R)

______________________________  Second Reader
Chuck Webster, COL, IN

______________________________  Third Reader
Jonathan M. House, Ph.D.

______________________________  Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Stefan Banach, COL, IN

______________________________  Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Disclaimer: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the US Army Command and General Staff College, the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
Abstract

ADAPTING THE DOCTRINAL DISCOURSE ON CAMPAIGN PLANNING TO THE REALITY OF CURRENT CONFLICTS by MAJ Mark C. Andres, United States Army, 70 pages.

The historical examples of World War I, World War II, Korea, and the 1991 Gulf War are the basis of the current Joint and Army campaign planning doctrine. These conflicts highlight the requirement to centrally plan campaigns that efficiently utilize scarce military resources against similarly organized and relatively homogeneous conventional foes. Over the course of eighty years, the destruction of this opposing force as efficiently as possible became the object of American military campaigns.

Concurrently, the United States military learned that while conducting both counterinsurgency and stability operations, specificity of action tailored to the particular characteristics of a given operating environment was more important to achieving strategic objectives than the efficient employment of scares assets. Joint and Army campaign planning doctrine did not capture these lessons; instead, they continued to focus on high intensity combat.

Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated spectacularly the limits of the current concept for campaign planning. It showed that the Joint Force Commander could plan and execute a campaign that destroyed the opposing force, but failed to create the conditions that supported the attainment of strategic objectives. Furthermore, it demonstrated that the centrally planned joint campaign could not envision all the nuances of the theater of operations and provide relevant guidance to subordinate commanders conducting counterinsurgency and stability operations.

To achieve strategic objectives, commanders of corps, divisions, and brigade combat teams began planning campaigns tailored to the specifics of their areas of operation that were nested with the plans of their higher headquarters. Though this proved a successful adaptation to the reality of the conflicts in Iraq, the Army did not incorporate the notion of nested campaign planning into the latest editions of Field Manual 3-0, Operations, or Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process.

Joint and Army campaign planning doctrine is losing relevance to the nature of current conflicts. The Army must balance the requirement to destroy efficiently conventional opposing forces in major combat operations against the requirement to effectively consolidate the gains and achieve the national objectives during stability operations.

If the Army does not incorporate into its doctrine the necessity of nested campaign planning, it will continue to rely on the local improvisations of field commanders. As with each past conflict that the United States fought, future commanders will eventually adapt successfully to deliver victory to the nation, paying for their adaptations with American blood and prestige.

The United States Army can choose either to adapt its doctrine, or to cling to a concept that is fast losing relevance to current conflicts. The purpose of this study is to make the case for the adaptation of current Joint and Army doctrine by providing the historical context that led to development of current doctrine, as well as describing how commanders have successfully adapted that doctrine to win in Iraq.
Acknowledgements

This work bears my name, but many people aided me bringing it to fruition. I would be truly remiss for not mentioning them and their special contributions to this work.

First, I want to thank my wife, Beth, for supporting me during this process. Every minute I spent reading, writing, or thinking about this project was a minute that I was unable to devote myself fully to you. I know that it was difficult to share me with this project, but know that your love motivated me to produce a work commensurate to the sacrifice you gave to support its creation.

Next, I would like to thank my monograph director, Mr. Mark Calhoun. The long hours you spent guiding me through this process allowed me to learn invaluable lessons from this research project. Thanks to the other members of my monograph committee: Dr. Jonathan House for providing advice and insight as I researched the historical evolution of the American concept of campaign planning; and to Colonel Charles Webster, my seminar leader, for providing common sense to my academic ramblings.

Thanks to Major General (Retired) James Simmons for allowing me to serve as your aide. The inspiration for this paper came from visiting 17 brigades and 59 battalions during OIF 06-08. I must confess, however, that it took me longer than the duration of a baseball game to write it. Thanks to Colonel William Hickman, who personally provided me a copy of his brigade’s unclassified history between trips with the CENTCOM commander. Without your support, this project would have come to an abrupt end.

Finally, thanks to Major John Bushman and Mr. Johnny Lairsey: professionals of the highest caliber and close friends. Your advice was crucial for maintaining my sanity and the friendship we forged will extend well past our time at the School of Advanced Military Studies.

Loyal and Faithful!
# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii  
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii  
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1  
   The “Discourse on War” versus the “Reality of War”................................................................. 1  
   Guardians, Managers, and Heroes............................................................................................... 2  
   Overview of the Current “Discourse on Campaign Planning” versus the “Realities of Campaign  
   Planning” ..................................................................................................................................... 5  
   Methodology................................................................................................................................ 8  
The Evolution of U.S. Campaign Planning Doctrine ..................................................................... 9  
   1919-1939: Laying the Foundations of U.S. Campaign Planning Doctrine................................. 9  
   World War II: Adaptation of Campaign Planning Doctrine to the Reality of War .................... 13  
   1947 to 1973: Imposition of the Discourse on War upon the Reality of War .......................... 15  
   1976 to 1986: The Transformation of the Army’s Operational Concept .................................. 24  
   The 1991 Gulf War: Validation of AirLand Battle; Repudiation of America’s Campaign  
   Planning Construct .................................................................................................................... 29  
   1991 to 2003: A Decade of Missed Opportunities and Signals............................................... 33  
   Operation Iraqi Freedom 2004-2006: A Period of Confusion and Improvisation ................. 46  
New Doctrine Arrives, Field Commanders Adapt and Win in Iraq .......................................... 47  
   Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, December 2006 ......................................... 48  
   FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Arrives in December 2006 ......................................................... 49  
   JP 3-0, Joint Operations, February 2008 .................................................................................... 50  
   FM 3-0, Operations, February 2008 .......................................................................................... 51  
   FM 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008 ........................................................................ 53  
   2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (2/101 AASLT) conducts BCT level campaign  
   planning in OIF 07-09 ............................................................................................................... 54  
Conclusions and Recommendations .............................................................................................. 58  
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................... 64  
   Articles ...................................................................................................................................... 64  
   Books ......................................................................................................................................... 64  
   Government Publications .......................................................................................................... 67  
   Monographs, Papers, Reports, and Theses ............................................................................... 69
Introduction

The “Discourse on War” versus the “Reality of War”

In *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, John A. Lynn introduces his theoretical model of the “Discourse on War” versus the “Reality of War” as a means to describe the difference between the reality of armed conflict throughout the ages and the ways in which various groups have envisioned and prepared for future armed conflict to achieve their purposes.¹

Lynn’s model begins with the “Discourse on War”: the preconceptions, values, and ideals of a given society that reflect how war is “supposed to be.” He postulates that societies try to change or control the reality of war to fit into their cultural conceptions, a process called “Reformation.” This reformation can lead the society to “Modification” of the reality of war to bring it within certain acceptable limits, which vary through time and across cultures. However, the society may instead conduct “Replacement” of the current reality with a “Perfected Reality” that suits their cultural needs, but may be incompatible with the nature of armed conflict. He then moves on to the “Reality of War,” stating that when the reality of war conflicts with the discourse on war, one of two actions will occur. Either the society can undertake an “Adjustment” of its discourse on war in order to better align it to the newly observed reality, or it can choose “Rejection” of the reality of war, creating an “Alternate Discourse” that justifies a more “Extreme Reality” of war.²

This model illuminates the situation in which the Joint Staff and the United States (U.S.) Army currently find themselves: they maintain a “doctrinal discourse on campaign planning” that is out of sync with the “reality of campaign planning.” To adapt doctrine to reality, the Joint Staff and U.S. Army must first divorce themselves from the “perfected reality” of a single joint campaign plan that they have long supported. Second, they must acknowledge the reality that

---

² Ibid., 331-341.
nested campaign planning—from the Joint Force Commander to the Brigade Combat Team—is both valid and necessary to winning the conflicts the United States currently wages. Acknowledging this truth will fundamentally alter the current American concept of campaigning in a manner that is both consistent with the concept of Full Spectrum Operations and the history of the United States military. Failure to adapt to currently observed reality will result in the continued irrelevance of joint campaign planning doctrine, continued unsystematic improvisation by field commanders, and sub-optimal performance of American military forces in both current and future conflicts.

Guardians, Managers, and Heroes

Lynn’s model demonstrates that the discourse on war differs from the observed reality of war, but it does not explain why the discrepancy exists in today’s U.S. military doctrine. Why would well-educated, patriotic Army leaders choose to modify or replace observed reality to support the discourse on war instead of choosing to adapt the discourse to the reality? Brian McAllister Linn provides a possible explanation to this question.

In *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War*, Linn argues that three distinct, mutually exclusive martial traditions constitute the U.S. Army officer corps and the “Army's way of war.” The first of these traditions is the Guardians. Officers in this category seek to apply scientific laws and principles to defend America, much like the coastal artillery officers of the early nineteenth century who engineered defenses to protect the Atlantic seaboard against another invasion like that experienced during the War of 1812. Officers who view war as an engineering project in which the application of scientific principles by skilled technicians guarantees success express the legacy of this tradition. The principal weakness of the Guardian tradition reveals itself in its officers’ tendency to reduce the conduct of war to the application of immutable scientific principles. They tend to believe they can discern the conduct of the next war by applying “the
correct” national security policy, totaling up the available military resources, and comparing them to the resources of potential adversaries.³

Linn refers to officers from his second martial tradition as the Heroes. These officers emphasize the human element, reducing war to its simplest form: armed violence to achieve an end. The heroic tradition encourages adaptability and innovation and fosters an ability to separate the essential from the trivial, thereby making it relatively easy to transition from one form of warfare to another. Linn criticizes the heroic tradition for its tendency to engage in emotional posturing, elitism, selfishness, muddy-boots fundamentalism, and anti-intellectualism as it reduces war down to elemental battle.⁴

Linn’s third martial tradition stands in opposition to the first two. The Managers believe war is a logical outgrowth of political and economic rivalry, and future conflicts, like the World Wars of the past, will require the mobilization of the entire nation. To prepare for this possibility, the Managers encourage the creation of a mass army, equipped with the best armaments, trained in large unit operations, and controlled by educated professionals. The Managers’ fixation on future wars makes them indifferent to small outbreaks of violence, stability operations, and unconventional or counterinsurgency missions.⁵

Linn’s primary concern lies not with the existence of these three martial traditions; rather, his focus is the U.S. Army’s failure to reconcile them into a unified American philosophy for the conduct of war. The transitory dominance of the each of the three disparate traditions has guided the U.S. Army’s preparation for future war based on whichever agenda is ascendant during times of peace. Prior to 9/11, the Guardians sought to reduce the chaos of war into rules, principles, and predictable outcomes. Meanwhile, the Managers—too immersed in the day-to-day administration

---

⁴ Ibid., 6-8.
⁵ Ibid., 7, 9.
of service programs—failed to concern themselves with long-range strategic planning. Moreover, the Managers remain fixated on the idea of preparing the nation to fight major conventional wars with the next generation of technologically sophisticated and lethal weapon systems. Before September 11, 2001, the Heroes resided primarily in the special operations community, their exploits highly classified and known to the public only through popular books and movies. While some Heroes rose to senior positions of responsibility, they tended to recommend simplistic solutions to complex problems. The adherents of the other martial traditions and the civilian leadership of the nation, who, in recent years, have favored the Managers’ views, rejected these simple solutions, marginalizing the heroic tradition during the intervening peace. Linn concludes by arguing the current conflicts spurred a renaissance of the Heroic tradition, but both the Guardians and Managers must accept and assimilate this renaissance into their own traditions for it to be enduring as the Army transitions from war to peace.6

Linn’s model provides a possible explanation why the U.S. Army and Joint Staff continue to cling to the perfected reality of the JFC planned campaign, instead of adapting doctrine to the reality of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, Linn’s argument focuses on the intellectual aspect of the problem, paying less attention to the bureaucratic, institutional, and political factors that bear on the problem. Additionally, Linn’s martial traditions appear less distinct in contemporary officers than in officers of the past. Although Linn’s framework has flaws, it offers a plausible explanation for the persistent discrepancy between observed reality and doctrinal discourse in Joint and Army doctrine.

6 Linn, 235-240.
Overview of the Current “Discourse on Campaign Planning” versus the “Realities of Campaign Planning”

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, and FM 5-0, The Operations Process, articulate the current doctrinal discourse on campaign planning. The crux of the discourse is the statement in JP 5-0 that only the Joint Force Commander (JFC) will develop a joint campaign plan, while subordinate and Service commanders will plan and execute major operations in support of that overarching plan. Three key points underpin this concept: First, U.S. forces will fight a similarly organized, relatively homogeneous adversary in high intensity combat. Second, the destruction of that adversary requires the efficient planning, allocation, and employment of scarce air and maritime assets from a central authority. Three, the nature of the conflict does not vary significantly across the theater of operations. Therefore, the JFC can provide guidance relevant across the entire theater in campaign plan to guide his subordinate’s actions. FM 3-0 officially supports the Joint position, but then describes the concepts of “Operational Art,” the “Elements of Operational Design,” and a rather flexible definition of the “Operational Level of War,” allowing for the possible interpretation that echelons below the JFC do in fact plan and conduct campaigns.

The U.S. military has adjusted its discourse on campaign planning frequently during its long history to align with the changing reality of war. However, the perfected reality of the 1991 Gulf War conflicts with current reality as observed by commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. The

7 “Campaigns are joint-functional components (air, land, maritime, and special operations) and Service components plan and conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns.” The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations Planning (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006), IV-2 (Emphasis in the original); “Land component commanders are not directly responsible for defining the military end state. Nonetheless, their participation in the initial stages of the campaign design is vital. When designing major operations within a campaign, land component commanders formulate activities at the operational level of war.” (Emphasis added) The Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2008), 6-5.
1991 Gulf War is an example that resonates with both the Guardians’ desire to apply scientific principles and orderly processes with observable effects to the conduct of war and the Managers’ desire to conduct large-scale conventional maneuver warfare. The 1991 Gulf War is an incomplete example, however, because it only covers Phases I (Deter), II (Seize the Initiative), and III (Dominate), while omitting Phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authority) of the current joint phasing construct. By retaining the 1991 Gulf War as their example, the Joint Staff and Army are able to support their doctrinal position that only the JFC can plan, allocate, and employ scarce air and maritime assets with the greatest effect. 8

The retention of the 1991 Gulf War as the American model for campaigning causes three consequences. First, it fosters the belief that the JFC has the greatest understanding of the nature of the conflict and is, therefore, able to plan a campaign that is relevant across the entire theater of operations. Second, it reinforces the notion that only the JFC “re-aggregates” the different capabilities of both the joint force and other instruments of national power to achieve the strategic objectives established by the President. Finally, it supports the position that subordinate commands need only execute discrete tactical missions that contributed to the success of the joint campaign. 9

The current discourse on campaign planning has produced doctrine that is exceedingly capable of conducting high intensity military operations against adversaries, both regular and irregular, but is less capable of conducting campaigns that identify realistic war termination criteria and deliver victory to the nation. Military professionals and academics first perceived the

---

9 “The primary purpose of operational art was to reaggregate the diverse effects and operational characteristics of these [combat] forces either simultaneously or sequentially across a much larger theater of combat operations.” Bruce W. Menning, “Operational Art’s Origins” in Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (Washington, D.C: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 2007), 9; “While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, joint operations plans for campaigns consider all instruments of national power and how their integrated and/or coordinated efforts work to attain national strategic objectives.” The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations Planning (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006), IV-35-38, IV-3.
growing rift between the Joint concept of campaign planning and the realities of warfare during operations in Somalia in 1993. The enormity of the disparity did not fully manifest itself until the Fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003, when the 3rd Infantry Division’s Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) completed Phase III combat operations and, in the absence of a Phase IV stability plan, found themselves standing by with no orders, watching Iraqi citizens loot the offices of former regime officials. The post-Phase III inertia resulted from doctrine based on the perfected reality of war—not on the actual reality that confronted the combat forces. The 3rd Infantry Division followed Joint and Army doctrine that specified tactical formations did not conduct campaign planning. Since the JFC campaign addressed operations only through the end of Phase III, subordinate formations found themselves operating with no guidance from operational-level command, even though military operations had not established the conditions for national victory.10

Starting in the summer of 2003, division and BCT commanders recognized the need to conduct long term planning, employing the means available to them in ways that achieved strategic ends. Furthermore, they realized that it was not possible for their higher headquarters to gain the level of fidelity on the specific conditions in their Area of Operations (AO) that would allow that headquarters to create an overarching campaign plan relevant to all parts of Iraq. In short, they realized that the reality of campaigning required them to conduct nested, long term planning that integrated all aspects of national power to set the conditions for the attainment of national objectives. The BCT commanders that started adapting to the reality of campaign planning in late 2003 discovered two things. First, the concept of a campaign was as valid at their level as at the JFC level. Second, there was no doctrine to guide their campaign planning; therefore, they had to improvise.

The publication of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in December 2006 and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, in October 2008 assisted their efforts but failed to address the fundamental problem. Instead of adapting its capstone campaign planning doctrine to align with current reality, the U.S. Army developed subordinate “niche” doctrine and continued to rely on field commanders to continue improvising. The Army’s maintenance of the perfected reality of the 1991 Gulf War, even when it had become clear that it was involved in a very different type of war, reflects the irreconcilable influence of its conflicting martial traditions.

In the short term, successful battlefield commanders will continue the trend of localized adaptation to the reality of war. However, in fifteen years, most of these BCT commanders will retire from active duty and the military will lose the insight they gained from their successful improvisations. If the Army does not adapt its doctrinal discourse on campaigning to the reality of the nation’s wars, the next time the military conducts a campaign it will repeat mistakes it made when planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Such an outcome would be tantamount to professional negligence: to observe successful concepts in action yet choose to retain flawed doctrine results in decreased American military proficiency and unnecessary causalities.

**Methodology**

The following analysis reveals the impact of the declaration in Joint and Army doctrine that campaign planning is solely resident at the JFC level on the BCT’s ability to plan and conduct campaigns in Full Spectrum Operations. It traces the evolution of Army and joint doctrine regarding the planning and conduct of campaigns, shows how Army staffs conducted campaign planning as doctrine evolved, and reveals how changes in doctrine and force structure culminated in the plan for OIF in April 2003. It then describes the “stop gap” doctrine the Army developed in response to the deficiencies in initial OIF planning that resulted from flawed doctrine. The 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (2/101 AASLT), OIF 07-09 campaign plan illustrates the improvisational nature of this “stop gap” doctrine, providing an
example of a necessary, relevant, and successful adaptation by a BCT commander in response to
the changing reality of current operations. The analysis closes with a recommended change to
both FM 3-0 and FM 5-0, facilitated by equivalent adjustments to joint doctrine that will increase
their relevance in current and future conflicts. These changes enable Army commanders down to
the BCT level to plan campaigns nested in purpose to the overarching JFC campaign plan,
thereby linking tactical mission success to strategic victory.

The Evolution of U.S. Campaign Planning Doctrine

1919-1939: Laying the Foundations of U.S. Campaign Planning Doctrine

The modern discourse on campaign planning began in the aftermath of World War I with
the recognition of the changing reality of modern warfare. The nineteenth century “strategy of a
single point” in which belligerents massed forces for a single decisive battle proved untenable
after the technological breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution (smokeless gunpowder, the
machine gun, large caliber artillery firing indirectly). Wartime innovations like tanks and air
power provided enormous killing power, but the sheer size of the massive conscript armies
involved virtually guaranteed that victory required more than one battle. Additionally, U.S. war
planners recognized that future conflict would once again require a massive mobilization and
deployment like that required during the First World War, with a simultaneous transition to a
wartime economy to sustain forces in the field. The U.S. Army recognized that in any future war,
the nation would attain victory not through a single decisive battle, but through a series of
tactical, logistical, and administrative actions sequentially and simultaneously conducted to form
operations and campaigns.11

XIX, No.1 (March 1989): 86; Michael R. Matheny, The Development of the Theory and Doctrine of
Operational Art in the American Army, 1920-1940 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military
To address this new reality, in 1919 the U.S. Army reestablished both The School of the Line and The General Staff School (renamed the Command and General Staff School in 1922) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the General Staff College (later renamed the Army War College) in Washington, D.C. The Fort Leavenworth schools prepared officers for service in army groups, armies, corps, and divisions. The General Staff College prepared officers to serve on the Army General Staff, which developed the national military strategy that would support the creation, sustainment, and employment of field forces.12

The 1920s curriculum of the Fort Leavenworth schools developed the foundation for the American concepts of the operational level of war, operational art, and campaign planning. It taught students to plan for the tactical employment and logistical support of brigades, divisions, corps, armies, and army groups in high intensity combat against similarly organized conventional forces. As early as 1925, students created a “plan of the campaign,” including associated plans for operations and logistical requirements. The Fort Leavenworth curriculum emphasized that the initial campaign plan concentrated forces in a theater of operations, from which they would conduct strategic maneuver to engage the enemy in the first battle. However, as the campaign unfolded, the protracted nature of modern warfare required additional “plans of operations” to guide forces to either exploit success or reverse initial setbacks. Additionally, the instruction stressed the existence of multiple campaign plans at the national level, General Headquarters (GHQ), and in the army groups or armies conducting the actual fighting.13

The Army codified its adaptation to the new reality of war in two key publications. Field Service Regulations, United States Army, 1923, (FSR) described the tactical actions of Divisions and smaller units (later renamed FM 100-5, Operations). A Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional), 1930, articulated Army doctrine for conducting land campaigns that linked

12 Matheny, 11.
13 Matheny, 14-16.
the tactical actions of Corps and below to the strategic direction of GHQ. These two manuals represented the foundation of modern American campaign planning doctrine. Many of the concepts found in these two manuals remained essentially unchanged until 1974, demonstrating a continuity of thought regarding campaign planning and the roles the services—particularly the army—played in campaigning.14

Although the 1923 FSR concentrated on the tactical level of war, it began by describing the purposes of the different “large units” of the Army: the division, corps, army, army groups, and GHQ. The manual identified the army as the first organizational level capable of independent action and charged it with campaign planning responsibility. It described establishment of army groups to command and control different ground forces conducting simultaneous campaigns in support of national objectives. Finally, it described GHQ’s responsibilities in terms equivalent to those of the modern Combatant Command.15

A Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional), 1930, clarified and expanded upon the Leavenworth curriculum and the concepts contained in the 1923 FSR. First, the manual dictated that the commander-in-chief (CINC) of the GHQ who exercised overall control over a theater might subdivide it into multiple theaters of operation. Next, it required the CINC to conduct strategic level planning linking military ends, ways and means to achieve strategic objectives, highlighting the CINC’s role in the concentration of forces to achieve those objectives. Furthermore, the manual provided the bridge from strategy to tactics by delineating the duties and responsibilities of the commanders of larger units. Specifically, chapter five

---


15 “The army has territorial, strategical, and tactical functions. It is organized in all its branches for operation and administration, and is capable of independent action wherever required. It plans and executes the broader phases of strategical and tactical operations necessary to carry out that part of a given strategical mission directly assigned it by higher authority.” U.S. War Department, *FSR, Operations, (1923)*, 1-2.
reiterated that the army conducted independent actions and, therefore, performed campaign planning. This chapter established the army as the “center of gravity” for campaign planning, a concept that remained until its elimination in 1973.16

The FSR evolved into FM 100-5, *Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations*, in 1939. This manual demonstrated the Army’s continued effort to adapt its doctrinal discourse to the changing reality of modern war. It retained the focus on tactical actions at the division and below, but acknowledged the maturation of technology since the 1920s. It restated the operational chain of command proceeding from the President to the War Department, through the Chief of Staff and the GHQ CINC, and finally to one or more army commanders who conducted ground campaigns to achieve strategic objectives. It explicitly identified the ultimate objective of any military strategy as the destruction of the opponent’s armed forces in decisive battle. Finally, it indicated that the field forces would achieve this ultimate objective only after they achieved one or more intermediate objectives. This implied the need to plan a comprehensive campaign that linked field forces’ tactical actions to theater strategic and national political objectives.17

16 “A commander in chief exercises control over a theater of war, which may consist of one or more mutually dependent theaters of operations within easy communication with one another. He draws up and issues strategical plans in accordance with the general policies prescribed by the President. . . . From him must come the plans and impulses that guide and animate all below him. It is he who succeeds or fails in a campaign. . . . The army commander plans and carries out the broader phases of tactical operations necessary to execute the strategical mission assigned to him by the commander in chief. He initiates operations by giving orders to the commanders of corps and other large units directly under his command and to the chiefs of army services. The army commander draws up tactical and administrative plans for the employment of the army, under instructions from higher authority; he issues orders to the corps and other units under his control; he allots divisions and special troops to the corps based on the tactical and administrative plans; and he coordinates the efforts of the corps and the army troops.” U.S. War Department, *Manual for Large Units (1930)*, 7-8, 15-16, 29-30, 39.

17 “The conduct of war is the art of employing armed forces of a nation in combination with measures of economic and political constraint for the purpose of effecting a satisfactory peace. . . . The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces in battle. Decisive defeat in battle breaks the enemy’s will to war and forces him to sue for peace, which is the national aim. To attain this ultimate objective one or intermediate objectives may have to be determined. These objectives must be well defined and contribute toward the attainment of the ultimate objective.” U.S. War Department, FM 100-5, *Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 2.
These three documents codified the Army’s doctrinal discourse on campaign planning that derived from its adaptation to the reality of modern war. They expressed the American concept of campaigning in the following construct: The president developed national political strategy, from which a CINC of a theater of war derived a military strategy and a campaign plan. Commanders of army groups and armies created subordinate campaign plans in their theaters of operations conducting sequential and simultaneous tactical, logistic, and administrative actions to destroy a similarly organized conventional opponent in decisive battle. It is a testament to the appeal of this concept that Joint an Army doctrine sixty-two years later retained this thinking.¹⁸

World War II: Adaptation of Campaign Planning Doctrine to the Reality of War

From this foundation, the U.S. Army adapted its doctrine to the realities of the next major conflict it faced, World War II (WWII). As the United States prepared to enter the war, the Army updated FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations, Operations* in 1941, retaining its focus on the tactical actions of division and smaller units while adding a section on the purpose of larger units. It maintained the preexisting line of thought by giving GHQ overall control of the theater of war, with subordinate units consisting of one or more armies (that may or may not be formed into army groups) that were both tactical and administrative headquarters; army corps that focused solely on the tactical fight; and divisions that fought battles and engagements. In keeping with its intent to be used by tactical leaders, the Army removed all language associated with larger unit operations from this version of FM 100-5.¹⁹


After six months of combat, the Army published FM 100-15, *Field Service Regulations, Larger Units* in 1942, superseding *A Manual for Commanders of Large Units, (Provisional), 1930*. First, this manual sustained the existing structure and responsibilities of the chain of command with only minor adjustments in language. Next, it addressed campaign planning, stating that during peacetime, the War Department was responsible for developing an overarching “plan of campaign” while subordinate theater and task force commanders developed “plans for operations.” However, upon the outbreak of hostilities army and higher level commanders planned nested campaigns in their theaters of operation that supported both the national political strategy and the military strategy laid out by the Chief of Staff. Finally, it defined the objective of war as the imposition of the will of one country upon another through the strategic offense, requiring both the War Department and subordinate commanders to plan a campaign consisting of both sequential and simultaneous tactical actions that maximized the politicians’ bargaining power during peace negotiations following hostilities. Thus, the 1942 version of FM 100-15 provided a clear line of reasoning linking armies’ military campaigns to national objectives.20

The 1942 FM 100-15 also continued the line of reasoning found in the 1930 manual regarding the army’s larger units. It envisioned the army group as primarily a tactical unit, but with administrative functions when acting as the theater command. FM 100-15 devoted the most attention to the army, first echoing that it was the fundamental unit of strategic maneuver and second, that it was the basis for planning and executing strategic and tactical operations. Additionally, it echoed the language of the earlier manual that directed the army commander to plan well into the future while corps successfully completed current battles and engagements.

---

20 “The object of war is to impose the will of one country upon that of another. The accomplishment of this object normally requires the decisive defeat or destruction of the hostile armed force. . . . Whatever the objective selected for the initial operations, the decisions and plans of the commander must be positive and clear-cut, and they must visualize the attainment of the ultimate objective.” U.S. War Department, FM 100-15, *Field Service Regulations, Larger Units* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1942), 1-2, 10-14.
Finally, it reiterated that the corps was a tactical formation whose purpose was to conclude successfully current battles.\textsuperscript{21}

In 1944, the War Department published FM 100-5, \textit{Field Service Regulations, Operations} that continued to adapt doctrine to the experiences of the Army after two years of war. The new edition retained its focus on the tactical actions of divisions and below. It laid the official foundation for “joint” warfare by specifying that the Army and the Army Air Forces provided field forces whose operational chain of command ran from the president, through the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, and the CINC of the theater of war in which they were to fight.\textsuperscript{22}

These three manuals not only demonstrated the War Department’s willingness to adapt its doctrinal discourse to the realities of WWII, but also outlined the new American concept for campaigning wherein the services provided properly organized, trained, equipped, and manned forces to a CINC of a theater of war. The theater CINC planned an overarching campaign, while subordinate army group or army commanders planned nested campaigns in their AOs. Commanders employed forces in sequential and simultaneous tactical actions to achieve strategic military objectives to give the nation’s political leaders the advantage they required to forge a favorable and lasting peace. Far from theoretical, these manuals reflected the reality of the U.S. Army’s efforts as part of the Allied coalition to fight and win WWII.

\textbf{1947 to 1973: Imposition of the Discourse on War upon the Reality of War}

After the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendment, the newly established Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the Army, published new campaign planning doctrine to fit the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} “The army is the fundamental unit of strategic maneuver. It is the unit which the theater commander or commander of the field forces uses as a basis for planning and executing strategic and tactical operations. The army has territorial, tactical, and administrative functions. . . . In his planning the army commander must project himself well into the future; his plans must cover considerable periods of operations; and while one operation, which may extend over many days or weeks, is progressing, he must be planning the next.” U.S. War Department, FM 100-15, \textit{FSR, Larger Units} (1942), 49-57.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} U.S. War Department, FM 100-5, \textit{Field Service Regulations, Operations} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 2-3.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
updated organizational structure of the Department of Defense (DOD). The 1949 editions of FM 100-5, Operations, and FM 101-51, Department of the Army Planning System, and the 1950 edition of FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations Larger Units, began the DOD leadership’s efforts to impose a divergent doctrinal discourse upon the reality of war in accordance with service and branch parochialism.

The 1949 edition of FM 100-5 remained faithful to its forbears by focusing on the tactical actions of the division and below in a conventional war while recognizing the newly established national security framework. It acknowledged the creation of the Department of the Army and its responsibility to provide trained and ready forces to a field commander, and then moved on to matters of tactical actions. The 1950 edition of FM 100-15 likewise retained the core tenets of American campaign planning doctrine while acknowledging the new responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for strategic planning (previously the purview of the War Department General Staff) and the responsibility of the Department of the Army to provide trained and equipped forces to the Unified commands. The 1950 FM 100-15 continued the line of thought established in the 1942 edition regarding nested campaign planning. It outlined a framework in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff published strategic plans to guide the theater commander’s development of theater wide plans for execution by the component commanders. Finally, army group or field army commanders created nested campaign plans to guide their subordinate corps’ and divisions’ efforts to accomplish assigned tactical objectives.\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\) U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), 2-3; “The theater commander plans far in advance and makes his projected operational needs known to the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff. His planning should be projected to include the successful accomplishment of his mission. This may involve several campaigns, depending on the division of the whole operation into separate campaigns, each including operations of considerable magnitude. . . . He [the theater Army commander] coordinates his operations with those of the theater Navy and Air Force. . . . The detailed plan for operations usually is formulated by the theater, defense command, base command, or similar commander designated in a particular area. . . . It also should contemplate probable successive operations to continue the success achieved initially as well as provide for action to be taken should the results be other than those planned. . . . The higher commander must visualize the whole campaign, while focusing his attention on the objective of the campaign he must evaluate the
The United States employed this doctrine during the Korean War. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and his successor General Matthew B. Ridgway commanded both the United Nations Command (UNC) and the U.S. Far East Command (FEC), planning the overall theater military strategy in accordance with the objectives of the President of the United States and the United Nations Security Council. Subordinate commands included the Far East Air Forces (the air component command), Naval Forces Far East (the naval component command), and the Eighth United States Army (EUSA, the land component command). Under the strategic direction of the Commander UNC/FEC, the EUSA commander planned and executed the land campaign throughout the war, commanding and controlling six subordinate, combined corps (I, IX, and X U.S. Corps; and I, II, and III Republic of Korea (ROK) Corps.)

U.S. forces did not adjust their doctrine during the Korean War, but upon its conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Army sought to adapt to the challenge of fighting a limited war while preventing escalation that could result in a nuclear exchange. Thus, in 1954 the Army published FM 100-5, Operations. Like its predecessors, this manual focused on the tactical actions of division and smaller units. However, the 1954 version of FM 100-5 included an extensive introductory chapter that established “the broad concept of military operations and the relationships of the various military services in pursuit of those operations and in support of national policies and objectives.” In this manner, the Army began to increase the scope of FM

situations, which may develop, as a result of his planned operations. . . . The object of war is to impose the will of one nation upon that of another nation or group of nations. Its accomplishment requires the destruction of the enemy’s will to fight, which normally requires the decisive defeat of his armed forces. . . . Whatever the objective selected for the initial operations, the decisions and plans of the commander must be positive and clear cut, and they must visualize the attainment of the ultimate objective. . . . Possession of objectives which will favor gaining the initiative and force the enemy to regulate his movements on those of the attacker may be necessary initially.” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), 3-7, 12-19.

100-5 to address the realities observed in the Korean War, while retaining the strengths of FM 100-15.\textsuperscript{25}

The 1954 version of FM 100-15 maintained that the basic doctrine of Army operations was “to defeat the enemy by application of military power directly or indirectly against the armed forces which support his political structure.” The manual emphasized the overall mission of Army forces was “to bear upon an enemy’s military capacity sufficient power at decisive points and times to render it ineffective.” Thus, in the ten years since the publication of the 1944 version of FM 100-5, the Army modified its concept of campaigning from one focused on imposing the national will upon an enemy to one of the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces. This reflected the United States’ Cold War era concern with avoiding general war and its associated danger of nuclear exchange, focusing instead on limited wars to contain the spread of Communism.\textsuperscript{26}

In 1962, the Army published the next version of FM 100-5, which continued the traditional tactical focus but expanded the introductory chapter to address the larger issues of strategy and military force. The chapter began with a discussion of national objectives, policies, and strategies. It stated that U.S. national strategy desired to attain these objectives peaceably, but that the U.S. was prepared to wage war at any level of intensity should peace fail. Next, it explained that military strategy was tied directly to the attainment of national objectives and that military forces were required to fight across the “spectrum of war” with cold war on one end, general war on the other, and conventional, limited war in between.\textsuperscript{27}


\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{27} “Land, sea, and airpower are interdependent elements to be applied under unified direction and command toward the attainment of United States’ objectives. . . . Landpower is the power to exercise direct, continuous and comprehensive control over the land, over its resources, \textit{and over its people}.” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, \textit{Operations} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 4-6, 10-14.
After describing the realities of the operating environment in FM 100-5, the Army published FM 100-15 in 1963 to put forth an updated concept for campaign planning. The 1963 version of the manual retained many concepts from the 1950 version, including its description of the president developing national objectives, policy, and strategy, which in turn enabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate an overarching military strategy. The theater commander, in turn, developed his theater campaign plan to guide his component commanders’ efforts, including the theater army commander’s creation of a campaign plan for employment of subordinate land forces. Army group or field army commanders then created plans for both operations and campaigns and issued nested operations orders to their subordinate corps to attain the designated objectives. The United States Army initiated operations in Vietnam based on this doctrinal foundation.28

In Vietnam, the U.S. military experienced perhaps the greatest divergence in its history between its doctrinal discourse and the reality of war. Its efforts to come to grips with this challenge set the precedent for the joint community’s current discourse on campaigning. The first major difference between Vietnam and previous conflicts was the incremental manner in which American involvement developed, beginning in 1950 with military advisor support to French forces combating Communist guerillas in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) considered the Military Assistance Advisory Group-Indochina (MAAG-IC) a temporary organization whose operational chain of command ran through it through the Department of the Navy to the President. Thus, from its inception, U.S. military forces in Vietnam were subordinate to the PACOM CINC.29


From 1950 to 1961, MAAG-IC supervised the United States’ ever-growing advisory effort to French and Republic of Vietnam forces that by 1961 involved responsibilities that exceeded the scope of its capabilities. President John F. Kennedy decided to upgrade the U.S. command by creating the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in February 1962, establishing it as a subordinate unified command under PACOM. Because the United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC) was the headquarters designated in existing plans to execute contingency operations in Indochina under PACOM’s command President Kennedy selected General Paul D. Harkins, the USARPAC Deputy Commanding General as its first commander. General Harkins proposed to organize MACV under the existing doctrinal construct, thereby establishing subordinate Army, Navy, and Air Force component commands to conduct operational level planning and execution in Vietnam. However, Admiral Harry D. Felt, the PACOM CINC, disagreed based on the rationale that the MACV was responsible to provide advisory assistance, and that any contingency operations should fall under the purview of USARPAC and PACOM. Additionally, the PACOM commander was concerned that the activation of an Army component command subordinate to an Army-led joint command would provide the Army a disproportionate influence on policy in Vietnam, relegating the Navy and Air Force to subservient roles based on the lack of component commands of their own.30

From 1962 to 1964, MACV controlled a greatly expanded military advisory assistance program, but did not command or control any combat forces. This situation changed in late 1964 when President Lyndon B. Johnson decided to deploy Army and Marine combat forces to Vietnam. In response to this changing situation, Army Chief of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler submitted a proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the creation of an Army component command capable of commanding and controlling a land campaign while providing for the administrative and logistical support of all Army forces in Vietnam. Both the PACOM commander, Admiral

30 Eckhardt, 22-23, 26-27, 33-35.
U.S. Grant Sharp, and the new MACV commander, General William C. Westmoreland, opposed this proposal. General Westmoreland gained the Joint Chiefs’ approval for his alternate recommendation to create the United States Army, Vietnam (USARV), which he would command in addition to MACV. The current commander of the Army Support Group would become the Deputy Commander of USARV, which would serve as the single headquarters for all Army forces in Vietnam. Thus, General Westmoreland exercised operational control (OPCON) over Army combat forces as the MACV commander, and commanded all logistic and administrative units as the USARV commander. This command structure remained in place from 1965 until 1969.31

With MACV planning both the theater strategy and the land campaign, General Westmoreland proposed the creation of intermediate tactical headquarters to command and control the growing number of U.S. combat units and MACV advisory teams assisting the Army of Vietnam (ARVN). Initially, General Westmoreland envisioned one headquarters: Field Forces Vietnam. At the height of U.S. commitment in Vietnam, MACV exercised OPCON over four corps level commands: First and Second Field Forces, Vietnam (I FFV and II FFV), Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), and Twenty Fourth Corps (XXIV Corps). Each of these commands in turn controlled the tactical actions of subordinate divisions and separate brigades while advising the three ARVN Corps. 32

The Army adapted to the new reality of the war in Vietnam by updating FM 100-5, Operations of Army Forces in the Field, in 1968, FM 100-15, Larger Units: Theater Army-Corps, in 1968, and FM 100-15, Larger Units: Theater Army-Corps, in 1973. While the new FM 100-5 contained significant changes in tactics at the division level and below, the introductory chapter on strategy and military forces remained unchanged from the 1962 version. The 1968 version of

32 Eckhardt, 51-58.
FM 100-15 codified the new command and control hierarchy in Vietnam. Unlike the 1962 edition, which identified the dual roles of the theater army commander as resource provider and operational commander, the 1968 manual stated in time of war the theater commander would retain OPCON of large combat units assigned to the theater army. Thus, the theater army commander relinquished land campaign planning responsibility, focusing merely on providing administrative and logistical support to Army forces in theater. The theater commander could exercise one of three options to conduct operational level campaign planning. He could establish a Joint Task Force for a short duration mission; create a sub-unified command for an enduring mission; or delegate campaign planning to the senior commander of Army combat forces (army group or usually field army) in the combat zone.  

A confluence of events occurred in 1973 that forced the United States Army to adapt its campaigning doctrine yet again to the realities of war. First, the Army published a new version of FM 100-15 that expanded on Army component planning in the “MACV construct.” It laid out an operational chain of command from the unified commander through the joint force (either subordinate unified command or JTF) commander to the Army combat force commander. The theater army commander provided command and control to combat support and combat service support units, and provided logistical support to Army combat forces. While the unified commander remained responsible for campaign planning, he could delegate that responsibility either to the subordinate unified commander or to the commander of Army combat forces. Thus, the new FM 100-15 eliminated the theater army echelon, but still required an army headquarters (army group, field army, or corps) to prepare a land campaign in support of the unified commander’s campaign plan.

33 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Larger Units: Theater Army-Corps (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968), 1-1 to 1-7, 4-1 to 4-2, 5-1, 6-1 to 6-2, 7-3 to 7-4.

34 “Theater plans provide sufficient guidance for the component forces to conduct operations that ensure unity of effort. . . . Subordinate commanders normally do not prepare orders and plans to cover the
Next, in June 1973 Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General Creighton Abrams approved the elimination of field armies from active duty. In this new force structure, the corps operated directly under the unified commander (just as they had in the final years of the war in Vietnam). This change in force structure broadened the corps’ focus from its traditional tactical mission to include operational concerns. With theater armies out of the operational chain of command, and no army groups or field armies left in the force structure, the corps became the unified commander’s primary echelon responsible for campaign planning.35

Third, the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War significantly influenced the U.S. Army’s view of modern mechanized warfare. The demonstrated lethality of man-portable anti-tank missiles, in combination with the new generation of armor and air defense systems, forced Army leaders to re-evaluate their entire concept for the defense of Western Europe in the face of Soviet aggression.36

The Army published a “Test Version” of FM 100-15, Larger Unit Operations, in March 1974 that combined the “MACV construct” with the reality of decreasing force structure. This manual specified that the unified commander created a campaign plan that served as the basis for orders issued to subordinates “stated in broad terms to provide the corps commanders maximum flexibility and freedom of action.” The corps commander translated the theater campaign plan’s entire time span/scope of the campaign plan. . . . For undertakings occurring later in the campaign plan, they conduct long range planning. . . . In peacetime, the theater army (TA) commander usually is responsible for command and operational control of all theater army forces. In wartime, the responsibility for tactical planning and operations of forces in the combat zone normally is retained by the commander of the unified command. However, the commander of the unified command may delegate this responsibility to the commander of a subordinate unified command or to the senior commander of Army combat forces in the combat zone. . . . The commander of Army combat forces in a theater may be any of the following an independent corps commander, field army commander, army group commander, or senior land force commander.” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Larger Units: Theater Army-Corps (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973), 3-7 to 3-8, 3-11, 4-1, 5-1, (emphasis in original)

strategic objectives into tactical missions for its subordinate divisions and brigades. Previously, higher echelon commanders performed this function. The test version also reiterated the support role of the theater army, but with a caveat. It stated that unusual wartime operational requirements might necessitate the establishment of a numbered Army to reduce the span of control of the unified headquarters over multiple corps, or to control tactical actions in one part of a geographically dispersed theater. Thus, the 1974 FM 100-15 acknowledged the reality of the current force structure while presenting a construct that under “unusual circumstances” identified a numbered army to plan and execute a land campaign. Although the Army desired to make the corps the echelon of operational employment, events in both Western Europe and the Persian Gulf would actually make the “unusual circumstances” referenced above the norm for the next 30 years.37

1976 to 1986: The Transformation of the Army’s Operational Concept

More changes awaited the FM 100-15, Larger Unit series manuals and Army doctrine as a whole. General William DePuy combined the lessons learned from Vietnam, the observations of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Army experimental maneuvers of 1974, and the renewed emphasis of the defense of Western Europe from Soviet aggression to justify the wholesale modification to the U.S. Army’s doctrinal discourse. DePuy focused on the 1976 update of FM 100-5, Operations, as the starting point for a total revision of the Army’s core doctrinal manuals. DePuy envisioned FM 100-5 as “the capstone of the Army’s system of field manuals,” while FM 100-15 would transition to become the definitive doctrine for Corps operations.38


The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 articulated the “active defense” as the Army’s basic operational concept, focusing on execution at the tactical level by corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions. It did not acknowledge that future warfare would require a land campaign to sequence tactical actions to achieve strategic objectives. Instead, the manual emphasized the “new lethality” of the recent Arab-Israeli War to support its depiction of future conflicts as short and deadly, with victory most likely determined in the first battle instead of a lengthy campaign.

Though titled “Operations,” the focus of the manual was the conduct of engagements and battles. This manual introduced the concept of “discreteness” into the Army’s thinking. It required commanders to plan forward in time to win the first battle of the next war, instead of envisioning the conflict as a whole as prevision doctrine dictated.39

Although field commanders widely criticized the 1976 version of FM 100-5, it did serve to stimulate discourse on how the United States Army intended to fight future conflicts in relation to the changes in the nature of modern warfare. As field commanders tried to implement the “active defense” concept, they found it overly complicated and reliant on defensive firepower. Furthermore, U.S. allies in central Europe expressed discomfort with the doctrine’s willingness to trade space for time. The Army ultimately rejected the 1976 doctrine and began a process of revision in 1979 that ultimately resulted in the publication of the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, and the adoption of the concept of AirLand Battle.40

39 “Because the lethality of modern weapons continues to increase sharply, we can expect very high losses to occur in short periods of time. Entire forces could be destroyed quickly if they are improperly employed. Therefore, the first battle of our next war could well be its last battle: belligerents could be quickly exhausted, and international pressures to stop fighting could bring about an early cessation of hostilities. The United States could find itself in a short, intense war—the outcome of which may be dictated by the results of initial combat. This circumstance is unprecedented: we are an Army historically unprepared for its first battle. We are accustomed to victory wrought with the weight of materiel and population brought to bear after the onset of hostilities. Today the U.S. Army must, above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war.” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 1-1, 3-4.

Lieutenant Colonel Don Holder wrote the first version of AirLand Battle as a contributor to the 1981 draft version of FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*. Combining his experiences in Vietnam with the reality of American force structure deployed in Europe and Korea, Colonel Holder specified that the corps now operated at both the tactical and operational levels of war. This made it incumbent upon the corps to plan and execute campaigns, translating the broad strategic guidance of the unified commander into a logical sequence of tactical, logistical, and administrative actions for subordinate forces to execute.41

Lieutenant General William R. Richardson directed Colonel Holder, Lieutenant Colonel Richmond B. Henriques and Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege to revise FM 100-5, *Operations*, resulting in publication of the 1982 edition, which articulated AirLand Battle as the Army’s operational construct. This new doctrine directed employment of Army corps and divisions at both the tactical and operational levels to fight and win battles and campaigns in support of strategic objectives. It also provided the first American doctrinal definition of the operational level of war. In 1985, The Command and General Staff College published the final draft of FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*, based on the changes presented in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5. The new FM 100-15 stated “the corps commander may act as the operational-level army component commander and that when acting in this capacity, he has the requirement to plan a land campaign to achieve the strategic objectives of the unified commander.” Thus, in accordance with the force structure and contingency plans established for the defense of Europe and Korea,

---

41 “The corps may be the only Army force in a theater of operations or it may serve as one operational element of a multi-corps ground force. In either case—but especially when it is the only Army force in theater—the corps fights at both the operational and tactical levels of war. Army doctrine of AirLand Battle applied to both levels of war. . . . The corps commander translates his mission into a campaign plan and accomplishes his campaign goals through a series of simultaneous and sequential tactical actions. The campaign plan outlines the broad conduct of operations establishing a general plan for the defeat of the enemy, directing general dispositions of corps forces for the most favorable engagement of the enemy and setting out flexible options for long range conduct of the campaign based on the outcome of battles.” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*, Coordinating Draft (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1981), 5-1 to 5-2, 5-10 to 5-13.
the new Army doctrine assigned to corps commanders the tasks that army commanders performed during WWII and Korea.  

AirLand Battle’s emphasis of the offensive, viewed within the context of President Ronald Regan’s comments about the “evil empire,” concerned some of the European NATO allies. Additionally, it conflicted with the NATO operational warfighting concept of Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) developed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Bernard Rogers. To resolve these sources of friction, the Army revised FM 100-5, Operations, yet again, publishing an updated version in 1986.

The 1986 version described Army forces, as the land component of a joint force, fighting engagements and battles at the tactical level, and conducting major operations and campaigns at the operational level, to achieve specified strategic military and political objectives. The manual clearly delineated three levels of war: Strategy, Tactics, and Operational Art. The manual paid particular emphasis to Operational Art due to its recent incorporation into Army doctrine, defining it as “the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.” It described a campaign as “a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war.” Additionally, the manual stipulated, “No particular echelon of command is solely or uniquely concerned with operational art, but theater commanders and their chief subordinates usually plan and direct campaigns. Army groups and armies normally design

---

42 “The operational level of war uses available military resources to attain strategic goals within a larger theater of war. Most simply, it is the theory of larger unit operations. It also involves planning and conducting campaigns. Campaigns are sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles. . . . The object of all operations is to destroy the opposing force. . . . At corps and division, operational and tactical levels are not clearly separable. They are guided by the same principles, and this manual applies to both.” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 1-5, 2-1, 2-3; U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Corps Operations, Final Draft (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1985), 3-9 to 3-10.

the major ground operations of a campaign, and corps and divisions normally execute those major
ground operations.” FM 100-5 went on to state that Operational Art reflected the operational
commander’s vision for establishing the military conditions that supported the strategic objectives
through a series of linked actions with the resources allocated to him.44

The 1986 version of FM 100-5 included an extensive chapter on planning campaigns,
major operations, and battles. The manual harkened back to the 1950 version of FM 100-15 in
which the theater commander planned the campaign and issued his long-range strategic guidance
to subordinate component commanders. However, component commanders no longer planned
supporting component campaigns as they had in accordance with the FM 100-15 series of
manuals; rather, under the new construct they planned and synchronized major operations that
served as phases in the theater campaign plan. This new construct ensured that subordinate
component commands planned and executed operations in accordance with the theater
commander’s vision for the campaign, reflecting an emphasis on centralized control intended to
reconcile the tactical focus of Army corps commanders with the operational and strategic focus of
Air Force commanders who allocated airpower at the theater level.45

44 “FM 100-5, Operations, is the Army’s keystone warfighting manual. It explains how Army
forces plan and conduct campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements in conjunction with other
services and allied forces.” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC:

45 “Each joint or combined commander responsible for a theater of operations makes a campaign
plan to implement the joint or combined strategic guidance and to give direction to his subordinate
component commands. Ground operations planning must be coordinated with air and naval operations
plans to assure mutual support. . . . Campaign plans set long-term goals—strategic aims such as control of a
gerographical area, reestablishment of political boundaries, or the defeat of an enemy force in the theater of
operations. These must be accomplished in phases in most cases. Accordingly, the campaign plan normally
provides both a general concept of operations for the entire campaign and a specific plan for the
campaign’s first phase. . . . Major operations are the coordinated elements of phases of a campaign. The
success or failure of a major operation will have a decisive impact on the conduct of a particular phase of a
campaign.” Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (1986), 28-29; Swain, “Filling the Void,”
164.
The 1991 Gulf War: Validation of AirLand Battle; Repudiation of America’s Campaign Planning Construct

The 1991 Gulf War validated the equipping, manning, educating, and training reforms of the 1970s and 1980s. However, it repeated the two flaws of American campaigning resulting from MACV and USARVN’s organizational structure. The post war euphoria masked these organizational deficiencies. Unfortunately, both the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate (J7) utilized U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) actions as the example for new Army and Joint doctrine because they seemed to provide the recipe for decisive victory that Americans had yearned for since the end of World War II.

The Army took the 1986 version of FM 100-5 into the Gulf War. Organizational factors, however, ultimately determined how both CENTCOM and its Army component—U.S. Army, Central (ARCENT)—planned and executed the war. Both CENTCOM and ARCENT understood the changing nature of threats in the Persian Gulf and revised existing theater contingency plans to deal with them. In accordance FM 100-5, ARCENT assisted in the creation of CENTCOM’s theater campaign as well as its supporting plan. The CENTCOM campaign plan consisted of two phases: a defense of critical Saudi Arabian oil, sea, and airport facilities, followed by a counteroffensive to destroy invaders and recapture land and facilities occupied by the invader. From CENTCOM’s concept, ARCENT developed a three-phased supporting plan to build up a corps-sized force in theater, to conduct a defense of critical port and oil facilities while operating common-user seaports and providing logistics and administrative support to Army forces in theater, and finally to conduct a counteroffensive to regain lost territory.46

ARCENT identified XVIII Airborne (ABN) Corps as the Army combat forces commander for the execution of CENTCOM’s plan. In accordance with the 1974 version of FM 100-15—still in effect—CENTCOM exercised OPCON over XVIII ABN Corps while ARCENT commanded, less OPCON, XVIII ABN Corps. XVIII ABN Corps, as the Army combat forces commander, planned and executed all tactical operations in ARCENT’s area of responsibility. Through this command and control structure, CENTCOM coordinated the actions of two largely autonomous corps-level tactical formations (XVIII ABN Corps and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF)) with those of its air and naval components, while ARCENT focused on its theater army responsibilities. This plan complied with current doctrine, subordinate commands understood it, and from August to October 1990, U.S. forces executed the plan essentially in the manner the planners envisioned it.47

However, the composition of the ARCENT staff profoundly affected how both ARCENT and CENTCOM oversaw execution of the plan. The Army considered deployment to the CENTCOM area of operations unlikely during the 1980s. Therefore, it staffed ARCENT at twenty-five percent of its Table of Distribution Allowance (TDA) strength. A small cadre of active duty officers controlled ARCENT’s day-to-day functions, while the remaining staff came from the reserve component. Additionally, the Army activated the 377th Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM)—the major subordinate unit that provided command and control of theater level logistics operations—from the reserve component. ARCENT assumed that the intelligence community would warn provide them at least nineteen days advance warning of an impending crisis, allowing adequate time for mobilization of the remainder of its staff and the 377th TAACOM before operations began.48

47 Swain, Lucky War, 9-11.

The events of August 1990 proved this assumption wrong. The nation’s swift response to the unanticipated Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caught both CENTCOM and ARCENT flat-footed. Furthermore, President George H.W. Bush’s decision not to mobilize the reserves until 22 August 1990 affected ARCENT significantly by delaying the mobilization of the 377th TAACOM. This forced ARCENT to create a provisional Support Command from its own headquarters personnel to meet the immediate needs of XVIII ABN Corps, which started arriving in theater on August 9, 1990. The delay in mobilization of the reserves also forced ARCENT to use the operations section planners (G3 Plans) to form the Coalition Coordination Communication and Integration Center (C3IC) to coordinate host nation (HN) support for arriving units. These two actions committed the vast majority of ARCENT’s 266 active duty personnel to overseeing the logistic and coordination efforts. Therefore, ARCENT lacked the ability to plan the counteroffensive phase of CENTCOM’s campaign plan until late-November 1990, when CENTCOM assumed responsibility for staffing the C3IC, thus freeing the ARCENT G3 Planners to return to their normal duties.49

CENTCOM, meanwhile, planned offensive operations against Iraqi forces. Although the air component provided CENTCOM its first offensive capability, like ARCENT, Central Air Forces (CENTAF) lacked the necessary resources to oversee the reception of deploying units and plan for future operations. Therefore, the CENTCOM commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, requested the Air Force Staff Plans Directorate (A5) to augment CENTAF’s capability to plan an aerial campaign. The four phases of the resultant air campaign; (1) strategic theater air objectives, (2) air supremacy in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO), (3) battlefield

49 Swain, Lucky War, 32-33, 42-46, 93; Scales, Certain Victory, 57-65.
preparation in KTO, and (4) support to ground campaign—created an enduring framework to which the CENTCOM planners grafted the ground campaign plan.50

To plan the ground campaign, General Schwarzkopf requested and received four recent graduates of The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). These four officers planned the CENTCOM counteroffensive between 18 September and 17 October 1990. On 24 October, General Schwarzkopf sent the SAMS planners to ARCENT to augment their G3 and plan the Army component ground offensive (ARCENT G3 had assumed control of the C3IC in August). While supporting ARCENT, the SAMS planners developed the concept for a two corps attack linked to the CENTCOM concept for an envelopment of Iraqi forces from the western desert.51

The 1991 Gulf War therefore consisted of a joint campaign made up of two major operations linked by time and purpose, planned by the Joint Force Commander. Component commanders created subordinate plans that supported the theater campaign plan, but not of their own volition. Planners from the Air Staff A5 created an air campaign while the forward deployed CENTAF commander focused on the reception and basing of deploying squadrons. Likewise, the same group of Army planners created both the CENTCOM and ARCENT plans while the ARCENT G3 Plans section staffed the C3IC. It is likely only the war’s dramatic and rapid success preventing military and civilian leaders from leveling severe criticism on the ad hoc nature of the planning effort. The decisive nature of the victory, however, masked the serious structural and procedural flaws of the conflict.52

51 Swain, Lucky War, 76, 84-93; Scales, Certain Victory, 109-110, 125-133.
52 Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 143-144; Swain, Lucky War, 93.
In 1989, the U.S. Army started searching for a new doctrinal construct relevant to the post-Cold War world. Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Carl E. Vuono directed the Army to replace its venerable AirLand Battle doctrine with a new operational construct. Instead of defending Western Europe from attacking Soviet forces, the Army needed new doctrine that retained the essential elements of AirLand Battle, but recognized the reality of a smaller, conti

After General Gordon R. Sullivan relieved General Vuono as CSA in the summer of 1991, he assigned General Frederick M. Franks, the new TRADOC commander, the task of developing the Army’s new operational concept. General Franks benefited from his experiences as the VII Corps commander during Operation Desert Storm. He believed that in the new strategic setting, the U.S. Government would call upon the Army to alert, mobilize, and deploy lethal expeditionary forces from the United States to an austere theater to execute operations spanning the spectrum of conflict to achieve strategic objectives. He led the effort to publish the Army’s new version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, in June 1993. Concurrently, he worked with the Air Force and Navy to develop mutually supporting inter-Service doctrine and provided

---

fundamental input to the Joint Staff J7’s work on the forthcoming Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations.*

The new FM 100-5 hinged on the concept that Army forces, as part of a joint team, conducted major operations that achieved the strategic objectives of the combatant commander. The manual recognized that in future conflict the Army would deploy smaller, more lethal forces to conduct operations in support of the theater campaign plan. Furthermore, it specified that the Army would never fight as a single service, and that the responsibility for planning campaigns fell to the operational level joint force commander. Therefore, although it recognized that Army forces would execute a wide range of military operations, it officially ended the longstanding requirement for an Army commander to plan and execute a ground campaign.

Concurrent to the Army’s doctrinal update, General Colin Powell directed the J7 to draft definitive “Joint” doctrine (doctrine applicable to all the services operating together) in accordance with the provisions of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. In January 1990, the J7 published Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Test Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations,* which expressed a joint construct based on the 1986 version of FM 100-5 and the 1974 version of FM 100-15. Throughout 1990, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Unified Commands staffed JCS Test Pub 3-0; however, the events of the Gulf War put a hold on the publication and implementation of the new joint doctrine.

In July 1991, the Joint Staff published a test version of Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations,* its concept for planning joint campaigns and operations. This document laid the foundation for the current American concept of campaigning. First, it

---

54 Ibid., 35-38, 92, 104, 132-133.
56 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations (Test)* (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990), i.
specified responsibility that both campaign planning and the conduct of the campaign belonged to
the Unified commander or his principal joint subordinates. Second, the campaign plan
represented the operational extension of the Unified commander’s theater strategy. Third,
subordinate unified commands and JTFs created subordinate campaigns. Finally, component
commands planned major operations that supported the phases of the theater campaign plan. In
June 1992, the Joint Staff published JP 5-00.1, Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning, followed
by JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, in September 1993. The J7 developed these documents
in parallel with the Army’s revision of FM 100-5, ensuring the manuals remained in sync.57

U.S. forces employed these doctrinal concepts during the planning and execution of
Operation Restore Hope and the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) from December 1992
to March 1994. Although the U.S. military invested significant intellectual energy into
developing the new operational concepts contained in the 1993 versions of FM 100-5 and JP 3-0,
they did not measure up to the reality of the conflict in Somalia. The fact that the events of 3-4
October 1993 occurred under the auspices of United Nations command obscured the deficiencies
of the new U.S. doctrine. American military personnel compared operations during Operation
Restore Hope favorably to those conducted under UNOSOM II, thereby missing the opportunity
to learn from the shortcomings of their doctrine.58

Because President Bush desired American intervention in Somalia to transition to a U.N.
led multinational effort before President-elect William J. Clinton took office in January 1993,
CENTCOM planned a four-phased major operation rather than a campaign to achieve the
strategic objectives of restoring a secure environment to Somalia and allowing effective food
distribution. Although ARCENT participated in the initial planning, the CENTCOM commander,
General Joseph Hoar (USMC), selected the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) as the joint

---

57 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Test)
58 Allard, 89-97.
operational level headquarters in Somalia. The selection of a tactical, corps-level headquarters to direct operations in Somalia reflected both joint and service doctrine, particularly given the expeditionary nature and expected short duration of the mission. However, I MEF was not prepared to plan an overarching campaign to stabilize Somalia because it did not have the requisite expertise in operational level planning or appropriate doctrine to guide its efforts. This lack of operational expertise manifested itself in the decidedly tactical focus of the United Task Force (UNITAF), commanded by Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC. CENTCOM chose to employ an organization manned, trained, and equipped to execute tactical-level tasks rather than its experienced component commands that managed the operational support for the 1991 Gulf War. The resultant disconnects between the tactical successes achieved during Operation Restore Hope and the strategic failure of the overall U.S. effort should have been a warning sign to military leaders. However, the focus of American public attention shifted quickly from Somalia to the island of Haiti.\footnote{Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates, \textit{My Clan Against the World: U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994} (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 26, 28-29, 36.}

In September 1991, Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras forced Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to flee to Venezuela. Following a series of unsuccessful diplomatic efforts in 1992 and 1993, President Clinton authorized the use of military force to oust General Cedras and return President Aristide to power. Accordingly, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM)—the unified commander for the Caribbean region—planned for a military invasion of Haiti. In accordance with the 1993 JP 3-0, USACOM selected the XVIII ABN Corps as the operational level headquarters in Haiti and designated it CJTF 180. CJTF 180 organized itself with Army, Navy, Air Force, special operations, and psychological operations components. It planned a five phased campaign: (1) pre-deployment and crisis action activities; (2) opposed forcible entry into Haiti followed by brief combat operations against the armed Forces of Haiti (FAd’H) and the
Haitian National Police (HNP); (3) initial civil-military operations; (4) civil-military operations; and (5) transition to a long term, United Nations led, peacekeeping and nation building mission.\(^\text{60}\)

In June 1994, the JCS directed USACOM and XVIII ABN Corps to plan a different campaign. The new concept eliminated the forcible entry and combat operations against the FAd’H, but retained the mission of reestablishing President Aristide’s duly elected government. The expected duration of this plan exceeded 180 days, which concerned both the FORSCOM and XVIII ABN commanders because it committed the nation’s forced-entry and special operations forces, leaving them unable to react to other contingencies that might arise. General Dennis Reimer, the FORSCOM commander, acting as the Army component commander for USACOM, convinced Admiral Paul D. Miller to designate the 10\(^{th}\) Mountain Division as JTF 190 and vest it with responsibility for planning this new campaign. Thus, up to the very moment of the invasion both XVIII ABN Corps and 10\(^{th}\) Mountain Division worked in parallel but planned two very different campaigns for execution in Haiti.\(^\text{61}\)

JTF 190 planned a five-phase campaign very similar to that developed by XVIII ABN Corps. Phase I consisted of pre-deployment activities that postured the JTF in intermediate staging bases close to Haiti. Phase II consisted of the deployment and initial security operation in Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, and the Haitian countryside. Phase III consisted of securing key Haitian leaders and critical infrastructure, as well as initial screening of FAd’H and HNP. Phase IV expanded the civil-military operations to retrain the FAd’H and HNP while stabilizing the Haitian countryside. Phase V transitioned the mission to United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) forces that would arrive to relieve U.S. personnel. In July 1994, USACOM formed Caribbean Command (CARICOM) at the insistence of several Caribbean nations who wanted to


\(^{61}\) Ibid., 57-58.
contribute forces to operation in Haiti. Although CARICOM was subordinate to USACOM, it served under the tactical control of the 10th Mountain Division, transforming the division headquarters into Combined Joint Task Force 190 (CJTF 190), later designated Multi-National Force-Haiti (MNF-H). 62

The unexpected negotiated settlement between the U.S. envoys and General Cedras caused the nature of the mission to change just before the arrival of U.S. forces. Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton’s responsibilities changed from that of senior tactical commander in Haiti to U.S. representative to the Cedras regime. The forces that executed the forced entry operation returned to their home stations, and CJTF 190 conducted airmobile operations to secure Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. Once on the ground, the commander of CJTF 190, Major General David C. Meade, executed his campaign plan with 2nd Brigade in Cap Haitien, and his remaining forces (1st Brigade, Task Force Mountain, and other TF 190 elements) in Port-au-Prince. The 10th Mountain Division conducted operations in Haiti from September 19, 1994, until relieved in January 1995 by the 25th Infantry Division headquarters. Once the 25th Infantry Division established control of its area of operations, the United Nations Multi-National Force-Haiti (UNMNF-H) assumed command and control of all U.S., CARICOM, and U.N. forces operating in Haiti. 63

During Operations Restore Hope in Somalia and Uphold Democracy in Haiti, corps-level organizations executed military operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Similarly, during Operation Joint Endeavor, the 1st Armored Division (1AD) reorganized as a multi-national division (MND) and named Task Force Eagle operated subordinate to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)—the senior tactical headquarters—in Bosnia. ARRC served under Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH), the joint force commander in charge of the

63 Ibid., 135-136.
Implementation Force (IFOR) mission. Unlike Operation Restore Hope and Operation Uphold Democracy, the CINC for allied operations in the Balkans—who served as both the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) and the commander of the U.S. unified European Command (EUCOM)—utilized both Army and Navy component commands to not only plan but also execute Operation Joint Endeavor. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) formed its subordinate headquarters—V Corps—into USAREUR Forward to plan and supervise the deployment and sustainment of TF Eagle from its garrison locations in Germany to its area of operations in Bosnia. Simultaneously, AFSOUTH—formed around U.S. Navy Europe (USNAVEUR), conducted the operational planning for the actual campaign inside Bosnia, in which the ARRC planned for the tactical employment of the three MNDs that it would control. Thus, while Task Force Eagle consisted of diverse multi-national organizations responsible for unique areas of operation, it merely conducted discrete tactical actions under the direction of the ARRC because USAREUR Forward and V Corps retained responsibility for conducting operational level planning and sustaining the force.64

When the U.S. committed Task Force Falcon to Kosovo in 1999, it operated under the same U.S. and NATO command structures as Task Force Eagle. The NATO Supreme Allied Commander—also the U.S. Commander-in-Chief European Command (CINCEUR)—established an operational level joint task force (JTF Noble Anvil) from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH). To augment JTF Noble Anvil, SACEUR established subordinate component commands. The land component command served as the senior tactical headquarters in Kosovo and exercised operational control over five multi-national brigades (MNB) in five distinct areas of operation. Task Force Falcon served as the Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR), MNB-East, consisting of 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division

64 Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, Walter E. Kretchik, Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 60-61, 67-77, 94.
(2/1 ID) augmented by forces from the Ukraine, Russia, Greece, Poland, and the United Arab Emirates. Again, due to robust operational level support from USAREUR and V Corps, TF Falcon conducted discrete tactical operations under the direction of COMAARC and COMJTF Noble Anvil. Thus, at a time when senior military and civilian leaders sought efficient operations, they saw an example of a tactical unit executing the unified commander’s campaign plan. What they did not understand was that this was only possible in Europe and Korea, where NATO and EUCOM developed the command structure and interoperability processes during the fifty years since the end of WWII.  

**Operation Iraqi Freedom March-April 2003: The Edge of the Doctrinal World**

The combination of inaction and irrelevant action by U.S. forces immediately following the fall of Baghdad in April 2003 demonstrated just how large the gulf between the discourse and the reality of war had become. In order to understand why the most capable, jointly interdependent force ever fielded was unable to consolidate the victory they had just won, it is necessary to investigate the doctrine that guided the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Army published its first version of FM 3-0, *Operations*, in June 2001, acknowledging a spectrum of conflict and requiring Army forces to conduct operations at any point along that spectrum. The manual addressed the levels of war, highlighting the operational level and the tools that Army commanders would use in order to operate successfully in that level: operational art and the elements of operational design.  

---


66 “The operational level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations (AOs). It links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. A campaign is a related series of
The 2001 FM 3-0 acknowledged the reality that Army forces must execute not only offensive and defensive operations, but also stability or support operations, all either simultaneously or sequentially as required by the nature of the conflict. The flaw of this version was its focus on the conduct of major operations. It accepted the logic of the 1993 FM 100-5 that the JFC would plan an overarching campaign, and that subordinate Army commanders would plan simultaneous and/or sequential major operations that comprised phases of the overarching plan. Focusing on planning major operations that were kluged together into the phases of a Joint campaign plan prevented Army leaders from envisioning the full range of possible future conflicts.

The Joint Staff published an updated version of JP 3-0 on 10 September 2001. This version acknowledged that although U.S. forces had conducted primarily military operations other than war (MOOTW) since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, they must retain the ability to conduct large-scale combat operations to achieve national strategic objectives. It reiterated the point of joint campaigns, acknowledged that achieving national objectives would only come through full spectrum dominance, and described campaigns in terms of military actions against a similarly organized conventional military or paramilitary adversary. To emphasize the requirement to conduct major combat operations despite almost a decade of engaging exclusively in MOOTW, the manual used the 1991 Gulf War as its example of the joint campaign. The manual acknowledged that subordinate JFCs and JTF commanders developed supporting military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. . . . Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. . . . It is practiced not only by JFCs, but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. . . . Operational art is translated into operation plans through operational design. . . . Operational commanders identify the time, space, resources, purpose, and action of land operations and relate them to the joint force commander’s (JFC's) operational design. . . . The elements of operational design are tools to aid designing major operations. . . . The elements of operational design are most useful in visualizing major operations. They help clarify and refine the vision of operational-level commanders by providing a framework to describe operations in terms of task and purpose.” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001), 1-14 to 1-16, 2-2 to 2-4, 5-6 to 5-7.
campaigns or operations plans (OPLANs), but specified supporting plans developed by Service commanders focused on discrete operations that formed phases of the theater campaign plan.67

The manual described the facets of operational art and a four-phased joint campaign construct to assist in campaign planning. The joint concept envisioned a campaign that sought to deter aggression through constant military engagement. If deterrence failed, the initial phase of any campaign would focus on defining the crisis. Next, the joint force would seize and retain the initiative in preparations for decisive operations when the JFC would employ military means across the full spectrum of military operations to achieve the strategic objectives. Finally, the joint force would conduct activities to bring the crisis to conclusion and return to home station. This concept resurrected the vision of the 1991 Gulf War, even though it conflicted with the recent experience of operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.68

Both CENTCOM and the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) used this doctrine and their recent experience executing Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in

67 “A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose. Campaigns are joint in nature and serve as the focus for the conduct of war and MOOTW. Campaigns must be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. A wartime campaign is the synchronization and integration of any necessary air, land, sea, space, and special operations — as well as interagency and multinational operations — in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives. . . . A campaign is a series of related major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose. Within a campaign, major operations consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign and usually decide the course of the campaign. Campaigns are joint in nature. They serve as the focus for the conduct of war and MOOTW. A campaign is the synchronization and integration of necessary air, land, sea, space, and special operations — as well as interagency and multinational operations — in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives. . . . Subordinate JFCs may develop subordinate campaign plans or OPLANs that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) theater strategic objectives. Thus, subordinate unified commands typically develop campaign plans to accomplish assigned missions. Also, JTFs can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration. Subordinate campaign plans are consistent with the strategy, guidance, and direction developed by the combatant commander and contribute to achieving combatant command objectives. Supporting plans are prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders to satisfy the requirements of the supported commander’s plan. Supporting plans address discrete operations...” (Emphasis added in original) The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001), vii-viii, xi-xii, II-3, III-4 to III-6.

68 The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (2001), III-10 to III-46.
Afghanistan to plan and execute Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). CENTCOM commander General Franks divided OIF into four phases: Establish international support and prepare for deployment (Phase I), shape the battle space (Phase II), major combat operations (Phase III), and post-conflict operations (Phase IV). Because Joint and Army doctrine stipulated that major operations formed the phases of a joint campaign, both CENTCOM and CFLCC planned highly detailed major operations for Phases I-III. Planning for Phase IV, however, started late with the newly formed Task Force IV (TFIV) that conducted planning independent of both CENTCOM and CFLCC.

At this point, the historical trend of American campaign planning manifested itself. Had the planners followed the 1962 FM 100-5, they would have envisioned a holistic campaign from the outset, with the object of “continuous and comprehensive control over the land, over its resources, and over its people.” Instead, in accordance with the logic of the 2001 versions of FM 3-0 and JP 3-0, both CENTCOM and CFLCC planned for a short major combat operation to destroy the Iraqi military as a prerequisite to ousting the Baathist regime from power. The joint force would then transition the peacekeeping mission to a UN led multinational force. 69

The effect of this thinking revealed itself after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003. Phase III major combat operations concluded on 9 April 2003, however, CFLCC did not publish its Phase IV plan until 12 April 2003. Thus began a period in which Army and Marine units in Iraq operated without both relevant guidance from higher headquarters and realistic doctrine to guide their actions. Although Army leaders acknowledged the need to consolidate the victory they had

just won, the JFC campaign failed to provide the overarching framework from which subordinate units could derive their discrete tactical tasks. Therefore, Army and Marine forces improvised by defaulting to standard tactical tasks, conducting “presence patrols” from 9-16 April 2003; these actions were not relevant to the situation on the ground and failed to prevent the looting of critical infrastructure required to restore stability to Iraq. Prohibited from planning subordinate campaigns relevant to the rapidly changing nature of the operational environment, and lacking guidance from the JFC, Army and Marine units stood by and watched the looting occur.\(^70\)

A massive transition of organizations, key leaders, and responsibilities in May and June 2003 compounded the effects of this doctrinal morass. Wishing to project the image of a short, sharp war that was transitioning to a long duration peacekeeping mission, civil and military leaders adopted an organizational model reminiscent of the Vietnam War. A Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) assumed control of forces and operations in Iraq and reported directly to CENTCOM in the United States. Meanwhile, CENTCOM redeployed to Tampa, and General Franks retired, relieved by General John Abizaid on 16 July 2003. CFLCC—the operational level headquarters for OIF—redeployed to Kuwait and Atlanta in June 2003 to resume their theater wide support function as the Army Service Component Command. Lieutenant General William Wallace, V Corps commander and the senior Army tactical commander in Iraq, changed command with Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez on 14 June 2003. On 15 June 2003, V Corps transitioned to Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7), responsible for the direction of

\(^{70}\) “Right after we got into Baghdad, there was a huge window of opportunity that if we had this well-defined plan and we were ready to come in with all these resources, we could have really grabbed a hold of the city and started pushing things forward. By the time we got a plan together to resource everything, the insurgents had closed that window of opportunity quickly. What we started doing in September [2003] was probably a good idea to have done in April 2003.” Donald P. Wright, Timothy R. Reese, \textit{On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003-January 2005} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 89-92, 140-141, 148-149; Anthony Cordesman, \textit{The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons} (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 144-146; John Keegan, \textit{The Iraq War} (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 202-210; Williamson Murray, Robert H. Scales Jr., \textit{The Iraq War: A Military History} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 230-233.
tactical, operational, and strategic operations in Iraq. Additionally, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer III replaced the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) headed by the retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner.  

In this environment of strategic and operational uncertainty, Army formations conducted combat and stability operations against the coalescing elements of the Iraqi insurgency. U.S. forces conducted localized operations, but the small number of troops in Iraq left vast areas unsecure. Insurgents subsequently used these areas as safe havens for planning, training, and preparation. Notable exceptions to this tactical focus were the “nation-building” operations of the 101st Airborne Division in northern Iraq and the operations of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) in the Sadr City area of Baghdad. Both units stressed the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment, re-establishing the rule of law under Iraqi police and judges, empowering local governance, facilitating the restoration of essential services, supporting humanitarian assistance to the population, and promoting the development of local economic prosperity. These actions were well outside of their traditional responsibilities, yet were ultimately required to achieve the nation’s objectives in Iraq.

From July to December 2003, CJTF-7 created its campaign plan, eventually publishing it in January 2004. The plan consisted of five Logical Lines of Operations (LLOs) arranged in four sequential phases that combated insurgents, established security, and began to foster political and economic stability. During the fall of 2003, both the 4th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Divisions developed campaign plans refined to the specifics of their areas of operation. Contrary to joint doctrine, CJTF-7 encouraged these division-level campaign plans as a means to establish unity of

---

71 Wright, Reese, 25-33, 144-149, 157-161; LTG Steven Whitcomb, interviewed by Jim Bird, June 7, 2006, transcript Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

72 Wright, Reese, 116-117.
effort across Iraq while empowering the divisions to execute de-centralized operations with the
CJTF-7 commander’s broad intent.73

**Operation Iraqi Freedom 2004-2006: A Period of Confusion and
Improvisation**

Transitions continued in OIF after January 2004. The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division replaced the 1<sup>st</sup>
Armored Division and 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR in Baghdad. The 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division replaced the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry
Division in the center of Iraq. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) replaced the 82<sup>nd</sup>
Airborne Division and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Cavalry Regiment (3<sup>rd</sup> ACR) in western Iraq. Task Force
Olympia replaced the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division in northern Iraq. Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)
replaced CJTF-7 and became the tactical and operational headquarters in Iraq. Finally, on 1 July
2004, Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) activated as a CENTCOM sub-unified command and
assumed control of strategic actions in Iraq, providing operational guidance to MNC-I. During
2003, these forces observed operations in theater, coordinated with the units they were to relieve,
and planned their own campaign plans. The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, for example, developed a
campaign plan based on six logical lines of operation (LLOs): conduct combat operations, train
and employ Iraqi security forces, restore essential services, promote governance, develop
economic pluralism, and conduct full spectrum information operations. Furthermore, the brigades
of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division utilized this campaign plan to create their own “campaign designs”
covering their own AOs.74

These new units prepared campaign plans to enable a combination of mid-to-low
intensity combat operations against former regime remnants and simultaneous stability operations

---

73 “As MG Miller, the CJTF-7 chief of operations (CJ3) noted: The campaign plan provided what I
would call a very broad framework [lines of operation] and little specific direction—or specific when
warranted. It was descriptive not prescriptive—and rightfully, so.” Wright, Reese, 118-123, 161-165.

74 Wright, Reese, 123-124, 172-174.
to assist the general Iraqi public and the Interim Iraqi Government. However, April 2004 marked
the beginning of an uncoordinated general uprising by Sunni Arab insurgents in the western and
central parts of Iraq and by Shia militias in southern Iraq and Baghdad. Thus, the carefully crafted
campaign plans of the new units became largely irrelevant as Soldiers fought mid-to-high
intensity combat across the country from April to November 2004. Compounding this unexpected
change in mission and intensity was the fact that the nature of the insurgency varied across the
country according to the motives and composition of the insurgents and the nature of the
environment. Divisions and brigades that planned campaigns in 2003 based on CJTF-7 guidance
reevaluated their situations in contact, often with little relevant guidance from their higher
headquarters. This drove brigades and divisions to create “design concepts” that took the general
guidance from the CJTF-7/ MNF-I campaign plan and refined it to meet the specifics of their
operating environment.75

New Doctrine Arrives, Field Commanders Adapt and Win in Iraq

Throughout 2004 and 2005, division and BCT commanders adapted the MNF-I campaign
plan to the specifics of their AOs and produced corresponding “campaign designs” or “campaign
constructs.” Two problems still impeded these commanders from planning campaigns that
employed civil and military means in ways that achieved operational and strategic objectives.
First, they lacked relevant doctrine to guide their tactically focused and relatively junior staffs.
Second, without a relevant doctrinal guide, senior commanders had only the force of their
personalities to enforce compliance with the MNF-I campaign plan. While some subordinate
commanders made the transition from conducting lethal tactical operations against insurgent

75 Ibid., 38-41, 173-174, 322-357; COL Robert Abrams, interviewed by Jim Tenpenny, November
15, 2005, transcript Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth,
KS.; COL Michael Formica, interviewed by Matt Mathews, April 21, 2006, transcript Contemporary
Operations Studies Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS; COL Mike Murray,
interviewed by Dan Van Wey, December 8, 2005, transcript Contemporary Operations Studies Team,
Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
forces to conducting simultaneous combat and stability operations, others did not. The net effect was diffusion of unity of effort, which senior leaders only counteracted by sheer force of will. To execute effectively the decentralized operations that OIF demanded, commanders in the field needed both the Joint Staff and the Army to produce relevant doctrine to guide the planning of BCT and division staffs as they adapted the strategic MNF-I campaign plan to the specifics of their AOs.76

**Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, December 2006**

Responding to this demand, in December 2006 the Joint Staff J7 published the newest version of JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*. This version superseded both the 1995 JP 5-0 and the 2002 JP 5-00.1, *Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning*, providing definitive guidance for planning joint operations and campaigns. Chapter three described the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP), while chapter four discussed Operational Art and Design. The manual utilized a fictitious scenario based off the 1991 Gulf War to highlight both JOPP and the elements of operational design. However, this example lacked relevance to ongoing operations because it reflected a conventional response to a regional threat’s invasion of a weaker neighbor. Although the chapter provided a detailed explanation of the joint six-phase campaign construct and described the use of both physical and logical lines of operation, the example ended with a massive U.S. conventional intervention on the behalf of the invaded nation. It made no mention of the stability operations that would follow major combat operations to enable civil authorities to resume pre-conflict governance.77

---

76 COL Joseph DiSalvo, interviewed by Jim McCool, March 27, 2006, transcript Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War on Terrorism, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS; COL Sean MacFarland, interviewed by Steven Clay, January 11, 2008, transcript Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

In February 2006, Lieutenant General David Petraeus convened over 100 experts on irregular warfare at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Petraeus formed this group to update the Army’s counterinsurgency (COIN) manual and provide commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan current, relevant doctrine adapted from prior British, French, Australian, and American COIN experience. The resulting manual, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, provided commanders of corps, divisions, and BCTs timely, relevant doctrine that they adapted to the specifics of their operational environment.\(^{78}\)

FM 3-24 specifically addressed the issue of Army forces designing, planning, and executing campaigns—albeit counterinsurgency campaigns. Chapter four introduced the concept of “local relevance,” that the specifics of the local environment and the nature of the local threat became the primary determinant that counterinsurgent leaders used to select appropriate actions. It stated that insurgents and the populations within which they hid vary dramatically across the breadth of the theater of operations. Therefore, no single strategy applied universally to all populations. Rather, local commanders had to translate the strategies of higher headquarters into a sequence of tactical, administrative, and logistical actions that employed both civil and military means in a way that was relevant to their specific context to achieve strategic and operational objectives.\(^{79}\)

In chapter five, the new manual introduced the “clear-hold-build” operational approach, and described five counterinsurgency LLOs. These LLOs covered the range of activities expected in a COIN campaign: (1) conduct combat/civil security operations; (2) train and employ host nation security forces; (3) establish or restore essential services; (4) support development of better


\(^{79}\) U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 4-1 to 4-9.
governance; and (5) support economic development. They created a framework to guide tactical leaders in developing locally relevant COIN campaigns that achieved strategic objectives through decentralized execution. FM 3-24 recognized the reality of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; and as the case study will demonstrate, BCT commanders in the spring and summer of 2007 utilized it to frame their thinking in preparation for their upcoming deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.80

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, February 2008

In 2008, the Joint Staff published a new version of JP 3-0 that superseded the 2001 JP 3-0 and the 1995 JP 3-07, Military Operations Other Than War. The new version recognized the reality of full spectrum operations and campaigns that incorporated offensive, defensive, and stability planning from the outset. Additionally, it presented an expanded chapter on operational art along with the operational design elements that built on the concept presented in the 2006 FM 5-0. The new JP 3-0 acknowledged that battlefield success alone was not sufficient to achieve national objectives, and worked to reconcile the gap between major combat operations like the 1991 Gulf War with the small scale contingencies and MOOTW that U.S. forces conducted from 1992 until Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001. Still, the retention of the 1991 Gulf War as the example of a joint campaign—rather than a more relevant example like OEF or OIF—signaled the desire of the Joint community to continue to apply overwhelming American technological advantages in a war of maneuver against a conventional threat in open terrain. The Joint staff could have incorporated many examples from recent operations including Restore Hope in Somalia, Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and Allied Force in Kosovo, yet it chose to highlight the incomplete example of Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm.81

---

80 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (2006), 5-1 to 5-23.
81 "To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign successfully, JFCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations with offensive and defensive operations within each major operation or campaign phase. Planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation planning is initiated. . . . Operational art is the application of creative imagination by"
The Army published a new version of FM 3-0, *Operations*, in February 2008 based on lessons learned in OEF and OIF. The Army faced growing internal and external criticism over the lack of action by U.S. forces immediately after the fall of Baghdad and the seemingly counterproductive tactical actions from April 2003 to April 2004. The ongoing conflict in both Iraq and Afghanistan pointed to a fundamental flaw in Army capstone doctrine. Although Army forces excelled conducting intense, high tempo offensive and defensive operations, they failed to transition effectively from major combat to COIN and stability operations. The Army realized its forces must defeat enemy combatants in Phases I-III (as they had in the 1991 Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom), then rapidly transition to operations focused on control of occupied territories and populations during Phase IV, then support the establishment of effective local governance in Phase V, before redeploying home. The reconciliation of Major Combat Operations (MCO) and MOOTW that began with the introduction of full spectrum operations in the 2001 FM 3-0 had reached a new level of importance.82

Full Spectrum Operations became the operational concept for the Army, and with it came an implied requirement for Army leaders to plan and conduct subordinate campaigns that supported the JFC’s overarching campaign. Army leaders recognized that future conflict would rapidly transition from centrally planned and directed high tempo offensive wars of movement

---

82 “Battlefield success is no longer enough; final victory requires concurrent stability operations to lay the foundation for lasting peace. . . . Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book; it describes the Army’s operational concept—full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results through combinations of four elements: offense, defense, stability or civil support operations.” U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), i, v; Ricks, *Fiasco*, 135-138.
against a homogeneous conventional opponent to a series of dissimilar stability operations in fixed areas of operation against a constellation of threats and a host of distinct populations. This realization compelled them to place all of the tools of Joint campaign planning at the disposal of their leaders.83

This brought Army doctrine to a critical junction: how to acknowledge the reality of distinct yet complimentary counterinsurgent and stability campaigns while maintaining conformity with Joint doctrine that allowed for only a single campaign plan. The Army chose to avoid a direct confrontation with Joint Forces Command over this doctrinal issue. Instead, the new doctrine provided an indirect solution in chapter six, Operational Art, by promulgating a rather flexible definition of the operational level of war and by restructuring the elements of operational design to align closely—but not exactly—with the joint elements of operational design. The Army tacitly acknowledged that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan diverged from the Joint concept of campaigning, and provided “maneuver space” to commanders in the field by providing a vague definition the operational level of war. However, it failed to confront the central issue: joint doctrine’s insistence on a single JFC-planned campaign that served as the sole source of operational-level guidance for tactical commanders across the full spectrum of conflict. Thus, despite all the advances the 2008 version of FM 3-0 made in restoring the concept of campaigning to the minds of Army commanders, it failed to reconcile the doctrinal discourse on war to the six years of experience gained by commanders observing and adapting to the realities of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.84


84 “Operational Art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize an employ military forces. (Emphasis added) Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. It is applied only at the operational level. . . . The operational level links employing tactical forces to achieve strategic end states. At the operational level, commanders conduct campaigns and major operations to establish conditions that define the end state. A campaign is a
Following the publication of the 2008 version of FM 3-0, the Army published FM 3-07, Stability Operations, to provide additional relevant doctrine to field commanders who faced challenges that exceeded the scope of counterinsurgency operations. Like FM 3-24, FM 3-07 acknowledged that effective stability operations required tailoring to the specifics of the local operational environment. As such, FM 3-07 reiterated the local commander’s responsibility to plan and execute stability operations meant to address the specific challenges of the culture, society, system of government, and the key personalities in his area of responsibility. Moreover, chapter four provided a framework modified from the elements of operational design in chapter six of the 2008 FM 3-0 to guide commanders employing military and civil means in ways that achieved strategic or operational ends.

The message of FM 3-0, FM 3-07, and FM 3-24, although unstated, is clear: BCT, division, and corps commanders must plan for the employment of military and civil means in ways that are relevant to the specifics of their operational environments to create the conditions that achieve operational and strategic ends. Because fielded forces do not possess the means required to achieve the strategic ends during full spectrum operations in one major operation, they

---

85 “The elements of operational design are essential to identifying tasks and objectives that tie tactical missions to achieving the desired end state. . . . Planning for stability [operations] draws on all elements of operational design. However, certain elements are more relevant that others are, and some in particular are essential to successful stability operations. (See FM 3-0 for a detailed discussion of the operational art.)” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 4-1 to 4-14.
must plan sequential and simultaneous operations connected by purpose to achieve the strategic ends in a given time span and space. Both JP 5-0 and FM 3-0 call these actions campaign planning. The U.S. Army still supports the joint position that only the JFC prepares a campaign plan. However, commanders of Army corps, divisions, and BCTs employ the doctrinal tools in FM 3-0, FM 3-24, and FM 3-07 with increasing frequency to construct campaign plans unique to their areas of operation. While subordinate commanders often refer to their nested campaign plan as a “campaign design” to avoid explicitly violating joint doctrine, they are clearly adapting an increasingly irrelevant joint doctrinal concept to the reality of current conflicts. They persist in this adaptation in an effort to link their tactical actions to those of their adjacent and higher headquarters, while providing relevant operational-level context to their actions and synchronize them with the overall strategic aim. The following case study provides one example of this increasingly frequent process of adaptation.86

2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (2/101 AASLT) conducts BCT level campaign planning in OIF 07-09

Operations in Iraq from late 2006 to early 2008—including the increase in troop strength and refocus of effort articulated in the 2007 MNF-I Campaign Plan, often referred to as the Surge—demonstrated the viability of the new COIN doctrine presented in FM 3-24. Combined with the new versions of FM 3-0 and FM 3-07, BCT and division commanders finally possessed doctrine that guided their intuitive conceptual processes and supplemented the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). In 2007, Colonel William B. Hickman, commander of the 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (2/101 AASLT,) employed this doctrine to plan and

86 “A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Planning for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated simultaneous or sequential military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.” U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations (2008), 6-3.
execute a full spectrum campaign tailored to the specifics of his operational environment to achieve the strategic and operational objectives of the MNF-I campaign plan.87

Colonel Hickman’s previous experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom included service from 2003-2004 as commander of the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment (1-502 IN), 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) (2/101 AASLT), followed by staff experience as the division operations officer (G3). This gave COL Hickman experience conducting full spectrum operations in Iraq during the early stages of OIF, without the benefit of an overarching JFC campaign plan. In his area of operations, Colonel Hickman employed his troops to establish a secure environment and mentor fledgling Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) units and local Iraqi police. The battalion conducted what would be known as security force assistance training (SECFOR-A) at the station, platoon, and company level to empower the newly re-established Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to resume civil security and control in Ninewa province. Additionally, under General Petraeus’ direction, the battalion assisted local Iraqi leaders in resuming governance of the province, restoring essential services, improving economic development, and establishing a stable environment. 88

From 2005 to 2006, Colonel Hickman gained additional experience in Iraq while serving as the joint current operations officer (J3) of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). MNSTC-I’s responsibilities included training, equipping, and deploying both Iraqi Army and police forces. During his time at MNSTC-I, Colonel Hickman became intimately


88 COL William B. Hickman, interviewed by John McCool, September 22, 2006, transcript Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War on Terrorism, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
knowledgeable of MNF-I’s strategy to place ISF “in the lead,” giving Iraqi forces the responsibility of securing Iraq so U.S. personnel could withdraw.\(^{89}\)

In the spring of 2007, COL Hickman prepared his BCT for its upcoming deployment to replace 2\(^{nd}\) Brigade, 1\(^{st}\) Infantry Division (2/1ID) in Northwest Baghdad in support of OIF 07-09. In the same way previous BCT commanders tailored the broad guidance from the MNF-I campaign plan to their specific geographic area, Colonel Hickman developed a campaign plan based on four lines of operation: security, economy, governance, and services. However, 2/101 AASLT differed from previous BCTs in two major regards.\(^{90}\)

First, OIF 07-09 was the first rotation in which embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs)—which started operating in Iraq in mid-2006—were integrated into the staffs of new units prior to arrival in theater. During the previous OIF 06-08 rotation, the ePRTs deployed to Iraq and began integrating with military forces that were already half-way through their deployments. While the military commanders recognized the capabilities of the ePRTs, they did not fully utilize them due to the routine changeover of military forces in mid-2007. The capability provided by his ePRT empowered Colonel Hickman to plan a campaign that employed a “whole of government approach” to the full spectrum of offensive, counterinsurgent, and stability operations that he determined his BCT must accomplish in his area of operations to achieve the operational and strategic objectives of the MNF-I campaign plan. Past BCTs employed military means along the economic, governance, and services LLOs with limited success. Colonel Hickman integrated the ePRT into the BCT staff, leveraging the expertise of individuals assigned to the ePRT from the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Justice. Additionally, the ePRT provided Colonel Hickman direct access to

\(^{89}\) COL William B. Hickman, interviewed by John McCool, September 22, 2006, transcript Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War on Terrorism, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

other personnel from the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and the Corps of Engineers assigned to the United States Embassy, Iraq (USAEMB-Iraq). This integration at the BCT level facilitated unity of effort between complimentary campaign plans of both the USAEMB-Iraq and MNF-I.  

Second, with the assistance of FM 3-24, Colonel Hickman was able to develop a “campaign design” nested in purpose to MNF-I’s campaign plan, yet tailored to the specifics of his area of operations, prior to deployment to Iraq. Where previous BCT commanders improvised in response to the reality of the conflict once they arrived in their area of operations, Colonel Hickman utilized newly published doctrine to determine his overarching campaign plan before deployment, and prepared his BCT for operations accordingly. Once in theater, Colonel Hickman, his subordinate commanders, and staff constantly assessed the effectiveness of his brigade’s operations to confirm or deny the relevance and validity of his campaign design, adjusting it as required by the changing situation on the ground.

The experience of 2/101 AASLT during OIF 07-09 completes the transformation of BCT-level campaign planning during stability operations. BCT campaign planning went from inaction or inappropriate action in the spring and summer of 2003, to rudimentary campaign plans during the remainder of 2003, through fragmented improvisation in 2004-2006, and finally to locally specific, nested campaigns from 2007 onward. Although divisions and brigades planned nested campaigns starting in 2003, their efforts were doctrinally unsupported improvisations initiated in response to the changing nature of the conflict. Colonel Hickman demonstrated that a BCT—supported by relevant doctrine—could plan a supporting campaign nested in purpose to the JFC’s overarching campaign to achieve successfully operational and strategic objectives. As commendable as Colonel Hickman’s achievements were, however, the Army did not captured

---

92 Ibid., 6-16.
them in doctrine, and they have not influenced the insistence in joint doctrine that only the JFC prepares a campaign plan.93

Conclusions and Recommendations

Joint and Army campaign planning doctrine does not meet the realities of combat in current conflicts because it is still written to address high intensity combat operations against a homogeneous conventional or irregular threat. In that part of the spectrum of conflict, the scarcity of air and maritime assets compels centralized planning to ensure the optimized employment of these forces. However, the situation changes radically when U.S. forces engage in counterinsurgency and stability operations against a wide variety of actors and threats. In this part of the spectrum of conflict, decentralized execution based on the specifics of the operational environment, linked by purpose from the BCT through the division and corps to the JFC, supersedes efficient employment of scarce resources that a centrally planned joint campaign directs.

The current doctrinal constraint that only a JFC can envision and plan a single joint campaign that is relevant across an entire theater of operations does not match the experiences of Army officers engaged in current operations. The concept of full spectrum operations acknowledges that at any given time, Army forces will conduct offensive and defensive operations against a constellation of adversaries as well as conduct stability operations to control locally concentrated heterogeneous populations, who vary according to the historical development of their cultures and societies. Furthermore, though all Army forces conduct all three types of operations, the focus of military operations varies across the spectrum of conflict, the specifics of the operational environment, and the concept of the operation and campaign. Full spectrum operations provides a framework that explains why one multi-national division in Iraq might be engaged in offensive operations to clear enemy combatants from a stronghold at the

same time that another multi-national division focuses on assisting host nation security forces to restore civil security and essential services. Full spectrum operations equally applies to the actions of BCTs, explaining why one battalion operating in a Sunni enclave of Baghdad conducts offensive operations to clear the area of insurgents while another battalion operating in a Shia neighborhood a few blocks away is assists local and provincial governments increase medical capacity in area hospitals.  

It is illogical to believe that a single overarching joint campaign plan could envision all these variations and derive relevant tactical tasks across an entire theater of operations with units engaged in full spectrum operations. Throughout most of the twentieth century, doctrine allowed for tailoring of the theater campaign plan by subordinate land headquarters. Ironically, the nature of warfare during this period rarely required units to create unique campaign plans because the densely concentrated allied armies in conventional conflicts like WWII generally fought a homogeneous, conventional enemy force and rarely engaged in irregular combat or conducted stability operations. Equally ironic is the fact that now that U.S. forces primarily engage with irregular enemies and civilian populations, joint campaign planning doctrine does not allow for creation of nested subordinate campaign plans. The newly published Army Capstone Concept (ACC) touts operational adaptability—the quality that army leaders and forces exhibit based on critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and decentralization, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and the ability to make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation—as the key to success in the future operating environment. However, the latest versions of both FM 3-0 and FM 5-0 still restrict subordinate commanders from creating campaigns adapted to the operational specifics of their environment.  

---

95 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept “Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity
The change of focus that accompanied the 1993 publication of both FM 100-5 and JP 3-0 from “campaigning” to “conducting operations” profoundly affected military leaders’ ability to conceptualize employing military means in ways that achieve strategic ends. The notion of “conducting operations” implies discreteness—the ability to bound a problem within the confines of a definitive starting and ending point—that is usually not resident in the complex situations to which the United States applies its military forces. Compounding this change of focus, the U.S. typically commits large-scale military forces in response to an unfolding crisis; therefore, time is usually limited, forcing planners to focus the majority of their efforts on the immediate phases of “the operation” instead of envisioning the campaign as a whole. The result of this focus on “conducting operations” is that commanders on the ground typically default to planning discrete tactical actions that may or may not achieve the nation’s objectives.96

Joint and service doctrine holds that only the JFC plans a holistic campaign, and that overarching joint campaign plan serves as the basis for the development of specific orders to conduct major operations. Thus, commanders on the ground have their hands tied by a single joint campaign plan that is supposed to serve as their sole source of guidance regarding the linkage of tactical actions to achieve strategic objectives. Instead, doctrine should recognize the value of local commanders making their own assessments of what they must accomplish in their areas of operations to create the conditions for the achievement of strategic objectives. Subordinate commanders should determine for themselves where they are along the spectrum of conflict and what actions are appropriate within their operational environment to support the achievement of strategic objectives. If one subordinate commander should take a different

96 Baumann, Yates, 36, 40-41, 205-207.
operational approach from another in achieving those objectives, this merely reflects reality on the ground. So long as subordinate commanders nest their campaign plans to their adjacent and higher headquarters and through them to the JFC’s overarching campaign plan, the particulars of a given commander’s tactical actions should be adapted to the specific context of the local situation.

America has shown a desire to maintain as small a standing military as possible. In line with this desire, the Army is drafting a new operations concept reminiscent of the 1982 FM 100-5 that stipulates the corps will once again be the largest Army formation OPCON to a GCC. Accordingly, there is little chance that in the current strategic environment U.S. forces will be able to generate the troop density required for the army to reactivate the traditional echelon that planned land campaigns—the army. Thus, the Army Service Component Command will likely retain its current mission of providing administrative and logistical support to operational forces and the corps will conduct military operations to achieve the objectives of the GCC. Furthermore, the new operations concept stipulates that the corps will be the largest formation assigned to a GCC to conduct military operations. Past experiences in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan have demonstrated that units as small as a BCT can form the nucleus of a joint task force and operate directly for the GCC. The utilization of corps, division, and brigade level headquarters by the GCC as operational level headquarters places tactically minded leaders in positions for which they are unprepared and can find little guidance in current doctrine.97

Historically, when placed in situations unsupported by current doctrine, commanders improvised solutions that allowed them to meet the realities of the war they faced. Although current joint doctrine precludes campaign planning below the JFC level, FM 3-0, FM 3-07, and FM 3-24 provide the tools, that a BCT, division, or corps commander needs to plan a campaign,

even if joint doctrine does not yet endorse that capability. The resulting campaign plan can logistically arrange both military and civil means in tactical, logistic, and administrative ways that achieve strategic ends. Despite the doctrinal prohibition on subordinate campaign plans, commanders in the field are planning multiple operations over extended durations, applying all the elements of national power against the situations that they face in order to achieve victory. The fact that they call these plans “campaign designs” or “campaign constructs” should not obscure the true nature of the situation: commanders down to the BCT level must conduct nested campaign planning in order to achieve victory in the full spectrum operations in which the U.S. currently finds itself engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.98

From these conclusions, this paper makes the following recommendations. First, adapt Army doctrine to the reality of the wars the U.S. is currently fighting, instead of clinging to the perfected reality of the 1991 Gulf War. If commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan down to BCT level are achieving the nation’s strategic objectives by planning supporting campaigns that are nested with the JFC’s campaign plan, then—just as the War Department did in 1941, 1942, and 1944 and the Department of the Army did in 1954—the Army should adapt current doctrine to meet this reality. Eight years in Afghanistan and seven years in Iraq have shown that the current doctrinal construct of BCTs, divisions, and corps executing tactical actions within the parameters of the JFC’s campaign plan does not achieve the nation’s strategic objectives. However, BCTs, divisions, and corps that plan and execute campaigns based on a nested purpose that are specifically adapted to their operational environments are able to achieve a unity of effort with other military forces, governmental agencies, and non-governmental organizations that does achieve national strategic objectives.

98 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations (2008), 6-6 to 6-19; U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, Stability Operations (2008), 4-1 to 4-14; U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (2006) 4-1 to 4-11.
Second, extend the doctrinal tools already present in joint and service doctrine to the commanders in the field that need it. Instead of creating “niche” doctrine that covers a particular set of circumstances, incorporate the concept of nested campaign planning into the Army’s capstone doctrine: FM 3-0, chapter six, and FM 5-0, chapter two. As General Franks proved in 1993, the Army can exert a powerful influence on the development of joint doctrine. Now is the time for the Army to capture in its capstone doctrine the successful adaptations of commanders in the field and to force the joint community to re-visit the notion of the JFC-only campaign plan. The Marine Corps has long since published its own series of doctrinal manuals concerning campaigning; were the Army to do so as well the Joint Staff would be forced to acknowledge that the relevancy of the current campaign planning construct is waning. 99

Third, restructure the professional military education system at the Staff College level to adjust field grade officer thinking away from “conducting operations” back to “campaigning.” The Army has great experience conducting small unit campaigns; with the modularization of Army forces, commanders down to BCT level will have the authority and capability to apply all the elements of national power to solve existing and emergent crises to achieve national objectives. However, if the Army continues to support the view that only the JFC can plan a relevant, overarching campaign, it will waste lives, material resources, time, and the prestige of the United States, while commanders in the field improvise solutions by working around the constraints that exist in current joint doctrine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Articles


Books


**Government Publications**


**Monographs, Papers, Reports, and Theses**


Pearl, Brian. *Interview with Major Brian Pearl*. Operational Leadership Experiences Collection. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005.


