JOINT HEADQUARTERS RENEWAL: COMBINED IS THE WAY

BY

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Joint Headquarters Renewal: Combined is the Way

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Walker

Colonel David Dworak
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The 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy mandates the Canadian Forces to take a leadership role at home and abroad and to lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period and to maintain the ability to deploy forces in response to a crisis elsewhere in the world for shorter periods. The CF Joint Headquarters (JHQ) Renewal Project will correct current employment limitations and create a much improved capability to command and control joint, interagency, multinational forces, for employment on both domestic and international contingency operations; a capability that is lacking within the CF. In an era where coalition operations are the norm, the ABCA nations are the most likely Canadian coalition partners and provide a tested and viable means of sourcing personnel for employment in a multi-national headquarters. A CF JHQ that is manned primarily by CF personnel, and augmented by personnel from ABCA partner nations, is the only viable option for Canada to create a truly rapidly deployable, interoperable, high readiness JHQ that can achieve Canadian strategic interests in times of international crisis.

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JOINT HEADQUARTERS RENEWAL: COMBINED IS THE WAY

If you want to be taken seriously in the world, you need the capacity to act - it’s that simple.

—Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Canada First Defence Strategy

In the 2005 Defence Policy Statement (DPS), the Government of Canada (GoC) called for an “effective, responsive and relevant 21st Century Canadian military – a force able to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security.” With a strategic vision for a role for the Canadian Forces (CF) on the international scene and financial commitment by the GoC, General Rick Hillier, then the serving Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) began the first overall transformation of the CF since unification in 1967. The ongoing transformation of the CF was vital as it has laid the foundations for Canada’s national and international security strategies since 2005.

The launching of CF Transformation initiative in 2005 was conducted at a challenging time when the CF, particularly the Army, was at war in Afghanistan and was in the process of establishing a new area of operations from the capital in Kabul to Kandahar Province. By February 2006, this included the deployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team, an infantry battle group (BG), a National Support Element (NSE), a National Command Element and Special Operations Force (SOF) for a total troop strength of over 2500 soldiers. While the nation was at war, the CF Transformation initiatives at home resulted in a more fully integrated and unified approach to operations—both domestic and international, within the CF. However, the CF still lacked a deployable headquarters (HQ) to command major multi-national operations.
Canada’s commitment to its Afghan mission became a test case for Canadian leadership in international security operations. In February 2007, Canada deployed an ad hoc Joint Task Force Headquarters with the responsibility to lead and conduct coalition operations in Kandahar Province. Later in the fall of 2007, Canada assumed responsibility as lead nation for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) ad hoc multi-national Regional Command South (RC (S)) headquarters in Kandahar, Afghanistan, responsible for the conduct of security operations in the six southern Afghan provinces.3

The Afghanistan commitment served to reinforce the idea that Canada needed to develop a joint deployable command and control capability to successfully respond to future international security challenges. With the release of the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS),4 the GoC made a commitment to expand to 70,000 regular Force and 30,000 Reserve Force personnel, improve key CF infrastructure, increase the overall readiness of the CF and proceed with major “combat fleet replacements of surface combat ships, maritime patrol craft, fixed wing search and rescue aircraft, fighter aircraft and land combat vehicles and systems.”5 The CF was mandated to take a leadership role at home and abroad to ensure that it can be a robust and reliable contributor, responding quickly to international security and humanitarian missions in support of Canadian interests and values. As part of the core missions that are outlined in the CFDS, the CF must maintain the ability to “lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period”6 and to maintain the ability to “deploy forces in response to a crisis elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.”7 As a result, the CDS directed8 that the CF reinvigorate the joint deployable command and control
headquarters capability, called the Joint Headquarters (JHQ) Renewal Project, and stand up a CF JHQ.⁹

This paper examines how the CF got to the point where it no longer possessed a capable deployable joint command and control capability which led to the creation of the CF Joint Operations Group. Canada’s history as a contributor of tactical level forces for international operations and the role of coalitions, including the ABCA nations (the armies of America, Britain, Canada, and Australia, with New Zealand as an associate member) in conflict intervention, will be explored. The study will argue that in an era where coalition operations are the norm, a rapidly deployable Canadian JHQ to lead and/or conduct major international combat operations should include integral ABCA partner nation’s personnel. While there will be challenges in sourcing CF personnel with the requisite skill sets for employment in the JHQ, a standing joint, interagency, multinational, rapidly deployable JHQ would enhance coalition joint interoperability and achieve Canadian strategic interests in times of international crisis.

In an effort to curb deficit spending throughout the 1990’s, a series of consecutive defence budget cutbacks by a succession of Liberal governments had an adverse impact upon the CF.¹⁰ All this was done a time where the CF spent most of its time participating in United Nations and NATO mandated missions. Some 40,000 military personnel served throughout the Balkans during that decade performing demining, weapons collection and destruction, election monitoring, humanitarian assistance and other complex military operations.¹¹ Yet by 1997, the Liberal government sought to adopt a new direction for equipping and employing the CF.¹²
Senior Army leadership was forced to make decisions that reduced Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups (CMBG) to serving as force generators of Battle Groups (BG) or sub-unit sized force packages for the missions in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and elsewhere. The CMBGs were no longer resourced to train for deployment on international operations without significant augmentation.

By the end of the decade, the Army’s commitment in Bosnia was not sustainable and personnel fatigue, stress, unit strengths and leadership cadres had fallen to critical levels. The Army was outdated and fragile. The Navy was unable to deliver on mandated defence tasks due to limited resources, serious personnel shortages and delayed ship modernization programs. The Air Force experienced a notable decline in capability due to a lack of resources, a high operational tempo and the loss of its flexibility to surge airframes for operations due to significant personnel shortfalls. In what was dubbed ‘the decade of darkness’, Canadians saw the depreciation of military capabilities in the pursuit of Canadian foreign policy objectives and the promise of soft power to resolve international disputes.

On 1 June 2000, the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters and Signal Regiment (1st Cdn HQ and Sigs Regt) officially disbanded; just over ten years after it was recreated to be capable of deploying a land-based, Joint Task Force Headquarters at Division level or a Joint Force Headquarters. The HQ was created for territorial defence, contingencies and other missions including complex international scenarios and was staffed by Army, Navy and Air Force personnel. The Division HQ trained CMBG HQs, planned for contingencies and was designed to command assigned forces in crisis situations. The loss of the 1st Cdn HQ and Sigs Regt headquarters and the
reallocation of its 580 personnel was a telling admittance by the CF leadership that at the end of the Cold War, the Canadian Forces could no longer maintain the minimum joint organizational structure used by its NATO allies - the division headquarters.\textsuperscript{15} The result was a CF that was not capable of leading full spectrum combat operations. In its place, the CF Joint Operations Group (CFJOG) was created\textsuperscript{16}, comprising the CF Joint Headquarters (CFJHQ), the Canadian Forces Joint Support Group (CFJSG) and the CF Joint Signals Regiment (CFJSR) in order to retain a minimal deployable headquarters capability.\textsuperscript{17}

The very real limitations of the CFJOG were soon exposed as a result of Canada’s commitment in 2001 to the United Nations peacekeeping mission to Ethiopia and Eretria,\textsuperscript{18} a subsequent commitment to the Afghan conflict, as well as a wide variety of other missions throughout the decade. The CFJHQ was only capable of deploying a small headquarters to act as a Theatre Activation Team or to command short duration missions such as those with the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART),\textsuperscript{19} responding to a humanitarian crisis or a permissive Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).\textsuperscript{20} The CFJHQ was never capable, nor intended, to provide the robust command and control necessary to lead a major Main Contingency Force headquarters.\textsuperscript{21}

Initiated in 2005, General Hillier’s CF Transformation Project aimed at rebuilding the Canadian military. In the article “CF Transformation: From Vision to Mission, the Strategic Command Construct,” Vance White notes that Hillier wanted a clear “delineation between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command,”\textsuperscript{22} something that was clearly lacking in the under resourced Cold War force structure
Hillier inherited as CDS. In February 2006, Hillier separated the strategic and operational-level staffs and created the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), Canada Command (CANADACOM), Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) and the Canadian Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM). The CFJOG was disbanded and CFJHQ and CFJSR were transferred to CEFCOM and CANOSCOM respectively.

From 2007-2009 the CF conducted a Capability Base Planning Study, analyzing eight scenarios from across the spectrum of operations. The study determined that in almost every scenario, the CF had an “insufficient capacity to provide a deployable and sustainable command and control capability at the operational level.” This was not a new assertion, as Jonathan Vance explains in the article, “Canada’s Departure from the Classic Doctrine of Operational Art”. Historically, Canada had been a force contributor of tactical level Army, Navy, Air and now Special Forces for international operations and not a force employer at the operational level of war; more often than not having its tactical forces commanded at the operational level by an allied officer assigned the lead for campaign design and execution. Prior to Canada’s recent contribution to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, Canada’s national strategic objectives were at times obscured, or at worst marginalized, because they were poorly defined and at times not included in the overall coalition campaign plan. Many Canadian historians, including Douglas Bland and Desmond Morton, have observed that Canada’s way of war routinely deploys tactical level military forces on international operations as part of alliances and coalitions without a well defined national objective and national interest at stake, other than to be seen to be involved. Furthermore, Vance notes that as a force
provider of tactical level forces, at the operational level, “Canada has never taken full responsibility for running an overseas theatre of operation; preferring or relegated to a supporting role in providing Canadian Blood and treasure to shared strategic objectives. No direct Canadian tactics to strategy link – no Canadian operational level.”\textsuperscript{29} In essence, what the Capability Base Planning Study should have concluded was that the CF ought to focus its future efforts on achieving effective strategic command and control of tactical forces within an alliance construct.

In the article, “Coalition of the Willing: Where is the Will?”, Walter Natynczyk notes that coalitions led by capable lead nations have been the norm throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} and early 21\textsuperscript{st} century and are the preferred instruments for conflict intervention by nations seeking to stabilize complex regional crises in the future.\textsuperscript{30} The political, diplomatic and military elements of a contributing nation’s power stem from the national interests and values of a coalition of willing nations.\textsuperscript{31} He argues that the core of any successful coalition operation is a nation willing to assume a leading or meaningful role. In the article “Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and With Whom?” Douglas Bland reminds us that a nation needs more than just political intent; it must also have the legitimacy and capacity to meet the challenges of modern coalition and multinational operations.\textsuperscript{32}

Participation in a multinational coalition is not without its challenges and difficulties.\textsuperscript{33} The senior CF leadership is keenly aware of that as a result of their experience as a member of the Multinational High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG). Canada’s previous commitment to this multinational force serves as a reminder of the challenges of establishing a standby, high readiness
military capability by a coalition of middle power nations for use by the United Nations. Following a 1994 Dutch study to create a UN Rapid Deployment Brigade and a 1995 Canadian proposal for a Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters, a letter of intent was signed on 15 December 1996 by seven founding nations to establish SHIRBRIG.34 The words of Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, summed up the vision of the founding nations noting that "I truly believe that SHIRBRIG is a model arrangement. It will finally provide the instrument for swift and coordinated action that we all recognize is a condition for successful peace-keeping."35

Declared operational in 2000 and involved in several operations from 2001-2009, by 2006 it became clear that the organization, supported by 16 nations, employed a cumbersome decision making process as well as the persistent absence of resources and political will, which undermined SHIRBRIG’s overall effectiveness.36 By 2009 the political will to continue to support this rapid reaction force was gone and the headquarters disbanded. Key lessons from the experience to be learned are that SHIRBRIG did not establish a lead nation concept and as a result, member nation’s militaries generated their troop contributions outside of the established SHIRBRIG framework for a particular mission. The SHIRBRIG chairmanship was invariability staffed with a low ranking general officer who did not have access to the political decision makers. The organization’s Steering Committee was staffed with desk officers from the troop contributing countries instead of high ranking decision makers. These factors indicated a declining political interest in the original SHIRBRIG concept and rendered decision making ineffective in the important task of generating the necessary forces from the troop contributing countries in an efficient manner. Over time, the
Steering Committee focused on operational issues, rather than on their political role. These circumstances, and the fact that SHIRBRIG and the United Nations Directorate for Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) did not establish direct communications, proved to be one of the most serious short-comings.37

Respected military historian Sean Maloney reminds us that Canada’s international foreign policies since the Second World War have historically rested on pragmatic strategic choices. Canada maintains close relations between the traditional alliance and coalition partnerships of America, Britain, Canada and Australia (the ABCA nations), its participation in the bilateral North American Aerospace Command (NORAD) security treaty and its participation in NATO. Coalition operations have been the norm for much of Canada’s military history.

Maloney debunks the myth that Canada was just a nation with a reputation for peacekeeping prior to its NATO mission to Afghanistan in the article “Why Keep the Myth alive?” Canada fights wars; it has never been neutral in its pre and post Cold War-era UN and non-UN missions. Maloney opines that “the types of post Cold War military operations that Canada and her allies engaged in were, in the main, not UN peacekeeping missions. They were mostly armed humanitarian interventions and stabilizations missions, and even open warfare. After 1995, most of these missions were to be led by NATO, or by ABCA nations.”38

An example of a successful contemporary international operation by a middle power was the 1999 United Nations mandated mission in East Timor.39 Following an Indonesian military invasion of the former Portuguese colony in 1975, a long and bloody occupation led to the death of over 100,000 people from military action, disease and
In 1999, after pressure from both the United Nations and Australia, a long-awaited independence referendum was held where the islanders overwhelmingly rejected union with Indonesia. This brought a renewal of violence, where Indonesian military and paramilitary reprisals resulted in the killing of over 2,000 East Timorese and which decimated 75 percent of the country’s infrastructure. One third of the population, some 240,000 people, was forced to flee their homes and be forcibly relocated to the Indonesian province of West Timor.

An international coalition of 21 countries under Australian leadership was mounted to achieve three main tasks: restore peace and security in East Timor; protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks; and within force capabilities, facilitate humanitarian-assistance operations. ABCA armies played a key role in support of the United Nations mandated mission. The United States provided intelligence, communications, logistic, civil affairs and other enabling capabilities while Australia acted as the lead nation for the Joint Task Force. The bulk of the land forces were provided by the Australian Army and augmented by a British Battalion with a Gurkha company, a New Zealand infantry battalion and a Canadian infantry company.

Even though Canada is a member of the NATO alliance, throughout the past six decades Canada’s most desirable allies have been the ABCA nations. Historically, these nations sought tactical level interoperability through a program that included hundreds of international operations and exercises in order to produce interoperability agreements. The ABCA program evolved from the Second World War coalition between the participating armies that ultimately led to the 1947 Plan to Effect Standardization Agreement. Subsequent multilateral agreements between the nations
in 1954 and 1964 sought to promote compatible tactical level doctrine, weapons, tactics and equipment in order to promote as much interoperability amongst the respective armies as possible.43

In the article “ABCA: A Petri Dish for Multinational Interoperability”, Robert Maginnis notes that, beginning in June 2002, the senior ABCA leadership began a strategic re-assessment of the alliance. The changing geopolitical realities of the 21st century, with the emergence of threats by transnational, asymmetric and non-state actors, caused these strategic leaders to recognize that their armies must in the future fight in an intricately integrated land-sea-air-space-cyber and even geopolitical environment.44 This new reality recognized that interoperability across the ABCA alliance nations was no longer a luxury and that these nations will continue to fight together in a coalition anywhere in the world. Future coalition operations were assessed to focus on full spectrum operations in a joint and interagency environment involving any force levels or structure. And thus, by necessity, the ABCA program would have to evolve from a tactical standardization program to a new strategic imperative.

The senior ABCA leadership concluded that the new strategic environment had outstripped the ABCA programs procedures, practices, structures and culture. There was also recognition that the ABCA could no longer limit its valuable interoperability work to its five member nations, since its efforts are universally applicable and apply to all coalition partners and include a wide variety of missions.45 Coalitions formed within the ABCA alliance certainly will benefit from policy coordination, doctrine, capabilities development, leadership and national commitment as it resolves differences and
removes obstacles to the effective functioning of coalition forces operating in a multina
ternational environment. While the ABCA program is army centric, historically navy, air
forces and SOF forces of the ABCA nations work closely together to improve technical
and doctrinal interoperability. The ABCA nations, with similar values, interests and
cultures, have developed militarily similar standards in training and military culture.
More importantly, there is generally a very good level of comfort and respect of each
other’s leadership, both political and military; although at times relations can be
strained. Ongoing interaction can go a long way to resolve the common
misunderstandings and differences over mission objectives and priorities, different rules
of engagement or national caveats, detainee handling, different types of equipment, or
similar equipment with different specifications.

There is no indication that, in the future, the GoC will not opt to participate in
military coalitions under the auspices of the United Nations or coalitions of the willing.
Through the issue of the CFDS, the GoC has expressed the political will to employ the
means to influence the shape and expectations of future military coalition operations to
best benefit Canada’s national interests. This suggests that the Canadian government
intends to continue to play a reasonable and responsible leadership role in international
affairs into the future. Canada has chosen to influence and shape future military
coalitions and has made the pragmatic choice of creating the rapidly deployable JHQ in
order to influence international events. The only way Canada can achieve this is to act
as lead nation of a coalition operation or operate at the operational level within a larger
coalition operation to meet its strategic ends with its committed tactical level forces.
As such, the development of the CF JHQ is an appropriate intervention capability for Canada and will be one of the key means to achieve strategic political ends when participating in future military coalitions. As a lead nation for a JHQ, this implies that Canada would be expected to take the lead in rationalization, standardization and interoperability, both technical and doctrinal, for the nations that it is leading. There is also an expectation that Canada would provide a sizable troop contribution and coordinate amongst troop contributing nations to acquire specific enabling capabilities to accomplish military missions. Troop contributing nations would agree to assign operational control of their forces to Canadian commander who would establish standards of operations. The challenge for Canada is how to shape coalitions to meet Canadian interests, needs and constraints.

A notable example of a no-notice joint force contingency operation that merits examination by the planners responsible to develop the CF JHQ is the United States intervention in Grenada in 1983. Following a successful coup on 12 October, Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard was unable to consolidate his power. A few days later General Hudson Austin, the head of the People’s Revolutionary Army, seized control and announced the formation of a Revolutionary Military Council and declared that he was now president of an interim government.

Initially there was no serious American consideration of intervening to effect a regime change. Soon U.S. officials concluded that there was a threat to more than 600 American medical students and 400 other foreigners living on the Caribbean island. Code named Operation Urgent Fury, military planners envisioned simple show of force followed by the seizure of a few departure locations with only enough lethal force to
defend and protect up to 1,000 evacuees in a permissive, non violent NEO. Attempts to resolve the crisis were unsuccessful as the Grenadians, either because of internal dissension or because of a desire to exploit the situation for their own benefits, frustrated every American effort to get an explanation of what was happening on the island.48

On 23 October President Ronald Reagan approved a plan to evacuate American and other foreign citizens. As a result, the simple plan to conduct a NEO operation with a Marine amphibious unit grew into a complex operation involving all four armed services, including the defense forces of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.49 Over in less than three weeks, US troops would rescue American and foreign citizens, restore the Grenadian government, and eliminate a perceived threat to the stability of the Caribbean and American strategic interests.

Operation Urgent Fury was the first joint operation attempted since the end of the Vietnam War. While the operation was a success, it underscored the challenges of working in a joint environment with Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine components. There were serious flaws in the operations execution relating to an inadequate JTF headquarters structure for joint command and control, a naval staff with little or no experience in planning and commanding large ground operations, inadequate tactical intelligence and shortcomings in logistics planning and coordination. In the study “Operation Urgent Fury – Grenada,” Richard Cole states that the operation reinforced awareness of “weaknesses in the joint system and helped prod Congress to undertake the fundamental reforms embodied in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.”50
The standing up of the CF JHQ as a deployable, high readiness command and control headquarters capability will pose a challenge for the CF as it does not currently possess a wealth of operational experience and expertise for these types of military operations. Other funding pressures, competing personnel demands, available infrastructure, equipment and information systems availability will certainly impact to varying degrees. While the CF JHQ Project Charter states that the ad hoc NATO ISAF land centric RC (S) headquarters in Afghanistan will be considered as the initial planning basis for any Canadian rapidly deployable JHQ, it is a static headquarters designed for counter insurgency operations in the Afghanistan context. There are a number of examples of multinational headquarters that the CF can examine for suitability and applicability as it builds its new JHQ. The Allied Command Europe Mobile Force – Land (ACE Mobile Force-Land or AMF (L)) was a small NATO multinational quick reaction force that was active from 1960 to 2002. From a historical perspective, and somewhat more applicable to Canada’s circumstances, the Immediate Reaction Task Force (LAND) (IRTF-L) was a novel multinational command and control concept developed between 1999-2001. The AMF (L) enabled one of its existing multinational brigade headquarters to command a divisional sized force with minimal augmentation. The AMF(L) has since been replaced by the NATO Response Force, which is a fairly robust headquarters that commands land, air, naval and special operations forces. The NATO Response Force can offer valuable insight into the challenges of commanding multi-national headquarters from across the NATO nations. The NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) as well as other US Corps level headquarters could offer additional insight.
In renewing the CF JHQ, the intent would see Canada establish the framework for a multi-national HQ, commanded by a Major General, with the requisite key capabilities for a theatre deployment (ie. the Comd staff, the J-staff, etc), which includes a theatre activation team, to be able to conduct humanitarian assistance and NEO missions. An incremental and scalable approach\textsuperscript{54} to manning and capability development will be used as the CFJHQ moves towards the final operational capability - the command and control of joint (naval, air, land and SOF), interagency, multi-national forces in full spectrum operations, for employment on both domestic and international contingency operations. In essence, the concept of employment calls for two separate command and control capabilities to respond to military contingency operations.\textsuperscript{55}

First, the immediate goal is to create a JHQ capable of responding to a semi-permissive, short duration operation, such as a NEO or other humanitarian crisis. A theatre activation capability would also be included.\textsuperscript{56} This would be, for the most part, an entirely Canadian response and is the immediate focus of the CF JHQ Renewal Project.\textsuperscript{57}

Secondly, the long term goal is to create a JHQ capable of responding to an event that will require the JHQ to remain in theatre for 9 - 12 months. JHQ Renewal Project staff have assessed that it is not realistic at this time for Canada to establish a standing JHQ of appropriate size (500-600 personnel) in the near term since the CF is currently over programmed in terms of available personnel and other resource demands.\textsuperscript{58} While the initial JHQ concept is Army centric, it will be capable of leading air, naval and SOF operations. As needed, the Army, Navy and Air Force and SOF would generate a LCC, MCC, ACC and SOCC.\textsuperscript{59} As planning for a particular
contingency operation matures, other positions within the Joint HQ would be sourced from other troop contributing nations (TCN). Sourcing these personnel could prove to be problematic and a drawn out process during a crisis. Whereas coalition operations have become the norm, the CF appears to be preparing for the next conflict as if it is acting alone.

Instead, a Canadian-led, combined multi-national JHQ, supported by permanent exchange personnel from the likely coalition partners, the ABCA nations, could prove to be a valuable asset to respond to short notice international crisis. In a modern multi-domain air, land, sea, SOF and JIMP environment, the challenge for the CF is to create a JHQ that is truly rationalized, standardized and interoperable, both doctrinally and technically, with likely coalition allies. Building relationships and trust takes time to develop, particularly among coalition partners, and requires a high degree of consensus on procedures, doctrinal policies, staff relationships. Integrating the staff with ABCA personnel will allow the Canadian JHQ commander the ability to draw on the expertise of the allied partners in areas where CF personnel may have less experience. The CF and allied nations services operate different systems architecture (classified and non-classified) and protocols for command and control of the different air, land, sea and SOF components that the headquarters must be capable of coordinating. If the CF JHQ is to be taken seriously as a legitimate headquarters capable to lead multi-national operations, it must be interoperable, capable and relevant. If not, it and Canada will not be taken seriously – it is that simple.

With a capable JHQ, Canada would demonstrate international leadership in the initial stages of an operation, then hand the responsibility to a follow on nation to take
the lead role after 9-12 months. This does not signal a limited engagement strategy as some could argue, but signals a commitment to provide coalition leadership, within capabilities, when it is in the nation’s interest. In fact, there are many instances where Canada has committed military forces, and remained committed to a specific theatre of operations for an extended period of time. Canada’s commitment to the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and the current commitment to Afghanistan are two contemporary examples.

The CF is well respected internationally as a fighting force and has provided capable senior officer leadership at the strategic and operational level in Iraq and Afghanistan. Canadian general officers also occupy senior command and staff positions as exchange officers within US Army and Air Force formations. It is doubtful that the CF would experience institutional resistance from ABCA nations in providing exchange officers and non-commissioned officers for employment within the JHQ; although it is acknowledged that manning pressures do affect all services amongst the ABCA nations. There is no doubt that how decisions are made regarding employment of the HQ would also have to be agreed upon. That said, it is well known that words have meaning. Should a decision be made to name the CF JHQ the 1st Canadian Division HQ for nostalgic sentiments, there may be some resistance to sending personnel from other services, both inside and outside the CF, to what would be viewed as solely an Army Division HQ. The Canadian Response Force HQ is an appropriate name that springs to mind.

Within the CF, one would expect little institutional resistance to the overall intent and concept for the CF JHQ. However there may be some institutional resistance,
since the services are overstretched in terms of resources, personnel, equipment and organizational construct, to provide permanent personnel to the JHQ J3/5 branches integrated domain cells, with a land, air, maritime and SOF focus, and at the same time, be able to provide service component commands.

For the JHQ, the Army should be able to generate a tailored Joint Ground Operations Centre focused on ground maneuver, fires coordination, engineer coordination and ISR, as well as a Land Commander based on a CMBG HQ. The Special Operations Group should be able to provide a small Special Operations Command and Control Element focused on special missions as well as Special Operations unit for execution of high value tasks. The Air Force will be stretched to generate a small, but tailored Joint Air Operations Centre focused on mobility, ISR and discrete air attack, and to staff a small composite Wing/Squadron TF for an Air Commander. The Navy may pose a different challenge. Currently, any deployed Canadian Naval Task Group commands and controls operations from a Canadian naval destroyer which relies upon a reach back capability to a Maritime Operations Centre, either in Halifax, Nova Scotia or Victoria, British Columbia, to assist in planning and coordination. Naval personnel rarely operate in a joint environment with their sister services and one could expect resistance to providing personnel to serve in a small Joint Maritime Operations Centre at the CF JHQ to coordinate maritime interdiction, sea control, maritime presence, surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare and counter-mine operations due to competing demands for their personnel. There may be a preference to just provide naval advice to any CF JHQ from one of their fixed Maritime Operations Centre’s installations since they must continue to support other operational missions.
The challenge for the CF will be not creating a JHQ in name only, which has a land focus, but limited staff expertise to provide command and control to non land assets.

Since the 1950’s, Canada’s coalition policies have been shaped by participation in United Nations mandated operations or NATO led operations. It is safe to assume that, as in the past 60 years, Canada will always partner with NATO or ABCA nations in response to international crisis. The Australian experience in East Timor has proven that middle powers can lead coalition operations. The Afghan experience has aptly demonstrated that Canada is well suited to take the initiative of leading some coalition operations and thus resist as Douglas Bland says, our history of “lending troops to others, leaving them unattended to serve some communal interest while assuming it is a common interest.”63

In conclusion, through the release of the CFDS, the GoC appears committed to advancing its international security interests through its determination to respond to international crises, and to seek a leadership role in future multi-national operations. At present, the CF can only deploy a small JHQ in response to a humanitarian crisis or to act as a Theatre Activation Team for a new military mission. Through the JHQ Renewal Project, the CF intends to create a much improved JHQ to command and control joint, interagency, multi-national forces in full spectrum operations, for employment on both domestic and international contingency operations. The CF is currently over stretched in terms of personnel and resources needed to meet current operational demands across services and will be challenged to source personnel with the requisite skill sets, as well as enabling capabilities, to achieve the CF JHQ vision and desired operational capability in the future. In an era where coalition operations are the norm, the ABCA
nations are the most likely coalition partners and provide a tested and viable means of sourcing the personnel for employment in multi-national headquarters. A CF JHQ that is manned in the main by CF personnel and augmented by personnel and critical enablers from ABCA partner nations, is the only viable option for Canada to create a truly capable, rapidly deployable, interagency, interoperable, high readiness HQ that can achieve Canadian strategic interests in times of international crisis.

Endnotes


3 With approximately 2600 soldiers deployed to Afghanistan, the ad hoc nature of the force generation of these headquarters exacerbated the already strained operational tempo of the institutional army and stripped many subordinate headquarters and units of much needed staff officers.

4 Department of National Defence (Canada), Canada First Defence Strategy, http://www.dnd.ca/site/focus/first-premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf; (accessed 15 March 2010). The strategy commits stable and predictable defence funding to the Canadian Forces including investments in military personnel, equipment, readiness and infrastructure. The Strategy will increase the size of the Canadian Forces and replace core capabilities.


6 Department of National Defence; Canada First Defence Strategy.

7 Department of National Defence; Canada First Defence Strategy.


Inconsistency of government policies and preferences saw military capabilities withered away, experience and well trained personnel were encouraged to take early retirement and leave the Canadian forces. The defence budget was reduced by 30 percent.


12 In 1997, as part of a major restructure of the CF, the Management, Command and Control Re-engineering (MCCRT) initiative created a deployable joint HQ for domestic and international contingencies.


14 The HQ also provided a division headquarters structure for Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College student exercises. It is an open question as to whether the HQ was truly capable of ever leading multi-national operations without a significant investment in personnel and resources in order to achieve interoperability.

15 George Jaxon, “Wither the 1st Canadian Division, Again,” Esprit de Corps Magazine, March 2000, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6972/is_9_7/ai_n28817535/. (accessed 19 March 2010). In August 1999, the senior military leadership called for “a new direction for equipping the CF while accepting that the CF would not be prepared for the high end of the spectrum of conflict. It also meant that the Canadian Division Headquarters and Signal Regiment would be demobilized for the fourth time.”


17 This was intended as a very much reduced capability to maintain a deployable operational-level joint command and control capability for CF contingency operations.


19 Created in 1996, the DART is made up of about 200 CF personnel and is designed to quickly deploy to disaster areas throughout the world. The primary mission is to provide emergency services, such as drinking water and medical treatment, until long term aid arrives.
20 It is doubtful the CF could deploy the JHQ with assigned land forces to conduct a NEO as the CF lacked sufficient strategic lift, appropriate equipment and other critical enablers to assure mission success.

21 The CF has also been forced to create additional adhoc HQs to command and control capability to support the 2010 Winter Olympics (Operation Podium) as well as its 2010 earthquake relief efforts to Haiti.


23 In Feb 2006 CANSOFCOM HQ took responsibility for JTF 2 and the JNBCD Company. 427 Sqn in Petawawa was designated 427 Special Operations Aviation (SOA) Sqn, OPCOM to CANSOFCOM. In addition, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment was established in Petawawa in early 2006.


26 E-mail correspondence between the author and senior defence officials. Department of National Defence, B-GL-005-500/FP-00 CF Operational Planning Process (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 2-1. Operational art is defined in Canadian doctrine as “The skillful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles.”

27 Jonathan Vance, “Canada’s Departure from the Classic Doctrine of Operational Art” AMSC 7 – Student Paper, Canadian Forces College, October 2004. In discussing the operational art within the Canadian doctrinal context, the author concludes that Canada ought to focus on achieving effective strategic command of tactical forces. There would seem to be “no pure chance of operational level action external to Canada.”


29 Jonathan Vance, “Canada’s Departure from the Classic Doctrine of Operational Art” AMSC 7 – Student Paper, Canadian Forces College, October 2004. 18. Using the Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia contribution to Operation Apollo in support of the US led campaign against terrorism as just one example, Vance observes that Canada often has met its political and military strategic objectives by being seen to participate in international military operations, “while relying on the tactical forces in theatre to close the loop.”
30 W.J. Natynczyk, *Coalitions of the Willing: Where is the Will?*, Strategic Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002) iii. “The study considers the global, regional and national causes that compel nation states to contribute forces to coalitions; the characteristics of coalitions [and] the capacity of nations to provide intervention forces.”

31 Ibid, 11. ‘Coalition of willing nations’ refers to “multilateral cooperative arrangements between nations with the share interests and the national will to act with military force for a specific purpose, action or event. Military coalitions are the means by which the armed forces of different countries collaborate to achieve common ends. Coalition formation and sustainment are the result of political interaction between nation states.”

32 Douglas Bland, “Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?”, 13. Problems include “weak mandates and directions, uncertain international command; confused civilian and military relationships; …over-tasking of individuals and some types of units; incompatible communications and logistics systems; and contradictory force protection orders and rules of engagement.”

33 Ibid, 13, “Generally these fall into six categories: weak mandates and directions; uncertain international command; confused civilian and military relationships; over-tasking of individuals and some types of units; incompatible communications and logistics systems; and contradictory force protection orders and rules of engagement.”

34 The founding nations were Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Norway, Poland and Sweden.


37 Ibid, 8.


41 Ibid.

Interoperability is defined as the ability of Alliance Forces, and when appropriate, forces of Partner and other Nations, to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.


Operational control is defined as “the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.”

The intervention had its roots in a bloody power struggle between Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and his Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, a Marxist theoretician within the “New JEWEL” (New Joint Effort for Welfare, Education, and Liberation) movement. Following the coup by Coard’s and his supporters, riots broke out. After a few days, supporters of the imprisoned Prime Minister Bishop were able to free their leader. However, before Bishop could consolidate his power, he and several of his prominent supports were captured and executed.

US Army Center of Military History, Operation Urgent Fury – The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983, (Washington, DC, 2008), 9. Attempts were made to dock a passing ocean liner to evacuate Americans and foreigners were blocked by the Grenadians. “Austin’s government was soon assessed to be disarray and that foreign nationals were beginning to be viewed as potential hostages or bargaining chips.”


54 Depending on the mission, the headquarters will be augmented by personnel from across the services.

55 The concept was developed from discussions with defense officials as well as the Project Charter – Joint Headquarters Renewal, DRAFT as at 17/05/2010. “The CF will develop this capability using an incremental approach that will first see the immediate stand-up of a land-centric joint-enabled HQ. This HQ, JHQ(R), will be scalable and will consist of a standing core staff, with joint enabling elements located as required but capable of responding within established readiness for short notice deployments.”

56 This includes liaison, assessment and reconnaissance, and theatre activation tasks.

57 Canada’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake is a good example. Canada has its own area of responsibility and works directly with the Haitian government, all the while coordinating its efforts with other nations, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

58 Project Charter – Joint Headquarters Renewal, DRAFT as at 17/05/2010. The capacity for the environmental chiefs of staff is limited to provide staff officers within the joint staff as well as to generate certain enabling capabilities which could include the FSCC, ESCC, WECC, ISTAR CC, AOCC, Naval fires, C-IED, IO and PSYOPS. The ad hoc ISAF Regional Command South (RC (S)) is being used as the basis for the CF JHQ development.

59 Land Component Commander, Maritime Component Commander, Air Component Commander and Special Operations Component Commander.

60 It is difficult to see how NATO, the United Nations or any important coalition could succeed without U.S. political and logistic support, and at times, its armed forces.

61 Canadian general officers currently serve as Deputy Commanding Generals with US Army I and III Corps, 18 Airborne Corps and as of 2010, 10th Mountain Division. A general officer currently serves as CENTCOM J5. NORAD-related positions include Deputy Commander NORAD HQ, NORAD HQ J3, NORAD and US Northcom Deputy Director Plans, Policy and Strategy and Deputy Commander Continental US NORAD Command Region.

62 The Army has recently generated land centric JTF HQs, based on CMBG HQs, and included infantry battle groups for employment in Afghanistan. The Navy has deployed Canadian Task Groups (TG) commanded by a destroyer for NATO operations. These TG might include a combination of different warships – including destroyers, frigates, replenishment ships, coastal defence vessels and submarines. The Air Force has deployed small land based TF HQs based on composite Air Wings, with both fixed and rotary wing aircraft, for air operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.