Drawdown and Reset of Equipment in Iraq - Operation Clean Sweep
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ESC    Sustainment Command (Expeditionary)
FRAGO  Fragmentary Order
FOB    Forward Operating Base
MNC-I  Multi-National Corps–Iraq
MRT    Mobile Redistribution Team
TEU    Twenty Foot Equivalent Units
USF-I  U. S. Forces–Iraq
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES–IRAQ  
COMMANDER, 13th SUSTAINMENT COMMAND  
(EXPEDITIONARY)

SUBJECT: Drawdown and Reset of Equipment in Iraq–Operation Clean Sweep (Report No. D2010-060)

We are providing this report for your information and use. We performed this audit in response to a U.S. Central Command request. We considered management comments on a draft of this report in preparing the final report.

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command endorsed and forwarded comments from the U.S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate. Management comments conformed to the requirements of DOD Directive 7650.3; therefore, additional comments are not required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to Carol N. Gorman at (703) 604-9179 (DSN 312-664-9179).

Daniel R. Blair, CPA  
Principle Assistant Inspector General  
for Auditing
Results in Brief: Drawdown and Reset of Equipment in Iraq—Operation Clean Sweep

What We Did

We evaluated DOD’s plans for Operation Clean Sweep to determine whether roles, responsibilities, and lines of reporting were well defined and documented; the plans comprehensively addressed equipment accountability, visibility, and disposition; and whether realistic milestones were established. We also determined whether Operation Clean Sweep was effectively implemented in accordance with those plans.

What We Found


According to documents provided by the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) (ESC), the Mobile Redistribution Teams (MRT) processed and re-established accountability for about $768 million of excess equipment from October 2009 to April 10, 2010. We commend the 13th ESC and the MRTs for those results.

However, not all units supported the MRT mission, limiting the effectiveness of Operation Clean Sweep. During our site visits to four Forward Operating Bases, we identified units that denied the MRTs access to their excess equipment, did not comply with FRAGO requirements to sort their excess equipment before the MRT’s arrival, and did not provide adequate logistical support to the MRTs. This occurred because FRAGO 1022 did not require mandatory participation in Operation Clean Sweep and the MRT’s mission and goals were not communicated to all units and commanders.

During our audit, U.S. Forces–Iraq and 13th ESC issued two FRAGOs which addressed our communication concerns; however, neither required mandatory participation in Operation Clean Sweep.

Mandatory participation is key to Operation Clean Sweep effectiveness. When units pack and ship excess equipment without MRT assistance, the risk of injury to personnel at the receiving activity is increased and the accountability and visibility of the equipment is delayed. We identified containers at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, that were not packed and shipped by the MRTs, which were poorly packed and contained items such as weapons and hazardous material. In addition, those items were not brought to record until reaching Camp Arifjan, delaying the accountability and visibility of equipment that might be needed elsewhere, including Afghanistan.

What We Recommend

We recommend the Commander, U.S. Forces–Iraq, revise and reissue FRAGO 0436 to require mandatory participation in Operation Clean Sweep.

We recommend that the Director, U.S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate issue FRAGOs directing participation in Operation Clean Sweep to those units not participating.

We recommend the Commander, 13th ESC, revise and reissue FRAGO 0094 to remove the option to decline participation in Operation Clean Sweep and to also report unit participation data to the Director, U.S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command, endorsed and forwarded comments from the U.S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate. The comments were responsive to the recommendations. Please see the recommendations table on the back of this page.
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Introduction

Objectives

Our overall audit objective was to evaluate DOD’s plans for the drawdown and reset\(^1\) of equipment in Iraq. Specifically, our objective was to determine whether:

- roles, responsibilities, and lines of reporting were well defined and documented;
- plans comprehensively addressed issues including equipment accountability, visibility, and disposition; and
- the plans established realistic milestones for the initiation and completion of drawdown activities.

On November 2, 2009, we re-announced the audit to add an objective to review the implementation of the drawdown plans.

This report is one in a series of reports concerning the plans for the drawdown and reset of equipment in Iraq. This report focuses on Operation Clean Sweep and the role of the Mobile Redistribution Teams (MRT) in that operation. Future reports will focus on the roles of the Supply Support Activities and the Defense Reutilization Marketing Offices.

Background

We performed this audit in response to a request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to focus oversight on asset accountability to ensure U.S.-funded assets are properly accounted for and that there is a process for the proper transfer, reset, or disposal of assets in conjunction with the responsible drawdown of U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq.

According to the Security Agreement between the governments of the United States and Iraq, all U.S. Forces will withdraw from Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011. By the end of August 2010, 65,000 U.S. combat forces will have withdrawn from Iraq, reducing U.S. troop levels to about 50,000. In addition to the drawdown of personnel, DOD must also determine the disposition of its equipment, which can include equipment as small as ammunition to as large as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. According to U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I),\(^2\) there were about 3.4 million pieces of military equipment in Iraq in May 2009. The amount of military equipment was reduced to about 3 million items by January 2010, and is expected to be reduced to 1 million items by

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\(^{1}\) Reset represents a series of actions taken to restore units to a level of combat capability. It encompasses replacing equipment, restoring equipment’s useful life, and correcting equipment faults at and above the field level.

\(^{2}\) On January 1, 2010, Multi-National Force–Iraq; Multi-National Corps–Iraq; and Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, combined into USF-I. Throughout this report, we will attribute actions to the performing organization.
September 2010. In an effort to identify and re-establish accountability of excess equipment in anticipation of the drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq, Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) initiated Operation Clean Sweep in October 2009.

**Operation Clean Sweep**

MNC-I Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1022, “Operation Clean Sweep,” October 26, 2009, established a process for expediting the identification, accountability, and turn-in of excess U.S. equipment in support of the Iraq drawdown. The FRAGO states that “Operation Clean Sweep” will increase the ability for U.S. military units to:

- identify excess equipment and supplies,
- clear waste in the battle space, and
- reduce the U.S. operational footprint as early as possible.

The 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) (ESC) is the executive agent of Operation Clean Sweep. The 13th ESC has command and control of all logistic operations in the Iraqi theater and its focus is to coordinate, synchronize, and execute the drawdown.

**Mobile Redistribution Teams**

FRAGO 1022 requires the 13th ESC to establish MRTs to assist units with the identification, classification, and disposition of excess equipment. The MRTs are comprised of personnel with backgrounds in supply, maintenance, automated logistics, armament repair, ammunition handling, and transportation, and have the technical knowledge to handle equipment such as weapons and ammunition. MRT personnel attend training to learn how to identify serviceable and unusable equipment and the procedures necessary to process that equipment for reuse or disposal. Once on a Forward Operating Base (FOB), the MRTs have three objectives:

- account for all containers on a FOB by executing a 100 percent count of the containers,
- provide assistance to identify, sort, process and turn-in excess equipment at each units’ location, and
- recover and ship 463L pallets to the nearest aerial ports of embarkation.

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3 A FOB is a U.S. military installation that serves mainly as a staging area for tactical operations. A FOB may support a battalion, multiple brigades, and smaller elements. Other types of U.S. military installations in Iraq include Contingency Operating Bases, Contingency Operating Sites, and Contingency Operating Locations. For the purpose of this report, we will use FOB to refer to all these types of installations.

4 A container is a portable, reusable metal box, commonly twenty foot in length, designed and used for transporting equipment on land and sea. These containers are also used by the military for storage within the Iraq Theater of operations.

5 Pallets designed to interface with the cargo restraint systems of military aircraft and also used for moving material via surface transportation.
Excess Equipment

The equipment processed during Operation Clean Sweep is non-mission essential excess equipment that is not accounted for on unit⁶ or theater property books. This excess equipment includes serviceable and unserviceable equipment. Serviceable equipment is in a “like new” condition and can be immediately returned to the supply system for use by other U.S. Forces. Unserviceable equipment is either repairable and can be shipped to a depot for maintenance, cannot be repaired, or is no longer authorized for use and must be disposed of. In Iraq, serviceable and unserviceable equipment is processed as described in Table 1.

Table 1. Excess Equipment Processing

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<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Equipment Condition</th>
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<tr>
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<td>• Serviceable</td>
<td>Shipped to Local Supply Support Activities in the Iraqi Theater</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Unserviceable repairable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Serviceability unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment with or without National Stock Numbers</td>
<td>• Unserviceable non-repairable</td>
<td>Shipped to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office or to local landfill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Unserviceable no longer authorized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment without National Stock Numbers</td>
<td>• Serviceable</td>
<td>Shipped to the Theater Redistribution Center, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Unserviceable repairable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Serviceability unknown</td>
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</table>

⁶ For purposes of this report, unit refers to U.S. military organizations stationed on a FOB; a unit could be a Battalion, Brigade, or smaller size element.
⁷ A National Stock Number is a unique series of numbers applied to an item of supply that is repeatedly procured, stocked, stored, issued, and used throughout the federal supply system.
Review of Internal Controls

DOD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control (MIC) Program Procedures,” January 4, 2006, requires DOD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provide reasonable assurance programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified an internal control weakness for USF-I. Specifically, USF-I did not have adequate internal controls to ensure that all equipment shipped to the Theater Redistribution Center, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, was properly sorted, segregated, packed, blocked, and braced for shipment. Implementing recommendations in the Finding will increase the use of MRT assistance which should reduce the number of unsafe and unsorted containers of excess equipment received at the Theater Redistribution Center. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in USF-I.
Finding: Operation Clean Sweep

FRAGO 1022, “Operation Clean Sweep,” October 26, 2009, defines operational roles and responsibilities and the procedures necessary for processing excess U.S. equipment in support of the Iraq drawdown. We commend the 13th ESC and the MRTs for the results achieved as of April 10, 2010. According to documentation provided by 13th ESC, the MRTs, from October 2009 to April 10, 2010, processed 15,437 Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) and identified and re-established accountability for excess U.S. equipment valued at about $768 million. However, the effectiveness of Operation Clean Sweep was limited because units were not required to participate. We identified units that denied the MRTs access to their excess equipment, did not comply with FRAGO requirements to sort their excess equipment before the MRT’s arrival, and did not provide adequate logistical support to the MRTs. Other units were not aware of Operation Clean Sweep or the MRT mission and were wary about participating.

When units do not participate in Operation Clean Sweep, the risk of injury to personnel is increased and visibility of equipment in the supply system is delayed. We identified containers at the Theater Redistribution Center, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, that were not packed and shipped by MRTs, which were poorly packed and some contained weapons and hazardous material, increasing the risk of injury to Theater Redistribution Center personnel responsible for opening the containers. Other containers not packed or shipped by MRTs held unserviceable non-repairable equipment and trash that should have been destroyed or scrapped in Iraq. In addition, equipment in these containers was not identified, processed, and brought to record until it reached Camp Arifjan delaying visibility of serviceable equipment in the supply system that may be needed elsewhere, including Afghanistan.

FRAGO 1022 Requirements

FRAGO 1022 defines the roles and responsibilities of MNC-I, ESCs, MRTs, and units in Operation Clean Sweep, and provides instructions for each of those activities to achieve their operational mission. The FRAGO describes unit and MRT responsibilities prior to MRT arrival on the FOB, upon the MRT’s arrival on the FOB, and while the MRT is assisting the units. See Appendix B for a flowchart of the unit and MRT responsibilities as defined in the FRAGO. Once the MRT has completed assisting the units with identifying, processing, and re-establishing accountability of excess equipment, the equipment is shipped to the local Supply Support Activity, the Theater Redistribution Center, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office, or local landfills.

Recovered Excess Equipment

According to documentation provided by 13th ESC, the MRTs, as of April 10, 2010, had identified and re-established accountability for 15,437 TEUs of excess equipment valued at

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8 TEUs are twenty foot container equivalent units used for shipping equipment.
Operational Effectiveness

Although the MRTs were able to recover 15,437 TEUs of excess equipment, the effectiveness of Operation Clean Sweep was reduced because unit participation was voluntary. Therefore, some units did not allow the MRTs access to their excess equipment; comply with FRAGO requirements to sort their excess equipment before the MRT’s arrival; or provide adequate logistical support to the MRTs.9 Other units were not aware of Operation Clean Sweep or the MRT mission and were wary about voluntarily participating.

MRT Utilization

Units at two FOBs did not allow the MRTs access to their excess equipment. In December 2009, Camp Taji personnel from one unit directed the MRT personnel to leave their area of operation, stating they could handle the processing of their excess equipment and did not require the assistance of the MRT. We also received documentation showing that in November 2009, MRT personnel left FOB Warrior after brigade command operations threatened to remove the MRT from the FOB based on a misunderstanding of the MRT’s mission and units stating they did not want to participate.

Sorting and Classifying Excess Equipment

Units did not always sort excess equipment by supply class and serviceability code, as required by FRAGO 1022. We accompanied the MRTs to four FOBs (Speicher, Taji, Kalsu, and Sykes) and at each of those FOBs the MRTs unpacked containers and segregated the excess equipment by supply class and serviceability code, which should have been accomplished by the unit prior to the MRT’s arrival. Additionally, units did not always provide a list of excess equipment sorted by supply class and containing the following information as required in the FRAGO: national stock numbers, nomenclature, unit of issue, quantity, and part number. MRTs had to expend additional time and effort unpacking containers, categorizing equipment, and determining serviceability before processing the excess equipment.

Logistical and Operational Support

Units did not always assist the MRTs by providing local haul transport, such as fork-lifts and flatbed trucks, as required by FRAGO 1022. At Speicher, flatbed trucks were not available to move completed tri-walls10 from a motor pool to a secure location. The tri-walls remained in the motor pool overnight, where unauthorized personnel opened one and some contents were removed, resulting in the MRTs having to re-inventory the

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9 Logistical support includes, but is not limited to coordination with personnel from the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office and the Landfill and access to Material Handling Equipment.
10 Tri-walls are heavy-duty weather-resistant boxes with a plastic base that allows for movement by fork lift or other material handling equipment.
equipment in the tri-walls. At Kalsu, it took additional time to move the unprocessed and processed excess equipment because the pallet jack was not adequate for the task. At Speicher, with a large area of operation, the MRT’s movement was hindered by the lack of transportation. Specifically, three MRTs had to share two vehicles to perform site visits while assisting units with the processing of their equipment. At Taji, the MRT team manager had to spend time borrowing vehicles in order to maintain oversight of his personnel and meet with units to arrange for the processing of their equipment.

Unit Awareness

There was a lack of unit awareness of the MRT’s mission and the support required. FRAGO 1022 clearly states that MNC-I was to advocate command emphasis to ensure units eliminate non-mission essential excess equipment. However, we found that commands did not adequately communicate the MRT mission and goals, leaving units apprehensive about participating with MRTs. Specifically, units:

- believed MRT personnel would direct them to retrograde all equipment, including mission essential equipment that would affect unit readiness,
- feared reprisal for having large quantities of excess equipment even though the units inherited the equipment from previous tenants, and
- believed that MRTs would reset the unit’s excess equipment without assistance or support from the unit.

Lack of unit awareness resulted in MRT personnel spending time promoting their services instead of processing excess equipment. For example, at Speicher and Taji, the MRT team manager or non-commissioned officer-in-charge spent a majority of their time promoting MRT services. At Speicher, we observed the MRT non-commissioned officer-in-charge stop an Army First Sergeant to explain the MRT mission in an attempt to schedule the unit for participation. Additionally, the MRT non-commissioned officer-in-charge stated that upon arrival at a FOB, he would obtain the base directory to begin calling unit commanders and would stop any “E-7 and above” in an effort to get units to participate. During another FOB visit, the MRT team manager stated that MRT personnel distributed fliers in an attempt to get units to participate. MRT personnel stated that having to promote their services was due to a lack of command emphasis concerning Operation Clean Sweep.

Increased Risk

When units do not participate in Operation Clean Sweep, the risk of injury to personnel at the receiving activity is increased. We identified containers at the Theater Redistribution Center, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, that were not packed and shipped by MRTs, which were poorly packed, blocked, braced, and held equipment such as weapons and hazardous material.
Poorly packed containers led to damage of the equipment inside the containers. In one container, hazardous material was not properly packed and leaked onto other items in the container. A second container held batteries that were not properly packed for shipment that leaked and created a hazardous material spill (See Figure 1).

Other containers held items such as weapons (See Figure 2) and dangerous material, increasing the risk of injury to personnel at the Theater Redistribution Center, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. For example, in September 2009, two civilians were accidentally stuck by atropine injectors (See Figure 3) while sorting equipment and were immediately sent to the local Theater Medical Clinic for treatment.

**Figure 1. Damaged and Leaking Hazardous Material**

Source: 593rd Sustainment Brigade, Container Violation Report, November 7, 2009

**Figure 2. Weapon in Container**

Source: 593rd Sustainment Brigade, Offender Report, September 15, 2009

**Figure 3. Potentially Dangerous Equipment**

Source: 593rd Sustainment Brigade, Offender Report, September 15, 2009

**Delayed Accountability and Visibility**

When equipment was not processed or brought to record before shipment, it had to be identified, processed, and brought to record at the Theater Redistribution Center, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. This delayed the accountability and visibility of serviceable equipment in the supply system for use by units in other theaters of operation, to include Afghanistan. In addition, units that did not properly sort, segregate, and pack excess equipment for shipment caused the receiving activity to increase their level of effort to ensure proper disposition. For example, when contractors receive a container of excess equipment that has not been properly sorted and segregated, each item in the container
must be inventoried, which increases the number of personnel and time needed to process containers. (See Figures 4 and 5). Further, units shipped unserviceable, non-repairable equipment to the Theater Redistribution Center, instead of disposing of the items at the local Defense Reutilization Marketing Office or landfill. Shipping non-repairable equipment limited space in containers that could be used to ship equipment for use in other theaters of operation, and DOD paid to ship equipment that could have been destroyed in Iraq.

Figure 4. Unsorted Container  
Figure 5. Unsorted Container

Source: 593rd Sustainment Brigade, Offender Report, September 15, 2009  
Source: 593rd Sustainment Brigade, Container Violation Report, January 11, 2010

Management Actions

Throughout the audit, we conducted briefings with the 13th ESC so that when possible, corrective action could be taken in response to our concerns. During the audit two FRAGOs were issued, which addressed some of our concerns—USF-I FRAGO 0436, “Operation Clean Sweep,” January 28, 2010, and 13th ESC FRAGO 0094, “Operation Clean Sweep,” February 26, 2010.

USF-I FRAGO 0436

FRAGO 0436 superseded FRAGO 1022 and addresses the lack of command emphasis with respect to unit support and understanding of the MRT mission. The FRAGO contains guidance requiring FOB Commanders to notify each unit 1 week prior to the MRT’s arrival. FRAGO 0436 also requires the FOB Commander to schedule time for each unit to work with the MRTs, and to chair initial meetings with the MRT Officer-in-Charge, non-commissioned officer-in-charge, unit commanders, property book officers, S4 (Command Operation), and supply personnel. We believe these meetings are sufficient to enhance communication between the MRTs and the units and to reduce misunderstandings of the MRT’s mission and required support. The meetings provide the MRTs an opportunity to explain their mission, roles, and responsibilities relating to Operation Clean Sweep.
13th ESC FRAGO 0094

To support the Commander USF-I’s requirement under FRAGO 0436, the Commander, 13th ESC issued FRAGO 0094. FRAGO 0094 states that MRTs will obtain a complete list of units down to the battalion level from each FOB commander to ensure that each unit is contacted concerning the initial meeting with the MRT. During the initial meeting, the MRT will require battalion representatives to sign one of two memorandums of agreement. One memorandum is an agreement stating that units understand the MRT’s mission and that the unit will participate, the other states that the unit declines to participate in the operation. Although we agree with FRAGO 0094 requirements with respect to communication with the FOB commanders and units, we do not agree with providing an option to the battalion representatives to decline participation in Operation Clean Sweep.

Conclusion

Operation Clean Sweep provides USF-I with the ability to efficiently expedite the removal of excess equipment from Iraq in conjunction with the Iraq drawdown. To ensure the success of Operation Clean Sweep and the overall timely drawdown of equipment from Iraq, it is vital that USF-I require 100 percent unit participation and full MRT support. FRAGOs 0436 and 0094 address our concerns of lack of communication of the MRT mission and required unit support. Therefore, we are not issuing recommendations specific to those issues. However, FRAGO 0436 stops short of requiring 100 percent unit participation and FRAGO 0094 allows units to decline participation in Operation Clean Sweep. We believe that participation in Operation Clean Sweep should be mandatory and units should use MRT assistance to identify, segregate, account, and turn-in non-mission essential equipment.
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

1. We recommend that the Commander, U. S. Forces–Iraq, revise and reissue Fragmentary Order 0436 to require mandatory participation in Operation Clean Sweep.

2. We recommend that the Director, U. S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate, issue Fragmentary Orders directing units identified by the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) in Recommendation 3.b. to participate in Operation Clean Sweep.

3. We recommend that the Commander, 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary),
   a. Revise and reissue Fragmentary Order 0094 to remove the option to decline to participate in Operation Clean Sweep.
   b. Provide the Director, U. S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate a list of units at each FOB that do not participate in Operation Clean Sweep.

U.S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate Comments

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command endorsed and forwarded comments from the U.S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate. The Deputy Director, U.S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate, responding for U.S. Forces–Iraq and the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), agreed with our recommendations. The Deputy stated that Fragmentary Orders 0046 and 0094 will be revised to remove the option for units to decline participation in Operation Clean Sweep. The Deputy also stated that the Commander, U.S. Forces–Iraq will enforce participation by units identified by the Commander, Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) as being non-compliant with the reissued Fragmentary Order 0094.

Our Response

The comments of the Deputy Director, U.S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate are responsive. No further comments are required.
Appendix A.  Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through April 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We coordinated with officials from the U.S. Army Central Command, Army Materiel Command; USF-I; Multi-National Force–Iraq; MNC-I; 402nd Army Field Support Brigade; and the 13th ESC. We coordinated with personnel from the Army Audit Agency, who were conducting an audit that involved a portion of the plans for the drawdown of excess equipment.

We obtained and reviewed DOD Regulations, MRTs standard operating procedures, Container Violation (Offender) Reports, Container Detail Reports, and Multi-National Force–Iraq and MNC-I Operation Orders and FRAGOs.

We conducted interviews with the personnel from the FOB Command, tenant units, and MRTs. See table A-1 for a listing of the FOBs visited.

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<td>15th Sustainment Brigade</td>
<td>Speicher</td>
<td>Dec. 15 – 19, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th Sustainment Brigade</td>
<td>Taji</td>
<td>Dec. 28 – 31, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Sustainment Brigade</td>
<td>Sykes</td>
<td>Jan. 20 – 22, 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We gained an understanding of the MRT’s procedures by reviewing FRAGO 1022 and standard operating procedures. We then tested the procedures during our FOB visits by observing the MRTs at work and interviewing MRT personnel on the policies and procedures for processing excess equipment. To determine the condition of the excess equipment shipped to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, we interviewed personnel from the 593rd Sustainment Brigade and visited the Theater Redistribution Center, Camp Arifjan to observe and document the contents of containers shipped from units and MRTs in the Iraqi Theater.
Use of Computer-Processed Data
As part of our audit, we reviewed plans for the drawdown of equipment from Iraq to determine if the plans were comprehensive, viable, and executable. The data was provided in the form of e-mails, PowerPoint presentations, .pdf files, and Word documents used in the normal communication process. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations were not based solely on analysis of these documents, but included visual observation of MRT procedures. Computer-processed data was used but did not significantly impact our review objectives, nor did it materially affect our findings, conclusions, or recommendations.

Prior Coverage
During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Army Audit Agency have issued seven reports discussing topics related to the Iraq drawdown and excess equipment. Specifically, there are two reports dealing with overall planning for the drawdown from Iraq, two reports related to the disposition of excess property, and three reports dealing with the management of shipping containers in Southwest Asia.

**GAO**


**Army**


Appendix B. Fragmentary Order 1022
Requirements
FOR: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL


1. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the recommendations presented in the DODIG draft report.

2. USF-I concurs with the recommendations contained in this report.

3. The Point of Contact is [redacted], USCENTCOM Inspector General.

[Signature]
JAY W. HOOD
Major General, U.S. Army

Attachments:
1. USF-I Cover Memo
2. USF-I Response
MEMORANDUM FOR CENTCOM IG

SUBJECT: CT-(0419-001) Drawdown and Reset of Equipment in Iraq - Operation Clean Sweep.

1. USF-I J4 has reviewed DODIG Project D2009-D000JB-0280.000, Drawdown and Reset of Equipment and provides the attached comments to the Draft Report.

2. POC is [redacted], email: [redacted]

GEORGE R. SORENSEN
COL, LG
USF-I J4, Deputy

Encl:
USF-I J4 Comments to the Draft Report
On Page 11 of the draft report, DODIG recommends the following:

**RECOMMENDATION 1.** DODIG recommends that the Commander, United States Forces-Iraq, revise and reissue Fragmentary Order 0436 to require mandatory participation in Operation Clean Sweep.

**RESPONSE:** USF-I J4 will re-issue Fragmentary Order 0436 to require mandatory participation.

**RECOMMENDATION 2.** DODIG recommends that the Director, United States Forces-Iraq J4, issue Fragmentary Orders directing units identified by the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) in Recommendation 3.b. to participate in Operation Clean Sweep.

**RESPONSE:** USF-I will enforce participation in Operation Clean Sweep if any units are identified by the ESC Commander as non-compliant with the new USF-I Fragmentary Order.

**RECOMMENDATION 3.** DODIG recommends that the Commander, 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary);

a. Revise and reissue Fragmentary Order 0094 to remove the option to decline to participate in Operation Clean Sweep.

b. Provide the Director, United States Forces-Iraq J4 a list of units at each FOB that do not participate in Operation Clean Sweep.

**RESPONSE:** USF-I will re-issue Fragmentary Order 0094 removing the option to decline participation in Operation Clean Sweep.