NON-DEPLOYABLES: AN INCREASING CHALLENGE FOR THE ARMY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2010

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**Non-Deployables: An Increasing Challenge for the Army**

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As units prepare to deploy many Soldiers become labeled as non-deployable. The reasons are broad, ranging from minor, temporary conditions to suffering from combat related injuries. Human resources managers must manage Soldiers to best serve the Army's requirements and ensure deploying units' personnel readiness is 102% of authorized strength. Commanders preparing to deploy should not be burdened with processing non-deployable Soldiers. Deploying commanders must be concerned with preparing Soldiers who are going to war. Army commanders challenge in managing non-deployable Soldiers impacts deploying units' personnel readiness for combat. Even talented, trained combat veterans who become non-deployable impact the Army's deployable strength posture. Also, establishing more restrictive personnel policies leading to separation and temporarily increasing Army end strength may improve the Army's deployable strength posture. Ultimately, the Army's inability to separate or reassign non-deployable Soldiers negatively impacts operational units' personnel readiness for combat.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**
Human Resource Management, Personnel Management, Readiness

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**
- **a. REPORT** UNCLASSIFIED
- **b. ABSTRACT** UNCLASSIFIED
- **c. THIS PAGE** UNCLASSIFIED

**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT** UNLIMITED

**18. NUMBER OF PAGES** 26

**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
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As units prepare to deploy many Soldiers become labeled as non-deployable. The reasons are broad, ranging from minor, temporary conditions to suffering from combat related injuries. Human resources managers must manage Soldiers to best serve the Army’s requirements and ensure deploying units’ personnel readiness is 102% of authorized strength. Commanders preparing to deploy should not be burdened with processing non-deployable Soldiers. Deploying commanders must be concerned with preparing Soldiers who are going to war. Army commanders challenge in managing non-deployable Soldiers impacts deploying units’ personnel readiness for combat. Even talented, trained combat veterans who become non-deployable impact the Army’s deployable strength posture. Also, establishing more restrictive personnel policies leading to separation and temporarily increasing Army end strength may improve the Army’s deployable strength posture. Ultimately, the Army’s inability to separate or reassign non-deployable Soldiers negatively impacts operational units’ personnel readiness for combat.
NON-DEPLOYABLES: AN INCREASING CHALLENGE FOR THE ARMY

As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains. They have something to tell us, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper through the ages. We honor them not only because they are guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service; a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves.

—President Barack Obama
Inaugural Address, January 2009

Prior to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York City on September 11, 2001, Army personnel manning practices hid many of the personnel shortages and personnel readiness issues the Army continues to experience today. While current personnel systems served the Army and its Soldiers well in recent years, the potential strain of decades of persistent conflict will likely fail to meet future needs. The dual challenges of new force structure and continual deployments to multidimensional battlefields, strongly suggests the need to modify the Army’s personnel systems so they effectively embrace creativity, risk-taking, and flexibility.2

Prior to 9/11, commanders viewed deployability and unit readiness in a different way than they do today. Peacetime commanders often felt pressure to report their unit as “combat ready” which gave a new meaning to the personnel readiness ratings given today.3 The definitions are the same, but the true meaning of being deployable versus being non-deployable during peace time took on a different light.

Every month the personnel officer, a battalion or brigade S1 or division G1, provided the complete personnel portion of the unit status report (USR) in accordance with Army Regulation 220-1 through command channels to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and the Army’s senior leadership. The personnel data would be
formulated, analyzed, and if required, manipulated to provide the Army leadership
statistical analysis painting the picture that a unit was “combat ready”.

After September 11, 2001 as units prepared for contingency operations in
support of the global war on terror (GWOT), the Army’s senior leaders identified a
negative trend in the personnel readiness of the force. This trend portrayed that there
were increasing numbers of non-deployable and non-available personnel reducing units’
personnel readiness below acceptable levels for deployment. The percentage of
Soldiers who were unavailable for combat has risen sharply in the past three years from
11% of each brigade in 2007 to 16% this year. A typical brigade combat team (BCT)
has about 3,500 Soldiers assigned. General Peter Chiarelli, the Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army stated that repeated deployments and health problems drive much of the
increase in Soldiers viewed as non-deployable. This paper examines and
recommends policy alternatives available to commanders and senior leaders for
achieving a personnel readiness of 102% for deploying units as outlined in the
Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) Active Component (AC) Manning
Guidance Fiscal Years 2008-2010. It also highlights how non-deployable Soldiers
impact not only their unit preparing for deployment, but also impacts the follow on unit to
which the Soldier may be assigned in the future.

Currently units are deploying below their authorized strength, due to personnel
shortages within certain critical Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). Because the
Army is at war, units deploying below their authorized strength is unsatisfactory. In
some cases, units have the required Soldiers assigned with the proper MOS, but due to
events and changes, often beyond Soldiers’ and units’ control, many Soldiers become
non-deployable. For example, General Chiarelli highlighted this issue when he said, “these are folks who have a knee problem after the first (combat) rotation, and then, finally, after the third one of humping a rucksack in Afghanistan at 10,000 feet, the Doc says, ‘I don’t care if you’re going to deploy again, the fact of the matter is you’re going to (stay back until you) get your knee fixed.’”

A commander preparing their unit for deployment should not be burdened with processing non-deployable Soldiers, regardless of whether the Soldiers are in a permanent or temporary non-deployable status. A deploying commander’s primary concern should be with his unit’s training and equipment readiness rather than personnel issues in his preparations to go to war.

Although the Army attempts to make up for the shortage of non-deployable Soldiers in one unit by adding Soldiers from other units, Army records from 2008 show the overall shortages hurt Army readiness overall. As units prepare to deploy, the reasons for being labeled non-deployable are broad, ranging from minor, temporary conditions to suffering from serious combat related injuries. Army Regulation 614-30, Overseas Service identifies the criteria that can cause a Soldier to be classified as non-deployable from deploying overseas. The following are eight examples.

1. Family hardship can be a non-deployable condition which includes when another military family member died, is or was Missing in Action (MIA), or officially determined to be 100% physically or mentally disabled, because of service in a Hostile Fire Area. Additionally, a military member experiencing an adoption or childbirth will be non-deployable for 6 months from the date of the child’s birth or adoption.
2. Medical fitness criteria often identifies non-deployability and includes those Soldiers with a permanent physical profile of “3” or “4” or are HIV positive or Soldiers whose medical/physical status indicates they are temporarily non-deployable for at least 120 days, or who cannot be medically cleared (for example, pregnant, mental disorder, drug rehabilitation, convalescing) within 30 days of the unit’s main body departure date.\textsuperscript{11}

3. Mandatory training and assignments can make Soldiers non-deployable because they include those who must complete the officer basic course (OBC), warrant officer basic course (WOBC), and advanced individual training (AIT) for enlisted Soldiers. Soldiers selected for Warrant Officer Candidate School or Officer Candidate School will comply with assignment instructions to the school.\textsuperscript{12}

4. Soldiers are non-deployable when subject to the Individual Dwell Time (IDT) deployment policy.\textsuperscript{13}

5. Legal actions can also change Soldiers’ deployable status and include those Soldiers under criminal investigation for desertion, spying, espionage, aiding the enemy, treason, sedition, or subversive activities or who are under arrest are non-deployable. Soldiers confined, pending criminal court action or legal processing that precludes performing their unit duties are also non-deployable.\textsuperscript{14}

6. Separations and HQDA assignment instructions can make Soldiers non-deployable and include Soldiers being discharged, retired, released from active duty, or processed for expiration of term of service (ETS)/expiration of
service agreement (ESA). Soldiers in units scheduled to deploy are temporarily unavailable for deployment if in receipt of HQDA assignment instructions that conflict with deployment dates.15

7. Soldiers who have a the Lautenberg Amendment violation and are subject to the provisions of HQDA policy for implementing 18 USC 922, (amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968) are considered permanently non-deployable and must be involuntarily reassigned to organizations not likely to deploy.16

8. Soldiers under the age of 18 years of age are not eligible for deployment until they reach age 18.17

The role of Human Resource (HR) managers, at all levels of command, is to efficiently manage Soldiers to best serve the Army and meet all Army requirements. Additionally, HR managers have the task of ensuring that if non-deployable Soldiers cannot perform their duties, viable options are provided to the commander to ensure the Army’s and the Soldier’s needs are met. In some cases, Soldiers, not meeting the standards for deployment, will be separated from the Army.

According to the 2009 Army Posture Statement, the Army had over 710,000 Soldiers on active duty from all components (Active duty, Reserve and National Guard) fulfilling its global commitments.18 The Army also had 255,000 or 36% of the force deployed in nearly 80 countries around the world, with 140,000 (20%) in active combat theaters.19 Senior Army leaders are emphasizing that the Army is out of balance and is straining its ability to sustain the All-Volunteer Force and maintain strategic depth.20 This imbalance will continue to strain Army deploying forces as BCTs move through the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) preparing for contingency operations.
In 2004, the Army’s Chief of Staff announced that as part of a transformation initiative, the Army would increase the number of its BCTs in the AC from 33 brigades to 48 modular BCTs. To fill these BCTs with Soldiers the Army would use a new manning policy called “lifecycle management,” which has since been replaced by the Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG). However, lifecycle management incorporated several of the same manning policies used and practiced for several years prior to 9/11. The disadvantage of mixing the old manning processes with the new lifecycle management processes was the inability of HR specialists to still fill those MOSs critical to the BCT commander, such as MOSs 13 (Field Artillery), 25 (Communications Specialist), 35 (Military Intelligence), 94 (Electronic/Missile Maintenance).

Prior to the PPG the Army relied on reassigning Soldiers from unit to unit or “cross leveling” to fill deploying unit’s critical positions required for deployment. Unfortunately, this practice means the Army still had a vacancy within its ranks; this “shell game” merely masked the real shortage and may provide a quick, immediate fix, but does not cure the units’ or the Army’s long term issue of having a shortage of critical MOS. The Army, at large, still reports the MOS as an overall shortage, reinforcing the fact that other brigade formations will go unmanned.

In order to facilitate Army personnel management policies and fill deploying units with enough Soldiers for deployment, alternative HR practices were put into effect to assist with the Army’s overall readiness shortfalls. One initiative the Army decided to use was the Army’s “Stop Loss/Stop Move” program which went into effect in 2003 and was modified and then discontinued on January 1, 2010. The Stop Loss policy retained Soldiers on active duty beyond their contractual service obligation. This practice
supported the deploying BCT commander but did not provide a replacement Soldier in the following years after the unit re-deploys because the Soldier separates from the Army. Such practices are often referred to by the idiom of – “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” a principle military personnel managers continue to use to man the force in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) era.\textsuperscript{25} Again, this practice still did not and does not cure the Army’s overall shortage of personnel and the Army’s shortage of Soldiers with critical MOSs.

Part of the modification to the Stop Loss/Stop Move program which went into effect after January 1, 2010, the Army implemented an enlisted involuntary early separation program. This program is designed to identify enlisted Soldiers for early, involuntary separation from a deploying unit. It also impacts Soldiers who decide not to reenlist or extend their enlistment on active duty, under the provisions of the Deployment Enlistment Incentive Pay (DEIP) program. Soldiers will be subject to involuntary separation up to three months earlier than their contractual expiration term of service (ETS) date.\textsuperscript{26} The DEIP should assist BCT commanders in building cohesive and ready units by eliminating last-minute personnel changes. Also, since it will allow Army HR managers to identify Soldiers preparing to depart at their expiration term of service (ETS) date who will not deploy with the unit, then HQDA should be able to provide replacements for these Soldiers prior to the unit’s deployment date. This should ensure there is ample time for new arrivals to effectively integrate into the unit and train on individual and collective tasks.\textsuperscript{27}

In September 2002, the consolidated PPG was originally approved for release. The intent of its development was to consolidate Theater and Department of the Army
PPGs into one document in support of contingency operations. Due to rapid policy
changes, the Army’s senior HR leaders determined the PPG would best serve as a
living document, rather than a published regulation. This decision allowed for
continuous updates based on approved policy guidance and revisions over time such as
changes to All Army Activities (ALARACT) and military personnel (MILPER) messages,
DOD instructions, and Army Regulations. Now the PPG outlines the policy for
deployment criteria and gives directives for non-deployable Soldiers.

According to the HQDA Active Component (AC) Manning Guidance for Fiscal
Years (FY) 2008-2010, Soldiers who meet the criteria to be in a temporary non-
deployable status (not including Warriors in Transition), should remain with their unit
until they are deployable again. Soldiers in this status will perform rear detachment
duties commensurate with their duty limitations. Permanently non-deployable Soldiers
should be cross-leveled on the installation as determined by the BCT commander in
coordination with Army Human Resources Command (AHRC). If no such cross-leveling
assignment is available on the installation, then HR managers on the installation will
coordinate with AHRC for reassignment to another installation. Based on the Soldier’s
MOS however, the new assignment is not guaranteed to be with a non-deploying unit.
Without detailed management by the HR specialist, the Soldier’s cause for being non-
deployable could place the Soldier in the same situation in which they started.

Nearly 70% of the Army’s current strength of 460,000 enlisted Soldiers have
been to war – half of them once, nearly a third of them twice, 13% with three combat
tours and 4% deployed four times. Based on these figures, the Army’s senior leaders
and the Secretary of Defense had a growing concern the Army would not be able to
continue deploying forces at this pace and maintain its current end strength. In 2007 Secretary of Defense Gates won approval from Congress to increase the Army’s active duty end strength to 547,000 Soldiers. The Army’s intent of this “grow the Army” plan was to add six new BCTs to share the burden of repeated deployments. In theory, this would relieve the burden on deployed units but would not necessarily relieve the individual Soldier.

In April 2007, Secretary Gates ordered the Army to stop building three new BCTs and use the manpower originally allocated for these three, more than 10,000 Soldiers, to fill holes in existing units. The 10,000 Soldiers would be used to raise the unit readiness for units preparing for deployment and replace Soldiers identified as non-deployable. To continue to relieve the pressure on the Army’s personnel readiness, in July 2009, Secretary Gates received a temporary increase of an additional 22,000 Soldiers designated for those units already scheduled to deploy. This is a temporary increase from the current authorized permanent end strength of 547,000 to an authorized temporary end strength of 569,000 active duty Soldiers. Army Colonel Robin Mealer, a planner at the Pentagon told reporters “we try to get our units out the door at a minimum of 90 percent [of authorized strength] to deploy into combat.” This is a very minimum goal and the Army is stressed to achieve it.

If the Army is going to be able to sustain multiple deployments for its Soldiers and units in the future, it must establish more restrictive assignment criteria for non-deployable Soldiers. This means Soldiers with a temporary non-deployable status should remain with their unit until they are deployable as outlined in the current PPG. Reassigning non-deployable Soldiers to another deploying unit is not in the best interest
of the next unit and its training readiness. Likewise, it is not cost effective to conduct a permanent change of station and move Soldiers characterized as temporarily non-deployable to another geographic location. Therefore, the Army should establish an adjusted time limit in the PPG giving a deploying commander a timeline to work with to ensure they will have the required personnel strength for the mission.

For example, the time limit for a Soldier in a temporary non-deployable status should not exceed the unit’s Latest Arrival Date (LAD) in theater plus 120 days. If a Soldier requires more time to become deployable, then the Soldier should be cross leveled on the installation or reassigned to another installation to a non-deploying unit to meet the needs of the Army. Stipulating a time limit would assist commanders by retaining Soldiers with required specialties their units need to accomplish their missions. In theory, a Soldier could remain at home station in their unit’s rear detachment during a deployment waiting to be cleared, depending on the type of temporary non-deployable status the Soldier is placed in.37 This is important, because usually temporary non-deployable Soldiers are identified during their pre-deployment screening otherwise known as the Soldier Readiness Process (SRP) prior to a unit’s deployment. A Pentagon report from May 2008 highlighted that approximately 9,140 Soldiers were non-deployable based on the pre-deployment health assessment, which includes a number of physical checks by medical personnel approximately 90 to 60 days prior to deployment.38

After the SRP, Soldiers identified as permanently non-deployable should be reassigned to a non-deployable unit within the Army and a permanent code attached to the Soldiers file, ensuring they will not be reassigned to a deployable unit. Since most
non-deploying units are assigned to the Major Commands (MACOMs) such as the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Medical Command (MEDCOM) it is possible permanently non-deployable Soldiers could be assigned to these. For example, TRADOC has approximately 27K officer, warrant officer and enlisted positions which require a variety of MOSs for assignment.\textsuperscript{39} MEDCOM is authorized approximately 24K officer, warrant officer and enlisted positions.\textsuperscript{40} Most of these positions are specialized MOSs/positions specific to the medical community, although a portion could be filled with the non-deployable Soldiers after being cross/re-trained to meet the new positions’ MOS qualifications. This cross training may give AHRC the flexibility to reassign those deployable Soldiers from TRADOC or MEDCOM to the units that are deploying.

With the increase in force structure Secretary Gates authorized for the Army, many considered it would sustain the current projected level of deployments and lower the stress on the force. However, at about the same time Secretary Gates directed the Army to reduce the size of the non-deploying units found in the institutional portion of the Army, such as TRADOC and MEDCOM.\textsuperscript{41} Yet by reassigning non-deployable Soldiers to the institutional Army, HR managers may continue to fill deploying units with combat deployable Soldiers and at the same time meet the Secretary of Defense’s directive of reducing the institutional portion of the force.

An advantage of this HR practice would be to provide the institutional Army with Soldiers with current combat experience. While the value of these Soldiers’ experience may be a challenge to measure, this practice might pay huge dividends to the Soldiers and Civilians engaged with combat experienced Soldiers. These combat veterans
could contribute to developing training materials and curriculums for the Army’s training centers or working and assisting other Soldiers in medical treatment facilities and as they are going through medical processing.

A potential risk associated with reassigning temporary non-deployable Soldiers from combat units would be the loss of valuable combat experience from such units. For example, in some cases a combat veteran with a temporary non-deployable condition which is not resolved prior to the newly established timeline may be reassigned. Another risk associated with this option would be creating the perception of allowing Soldiers the ability to stay on active duty and never deploy or not deploying again.

A challenge for the Army is that at any given point in time, approximately one-third of the Army has “never deployed” because most of the Soldiers in this category are new to the Army and are still in training. There is also 5.6% of active duty Soldiers who are deployable, but are assigned to positions in non-deploying commands and organizations that preclude them from deploying. A permanently non-deployable Soldier would fall into this category. The positive side of this option is the Army would be taking care of Soldiers by providing them an opportunity to stay on active duty. Because the Soldier would have already completed basic training, the cost to re-train them in another specialty would be minimal. The Army still has the requirement to fill all authorized positions in its units, and some of these positions may not require a Soldier to meet the deployment criteria outlined in the PPG or AR 614-30. Such Soldiers could still serve the Army as an instructor at a TRADOC school or running the supply system.
on an installation in the institutional part of the force. Therefore, to qualify to stay on active duty the criteria must be stringent but not so restrictive that no one qualifies.

A second option to ensure units deploy at 102% and commanders are not burdened with non-deployable Soldiers, would be to apply such restrictive personnel assignment policies which would require Soldiers to separate from the Army when they do not meet the deployment criteria due to a permanent non-deployable status, such as Soldiers without a family care plan or Soldiers who violated the Lautenberg Amendment. Current policy is to retain these Soldiers within the Army’s ranks by reassigning them to a non-deployable unit. Many may argue that if these Soldiers cannot perform the Army’s wartime mission, the Army should allow commanders to separate them and not retain them on active duty. The argument is that a permanently non-deployable Soldier hurts unit morale and does not contribute to the Army’s strength posture. Using the examples highlighted above, many tasks or functions in a non-deployable unit could be filled by a Department of the Army Civilian who is not expected to deploy. Separating non-deployable Soldiers with permanent conditions provides commanders on the ground the opportunity to open positions within their units which will be filled by AHRC through the PPG assignment process.

While Soldiers in a temporary non-deployable status could again be reassigned from a deploying unit to a non-deploying unit on the installation in order to provide time for the Soldier to become deployable, this does not improve the Army’s strength posture because the Soldier is still in the Army. This is because the reason for the reassignment would be to open up a valid requirement in the Army’s requisitioning
system which requires the Army through AHRC to provide a Soldier to fill the now vacant position.

However, the risk associated with separating Soldiers with temporary non-deployable conditions as soon as they become non-deployable could be the political fallout from creating a perception that the Army is not taking care of Soldiers. In actuality, the Army’s readiness must be its priority and HR managers must meet the Army’s and commanders requirements. For example, a Soldier who does not meet the standard of completing a family care plan when they need one to deploy, would violate a direct order. Based on the Army’s requirements to prepare a unit to deploy, deploying commanders often do not have the resources to deal with such issues. Separating Soldiers from the Army in the most expedient manner possible, saves the Army time and money, and should in the long run ensure the deploying unit meets personnel readiness standards required for deployment. For example, separating Soldiers who do not meet standards could serve as a deterrent for other Soldiers who claim they are unable to deploy due to a lack of a family care plan and would ultimately improve the Army’s overall unit readiness.

A third option for increasing the Army’s force has been discussed and researched by many of the Army’s senior leaders. A temporary troop increase to 569,000 can provide BCT commanders the troop strength required to deploy. This temporary increase of forces was judged that the increase would sustain the projected level of deployments and lower the stress on the force. However, as mentioned Secretary Gates directed the Army continue to reduce the size of the non-deployable or
institutional side of the force which may also reduce the pressure on the operational force.\textsuperscript{44}

Senator Joe Lieberman expressed his concern to a Senate Subcommittee, when he stated:

I am concerned that if the Army is not big enough, the institutional Army will continue to be cut in order to increase the number of brigades. As many respected former Army leaders have pointed out, it is the institutional Army that is the keeper of Army values and skills and that passes those values and skills on to the new recruits. We have had too many examples of ethical failures when our institutional Army was too small or staffed with too many of less capable Soldiers. The sexual scandal at Aberdeen and the breakdown at Walter Reed come to mind.\textsuperscript{45}

Temporarily increasing the number of Soldiers in the Army creates a false picture that the Army can fulfill all of its assigned missions. The reality is that the increase is primarily a temporary fix because it provides deploying units short term immediate personnel relief enabling them to deploy as close to 102\% as possible. However, over time the Army may still be unable to fulfill all of its requirements due to personnel shortages in the Army’s critical MOSs which are usually the low density high demand specialties. This is because the increase offsets the Soldiers in the Trainee, Transient, Holdee and Student (TTHS) account which is where the Army has approximately 20\% or 113,000 Soldiers. The TTHS account represents Soldiers not assigned to units.\textsuperscript{46} Most of the Soldiers in the TTHS will eventually be assigned to a unit that will deploy. However, the challenge is that each Soldier in the TTHS counts against the Army’s end strength and significant shortages still exist in the low density high demand MOSs.

Another challenge with the TTHS account is that not all training for each MOS is the same. Most Soldier trainees go through basic training and advance individual training attend for 9 to 13 weeks. For example, advanced individual training for military
intelligence and signal MOSs are examples of longer courses where Soldiers attend school from 12 to 18 months. When units need critical shortage MOSs, 18 weeks of training is a long time for a BCT to go without a Soldier with this specialty. In these cases it is appropriate to consider TTHS as the investment required for the Army to have trained and educated leaders and Soldiers ready and available to perform their missions.47

By increasing the Army’s end strength the Army has the ability to provide its Soldiers an increase in the amount of time they are at home station between deployments and to recover from repeated combat deployments.48 The time between deployments is referred to as dwell time and the Army’s goal is to provide its active duty Soldiers with a dwell time of one year deployed and two years at home station. An Army study confirmed that it takes Soldiers and units two to three years of dwell time to completely recover from a one year combat deployment.49

Another risk of temporarily increasing the Army’s end strength is it may create false expectations by senior leaders that deploying BCTs will continue to be filled to 102% and continue to be able to enjoy only a one to two year dwell time. When the Army no longer has an additional 22,000 Soldiers after 2013, it is likely deployment requirements may still remain. Therefore, unless the number of units required to deploy lessens, there can be no relief since the number of non-deployable Soldiers will continue to increase and other initiatives such as the adjusted dwell time will revert back to pre troop increase levels. However, the TTHS account will still likely remain at least 63,000 Soldiers up to its current level of 113,000 Soldiers. The only way to assist in reducing the personnel pressure created by the TTHS account would be to not count
the Soldiers assigned to the TTHS in the Army’s end strength. The challenge with this recommendation is that the Army must account for all Soldiers to DOD and Congress which provides funding for military personnel. Essentially the Army would have to request a permanent end strength increase to continue to support a large TTHS account.

As a result, it appears that to maintain current manning levels within the deploying BCTs, the Army must continue to receive an increased end strength of 22,000 additional Soldiers bringing its total to 569,000. It is apparent the numbers of non-deployable Soldiers and the number of Soldiers in the TTHS account exceed the Army’s ability to fill deploying BCTs and maintain dwell time at one year deployed and two years at home. However, the increase will continue to primarily assist deploying units and would not assist the Army in meeting its overall deployable end strength. The TTHS account does not provide the Army relief in end strength, but only provides a mechanism to account for Soldiers who are temporarily non-deployable due to one of the four categories it captures.

To assist HR managers temporary non-deployable Soldiers should be placed on a late arrival date (LAD) plus 120 day timeline to be eligible for deployment with their unit of assignment. If they cannot meet this standard they should be reassigned to a unit on the installation so the unit can request a replacement that can deploy.

Permanently non-deployable Soldiers should be reassigned to one of two MACOMs, TRADOC or MEDCOM which will cause an open position within the deploying unit which AHRC must fill. A permanently non-deployable Soldier will never deploy so to remove them from a unit’s’ ranks will ensure the deployable strength of the
unit is as close to 102% as possible because it opens up a position which AHRC must fill. It is also important to ensuring the criteria to retain permanently non-deployable Soldiers are stringent enough to enable them to contribute on active duty in a non-deploying unit but not so stringent that they must be separated from the Army through the chapter separation process. A temporary non-deployable Soldier’s experience in most cases will not be totally lost based on the timeline established for local reassignment. A unit commander could benefit from these Soldiers’ experience up to the point of deployment when these Soldiers are left behind until they meet the deployment criteria or are reassigned.

A challenge for the Army’s senior leaders is that assigning non-deployable Soldiers to major accounts in the institutional force is in violation of the Secretary of Defense’s directive to reduce the institutional force. When possible, the TTHS account should be kept at a minimum strength and reserved primarily for those Soldiers in training if the Army wants to reduce the TTHS account from 113,000 to approximately 63,000. For example, HR managers and commanders must execute a one for one swap of non-deployable for deployable Soldiers to ensure the Army meets the Secretary of Defense’s intent. In addition, another part of the institutional force that impacts the number of Soldiers in the TTHS account is the number of Soldiers recruited and brought on active duty. As recruiting increases to fill the Army’s increased end strength, the TTHS account also increases with new recruits in training in the institutional Army. Of course the opposite is true, when recruiting decreases it reduces the number of Soldiers in the TTHS account and the institutional Army.
HR managers must assist the Army and deploying BCT commanders in ensuring non-deployable Soldiers do not become a hindrance to the unit. Given that the Army has been at war for nine years, Soldiers and the force overall are becoming stressed and over extended. Managing the Army's most precious resource, its people, and ensuring they are prepared for combat, should also be the Army's number one priority.

Endnotes


3 John Sena. Based on personal observations and experiences of Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sena who served as the Battalion S1 for 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment from April 1992 to December 1993. In this capacity, he was the primary personnel manager for a Battalion which experienced the beginning of Army transformation and realignment during the Army's initial draw down.


5 Ibid.


7 John Sena. Personal observations and experiences of Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sena who served as the Assistant, Chief of Staff for Personnel (G1) for Headquarters, United States Army Alaska from June 2005 to June 2007. In this capacity, he was the primary personnel manager for the Army’s first BCT which utilized “lifecycle management” practices. Based on the number of BCTs deploying, the Army did not have the enlisted population in certain MOSs to fill every deploying unit forcing multiple deployments for those Soldiers and shortening their dwell time at home station between deployments.


9 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 17.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid, 1.


22 John Sena. Personal observations and experiences of Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sena who served as the Assistant, Chief of Staff for Personnel (G1) for Headquarters, United States Army Alaska from June 2005 to June 2007. In this capacity, he was the primary personnel manager for the Army’s first BCT which was managed utilizing “lifecycle management” practices.

23 John Sena. Based on personal observations and experiences of Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sena who served as the Assistant, Chief of Staff for Personnel (G1) for Headquarters, United States Army Alaska from June 2005 to June 2007. In this capacity, he was the primary personnel manager for the Army’s first BCT which was managed utilizing “lifecycle management” practices. Based on the number of BCTs deploying, the Army did not have sufficient enlisted personnel in certain Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) to fill every deploying unit to their required strength which often forced multiple deployments for Soldiers holding these MOSs.


27 Ibid.


29 In 2007, the Army created 35 warrior transition units (WTUs) at Army installations to fill a gap in support personnel for wounded Soldiers. The WTUs provide critical support to wounded Soldiers who are expected to require six months of rehabilitative care and the need for complex medical management. The units have physicians, nurses, squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and mental health professionals. These leaders are responsible for making sure wounded Soldiers’ needs are met, their care is coordinated, and their Families are taken care of.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.


37 John Sena, based on personal observations and experiences of Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sena who served as the Assistant, Chief of Staff for Personnel (G1) for Headquarters, United States Army Alaska from June 2005 to June 2007. As the 172nd SBCT prepared for deployment the unit had approximately 373 non-deployable Soldiers when it departed Alaska for Iraq. The rear detachment processed the non-deployable Soldiers out of the Army or arranged for Permanent Change of Station moves to other installations throughout the Army. Upon redeployment after 12 months, over 100 personnel remained in the rear detachment because of the HQDA policies and regulations which stipulate non-deployable requirements.


Timothy M. Bonds, Dave Baiocchi, Laurie L. McDonald, “Army Deployments to OIF and OEF,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, RAND Arroyo Center, October 2008, xii.

