

SOFT POWER AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO HARD POWER IN COUNTERTERRORISM IN SAUDI ARABIA

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USAWC CLASS OF 2010

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 15-03-2010			2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Soft Power as an Alternative to Hard Power in Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia					5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
					5b. GRANT NUMBER	
					5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Abdulhadi Alshehri					5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
					5e. TASK NUMBER	
					5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel F. Scott Main Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute					8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013					10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
					11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Only a work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright. Based upon the nature of a particular student-author's employment, a paper may not be a work of the United States Government and may, in fact, be protected by copyright.						
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15. SUBJECT TERMS Middle East, Terrorism, Discourse, Education						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON	
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)	
			UNLIMITED	34		

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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IN SAUDI ARABIA**

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Abdulhadi Alshehri

TITLE: Soft Power as an Alternative to Hard Power in Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 15 March 2010 **WORD COUNT:** 7,484 **PAGES:** 34

KEY TERMS: Middle East, Terrorism, Discourse, Education

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Hard power has globally been the main strategy in countering terrorism for a long time. Saudi Arabia tried this strategy and found it ineffective. In its quest to find an effective alternative, the Saudi Arabian government decided to try soft power.

One might ask what factors lead Saudi government officials to pursue a policy of soft power, and what elements built its soft power strategy. The answers are based on an analysis of the Saudi Arabian environment. Such an examination requires a thorough look at what effects the hard power approach had, as well as other factors such as education, social movements, and the historical role of the media.

Saudi Arabia launched its soft power strategy via educational curriculum reform and a multifaceted media campaign which included public discourse, interviews, and a public information multimedia campaign. The soft power approach is viewed by the Saudi people as fruitful and is credited with saving the country and its people from terrorism. As such, Saudi Arabia recommends its use of soft power as a case study to allied countries.

SOFT POWER AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO HARD POWER IN COUNTERTERRORISM IN SAUDI ARABIA

The issue of terrorism occupies a large space in the media and political theater nowadays. It also draws the attention of many researchers and thinkers. These researchers and thinkers trace this phenomenon by studying and investigating all the means to be able to understand its origins, causes, objectives, effects and means of countering it.

Saudi Arabia suffered a number of terrorist acts in contemporary history. Many measures have been taken to combat this. Most notable was the use of soft power strategy as an alternative strategy to hard power, because it is helping to win the hearts and minds of people voluntarily and eliminating the causes of terrorism in Saudi Arabia

In this paper, I will answer the question of: why the soft power succeeded when programs and methods were created and implemented by the nation of Saudi Arabia as well as explicate on the failed attempts of using hard power as a long term solution to Saudi Arabia's Terrorism problem? To understand the methodology in choosing it, we have to look back at the history of terrorism in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and investigate all of the terrorism events that occurred in contemporary Saudi history (1979-present) to know how Saudi dealt with them. This will lead us to the lone strategy for the contemporary terrorism events, which I will describe as the Saudi counterterrorism alternative strategy.

It is understood that strategy is composed of ends, ways and means. The soft power strategy is no exception. It may exist in many ways and means; such as

rehabilitation programs, financial aid, educational reform, and public information campaigns.

Reviewing the history of modern terrorism in Saudi Arabia will let us see how Saudi countered it and know the difference in methods used to counter terrorism then and now. In examination of the two most important waves of terrorism: the Holy Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and the recent wave that began in 1995.

Determining the center of gravity (COG) was the crucial factor in choosing the strategy. The COG of the first wave was the people, ideology was the second one. Accordingly, the choice of the strategy of soft power was based on analyzing the context of the terrorism in Saudi Arabia. Saudi government demonstrated its action by analyzing the environmental context that surrounded these events by posing some strategic questions. These questions grant us the opportunity to explore the underlying layers of the terrorism phenomenon and enable us to describe how the effective Saudi strategy was selected. Their answers led to define and frame the context and to locate the exact center of gravity. This enabled Saudi to choose the best methods to deal with root causes of the terrorism movement.

Here, the focus will be on the strategy of soft power, as used by Saudi Arabia in two dimensions: short term and long term. This will embody each of the terms with an example. The short term example is strategic communication, including discourse and the media, while the example of the long term is educational reform.

At the end of the paper are the highlighted results and recommendations at the local level and global level for addressing the causes supporting the growth of terrorism.

Definition of Terrorism

Besides this term (terrorism) there are some terms that go with it: extremism, violence, fundamentalism, and some other terms that have spread in the West for historical, religious and political reasons, then transferred gradually to the Islamic World and circulated. Attention should always be paid to the differences in the connotations and the concepts which are carried by the same terms among different civilizations. Not paying attention to these subtle differences may trap us in more confusion between those concepts in our current media, political and cultural life through comprehensive interference.

Although terrorism is as old as history, in recent years, it has acquired new dimensions in its ability to threaten both governments and their people by taking advantage of the stresses of modern-day life, like technology, particularly information, communication, and weapons technology. These technological advancements enable a small handful of people to threaten and intimidate the lives of millions of people. It is very important to understand this dangerous phenomenon called terrorism.

The US government has created a definition of terrorism which it has used "for statistical and analytical purposes" since 1983, and is now contained in Title 22 of the United States (Legal) Code, Section 2656 f (d). It states: The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually to influence an audience.

The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country¹. The definition purposely does not address intentions of the actors, and the State Department itself even admits that "no one definition has ever gained universal acceptance."²

Nevertheless, even if one is not able to create an adequate definition, it is up to the politicians or leaders to determine what an act of terrorism is when they see it. For the point view of those professional services – intelligence, diplomatic, military, security and law enforcement – whose mission is to counter terrorism, it would be more productive to look at characteristics than to compare definitions. Terrorist characteristics can be grouped in four general categories: goals, strategies, operation, and organization.³

Political goals always involve a sense of grievance or injustice that cannot be addressed by any other means. Thus, terrorism is often described as a tactic of last resort in which the moral imperative of the ends justifies the means, no matter how immoral they might be⁴

The Islamic World Organization provided a definition for terrorism. The organization asked the whole world to adopt its definition: “Terrorism is an aggression practiced by individuals, groups or states against mankind: religion, blood, mind, money and honor, that is to include the types of terrifying, harm, threatening and killing without any right, and that is related to waging war, highway robbery. All actions of violence or threatening that may become an execution of an individual or collective project of crime, that aims to terror the people by harming them or subject their life or freedom or peace or safety of circumstances for danger”.⁵

These types of crimes are harming the environment, the public and/or private properties. All these are types of mischief on the earth that Allah forbids Moslem to commit. Allah says ﴿And seek not (occasions for) mischief in the land: for Allah loveth not those who do mischief﴾⁶

Waves of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia

By applying the terrorism definition, it could be said that there were many countries subjected to terrorism. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was no exception to this case. It was one of the countries victimized by terrorism. "The terrorism in the past took a simple primitive form depending on the simplicity of the societies, usage of the available tools, capabilities to achieve its objectives and execute its plans. Terrorism developed in accordance to the development of the mentioned tools and plans until it becomes complicated, diversified in objectives and tools as we see now. It is like a cancer killing modern societies"⁷. We will summarize this in two waves: The holy mosque (1979) and Al Qaeda (2003-...)

First Wave. The first wave occurred in 1979 when a group of men sat in the Holy Mosque in Makkah leading by Juhaiman Al Otaiby. He has spared no effort in his group and anti-regulations governing it (from their point of view) do not govern the laws of Allah. This was evident in the letters written by himself or by his followers which shows these messages and examines the thoughts of the group with respect to matters of governance and succession. As followers of Juhaiman believe, abandonment of civil society and the means and isolation, due to rampant corruption and immorality in society and its distance from the straight path, is on the one side. On the other side, Juhaiman and his followers should not further regulations that govern the laws of Allah. Those who know, see a contradiction with Islamic movements in the mind of the group and its goals of society, who works in what was revealed to Allah and the Community for the entire community they want to change!

Muslims believe in arriving of one to be the redeemer of the religion every hundred years, believing the words of the Prophet (peace be upon him) "Allah at the

end of every hundred years to redeem my religion" for our era, this person is called Al Mahdi, who was described as of the family of the Prophet (peace be upon him) his name is "Mohammed", the name of his father, "Abdullah"

In late 1979, Mohammed bin Abdullah Juhaiman's brother in law said he saw in his dreams that he was the Mahdi, and that he will liberate the Arab island, and the whole world of evil doers. Here began the equation of the name (Mohammed bin Abdullah) and his dream to be Al Mahdi, completed in the mind of Juhaiman by two things: the approach of the new century of prophet immigration (14th), and the so called "Muhammad bin Abdullah" Juhaiman's brother in law, the Holy Mosque was the only thing left for Al Mahdi to find refuge in him. This is what happened later.

With the dawn of the first of Muharram (1st) month of 1400 AH, corresponding to November 20, 1979, Juhaiman and his group entered the Holy Mosque in Mekkah to perform the dawn prayer, carrying coffins misleading the guards, because they didn't inspect the coffins due to respect for the dead. These coffins were stores of firearms and ammunition. When prayer was done, Juhaiman and his brother stood in front of worshipers at the Sacred Mosque to declare to the people that Al Mahdi arrived.

The Juhaiman and his followers swore allegiance to "the Mahdi", and asked the crowds of worshipers pledge allegiance, and shut the doors of the Holy Mosque, and the congregation found themselves trapped inside the Holy Mosque.

At the same time there were other groups supporting Juhaiman and distributing leaflets, brochures and letters were written by him in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

Juhaiman's group held all those who were inside the mosque including women and children for about 3 days. After a while Juhaiman released the women and children,

but kept many of the men inside the mosque. The Saudi government had tried since the first moments of this event to solve this problem amicably with Juhaiman by requesting the release of the hostages and surrender of Juhaiman, but Juhaiman refused.

He disrupted the prayers and rites in the Holy Mosque. The two sides exchanged small arms fire. The Saudi government became impatient, scrambled commando forces, using reinforced troops trained comprehensively in new counterterrorism techniques; they successfully regained control of the Holy Mosque.

“Mahdi” was among those who had been killed, terrorists were shocked and began to collapse and surrender, respectively, Juhaiman and the surviving followers surrendered. This is the end of the first incident of religious extremism recorded in Saudi Arabian contemporary history.

Second Wave. The advent of new era of terrorism in Saudi Arabia was in 1995. Saudi Arabia experienced the first major terrorist attack against innocent civilians and government and private installations. In this incident, the terrorists used high explosive materials to cause extensive killing and injury to a large number of civilians, and massive damage to buildings and equipment.

Since that time a series of terrorist attacks have taken place in almost every area of Saudi Arabia. At the beginning of the attacks the terrorists were claiming that they were fighting to expel the foreign forces; namely USA troops out of the country. They claimed, also, that the Saudi government allowed the infidels to occupy the country. They said that they would kill infidels and destroy their compounds. Not only this, but they also announced that they would kill law enforcement personnel who provided security to those infidels.

As a second phase, they shifted most of their operations to cause extensive damage to the country's economic facilities, including oil field and refinery installations, governmental infrastructure and a number of other key assets. The latest incident occurred when the terrorists tried to assassinate Prince Muhammad, the interior ministry assistant⁸. Saudi Arabia is facing tremendous challenges, as well as dangers to our security forces due to the nature of the threat from the terrorists, therefore, "Terrorism is a threat that must be countered, whether it be terrorism practiced by an individual, a group, or state"⁹ at this moment, Saudi asked the following question.

Is this the Same Action, Requiring the Same Solution, or a Different Solution?

To deal with terrorism, we have to use power, but what does the use of power mean? Power is "The ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants. But there are several ways to affect the behavior of others".¹⁰ Power in counterterrorism is either hard power or the soft power. But prioritizing them depends on the terrorism situation and a government's available capability.

The Saudi government has confronted terrorism, and tried to put an end to it. In spite of its efforts; terrorism still occurs. Saudi, finally, confronted the first wave with only hard power. The hard power should, at least, theoretically, eliminate terrorism. When terrorism came back again, Saudi realized that hard power was only crisis management, treating the symptom not the root cause.

As a result of tracing back terrorism, we find it is a new phenomenon to Saudi society, which means the country didn't expect it at all and didn't have a contingency plan. This surprise to our country required Saudi to reframe its counter terrorism strategy and plans in many aspects. A new era of addressing terrorism has started in the country's history.

Now, it is critical to know that Terrorism could be classified into two aspects: the hard aspect and soft aspect based on terrorism results. The hard aspect is the destructive result; while the soft is addressing terrorism roots. This classification is misleading and a momentary one. The classification of terrorism levels or aspects should be innermost to evaluate it from different angles according to its result; we should classify it vice versa. The roots would be the hard part of it, for these reasons:

- It influences the people quickly.
- Lasts for long time
- Difficult to be observed.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, realized that the two waves shared almost the same motivation and causes. Their motivation was to gain political goals, but in the name of religion, which became the cause, because the terrorists had a corrupted understanding of Islam. In spite of this, the Saudi government used its power and dealt with the first one in the same way; through the hard power of the military means addressing only the visible symptoms of terrorism.

Saudi had to continue to plan for a broad and extensive counter terrorism strategy to guarantee the best result for the country. To counter this dangerous terroristic threat, Saudi had to follow logical consequences and consecutive steps. analyzing the context of the situation is a key to a choose a counter terrorism strategy, because a “good strategy is founded in a proper understanding and analysis of the strategic environment and national interests and policy, and an understanding of the theory and role of strategy”¹¹ To do so, Saudi analyzed and understood the context of the situation, because “All power depends on context”¹²

Context of the Situation

I shall briefly show how to account for the important notion of context in combat ideology. The contextual approaches assume more or less a direct relationship between situational, societal, political or cultural aspects of the environment of the ideology, on the one hand, and the structures of strategy or plan to be used, on the other.

Context is a whole and continuous process from thinking about the existing terrorism to the phase of production and proper strategy. This process begins with consideration of beings as mental constructs, which are able to function as they interface between societal structures and the strategy structures; because the context represents relevant aspects of situations and society.

Saudi started designing a counter terrorism strategy through posing the strategic questions: who, what, why, when and where. These questions come unconsciously to the mind rapidly and automatically. By applying them to produce anti ideology strategy, we could discover the clear idea of the root cause of the problem which is the outcome of the implied answers of these questions. According to the answers, Saudi would choose and formulate a counter terrorism strategy. However, the context of situation would be composed of the answers of the following strategic questions.

Who. This question implies the answer of “know the enemy and know yourself”¹³. It was directed at varying parties of the ideology environment. The first one is the ideologues’ people (terrorists) to whom the plan would be addressed, the second party is the officials and the public of the opponent societies. These two parties have a kind of relationship created by the existing event. Of course this new relationship doesn't fall within a friendship relationship. It is classified by hostility relation, which necessitates

the officials to create a special kind of treatment and to ask “Who is a hero? One who turns an enemy into friend”¹⁴

When. The answer of this question specified the time of the events and the actions against them to be effective, because the time is considered one of the main factors which affect the structure of the strategy when it becomes the one “he who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious”.¹⁵ So, Saudi tried to choose the proper tools and ways when the strategy was proper and used a previous time; may no longer be valid. Solutions must evolve a faster rate than adversaries. The strategy should be an immediate response to the center of gravity; to the ideology in specific time not to be a part of the history. So, it will be characterized by some preferred selections instead of other available ones.

What. This question posed to specify the strategy goals that the Saudi Government wanted to achieve. Consideration of this factor would help choosing the strategy components and the operational campaigns that would guarantee achieving these goals. To achieve these objectives, Saudi adopted the four D’s goals (4Ds). These four D’s are: Defeat, Deny, Defend, and Diminish¹⁶. Achieving them would be the criteria of Saudi prioritization rather than which line of operation we would use. These goals would be the subtitles of this strategy. There is a big “what” about the terrorist characteristics; namely their ideology and culture “Ideology and culture are powerful influences on the shaping of strategy and strategic success”¹⁷

Why. The strategy of combat ideology has its reasonable purpose. Saudi intended to achieve particular goals through the strategy. However, strategy might succeed or might not. Any plan may have various goals; one of them is to persuade the

people who espouse this ideology to give up their bad action, and at the same time, by the same strategy to warn the public about the surrounding danger. The strategy would be the answer of: why Saudi would choose specific strategy.

How. To achieve the strategy's goals; Saudi had to formulate it in the best way to guarantee its success. We can call it, in this perspective, the art of the war. "The art of war is the art of using the given means in combat"¹⁸

So, Saudi had to be careful, especially when it considered the strategy as powerful instrument of influence. Saudi government considered all of the previously attempted strategies when choosing the best strategy to convey the government's message to the people of Saudi Arabia.

So, all these factors (answers), or the strategic questions outcomes play a unique roles, each one contributes to the Saudi strategy structure: Ends, ways and means.

So, what is the Alternative Strategy?

By asking the previous questions, the Saudi government realized that in order to effectively counter terrorism, the causes of terror and extremism had to be understood and resolved alongside the environment in which terrorists recruit and operate. So "it is widely believed that ideology is the key motivating force behind the current wave".¹⁹ The ideology became the center of the gravity of terrorism. Center of gravity "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act"²⁰

It is obvious, then, that the challenge to combat ideology is not limited to Saudi, instead it is global and has a worldwide effect on the stability, security, and economy. Saudi worked to combat the terrorists in the previous two waves of terrorism and was successful in overcoming them immediately. But did it eradicate the causes of

terrorism? Did it crush the terrorists' center of gravity? No it didn't. So, "The resort to force is not scorned, but it is recognized as the absolute last resort and a clear recognition of a failure of all other methods to resolve conflict".²¹ Patience would be a necessary characteristic for this strategy to succeed.

Saudi had to look for a proper strategy to counter the terrorists' ideology as a center of gravity. When the hard power failed, Saudi was sure to reach an acceptable and feasible result; it had to eradicate ideology's roots. So the power of military actions would not be enough reaction "central to Saudi counterterrorism efforts has been the use of unconventional "soft" measures designed to combat the intellectual and ideology justifications for violent extremism".²² I think this a kind of creativity. Creativity is not the use of hard power, but it lies in the use of soft power "power comes in many guises, and soft power is not weakness"²³ On the contrary; the failure to use soft power effectively may be the reason behind escalating terrorism. Soft power will become increasingly important in preventing terrorists from recruiting new supporters, and to achieve the necessary international cooperation to confront terrorism

Because "Strategy is fundamentally about choices; it reflects a preference for a future state or condition and determines how best to get there"²⁴ Saudi preferred to concentrate on Soft power as the primary strategy for the following reasons:

- The twist in ideology is the basic reason for the terrorism.
- Terrorism isn't limited to the local area anymore; it exceeded Saudi's physical borders.
- Soft power strategy provides many means: Media, schools, mosques; they could be exploited and applied.

- Soft power will play a crucial role in attracting moderates and extremists, deny access to new constituencies, because “Terrorism depends crucially on soft power for its ultimate victory. It depends on its ability to attract support from the crowd at least as much as its ability to destroy the enemy’s will to fight”²⁵

It has been obvious that “Soft power resources often work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes take years to produce the desired outcomes”²⁶ and the combat against the ideology requires much effort and many steps; because each ideology has its logic, tools and resources.

Strategic Means

The strategy directed back and forth as two subsequent phases: to eradicate the opponent ideology on one hand, and to offer another acceptable ideology on the other hand. “Converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership”.²⁷ Saudi did. It could achieve these ends by creating its strategy through two main lines of operation (LOO):

- The short term LOO.
- The long term LOO.

This classification was based on the desired goals needed to be gained, because “War is fought on a battlefield. Terror has no [permanent] battlefield. It has become global. Though it can be contained by physical measures, ultimately it must be fought in the mind of both the terrorist and affected population. In the short term, conflicts are won by weapons. In the long run, they are won by ideas.”²⁸

The short term LOO concentrated on the actions which give direct and immediate response to the terrorists; by implementing the strategic communication, “Communicative action refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of

speech and action who establish interpersonal relations.”²⁹ We can classify this communication according to many factors; the resource, medium, contents, receiver. So we could find diplomatic communication, religious, educational or media campaigns: TV, press, radio, etc.

The long term LOO would need to be more enduring, because it will be used to eradicate the roots of terrorism and all influential conditions that may help the terrorists to mobilize the people and prepare for any probable action. This kind of strategy had to address all the capabilities and resources to guarantee denying the terrorist group from the population sympathizing. Educational reform was the best tool planned and used by the Saudi Government. It was directed toward future generations.

Communicative action will be explored by analyzing the discourse language “since language is the predominate symbolic code used in communication”³⁰

Short term LOO: Discourse. We will analyze King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz’s discourse that was addressed at the international conference for counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia (2005). Discourse is “that utterance ...as units of language production (whether spoken or written) that are inherently contextualized.”³¹ It is composed of language as its core component, but not isolated language, it is the language that is compatible to the context of situation. I shall briefly show how to account for the important notion of context in the era of Saudi counterterrorism. The contextual approaches assume a more or less direct relationship between situational, societal, political or cultural aspects of the environment of counterterrorism text and spoken word, on the one hand, and the structures of discourse itself, on the other. Context is a

whole and continuous process ranging from thinking about the existing event to the production of the proper discourse phase.

The context that encompassed this discourse was composed of both real and an assumptive situation. The reality was that the conference occurred in the wake of 9/11 and was held in Saudi, the audience attending it was the actual audience while the assumptive audience was the people who are listening around the world (universal audience). The discourse was constructed based on realizing these two different kinds of audience. The Saudi King was concerned about the common issues shared by the whole world, and didn't concentrate on the local dimensions. Discourse could be viewed through two lenses; the relationship among the people and the argumentative.

Creating Solidarity. He could create solidarity among the different people and nations by exploiting the linguistic tools; the pronouns and the adjectives (deixis) "these deictic elements mark the social identities of participants or their social relationship"³². These deixis refer to person(s), time, and place.

King Abdullah said, "My Dear Brothers and Friends: May God's peace, mercy and blessings be upon you. It is my pleasure to thank you for accepting the invitation to participate in this historic gathering, and to welcome you, on behalf of my brother, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques – may God protect him – and on behalf of the Saudi people, to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the land of peace and Islam, from which an eternal message of equality and friendship between all people was launched"³³

He used the personal deixis (you, my...) to refer to the representatives attending the conference and their countries and used (we) to indicate the people including Saudi people and allies, as if they are a one unit. In contrast to this, he used (those) to refer to

the terrorists. By using these contrary deixis he demarcated the boundaries theoretically and practically between these two different groups.

In addition, he confirmed his attitude by using adjectives like “friends” to set up an extensive frame for the relations he aspired to be achieved as a result of that conference; also, he used (brothers) to generate a closer relationship and to express the solidarity among the good people.

King Abdullah in his discourse tried to highlight the picture of terrorism and depicted the real world attitudes toward this phenomenon. So he drew the line between the pros and cons; the allied and terrorists. He could pave the road for the counterterrorism strategy.

Argumentation. First, what does Argumentation mean; “Argumentation is a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge.”³⁴The argumentative aspect in his discourse is clear. There were two main arguments against Islam and Saudi Arabia:

- Islam the religion of Terrorism
- Saudi Arabia supports Terrorism

These arguments were spread through the people, in spite of its falseness.

He started refuting the first one. To do so, he put forward two kinds of arguments; religious arguments and logical arguments.

Religious Arguments. If Islam supports terrorism, then, as consequential result, the holy Koran would be the most supportive authority to terrorism, because the holy

Koran is the main source of Islam. This was present in King Abdullah's mind when he produced his discourse. So, to refute this argument; he brought an excerpt from the holy Koran itself, which says something opposite to this false presumption. He excerpted, "In the words of the Almighty: "O, Mankind, we have created you from a male and female and made you into nations and tribes that you may know one another. Verily, the most honorable of you before God is the one who is most pious."³⁵

Islam doesn't differentiate between the people that support the terrorism against some of them, because there is no gauge of supremacy, but piety. By mentioning this, he could guarantee the unity of the world efforts against terrorism which is considered the first step toward a strategic action.

He said, "My Dear Friends: The convening of this conference, which includes nations from various cultures, faiths and political systems, is clear testimony that terrorism, when it strikes its victims, does not differentiate between cultures, faiths or forms of government. Terrorism does not belong to any culture, or religion, or political system. It is a global crime perpetrated by evil minds filled with hatred towards humanity and consumed with a blind desire to kill and destroy."³⁶

Logical Arguments. The second source of Islam is Prophet Mohammad's message, so King Abdullah prioritized him later when he mentioned him after mentioning the holy Koran as the first resource. He mentioned the prophet's characteristic of mercy which is well known for the people.

King Abdullah, by this, linked the religious argument with logic arguments. In logic, generally each argument is composed of one or more premises and conclusions. Its composition is based on the audience's attitude toward the issue. We find him

employing two kinds of the logical arguments; the explicit and the implicit arguments. The explicit contains the premises and the conclusion. The premise (s) leads to the conclusion.

He continued saying, "The prophet of Islam - God's peace and blessings be upon him - is a prophet of mercy, and Islam is a religion of mercy. It is therefore not possible that mercy and terrorism can co-exist in one mind, or one heart, or one house"³⁷

The argument propositions are:

- Premise 1: Mohammed is a prophet of Islam.
- Premise 2: Mohammed is a prophet of mercy.
- Conclusion: Islam is a religion of mercy.

Departing from this conclusion to be a premise, we can infer new argument as follows:

- Premise 1: Islam is a religion of mercy.
- Premise 2: Terrorism is a brutality. (omitted premise)
- Conclusion1: Islam is not the religion of terrorism.
- Conclusion 2: Islam doesn't support terrorism.

He exploited the contrary binary to put forward the last argument. Its second premise was omitted intentionally based on the mutual knowledge which already existed in the audience's mind.

He added "This eternal call from our Almighty God represents the true spirit of Islam, a religion of peace, wisdom and righteousness, not the false slogans espoused by those outside the bounds of Islam who proclaim them from dark caves in order for the enemies of Islam to use them to create a distorted picture of our faith."³⁸

In this passage King Abdullah used another logical technique when he described the traits of the contrary groups; the allied people and the terrorists to convince the people by using some scalar words. They are the words which represent various relations for the same field. For example (hot, warm and cool) to describe water. King Abdullah used them to represent the opposite meanings:

- God vs. Those outside
- True vs. False
- Spirit of Islam vs. Slogan
- Religion of peace, wisdom and righteousness vs. Distorted picture of our faith

He refuted the Second Argument:

- Saudi Supports Terrorism

To do so, he put forward numerous of premises:

- Premise 1: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to suffer from terrorism.
- Premise 2: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to warn of its danger.
- Premise 3: Saudi has dealt with it vigilantly on the local level.
- Premise 4: Saudi has dealt with it vigilantly on the regional level.
- Premise 5: Saudi has dealt with it vigilantly on the international level.
- Premise 6: We are fighting terrorism;
- Premise 7: Those who support it;
- Premise 8: Those who condone it.

- Premise 9: We will continue to do so until we eliminate, with the help of god, this evil.
- Conclusion: Saudi doesn't support terrorism.

He used many of these premises to build his discourse, because he realized the foe's argument depended on the false premises previously stated. The terrorist's argument was far from the reality, so it needed to be refuted strongly.

Media Campaign. Saudi launched many campaigns using different kinds of media. The media was the main medium for this strategy to convey the official discourse and spread it out. Saudi realized that "the role of the media is critical to the success of any political discourse because in modern societies it is the main transmission belt or conduit between politics and society."³⁹ At this point the Saudi government successfully initiated its media campaigns against terrorists.

Saudi concentrated, also, on creating a dialogical interactive environment with many of the terrorism affiliates including the repentant, instigators and leaders of the terrorist groups. This was done using TV shows, and the press pages by conducting interviews with them, the Saudi Government insisting on that "Face-to-Face communications remain the most effective."⁴⁰

To conduct the dialogue with terrorists effectively, Saudi chose a professional commentator, not ordinary people. Commentators were religious scholars, some of them might have had some experience in terroristic behavior, but there were no indications of the bad intentions, or committing bad actions. The government utilized their experiences after they desisted their terroristic ideas to be good examples of citizens.

The terrorists' leaders regretted, and expressed their real plans, claiming their plans were not made, intentionally, to kill innocent people or to destroy the country's infrastructure, but to draw, only, the government's attentions to reform some aspects of the developments like the education system, poverty and health care, but this approach mistakenly, led to terrorism.

Terrorists were convinced of their leaders actions' were not in the best interests of Islam and a poor reflection of the reputations of Muslims. The terrorist leaders' confessions surprised their followers, and they realized they had been misleading them over time to make troubles for the people and for the whole country. The leaders' new understanding motivated the followers to take a new and positive stance on the issue after recognizing they were traveling on the wrong path, wasting their time and their efforts toward the opposite direction of the country's favor, and of their own favor. The result of the interviews with the terrorists' leaders was a great step on the long road of counterterrorism and valuable indications.

The government's effort wasn't limited to the TV, press or radio. There were Islamic writers, intellectuals who openly and unambiguously participated in the strategy of government by rejecting violence made by these groups. For the peaceful majority of Muslims around the world, it is imperative that these distinctions be made.

Also, the government didn't limit the media efforts and programs to expose those who repented only, but attempted to reveal the public opinions about these incidents, by conducting interviews randomly with the public people. These interviews enabled the people to express their feelings, their solidarity and cohesion to the government. As a logical result, this effort unified the public to rally around the government and started

sharing its reform program. the media campaign isolated the terrorist group to make clear that soft power “is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”⁴¹

Long term LOO; Educational Reform. Education is the foundation of student knowledge and the main resource that could shape their minds. The most significant point to legitimize the modification of the educational system, including curriculum, is that youths are a critical component of Saudi society. The youths are the future leaders and they will be the scholars of the nation or state who would guide the people to their future. It is a vital step to instill in their minds what the strategists wanted them to absorb and yield in the near future years.

So, in Saudi “Education reform is but one item in a larger agenda that emerged in the course of three national Dialogues”⁴² Education, generally, is based on the method of indoctrination, a way to force the student to memorize the content exclusively, and divert it from the rational way that is concerned with giving the student the ability to think and debate. The danger of this method with regard to terrorism is that the terrorists are accustomed to hearing the instigators and surrender to the words, and work, including obeying without even slightest thought in examining the statements or to investigate their actions right or wrong.⁴³

Saudi Arabia identified the limitations of this method of education, and realized that the best way depends on creativity by urging the student and giving him intellectual freedom within the limits of culture and education during the discussion of teacher and the educational challenge in ways that are respected.

This project as a part of educational reform helped young people to get rid of the conventional methods of teaching, because the conventional way implies that perhaps young people who become terrorists were not questioning anything; they were merely following what others told them to do for no other reason than simply to obey orders. This situation was generated in the schools, where the students just follow the teacher.

As a further step to release the student's mind; the Saudi educational environment started developing the infrastructure, so the chance was approaching for the government to think out of that environmental box by implementing the new technology to change the people, especially the teachers and students' way of thinking and learning, and to create a new way from scratch, because changing the people's way of thinking is the first and vital step.

So, it was not possible to make a house without laying the foundation first. The strategists, instead of using other tools, took the responsibility to help lay the foundation for the new generations and encourage education systems that foster creativity in these societies. Using tools such as the internet would allow youths to break the barriers and open the windows to quick access to various types of knowledge over the entire world. Allowing their thoughts to grow would give these children the opportunity to imagine and be innovative soon.

The following step in this aspect was providing students with awareness of the culture's dimensions; like customs, languages and philosophy of the opponent ideology. This allowed future leaders to expand their knowledge to effectively understand the terrorists' ideology.

Knowledge of the adversary is associated with knowledge of friendly capabilities also in order to develop a range of options from which decision makers could choose to achieve their desired outcomes. The government didn't neglect the youths out of the school by generating special programs to warn them of the surrounding danger, because this layer of the community was targeted. Youths represented two thirds of the society, and they were very easy to influence.

To achieve this objective, the government designed a mobile program held in many places. The sponsors of this program either invited the students or made visits to the schools and universities. The students found great chances to discuss their feelings; they asked their hidden questions and raised their comments to higher level persons, especially their comments about some of the curriculum. Students were granted a great deal of respect by government officials.

The educational reform includes the curriculums as well, because these curriculums are the main sources to inculcate the new ideas in the youths' minds. The cumulative knowledge would appear in their behaviors in the future. So, it would be hard, if not impossible to remove the effects of this cumulative knowledge. The students would be convinced of the new ideas if they were added to the curriculums, because the curriculums are the most confidential and reasonable springs of their basic education. So, curriculums were being reviewed periodically to make sure that they respond to any new idea, and to be the principal means to spread information out to the people in general.

Fruitful Ends

Soft power strategy achieved Saudi ends. We can summarize them as follows:

- Many terrorists declared their repentance, their evidences were:
 - Returned to the right path, coming back toward the government's side.
 - Ended their bad actions.
 - Reintegrated themselves as members of Saudi society.
 - Proved their good intentions by taking as a part of their responsibility participating in government reform programs.
 - Started clarifying their decisions and revealing how their leaders could practice indoctrination to legitimize their attitudes.
 - Some of them broadcasted their own cooperative programs to warn and advise the public of the dangers surrounding them. So, they participated in the different media programs.
- This success “has convinced the Obama administration that Saudi Arabia is the ideal place to send dozens of Yemenis”⁴⁴ who are detainees in Guantanamo bay to join the rehabilitation program.

Conclusion

In this project, I tried to highlight the Saudi counterterrorism strategy. This was accomplished by reviewing how Saudi analyzed the context to choose its strategy by posing strategic questions. So, it chose the soft power strategy as the alternative strategy to hard power strategy which failed previously.

Saudi Counterterrorism strategy is composed of ends, ways and means. Every component of these three parts was outlined. the end was to eradicate the roots of terrorism, the ways were Media campaigns, conferences and educational reforms in

general, while the means were the discourse, involving technology and curriculums reforms.

Finally, Saudi strategy's ends were listed to prove its success.

Recommendations

At the end of this project, I would recommend two directions. First, for the Saudi government as a local environment. The second for foreign nations as the international environment. These two frames would intertwine:

First, Saudi Arabia has to continue its efforts in the fight against terrorism recruit more of the tools of soft power. the first step and the most important is Eliminating the causes of poverty, unemployment, corruption, nepotism, so as not to provide factors terrorists exploit to recruit people. It should, also, intensify of the community's awareness of the importance of discourse and dialogue as the value of appliances, useful and practical, and alternative methods in connection to be unjust.

Second; to allied nations, we recommend the use of soft power strategy as an alternative to hard power. The alternative must be worked out, because it's about correcting a perceived injustice. the nations' leaders must be responsive like the Saudi officials did including the royal family members. The key stone of this is the true causes of conflict must be addressed and the people/citizens must be heard. Leaders should address the educational reform and utilize the media. all of these means will be effective based on the conduct of deep analyzing for the context which differs from region to region and from time to time. This will include different factors: culture, Religion, Available local resources, local people cooperation and indigenous people grievances to make sure that strategy characterized of suitability, acceptability, feasibility, and assure of harmonizing the Ends, Ways and Means of the strategy.

Finally, we recommend this subject (soft power) to be a field of study in the near future, because it has not yet gained the attention of researchers.

Endnotes

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²⁵ Joseph S. Nye, *ibid*, 22.

²⁶ Joseph S. Nye, *ibid*, 99.

²⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *ibid*, 3.

²⁸ Jonathan Sacks *ibid*, 113.

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