DOES RED CHINA WANT WAR?

By

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US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966
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SUMMARY

In recent years the United States and the other major powers in the Far East have become increasingly alarmed over Red China's bellicose attitude. Moreover, Peking has selected the United States as the primary target of Red China's vitriolic propaganda. It is the purpose of this thesis to answer two questions: Does Red China want war? If so, how much war does she want?

A brief review of the last century of China's history shows quite clearly that China has suffered one profound shock after another as the Western powers forcibly opened her doors—one by one. From the resulting chaos, and in a general atmosphere of xenophobia, Mao Tse-tung emerged as the forceful leader of Red China.

Mao, the revolutionary leader, has taught his subordinates never to fight a battle they are not sure of winning. Above all, he enjoined them never to fight a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the nation is at stake.

While China has enjoyed a stable government under the communist regime, Peking finds itself unable to feed the growing population without spending half of its foreign exchange annually on food imports. China's industrial sector appears unable to support sustained large scale military operations, and the weak agricultural sector serves as a drag on rapid industrial development. Moreover, the armed forces, rich in manpower, lack the means of projecting Chinese military power very far beyond China's borders.

Red China's past foreign policy indicates that she is well aware of her strengths and weaknesses. While China often has threatened military action, her deeds have been carefully measured to stay within her limited capabilities.

This thesis concludes that China does want war by proxy—that is, wars of national liberation. While Red China will fight to defend her own borders—and perhaps her ring of buffer states—she will seek to avoid war with the United States. Finally, while Red China may be capable of triggering a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, such action is viewed as an act of desperation which could cause either of the other parties to attack China with thermonuclear weapons.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep! For when he wakes, he will move the world.

--- Napoleon

Our nation will never again be insulted. We have stood up.

--- Mao Tse-tung

It is the purpose of this thesis to answer two questions: Does Red China want war? If so, how much war does she want? Yet, because of the paucity of accurate and reliable information concerning mainland China (hereafter referred to as China, or Red China), this is in a sense, a hopeless and impossible task.

As in all underdeveloped countries, statistical data is either nonexistent or incomplete. Moreover, in the case of China, much of the data originating at the lower levels of government are deliberately falsified to show the progress expected and demanded by the Party; the Party, in turn, is not above falsifying data to fool the balance of the world. The problem is complicated even further by

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2Mao Tse-tung, Sep. 1949, as quoted by A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia; Challenge to American Policy, p. 67.
the fact that the Peking regime deliberately withholds data to keep the Free World in ignorance of Chinese gains or weaknesses.

There are, however, some meaningful indicators of Red China's strength and progress. Many serious scholars and analysts in the United States, as well as elsewhere in the Free World, pour over reports and data coming out of Hong Kong and other Chinese ports. Nationalist China takes aerial photographs and maintains an intelligence net on the mainland, and the Nationalist press seldom misses an opportunity to harpoon exaggerated claims from Red China. Additionally, from time to time, our own government releases meaningful data and reports, some of which were previously classified by the Peking regime. Thus, it appears that diligent research can provide some valuable insights into Red China's national power position and foreign policies.

The scope of this paper will include a brief review of the last century of China's history—a century of upheaval. The paper will also examine Mao Tse-tung's brand of Communism and China's national power position, thus developing a basis for inquiring into Red China's strategy and objectives. These considerations will be

related to Red China's foreign policy (1949-1965) toward the major powers in the Far East. Then, China's broad strategic options will be postulated. Finally, from the rationale previously developed, the paper will present conclusions as to whether Red China wants war and, if so, how much war.

The writer is painfully aware of the breadth of the foregoing scope. Moreover, considering the restrictions on thesis length, much detail must be omitted or relegated to brief footnote entries. On the other hand, the author's inability to find a study with such a comprehensive scope has prompted this effort.
A CENTURY OF UPHEAVAL (1840-1949)

A tremendous upheaval has taken place in China since 1840. The changes have been revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, and have exerted a profound impact on the cultural, ideological, social, economic, and political environment of the Chinese people. It is appropriate, therefore, to review briefly China's recent history and, thus, gain a deeper insight into the central question of China's intentions regarding war.

CULTURE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Chinese are a proud people with a long history and distinct culture. Prior to the nineteenth century Chinese civilization was almost totally untainted by foreign influence.

Confucianism and Taoism are among the more important Chinese philosophic concepts. The workings of the oriental mind have long been an enigma to the West; however, the first three chapters of Valentin Chu's Ta Ta, Tan Tan are particularly useful in gaining at least a partial understanding of the way Chinese people think and feel. Chu states:

There is a touch of the Confucian and of the Taoist in every Chinese. The Confucian is a voracious do-gooder who wants politicians moral, sons filial, and

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1 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China in Perspective, p. 4, (hereafter referred to as "Barnett, Perspective").
widows chaste. A Taoist is a vagabond who, laughing at man's folly, sneaks off to a bamboo grove or a misty lake to be part of it. A Chinese is consciously a Confucian and subconsciously a Taoist. He is a Confucian when enjoying fortune and success, and a Taoist in the face of adversity; a Confucian in public and a Taoist when alone. Confucianism without Taoism would make him a stuffed shirt. Taoism without Confucianism would make him a beatnik. During the past 2500 years, each time China enjoyed peace and prosperity, Confucianism was in ascendency. Each time it suffered from adversity, Taoism took over.²

The extended family system is another important aspect of China's culture. In fact, China's entire social system was based on the Confucian concept of the absolute authority of the head of the family. In this type of society an individual's life is not important, but consists of carrying on his father's line and rearing his sons so they, in turn, may do the same.³ While this type of social structure has lent a degree of stability against political shocks, it has had some undesirable results. For example, nepotism has been regarded as a duty,⁴ and the extreme social importance of producing male heirs has led to a high birth rate and a chronic trend toward over-population.

There is one more aspect of Chinese tradition which is important. Indeed, it is vital to an understanding of their territorial claims. The basic concept is that their territory should include all lands held during the Manchu dynasty over a century ago. Their rationale is based on several principles. In the first place, they

²Valentin Chu, Ta Ta, Tan Tan, pp. 5-6.
³Gerald F. Winfield, China: The Land and the People, pp. 30-32.
⁴Lynn and Amos Landman, Profile of Red China, p. 73.
believe the Chinese race is composed of several peoples. These include the Hans, the Manchus, the Mongols, and the Tibetans. Second, while Chinese leaders strongly condemn past Manchu rule, they accept and claim all territory acquired by prior conquest. Finally, China has never been prepared to accept the finality of Chinese territory ceded to any other nation by treaty arrangement. In their view, such treaties are illegal and unequal; they were forced on the Chinese government in time of weakness, and they are to be repudiated when China acquires sufficient strength.

CONTACT WITH THE WEST

Traditionally, the Chinese have regarded the peoples of bordering states and all foreigners as barbarians. Neighboring states were required to pay tribute to the emperor, and no foreign government was considered equal in rank to the Chinese government. Nevertheless, by the middle of the eighteenth century the European countries had established a significant amount of trade with China. However, East-West frictions grew, and tensions mounted as a result of the introduction of opium, by the British, into China. In 1840,

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50. Edmund Clubb, "The Sino-Soviet Frontier," Military Review, Jul. 1964, p. 5. Mao Tse-tung has stated that besides the Hans, there are scores of national minorities including the Mongols, the Huis, the Tibetans, and the Koreans, all of whom though in different stages of cultural development, have long histories of their own. China is a country with a very large population composed of many nationalities." cf., Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 3, p. 73.
6Ibid.
7O. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China, p. 4.
8Ibid., pp. 11-12.
the Chinese government seized and burned a large quantity of British opium. In retaliation, Great Britain declared war on China. Chinese culture had collided with the military power of Europe; China's power was found wanting.

During the next fifty years the Chinese were defeated repeatedly by the British and other Western powers. Between 1840 and 1894, Great Britain obtained an unprecedented series of territorial and commercial concessions from China. Other states demanded, and received, similar rights. The Russians obtained all Chinese territory north of the Amur and east of the Ussuri Rivers, including the port of Vladivostok. They obtained rights in Chinese Turkestan and Korea. The French took over Annam in Indo China. The Germans seized Tsingtao; the Russians used this as an excuse to occupy Port Arthur. Japan took Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung peninsula. Indeed, by the autumn of 1899, it appeared that the European powers and Japan would partition China and annex their respective "spheres of influence."\(^9\)

The Manchu dynasty could not withstand this pressure, and in 1911 the Imperial Government was overthrown; Sun Yat-sen was elected President. Disunity and internal strife prevailed, however, until after Sun's death in 1925.\(^10\)

Chiang Kai-shek, who became the leader of the Nationalists, started a new drive to unify his country and bring the rebellious

\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 23-24.
\(^10\)Ibid., p. 129.
warlords under control. By 1929 he had made substantial progress. The unequal treaties were modified to give China "almost complete tariff autonomy in import-export shipping."11

THE BEGINNING OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA

The greatest opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist (Kuomintang) government came from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which had been started in Shanghai in 1921, and became subordinate to the Comintern in 1922.12 By 1928 open warfare had broken out between the CCP and the Nationalists. Chiang drove CCP members out of his government and evicted the Russian advisors, but elements of the CCP continued to thwart Chiang and challenge his leadership. Among those who continued to organize guerrillas against the Nationalists was Mao Tse-tung, who had formed the All-China Peasant Union.13

WAR WITH JAPAN

As a result of Sino-Japanese friction over control of Manchuria, the Japanese attacked the Chinese forces in September 1931. Manchuria was soon converted into a Japanese puppet state called Manchoukuo.14

11Special Operations Research Office, American University, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare; 23 Summary Accounts, p. 474 (referred to hereafter as "SORO, Casebook").
12Ibid.
13Ibid., p. 464, 472.
14Clubb, op. cit., p. 172.
The Nationalists continued to battle the Japanese until Japan's defeat at the end of World War II. It was a bloody struggle; Japan, at times, held large parts of China.  

During this struggle against Japan, the Nationalist forces and the CCP forces had formed an anti-Japanese coalition, but this never amounted to more than an uneasy intermittent truce. In fact, there is considerable evidence that the coalition forces spent more time and energy fighting each other than they did fighting the Japanese.  

**DEFEAT OF THE NATIONALISTS**

Following World War II, and in spite of U.S. efforts to reconcile the two forces, the civil war in China continued. In 1945, the Communist forces received aid from the Soviet Union. Large stocks of captured Japanese material were turned over to the Chinese Red Army which had grown to more than one million men.  

Economic strangulation, mismanagement, graft, inflation, incompetence, and shortages of basic needs were having a telling effect on the Chinese people. By 1948 conditions were chaotic, and it was clear that the Communists were winning. The Nationalist government lost the initiative and, in 1949, was driven out of the capital at Nan-king. Chiang withdrew to Formosa, and Mao Tse-tung established the  

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15 The extent of Japan's invasion of China is shown on a map contained in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. 5, p. 539.  
16 SORO, *Casebook*, p. 466.  
17 Ibid., p. 484.
People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949. He located the capital at Peiping, which was renamed "Peking."19

A PERSPECTIVE

In a period of just over one hundred years China has experienced a series of revolutions--cultural, economic, social, and political. Certainly not all of the changes have been for the good. In some cases the forces unleashed by the impact with Western powers have resulted in suffering and disillusionment rather than improvement. There can be little doubt, however, that contact with the West carries strong destabilizing influences for any backward country. Among the most potent of these influences are the concepts of nationalism and anti-colonialism.20 The Communist regime of Mao Tse-tung was created in the social chaos which followed a bitter war and a century of internal upheaval.

The establishment of the People's Republic of China represented a major defeat for American foreign policy in the Far East. The United States had hoped to build the Nationalist government into a strong and friendly ally capable of exercising a stabilizing influence in Asia.21 Instead, the People's Republic of China is a deeply hostile power which represents a severe destabilizing influence throughout Asia.

18Clubb, op. cit., pp. 296-297.
19Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Article 106.
CHAPTER 3

MAO TSE-TUNG'S BRAND OF WORLD COMMUNISM

It is not the purpose of this chapter to delve extensively into the political and military precepts of Mao Tse-tung nor to analyze (in Marxist-Leninist terms) the various nuances of Maoism. Instead, this chapter is intended to lay the groundwork for a better understanding of Mao's foreign policy.

MAO'S BACKGROUND

Mao Tse-tung was born of a peasant family in Hunan Province on 26 December 1893. His early youth was characterized by a thirst for further education and a semi-continuous rebellion against paternal authority. After leaving home at the age of sixteen, Mao continued his schooling, except for a brief period in the army, until he was twenty-six. Even in school he was threatened with expulsion for organizing student strikes.

In the winter of 1920-21, Mao first read the Communist Manifesto, and by the spring of 1921 he considered himself a Marxist. That same year he became one of the original twelve delegates to the first Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, in a general atmosphere of xenophobia, Mao became a communist.

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1 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 126.
2 Anne Freemantle, Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings, p. xx3
3 Ibid., p. xxvi.
MAO'S MILITARY TENENTS

Mao has written volumes on warfare and military subjects, but there are, perhaps, only a few of his military principles that are important to the central issue of China's desire for war.

Probably, the most important of Mao's military principles is that of protracted conflict. Mao has recognized war as "man's politics with bloodshed," and he is well aware of the overall weakness of China's military forces. Mao has taught the Chinese that, under such circumstances, war will be long, bloody, and protracted and will pass through three stages: the strategic defense, preparation for the counter offensive and, the counter offense which must involve regular units engaged in mobile warfare. When it comes to waging a war, Mao has not been impatient.

A second important principle is to fight a battle only when victory is probable. If the commander is not fully prepared with a concentrated force several times the local strength of the enemy, the commander should avoid battle and seek a later opportunity to defeat the enemy. Equally important is Mao's corollary precept that one should never fight a decisive battle in which the life of the nation is in issue. In one instance he wrote:

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4Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, p. 230 (hereafter referred to as "Mao, Military Writings").
5Ibid., pp. 210-211.
6Mao, "Present Situation and Our Tasks," Military Writings, p. 347.
We should resolutely fight a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory; we should avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are not sure of victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically decisive engagement on which the whole fate of the nation is at stake.\(^7\)

Later he wrote, "We are for protracted war and final victory, we are not gamblers who risk everything on a single throw."\(^8\)

It is clear, therefore, that Mao is a commander who is strategically cautious and who gages carefully every military action in light of the risks involved.

The strategy of protracted conflict postpones the decisive battle and calibrates its challenges to a calculus of risks—until the balance of force has shifted overwhelmingly to the side of the revolutionary forces. Indeed this is and always has been the strategy of the . . . Chinese Communists.\(^9\)

The implications arising from Mao’s caution in the face of superior military force will be discussed below, when considering China’s foreign policy and strategic options.

**MAO’S POLITICAL TENENTS**

Mao’s political arsenal is extremely complex and varied. The old master of power politics and persuasion understands well that the conventional diplomacy of the West is relatively weak when pitted against a properly orchestrated combination of trade, aid, conventional

\(^7\)Mao, "On Protracted War," Military Writings, p. 254.  
\(^8\)Ibid., p. 257.  
\(^9\)Robert Strausz-Hupe and others, Prolonged Conflict, p. 2.
and cultural diplomacy, subversion, psychological warfare, military threats, and intimidation. 10

Mao, the student of dialectic materialism, sees the world in a constant stage of change. This type of thinking, generally alien to the status quo Western powers, seeks to exploit each situation so that a change in favor of China will be the result. In analyzing a problem, Mao teaches that one must ask not only, "What now?" but more importantly, "What next?" 11 It follows from this line of logic that negotiations are undertaken not to seek a permanent solution to a controversy but to gain time and prepare groundwork for future advances and continued struggle. 12

Mao has found it both expedient and useful to vilify the Western powers and the United States in particular. For example, in 1949 he wrote:

The war to turn China into a U.S. colony, a war in which the United States of America supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, has been an important component of the U.S. imperialist policy of world-wide aggression since World War II. The U.S. policy of aggression has several targets. The three main targets are Europe, Asia and the Americas. 13

10 Barnett, Communist China in Perspective, p. 79, (Hereafter referred to as "Barnett, Perspective").
11 Barnett, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy, p. 71.
13 Mao Tse-tung, "Farewell, Leighton Stuart!" Selected Works, Vol. 5, p. 433. His later works have been even more vehement. cf., Schram, op. cit., document IX A, p. 266.
In fact the Chinese, under Mao, have become so intent on denouncing the United States that a Soviet theoretician has argued recently that:

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\text{"China's propaganda\... reduces the entire struggle against imperialism solely to a struggle with the United States--by passing its allies--the Japanese, West German and French imperialists.}^{14}
\]

In view of Mao's many bitter diatribes against the United States, it would seem that his purpose is to provide the Chinese people with a common enemy and a threat which will spur them on to greater efforts and unity. It is possible, on the other hand, that his bitterness toward the U.S. is a manifestation of his frustration at U.S. successes in blocking the expansion of Peking's influence in Asia. In any case, Mao's hostility toward the United States is so deep that there appears to be little chance of purposeful dialogue, and even less chance of any agreement, between the United States and Mao.\textsuperscript{15}

Mao, the rebellious youth and the aging (perhaps senile) communist revolutionary, gives signs of annoyance and bitter disappointment that his concept of world revolution has not yet engulfed the Free World.\textsuperscript{16} Mao has long believed that Red China's successful revolution would serve as a prototype of revolution for the entire world, "... especially by toiling masses of the colonial

\textsuperscript{14}Mikhail A. Suslov as quoted by Oliver M. Lee, "Communist China and Western Europe," Current History, Vol. 47, Sep. 1964, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{15}This view is expressed also by Stuart R. Schram, cf., Schram, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 84.
Red China is firmly committed to the support of "just wars" of national liberation. Mao and his close associates have publicly stated that China can encourage and support such wars without incurring any substantial risk of nuclear intervention by the United States or any other Western power. Thus, Mao's communist ideology and revolutionary zeal promise to provide serious problems for the West, even long after Mao's death.

RED CHINA'S OBJECTIVES

Today China stands as the most frustrated of all leading world powers. This is due, in large measure, to her inability to regain lost territory and her rejection from membership in the major international councils. Mao's bitterness over lost territory is exhibited in the following extract from his work entitled, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party."

After having inflicted military defeats on China, the imperialist countries forcibly took from her a large number of states tributary to China, as well as part of her own territory. Japan appropriated Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukus Islands, the Pescadores, and Port Arthur; England took Burma, Nepal, and Hong Kong; France seized Annam; even a miserable little country like Portugal took Macao from us. At the

17Mao Tse-tung as quoted in Schram, op. cit., p. 256. Mao stated this view in 1936.
19Barnett, Perspective, p. 80.
same time that they took away part of her territory, the imperialists obliged China to pay vast indemnities.  

Moreover, Peking has not forgotten that the Soviet Union still holds land that was forcibly taken from China late in the nineteenth century.

China's frustration, and the nonfulfillment of her goals, however, seem to have had the effect of stabilizing the direction of her efforts to achieve her national objectives. Her tactics, on the other hand, have exhibited imaginative flexibility.

Mao's actions and writings seem to support the view that China's enduring national purpose is to maintain Greater China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, secure from all foreign aggression while promoting the growth of Marxist-Leninist governments throughout the world.

While there are many generally similar interpretations of Red China's objectives, if one accepts the foregoing statement of the national purpose, several national objectives

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follow logically. In the area of national interest, narrowly conceived, China's national objectives are to:

a. Build the People's Republic of China into a major world political and military power embodying a communist political and economic system.

b. Eject Western influence, particularly that of the United States, from the Far East and attain a dominant power position on the Asian continent.

c. Restore to China all territory and islands on or near mainland China which are included within the rightful claims of the People's Republic of China.

With regard to goals stemming from the communist ideology, other national objectives are to:

d. Gain leadership of the world communist movement.

e. Foster and assist revolutionary movements throughout the world.
CHAPTER 4

RED CHINA'S NATIONAL POWER POSITION

Any comprehensive examination of the challenge of Red China must inevitably appraise the roots of Chinese power. In so doing, it is important to assess both the strengths and weaknesses of the geographic, demographic, political, economic, military and technological aspects of Chinese power. Yet, even a comprehensive examination of this type can be misleading.

National power, as a concept of force, has both a relational aspect and a situational aspect which may not be ignored. For example, it is in the context the air and seapower of the 7th U.S. Fleet that the relative land power of Red China and Nationalist China must be assessed. Therefore, the ability to exert national power is not absolute and the projection of power cannot always be assured.

Moreover, there is a subjective aspect of national power which is extremely important. Until power is tested, it is only as strong as people think it is. At the present time, for example, there is considerable debate over the strength of Britain's economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Yet, as this type of economic power is put to its test, the debaters must surely adjust their views to conform to the facts that are developed.
THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

China is the most populous nation on earth, with about one-fourth of all the world's people. While there is no accurate census information, current population estimates vary from 650 million to over 750 million. The National Geographic magazine indicates the 1964 population as 700 million. A United Nations study, which estimated the 1956 population at 621.2 million with an annual natural growth rate of 2%, would place the 1965 population at approximately 742 million.

China's area of 3.8 million square miles is slightly larger than that of the United States. Only about one-tenth of China's land is considered arable; of this, 30% is good soil, 40% is of medium quality, and the balance is considered inferior. Thus, in all of China, there is only four-tenths of an acre of arable land per person. With a population expanding at a rate of at least 15 million people per year, one of China's most serious problems is a shortage of arable land. The Chinese farmers are already double cropping their fields.

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2 United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, Population and Food Supply, p. 15.
4 Valentin Chu, Ta Ta, Tan Tan, p. 51.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
Birth control would seem to offer a means of bringing the population problem under control. There is some evidence that birth control measures were instituted shortly after the 1953 census was taken. However, the Chinese and Marxist prejudices against birth control reasserted themselves, and following the bumper harvest of 1958, the program was abandoned. In 1962 and 1963, probably as a result of the food shortage in 1960-61, a new program was announced. Marital ages were established at 30 years for men and 25 years for women. Contraception, sterilization, and abortion were encouraged to limit the number of children to a maximum of three per family. Disciplinary measures were prescribed for those who refused to comply; yet, it is doubtful that China has the medical resources to promote an effective birth control program at this time. Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders seem to be attempting to reduce the current rate of natural increase from the current rate of 2.0 to 2.5% to about 1%.

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7For a more complete description of the proposed birth control measures refer to 7 Mar. 1957 speech of the Minister of Health. cf., translation in Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank, Communist China, 1955-1959, Policy Documents With Analysis, pp. 195-299 (hereafter referred to as "Bowie and Fairbank, Documents").

8A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy, p. 62 (hereafter referred to as "Barnett, Challenge"). Also see Bowie and Fairbank, Documents, p. 496, which contains a translation of a CCP resolution deemphasizing the need for birth control.


While an uncontrolled population explosion has hung as a millstone around China's neck, thus dampening the effect of some economic gains, there are incontrovertible national advantages in controlling one-fourth of the world's population. There are, for example, about 6 million men who reach military age each year, and only about 12% of these men are needed to maintain the largest army in Asia.\(^{11}\)

Thus, it appears conservative to estimate that there are over 100 million Chinese of military age. In contrast, the U.S. Army inducted fewer than 11 million men during the entire period of World War II.\(^{12}\)

Yet, this suggestion of a vast military manpower potential must, in fairness, be modified. In all of China there are, perhaps, 600 million peasants more or less tied to the land to eke out a minimum level of subsistence for the 100 to 150 million who are thereby freed for industrial or other types of work.\(^{13}\) In the United States, a land of nearly 200 million people, only about 4 million people are required to produce more food than is required.\(^{14}\) Thus, the United States now has a greater non-agricultural population than Red China with her 700 million people.

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\(^{11}\)Samuel B. Griffith II, "Communist China's Capacity to Make War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 43, Jan. 1965, p. 231. This may be a conservative estimate; with a natural population increase of around 15 million per year and a decreasing mortality rate, it follows that about 7 million men should enter the military age bracket every year.


The speed with which the communists have consolidated their power is almost frightening, particularly when one recalls that only sixteen years ago China lay prostrate after a great civil war. In this short period the CCP has established a totalitarian control over the Chinese people that has never been equalled in all of China's history; it has effected a drastic redistribution of property and income, and it has taken over ownership, operation and control of every important industry in China.  

Control of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)

Mao Tse-tung is well aware of the importance of maintaining absolute control and the loyalty of the armed forces of the PRC. As long ago as 1938, he wrote:

Every communist must grasp the truth: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the Party. . . . Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun. . . . Whoever wants to seize the political power of the state and to maintain it must have a strong army.  

In consonance with this view, the CCP maintains a complex and pervasive apparatus to maintain absolute loyalty and obedience within the PLA.

15Barnett, Challenge, pp. 30-33, passim.
The vital mechanism which controls the PLA is the powerful Military Affairs Committee of the CCP. This committee, composed of trusted, old-line marshals and generals who are loyal members of the Party, supervises the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. The Committee is responsible to the Party's Politburo for the loyalty, administration, logistics, strategy, and combat operations of the PLA.\textsuperscript{17}

The Party also maintains a duplicating chain of command within the Army. This chain of political advisors extends from the Military Affairs Committee down to company level and is not responsible to any unit commander. Except in extreme combat emergency, every commander's operational orders must be approved by his political advisor.\textsuperscript{18} There is evidence that political "supervision" has caused some friction and dissention within the Army, particularly among the younger post-revolutionary officers who advocate greater professionalism.\textsuperscript{19} Yet, it seems clear that the Party controls the PLA and is willing to endure this friction to ensure that the Party will "command the gun."


\textsuperscript{18}US Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, \textit{Staffing Procedures and Problems in Communist China}, p. 35 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, \textit{Staffing Procedures}").

\textsuperscript{19}Ellis Joffe, "Conflict in Red China's Army," \textit{Military Review}, Dec. 1964, pp. 70-82, passim.
The Party also maintains complete control of the state apparatus.

A striking feature of the Chinese system, even in comparison with its Soviet counterpart, is the pervasiveness of party control and manipulation. Positions of real authority anywhere in China are without exception held by party members. In fact, no level of government, no scientific, economic or educational organization, no activity of any moment is without its party group, the members of which effectively run the unit. Advancement is unlikely if the party does not approve.\(^{20}\)

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have been singularly successful in maintaining a stable regime. Mao Tse-tung has dominated China for over two decades and, with the exceptions of the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih incident of 1954-1955\(^ {21}\) and the Peng Teh-huai incident in 1959,\(^ {22}\) has maintained a remarkably harmonious relationship within the Politburo. In fact, the all-powerful Standing Committee of the Politburo is manned by six old-guard revolutionary leaders who represent an inner circle of Mao's advisors.\(^ {23}\)

\(^ {21}\) Kao and Jao are alleged to have attempted to advance themselves to positions subordinate only to Mao himself. For a more complete description of this abortive attempt, refer to J. Chester Cheng, "Red China's Leadership Problems," *Military Review*, Vol. 44, Oct. 1964, p. 16.
\(^ {22}\) Peng, a member of the Politburo and the Minister of Defense in 1959, was sacked for advocating less Party control and greater professionalism within the PLA. See Joffe, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
The key to Party domination of the government can be found in the series of interlocking CCP-Government positions held by selected members of the CCP. For example, Lui Shao-chi, a member of the CCP's Standing Committee, is Chairman of the PRC, Chairman of the National Defense Council and Supreme State Conference. This practice of interlocking positions of responsibility is duplicated over and over. Thus, after the Party has decided on a policy, the senior Party members are, as government officials, responsible for appropriate execution by the PRC.

The Constitution of the PRC states that, "All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people," and, "The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China is the highest organ of state power." In practice, however, the elections are controlled by the Party. The voting is always in favor of the Party's proposals, and Mao Tse-tung is the undisputed leader of the Party. In a broad sense, the PRC may be considered to be the executive agent of the CCP.

\[\text{24US Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, National Policy Machinery in Communist China, p. 10 (hereafter referred to as "Congress, Policy Machinery").}\]
\[\text{25For a list of important interlocking positions, refer to Congress, Staffing Procedures, p. 3, and to Congress, Policy Machinery, pp. 10-11.}\]
\[\text{26Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Art. 1, p. 9.}\]
\[\text{27Ibid., Art. 21, p. 17.}\]
\[\text{28Congress, Staffing Procedures, pp. 8-9.}\]
The Party and the People

It is probable that the people of China have never been under more rigid, omnipotent control than they are today. Mao's authority is as great as that of his dynastic predecessors, and it is doubtful that he wields his power in a less autocratic manner.\textsuperscript{29} Under Mao's leadership the Party has developed sophisticated mechanisms for controlling the Chinese people.

In the first place, the Party organization has its own chain of command leading downward to the rank and file who are told what the leaders feel is required to carry out the Party's programs.\textsuperscript{30} The members of the individual cells meet in "study groups" of up to 30 people to plan their activities in support of the program. Many meetings are held to discuss current affairs and inculcate the Party line; others, called "struggle" meetings, are held to ridicule publicly the apathy or alleged counter-revolutionary activity of an individual.\textsuperscript{31}

In the second place, the people are controlled by numerous mass organizations such as labor organizations, craftsmen's leagues, and clubs. These are all dominated by the Party.\textsuperscript{32}

Through the mass news media, the entire population is subjected to large doses of propaganda. "Thought reform" is stressed

\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 46-47.
constantly, and indoctrination methods have been developed to an art.\textsuperscript{33}

The \textit{piece de resistance} for mass control of the people was, however, the agricultural commune. Under this program over 500 million peasants were organized for communal living. Meals were provided not at home, but in communal mess halls. Community nurseries, canteens, sewing teams, and medical facilities were organized. Happiness homes for the aged were erected and staffed. In short, the Chinese peasant gave up his land, most of his private property, and a good share of his family life and parental authority in exchange for complete regimentation.\textsuperscript{34}

The Party set out deliberately to destroy the extended family system of the past, and they did a remarkably efficient job of it.\textsuperscript{35} The communes served the Party, however, by making available thousands of peasants for the labor projects of the CCP.

\textbf{An Appraisal}

It should be clear that there are certain national strengths inherent in China's political system. Perhaps the most apparent of these is the strength gained from a highly centralized leadership operating with unquestioned supremacy and having complete power to

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{33}Barnett, Challenge, p. 73.  
\textsuperscript{34}Bowie and Fairbank, Documents, pp. 463-470.  
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., p. 500.}
manipulate the economy, the armed forces, the people and, to some extent, their minds. This very strength, however, contains the elements of a weakness—rigidity and lack of flexibility.

China's vast manpower is a great resource and potential source of military power, provided of course, that it can be fed.

The stability of China's regime has been a source of strength and unity. It remains to be seen, however, whether the PLA and the people of China will continue to endure such a tight reign. The people have overthrown the yoke of oppression before and could do so again. It has been argued that the decision to place all peasants in a communal structure was the biggest gamble ever taken by the Chinese Communists. By callously treating the people as a material resource, by destroying much of their family life, and by constantly manipulating their minds, the Communists have set some very strong forces in motion. It is known that, by and large, there have been no signs of revolt or major disaffection among the peasants. On the other hand, the Bulletin of Activities does demonstrate conclusively that during a food shortage in 1960-1961, there was a loss of zeal and admiration for the Party. Similar reports of increased cynicism, selfishness, and corruption filtered out of China through Hong Kong. Thus, while the long range impact of the

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36 Barnett, Challenge, p. 25.
commune program cannot be predetermined, it does seem that powerful forces of suppressed opposition lie dormant in China.39

Another open question lies in assessing the importance of Mao's personal prestige to the political stability of China and to the revolutionary zeal of the CCP. It can be argued persuasively that Mao's death will hardly cause a ripple in Chinese policy, objectives, or actions. Indeed, Mao has observed the effects of rising standards of living in the U.S.S.R., and he does not like what he has seen—a diminution of revolutionary zeal. It seems certain, therefore, that Mao must have given careful attention to the selection of his successor and to the continuation of active struggle against the Western powers.40 Yet, there is some evidence that Mao is profoundly disturbed by the fact that the next generation of Party leaders lack experience in revolutionary struggle,41 and it may not be sound to conclude that Mao's death will hardly cause a ripple in China. It must be remembered, after all, that one of the great weaknesses of the communist governments is the total absence of any provision for the orderly transfer of power.

On balance, however, it seems prudent to assume that the Chinese Communist regime will continue to have great political strength and, barring some severe domestic tension such as a major

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39 This view is expressed also by Robert Strausz-Hupe. cf., Strausz-Hupe and others, Prolonged Conflict, p. 135.  
41 Ibid.
famine, is most likely to retain its strength—even after the
death of Mao Tse-tung.

**ECONOMIC POWER OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

There can be little doubt that, over the years, Mao has had
a full appreciation of the economic weakness of China, but he and
his closest associates seem to view the process of economic devel-
opment as if it were a series of military campaigns.\(^{42}\) The emphasis
has changed from one area of the economy to another several times.

**Red China's Agricultural Dilemma**

Today, Communist China has the poorest diet in the world.\(^{43}\) Moreover, Communist Asia, accounting for about one-fourth of the
world's population, is responsible for two-thirds of the total food
deficit in the world today.\(^{44}\) During the agricultural crisis of
1959-1961 the average Chinese consumed no more than 1800 calories
per day. Even today, during a period of relative plenty, the aver-
age Chinese consumes only about 2000 poorly balanced calories per
day.\(^{45}\) Yet, a minimum adequate level for the people of the Far
East is considered to be about 2300 calories per day.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{42}\) Alexander Eckstein, "On the Economic Crisis in Communist

\(^{43}\) US Department of Agriculture, *The World Food Budget, 1970*,
p. 8 (hereafter referred to as "USDA, Food Budget").

\(^{44}\) USDA, *Food Budget*, p. 33.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., p. 8.

\(^{46}\) US Department of Agriculture, *Man, Land, and Food: Looking
Ahead at World Food Needs*, p. 38 (hereafter referred to as "USDA,
Man, Land, Food").
China's agricultural sector is in deep trouble today. This is suggested clearly by the following facts:

a. China has become a net importer of grain.\textsuperscript{47}

b. During the past 25 years, the increase in food output in all of Asia was only about 7\%.\textsuperscript{48}

c. China's population is increasing at a rate of 2-2.5\% per year and is projected to double by 1985 and to triple by about 2000.\textsuperscript{49}

The depth of China's agricultural problem, while not subject to precise definition, can be developed in greater detail.

China has several means of increasing the per capita supply of food. She can open new land to cultivation, import more food, increase the yield on presently available farm land, reduce the rate of population growth, or adopt some combination of all of these measures. Each of these measures is considered below.

China has about 260 million acres of cropland now under cultivation,\textsuperscript{50} but this area cannot be expanded much further without large outlays of very scarce capital.\textsuperscript{51} Since four-tenths of an acre is now required to support each Chinese, and since only marginal land is still available, it follows that perhaps as much

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., p. 75.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50}US Department of Agriculture, A Graphic Summary of World Agriculture, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{51}USDA, Man, Land, Food, p. 101.
as one new acre would be required to support each additional
Chinese. If it is assumed further that an outlay approximating
$150 per acre is required for clearing and necessary terracing,
it can be shown that $2.25 billion would be required annually to
provide for a population increase of 15 million. For a country
with a total national income of 35 to 40 billion dollars per year,52
such an expenditure would represent a severe drain on limited
government resources. Thus, it appears that opening sufficient
quantities of new land to cultivation would be a very expensive
solution to China's problem.

Importing additional food in the required quantities does
not appear to be a completely feasible solution either. China's
imports have been about $700 million per year in recent years;
exports are slightly larger, about $800 million.53 Food imports
between 1961 and 1963 varied between $300 million and $350 million.54
In 1965, grain imports rose to about six million tons which, at an
estimated price of $73 per ton (including transportation), must
have cost China nearly $450 million. Since China's domestic pro-
duction of grain has, in recent years, been about 180 million
tons,55 the present level of grain imports represents an addition

52 USDA, Food Budget, p. 20.
53 Van Cleef, op. cit., p. 209.
54 Yuan-li Wu, "China's Economy and its Prospects," Current
55 United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, The State
of Food and Agriculture, 1965, p. 21.
of about 3% to the level of her domestic production. Yet, China is committing almost 50% of her foreign exchange for less than 3% of her food. Considering the population growth, it seems that importing food cannot offer more than a temporary solution to China's agricultural problem. Even 100% of China's annual foreign exchange would not solve the problem for more than about two years.

An analysis of the problems involved in increasing yield per acre is more complex. Nevertheless, this option probably offers China the best possibilities for solving her agricultural dilemma. It must be recognized that there is a high degree of interdependence in applying the various modern methods of increasing yield per acre. For example, heavier fertilization is required for most improved plant strains; more moisture (or irrigation) is generally required when heavy fertilization is used; mechanized cultivation and harvesting may necessitate new strains having heavier stalks; and weed control and the use of insecticides becomes more important with improved varieties. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some rough estimates concerning increased yield by considering only the rate of application of fertilizers.

It has been estimated that by 1972, China will need 15 million metric tons of fertilizer; yet, in 1963, Peking's announced goal for the next ten years was an increase of only 8 to 10 million

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56 United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, Possibilities of Increasing World Food Production, p. 85 (hereafter referred to as "UN, Food Production").
metric tons. A shortage of 5 to 7 million tons of chemical fertilizer could mean an annual grain shortage of 50 to 70 million tons. At current prices, this much grain would cost China about $4.5 billion. The 5 to 7 million tons of fertilizer, if it were available in such large quantities, would cost China about $1.5 billion. However, the entire world production of chemical fertilizer in 1960-1961 was only about 28 million tons, and China would undoubtedly find it difficult to import such large quantities from the available market.

Suffice it to say that China has a long way to go in developing her chemical fertilizer industry. This is pointed up quite clearly when one considers that the rate of application of chemical fertilizer in Japan is about ten times as great as in China. Thus, while increased use of fertilizer, insecticides and modern technology offer a ray of hope for China's agricultural problems, this option will not be inexpensive or easy. These facts remain: China's yield per acre has increased only 7% in 25 years; in the meantime her population has increased by nearly 85%.

58The prospective return from the use of fertilizer is subject to the law of diminishing returns; however, at the lower rates of application now applicable in China, a good "rule of thumb" is that one pound of fertilizer can increase yield by as much as ten pounds of grain. cf., USDA, Man, Land, Food, p. 127.
59India has recently agreed to pay $250 per ton for chemical fertilizer. cf., The Washington Post, 11 Dec. 1965, p. A12. Thus, 6 million tons of fertilizer would cost about $1.5 billion.
60USDA, Man, Land, Food, p. 37.
61Japan uses about 230 pounds of chemical fertilizer per acre. cf., UN, Food Production, p. 108.
62Computed on the basis of a 2.5 percent increase compounded annually for 25 years.
Birth control may offer a long-range solution to the problem of the shortage of food. On the other hand, it must be remembered that China's people, predominantly farmers, cannot be educated in birth control measures overnight. Consequently, the prospect of halting China's population growth in less than one generation seems to be remote. In the meantime, the fertility of the Chinese peasant will in all probability, continue to exceed the fertility of his soil.

A solution to China's food shortage is not impossible, only improbable. In recent years several of the less developed countries have increased their domestic production of food by more than 4% per annum. Perhaps, by some combination of the options discussed above, China can find a way to feed her people, but the evidence renders this conclusion doubtful. If the current population projections materialize, it seems almost inconceivable that China can achieve a feat of this magnitude in the face of dwindling per capita land availability and a paucity of agricultural capital. It would appear, therefore, that agriculture is one Achilles heel of Red China. China's population is growing too fast for the land; the Peking government has not solved this problem and seems unlikely to do so within the next decade.

63 Japan has had the greatest success of any nation in lowering its growth rate quickly. Even so, it took Japan almost 15 years to lower its natural rate of population increase from about 2.5% per year down to the vicinity of 1% per year. cf., USDA, Man, Land, Food, US Department of Agriculture, Changes in Agriculture in 26 Developing Nations, 1948 to 1963, p. v.
Red China’s Industrial Power

Even though many of China’s mineral deposits have not been fully surveyed, or even located, it seems that China is moderately well endowed with natural resources. Moreover, the results of the more recent geological surveys, which have not been released to the Western world, could conceivably improve China’s resource picture.

Coal is relatively abundant. In fact, the largest known seam of coal in the world is located in Manchuria. Iron ore reserves appear adequate for many years. Additionally, significant ore reserves of copper, nickel, lead, molybdenum, tungsten, aluminum, antimony, tin, and other metals have been located in recent years. Although rich oil reserves are known to exist in Sinkiang province, the existing transportation net will not permit immediate exploitation of these resources. It appears, therefore, that natural resources do not present any significant restraint to China’s industrial growth.

China’s industrial power does not begin to match that of the United States, as may be seen by the production figures shown below.

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65 Hu, op. cit., p. 355.
67 Caryl P. Haskins, The Scientific Revolution and World Politics, pp. 92-93.
68 Griffith, op. cit., p. 221.
It should be remembered, however, that China's population is over three and one-half times that of the United States. Consequently, conclusions drawn from comparisons of total volume should be viewed with a degree of caution. Even so, there is reason to doubt that a per-capita comparison would be any more meaningful. The reason, of course, is that a relatively high proportion of U.S. production is channeled into consumer goods. This is not so in Red China.

Can Red China's industry support a major conventional war? While certain elements of the answer to this question remain clouded, the answer is a qualified, "yes." China's performance during the Korean War demonstrates amply that, given the manufactured materiel, a suitable logistic system can be organized. It seems, therefore, that the heart of the question lies in the transportation facilities and manufacturing output.

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There can be little doubt that transportation facilities are severely limited. In all of China there is only about 20,000 miles of railroad track.\(^7\) The highway system, most of which is primitive by modern standards is estimated at less than 280,000 miles.\(^7\) Yet, during the Sino-Indian border fighting in 1962, China again demonstrated an ability to support the combat operations of several divisions, albeit for a limited time. Moreover, there is evidence that China is building new roads along the Sino-Indian Border and in northern Burma.\(^7\) Thus, within limits, transportation does not seem to offer a major bottleneck to major military operations along China's periphery.

Can China's industry provide the necessary war materiel to support a major conventional war near China's borders? Again, the answer appears to be a qualified "yes," and again, the duration of the military operation would have an important bearing on the determination. Red China's petroleum industry has expanded a great deal in the last few years and there is evidence that, while the petroleum situation is tight, China is almost self-sufficient in petroleum products.\(^7\) Small arms ammunition and light artillery shells are produced in large quantities, and some unmarked small arms are

\(^7\)\textit{Ibid.}
available for export. Moreover, China is given the capability of producing tanks and some models of jet aircraft.\textsuperscript{74} Undoubtedly, there are shortages in truck transport and some electronic equipment; the entire automobile industry in China produces less than 23,000 trucks per year.\textsuperscript{75} But, it does not seem appropriate to assume that the Chinese would, in all circumstances, be denied Soviet assistance. The Soviets helped China during the Korean War and are sending military aid to North Vietnam. It is prudent, therefore, to assume that Chinese industry, perhaps with some Soviet aid, can support conventional type wars on a large scale.

\textit{Future Prospects}

The question may be asked, what of the future? Where will China's economy be in ten or fifteen years? The experience of the Great Leap is a persuasive indication that, without Soviet aid, China is unable to maintain the 8-10\% annual rate of economic growth which was achieved during the First Five Year Plan. Even though China has modified her concept of unbalanced economic growth and is now pushing the fertilizer, petroleum, and machine tool industries,\textsuperscript{76} several of China's major policies seem to be inhibiting

\textsuperscript{76}Barnett, \textit{Challenge}, p. 45.
her economic progress. In the first place, the policy of self-reliance restricts trade and bans foreign investment. This, in turn excludes foreign technicians and skilled workers who are sorely needed in China. Additionally, with reduced trade, a favorable balance of foreign exchange is more difficult to achieve. Second, China's rather obvious obsession with attaining a nuclear warfare capability is costing about a half billion dollars per year, much of which requires industrial imports from the Free World, thus using scarce foreign exchange. These costs can be expected to rise sharply as the program moves into the production and deployment phases. More important, perhaps, is the fact that the extremely scarce scientific talent devoted to the nuclear program is not being devoted to industrial growth and expansion. Finally, China's acrimonious polemic with the Soviet Union has resulted in a hardening Soviet position toward aid to China. In fact, by late 1964, Soviet deliveries of complete industrial plants and machinery had dropped to one-fortieth of the 1959 level.

In passing, it should be pointed out that the foregoing policies which tend to dampen economic growth can be explained most easily in terms of China's militant foreign policy which, it seems, dominates domestic economic policy.

Based on China's demonstrated performance during the First Five Year Plan, but allowing for the dampening effect of current policies it seems prudent to grant China a probable economic growth rate of 5-7% during the next decade. China's gross national product (GNP) in 1975 would, therefore, be estimated at approximately $71 billion, or an increase of 90% over the 1964 level. Considering the projected population increase, the per capita share of the GNP would rise only 50%; thus, per capita income would still remain less than $100 per year—a figure which does not portend instant economic plenty.

MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a unified force consisting of ground, air, and naval forces whose combined active-duty strength is approximately 2.5 million men.

The Army

The Army contains about 2.3 million men organized into 117 combat divisions and 30 field armies. There are about four armored divisions, 2 airborne divisions, and a few well-equipped mountain

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80 This judgment may be optimistic; some authorities have assessed the probable range at 3-7% per year. cf., Morton H. Halperin & Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China & Arms Control, p. 33.
81 16% compounded annually for 11 years from a base figure of $37.5 billion in 1964 is equal to $71 billion.
82 An annual growth rate of 2.25% is assumed for the period.
83 The Institute For Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1964-65, pp. 9-10 (hereafter referred to as "The Institute, Mil. Balance").
divisions in Tibet. The balance of the combat divisions are infantry divisions and are adequately equipped with small arms, mortars, rocket launchers, recoiless rifles, light and medium artillery, and in some cases tanks—all of which are now produced in China. Ammunition for these weapons is also manufactured in China. 84

For all this, however, the Army has major problems. Logistic support is limited; equipment is generally World War II Soviet equipment; maintenance is poor; and there are severe shortages of heavy artillery and trucks. Radar and electronic communications equipment are primitive. Airlift capability is severely limited—perhaps a few battalions. 85

For the most part, the Chinese army has not had any recent combat experience. In fact, with few exceptions combat experience is limited to battalion commanders and more senior officers. Nevertheless, the army is well trained and combat-ready. During the Sino-Indian fighting in 1962, there was no evidence of poor leadership or lack of initiative in the lower elements of the PLA. 86

The Navy

The Navy is the weakest element of the PLA. While its total strength is about 136,000 men, its capabilities are severely limited.

84Ibid., p. 9.
85Ibid.
86Griffith, op. cit., p. 232.
The navy includes approximately 28 submarines, 4 destroyer escorts, and 800 other vessels including patrol boats and some high-speed torpedo boats. Thus, the navy can provide light coastal defense, but only a primitive amphibious capability. The principal threat to U.S. forces is, of course, the submarine fleet.

The Air Force

In 1960 the PLA air force was the third most powerful in the world, but by 1965 it had seriously deteriorated and is largely obsolete. The total strength of the air force is about 90,000 men and 2300 aircraft. Most of these are MIG 15's and 17's with a much smaller number of MIG 19's and a few MIG 21's. There is also a light bomber force which consists mainly of IL 28's (Beagles). The average flying time for pilots is probably less than 10 hours per month—the main restriction being the availability of jet fuel and aviation gasoline. While the air force has, in the past, had difficulty with maintenance and repair parts, the PRC is now credited with the capability of manufacturing MIG 21's and repair parts for older aircraft.

In assessing the effectiveness of the air force, it is worth recalling that when the Nationalist and the Communist air forces

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87 The Institute, Mil Balance, p. 10.
89 Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control, p. 37 (hereafter referred to as "Halperin & Perkins, Arms Control").
fought over the Taiwan Straits in 1958, the aircraft kill ratio was 16:1 in favor of the Nationalists. Indeed, the majority of the Nationalist victories occurred before they were equipped with U.S. Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.  

Nuclear Weapons

Red China has entered the nuclear arms race twenty years and 50,000 weapons behind the United States. Yet, this should provide little cause for complacency on our part. The PRC's first nuclear test in October 1964 consisted of an implosion fission device using U-235, rather than plutonium, as the fissionable material. This type of triggering technique and the fissile material were both more advanced than the West expected. In consequence, many analysts and scientists have advanced their opinion of Chinese nuclear capabilities; some have predicted a thermonuclear capability by 1969. In the meantime, the Chinese capability to produce nuclear weapons is estimated to be a little less than one bomb per month. If this is so, China should be able to carry out a limited test program and also stockpile about 30 weapons in the next three to five years.

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90 Griffith, op. cit., p. 225.
92 The Institute, Mil. Balance, p. 8.
93 Powell, op. cit., p. 140.
94 Griffith, op. cit., p. 219.
The question of what kind of force de frappe the Chinese may elect to build will be discussed below. It is important to recognize, however, that options do exist, and limited resources will force the Peking leadership to make decisions now which will limit their future capabilities. It stands to reason that a warhead configured for air delivery cannot function in an MRBM or an ICBM.

It is generally conceded that China has the capability now, based on its two nuclear tests, to deliver airborne nuclear weapons with her short-range light bombers, the Il 28's. The status of development of an MRBM is less clear. Since the Chinese have developed a missile range in Sinkiang, it can be assumed that they have fired test missiles. Prudence suggests, therefore, that an MRBM capability be assumed within the next two to four years.

The information in open literature concerning development of an intercontinental bomber or an ICBM is so limited that any judgment borders on speculation. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the cost of developing a modern intercontinental bomber in the United States is nearly one billion dollars, and the cost of developing our earlier ICBM's--Atlas and Titan--was between one and two billion dollars each. A project of this magnitude and complexity cannot be completed in a short period of time, such as two or three years. This judgment, which considers the difficulties of

95 The Institute, Mil. Balance, p. 9.
96 Halperin and Perkins, Arms Control, p. 34.
design, allocation and mobilization of resources, construction of a prototype, testing, modification of design, tooling, production, and personnel training, suggests that an effective intercontinental nuclear strike force cannot be deployed in a combat-ready condition before the 1975 to 1980 time frame.

If the Chinese decide to opt for an ICBM force, they will surely have to fire test missiles. In view of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would allow China to use any part of Soviet territory as a missile range--nor would the Chinese want the Soviets to know too much about the Chinese program. Therefore, it seems almost certain that their first long range tests will be conducted over the ocean and promptly detected by Western electronic devices. Given the current state of development of the Nike X, and projecting from this an improved capability to deploy an ABM defense, it seems unlikely that Communist China will be able to present a serious military threat to the continental United States during the next ten to fifteen years.

From the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that the PLA has the capability of:

a. Maintaining internal order.

b. Mounting limited ground and air operations along the periphery of the Chinese borders.

c. Providing a powerful defensive force against invasion by the Chinese Nationalists, or others.

d. Threatening Asian neighbors with military intervention and nuclear blackmail.
CHAPTER 5

RED CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Considering that Chinese logic has long been an enigma to most Westerners it seems prudent, insofar as practical, to analyze China's foreign policy based on her past actions and demonstrated performance. In so doing, it is believed that projections of future Chinese actions will be more understandable and reliable.

In dealing with Chinese foreign policy, the issues involving her relations with minor powers in the Far East will be treated only lightly and on a collective basis. This is considered appropriate, not because China's relations with her smaller neighbors are unimportant, but only because the central issue of this paper is a determination as to whether China is willing to go to war to attain her goals. A war of any appreciable magnitude or duration would, most certainly, involve at least one of the other major powers in the Far East.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

If the Chinese people, both Communist and Nationalist, have learned nothing else, they have learned well that the Western democracies are opposed to actions which would place Red China in a position of hegemony in Asia. Moreover, even the Western Communist states seem less than completely sympathetic with China's objectives.¹

Chinese Policy Toward the Bordering States

Among the authorities on Far Eastern affairs, there is substantial agreement that China seeks a ring of buffer states friendly to China and politically alienated from the West.\(^2\) There seems to be less agreement as to whether China seeks to annex the border states or simply to convert them to Chinese vassals, responding neither to the Soviet Union or the United States.

If China were seeking annexation, it would seem anomalous for her to sign border treaties with Nepal, Sikkim, and Burma, as she has done recently. Then there is the question of whether the border states, most of whom are economically weak, would be an asset or a liability. Only a few would be capable of exporting food, and this would be only a small fraction of China's requirement. Many of the bordering states would constitute an economic liability.

On the other hand, it can be argued that China has recently annexed Tibet. However, is this not a special case? Mao considers the Tibetans to be Chinese people. In one case involving non-Chinese people, the PLA did in fact withdraw. The PLA left North Korea in late 1953 and 1954 without any attempt to annex any part of North Korea. Admittedly, the Chinese may have withdrawn from

Korea under pressure from the Soviet Union; this point is not clear at this time. Yet, the fact remains—the Chinese did withdraw from Korea.

Moreover, the Chinese are undoubtedly aware that if they try to force communism on reluctant neighbors, there is a risk that these neighbors will turn to the United States for aid. This could lead to new American bases and military aid.

In view of the past record and the weight of the arguments, it seems reasonably certain that China does not seek annexation of all her border states, but she probably does wish to annex those areas she considers as former Chinese territory. In any case, it seems certain that she believes that a ring of buffer states will provide a degree of protection from invasion.

Trade As An Instrument of Foreign Policy

For over a century China's millions have, as potential customers, been a powerful lure to the trading nations of the world. Yet, for the most part, China's poverty and her failure to reach economic maturity have stifled her ability to develop any significant leverage in the markets of the world. This is not to say that her trade has always been unimportant to the more industrialized countries who rely heavily on foreign trade. As pointed out in Chapter 2, China's trade has not been unimportant; but one must

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distinguish between importance, in the sense of a source of profit, and leverage, in the sense of controlling strategic materials—as in the case of controlling the oil of the Middle East.

In recent years China's trading position in the world has not been helped by the sudden reorientation of her markets. At the end of World War II, China, then under control of the Nationalists, was not trading with the Communist countries. Yet, ten years later, eighty-two percent of China's foreign trade was conducted within the Communist bloc. During the next ten years, that is by 1965, China's trade with Soviet bloc has dropped markedly as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Thus, China has not been able to build up any enduring markets; she has been forced, again, to shift the bulk of her trade toward the Free World, and these sudden shifts do not promote economic leverage.

There is still another aspect of China's attempt to use trade as an instrument of foreign policy, and this concerns the type of goods China can now trade. In the first place, China can no longer export food to the hungry underdeveloped countries; she has become a major importer of food. In this connection, China has imported some of the less expensive grains and "dumped" large quantities of the more expensive grains into Southeast Asian markets. This practice, along with other instances of "dumping," has not helped China's image as a responsible trading partner. In the second place, China

4A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and the Peace of Asia: Challenge to American Policy, p. 221 (hereafter referred to as "Barnett, Challenge")
is unable to export significant quantities of machinery or industrial goods to the underdeveloped countries who, like China, seek industrialization. Finally, the goods which China is able to export, mainly primary products and luxury-type consumer commodities, are not needed or wanted in the underdeveloped countries. For all of these reasons, China is unable to develop any significant economic leverage on her main political targets—the emerging nations of the world. Instead, China is forced to turn to the "imperialist" countries for her food and industrial imports. Consequently, to maintain any semblance of a favorable balance of trade, she must export to many of these same countries. For example, it seems certain that China would not continue to endure the British "thorn" in Hong Kong if trade through Hong Kong did not serve the overall economic interests of Peking.

It seems clear, therefore, that China cannot use foreign trade as an effective instrument of her foreign policy. She simply lacks the necessary economic strength.

The Overseas Chinese

Without counting the residents of Taiwan or Hong Kong, there are 11 to 15 million Chinese who have left mainland China and now live overseas. About 90% of all overseas Chinese came from the two southern provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung. Almost all of these

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\(^5\) Halperin & Perkins, Arms Control, pp. 41-47, passim.
people now reside in Southeast Asia. The following chart lists those countries whose population includes at least five percent overseas Chinese.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Chinese Population</th>
<th>% of Total Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>2,365,000</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>965,000</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2,360,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysian Borneo</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>780,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several of the Southeast Asian countries are concerned over the political significance of their overseas Chinese. This concern stems from their strong economic position, their clanishness, their close linkage with the homeland, and the extent to which they can be manipulated from Peking.

Chinese governments have long held that Chinese residing abroad are Chinese citizens forever; while they may hold dual citizenship, they cannot lose their Chinese citizenship. This is the principle of *jus sanguinis*. In fact, the Constitution of the People's Republic of China accommodates this principle by stating:

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Article 98

The People's Republic of China protects the just rights and interests of Chinese who live abroad.

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7 Data extracted from Barnett, *Challenge*, p. 176.
9 Ibid., p. 183.
Article 103

It is the sacred duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend the motherland.10

By exerting pressure on the overseas Chinese through foreign branches of the Bank of China and relatives at home, Peking maintains a substantial source of foreign exchange and a valuable source of intelligence information.11 The Peking regime takes care to assure that monetary gifts to relatives and investment capital sent to the homeland are safeguarded. Interest payments on investment capital are given a priority.12

Certainly, the future role of the overseas Chinese cannot be readily discerned. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that Peking will exploit these people whenever it seems desirable. It appears, therefore, that Malaysia and Thailand, both of whom have a high proportion of Chinese, would be well advised to take steps to assimilate these Chinese into their own societies as rapidly as feasible. Obviously, this cannot be done today, or even tomorrow; it may take a generation or more. Yet, at present, nearly

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11Barnett, Challenge, pp. 193, 197.
75% of the overseas Chinese were born outside of China and in the
country in which they now reside. Thus, these Chinese should be at
least partially susceptible to enlightened leadership and policies
designed to reduce their linkage and loyalty to Peking. In the mean-
time, prudence suggests that the non-communist governments of South-
east Asia maintain a high degree of vigilance with respect to these
built-in fifth columns.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Use of Conventional Military Power

However bellicose their official statements and serious warn-
ings may seem, the record shows that Peking has acted with consid-
erable restraint and caution in the use of military force. While
the Chinese have used their conventional forces as an instrument
of foreign policy, they have, with two types of exception, limited
the amount of force exerted—both in duration and magnitude. A
brief examination of China's use of military power should serve to
confirm these statements.

It is true that China used major force to subdue Tibet in 1962.
This was, perhaps, the clearest example of overt military aggression
since the end of World War II. In this case, however, Peking
believed that there was no danger of intervention from an outside
power, and events proved this assessment to be correct. Thus,

14 Ibid.
we may cite Tibet as one exception to China's limited use of military power. Moreover, we should recognize that China may again use her military power in any case where she does not expect military intervention from an outside power—particularly a nuclear power.

It is also true that China used major military force in Korea in 1950. This is the second exception to China's limited use of military force. In retrospect, it appears that China acted defensively in Korea. The Peking government was less than two years old. They probably believed that if the United States were permitted to destroy the North Korean government, the U.S. might not stop at the Yalu River and would then be encouraged to aid the Nationalists, their ally, in returning to the mainland.15 Thus, the Chinese fought to maintain the buffer state of North Korea. It can be argued that Peking believed that intervention was not so dangerous as non-intervention. It appears, therefore, that China will incur the risks of confrontation with a major power to protect her own national security and, perhaps, to preserve her ring of buffer states.

In all other cases, however, the Peking regime has carefully measured the risks involved, and has used her conventional power only to a limited extent. Even in the Sino-Indian fighting in 1962, the operation was limited in objective and duration, and the Chinese withdrew and offered to negotiate before any major power had time to intervene. By this carefully measured military operation, the Chinese gained four advantages. First, they secured control of that

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15 Halperin and Perkins, op. cit., p. 81.
part of Ladakh which dominates the strategic road from Tibet to Sinkiang. Second, they demonstrated to all Asians that China is a major power that cannot be ignored. Third, they have retarded India's economic growth by forcing her to increase her defense expenditures. Finally, China has demonstrated that the Chinese army is a formidable force capable of limited offensive action beyond her borders. Yet, for all this, China did not attack India with reckless abandon. The Chinese action was carefully measured.

Nuclear Strategy

There are many in the Western world who hold the view that China does not understand the magnitude of the destruction which would result from a nuclear war. From this opinion it is frequently argued that Peking's view of nuclear war is not rational. This image of China is supported by Peking's aggressive statements regarding nuclear warfare. The following passages from Lin Piao's recent speech serves to confirm this image of irrational aggressiveness.

Like a vicious wolf, it is bullying and enslaving various peoples, plundering their wealth, encroaching upon their countries' sovereignty, and interfering in their internal affairs. It is the most ferocious common enemy of the people of the world. . . . Even if U.S. imperialism brazenly uses nuclear weapons, it cannot conquer the people, who are indomitable. . . . The spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapons than the physical atom bomb. . . . War can temper the people

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16 V. C. Trivedi, "The Defence of India," Peace of Asia, p. 131.
and push history forward. . . . The naval and air superiority you [the U.S. imperialists] boast about cannot intimidate the Chinese people, and neither can the atomic bomb you brandish at us. If you want to send troops, go ahead, the more the better. We will annihilate as many as you can send, and can even give you receipts.  

The Soviets have tried to reinforce this picture of irrational Chinese leadership. To some extent they have been successful. Nevertheless, there are many clear indications that the Soviets are trying to distort the Chinese position on nuclear war. The central issue in the Sino-Soviet polemic regarding nuclear war does not stem from any difference of opinion regarding the destructiveness of nuclear war; they are arguing over the likelihood of nuclear war growing out of communist support of wars of national liberation. The Chinese deny that there is any substantial risk in supporting just wars of national liberation, and they seem to believe they can concurrently, deter a general world war. The Chinese view is summarized as follows:

The leaders of the C.P.S.U. hold that with the appearance of nuclear weapons there is no longer any difference between just and unjust wars. . . . They hold that with the appearance of nuclear weapons the oppressed peoples and nations must abandon revolution and refrain from waging just popular revolutionary wars and wars of national liberation. . . .

In short, according to the leaders of the C.P.S.U., with the emergence of nuclear weapons, the contradiction between the socialist and the imperialist camps, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries, and the

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contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism have all disappeared. . . . They regard the contradictions in the contemporary world as boiling down to a single contradiction, that is, their fictitious contradiction between the so-called common survival of imperialism and the oppressed classes and nations on the one hand, and their total destruction on the other.19

Regarding the risks of escalation the Chinese hold:

In recent years, certain persons have been spreading the argument that a single spark from a war of national liberation or from a revolutionary people's war will lead to a world conflagration destroying the whole of mankind. What are the facts? Contrary to what these people say, the wars of national liberation and the revolutionary people's wars that have occurred since World War II have not led to world war. The victory of these revolutionary wars has directly weakened the forces of imperialism and greatly strengthened the forces which prevent the imperialists from launching a world war and which defend world peace. Do not the facts demonstrate the absurdity of this argument?20

Thus, it seems clear that the Chinese, in reality, are not seeking a nuclear war; they simply refuse to shrink from supporting wars of national liberation which, they believe, engender only a slight risk of nuclear war.


But there is still another question. Does Peking really understand how destructive nuclear war would be, or is the regime acting in ignorance? In 1964, during his trip to Africa, Chou En-lai was asked if it were true that "...in the event of a nuclear war China feels she is less vulnerable than any other country on the globe and that she would hope to emerge victorious from such a war which might destroy the rest of the world?" Chou replied:

...this is fabrication pure and simple. ... If a nuclear war breaks out, China would lose more people than would other countries. ... It is with ulterior motives that imperialists and certain other persons unscrupulously have distorted China's position and made widespread propaganda about it.21

Probably because the Chinese have not had an adequate deterrent to nuclear war, they seem less willing than the Soviets to place undue emphasis on nuclear deterrence. Peking has found it expedient to proclaim that communism and China could survive a nuclear war, but in so stating they face the dilemma of not overstressing the destructiveness of nuclear war. They have discussed this problem, but their rationale points up their appreciation of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Peking has stated:

We hold that in order to mobilize the masses of the people against nuclear war and nuclear weapons it is necessary to inform them of the tremendous destructiveness of these weapons. It would be patiently wrong to underestimate this destructiveness. However, U.S. imperialism is doing its

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21 Interview with Agence France Presse as reported in Peking Review, No. 7, 14 Feb. 1964, p. 16.
utmost to disseminate dread of nuclear weapons in pursuit of its policy of nuclear blackmail. In these circumstances, while Communists should point out the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, they should counter U.S. imperialist propaganda of nuclear terror by stressing the possibility of outlawing them and preventing nuclear war; they should try and transmute the people's desire for peace into righteous indignation at the imperialist policy of nuclear threats and lead the people to struggle against the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war. In no circumstances must Communists act as a voluntary propagandist for the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail. We hold that the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail must be thoroughly exposed and that all peace-loving countries and people must be mobilized on the most extensive scale to wage an unrelenting fight against every move made by the U.S. imperialists in their plans for aggression and war. We are deeply convinced that, by relying on the united struggle of all forces defending peace, it is possible to frustrate the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail. This is the correct and effective policy for achieving a ban on nuclear weapons and preventing a nuclear war.  

While the foregoing statement may reveal a gigantic bluff or, perhaps, an inaccurate assessment of U.S. will and resolve, it also reveals a keen appreciation for the destructiveness of nuclear weapons.

There is one final point to be made with respect to China's appreciation of the hazards of nuclear war; this point concerns China's vulnerability. The bulk of China's industry is clustered in a few, perhaps less than twenty, major population centers along her eastern coasts and in Manchuria. Without these industrial centers China's modest economy would be reduced an unbelievably inadequate level; certainly the CCP's dream of great power status would be

destroyed for this generation. Peking's efforts in recent years to promote industrialization in the interior, away from the more vulnerable coastal population centers, underscores the regime's appreciation of their extreme vulnerability to U.S. nuclear armed air and sea power. Moreover, it seems certain that the Chinese leaders would bend a long way before jeopardizing their own infant nuclear production plants to U.S. air attacks. Thus, while China finds it necessary to belittle the importance of U.S. nuclear power, Peking certainly understands that there are very persuasive reasons why they cannot afford to press the United States too far.

One should now ask, "Why, if the Peking regime is aware of the risks involved in a nuclear war with the United States, do they alienate Moscow to the extent that the Soviet's nuclear umbrella may no longer extend over China?" A complete answer is both complex and lengthy, but it revolves around three principal points. First, the Chinese grew to doubt the mantle of Soviet nuclear protection after the Soviets failed to support China's offensive against Taiwan in 1958. This being so, the Chinese were less inclined to follow subserviently in the Soviet path. Second, by breaking away from the Soviet doctrine, the Chinese gained a greater degree of freedom in promoting wars of national liberation around the globe. This freedom of action permits the Chinese to vie with the Soviets for the leadership of the world communist movement. Finally, Mao--the old

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23 Barnett, Challenge, p. 49.
25 Ibid., p. 7.
student of the theory of dialectic materialism—believes, perhaps correctly, that by vigorously pursuing a position different from that of the Soviets, he can cause the Soviets to bend toward his view.

There is, perhaps, one final question which must be answered regarding Chinese nuclear strategy. What can China hope to gain by entering the nuclear race so far behind the Soviet Union and the United States? The answer lies in Peking's desire to make China a great power. More specifically, the regime needs the status of a nuclear power to gain its national objectives; they have so stated:

In the eyes of U.S. imperialism the countries of the world are divided into two categories: those which possess nuclear weapons and those which do not. The few nuclear powers, as a matter of course, are masters of the world, whereas the countries which do not possess nuclear weapons are, to quote Kennedy, irresponsible and unstable. . . . In other words, those countries which do not possess nuclear weapons and the broad masses of the people of the world must be left forever to the tender mercies of others, and doomed to be the object of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats.

There are more than 130 countries in the world. . . . It is absolutely impermissible for two or three countries to brandish their nuclear weapons at will, issue orders and commands, and lord it over in the world as self-ordained nuclear overlords, while the overwhelming majority of countries are expected to kneel and obey orders meekly, as if they were nuclear slaves.\(^\text{26}\)

Thus, Peking insists on diverting her precious industrial and technical resources into a costly nuclear weapons program. The only

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alternative Peking offers to their nuclear weapon program is the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons." 27

MAJOR POWERS IN ASIA

Sino-Soviet Relations

In 1950 the Soviet Union and the PRC signed a military alliance which bound them together under the Communist banner. 28 Yet, fifteen years later this alliance shows evidence of cracks from severe strain. While a history of the Sino-Soviet dispute is immensely interesting, only the most salient causes and the effects of the dispute can be included herein.

At the time of Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union--undisputed leader of the monolithic communist bloc--was still aiding revolts in the Philippines, Burma, and Malaya, but by the mid 1950's, Soviet influence in the Far East seemed to be waning. 29 Moreover, the United States' latest creation--SEATO--seemed to portend greater U.S. influence in the Far East. Khrushchev modified the previous Soviet policies toward Asia; he took a more moderate and sympathetic attitude toward neutralism, although as opportunities arose, he still opposed U.S. influence. 30 The Chinese viewed this softening of Russia's position with alarm and grew indignant as the Soviets extended

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27 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
large scale assistance to Indonesia, Burma, and India. Could it be that the Soviets were willing to compete with China for hegemony over Asia?

The Chinese grew more apprehensive as the Soviets failed to exploit the advantage gained by the successful Sputnik launching in 1957. Mao believed that Sputnik signalled a great strategic advantage. Addressing a conference in Moscow on 18 November 1957, Mao said:

'It is my opinion that the international situation has reached a new turning point... It is characteristic of the situation prevailing today, I believe, that the East wind is prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism are overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.'

If Peking was disillusioned over Moscow's failure to support their 1958 attack against the Nationalists in the Taiwan straits, they were embittered by Moscow's decision to withdraw all Soviet technicians in 1960. The dispute moved into the open at the Twenty-Second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1961. When Khrushchev attacked Albania for opposing his policies, China denounced Khrushchev. In early 1963, Peking was lashing out at Moscow's bungling in the Cuban missile crisis. The dispute has continued to grow more heated; in late 1963, the Peking Review announced:

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31 Mozingo, op. cit., p. 159.
33 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China in Perspective, p. 84.
34 Ibid.
Recently the Soviet press has stepped up its barrage of slanders against China. In September and October /1963/ it published no fewer than 430 commentaries, articles, and other items attacking the Communist Party.

Thus, it is clear that Moscow and Peking are flailing each other with words as they jockey in open competition for the leadership of the communist movement. Peking accuses Moscow of growing soft and betraying true Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The effect of the Sino-Soviet split has been the withdrawal of Soviet military, industrial, and nuclear assistance to China. Moreover, as the Sino-Indian fighting in 1962 has shown, the Soviets are unlikely to give support to China's aggressive military policies. More importantly, however, the threshold at which the Soviets are likely to come to the aid of China in any military situation has been raised substantially.36

The Chinese have deliberately pushed forward in this dispute, and the fact that they have pushed so far is undoubtedly a display of Chinese confidence.37 If from 1958 to 1963 Peking had been truly apprehensive about the possibility of a major attack by the U.S. (as they were in the early 1950's), it seems unthinkable that they would have alienated Moscow with such deliberation. However, the fact is that China has alienated Moscow, and it seems clear that in so doing, the Chinese have weakened their position in any confrontation with the United States.

37 Halperin, op. cit., Peace of Asia, p. 100.
Sino-Japanese Relations

The end of World War II left defeated Japan the bitter enemy of China, but by 1954 Chou En-lai conceded to visiting members of the Japanese Diet that China would like to conclude a peace treaty and reestablish diplomatic relations with Japan. However, there were conditions; Japan would have to loosen her ties with the United States and become truly independent. 38 Japan was not prepared to accept these conditions.

Again in 1955, China offered a peace treaty, repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war, and fishing rights on the condition that Japan restore diplomatic relations with Peking. 39 This offer stimulated great pressure on the Japanese government, but both Taipei and the United States exerted considerable leverage in Japan. Tiny Formosa continues to conduct more trade with Japan than mainland China with her hundreds of millions of people. 40

Peking was displeased when, in 1960, the Japanese renegotiated the Japanese-U.S. defense treaty. The Chinese press responded with violent attacks against Tokyo. 41

The fact is that China has made only limited progress by her alternate wooing and threatening actions. Peking seems to believe

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38Mozingo, op. cit., p. 160.
39Ibid.
40Ibid.
41Mozingo, op. cit., p. 160.
that the people of Japan hate both the United States and the Japanese government for their economic oppression. This is, of course, untrue. Moreover, China needs trade with Japan far more than Japan needs trade with China. As pointed out above, China has been forced to turn to the "imperialist" countries for food and industrial imports.

Thus, China has to accept trade--and the hopeful expectation of credit--on an unofficial basis with terms that are dictated almost entirely by Japan. It stands to reason, however, that if and when China can do without Japan's trade, Tokyo will come under increased pressure to eject U.S. influence from the Japanese islands. In view of China's economic weakness, this would seem to be more than a decade away. Chinese nuclear threats will probably prove ineffective so long as Japan remains behind the U.S. nuclear shield.

**Chinese Relations With Formosa**

The Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists are mortal enemies both of whom insist on being treated as the sole legal government of all of China.

Formosa, with her twenty-three U.S. supported divisions, will remain a thorn in Peking's side for so long as the U.S.

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42 Ibid., p. 164.
43 Ibid.
continues her financial support and neutralization of the Formosa Straits.

It must be clear to Peking, however, that if China were to choose to attack U.S. forces in South Korea or South Vietnam, the Nationalist divisions could provide substantial augmentation to U.S. forces. Moreover, if Peking were to send as many "volunteers" to Vietnam as could be supported logistically, it is probable that Taipei could be induced to send at least an equal number of volunteers providing, of course, they were supported by the U.S.

It appears, therefore, Taipei plays the role of a deterrent to any military adventurism on Peking's part. On the other hand, Taipei appears unable to project its power without U.S. agreement and help. Thus, in any test of military strength in Asia, Taipei, almost certainly, is destined to serve as a U.S. pawn.

Sino-Indian Relations

India, with her population of over 450 million, represents to China the only other serious contender for hegemony over Asia. Peking, undoubtedly, would prefer to see a communist government in India; judging this to be extremely unlikely, however, China has adopted a belligerent course designed to wreck India's economy and prove that in Asia, as elsewhere, democratic systems are doomed to fail—communism is the only way to success in Asia. The advantages

\[\text{\footnotesize \textbf{\textsuperscript{46}}V. C. Trevedi, op. cit., Peace of Asia, p. 131.}\]
accruing to China from her attack on India in 1962, were enumerated on pages 56 and 57 above. Additionally, India has been forced to double her investment in national defense, thus diverting investment capital from industrial growth to military expenditures. The Indian defense budget for 1963-1964 rose from about 2.5% of the GNP to over 5% of the GNP and consumed about 15% of India's annual foreign exchange.47

Any change in China's hostility toward India seems unlikely within the next decade. China is building both railroads and highways through Tibetan approaches to the plains of India. Whereas China can support only about fourteen divisions in Tibet now, this capability should double within a year.48 These activities by the Chinese do not portend a pacific relationship between India and China. Moreover, it should be expected that Peking will continue to exploit the Indian-Pakistani differences. In so doing, China will oppose India and try to pry Pakistan away from her anti-communist SEATO ally, the United States.

Chinese Relations With the United States

With the possible exception of the "thorn" on Formosa, Red China has chosen the United States her most bitter and enduring enemy. "Chosen" it seems, is an appropriate word; the United States harbors no malice toward the Chinese people. In fact, the United

48 Ibid., p. 135.
States has spent billions of dollars in defense of a free democratic China. But Peking, as all other communist powers, sees the United States—the powerful leader of the non-communist world—as a mortal enemy. Thus, militant Red China and the well-meaning United States seem destined to be locked in mortal combat until one or the other succumbs. Communist ideology is the most enduring obstacle to U.S. efforts to come to terms with Red China today. Moreover, there is little hope for any change in the near future. Mao and his followers seek change, ejection of U.S. influence from Asia, and expanded communist control. The United States seeks stability and status quo.

More specifically, the United States' objectives in the Far East are:

First, that the nations of the Far East, of Asia generally, should develop as free and independent countries according to their own views of how they should develop, although we would hope with increasing democratic structures.

Secondly, that the nations of the area should not threaten each other, or outside nations.

Thirdly, that no single Asian nation should either control or exert dominant influence over other nations of the area, either in the area as a whole or in any significant region of it.

Fourthly, that we would hope that the nations of the Far East and Asia would maintain and increase their ties to the West, in trade, in cultural respects, in education particularly to the maximum extent possible as a major means of knitting together a peaceful and stable world.

Certainly, these conflicting objectives should forewarn the United States of a protracted conflict in Asia.

49. William P. Bundy, "The United States and Asia," Peace of Asia, p. 71
50. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
CHAPTER 6

RED CHINA'S STRATEGIC OPTIONS

DEFINITION OF THE OPTIONS

With respect to the future use of military power as an instrument of foreign policy, China has essentially three strategic options.

First, China may continue to promote wars of national liberation while avoiding the employment of the PLA beyond her borders—except to preserve her ring of buffer states. This option could, of course, include opportunistic military adventures of limited scope (such as border skirmishes and threats of war). Essentially, this is the prolonged low-intensity conflict option.

Second, China could attempt to gain her objectives toward some Asian nation by deliberately provoking a conventional (limited) war. This type of conflict would almost certainly involve a nation which had taken a determined position against China's foreign aggressive policies. Thus, the United States, the ally of those who will stand up against communism, would most probably become involved in any conventional conflict started by China.

Finally, China could attempt to capitalize on her small nuclear capability by means other than threats against her Asian neighbors. In this case, for such an action to be rational, it would have to be designed in some way to trigger a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, China would be operating on the assumption that she would
emerge from the ashes of a general thermonuclear war as the major world power. At first glance, this option may seem absurd. It can be argued that it is not within the power of the Chinese to trigger a war between the U.S. and the USSR. But, would you be so certain if, during the height of the next U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the Chinese were to smuggle a nuclear weapon into New York harbor and another into Baltimore harbor and then detonate them both? It seems safe to reason that, under such circumstances, the likely U.S. response is far from clear.

Impossible, you say? Perhaps so, but it can be assumed that China has at least a few people who are adept at smuggling narcotics into the United States. If they were given an adequate budget by the PRC, could they not also smuggle two crates of "machinery" into the United States? Moreover, it is possible that China could devise an even more positive means of triggering a general nuclear war.

USE OF THE OPTIONS

Although it is repetitious, it serves a useful purpose to recall China's national objectives:

1. Build the PRC into a major world power.
2. Eject Western influence from the Far East.
3. Restore to China all territory.
4. Gain leadership of the world communist movement.

\[1\text{cf. ante, p. 18 for a complete statement of Chinese national objectives.}\]
e. Foster and assist revolutionary movements.

In considering China's strategic options, it should be recognized that China can employ the low-intensity warfare option against any non-communist country in Asia. In so doing, she may encounter the active opposition of the U.S., as in Vietnam today. The second and third options were, however, postulated in such a way as to infer that some type of confrontation with the U.S. is probably unavoidable.
CHAPTER 7

DOES RED CHINA WANT WAR?

FINAL ARGUMENTS

In light of the current events in Vietnam, there should be no doubt that China wants to engage in war by proxy. Her leaders have proclaimed to the world that China favors this type of warfare as an instrument of social reform. Yet, the extent to which China is willing to become directly involved is not clear.

The facts and the judgments indicate that China is too weak to fight a war with the United States and is acutely aware of this weakness. This conclusion stems from the following arguments:

a. China's agricultural sector is in deep trouble and the problem is not being solved.

b. China's industrial sector is relatively weak. While it is capable of supporting a limited war, it is vulnerable to U.S. air and naval power. Thus, prolonged support of a limited war is conditional and depends, to a large extent, on U.S. restraint in the use of its air power.

c. Logistic support and transportation facilities for the PLA are limited. Moreover, the air force is obsolescent, and the navy is weak.

d. China's nuclear capability cannot insure significant damage to the United States during the next decade.
e. China's trade is not effective in improving her power position.

f. Mao has never been inclined to fight a battle he is not sure of winning. Moreover, he has opposed gambling with the life of the nation.

g. China's aggressive role in seeking the leadership of the communist movement has resulted in alienating her nuclear ally and raising substantially the threshold at which the Soviets are likely to come to China's aid in any military situation.

h. China's past foreign policy seems to confirm that China has been seeking to avoid a military confrontation with the United States.¹

Those determinations which serve as contra-arguments are less numerous and less persuasive. They are:

a. China's main strength lies in her vast manpower. In the past, as in Korea, the Peking regime has used human wave tactics to offset their disadvantages in armament. Peking seems willing to do so again.

b. The Peking regime is aware of its advantage in centralized leadership and complete political control over the people as long as it can control the PLA.

¹Mozingo states that he "... can think of no instance where Chinese leaders have placed their mission to advance communism outside of China above their more immediate national interest." cf., David P. Mozingo, "China's Relations With Her Asian Neighbors," Current History, Vol. 47, Sep. 1964, p. 157.
c. Chinese leaders know that almost all communist regimes have come to power in the aftermath of war. The Peking regime may reason that a third world war would lead to a great expansion of communism and the downfall of capitalistic societies.\(^2\)

d. The Chinese leaders have great faith in their communist ideology and give a higher priority to the ideological goals than even the Soviets.\(^3\)

**UNCERTAINTIES, IMPOUNDERABLES, AND INCOMMENSURABLES**

In addition to the foregoing arguments, which suggest that a rational China should not want war with the United States, there are other factors and considerations. These aspects are unclear, perhaps, immeasurable, and may even be unknowable to the Western non-communist intellect.

The first uncertainty to be addressed is the aging Mao. Is he senile? Does he act with even the slightest degree of understanding of the United States? There is some evidence that Mao may be senile and, without the help of his staff, unable to converse intelligently with foreign visitors.\(^4\) Moreover, it should

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\(^2\) Lin Piao stated: "If the U.S. imperialists should insist on launching a third world war, it can be categorically stated that many more hundreds of millions of people will turn to socialism; the imperialists will then have little room left on the globe; and it is possible that the whole structure of imperialism will collapse." *cf.*, Lin Piao, "Article Commemorating V-J Day," Daily Report Far East Supplement, No. 171 (46), 3 Sep. 1965, p. 31.


be recalled that Mao has never visited a Western nation; at best, his second-hand knowledge of Western values and logic is clouded and imprecise. He grew up in an atmosphere of xenophobia, and it is conceivable that in his doddering age he has acquired a paranoiac outlook—perceiving the U.S.S.R., the U.S., and India aligned in some indescribable manner to destroy China. This could offer a different explanation of China's spoiling attack into India in 1962. In any case, if Mao is senile it does not augur well for a rational Chinese foreign policy.

There is another, perhaps related, aspect of China's present character which is unclear. There are recent rumblings coming out of China which suggest a degree of disaffection within the People's Liberation Army. We know that there has been friction between the political commissars and the younger post-revolutionary officers who advocate greater professionalism and less political control. We know also that the Chinese army and people are preparing for air attacks by the U.S. It seems likely that powerful new internal stresses will grow from the pressure the U.S. is exerting in Vietnam. If this is so, the contradiction may take the form of a struggle for political direction of the PLA. In other words, the gun may be trying to command the party. The results of such a struggle certainly would affect China's future foreign policy and, perhaps, her ability to control a hungry nation. While it would be sheer speculation to forecast how China's foreign policy might be affected, one

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can hope that the younger professionals would take a more moderate and realistic view of China's ability to eject the United States by force from Asia.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty lies in a consideration of the use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese leaders are aware that in any Sino-U.S. conflict there would be great pressure on the U.S. not to use nuclear weapons. 6 First, there is the question of world opinion against the use of nuclear weapons. Second, there is the tremendously important question of the Soviet reaction to U.S. use of nuclear weapons against China.

While it is true that the U.S. would be under great pressure not to employ nuclear weapons, the real danger may be that the Chinese leaders have convinced themselves that the U.S. would never use nuclear weapons in Asia. If this is the case, they may choose to confront the United States in a manner which would, from a U.S. viewpoint, make nuclear war unavoidable. The point to be made is that if there are no conditions under which the President of the United States would authorize the use of nuclear weapons in Asia, then cost-effectiveness planning in the Pentagon has not precluded the obvious waste of billions of dollars.

The most important question is, of course, "Will the Soviets stand by China against the United States in a nuclear confrontation?" It seems reasonable to assume that even the Soviets would

not know with certainty in advance of the specific circumstances and conditions. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. is not interested in seeing a nuclear armed China at her backdoor; if they were, they would still be helping China's nuclear program. As we know, the Soviets are not doing so. In fact, from a national viewpoint, the Soviets might enjoy seeing the United States knock out China's nuclear reactors and missile research facilities. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful that this important question is answerable with any degree of certainty.

CONCLUSIONS

Does Red China want war? It seems that the answer must be a qualified yes.

How much war does Red China want? On balance, it appears that China wants wars of national liberation—that is, war in the sense of her first strategic option. As Mao gets older, he is probably getting more impatient to see his lifelong dreams come to fruition. If the wars of national liberation are not successful in Southeast Asia, China probably will confront the United States (at least once) with the prospect of conventional war. But if the U.S. stands as determined as it did during the Cuban missile crisis, it would seem foolhardy for China to pursue her second strategic option--conventional war. China would probably back down and avoid a conventional (and perhaps one-sided nuclear) war with the United States.
The third strategic option--attempting to trigger a nuclear war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.--is viewed as an act of desperation. Certainly if China's complicity were discovered, she would be subject to destruction by both the Soviet Union and the United States. It seems, therefore, extremely unlikely that China would attempt to pursue her third strategic option.

In summary, it is concluded that China does not really want war, except for the case of proxy wars of national liberation.

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LT COL CE
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(Excellent coverage of the revolutionary period before 1949.)


(A comprehensive study of Red China. Readable, well documented, and of great value.)


(Extremely helpful background material.)


(A biased account which places China's "best foot forward.")


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(Of some value to this thesis.)


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