ENDING AN INSURGENCY VIOLENTLY: THE SAMAR AND BATANGAS PUNITIVE CAMPAIGNS

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Ending an Insurgency Violently: The Samar and Batangas Punitive Campaigns

By Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Bruno

From 1899-1902, the United States Army waged a successful counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines. For over two years, Army strategic leaders endeavored to employ a policy of benevolent assimilation to attract the Philippine populace. Due to insurgent resistance, varying levels of attraction and chastisement policies were actually utilized. In 1901, the massacre of a U.S. infantry company at Balangiga, Samar, acted as a catalyst for the Army to end the waning insurgency in the two remaining un-pacified provinces. Resultantly, the Army undertook punitive operations to reduce the last major rebel strongholds in the Philippines—the Batangas Province on Luzon and the island of Samar. Several scholars assert that the Samar Expedition, commanded by BG Jacob H. Smith, was based on a harsh policy of devastation. Smith’s expedition undeniably resulted in significant public outrage over charges of excessive cruelty and war crimes. In contrast, the Batangas campaign plan, under the direction of BG J. Franklin Bell, is remembered as a balanced strategy of coercion and attraction. Nevertheless, both campaigns provide an opportunity to analyze the proper balance of attraction and retribution policies necessary to carry out a successful counter-insurgency campaign.

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From 1899-1902, the United States Army waged a successful counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines. For over two years, Army strategic leaders endeavored to employ a policy of benevolent assimilation to attract the Philippine populace. Due to insurgent resistance, varying levels of attraction and chastisement policies were actually utilized. In 1901, the massacre of a U.S. infantry company at Balangiga, Samar, acted as a catalyst for the Army to end the waning insurgency in the two remaining un-pacified provinces. Resultantly, the Army undertook punitive operations to reduce the last major rebel strongholds in the Philippines—the Batangas Province on Luzon and the island of Samar. Several scholars assert that the Samar Expedition, commanded by BG Jacob H. Smith, was based on a harsh policy of devastation. Smith’s expedition undeniably resulted in significant public outrage over charges of excessive cruelty and war crimes. In contrast, the Batangas campaign plan, under the direction of BG J. Franklin Bell, is remembered as a balanced strategy of coercion and attraction. Nevertheless, both campaigns provide an opportunity to
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ENDING AN INSURGENCY VIOLENTLY:
THE SAMAR AND BATANGAS PUNITIVE CAMPAIGNS

From 1899-1902, the United States Army waged a successful counter-insurgency campaign against the Philippine Insurrection. For over two years, the Army’s strategic leadership endeavored to employ a policy of benevolent assimilation to attract the Philippine populace. In reality, varying levels of attraction and chastisement policies were utilized due to intense insurgent resistance. In September 1901, the massacre of an American infantry company at Balangiga, Samar, acted as a catalyst for the Army to end the waning insurgency in the two remaining un-pacified provinces. Resultantly, the Army undertook punitive operations to reduce the last major rebel strongholds in the Philippines—the Batangas Province on Luzon and the island of Samar. In retaliation for the massacre, both campaigns were vigorous punitive expeditions that employed the harshest measures allowed under General Order 100 of 1863.1 Several scholars have asserted that the Samar Expedition, commanded by Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, was based on a harsh policy of devastation and retribution with little attention given to achieving the assimilation of the population. In contrast, the Batangas campaign plan, under the direction of Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, is remembered as a balanced strategy of coercion and attraction. Though both campaigns achieved their objective of pacification, Smith’s expedition resulted in significant outrage among some American citizens and civilian leaders over charges of excessive cruelty and war crimes. Nevertheless, both campaigns provide an opportunity to study the proper balance of attraction and retribution policies that are necessary to carry out a successful counter-insurgency campaign.
When waging a guerrilla war, the American counter-insurgency experience has underscored that success is largely determined by two factors—(1) the defender’s ability to provide security for the general population; and (2) cutting off the guerrilla forces from their external supply lines. In terms of security, it has been asserted that “one hundred percent security in 75 percent of the country is far better than 75 percent security in 100 percent of the country.” The counter-insurgency strategy must strive to provide “nearly perfect” security for the population in designated areas. Ultimately, the U.S. Army was successful in achieving all of these goals in its efforts to quell the Philippine Insurrection.

The final two campaigns, in Batangas and Samar, integrated social, cultural, economic, political, and military measures to achieve the above objectives. The fundamental methods employed in both campaigns were similar. To break the will of the insurgent sympathizers, commanders emphasized the use of legal pressure to target wealthy citizens and other prominent leaders—arrests, fines, and confiscation of private property targeted the Filipino civilian leadership’s social and cultural ties to the insurgency. Additionally, both commanders enacted economic policies to regulate commerce in order to reduce the insurgency’s access to supplies via illicit trade. Militarily, the Army employed the “triple press” of population concentration, devastation of the countryside, and harassment through vigorous field operations to subdue the insurgent bands.

At the operational level, the importance of separating the population from the guerrillas was made a top priority. This objective was accomplished by a combination of population control (concentration) and counter-infrastructure operations.
population control measures effectively facilitated aggressive tactical operations in the countryside by lessening the threat of collateral damage. At the same time, they allowed the Army to provide effective security for the populace in the “colony.” However, relocation undoubtedly led to increased tensions between the displaced citizenry and the occupying Army. Obviously, American officers felt that the tactical advantages outweighed the civil antagonism.\textsuperscript{5}

Many of the methods employed by the Army in the Philippines are no longer acceptable by modern ethical standards. In fact, excesses in the application of force and allegations of war crimes caused a public uproar near the end of the insurgency. The subsequent investigations, Senate Hearings, and courts-martial resulted in a period of public scrutiny focused on both the Army’s and senior civilian leadership’s conduct of the war. However, the Philippine-American War is replete with lessons concerning the relationship and application of \textit{policies of attraction} and \textit{policies of chastisement} during complex insurgencies. Additionally, the implications of strategic leadership and communication are highlighted by the various commander’s successes and failures.

\textbf{Background: An Attempt at Benevolent Assimilation}

At the outset of America’s conquest of the Philippines, it seemed as though the territory would be occupied through conventional military operations. Filipino rebels, led by the revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo, used conventional military tactics. In February 1899, U.S. forces under Major General Elwell S. Otis, aided by Admiral George Dewey’s gunboats, drove the rebels from their trenches surrounding Manila. Later that year, Otis launched spring offensives north and east of Manila and successfully routed the rebel army. By November 1899, conventional column tactics in the Luzon plains had shattered Aguinaldo’s army. Its fragmented bands were forced to
dissolve into the surrounding jungles and mountain ranges. As the American Army was soon to discover, the poorly supplied and trained insurgents were much better suited to guerrilla warfare. The Army’s initial victories caused senior leadership, especially General Otis, to underestimate the scale of the resistance. Though Otis believed his military operations had caused the complete collapse of the rebel forces, the resistance movement had merely transitioned from conventional warfare to guerrilla techniques. Aguinaldo reorganized his forces into small, independent guerrilla bands that blended in with the local populace, allowing the combination of irregular combat with sabotage and subterfuge in the “pacified” areas. Semi-autonomous regional commanders led the resistance, based on guerrilla tactics employing surprise, ambushes, and raids. Additionally, the Filipinos were aided by full and part time militias and clandestine political, logistic, and leadership organizations. Their goal was not to achieve victory over U.S. forces but rather to harass them until American political and military will was exhausted.

Almost immediately, the Army began a policy of benevolent assimilation. Military programs focused on civil improvements to win the support of the population. Reforms targeted transportation, education, infrastructure, and public health in order to raise the Filipino standard of living. The U.S. Army based its strategy on a pacification campaign, relying on a policy of attraction. This political-military program was aimed at “winning the confidence, respect, and admiration” of the populace. These programs were based on policies the Army had previously employed on the American frontier. They employed the firm but fair frontier legacy and tried to inculcate the Filipino villagers with American ideals. The Army enforced these procedures internally by enforcing
troop discipline, penalizing looting, and paying for military requisitions. In the civil realm, the Army embarked on a series of societal programs aimed at winning the confidence and support of the local populace. The Army oversaw the construction of schools, roads, and civil infrastructure—by August 1900, over 1,000 schools were constructed in the Philippines. Education was viewed as an “adjunct to military policy,” not merely a civil policy. The Army also attempted to organize municipal governments comprised of the local citizenry. The courts even showed a high level of leniency toward low-level partisans and their supporters, often reducing or overturning the sentences of military commissions and tribunals. (In fact, as municipal governments and civil courts expanded their purview, some garrison commanders viewed them as intrusions on their jurisdiction). For example, Brigadier General S.B.M. Young, a District Commander in the Department of Northern Luzon, stated:

I find it very injurious to our cause to release captured prisoners here. They invariably return to the insurgent bands or use their energies in giving aid to them. . . . Those who do not directly return to the mountain bands, act as spies, and disappear finally from our sight.

Insurgent influences also served to undermine the progress of the pacification campaign. One of the strongest of these influences was the populace’s fear of guerrilla retribution for supporting the Americans. Akin to the present-day concept of terrorism, fear was used by guerrilla forces to gain support in areas where none may have existed previously. American sympathizers were commonly assassinated, mutilated, or buried alive. Shadow governments maintained control of the villages and organized support for the guerrillas in the form of taxes, supplies, recruits, and intelligence. To the common villager, fear of guerrilla retribution was stronger than the attraction of U.S. civil improvements. Ironically, American leniency toward guerrilla activists often proved to
be counterproductive in this area. Many officers soon realized the need to augment “soft” policies with harsh measures to ensure effective security and protection for the local populace. In the words of one American officer, the Army policy would be modified to treat “the good man very well . . . and the bad man very harshly.”

The origins of this problem were rooted in the initial underestimation of the depth of the Philippine Insurrection. In the first months of the conflict, U.S. leaders incorrectly assumed that the insurrection movement was limited to a few key leaders who imposed their will on the masses. Although this was true to a certain extent, the independence movement held a strong cultural and nationalistic appeal across the upper and lower classes of the Filipino population. Initial U.S. strategy was aimed at toppling the principal leaders to cause the quick collapse of public support. The intensity of resistance startled the American Army and political administration. The Filipino lower class was largely dependent on, and therefore loyal to, their wealthy masters, (the principales). Accordingly, U.S. civil programs and promises of reform initially had little effect on the common peasant.

In reaction to the lack of decisive outcomes following the initial months of battlefield victories, Army officers increasingly supported harsher measures. This attitude eventually permeated the highest levels of the chain of command (and political administration) and resulted in the formulation of a policy of chastisement. These measures were the same ones directed in the Civil War era’s General Order 100 (GO100)—fines, communal punishment, destruction of private property, imprisonment, population relocation, exile, and execution—to counter guerrilla activity.
The roots of GO 100 dated back to the Union Army’s occupation of the South during the Civil War. Union generals were forced to deal with the problem of partisan forces employing guerrilla tactics. Men like Colonel John S. Mosby and Major General John H. Morgan harassed the Union lines of communication during the war. In 1863, the Union Army issued General Order 100 of 1863, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field in response to the guerrilla threat. GO 100 was the first official document that specified the possible range of responses available to commanders for counter-insurgency operations. The order underscored that efforts to pacify the populace were advantageous to military commanders but also recognized the need to employ harsh measures to counter the actions of guerrilla forces. General Order 100 allowed the use of fines, community punishment, property destruction, imprisonment, exile, and execution to dissuade public support of guerrillas.¹⁷

Specifically, GO 100 directed a reciprocal relationship between the military and the occupied civilian population. Respect and moderation were appropriate in order to achieve the eventual restoration of peace. To that end, the order specifically forbade the excessive destruction, looting, torture, and disproportionate reprisals against the population. However, GO 100 also recognized that harsh measures would be necessary to counter guerrilla threats and acts of terrorism (using a present-day term). Importantly, GO 100 gave commanders the discretion to punish civilian supporters of guerrilla forces. The order specified that irregular forces would only be granted protection of legitimate combatants if they wore uniforms and were an organized unit of a larger, traditional army. Guerrillas, who assumed “the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers,” were to be treated as
criminals rather than soldiers. Thus, *General Order 100* contained a “practical blend of moderation and stringency that would characterize the Army’s approach to military government, counterguerrilla, and pacification operations for the next one hundred years.”

Initially, senior American civilian and military leaders were hesitant to employ harsh measures in an attempt to avoid domestic political opposition and anti-colonial allegations from American opposition parties. However, junior Army commanders realized that lenient U.S. policies were viewed as weakness by guerrillas (and the Filipinos civilians who secretly supported the insurgency). American officers soon realized that fear was a greater motivator than kindness. By the fall of 1900, military officers, on their own initiative, were launching “unofficial” punitive campaigns to counter guerrilla activists. These measures were aimed at withholding aid to partisan-controlled areas through the destruction of crops and the punishment of hostile populations. In order to reduce the guerrilla logistic base and their popular support, Army commanders began fining entire villages, destroying private property, and punishing hostile citizens to curtail support to the rebel organizations.

After the 1900 election, the American administration was relieved of the political pressure caused by the election process. Afterwards, the military was freed to adopt an official *policy of chastisement* in the Philippines. On 20 December 1900, Major General Arthur MacArthur, who had succeeded Otis as commander of the U.S. forces in the Philippines, issued orders allowing the sternest measures authorized in *General Order 100*. The burning of villages, exiling of rebel leaders, and reducing judicial restraints to prosecute an aggressive counter-guerrilla campaign were now officially sanctioned.
The *policy of chastisement* was specifically aimed at the guerrilla leadership, not directly at the partisan forces in the field. The insurrection’s leaders were largely the landed, upper class of the Philippines. As such, the leaders were more vulnerable to American policies that now threatened them with imprisonment and loss of property. This psychological offensive, coupled with aggressive operational and tactical-level field offensives, proved extremely effective. The combination of physical and moral offensives cowed the rebellion’s leadership, starved the guerrillas in the field, and served as a lesson to the inhabitants of the surrounding regions. More importantly, their devastating effect on rebel soldiers eventually allowed the U.S. Army to gain the confidence of the local population by providing them credible security from guerrilla brutality.\(^2\)

To distinguish clearly between friend and foe, the U.S. Army began to relocate the population to areas under American control. This was reminiscent of the Indian reservation policy on the Great Plains. Theoretically, concentration policies allowed aggressive actions to be executed in all external areas without excessive concern for collateral damage (since anyone outside of the “*colony*” or “*zone*” was considered, by default, hostile).\(^2\)

For example, re-concentration tactics were practiced extensively during Major Frederick A. Smith’s [not to be confused with BG Jacob H. Smith] campaign from February - April 1901 on the island of Marinduque. Major Smith’s expedition relocated the island’s entire population—50,000 Filipinos—into the six major American-occupied towns on the island. Later, he credited concentration with separating friend from enemy and depriving the rebels of their external recruits, intelligence, and supplies.
Concentration camps also theoretically allowed the Army to "gain the confidence of the people" by protecting them from guerrilla retaliation. Major Smith employed a policy of *devastation* throughout the countryside, destroying the islands’ most valuable commodities—cattle, crops, and hemp—in an effort to “starve out” the guerrillas. Lastly, he conducted frequent patrols to separate the guerrillas from their supplies, keeping them under constant pressure. As with the earlier US Army’s experience in the American Indian Wars, “the triple press of concentration, devastation, and harassment” led to eventual victory. In fact, the actions on Marinduque would serve as a guide for the later campaigns on Samar and Batangas.²³

The combination of the aforementioned policies proved highly successful when used in conjunction with aggressive military offensives. Specifically, the Winter 1900 and Spring 1901 Army offensives applied direct military pressure on guerrilla bands. The offensives were augmented by the support of intelligence networks, judicial institutions, and civil policies that facilitated the penetration of the rebel political support network and the destruction of their supply bases. The 1901 offensives caused the surrender of all but two guerrilla groups—General Miguel Malvar’s band in Batangas and General Vicente Lukban’s group in Samar. MacArthur’s 1901 offensives, backed by harsh, coercive measures, had turned the tide of the war in all but these final two provinces.²⁴

In September 1901, the extremely gruesome massacre of a garrison of U.S. Army troops at Balangiga, Samar, acted as a catalyst for the Army to bring the final two un-pacified provinces under control. The surprise attack, involving townspeople augmented by insurgents secreted in from the surrounding areas, resulted in the brutal
deaths of forty-eight of the 74-man garrison, including all the officers. Investigations would reveal that the local town officials, supposedly loyal to the U.S., had secretly coordinated the attack. Compounding their actions, the attackers mutilated the bodies of the dead soldiers, “with a ferocity unusual for even guerrilla warfare,” giving special attention to the officers.\textsuperscript{25} The event shocked the Army and the American public. In striking similarity with the “hard war” concepts of Sherman and Sheridan in the American Civil War, the final two offensives of the war—led by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell in Batangas, and Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith in Samar—were purposefully brutal campaigns. They were designed to make the Filipino populace “feel the hard hand of war.”\textsuperscript{26} These ruthless campaigns would rely on population concentration and the mass destruction of property and lives to defeat the Filipino insurgency.

The Build-Up: Standing on a Volcano

Following the massacre of C Company, 9\textsuperscript{th} Infantry at Balangiga, the U.S. Army undertook operations to reduce the final two rebel strongholds in the Philippines—the Batangas Province and the island of Samar. In retaliation for the Balangiga massacre, both operations were vigorous campaigns that employed the harshest measures allowed under (and some would claim beyond) \textit{General Order 100}. Nevertheless, the two campaigns provide an interesting study into the proper balance of attraction and retribution policies that are necessary to carry out a successful pacification campaign. The Samar Expedition, commanded by General Jacob H. Smith, was based on a harsh policy of devastation and retribution with little attention given to achieving final assimilation of the population. In contrast, the Batangas campaign plan, under the guidance of General J. Franklin Bell, is noted for its balanced strategy of coercion and
attraction. Accordingly, Bell’s campaign is commonly regarded as being more efficient than Smith’s Samar campaign.\textsuperscript{27}

Major General Adna R. Chaffee, MacArthur’s replacement as the Commander of the Division of the Philippines, undeniably believed that a combination of the leniency of the Philippines Commission and well-meaning Army officers had created the unfortunate conditions that led to the Balangiga Massacre. The Second Philippine Commission—also known as the Taft Commission, after its leader, future US President William H. Taft—was originally established by President McKinley in March 1900. The commission’s purpose was to hasten the newly acquired archipelago’s progress toward civil, rather than military governance. The Taft Commission arrived in the Philippines in May 1900 to assist General MacArthur with civilian matters. By July 1901, Taft had assumed duties as the Governor of the Philippines and took control of several pacified regions. Chaffee controlled the un-pacified areas, serving in a dual capacity as the Military Governor and Commander of the Division of the Philippines. Unfortunately for all involved, the military and civilian leaders often clashed over policy issues. Both General MacArthur, and later General Chaffee, complained about the civilian commission’s interference in military matters, and \textit{visa versa}. Chaffee especially chafed under what he perceived as excessive leniency and interference on the part of the Taft Commission. In fact, the disagreements became so intense that President Roosevelt rebuked both General Chaffee and Governor Taft in an official telegram, much to their chagrin.\textsuperscript{28}
Chaffee’s true beliefs concerning the leniency of his officer corps were relayed in his official correspondence and reports. Following the massacre, he wrote to one of his subordinates:

The condition of mind of officers and men in these islands is largely in error. Their opinion is that the people are far more friendly than they really are, and that they are satisfied with our presence among them . . . . as a rule I would not trust more than 50 percent of the male population, and they must not be trusted.29

The fledgling Division of Military Information fed the General’s already peaked suspicions by forwarding a report which forecasted a coordinated uprising throughout the archipelago targeting January 1902. This thirteen-page intelligence document (with multiple enclosures) was released in October 1901, shortly after the Balangiga attack. The report contained a compilation of observed intelligence indicators throughout the archipelago. In hindsight, the observations appear unrelated—but at the time they were perceived as a possible “wide spread” insurgent effort. The report referred to the suspected effort as the “new movement,” and predicted that it would erupt before January 1902. Following closely behind the Balangiga Massacre, these unrelated events may have taken on exaggerated importance to the evaluators. In his defense, the report’s author did qualify his observations with the below statement:

These reports have come from various sources and so far there is no documentary evidences of any kind to support them. However, reports of coming trouble are persistent and with people such as these we cannot be too careful. There may be no truth in any of these reports but nevertheless the Division Commander should be kept informed of the fact that such reports are current . . . . 30

In retrospect, the report has been judged as a compilation of the intelligence division’s worst fears, rather than an objective analysis of the available information.31 However, Chaffee’s pessimistic perception of the environment may have made him
even more susceptible to such exaggerated reports than usual. Evidence exists that these intelligence estimates were taken seriously and even communicated to the common soldier. For example, in an October 1901 letter to his sister, a Marine serving at Cavite Naval Base stated, “An uprising is expected at anytime among the natives of Luzon Island.” 32

Other events soon occurred which further reinforced Chaffee’s suspicions. Within weeks of the Balangiga attack, another Army detachment was assaulted in Gandara, Samar, by 400 bolo-men, resulting in ten deaths, and six wounded. Additionally, several other minor stations on Samar received small-scale attacks. In fact, a small garrison at the town of Weyler was besieged for nearly two days.33 Later, the small towns of Mutiong, Calbiga, and Dapdap were also subject to minor attacks.34

Though the Filipino insurgency was apparently not sufficiently organized to conduct a widespread, coordinated revolt, there is evidence to believe that General Malvar was planning a “full-scale attack on the American garrisons” in November 1901.35 Additionally, a captured insurgent document from General Lukban praised the attacks on Balangiga and Gandara, urging other guerilla leaders to “attempt the same thing.” 36 In another letter from Lukban to his subordinate commanders, he concluded with the statement, “Imitate, then, brave compatriots, the example shown us by the praiseworthy people of Balangiga.” 37 Undeniably, insurgent leaders would have supported the spread of Balangiga-type attacks throughout the island. However, various communicative and organizational obstacles prevented the widespread execution of the proposed plan. Therefore, it is not surprising that General Chaffee metaphorically equated the Army’s tenuous hold on the archipelago with “standing on a
volcano.” It is reported that on many mornings, the general would alarmingly ask his staff, “Has it blown up yet? . . . The volcano, damn it! The volcano we’re standing on!” 38

Chaffee’s guidance to commanders was in line with his internal apprehensions. He directed that soldiers were to be “stern and inflexible” in order to impart a “wholesome fear” of the Army on the Filipino population. He also directed his officers to punish every hostile act “quickly and severely.” Chaffee was clearly anxious. He estimated that another hundred soldiers would probably be lost attempting to retrieve the firearms captured during the Balangiga massacre. His anger was even less restrained to the Adjutant General of the U.S. Army back in Washington. In a letter to Major General Henry C. Corbin written shortly after Balangiga, Chaffee stated, “they will start a few cemeteries for hombres in Southern Samar.” Confirming this mindset, the Philippine Commissioner, William H. Taft, recorded other cases of Chaffee’s rants. Taft recorded Chaffee as stating that the only way to achieve peace in the Philippines was to pin down the Filipinos “with bayonets for ten years until they submit.” 39

The Balangiga Massacre so affected General Chaffee’s psyche that a year later he used the event to reinvigorate the watchfulness of his soldiers. In September 1902, Chaffee, possibly fearing an “anniversary” insurgent attack, released a Memorandum Order stating:

The Division Commander points attention of all officers and men of this command to loss of comrades at Balangiga, Samar, September 28th, last, due to unwatchfulness and unwarranted confidence in professed loyalty of the inhabitants of the town where the troops were located.

Officers and soldiers should know that in every town are to be found men professing friendship while plotting against them.
It is the special business and obligated duty of the Army to look with suspicion upon native inhabitants of these Islands, so that proof of error in this regard should rest with them to openly demonstrate not so much by words as by actions, incapable of misunderstanding.

Open, day-light foes you have none[,] but remember that large masses of these people are easily led astray by unscrupulous men among them who lie with facility and laugh at your humanity.

Always watch and when the temperature seems most calm, double your vigilance.40

Chaffee was not alone in his opinion. Many of his officers agreed with his support for increasingly harsh measures when dealing with insurgents. The Commanding General of the Department of the Visayas, Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, wrote, “After a few more funerals I think the island [of Samar] will have sufficient experience in the discomforts of war to be willing to accept peace on any terms.” Similarly, Major General Loyd Wheaton, Commander of the Department of Northern Luzon, supported “swift methods of destruction,” while casting aspersions at policies advocating, “going in with a sword in one hand, a pacifist pamphlet in the other . . .” Wheaton added, “You can’t put down a rebellion by throwing confetti and sprinkling perfumery.” Other commanders expressed similar views. For example, Brigadier General Young, stated that since “Asiatics” had “no idea of gratitude, honor or the sanctity of an oath,” harsh methods should be employed to counter the insurgency. Accordingly, Young advocated policies of concentration and the imprisonment or summary execution of insurgents—especially those who resumed active anti-American activities after swearing allegiance to the United States. Colonel Robert L. Bullard, a Regular Army Officer serving as the Commander of the 39th US Volunteers, lamented in his diary that the Army would eventually “be driven to the Spanish method of dreadful
general punishments on a whole community for the acts of its outlaws which the community shields and hides, always."  

For his part, Chaffee complained openly about Commissioner Taft’s "silly talk of benevolence and civilian rule," and his "soft mollycoddling of treacherous natives," which were no substitute for "shells, shot and bayonets." 42 In a letter to the Adjutant General, discussing a different topic, Chaffee let his intentions be known again, “. . . in my opinion it is very necessary to maintain here the influence of the Army on the mind of the people—That they fear it.”43 In fact, some scholars have surmised that Chaffee’s “direly vengeful” frame of mind may have impacted General Smith’s later actions.44

Judging from his feelings at the time, one could deduce that Chaffee may have selected General Jacob H. Smith to command in Samar because of, rather than in spite of, his bellicose attitudes. General Smith’s attitude towards waging “hard war” was well known. In fact, Smith had told reporters earlier that fighting Filipino insurgents was “worse than fighting Indians.” The article’s headline posted as “Colonel Smith of the 12th Orders All Insurgents Shot at Hand.” 45 One author asserts that in one of Smith’s official reports prior to Samar, he admitted to firing on enemy combatants who were displaying white surrender flags.46 In other reports, Smith purportedly used demeaning terminology to describe Filipinos. He used references such as scattering the enemy “like quail,” and sending them “scampering” away after being attacked.47

Smith even bragged to reporters about his harsh methods. Prior to his campaign in Samar, he posed in front of cattle pens—crude cells created from railroad ties used to imprison captured insurgents for months at a time.48 During his Samar expedition, Smith submitted an article to a Manila newspaper in which he stated that the Balangiga
massacre was the result of “officers who love [their] ‘little brown brother’ ”49 While serving as a district commander in Northern Luzon prior to his assignment in Samar, Smith cautioned his officers to remember that “many [Filipinos] who apparently are friendly to the Americans rule [sic] are guilty of the blackest treachery and all officers are warned not to allow their suspicions to be lulled to sleep by friendly association and social intercourse with the native inhabitants.50 General Smith regularly complained about the excessive leniency of American officers. For example, following the arrest of several Filipinos suspected of attacking a group of US soldiers with bolos, Smith lamented,

I only wish that I could have been there to have summarily dealt with them, but it is difficult to get Officers to take prompt measures under G.O. 100 . . . . A few killings under G.O. 100 will aid very much in making the enemy stop these assassinations.51

These bold proclamations make it reasonable to assume that General Smith’s hard-line attitudes toward counter-insurgency warfare were widely known throughout the Philippine Division.

In fact, General Smith had a notorious history of squabbles and rash talk among Army circles. His career was replete with legal and disciplinary problems resulting from rash decisions and loose talk. Prior to his service in the Philippines, he had been the subject of several civilian legal cases and two military courts-martial for accusations of fiscal misconduct and blatant disrespect to a senior officer. His history of imprudent remarks and pointless ramblings was so well identified that his official efficiency report in 1867 un-complimentarily described him as “garrulous.”52 However, he also had a reputation as a fierce and aggressive commander on the battlefield, routinely demonstrating bravery in combat.53
General Chaffee’s sense of urgency and strong confidence in Smith’s abilities may have further bolstered the new brigade commander’s aggressive nature. Chaffee ordered Smith’s direct superior, Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, Commanding General, Department of Visayas, to undertake immediate operations to “disarm these people and to keep them disarmed, and any means to that end is advisable.” [italics added] In fairness to Chaffee, he tempered his guidance by writing, “While I do not urge inhumane treatment of any person in these islands, it is necessary that we be stern and inflexible.” In fact, reports of his even-tempered policies and strict adherence to the laws of war during his command of US forces participating in China’s Boxer Rebellion were well known. However, Chaffee’s mercurial temperament would often cloud his intentions by communicating inconsistent guidance. For example, following Balangiga, Chaffee told a reporter, “if you should hear of a few Filipinos more or less being put away don’t grow too sentimental over it.”

In a written order, he informed General Hughes that two Separate Brigades would be constituted in his Department, stating that his object was to make them more effective by giving their commanders authority under the Articles of War to convene courts-martial and military tribunals within their assigned areas. In reaction to Balangiga, he rushed General Smith’s Sixth Separate Brigade to Samar, while stating his favorable impression of Smith’s abilities: “General Smith, as I am told, is an energetic officer, and I hope he will prove so in command of that brigade.” Chaffee undoubtedly wanted Smith to conduct an active campaign aimed at providing Lukban’s forces no respite. In his report to Washington he stated his overall guidance to Smith, “I
shall let Smith prosecute affairs vigorously in Samar and hope to bring Lukban to . . . submit within a couple of months.” 58

Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that General Smith did not feel his commander was expecting a restrained campaign—Chaffee’s conscious and unconscious signals urged vigilance and retribution. Consequently, it is not surprising that Smith assumed he had free rein to employ harsh measures during his expedition. Even before Smith’s arrival in Samar, the Army displayed its institutional desire for vengeance. Following the massacre, General Hughes ordered the commander of the relief patrol to “make a desert of Balangiga.” 59 In official telegraphic messages, the commander of the expedition informed his superiors that he had “completely destroyed” the town and “burned all the houses along the trail.” The officer continued the report by describing his plan for future operations—“Will continue tomorrow destruction of towns on coast north of Balangiga. . . . This section of the country devastated.” 60 Obviously, the Army sought retribution for the Balangiga massacre. However, displaying an odd inconsistency in its application of retaliation, the Adjutant General of the Department of Visayas chastised a different unit two days later for perceived excesses in its operations. The warning advised a station commander to take immediate action to prevent his soldiers from taking “the law in their own hands.” 61

Upon Smith’s arrival in Samar, the guidance from the Commanding General of Department of the Visayas was no less clear than his initial direction from Chaffee. Brigadier General Hughes explained to Smith that he was being given additional troops to “destroy any hopes created in what the savages might designate in their minds from
their success at Balangiga.” Further, he warned that “Simple burning out appears to do no good, the[y] [sic] want to be stayed with and either killed or domesticated.” 62

Members of the Philippine Commission seemed to sense the gathering storm. In a report issued in October 1901, they stated:

It would be a sad injustice if the Samar disaster shall induce on one side a rigor in the treatment of all Filipinos and on their part a revulsion in those feelings of friendship toward Americans which have been growing stronger each day with the spread and development of the government. 63

Further irritating Chaffee, Governor Taft’s 1901 Report went so far as to state, “The people are friendly to the civil government” and desire “protection by the civil government.” 64 General Chaffee did not agree.

Samar: “The Howling Wilderness”

In October 1901, General Smith took command of the Sixth Separate Brigade in Samar and was tasked with retrieving the weapons and ammunition lost during the Balangiga massacre. His campaign, commencing in November 1901, has been criticized as being poorly planned and executed. Critics assert that Smith’s central policy of retaliation and severity seemed to have no quantifiable objective other than to avenge the Balangiga massacre. 65 Accordingly, General Smith’s officers were instructed to treat all Filipinos as enemies until they proved themselves otherwise. Smith strove to starve the rebel forces by destroying the indigenous food supply and blockading the island from all trade. To achieve this end, he sanctioned the most severe methods authorized by GO100. Therefore, critics claim that fear and starvation were the central themes of Smith’s campaign plan. 66

General Smith’s retaliation mindset was unquestionably highlighted by his what would become infamous orders to the commander of the Marine battalion sent to relieve
the recently devastated 9th Infantry. Still in the heat of the Balangiga aftermath, General Smith ordered Marine Major Littleton W.T. Waller:

I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States. . . . The interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness. 67

When questioned by Major Waller concerning the age limitation of his guidance, Smith replied that males over ten years old should be considered as being capable of bearing arms. Major Waller and General Smith were later court-martialed for their actions on Samar. Waller would testify that rather than taking the order literally, his interpretation of Smith’s intemperate guidance was “that the General wanted all insurrectos killed . . . people who were bearing arms against Americans. . . . I understood that we were not to take prisoners if they were armed.” In fact, Waller testified that he cautioned his officers that “we were not sent here to make war on women and children and old men.” 68

Though he may not have expected his orders to be taken literally, Smith’s intemperate language undoubtedly had an effect on his various subordinates’ implementation of his written and verbal orders. For example, Major Waller led his 300-man battalion into Samar in November 1901 on a punitive campaign to eradicate guerrilla forces. Food and trade to the island were severed while patrols scoured the countryside in an effort to “starve the revolutionaries into submission.” In an eleven-day period, one of Major Waller’s patrols reported killing 39 men, destroying 255 dwellings, and butchering or destroying local cattle and crops. 69 The patrols employed the harshest measures allowable by, (and in some documented cases exceeding), General Order 100.
Months later, reports of excessive cruelty, including torture and other excesses throughout Samar, began reaching the US public. The subsequent Waller and Smith courts-martial would spark several other investigations of war crimes in the Philippines. Specifically, in March 1902 Major Waller was tried and acquitted for his summary execution of eleven Filipino prisoners following his ill-fated trek through the mountains of Samar. During his defense, General Smith was implicated in the incident when his intemperate and illegal orders to Waller were brought to light. Though Smith dishonorably denied having ever given the “kill and burn” orders, the Army was forced to court-martial him based on the damning testimony in Waller’s trial.70

Amazingly, Smith was not tried for issuing illegal orders, or for inciting war crimes—instead, he was charged with “Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline,” for the excessive nature of his orders. The trial found General Smith guilty of “intemperate, inconsiderate, and violent expressions, which, if accepted literally, would grossly violate the humane rules governing American armies in the field.” Astonishingly, the court’s subsequent sentencing was extremely lenient. General Smith was merely sentenced with “admonishment” by the reviewing authority.” Politically, the Roosevelt administration could not let such a lenient sentence stand in response to the huge public outcry. Accordingly, Secretary of War Elihu Root recommended that General Smith be retired from active service, claiming he had damaged “[h]is usefulness as an example, guide, and controlling influence for the junior officers of the Army . . . .” President Roosevelt agreed and retired General Smith, stating that his and Waller’s actions had “sullied the American name.”71
However, Secretary Root claimed that though General Smith had committed many verbal transgressions, his written orders were in accordance with the laws of war:

The actual conduct of military operations in Samar, were justified by the history and conditions of the warfare with the cruel and treacherous savages who inhabited the island, and their entire disregard of the laws of war, were wholly within the limitations of General Orders 100, of 1863, and were sustained by precedents of the highest authority.72

The President of Smith’s court-martial, Major General Loyd Wheaton, justified the court’s lenient sentence in his official post-trial statement. He explained that Smith “did not mean everything that his unexplained language implied,” and that “his subordinates did not gather such a meaning; and that the orders were never executed in such a sense.” Wheaton went so far as to proclaim, “Fortunately they were not taken literally and were not followed. No women or children or helpless persons or noncombatants or prisoners were put to death in pursuance of them.” 73

Most historians disagree with General Wheaton’s assessment. General Smith’s orders to Waller were not the only documented cases of Smith’s excessively brutal verbiage. One officer testifying at Smith’s court-martial relayed yet another example of Smith’s intemperate guidance. Smith admonished the officer stating, “I want this war carried on with more severity. In fact, it is more killing that I want.”74 When another officer complained that the destruction of crops was resulting in the starvation of the natives in his district, Smith replied, “Let them die, the sooner they are all dead the sooner we will have peace.” 75

Other officers serving under General Smith were also tried for violating the laws of war. For example, Major Edwin F. Glenn, Smith’s Brigade Provost Marshal, was court-martialed for the routine use of the water cure torture to gain information from suspected insurgents. (The “water cure” was a method of torture used to gain information from
unwilling prisoners. The restrained prisoner had a hose or bamboo tube inserted down his throat through which a large quantity of water was forced. The resulting bloated stomach caused extreme discomfort and sometimes even death. American soldiers allegedly learned the torture method from Filipino native scouts. Glenn’s interrogations were notoriously brutal. Further, he was implicated with conspiring in the murders of at least ten suspected Filipino insurgents. At his court-martial, Major Glenn was accused of a “reckless disregard of human life.” However, Glenn defended his actions stating, “I am convinced that my action resulted in hastening the termination of hostilities and directly resulted in saving many human lives, and directly injured no one.”

Interestingly, General Chaffee personally knew Major Glenn, and specifically attached him to Smith’s staff, stating:

I have attached Major Glenn, who is a man of very much experience, to General Smith’s staff. He is able and I am sure will be of great assistance to General Smith. Glenn has an excellent nose for smelling out insurrectos, and once he gets on his trail, he is not liable to escape him.

Though not conclusive, this telling passage leads one to believe that General Chaffee knew of Glenn’s reputation for employing harsh interrogation tactics. Also telling is a letter written by Major Glenn to his brother concerning his court-martial:

I have but one regret through it all which is that our responsible commanders who were in a position to do so did not protect us in doing that which they sent us to do and which in fact they showed great anxiety that we should do in order that credit might come to them.

This letter reveals that Major Glenn believed his commanders had knowledge of his actions but did not defend him during the ensuing public scandal.

General Smith’s ruthless reputation even influenced the naval officers assigned by Rear Admiral Frederick Rodgers, Commander of the Navy’s Asiatic Squadron, to
support the Army on Samar. A naval officer and gunboat commander, Lieutenant Edwin A. Anderson, wrote to his wife concerning Smith’s instructions:

All persons in the boats are to be killed, there is nothing said about capturing. . . . Samar, as far as I can find out is absolutely bare of everything. Wherever the army has gone lately they have destroyed all crops, houses, killed cattle and generally laid the island to waste.81

However, like Major Waller, Lieutenant Anderson did not carry out Smith’s exhortations literally. His vessel regularly took prisoners according to the laws of war. Anderson also criticized the Army’s use of torture, namely the water cure, which he observed several times. Lieutenant Anderson’s letters also complained that Smith’s harsh techniques seemed to be applied haphazardly. Anderson believed that General Smith sought to crush the rebellion by blindly striking out against the Filipino population of Samar. Lieutenant Anderson felt the rugged, often inaccessible terrain limited the effectiveness of Smith’s campaign to the coastal towns within reach of the Navy’s gunboats and transports. (Accordingly, he thought the coastal operations of the Navy and Marines were more effective than the Army’s efforts. He claimed that soldiers did not pursue the enemy as vigorously as the Marines).82 The acting civilian Governor of the Philippines, Luke Wright, would have agreed with Anderson’s observations of Smith’s leadership. He would further write that Smith’s harsh measures were “arbitrary and drastic.”83

In General Smith’s defense, his original orders from Chaffee, though less fiery than his own outbursts, were no less clear:

We have lost 100 rifles at Balangiga and 25,000 rounds of ammunition. You must get them back . . . . Capture the arms if you can, buy them if you must; whichever course you adopt, get them back.84
General Smith’s first priority was to conduct a survey of his command to acquaint himself with the challenges that he would be facing. Smith soon realized that before he could achieve his objectives, he would have to overcome many serious obstacles quickly. Among the toughest challenges were the harsh terrain and climate of Samar. Even Chaffee, in his *Annual Report*, attested to the grueling campaign conditions that faced the Sixth Separate Brigade:

It fell to the lot of these troops to surmount apparently impossible physical difficulties, and to withstand the demoralizing influence of prolonged mental strain due to apprehension of ambush made possible at every step through the tropical jungle. Only the officers and men who actually participated in the work of hunting for the enemy in the pathless wilderness of the island can form an appreciative idea of the hardship which the terrain and climate exacted from all the scouting parties.85

Smith agreed and later reported the effect of terrain on his operations to a local Manila newspaper:

. . . all the transportation of the island of Samar must be by water, either along the sea coast, or up the various streams in the mountains and plains. There are no roads, and only trails of the poorest kinds, and all of them must have considerable work to make them navigable for pack animals. The streams are navigable for boats larger than the native *Barota* only for a short distance from their mouths. The bringing [of] the condition of the troops up to proper standard for the solution of the problem was not an easy task, with all the work of supplying them with food, ammunition, etc. [sic] 86

General Smith began his tour of command by conducting an inspection tour of the stations in his new territory. Telegraphic communication records show him traveling through the various stations on Samar. Smith soon realized that, beyond Samar’s harsh terrain and climate, he would have to overcome several other obstacles. General Smith also had to compensate for an initial shortage of troops, compounded by what he perceived as lax discipline. 87 Smith astutely described the initial conditions found during his inspection tour. His comments demonstrate his prescient understanding of
the personnel, disciplinary, and logistical problems he would have to overcome in order
to counter the growing insurgency in Samar.

I found the troops scattered over an immense territory, and with only the coast towns garrisoned and by barely sufficient number of soldiers to protect themselves from raids of the mountain hordes. Little or nothing had been done owing to a feeling of security and confidence which had been engendered by officers who loved the “Little Brown Brother” . . . Guard duty was almost entirely neglected; the soldiers mixed freely with the inhabitants; . . . no matter how far from their barracks the soldiers had to go for meals, no guns were carried, and a general do-as-you-please was the order of the day. The only pack train on the island of Samar had been neglected and was worthless for this reason. The steam launches had not been inspected, and had been allowed to deteriorate from lack of care and attention.88

General Smith quickly and aggressively went about solving the largest challenges: 1) lack of troops; and 2) cutting off the insurgent supplies by controlling and regulating trade. The attacks on Balangiga and Gandara convinced him that a concentration of troops into larger formations was required since the “small detachments were not safe at isolated points.” Accordingly, Smith judiciously requested additional troops from the Division Commander and gladly accepted the offer of Rear Admiral Frederick Rodgers to supply him with a battalion of over 300 Marines [Major Waller’s command]. General Smith also requested, and received, increased Navy gunboat support to blockade the coast of Samar. This effort was an attempt to disrupt the smuggling of food and supplies from the nearby Island of Leyte to the insurgents on Samar.89

Chaffee, at least initially, agreed with General Smith’s tactical assessments. In his 1902 Annual Report, General Chaffee wrote:

Prior to October, 1901, the number of troops in Samar were [sic] too few to campaign for peace. The most that could be done under the circumstances was for the soldiers to remain idle in the numerous
occupied stations and talk; many stations were inadequately garrisoned.\textsuperscript{90} Accordingly, Chaffee reported to Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin, “[Brigadier General] Hughes has unsafely spread his force there, several places being held by 15 or 20 men.”\textsuperscript{91} In Hughes’ defense, dispersed army forces were employed in an effort to provide security to the Filipino populace by (theoretically) controlling the terrain and isolating the populace from the guerrillas. To maintain pressure on troubled areas and respond with prompt offensive action, a series of small garrisons were established throughout the countryside. Tellingly, the number of Army posts in the Philippines increased from several dozen in 1899, to 639 by 1901. Often, army garrisons consisted of company-sized detachments stationed in major towns throughout the districts, with smaller detachments assigned to less populated villages. However, dispersion became a “two-edged sword”—though small garrisons allowed wider coverage throughout the countryside, the individual posts were often under-manned and vulnerable to attack. For example, army officers stationed on Marinduque in 1900 noted that garrisons with less than one hundred men were not strong enough defend themselves while carrying out offensive operations. The Balangiga massacre underscored the potential weakness of small garrisons.\textsuperscript{92}

Accordingly, General Chaffee gave Smith substantial reinforcements to strengthen his garrisons, hoping to spur more active operations into the interior of the island. The Sixth Separate Brigade was quickly reinforced to twelve battalions of regular infantry and seven companies of Filipino scouts—approximately 4,000 men. Previously, the Samar’s garrison rarely exceeded 1,000 troops.\textsuperscript{93} After Balangiga, Samar saw an increase of troops from eighteen line infantry companies in early 1901 to
over forty-three companies and five native scout companies by January 1902, (not including the additional reinforcements sent to the neighboring island of Leyte).

However, the real indicator of the Army’s renewed emphasis on the expeditious pacification of Samar was the increased number of towns and villages garrisoned. In January 1901, the army had only five towns occupied by company-sized garrisons—shortly after the Balangiga Massacre, the number of company posts increased to forty-three.\(^ \text{94} \)

Smith also enacted changes in the command and control system by streamlining the chain of command. Due to the scattered location of posts and stations, manned by a hodgepodge of detachments, he initially observed a lack of cohesion, with officers “having no chiefs to apply to for orders except direct to Brigade Headquarters.” He injected the battalion commanders into the chain of command to effect a solution, allowing troops to “work intelligently under their Battalion Commanders, thus avoiding much red tape and paper work.”\(^ \text{95} \)

Additionally, one of General Smith’s first field orders was wisely aimed at attacking the insurgents’ ties with the underground supply chain—consisting mainly of food stores and hemp, which transited among the small villages of Samar and extended to the neighboring island of Leyte. In his \textit{Field Order No. 1} [issued 21 Oct 1902], the newly appointed commander ordered that all vessels be painted the conspicuous color of red and their owners issued identification passes delineating their point of origin, destination, and content. By strictly limiting and controlling the passes, General Smith was determined to reduce the flow of illegal supplies and funds to Lukban’s insurgent groups.\(^ \text{96} \)
General Smith heavily emphasized Army-Navy cooperation in order to achieve his goal of interdicting supplies from reaching the insurgents. Of note, during this period, no defined doctrine or command relationships existed to promote joint operations. In lieu of any written doctrine, joint cooperation in the Philippines was usually informally coordinated at the lowest tactical levels. The majority of coordination was conducted via ad hoc meetings between commanders or junior officers. As a result, the effectiveness of Army-Navy operations ran the gamut from efficient to extremely frustrating. (In fact, after an initial period of mutual cooperation on Samar, one historian documented several incidences of problematic “joint” operations on Samar. However, due to the lack of defined doctrine and command relationships, this type of friction was most likely unavoidable and should not be blamed solely on General Smith. In all likelihood, these same types of problems were commonplace throughout the conflict). 97 Even the Marines on Samar had difficulty clarifying their command relationship. Though Waller’s battalion was placed directly under the command of General Smith’s Sixth Separate Brigade, he was ordered by Admiral Rodgers to report to the senior Navy commander in the Philippines.98 (In fact, during his court-martial, Waller would claim that he could not legally be charged by the Army since his command was technically under the Navy’s chain of command).

Regardless, Smith admirably enjoined all “army and navy officers . . . to take all possible precautions to stop illicit trade.” In conjunction with his active land operations, (consisting of battalion-sized sweeps), Smith coordinated with the Navy to strengthen the blockade of the island.99 He also intensified the naval patrols of the San Juanico Strait and coordinated increased gunboat support to the Army’s coastal and river
operations. Smith’s efforts created an initial atmosphere of mutual cooperation between the Army and Navy, with Admiral Rodgers commenting on the “cordial relations which now exist between the Army and the Navy.”

As stated previously, due to its harsh terrain, Samar’s security and supply depended heavily on naval support. Resultantly, General Hughes gave the Sixth Brigade the Department’s largest allocation of transports and waterborne supply craft. Smith employed the flexibility afforded by naval maneuver and firepower to augment his forces. He used gunboats to protect his garrisons and augment his patrols’ firepower. Additionally, steam launches transported and supplied Smith’s detachments throughout the archipelago. Despite occasional friction between the army and navy chain of command, the navy provided Smith’s forces increased flexibility through tactical and logistical mobility.

After taking command, General Smith addressed the complexities of joint operations. In an attempt to increase the efficiency of the joint Army-Navy operations, he released an order aimed at promoting cooperation between the Navy gunboat blockade and his station commanders. Inconsistencies in the regulation of trade and the issuance of passes by the various station commanders led to confusion in the naval enforcement of the blockade. Accordingly, Smith’s Circular No. 7 [27 Dec 1901] directed increased control of Samar’s pass system. Smith’s order also disseminated a standardized tactical signal system designed to improve communication between the stations and their supporting naval vessels. Unfortunately, in spite of General Smith’s best efforts, Army-Navy relations on Samar would later deteriorate. Admiral Rodgers would contradict his previous praise of Smith’s operations, stating, “It may be safely said
that if the military operations on shore were conducted by the Army with the same unflagging zeal, energy and unity of purpose that characterized the movements afloat, the termination of hostilities on Samar would be a matter of weeks instead of months.**104

General Smith also focused his efforts on the Filipino population, especially the social elite. He released a *Proclamation* on 01 Nov 1902 which announced his belief that the population, especially the influential and wealthy citizenry, was secretly supporting the insurgency. He proactively commenced a weapons purchase program and demanded that the natives establish their friendly intent by the 10th of November through concrete acts:

1st- By giving information as to the location of any guns used for the purposes of the insurrection.

2d - By giving information as to the whereabouts of persons in insurrection.

3d - By inducing persons in insurrection to present themselves with their rifles or other arms to the nearest American official.

They cannot establish the fact of their friendship by protestations of any kind.**105

This proclamation espoused several principles central to successful counter-insurgency campaigns. The policy attempted to make the population responsible for their actions, thereby driving a wedge between the insurgents and the peaceful natives. It also laid the seeds for future security programs aimed at rejecting protestations of neutrality as rationale for not supporting American forces.

Unfortunately, Smith’s flashes of tactical brilliance were matched by his characteristically inflammatory and indiscreet verbiage. In a self-written newspaper article, General Smith pronounced, “It did not take long before it was quite obvious to any observer that only the ‘Fire and Sword’ policy could succeed in bringing these
people to understand that they must come under the absolute and complete control of
the United States.” 106

Accordingly, some aspects of General Smith’s campaign got off to a rocky start
due to his over-aggressive policies. For example, shortly after taking command, Smith
wisely began arresting native municipal officials who were covertly supporting the
insurrection. He then requested through General Chaffee that these offenders be
deported to Guam, as had been done with some previously high-profile Filipino leaders.
Chaffee, sometimes considered politically insensitive himself, refused Smith’s request
outright, stating to his superiors that he considered the action too excessive for its
expected return.107

Soon after, General Smith issued an order attempting to restrict and control trade
with the neighboring island of Leyte. The objective was to cut-off supplies to the
insurgents on Samar. In fact, the policy of securing trade through the San Juanico
Strait proved to be an extremely effective military tactic. Combined with the destruction
of crops during the war, the lack of external food supplies resulted in people being
forced to eat edible roots in order to survive. It follows that starving natives would be
hard pressed to donate foodstuffs to the insurgency voluntarily. 108 Smith defended his
actions to his superiors in a letter stating his rationale:

The people of Leyte are actively cooperating with and assisting the
insurgents in Samar by sending food supplies, men, arms, and money
across the Straits of San Juanico, and by operating a system of signals to
warn all parties of the approach of our gunboats. . . . Leyte remains an
asylum to which they may repair in security to rest and recruit . . . .109

However, General Smith poorly coordinated his military campaign with the civil
authorities. Although Smith had coordinated his operations with the Governor of Leyte,
his brash actions caused a confrontation with Philippine Commission’s (acting)
Governor, Luke Wright, over jurisdiction issues. Commissioner Wright took issue with several of General Smith’s actions. Due to its close proximity to Samar, Smith felt certain that the insurgents in Samar were being routinely supplied from Leyte. However, Smith’s attempts to control all trade with Samar interfered with the governance of Leyte. The Sixth Separate Brigade arrested suspects in Leyte and had them transferred to Samar without the knowledge or approval of the civil authorities. Of note, Chaffee’s Annual Report defended Smith’s actions by stating that he had coordinated his actions with the local authorities on Leyte. In Smith’s defense, the War Department’s Annual Report for 1902 did contain correspondence from Leyte Governor J.H. Grant admitting knowledge of, and acquiescing to, Smith’s operations:

> I desire to inform you that I had a long conference with general Smith before this circular was issued and I am satisfied that it will ultimately proves exceedingly beneficial to this province, although its provisions are somewhat contrary to the spirit of civil law, and are bound to cause quite a good deal of dissatisfaction just now. 110

Therefore, the source of the resistance to Smith’s Leyte transgressions was most likely either the Philippine Commission in Manila, or angry merchants who were losing money due to the policy’s negative effect on trade. Regardless, the leadership of the Philippine Commission took issue with Smith’s aggressive tactics.111

These squabbles caused General Smith to request that Leyte be transferred to his jurisdiction under martial law. Following inquiries by General Chaffee, Smith’s requests for increased control were denied, and he was ordered to make amends with the civil government. Through his shortsightedness, General Smith had garnered the ire of both his civilian and military superiors. He was, therefore, forced to release additional orders and circulars clarifying and modifying his previous guidance.112
Subsequently, Smith released *Circular No. 3* [18 Nov 1901], clarifying the intent of his previous orders; and, *Circular No. 4* [2 Dec 1901], which rescinded the majority of the trade restrictions of Leyte. By 7 Dec 1901, *Circular No. 5* was released, completely removing all restrictions on trade in Leyte. These additional circulars were most likely issued in reaction to the harsh resistance and criticism he received from the Philippine Commission. Although General Chaffee may have privately supported Smith’s policies, he officially applied pressure, forcing Smith to rescind his orders. Unfortunately for Smith, Chaffee had already clashed with the Commission (specifically, Governor Taft) over jurisdiction issues and had been recently reprimanded by President Roosevelt. Therefore, he may have been hesitant to support Smith over another “military-versus-civilian” jurisdiction matter.\(^{113}\)

In Smith’s defense, the military rationale for his politically precarious recommendation was sound. Even General Hughes, who clashed with Smith over various tactical issues, admitted that closing the ports in Leyte would offer a “very decided military advantage.” However, Hughes was savvy enough to demur on its application due to potential political ramifications.\(^{114}\) Accordingly, Chaffee’s rebuke to Smith was relatively mild. He admonished Smith, stating “It is not good policy to withdraw provinces from civilian column and I must not ask for it save as a last resort . . . .” He directed Smith to consult with the Philippine Commission leadership to work out an agreement and insist that the civilian government enforce the already existing trade restrictions.\(^{115}\)

Chaffee’s reply illustrates that he most likely agreed with Smith’s overall military objective but was restrained by political considerations. Chaffee later counseled Smith
but hinted at his overall approval: “Failure [by the civilian officials] to do so will be our justification for military interference to insure that end, but we must have proof of that failure . . . .” 116 In fact, General Chaffee’s propensity to support similar measures, when not bound by political concerns, was demonstrated a month later. In December 1901, Chaffee supported General Bell’s request to close the ports of Batangas and Laguna provinces in order to cut off supplies from the insurgents.” 117 Unlike Leyte, these provinces had remained under military control and therefore did not present as large of a political obstacle. Chaffee was most likely being pressured from Washington to ensure the primacy of the civil government in the Philippines whenever possible.

(Of note, the President’s desire to establish civil control over the Philippines was expressed early in instructions to Chaffee’s. While still in Peking commanding the China Relief Expedition, Chaffee received correspondence from the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, stating his initial instructions as the incoming commander of the Division of the Philippines. In February 1901, Root directed, “We intend to discontinue the military government of the Philippine Islands and to establish a civil government which will reign supreme there . . . We are very desirous to have this accomplished . . . .” 118

In fact, by December 1901 Chaffee’s correspondence shows that, beyond closely monitoring General Smith’s civil-military coordination issues, the Division Commander was watchfully safeguarding civilian jurisdiction. He instructed his department commanders to “abstain from interference in any form whatever in civil affairs.” He went on to instruct, “The strictest discipline must be enforced in all commands. Any soldier who wrongs a native must be dealt with at once . . . .” The fact that this correspondence
was found in General Corbin’s Papers supports the theory that Chaffee was responding to pressure from the War Department, or higher.  

Nevertheless, General Chaffee also conveyed subdued support of Smith’s attempt to interrupt the flow of supplies from Leyte to Samar to his superiors in Washington. In January 1902, Chaffee reported to the Adjutant General that he had instructed Smith to release prisoners arrested outside his jurisdiction. However, he also noted that the Sixth Separate Brigade was now forced to expend an entire battalion on picket duty to guard the coastline of the San Juanico Strait in order to prevent supplies from being smuggled from Leyte. Previously, Chaffee corresponded with Philippine Commissioner Wright, to explain that General Smith had coordinated his operations with the Governor of Leyte, J.H. Grant. However, Chaffee’s support to Smith would wane as 1902 progressed. The political fury resulting from the Smith, Waller, and Glenn courts-martial, combined with the testimony of the 1902 Senate hearings, undoubtedly caused Chaffee to distance himself from Smith. Chaffee was certainly aware of these events’ affect on his future. In April 1902, General Corbin wrote Chaffee, assuring him of the War Department’s support regardless of “any rumors of dissatisfaction.” However, Corbin also cautioned him, “that questions might arise as to your jurisdiction.”

In December 1901, Smith decided to focus and intensify his brigade’s efforts on the island of Samar. On Christmas Eve 1901, General Smith released Circular No. 6 [24 Dec 1901] to his commanders. Circular No. 6 was a drastic increase in the intensity and tempo of Samar’s counter-insurgency effort. In consonance with General MacArthur’s previous enactment of GO100, Circular No. 6 transmitted its commander’s
belief that “short, severe wars are the most humane in the end.” It continued, “No civilized war, however civilized, can be carried on on a humanitarian basis.” Again displaying his intemperate streak, General Smith purportedly stated to his staff that it was his intention to turn Samar into a “howling wilderness.” 122 (Of note, some scholars have hinted that the above phrase may have actually originated from General Chaffee). 123 In fact, Chaffee utilized similar terminology in a letter to Adjutant General Corbin while describing the situation on Batangas, rather than Samar:

I can’t say how long it will take us to beat Malvar into surrendering, and if no surrender, can’t say how long it will take us to make a wilderness of that country, but one or the other will eventually take place. 124

In any case, Circular No. 6 endorsed a counter-insurgency policy designed to make the population take responsibility for their actions by laying the burden of the insurgency on the wealthy class of Filipino citizenry. Its goal was to “wage war in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible,” and thereby:

creat[ing] in all the minds of all the people a burning desire for the war to cease; a desire or longing so intense, so personal, and so real that it will impel them to devote themselves in real earnest to bring about a real state of peace. 125

Beyond its opening proclamation, Circular No 6 promulgated several guiding counter-insurgency principles. Firstly, Smith dictated that all natives would be regarded as an enemy until they conclusively displayed their loyalty to the United States. Accordingly, words or pledges would not suffice as proof of allegiance—loyalty was to be measured solely by an individual’s actions. Neutrality was not to be tolerated—Smith decreed that all natives must be regarded as an active friend or open enemy. 126

He also warned his officers that nearly all Filipino town officials were either directly supporting, or sympathetic to, the insurgency. Smith considered the Filipino
peasant as merely an ignorant tool of the wealthy class, easily manipulated by its master. Therefore, the wealthy sympathizer represented the most dangerous threat to the counter-insurgency effort. Accordingly, the brigade’s counter-insurgency fight needed to focus on the influential princípal class. To support this effort, Circular No. 6 permitted the arrest and confinement of suspected sympathizers as Prisoners of War on the sole basis of suspicion—even if there was not sufficient evidence to convict by trial. This relaxation of legal restraints was designed to prevent contributions and other support from reaching the insurgents. ¹²⁷

The authorization to arrest citizens based on suspicion alone was not a new tactic in the Philippine Insurrection. As early as December 1900, guidance was being disseminated in the Philippines directing commanders to focus their efforts on those natives aiding the insurgents but especially on prominent families. Specifically, the guidance authorized arrests based on suspicion of aiding the insurgency in cases where not enough evidence existed to bring the suspect to trial by a military commission. The guidance directed that these cases should be reported to the Department Headquarters. Interestingly, one order stated:

Prisoners arrested in accordance with the foregoing instructions may be treated with such severity as the nature of their offense or the necessity of example may demand, provided that such treatment be not in violation of the dictates of humanity or the recognized laws of war . . . . No excuse on the part of an arrested person that he contributed to the insurgent cause . . . under compulsion and through fear of personal harm will be accepted. The natives must be made to feel that a compliance with insurgent demands will be as dangerous as a refusal. ¹²⁸

In the same vein, Circular No. 6 concluded with General Smith’s most prescient observations. In an attempt to reduce the influence of the insurgency over the local population (by its use of threats, violence, and terrorism), Smith pronounced:
Natives living in the pueblos will be informed that they can secure protection from forced contributions whenever they really desire such protection. . . . It is quite common for natives of all classes to claim that they are afraid of the insurgents; that if they assist the Americans or give any information to them they will be killed . . . . Officers will furnish protection against all real dangers directed against those natives who seek protection within their commands . . . . 129

This final guidance supported his effort to protect the population in order to invalidate claims of neutrality due to fear of guerilla reprisals. His officers were directed to provide security for inhabitants who earnestly sought peace. Future sympathizers would not be exempt from US punishment by claiming that their acts were performed under duress—specifically, through fear of terrorist retribution.

Accordingly, Smith continued a tactic already established by General Hughes. A concentration camp system was reinvigorated to separate the general population from the insurgent threat. This colony, or zone, system gave the American soldiers the ability to target nearly any native outside the camps based on the theoretical presumption that he was an insurgent, or an insurgent sympathizer. It also provided security and protection to the portion of the native population that earnestly desired American support. 130

Smith’s Circular No. 2 [13 Feb 1902], officially pronounced a concentration policy—although it did not openly use the contentious term, “concentration.” The employment of population concentration was extremely controversial due to the previous use of this tactic by the Spanish Army in Cuba. The squalid conditions caused by Spanish General Valeriano Weyler’s re-concentration camps were horrifying. Accordingly, they became central to the United States’ charges of cruelty used to justify America’s Declaration of War with Spain in 1898. Regardless, Circular No. 2 ordered Smith’s station commanders to:
... notify all natives living near them that for their protection they will move to within certain prescribed limits, and that so long as they remain peaceful will be afforded all opportunities to obtain food and other necessities. [As will be discussed later, a concentration policy was already being employed by General J.F. Bell in the Batangas Province].

The combination of the aforementioned policies—reduction of illicit trade, intolerance of neutrality, and security through population concentration—placed Filipino natives in the unenviable position of having to choose sides openly between the insurgency or the Americans. Presented with the option of accepting the protection offered by American concentration camps, natives could no longer claim involuntary support to the insurgents.

Smith’s counter-insurgency policies were also supported by active tactical operations. General Smith directed his forces to sweep the interior of the island to directly engage the guerrilla bands. Employing the recently arrived reinforcements, General Smith soon had sixty commands “driving in from the coast and river landings, dispersing the insurgent bands and destroying their caches of food and arsenals in the interior.” He described the methods employed to reinvigorate the counter-insurgency effort:

Increased activity was required of all the stations and a vigorous policy produced good results. Food supplies were cut off from getting to the interior of the island; smuggling prevented, and all traffic in hemp was suspended in both Leyte and Samar. Bands of insurgents were annihilated and their cuartels and stores of rice destroyed until the cry went up from the merchants of Leyte who had been aiding [insurgent General Vicente] Lukban’s forces . . . .

Chaffee supported, in fact urged, vigorous operations from the start. His initial perceptions of Smith’s military operations seemed favorable. In early November 1901, Chaffee reported that "Smith is now actively operating in Samar and has three of four columns moving in the Northern end of that island from the East, North, and West Coast
He then described the extreme adversity his subordinate was facing in the accomplishment of his mission, telling the Adjutant General:

. . . he has a most difficult task and one that it may be impossible to accomplish for three or four months, notwithstanding Smith’s energy and the energy which he will infuse into the troops under his command. It is almost equal to the old saying: “It is difficult to find a needle in a haystack.”

Despite claims by scholars that Chaffee had cooled to Smith shortly after he commenced his campaign, in December the Division Commander was still supportive of the operations in Samar. Describing the recent surrender of 700 bolo-men, Chaffee wrote to his superiors that “Smith is doing all he can in Samar. . . .” However, due to Samar’s harsh, impenetrable terrain, he downplayed the importance of small victories and expressed doubts that General Lukban would be captured any time soon. In December 1901, Chaffee speculated that Lukban’s surrender would not be achieved for “several months and it will probably be a matter of starving them out, as the island is so bushy and mountainous.” Rather than being critical of Smith, Chaffee’s correspondence more accurately described the substantial challenges faced by the soldiers on Samar.

In January 1902, Chaffee made a visit to Samar “to make a personal inquiry into affairs . . . .” and to determine the future prospects of success. Although he bluntly stated that the situation in Samar was “not encouraging,” he was not overly critical of Smith’s actions. Rather than discrediting the efforts of the brigade commander, Chaffee elaborated on the extremely harsh climate and weather, recently made even more challenging by an extremely heavy rainfall. In the same letter that described the tribulations of the failed Waller Expedition, (now notorious for its suffering and depredation), he had the perceptivity to mention, “Notwithstanding all this, the officers
and troops which I saw were cheerful and in fairly good health and look forward to the
time their efforts will be crowned by success.” He also reported that though only a few
of Lukban’s insurgent force had been captured, “[a] considerable number of the people
of Samar have come to the coast towns,” and stated that Lukban’s remaining forces had
been “broken into small bands.” Actually, Lukban had been reduced to nothing more
than issuing proclamations and urging his leaders not to surrender. Indeed, Lukban
was captured within a month of his letter, on 18 February 1902—well prior to Chaffee’s
pessimistic estimate.137

Although General Chaffee recommended that Smith adjust his troop dispositions,
his written correspondence concerning Smith’s performance did not express any strong
disapproval. Chaffee’s main criticism noted that General Smith had concentrated his
troops into battalions rather than operating from many small posts, which would
facilitate the soldiers’ ability “to work upon the people.” (Chaffee attributed the recent
success in Batangas to this type of broader troop disposition).138 However, in fairness
to Smith, Chaffee had initially agreed with his observation that General Hughes’ thinly-
garrisoned dispositions had contributed to the success of the insurgent’s Balangiga
attack.139 Therefore, this observation demonstrated a change of attitude on Chaffee’s
part.

During the guerrilla phase of the insurrection, it was determined by trial and error
that large-scale cordon and sweep operations were largely ineffective. In addition to the
cumbersome movement of large forces, difficult terrain often allowed guerrillas to detect
the approach of large forces through the limited avenues of approach. Guerrilla base
camps were often alerted before being engaged and were able to disperse prior to
being trapped. The most common operations were small-scale hikes consisting of fifty to one hundred men. Hikes were similar to present-day reconnaissance-in-force or search-and-destroy missions. The most effective techniques were found to be night movements, ambushes, and roundups—a concealed movement, usually conducted at night, followed by a pre-dawn attack. ¹⁴₀

Ironically, over two years earlier in 1899, (then) Colonel J.H. Smith complained to his Brigade Adjutant General about Bell’s unconventional tactics. Bell’s biographer, Edgar F. Raines, Jr., recounted the following description of (then) Colonel Bell’s tactical prowess:

He [Bell] emphasized the offensive under all circumstances. Whenever a detachment faced a group of armed Filipinos, it should attack, because, although brave, the Insurgents lacked training, equipment, proper organization, and adequate leadership. Bell emphasized to his troops that mobility and aggressiveness were the keys to success . . . . He taught his officers to bypass centers of organized resistance and to continue the drive forward to disrupt Filipino communications and attack their headquarters . . . . The aggressive Kentuckian believed in concentrating his men for a hard blow and accepted the fact that his flanks, and those of any neighboring units, would be exposed . . . . These concepts violated convention and drew harsh criticism, particularly from Colonel Jacob H. Smith of the 12th Infantry. This tactician advocated using dense lines of skirmishers, the whole force advancing only as fast as the slowest element. Smith’s emphasis on a tidy battlefield meant that resolute enemy resistance in one sector could hold up his entire command. The Filipinos simply lacked the training to mount that kind of effort with regularity. His tactics ultimately proved as successful as Bell’s, although slower in achieving that success. ¹⁴¹

Although this excerpt relates events that occurred before the insurgent army adopted unconventional tactics, it is illustrative of the differing mindset of both future brigade commanders—General Smith favored large, methodical battalion sweeps, while General Bell continued to employ more rapid, small-unit operations.
However, General Smith did demonstrate an ability to modify the intensity of his campaign based on changing tactical conditions. Regardless of Smith’s reputation as a ruthless and excessively forceful commander, his *Circular No. 3* [18 Nov 1901], specifically sought to ensure that *peaceful* natives were cared for:

> Emphasis is laid upon the point that the brigade commander desires not only to permit proper food supplies to reach all friendly natives, but he particularly desires that these supplies do reach them.\(^{142}\)

(Of note, Philippine Insurrection scholars John M. Gates and Brian M. Linn assert that Smith’s change in tactics was a reaction to pressure from Chaffee to relax his harsh methods. However, this circular was released within six weeks of Smith taking command, long before any alleged interference by General Chaffee in Jan-Feb 1902).

Later in the campaign, when indications revealed that the strength of the insurgency was waning, General Smith released another Circular that directed his officers to increase their efforts to distinguish between the natives supporting the insurgency and those desiring peace. To the latter class, Smith urged leniency, in an effort to soften the “rigors of war toward the noncombatants.”\(^{143}\) Shortly thereafter, a follow-on Circular urged even more lenient measures. Smith’s *Circular No. 3* of 1902 [22 Feb 1902] noted that “active opposition to our occupation of the island has crumbled away.” The directive continued, stating:

> We have in the past compelled them to respect our prowess in arms; we must in the future compel them to respect our generosity of heart toward a vanquished foe and our pity of purpose in waging war upon their misguided leaders and their followers.

> Henceforth, then, it must be the labor of our officers and men to assist the loyal natives in repairing the ravages of war. No opportunity should be lost to instruct them that the Americans have come among them, not to take from them any of the good things in life, but rather to give them more and in greater measure than they have ever enjoyed before.\(^{144}\)
By early-February 1902, Smith was able to claim impressive, if ruthlessly effective, results. The general boasted the following accomplishments in a newspaper article:

Insurgents killed, 425; insurgents captured, 334; cuartels destroyed, 9; powder factories destroyed, 4; salt factories destroyed, 2; horses, killed or captured, 34; caribaos [sic], killed or captured, 587; rice, captured or destroyed, (cavans) 10,036; towns and barrios destroyed, 19; houses destroyed, 1,662; boats, captured or destroyed, 206. Armed captured: Krag rifles, 12; Remington rifles, 12; shot guns, 5; revolvers, 3.  

Though Smith’s tactics have been harshly criticized, he successfully influenced the local population. In late March 1902 (shortly before Smith’s relief), Chaffee reported a plan to garrison the East Coast of Samar in order to support the return of natives to their villages, (which had been burnt out years prior by the insurgents). It was estimated that between 40,000 - 50,000 natives were homeless as a result of these actions. Chaffee reported that the commander of the garrison at Oras had recently established a town of 15,000 people near his station, boasting that it was “very orderly laid out and the buildings well constructed from the native material in the vicinity.”

The combination of the above policies soon took effect—in early February 1902, General Smith commenced (unsuccessful) negotiations with Lukban for surrender terms. However, his ragtag headquarters element would be captured shortly thereafter by a patrol on 18 February 1902. General Lukban’s condition illustrated the brutal effectiveness of Smith’s counter-insurgency campaign. Smith’s vigorous patrols forced Lukban and his staff to constantly change locations daily in order to avoid capture. When he was captured, the rebel General was “sick, malnourished, and disgusted with the war.” Shortly thereafter, Smith pressured Lukban to write his former commanders and encourage their surrender. At the time of General Smith’s relief in early-April 1902,
he was already coordinating with Lukban’s successor, General Claro Guevara, for his surrender.\textsuperscript{148} By the end of the month, Guevara surrendered to Smith’s replacement, Brigadier General Frederick D. Grant. \textsuperscript{149}

However, Smith’s forces have also been charged with haphazardly burning villages and destroying homes, crops, and draft animals. In several documented cases, this unrestrained violence led to incidences of abuse and wanton aggression toward the local population. Additionally, General Smith has been charged with making little effort to restrict contact between the civilians and the guerrilla forces. Critics assert that in addition to allowing guerrillas access to supplies and intelligence, the rebels retained their ability to influence the (increasingly dissatisfied) populace. Accordingly, detractors assert that American relations with the local citizenry were irreparably damaged, even though General Chaffee supposedly forced Smith to relax his severe measures prior to his relief. \textsuperscript{150} The argument alleges that Smith was pressured to limit the destruction of homes and private property, and to ensure fair treatment of the Filipino citizenry. Smith purportedly based his revisions on General Bell's directives and Telegraphic Circulars. Philippine scholar John M. Gates asserts that the guerrillas on Samar sustained their resistance until April 1902 due in large part to the hatred and motivation inspired by Smith’s harsh policies. Gates suggests that if General Smith had employed a more balanced approach of benevolence, tempered with chastisement, the insurgency might have ended sooner.\textsuperscript{151}

Though the above criticism supports the belief that Smith’s command of the Sixth Separate Brigade was erratic, if not bordering on incompetent, these observations were not held by his military superiors and peers. General James F. Wade, (the newly
appointed Commanding General of the Department of the South Philippines), stated in his *Annual Report* that he ensured Smith’s orders and circulars were “carefully scrutinized” and his troop movements monitored. In a January 1902 visit, Wade stated that Smith’s troop dispositions were “well located . . . and acting under proper instructions.” Even Smith’s successor (as the Sixth Separate Brigade Commander) found no glaring errors in his methods. In his *Annual Report*, Brigadier General Frederick D. Grant made the following statement, demonstrating subdued support for General Smith:

> . . .after making a complete tour of Samar I find that while the insurgents destroyed many of the principal pueblos and barrios of the island to prevent the Americans finding shelter therein, *our troops destroyed very little*, and this destruction was generally *confined to isolated shacks* which sheltered the enemy in the hills, though in a few cases the American troops did destroy towns. *Many of the rumors and statements* that have passed into circulation, so far as I have been able to ascertain the truth, *greatly exaggerated the facts.*

Later in his report, Grant credited Smith’s active campaign with the capture of General Lukban in February 1902, which led to the follow-on surrender of insurgent General Guevara less than six weeks later. Unlike most contemporary analyses of Smith’s Samar campaign, Grant’s report was not critical of Smith’s tactics. In fact, even General Chaffee’s harshest criticism of Smith (written prior to his court-martial proceedings), was combined with a compliment:

> General Smith has worked very hard in Samar but I cannot say that he has always worked with good judgment, particularly so when he first took command of the Brigade. At this time he got himself into an unnecessary snarl with the Civil Government in Leyte.

> Although brutal and repressive, Smith’s campaign must be credited with successfully crushing one of the most thoroughly ingrained insurgencies in the archipelago’s most rugged terrain. However, several scholars assert that, though the
rebellion had been crushed, the campaign caused permanent damage to American prestige and goodwill. A prominent Filipino citizen, Leon Guerrero, stated, “We have fallen into a moral prostration so great that kindly proposals cease to have any meaning for us. Any attempt to imbue our country with great ideals of peace and liberty would now be in vain.”

Guerrero may have been correct—but, opinions differ as to the effects of lasting dissatisfaction due to Smith’s harsh military operations. In July 1904, the island broke out in revolt again. Insurgents burned many villages and slaughtered American sympathizers. Between July and December 1904, Samar had to be reinforced with over 1,700 native troops, augmented by a cadre of American soldiers. Some observers might assert that the 1904 rebellion was the logical outcome of Filipino dissatisfaction and hatred for their occupiers. However, an opinion piece in the Army and Navy Journal attributed the uprising to the Samareno’s lack of respect for American rule. The article suggested that things would have been different if General Smith “had been allowed to finish his campaign.” The article asked readers to ponder, “Would this [revolt] have occurred if General Smith had been permitted to push his campaign home in the first insurrection?” Another American officer serving in the Philippines would lament the restrictions placed on the Army’s actions in response to the rash of court-martials.

Batangas: Making the People Want Peace—and Want it Badly

Flying in the face of the Philippine Commission’s efforts at benevolent assimilation, the staunch insurgency continued to thrive in the Tagalog province of Batangas. Resultantly, the exasperated commission returned the province to military control in July 1901. In the transfer of Batangas, some authors have asserted that the
civil administration was pursuing a “peace-at-any-price policy,” secretly hoping that the military would chastise the population into eventual acceptance of American allegiance. General Chaffee would later report:

The long-continued resistance in the province of Batangas . . . made it apparent . . . that the insurrectionary force keeping up the struggle there could exist and maintain itself only through the connivance and knowledge of practically all the inhabitants; that it received the active support of many who professed friendship of the United States authority, etc.

Even before the cataclysmic events surrounding the Balangiga affair, Chaffee was not satisfied with the progress being made in the Batangas Province. At that time, the province fell under Brigadier General James F. Wade’s Department of Southern Luzon. Specifically, the Batangas Province was under the direct control of Brigadier General Samuel S. Sumner’s brigade. (Sumner served as the First District Commander under General Wade’s Department of Southern Luzon until November 1901 when the commands in the Philippines were reorganized). In early September, Chaffee’s correspondence to the Army Adjutant General noted his displeasure with their performance, stating “. . . I have urged Wade and Sumner to be active and give [insurgent General Miguel] Malvar no rest, it results mainly in filling our hospitals with sick men . . . .”

Shortly after Balangiga, Chaffee’s criticism of Wade and Sumner’s alleged passivity would grow harsher. In his report to General Corbin, he stated:

We are making very slow headway in Batangas . . . I am afraid Sumner has not the vigor that the situation requires. I have given, in fact forced, upon Wade troops and scouts to press forward with the work in Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas.
By October, Chaffee had decided to replace Sumner as the Third Separate Brigade commander with J. Franklin Bell. His personal correspondence left no doubt as to his desire for a more vigorous campaign and commander:

Sumner in Wade’s Department has accomplished nothing with Malvar of consequence. Unless he does something soon I shall put someone else in command of his Brigade. . . . [Major General Loyd] Wheaton [incoming Commander of the newly organized Department of North Philippines] will want Bell put in Sumner’s place . . . .

By early November 1901, Chaffee would bluntly report, “We are practically at a standstill in Batangas.” General Chaffee most certainly wanted an energetic commander to unmercifully hunt down Malvar’s insurgents. Sumner’s restrained operations had not satisfied him, or produced any substantial results. With an even harsher tone, Commissioner Taft would write to the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, “General Wade is incompetent and General Sumner who is under him is not very much better.” On 30 Nov 1901, Sumner relinquished command of the Third Separate Brigade to General J. Franklin Bell.

Also in November 1901, the Division of the Philippines was reorganized into two departments under General Chaffee’s command—the Departments of North and South Philippines. Major General Wheaton took command of the Department of North Philippines which included Luzon. General Wheaton’s Department was further divided into seven separate brigades—the First through the Seventh Separate Brigades. The Third Separate Brigade encompassed General Sumner’s former district—including Batangas, Laguna, western Tayabas, and the island of Mindoro. General Bell took charge of the Third Separate Brigade as part of this reorganization. (Of note, General Wade relinquished command of the Department of Southern Luzon and took command of the Department of South Philippines. Likewise, General Sumner gave up command
of the First District, Department of Southern Luzon and took charge of the newly organized First Separate Brigade, in a quieter province within Wheaton’s department. \(^{167}\)

Ironically, General Sumner had commenced his operation in Batangas earlier that year as one of the Army’s most aggressive commanders. Shortly after taking command in May 1901, he began planning large unit sweeps of Batangas. When these operations did not yield the expected results, Sumner pressed his higher headquarters with requests to pursue the insurgents with increased vigor and harsher policies of chastisement. He requested permission to destroy villages that actively supported insurgents and to arrest and detain prominent citizens suspected of supporting the insurgency. General Sumner realized that his recommendations were “severe and stringent measure[s]” that would increase the “hardships and suffering” of the natives. However, Sumner had concluded that they were “The only practical means at hand to bring . . . a speedy end to the present unsettled and dangerous condition of affairs in this section.” General Wade, most likely tempered Sumner’s aggressive suggestions. Rather than forcefully pursuing enemy sympathizers, Sumner was soon cautioning his commanders to guard against excessive cruelty in their operations. A dissatisfied Sumner would later admit, “The amount of country actually controlled by us is about as much as can be covered by the fire from our guns.” \(^{168}\)

In fact, Senate testimony made months later would reveal that Sumner’s operations in Batangas were restrained by his higher headquarters. Statements from Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, former Adjutant General, Department of North Philippines, [a new department formed during the previously described reorganization of November
1901 which included the district previously commanded by General Sumner], revealed that Sumner was “seriously handicapped by the instructions that were given him from department headquarters.” These orders prohibited him from burning any building unless insurgent complicity could be proved. Sumner was also prohibited from destroying food stores. Both of these techniques would become commonplace in Batangas and Samar shortly after Sumner’s reassignment. Wagner further stated, “It was not until the hopelessness of terminating the war except by severe measures became apparent that such measures were sanctioned.”

This statement leaves open to conjecture the possibility that Army leadership made a conscious shift in strategy following the Balangiga attack—specifically, the official acceptance of *population-targeted* policies of chastisement.

In a very telling statement, Colonel Wagner testified,

I would state that neither General Sumner nor General Bell was responsible for the policy which he carried out. Each was acting in accordance with instructions from his department commander. If General Sumner had remained . . . he would have been required to carry out essentially the same policy that was carried out by General Bell.

When questioned as to who had directed the change in policy, Colonel Wagner presumed that the orders had originated from General Chaffee himself. In essence, Colonel Wagner’s testimony confirmed that the Army’s higher headquarters were aware of, and possibly directed, the military policy carried out in Batangas. If true, the same implications may also have applied to General Smith’s operations in Samar.

The commander of the insurgents in Batangas, General Miguel Malvar, led a force of approximately 4,000 guerillas, armed with an estimated 3,000 rifles. Of these men, approximately 400 to 600 were regulars with their bases in the surrounding mountains. When General Bell took command, he soon discovered that covert
resistance was also widespread in Batangas. By day, the natives feigned support to the American occupiers. However, shadow governments and individual Filipinos (especially the elites) supported General Malvar’s resistance. Towns organized voluntary contributions of money, supplies, and recruits. Town officials covertly exacted taxes on their residents to support the insurgency. Even Filipinos who chose to remain neutral were forced to generate involuntary donations. Those who actively associated with Americans were often the targets of violence and terrorism. In fact, Malvar decreed any town that cooperated with Americans would be “reduced to ashes.” Months prior, General Sumner had lamented the same predicament, stating, “Nothing that we can offer in the way of peace or prosperity weighs against their fear of assassination which is prosecuted with relentless vigor against anyone giving aid or information to the government.” Control of the population through intimidation, if necessary, was central to the insurgents’ strategy. One of the initial insurgent Proclamations (released in November 1899) listed one of the guerillas’ goals as inflicting an “exemplary punishment on traitors to prevent the people of the towns from unworthily selling themselves for the gold of the invader . . . .”

Bell must have soon realized that the harsher measures Sumner had recommended would have to be employed to achieve results. This thought process became the guiding principle of Bell’s campaign. Bell would write,

It became apparent that the only way I could possibly succeed in putting an end to the insurrection within the territorial limits of the brigade would be by cutting off the income and food of the insurgents, and by crowding them so persistently with operations as to wear them out.

Tactics would have to be severe enough to ensure the population realized the penalties for supporting the insurrection would outweigh any perceived gains. This was
especially true of the privileged *principale* class. In his well known *Circular No. 3* [09 Dec 1901], Bell pronounced:

> . . . the insurrection continues because the greater part of the people, especially the wealthy ones, *pretend* to desire, but do not in reality *want* peace; that when all *really want* peace, we can have it promptly. Under such circumstances it is clearly indicated that a policy should be adopted that will as soon as possible make the people *want peace* and *want it badly*. 177

Of note, the guiding message in Bell’s *Circular No. 2* [08 Dec 1901] is extremely similar to Smith’s November 1901 proclamation. Its objective was to focus the burdens of the counter-insurgency on the native population.

> It is an inevitable and deplorable consequence of war that the innocent must generally suffer with the guilty . . . but it should be borne in mind that the greatest good to the greatest number can best be brought about by putting a prompt end to insurrection. A short and severe war creates in the aggregate less loss and suffering than benevolent war indefinitely prolonged . . . . 178

Bell’s concepts on short, severe wars are likewise comparable to General Smith’s guidance in his *Circular No. 6*, that would be released weeks later. (In fact, the possibility exists that Smith actually copied the guidelines used by Bell for his own campaign). 179

Bell felt that the harshest measures allowable by GO 100 would have to be employed to sway the support of the Filipino sympathizers successfully. His *Circular No. 2* also recommended that wide latitude be given to subordinate commanders to aggressively pursue the insurgency. However, unlike Smith, Bell was careful to limit the *legal* authority of his commanders over issues of officially sanctioned retribution and retaliation. His *Circular No. 3* [09 Dec 1901], while even allowing the extreme measure of executions of convicted insurgents, specifically stated:
The provisions of this order will be strictly adhered to, but no station commander will put any one to death . . . without obtaining authority from a superior commander, nor will the death penalty be inflicted in any case without similar authority. 180

In a further attempt to destroy the insurgents’ link to the population, Circular No. 3 also allowed the arrest and confinement of suspected insurgent supporters based on suspicion alone. The Circular also proclaimed the intolerance of passive neutrality, thereby forcing the Filipino citizenry to “pick sides.”

No person should be given credit for loyalty solely on account of his having done nothing for or against us so far as known. Neutrality should not be tolerated. Every inhabitant of the Brigade should either be an active friend or be classed as an enemy. 181

Bell targeted the wealthy sympathizers as the largest threat to the counter-insurgency. Accordingly, he actively sought to place the burden of the war on the influential class by directly targeting their businesses and personal lives. Using the techniques discussed below, Bell enabled his officers to target the *principales* and other Filipino elites directly:

Another dangerous class of enemies are [sic] wealthy sympathizers and contributors who, though holding no official position, use all their influence in support of the insurrection, and while enjoying American protection for themselves, their families and property, secretly aid, protect and contribute to insurgents . . . . On the contrary, whenever sufficient evidence is obtainable, they should be brought to trial . . . . It will frequently be found impossible to obtain any evidence against persons of influence as long as they are at liberty, but once confined, evidence is easily obtainable. 182

Bell further emphasized his Brigade’s adherence to the harshest measures allowed by GO 100 in his Circular No. 5 [13 Dec 1901]. This instruction authorized some of the drastic measures heretofore prohibited in the Philippine Theater. After proclaiming that the Filipino insurgents had “divest[ed] themselves of the character and appearance of soldiers,” by conducting illegal raids and ambushes on American
soldiers, Bell took the drastic measure of authorizing retaliatory executions of randomly selected prominent citizens, as reciprocity for retaliatory assassinations. Specifically, if American prisoners, unarmed Americans, or natives friendly to the US government were murdered, Bell authorized the execution of a prisoner of war under the authority contained in GO 100. In order to further target the elite class, Bell added,

This prisoner of war will be selected by lot from among the officers or prominent citizens held as prisoners of war, and will be chosen when practicable from those who belong to the town where the murder or assassination occurred.

This policy had the dual goal of preventing terrorist threats to natives who would otherwise be peaceful, while at the same time targeting the elite class in retribution for their covert support to the insurgency. Of note, General Bell reported that he never actually resorted to utilizing retaliatory executions. He stated that “Its mere publication stopped the crime of assassination at once, and not a single incidence occurred after the announcement of the order.”

A consistent theme in General Bell’s counter-insurgency strategy was to force the native populace to take responsibility for their actions. Once again, General Bell would not tolerate neutrality and enacted policies that forced the Filipinos either to support the US actively, or else to be penalized as a sympathizer. For example, Circular No. 6 [13 Dec 1901] assigned specific areas to the direct supervision of nearby town officials or other prominent citizens. For example, if a telegraph line or bridge was burned near a village (presumably by a local insurgent), “a number of houses of that place, proportioned to the damage done, were burned.” Bell also directed commanders to number each telegraph pole and assign specific ranges to the officials of local towns or barrios. The assigned officials then held the townspeople directly
accountable by assigning “a native of the town or barrio to each pole, whose duty it should be to replace it immediately if destroyed.”¹⁸⁷ (Of note, this manner of retaliation was not new. The same types of penalties were applied to the Confederate population during the Civil War to discourage guerrilla acts. In fact, the Union Army routinely targeted citizens of the Confederacy with harsh retaliatory measures to discourage guerilla warfare).¹⁸⁸

The most controversial of Bell’s methods was his utilization of population concentration to separate the insurgents from the “peaceful” inhabitants. Of note, this drastic measure was not specifically espoused by GO100. As previously mentioned, the employment of population concentration was extremely controversial, and carried with it the potentiality of huge negative political implications. Bell’s employment of concentration camps was so controversial that General Chaffee, upon informing Adjutant General Corbin of its employment in Batangas, recommended that the documents be destroyed after briefing the Secretary of War. Chaffee wrote:

I enclose a telegram from Bell dated December 26th. This outlines in a way the proceedings going on in Batangas, Laguna and Tayabas. I wish you would hand it to the Secretary to read and destroy it. I don’t care to place on file in the Department any paper of the kind, which would be evidence of what may be considered in the United States as harsh measures or treatment of the people. I remember that a great outcry went up in the U.S. against Weylerism in Cuba. The concentration of the inhabitants we have found necessary here in order to put down the insurrection in Batangas. We hope that no severe suffering will result to any of the innocent people and we are taking every care to that end. . . . I believe however that we have done and are doing only what is justified and authorized in General Orders No. 100 for the Government of Armies in the field.¹⁸⁹

In addition to the Spanish use of the practice in Cuba, the British army employed concentration camps during the later stages of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). The British Army commander, Field Marshal Lord Herbert Kitchener, expanded
upon his predecessor’s use of the practice. Field Marshal Lord Frederick Roberts had originally established the camps to accommodate Boer families that had been displaced by the ravages of war. In March 1901, frustrated by a series of failed peace negotiations, Kitchener employed even harsher tactics to “flush out” Boer guerrillas from the hinterlands. His troops cleared the countryside of all supplies that could support the counter-insurgency—including horses, livestock, and supplies. Similarly to tactics being used by the US Army to quell the Philippine Insurrection, Kitchener concentrated Boer women and children into large laagers. The British Army’s administration of these laagers was extremely poor, (though conditions varied from one camp to another). Inhabitants were routinely kept on reduced army rations. Additionally, the combination of poor sanitation and inadequate medical care led to rampant illness. Lord Kitchener continued to employ concentration tactics until late-1901 when British domestic political pressure, in reaction to reports of high death rates in the camps, forced him to modify his operations. It was estimated that 154,000 Boers and African natives were detained in army camps. Approximately 20,000 whites and 12,000 Africans are presumed to have died in the camps—most from preventable epidemics. Domestic pressure caused the British government to form a commission charged with investigating the conditions in the Army’s concentration camps. At a December 1901 hearing, the government’s Fawcett Commission reported on the dreadful conditions it discovered in the South African camps. 190 Interestingly, the British concentration debate bore a striking similarity to the US Senate hearings which would occur later in 1902, emerging from charges of US Army excesses during the Philippine Insurgency.
Foreign military use of concentration tactics aside, the employment of population concentration during the Philippine Insurrection was not a new phenomenon on the archipelago. The policy seems to have evolved over a period of time. In addition to Major J.A. Smith’s aforementioned winter 1901 expedition on Marinduque, correspondence as early as June 1901 referred to protecting the population from insurgent violence by stationing troops among the natives. By July 1901, the commander of the Department of Visayas was supporting measures to “break off all connection[s] with insurrectos,” by encouraging natives to “come in and make homes for themselves and find protection . . . .” In August 1901, General Hughes openly referred to “colonies of natives” that were being established on Samar, claiming that 16,000 natives had voluntarily “come in.”

General Bell’s concentration policy was aimed at putting an end “to enforced contributions, now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts, by means of intimidation and assassination . . . .” He established friendly colonies or zones of protection along the coastline. Specifically, General Bell’s Circular No 2. [08 Dec 1901], directed that all garrisons:

immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average sized garrison, to exercise efficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredations of armed insurgents. These limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock can graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.

Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits and that unless they move by December 25th [1901]
from outlying barrios and districts with all their movable food supplies . . . to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction . . . .

As soon as peaceful conditions have been re-established in the Brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable. 193

In Batangas, over 300,000 people were eventually relocated into these concentration zones. All areas outside the colonies were designated as dead zones where the Army could prosecute an aggressive campaign with minimal restrictions on its operations. Accordingly, patrols advanced inland and devastated the interior—burning any villages, crops, and property that supported the guerrilla bands. 194

However, Bell’s campaign tempered the harsh policies of chastisement toward guerrillas with the benevolent treatment of civilians. General Bell realized that the pacification of Batangas would rely on the Army’s ability to target the resistance’s upper-class leadership and provide protection for the Filipino population. He skillfully applied the correct balance of coercion and benevolence in his treatment of the local citizens. Accordingly, Bell’s campaign strove to isolate the guerrillas from the population, while at the same time, protecting the population from guerrilla brutality. This was accomplished by offering incentives for the friendly population relocated in the camps. Benevolent policies supplied housing, medical care, schools, and food to the families in the protected areas. As stated, over 300,000 Filipinos were relocated into the protected areas, effectively severing them from guerrilla influence. The Army even went so far as to create a pass system to control the movement of the civilian population. 195

Outside the zones of protection, a swift, aggressive military offensive was waged against the guerrillas. General Bell had a long history of leading aggressive patrols in
enemy territory utilizing unconventional tactics. Accordingly, he endeavored to “destroy everything [found] outside towns.” He directed that “all able-bodied men will be killed or captured.” American forces targeted guerrilla supply bases and food sources with “relentless persistence.” Supplies were confiscated or destroyed to prevent their use by rebels. Bell ensured units were constantly rotated to the field to conduct offensive-natured patrols. At most times, approximately half of his assigned troops—roughly 4,000 men—were in the field conducting patrols. Forces set up temporary bases at strategic points and sent out “three or four detachments, with five or six days’ rations, to bivouac at points radiating several miles from its base.” Similarly, these detachments set up camps and conducted patrols in their areas. The other half of his force was assigned to the garrisons and stations protecting the civilians concentrated into the protected zones. Bell’s relentlessly aggressive counter-insurgency tactics are exemplified by his dispatch of 26 December 1901:

I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2500 men, who will be used in columns of fifty each. I expect to accompany the command . . . . I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley, and mountain peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside of town. All able-bodied men will be killed or captured.

By December 1901, Chaffee was convinced that Bell was making excellent progress; in his personal correspondence, he sang Bell’s praises to Washington:

The troops have been quite active in the 3rd Brigade during the last month and have made several quite successful strikes . . . . Bell has taken hold of the matter in a different manner than Sumner did . . . .

Bell’s tactics were extremely effective. By late January 1902, Chaffee was reporting to Washington that “troops have continued to be on the move in every direction throughout . . . the Province of Batangas.” Consequently, Bell’s forces
captured an impressive number of insurgents. Chaffee encouragingly reported, “So far as resistance is concerned, practically none exists at this time. They have ceased to fight.” Bell’s aggressive field operations had exhausted the insurgency. Between December 1901 to March 1902, it was estimated that Bell’s forces had captured or received the surrender of 3,000 insurgents and 2,500 firearms. By March 1902, Bell could report to General Chaffee that, although Malvar probably did not intend to surrender, he had “not given an order or exercised any command for nearly two months. He has been in contact with no body of troops but simply spends his time hiding himself.” He and his troops were dogged by American patrols and could not remain in the same location for over 24 hours.

Though often regarded as a model counter-insurgency campaign, Bell's tactics were undeniably harsh and vigorous, in order to crush the active insurgent network in Batangas. Undoubtedly, Bell’s tactics led to some excesses on the part of his men. However, most present-day scholars claim that he exerted more control over his commanders and soldiers than General Smith in Samar. Accusations of torture and other excesses did occur, but most scholars believe at a lesser rate than on Samar.

Perceptions concerning the conditions in Bell’s re-concentration camps also vary greatly. Some historians have asserted that General Bell’s concentration policy “led to widespread suffering and destruction in the province,” due largely to lack of food and inadequate shelter. One survivor of the Batangas concentration camps described the conditions many years later, stating, “It was terrible in the zones . . . So many people died.”
Probably motivated by political ambitions, Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles, Commanding General of the Army, made accusatory statements concerning Bell’s conduct of the Batangas Campaign. After an inspection visit to the Philippines, General Miles claimed that “the country appeared to have been devastated, large sections lying waste.” The General also made claims of the widespread use of torture, namely the water cure, throughout the Islands. He made several serious accusations specifically concerning excesses in the Batangas Province:

. . . in the district in which General Bell, commanding the 3rd Brigade, operated, some 400,000 people were concentrated. . . . They were given but fifteen days to gather what little property they had and come into these towns. . . . They were held in these places for several months, until they had nearly exhausted what little substance they had. If it had been continued two weeks longer they would have had to be fed or would have starved. 207

Resultantly, Miles claimed that the Filipino population had experienced an extreme level of cruelty; that they were largely dissatisfied with American rule; and that future relations with America had been soured.

The amount of concentration camp related deaths is also a topic of contention among present-day scholars and historians. One author relates that the population census figures of the Batangas Province from 1899 to 1903 differ by a reduction of over 54,000 people—a possible indicator of the devastation caused, at least in part, by General Bell’s campaign. 208 Specifically, between January to April 1902, the census shows that municipalities reported the number of deaths rose dramatically, to 8,344, with over two thirds coming in the last two months. 209 However, noted Batangas Campaign expert Glenn May asserts many other factors affected the casualty rates and demographics during this period. His most recent studies of the Batangas campaign have suggested that more reasonable estimates are approximately 2,000 deaths from
direct combat; 7,000 additional deaths related to the re-concentration policy; and 20,000 from a cholera epidemic that occurred near the war’s end. May acknowledged that there was a definite correlation between the concentration camps and increased the death rates, although other factors most likely also factored in.\(^{210}\)

As General Chaffee suspected, when the specifics of Bell’s concentration policy reached the US public, they caused a huge public outcry. Analogies between the harsh Spanish concentration methods in Cuba, and those employed in the Philippines were made in both media and political venues. For example, Senator Augustus Bacon (D-GA) alleged that General Bell was responsible for dreadful living conditions in his concentration camps. The Senator read a letter from an Army officer which alluded to "a reconcentrado pen with a dead line outside, beyond which everything living is shot."

The letter continued with inflammatory descriptions of compounds covered with a "corpse-carcass stench" and "clouds of vampire bats softly swirl[ing] out on their orgies over the dead." \(^{211}\)

However, other observers claimed that Bell ran model concentration camps that enabled him to defeat the insurgency, while gaining the support of the Batangueño citizenry. In glowing praise, one author, who also served as an Army officer in the Philippines during the insurrection, stated:

There was no starvation in those camps. All the reconcentrados had to do was not to cross the dead line of the reconcentration zone, and to draw their rations, which were provided as religiously as any ordinary American who is not a fiend and has plenty of rice on hand for the purpose will give it to the hungry. The reconcentrado camps and the people in them were daily looked after by medical officers of the American army. General Bell's active campaigning began in Batangas January 1, 1902, Malvar surrendered April 16 thereafter, and Batangas was thoroughly purged of insurrectos and the like by July. During this period the total of insurgent
General Bell’s concentration policy received a large amount of scrutiny due to public inquiries. Several Senate hearings were held on the subject in 1902. During these hearings, Bell’s fellow officers rallied behind him in near total support. Realizing the potential scandal, the Army directed an inspection of General Bell’s concentration camps in March 1902. One inspection, conducted by Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, resulted in another account of glowing praise. Wagner’s seven page report described superb living conditions at the two camps he inspected. Wagner stated that “The health of the people in the camp . . . was very good, sickness being practically nil.” He went on to describe vaccination programs, American-sponsored school systems, and no scarcity of food. In fact, Colonel Wagner heaped accolades on Bell’s camp system, stating “I was unable to find among these people . . . evidences of misery or neglect.” He continued with equally favorable impressions of the effectiveness of Bell’s concentration tactics, probably straying outside of the intent of his inspection:

It is gratifying to know that such hardships as exist fall upon the wealthy classes, and that it can no longer be said of the insurrection that it is a “rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight.” . . . The rich people have lost heavily because they have not been able to harvest their orange crop and cannot give their personal attention to their estates.

Wagner ended his inspection report by definitively stating:

Misery is reduced to a minimum and the management of the military authorities has been so beneficent that I believe that the common people in the camps are actually more happy and comfortable than they were in their own villages.

General Chaffee’s comments concerning Bell’s performance concurred with Colonel Wagner’s observations. In fact, he was reluctant to let General Bell leave the islands and transfer to his next duty station until after he completed his efforts in
Batangas. Accordingly, near the end of Bell’s tour of duty in the Philippines, General Chaffee petitioned the Army Adjutant General to delay his transfer. Chaffee expressed his desire that Bell be allowed to oversee the return of the local inhabitants to their previous homes. General Chaffee praised Bell’s management of the camps, stating that Bell was responsible for conditions in which not even “a child suffer[ed] for food; the inhabitants quite cheerful, all healthy and having a better knowledge of Government, sanitation and proper way of living than ever before.”

Bell personally defended himself stating that the Filipino people were voluntarily attracted to the concentration camps to receive protection from guerilla violence. (However, this statement conflicts with the guidance released in General Bell’s aforementioned Circular No. 2. This order was much more directive and its ramifications more punitive than Bell’s statement reveals). Nevertheless, Bell specifically addressed his efforts to care for the population, stating:

There has been absolutely no hunger; on the contrary, they have had more to eat than usual at this season of the year. . . . We have vaccinated over 300,000 persons, and, as a consequence, have not had the annual epidemic of small pox: besides this the sick have been attended to by our doctors and given food and medicine free of cost.

By most accounts, Bell’s campaign in Batangas was a striking success. Rather than focusing on revenge, Bell’s campaign incorporated lessons from previous successful pacification campaigns in the Philippines. In sharp contrast, the Balangiga Massacre had shocked the Samar garrison and galvanized tangible feelings of retribution and revenge in response to the atrocity. For example, Major Waller’s written orders to the Marine battalion following his initial meeting with General Smith proclaimed that “the [upcoming] expeditions, in a way, are punitive.” Waller and his Marines had served with the Ninth Infantry in China during the Boxer Rebellion.
Accordingly, he ended his orders with the stirring proclamation, “We have also to avenge our late comrades in North China, the murdered men of the Ninth U.S. Infantry.” The desire for revenge also permeated the enlisted ranks. One of Waller’s Marines, Private Harold Kinman, wrote, “We will go heavily armed and longing to avenge our comrades who fought side by side with us in China.”

Conversely, no single incident occurred in Batangas which incited the same level of virulent emotion. Like the troops stationed in Samar, the soldiers occupying Batangas routinely faced the intense mental and physical strains of counter-insurgency combat, replete with its share of attendant atrocities and violent fighting. Though soldiers in Batangas engaged in retaliatory acts against guerilla atrocities, the extreme spirit of revenge which permeated the Samar garrison did not exist. Accordingly, General Bell had an easier task of restraining his men.

However, even before taking command of the Third Separate Brigade, Bell had demonstrated a consistent history of measured restraint, combined with an acute sense of political awareness. Unlike General Smith, Bell tempered his harsher policies by maintaining strict control over his subordinates and instituting reasonable restrictions on their actions to prevent excesses. For example, while he was a District Commander in Southern Luzon, Bell warned a regimental commander to exercise increased control over his officers. General Bell chastised the colonel for submitting official reports which alluded to torture. The specific reports relayed incidents of gaining information “secured under pressure” from guerilla prisoners. Bell even admitted that in this case “the ends justified the means,” and that “such methods [were] necessary and justifiable under the circumstances.” However, he demanded stricter control over future operations.
Demonstrating a political awareness that far exceeded most of his peers and several of his superiors, Bell continued his explanation:

. . . knowing the temper of the American people well, knowing that their insistence on dealing with these natives as we would with people whose practices are in accord with the principles which control people of the highest civilization are fully in proportion with their ignorance of the real situation, they justly fear any scandal arising in connection with methods which we may employ in dealing with native problems. For these reasons I am sure they would feel duty bound to take official notice of conduct on the part of any officer which might become the subject of a complaint from natives or lead to public scandal.\textsuperscript{219}

Though he demonstrated restraint, General Bell was not a cautious or passive commander. Previous garrisons in Batangas had been ineffective and defensive due to their small size and over-dispersion. This resulted in virtually no offensive operations or aggressive patrolling—focusing instead on garrison security and mere survival.\textsuperscript{220}

General Bell reversed this trend. As a result of Bell’s continuous pressure, the guerrilla forces suffered severe supply and manpower problems. By April 1902, effective guerrilla resistance was destroyed and insurgent General Miguel Malvar surrendered.\textsuperscript{221}

Malvar’s post-capture statement was a testament to the effectiveness of General Bell’s counter-insurgency campaign. The captured general listed the following as reasons he eventually capitulated, after a long, grueling resistance:

- \textit{Lack of food} in the field, \textit{owing to the concentration} in the zone, apart from the \textit{increased activity of the American troops}; because of the adherence of the towns to the American troops on account of the concentration and \textit{measures taken by General Bell} . . . .
- Because the \textit{American forces kept me constantly on the move} from the month of February down to the last moment, when I found myself \textit{without a single gun or a clerk} . . . .\textsuperscript{222} [italics added]

The Army’s success at targeting the Filipino leadership, isolating the guerrillas, and protecting the population caused the disintegration of guerrilla resistance in the Batangas province. General Bell’s force, never numbering more than 10,000 men, had
successfully defeated a well-entrenched guerrilla force of at least 4,000 men. General Bell is credited with capturing or accepting the surrender of 8,000-10,000 insurgents. He also secured over 4,180 firearms and thousands of other weapons. Additionally, the Batangas campaign was completed in two months less time than the Samar Expedition. (In contrast, General Smith had 7,000 men in his command but faced a guerrilla force of less than 1,000 men). Certainly, the success of General Bell’s campaign must be attributed in a large part to his balanced approach towards pacification. In fact, Bell’s immediate superior, General Loyd Wheaton, proclaimed Bell’s campaign “a model in suppressing insurrections under like circumstances.”

The Aftermath of Victory—Public Outrage and the Army’s Reaction: “Such Things Happen in Every War”

However brutal the military operations, by April 1902 both provinces and their guerrilla leaders had surrendered to U.S. forces. The United States officially declared the Philippine Insurrection over on 4 July 1902. The cost of the war had not been low—the financial cost alone was $400 million. Over 125,000 U.S. troops saw service in the Philippines; of these, the Army lost approximately 4,200 soldiers from deaths of all kinds, mostly disease—1,037 of these were killed in action—and over 2,800 more were wounded. These figures are a far cry from the 5,000 men estimated to quell resistance in May 1899.

Unfortunately, the public outrage resulting from the Waller and Smith court-martials and charges of excessive cruelty clouded the Army’s many impressive accomplishments. The Anti Imperialist League, based out of Boston, applied political pressure on both the War Department and Roosevelt administration. They issued numerous public statements to the media and released several publications accusing
the Army of inhumane actions in the Philippines. The most inflammatory of these publications was the *League’s Secretary Root’s Record: “Marked Severities” in Philippine Warfare* (1902), which contained numerous accounts of alleged war crimes. Though the organization’s political motivation cannot be denied, some of the charges were based on fact. Others seem to have been based on the unverified statements of disgruntled soldiers. However, the *League* had the backing of several well-known, powerful supporters. For example, the Commanding General of the Army, Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles, released a statement claiming that illegal and inhumane “transgressions had been carried on either with the connivance or approval of certain commanders,” and that “with certain officers the impression prevailed, that such acts were justifiable.” The inflammatory public debate focused intense scrutiny on the Roosevelt administration. As a result, Senate hearings were held to review the conduct of the war and to investigate charges of inhumanity.

Adding fuel to the fire, upon their return to the States, several participants began making statements in defense of their actions. Many of these comments were inflammatory in their own right. For example, General Smith defended his actions to newspaper reporters shortly after his arrival in San Francisco, stating:

Some of those in Samar are nothing but savages, and, of course, cannot be treated like civilized people. They all would resort to most barbarous methods of warfare at times. Instances of torture and slaughter of American soldiers are very numerous. Any one of my commands knows that we were not unduly severe with the natives. I have always tried to conduct my campaigns according to military regulations.

Alarmingly, Smith would go on to state that the instructions he received from his superior, General Chaffee, were “much harsher” than the orders he (Smith) gave to Major Waller. In fact, several officers used a similar defense during their 1902 courts-
martial for charges of illegally executing prisoners. Three officers received acquittals due, at least in part, to claims that their actions were in line with Chaffee’s orders to attain information on the insurgency “no matter what measures have to be adopted.”

Concerning Smith’s and Waller’s actions in Samar, Chaffee would later acknowledge that Waller was “justified by the laws of war” to “defeat the method of warfare adopted by the enemy.” He continued, “If desperate in the last case, more desperate must be the attack to end it.” Probably an admirer of Smith’s tactics at heart, Chaffee purportedly stated that General Smith had made Samar “more peaceful than many parts of the United States.” In his official reports, Chaffee hinted at his overall approval of Smith’s actions. Concerning his supervision of the General Orders and Circulars released by Smith, Chaffee reported, “I have noted nothing in them which, in my opinion, was not justified by the conditions there to be overcome.”

The prevailing sentiment in the Army also supported Smith’s harsh methods, most stating that the General was a scapegoat for the political squabbling associated with the Spanish-American War and its aftermath—the acquisition of an empire in the Philippines. Newspaper articles reported that Smith had the “hardy approval of his fellow officers,” and many felt that Smith’s forced retirement by President Roosevelt was a “political” action. In fact, one officer asserted that “Some of the best fighting men in the army say that as a soldier in battle General Smith is superb.” Upon Smith’s return to the United States, one of the General’s staff officers defended his former Commanding General, stating that, if the American people knew “what a thieving, treacherous, worthless bunch of scoundrels those Filipinos are, they would think
differently . . . I do not believe there are half a dozen men in the U.S. Army that don’t think that Smith is all right.”

Friends rallied behind General Smith. They stated that Smith’s tendency to use overzealous language was well known throughout the Army—therefore, his subordinates realized they should not follow his outbursts literally. They also believed that his relief and retirement were the result of political pressure rather than his own poor judgment. Public statements asserted that “the effect upon the discipline and morale of the army is . . . anything but wholesome.” In fact, following his forced retirement, General Smith was elected as the commander of the Philippine War Veterans, a precursor to the modern day Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, in 1901.

Editorial pieces and reader comments found in the professional journals of the time also strongly demonstrated that the “semi-official” Army culture endorsed Smith’s actions. A host of officers submitted their opinions to The Army and Navy Journal in 1902. Not one of them was critical of Smith. As late as 1911, an opinion piece appeared in The Journal that seemed to sum up the officer corps’ sentiments concerning both General Smith and the overall policy of concentration:

It is recognized by all those thoroughly conversant with the situation which existed at the time in Samar that General Smith’s campaign was justified, that the only way to save the lives of hundreds of good American soldiers was to wage a destructive war in the enemy’s country and render it as desolate as Sheridan made the Shenandoah Valley. The peaceful natives, men, women and children, had ample time to report within the lines of reconcentration, and the natives who remained outside these lines and carried weapons were justly regarded as enemies, and treated as such.
Similarly, the Department of the Navy lavished official praise on Major Waller and his battalion of Marines. (In fact, prior to the announcement of court-martial proceedings, even the Army chain of command had highly praised the Marine battalion for its daring November 1901 assaults on Sohoton Cliffs—going so far as to recommend him for another brevet). The Admiral commanding the Navy’s Asiatic Squadron stated that the Marine battalion had “performed its duty in a most efficient manner.” Later, Major Waller would defend his actions on Samar to reporters, stating:

You can’t stop the revolution in the Philippines unless you take the severest of measures. You would hate to see your wounded and dead mutilated. I cannot describe the fearful condition in which we found some of the bodies of men under my command who were murdered by the *insurrectos*. I received both verbal and written orders from Gen. Jacob Smith to kill all *insurrectos* who were caught armed or refused to surrender. It was the only thing that could be done, and I never questioned Gen. Smith’s orders . . . . I left Samar a howling wilderness. They tried to make it that for us, but we made it a howling wilderness for them.

Attesting to the Navy and Marine Corps’ perception of Major Waller’s actions on Samar, upon the battalion’s return to the US, Waller and his men were treated to a hero’s welcome at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. In fact, Waller’s expedition would later become legendary in the Marine Corps, exemplifying extreme sacrifice and determination in the face of overwhelming adversity. For years afterward, whenever a Samar Marine entered the mess, other Marine officers would reverently rise to their feet, and announce, “Stand, gentlemen, he served on Samar!”

In addition to support from the officer corps, it seems that enlisted men also supported employing harsh actions to quell the insurrection. For example, one enlisted Marine participant of the campaign on Samar wrote:

I think that Major Waller and General Smith used good judgment in giving orders for the cruelty of those savage outlaws who wiped out Company C
of the Ninth Infantry and tried to do the same for the marines. General Smith's written and printed orders, and the actual conduct of military operations in Samar, were justified by the history and condition of warfare with the cruel and treacherous savages who inhabited the island, and their utter disregard of the laws of war, and were wholly within the limitation of General Order No. 100 of 1863, and were sustained by precedents of highest authority. 246

The author then went on to describe historical precedents for the use of severe retribution tactics associated to the American Revolutionary War and the Fort Kearny Massacre of 1866.

Secretary of War Elihu Root personally reacted to the public outcry. He responded with an attempt to convince the American public that reports of atrocities were greatly exaggerated—and that the Army took seriously those allegations that did occur. Resultantly, he published a report which revealed that over 350 soldiers had been tried for crimes in the Philippines. Of these, 39 soldiers were convicted of excessive cruelty. Unfortunately for the administration, the attempt at damage control backfired since the report also revealed that most convictions awarded extremely light sentences—mostly reprimands or fines—even in cases of torture or unauthorized executions. 247

Root’s true feelings were expressed in his private correspondence. Like the average Army officer, the Secretary believed that reports of atrocities were “grossly exaggerated.” His writings defended American soldiers, stating that, in some cases, they were justified to react as they had. Root believed that due to the insurrectionists’ “barbarous cruelty,” which had led to incidences where American prisoners were tortured to death, buried alive, and horribly mutilated, American soldiers were merely repaying an “eye for an eye.” Under these conditions, Root continued, “it was
understandable that American soldiers occasionally retaliated . . . Such things happen in every war.”

Another veteran officer of the Philippine Insurrection, writing to a professional journal, also defended the honor of the Army, stating:

. . . those who did not witness it . . . have failed to fully understand that we were practically fighting an Asiatic nation in arms and almost every man a soldier in disguise and a violator of paragraph 88 [of General Order 100]. . . No army was ever so blindly generous and forbearing as was ours in the Philippines, although fighting the most treacherous people in the world, a people who mistook our justice for lack of brains and our leniency for cowardice.

Conclusion: “Peace is Needed First”

The Army’s strategy for the Philippine Insurrection was to make continued guerrilla war seem hopeless and the concept of peace more attractive to the Filipinos. The overall strategy attempted simultaneously to entice the population with a policy of attraction and to coerce it with a policy of chastisement. However, this methodology necessitated augmentation by direct military action. Only after the neutralization of the guerrilla organizations’ influence, could the policy of attraction be effective. Near the end of the war, benevolent policies played a large role in helping to bring about the restoration of peace. In combination with harsher measures, progressive programs had promoted the fragmentation and disintegration of the resistance movement. The ultimate lesson was that, to be successful, both policies had to be used in combination and moderation. Secretary Root summed up the lesson succinctly in his report,

It is evident that the insurrection has been brought to an end both by making war distressing and hopeless on one hand and by making peace attractive.

The Army eventually recognized that it had first to establish security throughout the archipelago before progressive policies could take effect. Without the guarantee of
protection, the population’s security concerns prevented them from taking advantage of
the benefits offered by the occupiers—however benevolent the offers might have been.
Henry Kissinger’s more recent adage concerning the importance of providing near total
security in pacified areas directly applied to the situation faced by the American Army
during the Insurrection. A young company grade officer succinctly summed up the
situation at the time, stating, “This business of fighting and civilizing and educating at
the same time doesn’t mix very well. Peace is needed first.”

Operationally, the senior leadership focused on the implementation of techniques
the Army had used many years earlier in the American Indian Wars and Civil War. The
staunch resistance encountered in the provinces of Batangas and Samar forced the
Army to employ the harshest measures allowable by *General Order 100*—including the
“triple press” of concentration, devastation, and persistent harassment through active
operations. Due to the lingering stigma from the Spanish Campaign in Cuba, the most
intrusive and controversial of these population-targeted measures was the policy of
concentration.

Population concentration accomplished several tasks critical to the Army’s
pacification strategy. Firstly, it physically separated the population from the insurgents.
This isolation allowed the US Army to aggressively pursue the enemy outside the
camps, without being burdened by concerns of identifying friend from foe. It also made
easier the task of cutting-off insurgent supply lines, normally augmented by forced
contributions and voluntary offerings from sympathizers. Equally important, the
protection offered to the inhabitants of the camps invalidated any claims of neutrality
due to fear of guerilla reprisals. Army officers could now force Filipinos to demonstrate
their support through concrete actions, rather than having them recite worthless oaths of allegiance.\textsuperscript{253}

Regardless of various modern-day comparisons of Bell’s and Smith’s campaigns, the Army’s rejection of neutrality protestations was central to the successful pacification of both Samar and Batangas. Population concentration enhanced the Army’s ability to provide security for the majority of the population. Once an adequate level of security was established—whether enticed by a \textit{policy of attraction} or coerced by a \textit{policy of chastisement}—the Filipino natives were forced actively to support the American cause or suffer the consequences. Claims of fear from guerilla reprisals were invalidated. The population could now be reasonably expected to oppose, or at least report, insurgent activity in their \textit{barrios}. Even considering the drastic differences between the conduct of the Batangas and Samar Campaigns, this enhanced security environment contributed to the eventual downfall of the insurgency movements in \textit{both} provinces.

Concentration tactics also accomplished the goal of placing the burden of the war on the population. After months of living in temporary camps, the prospect of peace undoubtedly seemed more attractive. Through the implementation of legal measures, such as fines, deportations, and arrests (sometimes based on suspicion alone), the burden of the war was focused on the wealthy Filipino \textit{principales} who were secretly supporting the insurgency. Pressure applied to these prominent citizens and their business yielded quick results.

Outside the concentration camps, the army devastated the countryside to complete the isolation of the insurgents. Shelters, crops, farm animals, and supplies throughout the countryside were confiscated or destroyed. Trade was also rigidly
restricted and controlled. Utilizing these direct attacks on the insurgent supply lines, already reduced by the implementation of concentration tactics, the devastation of the countryside literally “starved-out” the insurgents. Additionally, the destruction of personal property reinforced the general population’s desire to end the war and work toward peace.

Lastly, active military operations harassed the insurgent bands while they were at their weakest. Patrols, cordons, and sweeps kept the disorganized bands off-balance by applying continuous pressure. When the last hold-outs were captured or surrendered, they were desperate men indeed. Shortly after being taken prisoner, both Generals Lukban and Malvar attested to the hopeless predicament of their harried bands. Their recent activities had been dominated by the necessity of avoiding US patrols rather than planning offensive operations against the Americans.

The conduct of the Samar and Batangas Campaigns also offers many salient lessons concerning the implications of strategic leadership during complex counter-insurgencies. The Balangiga massacre acted as a catalyst for violence and retribution for an Army already frustrated by the intense pressures of guerilla conflict. General Chaffee’s security anxieties and desire for retribution undeniably influenced his written and verbal orders. This mindset permeated his subordinates’ commands. Chaffee selected his new commanders based on their demonstrated performance as vigorous hardliners. He had recently reorganized his commands by reassigning and removing the more passive commanders, such as Generals Wade and Sumner. In fact, Chaffee most likely selected Generals Bell and Smith specifically due to their aggressiveness.
He then transmitted orders with a tone and directness that could be misinterpreted as *carte blanche* to punish the insurgents.

In most cases, commanders complied with good conscience and acted within the laws of war. However, some commanders, such as General Smith—already prone to intemperate talk and braggadocio—interpreted Chaffee’s guidance literally. Smith’s harsh orders to Major Waller exemplify the harmful and tangible influence a mercurial temperament can have on how a commander’s guidance is conveyed—and more importantly, how it is interpreted. As an institution, the Army undoubtedly sought revenge following Balangiga. The orders given to the relief columns immediately after the attack demonstrate this mindset. Ironically, the army’s retaliatory acts following the surprise attack can be interpreted as legal military reprisals under the laws of war. However, senior commanders were responsible for ensuring that proper controls and restraints were in place before ordering the retaliatory measures. Instead, Chaffee’s guidance served to encourage the already aggressive tendencies of his commanders. Alarmingly, evidence exists to support the possibility that General Chaffee was aware, and possibly approved of, some of the excessive tactics employed by General Smith. If so, Chaffee knowingly allowed General Smith to accept the full blame for these violations during the subsequent public inquiries and courts-martial.

Regardless, General Smith undeniably violated the laws of war by issuing his flagrantly illegal orders to Major Waller. The General’s personality had long displayed tendencies for aggressiveness and overreaction. If Smith’s history and aggressive attitude are used as a reference, one can assume that other excesses probably occurred under his command. (Most contemporary scholars agree that General Smith
exercised minimal control over his operations and men). These qualities led to several disputes with the civil government, and created unnecessary distractions for his military superiors.

When compared to Smith’s performance, General Bell’s leadership provides a sharp contrast. Bell’s level-headed direction tempered General Chaffee’s intemperate orders. Though “officially” employing policies just as harsh as those used on Samar—in some cases, even harsher—General Bell ensured measures were in place to provide control and restraint. His orders and actions were thoroughly disseminated and well documented. The harshest penalties—especially those involving executions and other “life and death” matters—required his approval, or notification. Stern measures were employed to place the burden of war directly on the population. However, Bell’s policies were ultimately aimed at the eventual pacification of the region rather than retribution. Unlike Smith, Bell’s retribution and retaliatory measures were not applied haphazardly. Natives were made responsible for specifically designated areas, and severe penalties held them directly accountable for inaction or active support to the insurgency.

Unfortunately, the long-term effects of the Samar and Batangas Campaigns were not beneficial to the Army. Allegations of war crimes overshadowed the daunting challenges that the Army had overcome and the many good works that the soldiers had accomplished. The counter-insurgency had been quelled throughout the entire archipelago, including the diehard provinces of Batangas and Samar. However, at the highest policy levels, the future occupation and governance of the Philippines was placed in jeopardy due to domestic political pressure. As is often the reaction in high-visibility political matters, decisions were made based on political expedience, vice
military necessity. Beyond damaging its own public image, the Army campaigns in Samar and Batangas provoked a public outcry that forced the Army to “tie its own hands” in the Philippines. One officer would later lament, “The truth is, all the officers out here . . . are afraid to do anything for fear of a court-martial. You cannot realize the mischief the different trials out here have worked . . . .”

Unfortunately, the Army also failed to formalize the positive lessons of the war. When the Insurrection broke out, the only existing written doctrine concerning partisan warfare and civil interaction in existence was General Order 100. However, this directive did not provide guidance to determine the proper balance between benevolence and retaliation. Even the ultimately successful results of the Philippine Insurrection had little effect on post-war written doctrine. The success of U.S. civil and military policy in the Philippines caused most officers to believe that the traditional American approach to partisan warfare was valid and, therefore, required no major changes or further investigation. Small changes such as expanded coverage on topics such as military occupation, pacification, and guerrilla warfare were evidenced, but no substantive changes or additions to Army doctrine were made.

However, as with much of America’s previous unconventional military doctrine, U.S. officers did not codify the lessons of the Philippine Insurrection into written tactics. References to guerrilla warfare and jungle fighting remained limited to small passages in Army field manuals. Officers believed that pre-war tactics, with only minor modifications, sufficiently covered guerrilla combat. Unfortunately, most pre-war guerrilla tactical guidance was informal, rather than official guidance. Additionally, most officers continued to view partisan warfare as an auxiliary form of military science—the
decisive form of combat would remain conventional warfare. Official works were also hesitant to publish effective guerrilla techniques due to the possibility of public outcry concerning the harsher techniques necessary in counter-guerrilla warfare. Although a limited amount of guidance was available in unofficial sources (such as professional articles, reports, and unofficial texts), America would have to rely on the short-term memory of its soldiers to fight the partisan wars of the future. As destiny would have it, guerrilla warfare and small wars would dominate America's future constabulary actions.256

Epilogue

The Philippine Insurrection served as a training ground for the 20th century Army's future senior leadership. A large number of the Army's senior leaders saw service in the Philippines—many served during the active Insurrection (1899-1902). In fact, every Army Chief of Staff through World War II saw service in the Philippines. For example, the fiery Lieutenant General S.B.M. Young, a district commander in Batangas, was assigned as the US Army's first Chief of Staff from 1903-1904. Lieutenant General Chaffee replaced him in January 1904. Lieutenant General Robert L. Bullard, a regimental commander in Batangas, commanded the First Infantry Division and the Second U.S. Army during World War I. Following his Cuban and Philippine service, Bullard would author several prescient articles concerning the Army's future role in pacification campaigns. Undoubtedly, his experiences during the Philippine Insurrection provided a strong foundation for his observations.257

As an institution, the Army did not hold a grudge against most of the officers that were implicated in the scandalous aspects of the Philippine Insurrection—whether
alleged or confirmed. In 1906, Major General J. Franklin Bell was assigned as the
fourth Army Chief of Staff after a tour as the Commanding General of the Army’s
prestigious Command and General Staff College. Even Major Edwin F. Glenn, in spite
of being found guilty at his court-martial, was eventually promoted to the rank of Major
General and led the 83rd Infantry Division in France during World War I.258

Only General Smith and Major Waller could lay claim to a lasting stigma from the
Insurrection and its ensuing courts-martial. General Smith remained on the Army’s
retired list. His family and friends sporadically petitioned the government to redeem the
general’s reputation officially but to no avail. Nevertheless, Smith remained active in
Philippine service veterans’ organizations. After the United States’ entry into World
War I in 1917, General Smith, at the age of 77, gallantly offered his services to the
Army. The Army politely declined.259

Prior to his service in Samar, Major Waller had seen action in Egypt (1882), the
Spanish-American War (1898), and the Boxer Rebellion (1900). After his 1902 court-
martial acquittal in the Philippines, Waller would go on to command Marine contingents
in Panama (1904), Cuba (1906 and 1911), and Haiti (1915). He also commanded the
First Marine Brigade during the 1914 Veracruz Expedition. In 1911, General Waller was
considered for appointment as the 11th Commandant of the Marine Corps. He was
passed-over in favor of Major General William P. Biddle. General Waller and his
supporters would claim that the stigma of the Samar expedition and its resulting court-
martial were the reason for his non-selection. He continued serving throughout World
War I but was never assigned to the Marine contingent of the American Expeditionary
Force. Once again, a disappointed General Waller believed that the legacy of his
Philippine service had biased the Corps’ decision to retain him in the States. Waller retired from the Marine Corps in 1920 as a Major General. At the time of his death in 1926, a newspaper announcement of it stated, “General Waller, who had served more than forty years in the Marine Corps, is said to have taken part in more engagements than any other officer.”

Endnotes

1 In 1863, the Union Army issued General Order 100 (GO 100), Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field in response to the partisan guerrilla threat. GO 100 was the first official document that specified the possible range of responses available to commanders for counter-insurgency operations. GO 100 will be discussed in greater detail later in this study.

2 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 629 (both direct quotations); and p. 660; Although Kissinger’s comments were offered in reference to the Vietnam War, they are applicable to all guerrilla conflicts.


In November 1899, General Otis launched a three-pronged cordon and sweep offensive into the Luzon Plains north of Manila. This successful offensive was followed by a secondary operation into the Cavite and Laguna de Bay areas south of Manila. U.S. forces occupied the important population centers of Luzon and other Philippine Islands. The conventional rebel resistance was shattered during these initial campaigns.

On General Otis’ November 1899 offensives:

For a detailed description of the conventional campaigns against the Philippine Insurgent Army in the early stages of the Insurrection, see:
Karl Irving Faust, *Campaigning in the Philippines*, (San Francisco, CA: Hicks-Judd Co, 1899);


   Birtle, “The Pacification of Marinduque,” 256;


Birtle, *U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, (on the Mexican War, 16-8; on Morgan, 28; on GO 100, 34-5; on Mosby, 36, 39).

Conceptually, GO 100 assimilated the informal and private writings and concepts of such military law theorists as Dr. Francis Lieber, General Henry W. Halleck, Swiss diplomat Emmerich Vattel, and Baron Antoine Henri Jomini. Each of these theorists’ philosophies contained similar concepts regarding reciprocal nature of moderation, reconciliation, and retribution when conducting operations against partisan forces and involving interaction with the local populace. (Birtle, *U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine*; on Vattel, 13-14; on Jomini, 14-15; on Halleck, 17-8; on Lieber, 32-3; on assimilation into *General Order 100*, 34-35).

Birtle, *U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, 34-5; specifically the first quotation, 34, Birtle quoting Hartigan’s, *Lieber’s Code*; ending quotation, Birtle, 35.


Examples of the early military application of the harshest aspects of the policy of chastisement are offered by the Hare Expedition (Oct-Nov 1900), Corliss Campaign (Dec 1900-Jan 1901), and J.A. Smith Campaign (Feb-Apr 1901). These operations employed extremely harsh measures including destruction of private property, imprisonment, and relocation/concentration in conjunction with aggressive tactical patrols to seek out guerrillas.

For detailed descriptions of unofficial punitive expeditions, see Birtle, “The Pacification of Marinduque,” 263-65 (Hare Expedition); 266-70 (Corliss Campaign); and 271-75 (Smith Campaign).


For a detailed description of the Balangiga Massacre:

27 Scholars holding this view include John M. Gates, Andrew J. Birtle, and Brian M. Linn. Their views have been endorsed by the Army which released two publications highly praising the campaigns of General Bell—Robert D. Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902* (2008), and Robert D. Ramsey, *A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902* (2008).

However, Bell does have detractors, including: Stuart C. Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903*, (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1982), and Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century’s Turn* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960). It must be kept in mind that both Miller and Wolff are virulent critics of the Philippine Insurrection.


Am deeply chagrined at the disagreement which aside from unfortunate results in the Philippines may also have unfortunate results here. I most earnestly wish to have this question settled in the Philippines.

[Carter, The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee, 249].


30 Philippine Insurgent Records (PIR), compiled by Capt J.R.M. Taylor, National Archives and Record Administration (NARA), Washington DC, Microfilm, M-254, Document 1303.2.

31 Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 251; (quoting a report found in the Philippine Insurrection Records (PIR), 1313.2, titled “For the Information of the Division Commander”). Gates’ endnote was a misprint. It is actually PIR 1303.2.

32 Harold Kinman Papers, Letter to his sister, dated 17 Oct 1901, USMC Research Center Archives, Quantico, VA; PC331/PB22 (9/G/3/6) in folder labeled “Letters 1899-1902.”

33 War Department, *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902*, vol. 2, (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1993), [reprint of 1902 War Department edition], 1298 [hereafter, War Department, *Correspondence*];


Telegram, BG Hughes to BG Hall, 19 Oct 1901, NARA Wash DC, RG 395, E2552, “Field HQ, Dept of Visayas, (Telegrams Received Jul-Nov 1901)” [describes siege of Weyler]

Correspondence, BG Hughes to MG Chaffee, 21 Oct 1901, “General Situation in the Island of Samar as it appears to him. Relative to the distribution of the 7th and 12th Infantry,” NARA Wash DC, RG 395, E2483, Box 49, “Dept of Visayas: General Correspondence, (Jan-Nov 1901)” [Mentions siege of Weyler]

Correspondence, BG Hughes to Adj Gen, Div of the Philippines, 4 Oct 1901, RG 395, E2550, Box 1, “Field HQ, Dept of Visayas,” (Letters Sent, May - Nov 1901). [This letter relates an insurgent attempt to assault the town of Mutiong with tactics similar to those utilized at the Balangiga massacre.]

34 War Dept, Annual Reports 1902, 189; Correspondence, BG Hughes to Adj Gen, Div of the Philippines, 4 Oct 1901, RG 395, E2550, Box 1, “Field HQ, Dept of Visayas,” (Letters Sent, May - Nov 1901).


39 Direct quotations from John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 250; (referencing Chaffee’s orders, Elihu Root Papers, General Henry C. Corbin Papers, and William H. Taft Papers); “hombres’ comment also found in, correspondence, 30 Sep 1901, Chaffee to Corbin, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 2 “Chaffee July-September 1900; January – October 1901” [hereafter Henry C. Corbin Papers, Box #, Folder #]


41 Hughes quotation: Correspondence, 24 Sep 1901, BG Robert P. Hughes to Adjutant General, Division of the Philippines, NARA Wash DC, RG395, E2550, “Field HQ, Dept of the Visayas, Letters Sent (May-Nov 1901)” ; Archer, The Philippines Fight for Freedom, 121;


42 Karnow, In Our Image, 191.
Chaffee to Corbin, 25 Oct 1901 (date stamped 01 Dec 1901, probably when received), Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 3, “Chaffee Nov - Dec 1901.”

James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912, (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1913), 379; Blount goes on to assert that, “General Chaffee was never really pressed on whether he did or did not prompt General Smith to do what he did.” [Hereafter, Blount, American Occupation]

Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 94-5; this passage was also referred to in Senate Hearings. The document referred to a report on 11 Nov 1899, from (then) Colonel J.H. Smith, 17th Infantry, reporting from Capas, Philippines, which stated:

In a few minutes after reaching here we discovered about 200 to 250 insurgents coming up the railroad track from the south, waving a flag of truce. I made my dispositions to receive them warmly, when we heard three volleys from the cavalry, who were to the right and the south of the railroad crossing. They dispersed quickly, going toward the east. I got word to a battalion that was in position to intercept them, and a few of them were killed; but they scattered like birds and we heard or saw nothing more of them. [The United States Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands: Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate, 57th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 331, Part 3, printed 10 Apr 1902, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 2867-8].

Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 238.


Walter L. Cutter Papers, Box 1, Philippines Scrapbook, Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC)/ Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle, PA; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 238; The newspaper picture clipping was most likely from the Manila Critic, an English language paper popular among soldiers stationed in the Philippines.

Of note, the newspaper clipping, entitled “Uncle Sam’s Pirates: All About the Brigands and Thieves of the Asiatic Possessions—They Infest the Mountains and are Found Even in the City of Manila—the Islands Fitted for Banditti—the Danger of Ambush and How the Insurrectos Operate in Small Bands,” by Frank G. Carpenter, was extremely complimentary of US forces, including (then) Colonel Smith. However, the retelling offered in Miller’s Benevolent Assimilation casts Smith’s action in a very poor light. Miller’s work is extremely critical of the US Army’s actions during the Philippine Insurrection. In fact, unearthing excesses of the US military during this period is one of the central themes of his study. Therefore, all his descriptions that are not specifically supported by primary sources should be examined with this caution in mind.

Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 238; Miller’s endnotes refer to several newspaper articles, including the San Francisco Call & Boston Herald, (both 24 Apr 1902) and the Manila Critic; Smith’s article was found in the Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 8, Folder 2, labeled “Philippines Miscellany.”


53 Fritz, “‘Before the ‘Howling Wilderness’,” 186-190; “A Brave Soldier Promoted: Col Jacob H. Smith Raised to a Brigadier General,” [newspaper clipping, no author or newspaper specifically listed, probably, *The Manila Critic*], found in the Walter L. Cutter Papers AHEC/MHI, previously cited.

Though Fritz attests to Smith’s spotty career, both aforementioned articles admit his bravery in combat. Smith was a Civil War Veteran who was wounded in battle three times throughout his career. A Manila newspaper article announcing Smith’s promotion to Brigadier General (referenced above) described him as “one of our most capable army officers” whose promotion to the rank of flag officer was at the “urging” of General MacArthur. The article specifically praised him for an act of bravery at Santiago, Cuba. He reportedly prevented the rout of his unit by “coolly putting his men, two battalions of regulars, through the manual of arms while under a galling fire from the Spanish trenches.” The article further credited Colonel Smith’s exploits during the Philippine Insurrection with capturing the town of Magalong and the capture of Filipino Insurgent General Montenegro with 180 officers and men, while he was the Commanding Officer of the 17th Infantry.

(Of note, Fritz condemned Smith’s manual of arms incident in Cuba as a foolhardy attempt to gain glory; Linn also disparaged Smith’s actions at Santiago. He pointed to the event as evidence of the poor professional development of some American officers. Linn asserts that due to a combination of the dispersion of the American Army into small frontier garrisons and the Army’s slow promotion system, many US officers had never commanded more than a company prior to the Spanish American War. He contends that when faced with an adverse tactical situation, Smith fell back on basic company-grade drill techniques. If Smith’s actions helped his unit regain its composure and prevented its rout (as the newspaper article asserts), this observation seems flawed. [Dr. Brian M. Linn “AY2010 ASAP Strategic Theory & Art: Insurgency—The Philippine Insurrection Seminar,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 13 Jan 2010]


55 “Gen. Chaffee’s Leniency; War Department Fully Indorses His Policy in China. His Refusal to Allow Executions in Peking Is in Accord with the American Army Regulations,” 12 Mar 1901, *The New York Times*, p. 1; The article relates General Chaffee’s lenient leadership when compared to the contingents of the other European armies who reportedly regularly
executed prisoners, sometimes as many as 50 executions per day. Chaffee’s command had not executed a single prisoner. Chaffee also refused to take part in punitive expeditions.

56 Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*, 196 (citing a comment made to reporter Joseph Ohl in the Fall of 1901, and reported in, *Nation*, 74 p. 61 in 1902).

57 United States Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands, *Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines*, (GPO: Washington, 1902), 57th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No 331, Part 2, 1591-92. [Relaying correspondence between Commanding General, HQ, Division of the Philippines (General Chaffee) and Commanding General, HQ, Department of the Visayas (General Hughes), dated 30 Sep 1901].

58 Chaffee to Corbin, 05 Nov 1901, *Henry C. Corbin Papers*, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 3.

59 Brian M. Linn, “We Will Go Heavily Armed,” 41; quoting telegraphic correspondence from BG Hughes to Col Isaac D. DeRussey, 29 Sep 1901, NARA Wash DC RG 395, E2551.

60 Telegram from Colonel DeRussy to HQ, Dept. of Visayas, 5 Oct 1901; NARA Wash DC RG 395, E2552, “Field HQ, Dept of Visayas, (Telegrams Received Jul-Nov 1901)” ; Colonel DeRussey stated that Capt Bookmiller’s relief expedition had already fired the town, but his detachment completed the work. The goal of his detachment was to retrieve the rifles lost during the attack, but most obviously included retribution for the Balangiga massacre.

61 Correspondence, Captain F. McIntyre (for the Adj Gen, Dept of Visayas) to Lt G.I. Feeter, 7 Oct 1901; NARA Wash DC RG 395, E2550, Box 1, “Field HQ, Dept of Visayas, (Letters Sent, May - Nov 1901)” ; In this letter, the Dept Commander directs that the Adj Gen chastise a unit for excesses. The letter states that two Filipino town officials and Filipino police official were recently shot on Mactan Island. The letter directed that this event was most likely a case of soldiers taking “the law in their own hands,” and demanded that the commander “take the matter up [him]self and institute such a government of your command that outlawry may not be charged against them.”

62 Correspondence, BG R.P. Hughes to BG J.H. Smith, 5 Oct 1901, “Welcomes General to Island; Discusses the outlook and General Situation in the Sixth Brigade,” NARA Wash DC RG 395 E2483 Box 49, “Dept of the Visayas: General Correspondence, (Jan-Nov 1901)” ; In this dispatch BG Hughes also describes the challenges that Smith will be facing in terms of terrain, climate, supply, and troop dispositions.


65 Many scholars claim that in comparison to J. Franklin Bell’s campaign, Smith’s expedition was poorly planned, led and executed. These critics include John M. Gates, Brian M. Linn, and Andrew J. Birtle (all previously cited).


Excerpts from the Records of General Court Martial (GCM) 30739: Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith Court Martial, RG 153: Records of the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General (JAG), NARA Washington DC;

The United States Senate, Trials or Courts-Martial in the Philippine Islands in Consequence of Certain Instructions; Letter from the Secretary of War in Response to Senate Resolution of February 23, 1903, Transmitting a Report Showing the Trials or Courts-Martial Had in the Philippine Islands in Consequence of the Instructions Communicated to Major-General Chaffee on April 15, 1902, Together with the Action of the President or the Secretary of War Therein, 57th Congress, 2d Session, Document No. 213, printed 03 Mar 1903, 6-7; 10;

War Department, Correspondence, 1336.

Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 252-56.


Adjutant General’s Office, Headquarters of the Army, General Orders No. 80, 16 July 1902, Washington DC. [hereafter, General Orders No. 80].

General Orders No. 80, p. 3

General Orders No. 80, 1-2.

Linn, The Philippine War, 314 [citing the testimony of Capt A.P. Buffington, GCM30739]


Linn, The Philippine War, 223.


Chaffee to Corbin, 10 Jan 1902, *Henry C. Corbin Papers*, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4.


David L. Fritz, “The Philippine Question: American Civil/Military Policy in the Philippines, 1898-1905,” PhD Dissertation for the University of Texas, Austin, TX, 1977, 358 (Referencing LT Anderson to his wife, 2 Dec 1901, Anderson Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) [hereafter, Fritz, “The Philippine Question”].


Fritz, “The Philippine Question,” 360; (Referencing Wright to Taft, 13 Jan 1902, Taft Papers).


Telegraphic correspondence between BG Smith and BG Hughes show the various movements of the new commander’s inspection tour. NARA Wash DC, RG395, E3451 “Field Telegrams Received/Sent at Catbalogan by BG Smith, October 1901”; Smith also related the observations from his initial inspection tour in his article “Campaign in Samar and Leyte from 10th of October to 31st of December, 1901,” *The Manila Critic*, 01 Feb 1902, newspaper clipping found in the *Henry C. Corbin Papers*, Library of Congress, Box 8, Folder 2, labeled “Philippines Miscellany”: BG J.H. Smith.

[emphasis added] Newspaper clipping found in *Henry C. Corbin Papers*, Library of Congress, Box 8, Folder 2, labeled “Philippines Miscellany”: BG J.H. Smith, “Campaign in
Samar and Leyte from 10\textsuperscript{th} of October to 31\textsuperscript{st} of December, 1901," *The Manila Critic*, 01 Feb 1902.

89 On the concentration of troops and coordination of Naval & Marine support: Newspaper clipping found in *Henry C. Corbin Papers*, Library of Congress, Box 8, Folder 2, labeled "Philippines Miscellany": BG J.H. Smith, "Campaign in Samar and Leyte from 10\textsuperscript{th} of October to 31\textsuperscript{st} of December, 1901," *The Manila Critic*, 01 Feb 1902.

On the Navy’s offer to employ a battalion of Marines, Chaffee to Corbin, 25 Oct 1901, *Henry C. Corbin Papers*, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 3;


In January 1901, Samar was organized as the 4\textsuperscript{th} District of the Department of Southern Luzon. The island was garrisoned by the following units:

1\textsuperscript{st} US Infantry, (HQ Co, C, D, E, F, G, H)
2\textsuperscript{nd} US Infantry, (E, H)
29\textsuperscript{th} US Volunteers, (HQ, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, M)
4\textsuperscript{th} US Artillery, (Battery F)

In January 1902, 3 months after Balangiga, Samar was garrisoned by the Sixth Separate Brigade, under the Department of the Visayas. The island was garrisoned by the following units:

1\textsuperscript{st} US Infantry (entire regiment)
7\textsuperscript{th} US Infantry (C, D, H, M)
9\textsuperscript{th} US Infantry (HQ Co, A, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M)
12\textsuperscript{th} US Infantry (A, B, C, D)
26\textsuperscript{th} US Infantry (H, K, L, M)
Native Scouts (23\textsuperscript{rd}, 24\textsuperscript{th}, 35\textsuperscript{th}, 36\textsuperscript{th}, 39\textsuperscript{th})

The 11\textsuperscript{th} Infantry (with 8 companies) and the 38\textsuperscript{th} Native Scout Company were stationed on the neighboring Island of Leyte.
According to the *Official Army Register*, the standard infantry regiment in 1901-1902 contained 12 companies. Each company was assigned approximately from 110-150 officers and men. These numbers reflect official manning levels as promulgated by Army Headquarters. Under-manning, combat losses, and disease significantly reduced the numbers of soldiers actually available to serve in the field.

Information on troop levels and stations in Samar was gathered from:

Information on the manning-levels of Army regiments and companies from:


100 Linn, “The Struggle for Samar,” 168-69; Linn states several specific examples of the Navy providing superb support to the Army and Marine units on Samar including fire support, transportation, supply.
Correspondence, BG Hughes to MG Chaffee, 21 Oct 1901, “General Situation in the Island of Samar as it appears to him. Relative to the distribution of the 7th and 12th Infantry,” NARA Wash DC, RG 395, E2483, Box 49, “Dept of Visayas: General Correspondence, (Jan-Nov 1901); This rationale was another reason that Hughes accepted the Navy’s offer to employ a battalion of Marines after the Balangiga Massacre. He later assigned the Marine Battalion to the Sixth Brigade in Balangiga since “their own people can readily supply them” in that district.

The ability of the Navy to supply and provide transportation for the Marine Battalion is also referenced in Joel D. Thacker, USMC Historian, “Stand Gentlemen, He Served on Samar!,” March 1945 (Monograph found in the USMC Research Center Archives, Quantico, VA; USMC Miscellaneous Box (33-B-2-10); and in the U.S. Navy Department’s, “Report of the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps,” Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1902, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 965-6.


Proclamation, Headquarters, 6th Separate Brigade, Tacloban, Leyte, P.I., [1 Nov 1901], Philippine Insurgent Records (PIR), compiled by Capt J.R.M. Taylor, National Archives and Record Administration (NARA) Microfilm, M-254, Roll # 70, Document # 1143.9.


Chaffee to Corbin, 05 Nov 1901, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 3.


112 Specifically referring to General Order No 29 [27 Oct 1901] and Circular no. 2 [6 Nov 1901], which restricted trade and traffic between both islands and imposed enforcement on either shore. Technically, Leyte was not within the jurisdiction of the Sixth Separate Brigade.

The below reference (Appendix A & B) contains a flurry of correspondence among multiple agencies over this contentious issue. The fact that an entire appendix of Chaffee’s Annual Report is devoted to this topic is an indication of the voracity and implications of this dispute.


Smith and Hughes had several internal military disputes over troop dispositions shortly after General Smith assumed command of the 6th Separate Brigade. Smith modified several of the troops allocations recommended by Hughes.
[Telegram, BG Hughes to BG Hall, 19 Oct 1901, NARA Wash DC, RG 395, E2552, “Field HQ, Dept of Visayas, (Telegrams Received Jul-Nov 1901)”]. In this telegram, Hughes explains to HQ, Division of the Philippines that he does not agree with Smith’s adjustments to his troop dispositions.

Hughes had previously explained the rationale for these dispositions in his initial guidance to Smith.

[Correspondence between BG R.P. Hughes to BG J.H. Smith, 5 Oct 1901, “Welcomes General to Island; Discusses the outlook and General Situation in the Sixth Brigade,” NARA Wash DC RG 395 E2483 Box 49, “Dept of the Visayas: General Correspondence, (Jan-Nov 1901)”]


117 Chaffee to Corbin, 09 Dec 1901, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 3.

118 Root to Chaffee, 26 Feb 1901, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 2.

119 Chaffee to Corbin, 28 Dec 1901, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 3.

120 Chaffee to Corbin, 31 Jan 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4.

Chaffee and Smith would also coordinate the receipt of additional troops to occupy the East Coast of Samar in an effort to rebuild the towns previously burnt out by the insurgents. Chaffee’s hopes were that “the people will come in and rebuild the towns.” This coordination again demonstrates Chaffee’s continued coordination with, and support for, General Smith.

[Chaffee to Corbin, 28 Feb 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4].

121 Corbin to Chaffee, 23 Apr 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 5.


128 [italics added] Correspondence, Colonel A.L. Wagner (Asst Adj Gen, Dept of Southern Luzon) to Commanding General, 2nd District, Laguna Province, 24 Dec 1900, NARA Wash DC, RG 395, E3121, Monthly and Tri-monthly Reports Relating to the Capture of Insurgents, Arms, and Native Prisoners (Sept 1901-Apr 1902); of note, I do not know why this report, dated 24 Dec 1900, was located in this Entry Group.


134 Chaffee to Corbin, 18 Nov 1901, *Henry C. Corbin Papers*, Box 1, Folder 3

135 Chaffee to Corbin, 18 Nov 1901, *Henry C. Corbin Papers*, Box 1, Folder 3

136 Chaffee to Corbin, 18 Dec 1901, *Henry C. Corbin Papers*, Box 1, Folder 3

137 Chaffee to Corbin, 31 Jan 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4; Linn, “The Struggle for Samar,” 173.


Smith also boasted that: “The foregoing is compiled from official reports received, and it is estimated that the actual results, if available, would aggregate at least one-third more of killed and wounded.”

146 Chaffee to Corbin, 30 Mar 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4.


148 Linn, “The Struggle for Samar,” 173-75; Direct quotation concerning Lukban’s condition on his capture from p. 175.

Chaffee to Corbin, 17 Mar 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4; Chaffee to Corbin, 30 Mar 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4;


103
Most contemporary studies of the Samar Expedition are extremely critical of General Smith’s conduct of the campaign. These scholars include the aforementioned John M. Gates, Brian M. Linn, and Andrew J. Birtle.

Although atrocities undoubtedly occurred, a contradictory viewpoint was offered by Col Arthur Wagner. He was quoted as stating, “As to the ‘water cure’ they lay so much stress upon, there has been more of that in the imagination of the people of the United States than in the island of Samar.” [Editorial Article on Col Wagner's recent statements upon his return to the United States after serving two years in the Philippines, The Army & Navy Journal, vol. XXXIX, no, 35, whole number 2019, (03 May 1902): 872].

155 Chaffee to Corbin, 17 Mar 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4;

As previously stated, evidence exists that General Smith actually coordinated his actions with the Governor of Leyte. However, the issue brought Chaffee unwanted political attention from Washington, DC, and the Philippine Commission in Manila.


157 Blount, American Occupation, 506-508


160 Blount, American Occupation, 384-85.


162 Chaffee to Corbin, 02 Sep 1901, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Box 1, Folder 2; Glenn A. May, The Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War, (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1991), 235 [hereafter, May, The Battle for Batangas].

163 Chaffee to Corbin, 30 Sep 1901, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Box 1, Folder 2; May, The Battle for Batangas, 238.

164 Chaffee to Corbin, 25 Oct 1901, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Box 1, Folder 3; May, The Battle for Batangas, 238.

165 Chaffee to Corbin, 05 Nov 1901, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Box 1, Folder 3


167 Ramsey, Savage Wars of Peace, 95-7


May, “Filipino Resistance,” 543-545; direct quotation on page 545; although the American Army believed differently, May contends that the majority of Filipinos, even the commoners, voluntarily supported the insurgency. He claims that out of 700 declarations to American officials, only 8 claimed involuntary support to the Filipino war effort, p. 544.

Another source confirms the shadow government and insurgent tax and contribution system, listing specific orders from General Malvar, entitled, “General Dispositions and Instructions,” issued between Apr-Dec 1901; [White, “The Pacification of Batangas,” 431-433].


General J. Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders Regulating Campaign Against Insurgents and Proclamations and Circular Letters Relating to Reconstruction After Close of War in the Provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro, Philippine Islands / Batangas, Batangas Province, P.I.: Headquarters, 3rd Separate Brigade, 1902, held at the Army Heritage and Education Center/Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. [hereafter, Bell, Telegraphic Circulars, AHEC/MHI]

179 Gates alludes to the fact that Chaffee would later apply pressure for Smith to adopt policies similar to those employed in Bell’s campaign, although no conclusive sources are listed for this presumption. [Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 255-256].

180 [italics added] Excerpt from Circular No. 3 [09 Dec 1901]: Ramsey, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare, 46-51; Bell, Telegraphic Circulars, AHEC/MHI.

181 Excerpt from Circular No. 3 [09 Dec 1901]: Ramsey, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare, 46-51; Bell, Telegraphic Circulars, AHEC/MHI.

182 Excerpt from Circular No. 3 [09 Dec 1901]: Ramsey, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare, 46-51; Bell, Telegraphic Circulars, AHEC/MHI.

183 Excerpt from Circular No. 5 [13 Dec 1901]: Ramsey, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare, 52-54; Bell, Telegraphic Circulars, AHEC/MHI.

184 Excerpt from Circular No. 5 [13 Dec 1901]: Ramsey, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare, 52-54; Bell, Telegraphic Circulars, AHEC/MHI.


186 Excerpt from Circular No. 6 [13 Dec 1901]: Ramsey, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare, 54-55; Bell, Telegraphic Circulars, AHEC/MHI.

187 Excerpt from Circular No. 6 [13 Dec 1901]: Ramsey, A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare, 54-55; Bell, Telegraphic Circulars, AHEC/MHI.


Major-General O. O. Howard (ret), in defense of the Army, relayed a situation from the Civil War era in an article submitted to The Independent in May 1902. Howard wrote about the actions of Union General George H. Thomas in Tennessse. Howard relayed that guerillas routinely attacked Thomas’ sole line of communication. These guerillas were not organized military forces, and mixed in with the civilian population to avoid retribution. Thomas issued a public notice stating that if a certain tunnel was disturbed, all homes within five miles would be destroyed. The notice was effective in protecting the tunnel from guerilla attack. Howard concludes the section stating, “. . . we ought to be very careful not to condemn the army for severe measures which appear to be necessary.”


106
Correspondence, Chaffee to Corbin, 10 Jan 1902, *Henry C. Corbin Papers*, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4, “Chaffee, Jan-Mar 1902”.


Pakenham refers to international pressure levied on Britain as a result of their concentration camps. The *Army and Navy Journal* articles for the years 1901-1902 do not make any specific mention of US Officer observations of Boer War concentration tactics. It would be interesting to study if American Officers learned any tactical lessons from their British counterparts, or *vice versa*. Likewise, it would be interesting to determine if US policymakers took note of the British political turmoil resulting from the employment of concentration tactics.

Interestingly, two opinion articles were written in the *Army and Navy Journal* during the same period of time which praised the conditions of British Prisoner of War camps during the Boer War. The articles specifically addressed POW camps and made no specific mention of concentration camps. However, one author began the piece with the phrase “In spite of all that has been said about the harsh treatment of Boer prisoners by their British captures, there is another side to the story.”


Jun 1901—Correspondence, BG R.P. Hughes (CG, Dept of Visayas) to Adj Gen, Division of the Philippines, 10 Jul 1901, NARA Wash DC, RG 395, E2550, Box 1, “Field HQ, Dept of Visayas, (Letters Sent, May - Nov 1901)"

Jul 1901 – Correspondence, 1stLt A.L. Conger (Aide-de-Camp, Dept of Visayas) to CO, Borongan, Samar, 23 Jul 1901, NARA Wash DC, RG 395, E2550, Box 1, “Field HQ, Dept of Visayas, (Letters Sent, May - Nov 1901)"

Aug 1901 – Correspondence, BG R.P. Hughes (CG, Dept of Visayas) to Adj Gen, Division of the Philippines, 20 Aug 1901, NARA Wash DC, RG 395, E2550, Box 1, “Field HQ, Dept of Visayas, (Letters Sent, May - Nov 1901)"

Excerpt from Circular No. 2 [08 Dec 1901]: Ramsey, *A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare*, 45-46; Bell, *Telegraphic Circulars*, AHEC/MHI.


Of note, another estimate on the size of Batangas’ concentration camps comes from Blount, who asserts that approximately 100,000 Filipinos were gathered in Batangas’ concentration camps. (Blount, American *Occupation*, 393-94)

Both men served with each other in General Arthur MacArthur’s Second Division of the VIII Corps at the beginning of the Insurrection as regimental commanders. Their regiments advanced alongside each other during General Otis’ offensives.

[War Department, Correspondence, 1097].


Chaffee to Corbin, 09 Dec 1901, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Box 1, Folder 3

Chaffee to Corbin, 31 Jan 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4.

Chaffee to Corbin, 17 Mar 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4.


General Bell’s Batangas Campaign is widely recognized as a model counter-insurgency campaign by Philippine Insurrection scholars including John M. Gates, Brian M. Linn, and Andrew J. Birtle. In fact, the US Army has released several publications which endorse this viewpoint. These works include, Robert D. Ramsey’s Savage Wars of Peace, and the same author’s A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare (both previously cited).

Although the opinions differ, the majority of scholars agree that Bell exercised a higher level of control over his soldiers. The most preeminent of this group include Gates and Linn. Gates lavishes a high level of praise on Bell, calling his campaign “a credit to the United States Army in the Philippines and a masterpiece of counter-guerrilla warfare.” (These views were reaffirmed in recent correspondence with two scholars. [John M. Gates, e-mail message to author, 10 Nov 2009; Brian M. Linn, e-mail message to author, 10 Nov 2009]).

Bell’s detractors include Stuart C. Miller (Benevolent Assimilation), and Leon Wolff (Little Brown Brother). Miller went so far as to title General Bell a “butcher.” [May, The Battle for Batangas, 243-44].


May's estimates of casualties in Batangas have changed throughout the years, based on refined research. May initially estimated that “tens of thousands” of deaths were caused by concentration camp related starvation and disease. May subsequently modified his figures based on his more recent research. Later, he would estimate that between Jan-Apr 1902, 8,344 people died in Batangas—28 out of every 1,000 people.

In this article, May admits in his footnote that his early casualty figures were an estimate based on information found in the Historical Data Papers (HDP) Batangas, from the National Library of the Philippines. As stated above, May later revised his estimates of casualties resulting from the war. (Gates, “War Related Deaths in the Philippines, 1898-1902,” cited previously).

Blount, *American Occupation*, 383-4; referring to a letter read aloud to the Senate on 23 May 1902 by Senator Bacon (D-GA);

Blount, *American Occupation*, 393-94; Captain Herbert A. White of the 11th US Cavalry, an officer serving in Batangas, also attested to the humane conditions in the Batangas concentration camps. He stated that the natives were well taken care of and that no starvation
existed. Highly praiseful of General Bell, he also credited the use of concentration camps for the eventual defeat of the insurgency in Batangas. [White, “The Pacification of Batangas,” 443-444 (previously cited)].


This inspection report is filled with praise for General Bell’s concentration methods. The report mirrors statements Col Wagner would later make in response to Senate Hearings. Therefore, the reader should be aware that Wagner’s report may have been an Army effort to minimize any suffering caused by concentration tactics. General Chaffee’s previously cited attention to the delicacy of public knowledge with respect to concentration tactics demonstrates how seriously senior Army leadership took the situation. Following the Smith and Waller courts-martial, the Army naturally would have been concerned with minimizing any further damage to the public’s perception of the war.

Additionally, as Brereton (cited below) surmises, Wagner was a staunch Army advocate who would have characteristically supported Army practices. [Brereton, p. 90]

Excerpts of this report and Wagner’s testimony at Senate hearings are also found in T.R. Brereton, Educating the U.S. Army: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 89-91.

214 Wagner, Concentration Camp Report

215 Wagner, Concentration Camp Report

216 Chaffee to Corbin, 22 Mar 1902, Henry C. Corbin Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1, Folder 4.


218 Schott, The Ordeal of Samar, 73; Kinman’s letter referenced in Brian M. Linn’s, “Samar 1900-1902: The ‘Howling Wilderness’,” Naval History, Vol. 4, Iss. 4, (Fall 1990): 10-15 [referencing a letter from Private Kinman to his sister, 18 Oct 1901, Harold Kinman Papers, USMC Historical Center].

219 Manuscript of a letter from BG J. Franklin Bell to Colonel Bisbee, 30 March 1900, provided to “AY2010 ASAP Strategic Theory & Art: Insurgency—The Philippine Insurrection Seminar,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 13 Jan 2010; the same letter is referred to in Linn, The Philippine War, 224; and Brian M. Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 84. [Both above sources reference Bell to Bisbee, Ltr, 30 Mar 1900, NARA RG395, E2206, LS69, Letters Sent Book 1]

Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags, 262.


Blount, American Occupation, 392.

Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 282, 296; Of note, the $400 million financial cost of the war was twenty times more that the amount the US paid to Spain for the annexation of the Philippines following the Spanish-American War.


Examples of documents released by the Anti Imperialist League include:

The Anti Imperialist League, Secretary Root’s Record: “Marked Severities” in Philippine Warfare; An Analysis of the Law and Facts bearing on the Action and Utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root, (Boston: Geo H. Ellis Co., 1902);


Of note, General Miles’ statements and reports were most likely politically motivated. Beyond having personal political ambitions, Miles’ split with the Roosevelt Administration was well known.


An extensive record of the Senate Hearings is contained in:

The United States Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands: Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate, 57th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 331, Parts 1-3, printed 10 Apr 1902, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1902);

Henry F. Graff, ed., American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection: Testimony Taken from Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands before the Senate Committee on the Philippines—1902, (Boston: Little, brown, and Co, 1969);

Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 259 [citing various articles from The San Francisco Call and The New York Times].

Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 258-9; Miller relates that Major Glenn, Capt Brownell, and Capt Ryan were acquitted for their 1902 courts-martial for murder, by claiming that their actions were in line with Chaffee’s orders. [Once again, Miller cites various articles from The San Francisco Call and The New York Times].


Karnow, In Our Image, 193-4.

U.S. War Department, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1902, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 188; However, following General Smith’s relief from command, General Chaffee may have begun to doubt Smith’s mental health and noted that he was behaving erratically. The Secretary of War even directed that Smith be reviewed by a medical board to determine his fitness for duty. However, this may have been a political attempt to discredit Smith or at least make an excuse for his actions. Later correspondence from Chaffee reports that medical officials would not find General Smith “Unfit for Duty,” and the Secretary dropped his request.

[Telegrams, between Corbin and Chaffee, 03 May 1902, 14 & 18 Jun 1902, War Department, Correspondence, 1335, 1344, 1347-8; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 238]; Miller asserts that requests to have General Smith’s mental health examined may have been a scheme by the Secretary of War to have Smith declared “temporarily insane.” Miller refers to the telegrams cited above and an 18 Jul 1902 letter from President Roosevelt.

The US Arlington National Cemetery Website even refers to the incident citing that General Chaffee requested permission to keep Smith in the Philippines, fearing that he would speak “absurdly unwise” to reporters and make statements contrary to the facts revealed at the court-martial proceedings. Chaffee purportedly stated that Smith might “act like an unbalanced lunatic.”

["Jacob Hurd Smith, Brigadier General, United States Army" (Gravesite Biography), The Arlington National Cemetery Website Homepage, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jhsmith.htm, accessed 13 December 2009; and Frisk, Before the ‘Howling Wilderness,’ 189].


Blount, American Occupation, 379-380.

Karnow, In Our Image, 193-4; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 256 ,citing articles from The San Francisco Call, 2-3 Aug 1902.

Correspondence found in the Walter L. Cutter Papers, AHEC/MHI, Carlisle, PA, has letters from the Army of the Philippines veterans' organization to Mr. Cutter. General Smith is listed on the organization's letterhead as the Commander-in-Chief and a member of the Executive Committee. Two letters, dated 17 Jan 1915 and 25 June 1916 are from BG J.H. Smith (ret) to Mr. Cutter. Of note, Major General J. Franklin Bell is also listed on the letterhead as the Second Junior Vice Commander.

[Walter L. Cutter Papers, Box 2 “WW I,” Army Heritage Education Center (AHEC)/ Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle, PA].

Also, a short historical reference to General Smith’s association with veterans’ groups, and the eventual consolidation of various veterans’ organizations into the modern day VFW, was found on VFW Post 2780 Website: “Who We Are” (History Page), Veterans of Foreign Wars Cherryland Post 2780 Traverse City, Michigan Homepage, http://www.vfwpost2780.org/page2.html, accessed 13 December 2009. (Of note, the website listed Smith’s name as “G.H. Smith,” obviously a typographical error.

Examples of articles defending General Smith and/or Major Waller or declaring them political scapegoats are listed below:

  * An editorial article relating comments of Colonel A.L. Wagner stated that only one officer had come forward with accusations of systematic violations of the articles of war. He identifies this officer as Major Cornelius Gardner, 13th US Infantry and former Governor of Tayabas Province. However, Wagner claims that Gardner's accusations were "vague, indefinite charges against the army as a whole, but without specifying an act, a date or a name to support or clarify his allegations." [Untitled Editorial Article, The Army & Navy Journal, vol. XXXIX, no, 35, whole number 2019, (03 May 1902): 872].

Some other examples of the praise levied upon the Marine battalion are listed below: ["Report of the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps," U.S. Navy Department,
Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1902, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 968-69, 974-75:

* Brigadier General Smith: “The brilliant success of your command, both men and officers, has my highest congratulations. There is nothing impossible for the American fighting man, and your work in the Sohoton Province is additional proof of that fact.

* Brigadier General Smith: “Maj. L.W.T. Waller, U.S.M.C., now brevet lieutenant-colonel, has proven himself to be an officer of exceptional merit, and carries out my instructions loyally and gallantly. He deserves another brevet for his services thus far, and I urge this recognition; also a general order from the division commander, congratulating him and the marine corps of his command.”

* Rear-Admiral Rodgers: “Well done, marines. The senior squadron commander sends a hearty congratulations to you, Captains Porter and Bearss, and your command. They are doing what I predicted for them, and are maintaining the reputation of the corps.

* Rear-Admiral Rodgers: “I desire to state here that the marine battalion commanded by Major Waller, which was sent to the southern end of Samar, then considered the worst place in the Philippines, and where nearly a whole company of the Ninth Infantry had just been massacred, was actively and continually engaged against the insurrectos for over three months and performed its duty in a most efficient manner.”

* Major-General Chaffee: “Have just read your message to General Smith, dated 19th. Thanks to officers and men. Assure each of my cordial regard and my highest appreciation of the manly heart and soldierly spirit which makes light of obstacles and is never daunted or satisfied while service can be rendered to our country. I hope kind Providence will guide the footsteps and take the part of American soldiers battling for peace in the wilderness of Samar.”

* A newspaper article relayed that the Navy Department was pleased and relieved when Waller was acquitted at his court-martial; “The Waller Acquittal: Navy Department People are Both Pleased and Relieved; His Friends Claim His Exoneration Shifts Responsibility from Marine Corps to the Army,” 15 Apr 1902, The New York Times.


245 “Paul Melshen, “He Served on Samar,” Proceedings, U. S. Naval Institute, (Nov 1979): 43-48; quotation from page 48; Joel D. Thacker, USMC Historian, “Stand Gentlemen, He Served on Samar!,” March 1945 (Monograph found in the USMC Research Center Archives, Quantico, VA; USMC Miscellaneous Box (33-B-2-10);

A less complimentary view of Waller’s performance on Samar is provided by Brian M. Linn’s, “We Will Go Heavily Armed”, 40-53.


Root also printed a compilation of various reports and orders illustrating the various efforts of the Army to ensure adherence to the laws of war: The United States Senate, \textit{Charges of Cruelty, Etc., to the Natives of the Philippines}, 57th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 205, Part 1, printed 19 Feb 1902.

248 Young, “Atrocities and War Crimes,” 72. [Young referencing , Senate Document 205, 1st Session, 1-4.]


252 Linn, \textit{The Philippine War}, 211; (referencing a letter from Captain John L. Jordan to his mother, 29 Oct 1900, John L. Jordan Papers, located at the Army Heritage and Education Center, and the Tennessee State Library and Archives).

253 Birtle, \textit{U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine}, 137.

254 An example of the negative effects of political pressure on military operations was expressed by an anonymous Army Officer in a New York Times editorial submission in April 1903. The full excerpt is listed below:

\begin{quote}
The truth is, all the officers out here, to use a slang expression are “buffaloed,” and are afraid to do anything for fear of a court-martial. You cannot realize the mischief the different trials out here have worked . . . . The commanding officer here is bound hand and foot, and is unable to take vigorous action. Everything has to be reported at headquarters before any expedition can be undertaken, and so we must sit with folded hands and raging hearts and “wait for orders.” We are certainly sowing the wind, and some poor devil will some day reap the whirlwind.
\end{quote}


256 Birtle, \textit{U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine}, 138-9; The U.S. Army and Marines would be involved in several future counter-insurgencies prior to World War II. US forces would fight insurgents not only in the Philippines and Moro land, but also in China’s Boxer Rebellion (1900-01), Panama (1901), the Second Cuban Intervention (1906-9), Mexican Punitive Expeditions (1914, 1916-17), Nicaragua (1910-13, 1927-33), Haiti (1915-34), and the Dominican Republic (1916-24). \textit{(Birtle, \textit{U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine}, 138-9).}

A limited number of unofficial essays on topics such as pacification, the legal and ethical considerations of guerilla warfare, and counter-insurgency tactics appeared in professional journals. Some examples are listed below:

Among other reforms, the Army Reorganization Act of 1901 discontinued the position of the Commanding General of the Army in 1903. It was replaced by an Army Chief of Staff. In the interim, the new U.S. Army War College functioned as a proto-General Staff; before becoming Army Chief of Staff, Young served as the first “President” (now Commandant) of the Army War College, 1902-1903.

A list of the US Army Chiefs of Staff can be found at “United States Army Chiefs of Staff,” U.S. Army Center of Military History Homepage, at http://www.history.army.mil/faq/FAQ-CSA.htm, (accessed 03/19/2010).

General Bullard wrote the following articles describing the Army’s pacification efforts in Cuba and the Philippines:
Robert L. Bullard, “The Army in Cuba”
Robert L. Bullard, “Military Pacification” [both previously cited].


“Littleton T.W. Waller, Major General United States Marine Corps,” (Gravesite Biography), The Arlington National Cemetery Website Homepage, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/lwwaller.htm, (accessed 03/19/2010); a disappointed General Waller sent the below message to the Marines fighting in France as part of the AEF:

From: The Oldest Active Officer of the United States Marines to the Officers and Men of the Marine Brigade fighting in France:
Fate has denied me the honor of leading you, my own people, in this great struggle, but I want you to know and feel that I am with you in spirit. Your splendid achievements in the recent fighting during the early part of June forces the admiration of the World and the deep gratitude of your comrades at home, in that you have lived up to the best traditions of our beloved Corps and have made
a brilliant page in its history. You will go on with this work in the same spirit. All honor to you living men and the peace of God which passeth all understanding to the souls of our beloved comrades who have given their lives in this great cause. May the pain of the wounded be alleviated by the full realization that they have stood for righteousness, truth and the honor of Country and Corps. Always faithful, always ready. In all the world there is no better precept, no better aim. May the God of Battles have you in his keeping and bring victory to your banners. As "you have stood as a stone wall between the Hun and Paris" you will always stand for the liberty of the World.

“Editorials Sent Us from Different Papers,” found in the Maj Gen L.T. Waller Papers, PC# 942/Box 1/ Folder 2B24, Folder 7, labeled “Waller LWT, Editorials Sent Us from Different Papers circa 1902-1914”, USMC Research Center Archives, Quantico, VA.