DISARMAMENT BEGINS TOMORROW; ARE WE READY?

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SUMMARY

Rationally, disarmament could not begin tomorrow because the US is currently involved in a fighting conflict, has active treaty commitments around the world, and maintains a deterrence against current threats to our national security.

As the fear of world destruction from nuclear weapons grew in the late 1950's, statesmen and scholars turned their attention toward the utopian general and complete disarmament. In 1962 both the US and USSR presented draft proposals for general and complete disarmament under strict international control to the UN and the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva for consideration.

The US proposal is an outline treaty which provides for across the board disarmament in three stages: Stage I calls for a 30 percent reduction in 3 years, Stage II a 35 percent further reduction in 3 years, and Stage III the remainder in 3 to 10 years. The great magnitude and complexity of the planning and world organization and direction required to implement the proposal are major factors that preclude the initiation of disarmament even with a willing East.

To support the long range planning necessary ultimately to achieve general and complete disarmament, the US must support international thinking, a degree of international government and law, and a UN Peace Force capable of keeping the peace. In spite of all efforts of the US and other members of the UN in this direction the anticipated results will not permit a lessening of US military commitments in the 1970's.
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The title alone should evoke a variety of remarks such as: How can we think of disarmament when there's a war in being and no peace in sight? or--How idealistic can you get? or even--This writer is with it; we hate all war (not to mention the personal inconveniences that go with it). Undoubtedly there are other thoughts; each is developed from one's heartfelt conception of disarmament and perhaps less on a factual knowledge of the subject.

In any event with the world military situation as it is today, the sound practical point is that disarmament could not begin tomorrow, or next month, or even next year. In fact, as disarmament concerns the two major military powers and their closest contenders, it is years away from realization. The subject is raised herewith because of its place in the announced objectives of the United States, its military implication with our national security, its popularity with many of the nations of the world, including the communist-oriented, and yet the world's failure to have much to show for its ardor.

We do not have to go far back in history to find a peace conference that Nicholas II, Czar of Russia, called in 1898 for the purpose of convincing the attending European nations to disarm. He was fearful that the rising nations would surpass Russia in military might and threaten his realm. Apparently his mistrust
was shared by each nation which in its final analysis decided to keep its military arms to meet issues impossible of political (or diplomatic) resolution, and the conference was completely unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the international system remained balanced, stable, and enduring and the storms of mistrust were taken care of through the operations of the gold standard, the market system, private enterprises, military defenses and the basic politics of representative governments.

After both World Wars the vanquished were disarmed and the victors individually reduced their arms to varying degrees. Nations talked arms reduction, and arms control (without any reduction) became a favorite topic for writers. The preamble to the United Nations Charter emphasizes the consideration of all measures for strengthening the peace to save "succeeding generations from the scourge of war." It was most appropriate that the first resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1946 called for the elimination, under effective international control, of all atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. The United States proposed under the Baruch Plan to destroy its few atomic weapons and to place the development and control of atomic materials under the international authority of the UN. Hindsight tells us that atomic disarmament was most feasible technically at that time, but it was not politically palatable to the USSR.

As the arms race continued into the late 1950's scholars, diplomats, and politicians began to advance the thesis of complete
and general disarmament. In presenting the subject to the US Senate in 1959, then Senator Hubert Humphrey advanced the point that he did not see why "disarmament and defense cannot be made the inseparable twins of national security policy." In 1960 the United Nations unanimously resolved that general and complete disarmament was the major goal in achieving world peace. It considered the lesser objective of arms control as only a collateral measure. Disarmament seminars and symposiums sponsored by educational institutions and contractors became increasingly popular and the scholarly dissertations on the possibilities of nuclear war and arms control came off the presses by the carload. One publication sold 50,000 copies instead of the 3,000 you might have expected for such a scholarly work.

In 1961 President Kennedy indicated publicly that general and complete disarmament was a major objective of the United States. In September he presented in person to the UN General Assembly a proposal for general and complete disarmament under strict international control. One day later President Kennedy brought to fruition more than a year of planning when he established the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This event marked the first time a government had set up a full-fledged independent agency to devote its total efforts to seeking a responsible reduction in arms and ultimate disarmament.

The USSR was not silent on the subject of disarmament. It became another of the peaceful principles of Communist propaganda.
In 1961, Premier Khrushchev was quoted as saying, "Comrades, if prevention of a new war is the question of questions, then disarmament is the best way to do it."

Both the US and the USSR culminated the work of the preceding years by formally submitting, in 1962, their treaty proposals to both the UN and the newly formed Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). Minor amendments have been submitted by each nation and today these still represent their respective offers. The two draft treaties are similar in many respects and yet widely divergent in other respects. The ENDC, in session in Geneva seven times since 1962, has continued its attempt to perfect each treaty separately with the objective of presenting finally a choice between two workable treaties rather than attempting an impossible amalgamation.

The UN Disarmament Commission was created in 1952 and it has accomplished very little since. It's do-nothing record was assured when in 1958 its membership was enlarged to include all members of the UN. The unwieldy commission has been called into session only twice. In 1960 a meeting of the commission requested by the US proved so unproductive that the ENDC was formed outside the UN in 1962 for consideration of the disarmament proposals. Knowing that the UN commission could do little harm and might advance Red propaganda, the USSR requested a session in 1965. From April through June the meeting permitted the airing of many positions and opinions not only by the major nuclear powers and other members of the ENDC.
but also smaller nations like Albania and Yugoslavia. Surprisingly, two resolutions were passed by the commission. The first, and only significant resolution according to the USSR representative, called for a world disarmament conference to be held in the near future. The second resolution urged the ENDC to resume its work as soon as possible with priority to be given to a nuclear non-proliferation agreement and a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The Soviet sincerity in the pursuance of its propaganda forays has been unquestionable, and the insincerity of their desire for peace has also been unquestionable. The normal obstructionist activities of the USSR representatives during the past five years were broken by the signing of the "hot line" communications agreement and the limited nuclear test ban treaty in 1963. These arms control measures have been the only encouragement experienced by the US in its disarmament relations with the USSR.

Now that we have briefly traced the course of disarmament as a subject, let us attempt to reconcile its inclusion in our present foreign policy. Today our commitment in South Vietnam is testimony of the United State's dedication to the protection of freedom, the improvement of the dignity of man, and the right of all peoples to uncoerced self-determination. On the other hand, President Johnson's peace offensive does not truly create a paradox because it is vocal evidence of our desire for peace and our willingness to try to negotiate all disputes. Most of us will want to add the proviso: as
long as we do not jeopardize our national security and sacrifice the basic ideals of our national purpose.

In spite of the few nations with ambitions of territorial conquest, the mistrust among nations is the primary justification for armaments. Switzerland and Costa Rica have views and special situations which have permitted them to rise above this mistrust; these are worthy of study but not universal application to achieve disarmament.

The removal of mistrust among nations is therefore the primary consideration in disarmament. The general idea is to remove the armaments with which a country could act against another and, equally as important, substitute a peaceful means by which disputes and grievances can be settled. Disarmament, however, is not an end in and of itself (contrary to what many would have you believe), but instead is visualized as one of the major means by which we can achieve a stable, free, and warless world. One of the master propagandists from behind the Iron Curtain ably states that "a world without arms and war could launch a war against poverty, ignorance, and backwardness."

Like the utopian end, the means is a long term proposition which deserves a healthy and competent research and investigative program. The United States is giving the subject an emphasis which unfortunately is not matched by any other nation.

In order to continue our analysis of US preparedness to institute disarmament measures we must determine whether the US has a
comprehensive, realistic treaty proposal that could be put into
effect tomorrow. In other words, assuming the peaceful settlement
of the Vietnam conflict, what if the USSR suddenly announced that
it was only interested in peacefully developing its own "great
society" and that it was prepared to accept the terms of the US
disarmament proposal of 1962? Once the initial disbelief has been
overcome and the long standing mistrust of the USSR at least set
aside, the US, the USSR and the UN would be committed to seemingly
never-ending negotiations before any disarmament action could be
taken. The US proposal with its three amendments is a comprehen-
sive, realistic, outline draft of a treaty for general and com-
plete disarmament. However, it is only an outline of about thirty
pages in length which requires the addition of voluminous annexes
of procedures and data that must be formulated and agreed to by all
concerned. Since the submission of the proposal to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee in 1962, the ACDA, with the support
of other US government agencies and contractors, has been researching
the problems of arms inspection and verification and the warless
world environment. Recently priority was placed on another aspect
of the disarmament proposal—preventing the spread of nuclear weapons--
and the ACDA prepared a draft treaty which was presented to the ENDC
in August 1965 for consideration.

Realizing that there are complexities and omitted details which
do not permit immediate disarmament actions, what is the scope of the
US proposal for general and complete disarmament? Briefly, the
outline treaty provides for disarmament in three stages with each of the first two stages being allocated three years for completion and the third stage unspecified—three, five, ten years or whatever is mutually determined necessary. Stage I calls for a 30 percent cut across the board in all types of weapons, both conventional and nuclear, and for a like reduction in all weapons production facilities. As for uniformed men, the US and the USSR would be reduced to 2.1 million each and other specified countries would be limited to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. Smaller countries would be limited to 100,000 men or one percent of their population, whichever was higher. The International Disarmament Organization is to be established early in Stage I, and it is to function within the framework of the UN, ensuring the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken by all parties to the treaty. For Stage II a 50 percent cut across the board of the remaining weapons, facilities, and personnel is required. During Stage II an as yet unspecified UN Peace Force is to be established and the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is to be accepted by all parties. The remainder of the total disarmament is to be completed in Stage III with the retention by each country of only the national police forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of its citizens. The UN Peace Force is to be progressively strengthened until it has sufficient armed forces and armaments that no state can challenge it. There are further requirements that all militarily
significant states become parties to the treaty before or during Stage I and that all states possessing armed forces and armaments become parties to the treaty before the completion of Stage II.

The organization and direction of an operation such as general and complete world disarmament should transcend by far in complexity and time required the demands of any nation's or alliance of nations' war effort in history. It will influence practically every nation, and the mistrust possible throughout all the stages could become earthshaking until the 100 percent nuclear disarmament is achieved. For these reasons the operation should become the primary business at hand of an enlarged UN organization rather than being delegated to a newly formed agency of the UN. In either event the people and organizational elements to do the job of the International Disarmament Organization as specified in the US proposal will require global assignments for a long haul task of from ten to twenty years duration. Many of the requirements for detailed planning including further segmenting of tasks, designation of additional phasing, definition of destruction, conversion standards and reporting will not crystalize until the skeleton organization is on its worldwide stations.

Under the US proposal, and even with the assumed acceptance of all conditions of inspection by the USSR, disarmament could not proceed beyond Stage I if the Peoples' Republic of China refused to become a party to the treaty. The point is academic, but the fact remains that no major nation is going to begin disarming until its
continued national security is ensured. The treaty provides no alternative to unanimous participation and even then fails to provide adequate protection of the countries until Stage III. It must provide procedures and protection such that partial or regional disarmament can be supported as a beginning. Again, disarmament cannot begin tomorrow because our national security would be threatened.

Two major aspects of disarmament under the US treaty proposal seem to defy solution at the rate and by the circuitous route which the world powers are pursuing disarmament planning. One aspect has to do simply with the overwhelming magnitude and complexity of the organization, planning and direction task, and the other fails to make sufficient provision for the defense of disarming nations when disarmament is less than worldwide. With this situation it would appear that we have an unattainable objective— in other words, we cannot get there from here, unless we change our tack by heading deeper into the wind. Therefore, what actions can we take to pave the way for meaningful progress in this field?

First, it is suggested that we develop a more sophisticated public opinion in the world— get people to think internationally. This is a matter of education and communication both of which have a greater effect upon people than ever before.

Second, we must help develop a deeper faith in international institutions. Here again education and communication wield a great influence, but also we must contribute our most able people to the UN and support all worthy efforts of the UN.
Third, we must foster greater participation in world government by the UN rather than allowing it to remain simply a world forum and loose association of nations. Allied with this we must promote the expansion of the UN's international law activity to include codification of law and compulsory acceptance of decisions.

And lastly, we must encourage the establishment and growth of a permanent UN Peace Force. Perhaps as a starter we might offer to transfer part of our present forces to the UN. If we develop a force in being from many nations, each nation will have reduced its arms by the transfer and the UN Peace Force will be available for protection against nonparticipating nations. Also, we must explore the advantages offered by regional peacekeeping forces such as a permanent Organization of American States force which could eventually become part of the UN force. A UN Peace Force in being offers many possibilities as part of or in support of the disarmament supervision organization of the UN.

The national purpose of all nations undoubtedly have security of the homeland and national sovereignty as the two highest priority items for achievement and maintenance. In order to begin to think of disarmament of the nations of the world, the United Nations must ensure the security beyond a doubt and in turn all nations must learn to give up a bit of sovereignty. When one reviews the past and anticipates the future on this ever-shrinking globe, it is realized that most modern nations have already had to give up a little of their sovereignty just to exist and prosper with their
neighbors and friends; a little more is required in the subject at hand. In agreeing in advance to submit appropriate classes of disputes to international courts and to respect the rulings, the US would remove many sources of mistrust between nations. By indicating its willingness to put national security in the hands of the UN, the US would contribute to the early formation of an international peace force which could readily supervise the disarmament of the parties to the treaty and at the same time protect them from other nations.

Assuming the settlement of the Vietnam conflict by 1970 and a positive pursuance by the US of the four policies advanced above, it is anticipated that in the 1970's the US military strategy will remain essentially the same "Flexible Response". The need for the US to be prepared to protect the right of a people to self determination and to prevent the spread of Communism will not lessen. If the UN, with US support, is successful in forming at least a nucleus of a permanent UN Peace Force perhaps the "wars of liberation" of the late 1970's might be handled as UN matters. However, the requirements for the forward support of NATO with troops and the maintenance of a strategic nuclear deterrence will remain unchanged throughout the 1970's. A UN government of sufficient strength to supervise a world disarmament and protect all nations is not visualized within the next twenty years.

In conclusion, if we truly believe that disarmament is the only adequate and meaningful answer to the dangers that face mankind
let us courageously support policies that have a chance of producing results before the 25th century--or recognize that we intend to give only lip service to disarmament, as the communists do, and use it only in propaganda.

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