Personnel Recovery is not CSAR!

Personnel recovery (PR) and combat search and rescue (CSAR) are sometimes thought to be synonymous. This view evolved due to a historical association with aircrew, but these conditions are no longer valid in a modern asymmetric environment. The capture and subsequent execution of hostages by insurgents and criminal elements in Iraq demonstrates that U.S. and coalition forces cannot afford to consider this form of terrorism an aberration. Kidnapping and hostage-taking are on the rise in many areas of potential interest to U.S. forces. Once isolated personnel are captured, intelligence is the only practical means of determining their location. This paper identifies the lineage that personnel recovery shares with CSAR and the influence it continues to have on current PR doctrine; demonstrates that the current, largely CSAR-based doctrine is of limited utility in hostage situations, and demonstrates that current PR doctrine does not adequately address the location of isolated personnel through intelligence means. Finally, this paper draws conclusions and offers recommendations to make joint personnel recovery doctrine more applicable across the full range of personnel recovery situations.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY IS NOT CSAR!

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:____________________________

23 October 2009
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Personnel recovery (PR) and combat search and rescue (CSAR) are sometimes thought to be synonymous. This view evolved due to a historical association of aircrew with isolated personnel, but these conditions are no longer valid in a modern asymmetric environment. The capture and subsequent execution of hostages by insurgents and criminal elements in Iraq demonstrates that U.S. and coalition forces cannot afford to consider this form of terrorism an aberration. Kidnapping and hostage-taking are on the rise in many areas of potential interest to U.S. forces. Once isolated personnel are captured, intelligence is the only practical means of determining their location. This paper identifies the lineage that personnel recovery shares with CSAR and the influence it continues to have on current PR doctrine; demonstrates that the current, largely CSAR-based doctrine is of limited utility in hostage situations, and demonstrates that current PR doctrine does not adequately address the location of isolated personnel through intelligence means. Finally, this paper draws conclusions and offers recommendations to make joint personnel recovery doctrine more applicable across the full range of personnel recovery situations.
INTRODUCTION

"Personnel recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel."¹ A simple definition, yet personnel recovery (PR) remains one of the most misunderstood terms in joint warfare today. Many confuse it with mortuary affairs and full accounting, believing it involves the return of remains of servicemen from bygone wars. To others, it evokes images of massive green Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopters hovering over the jungles of Southeast Asia, rescuing downed airmen while under fire. In reality, PR spans both missions, but its true extent is much greater than most realize. Personnel recovery should be more broadly understood as a blanket term obligating joint forces to account for, and take action to recover, any personnel who are isolated from friendly control, independent of the manner or circumstances of their isolation. Today’s battlefield requires a greater range of operations than can be fulfilled by CSAR alone, but current joint PR doctrine is heavily CSAR-centric, oriented toward the recovery phase, and is inadequate to address the resolution of the location of isolated personnel through intelligence means as is often required in a modern asymmetric conflict.

Personnel recovery activity was at its peak during the Vietnam War, in which an intensive air war resulted in several hundred aviators being shot down. To counter this, a robust CSAR apparatus was developed, which ultimately enjoyed a remarkably high success rate. Despite this success rate, many downed aviators were captured by North Vietnamese or Viet Cong forces, to spend the rest of the war in captivity, subject to inhumane treatment, and denied the rights afforded by the Geneva Conventions to prisoners of war (POWs). Additionally, due to the nature of the insurgency in South Vietnam, a fair number of ground
troops and civilians were captured by Viet Cong forces to be held in makeshift prisons in South Vietnam or moved northward. Once an individual was captured, the capabilities of the CSAR platforms were virtually useless, and the task of locating isolated personnel passed by necessity into the hands of the intelligence community. It then became a race to locate POWs before they succumbed to the conditions of their environment or the treatment of their captors. Unfortunately, the success rate for this endeavor was not as spectacular. No living American was ever rescued from a Viet Cong or North Vietnamese prison camp.2

The legacy of the Vietnam War remains. The lessons learned through the evolution of CSAR were captured and are manifest in contemporary joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. Conversely, conventional wisdom gained from the failures of post-CSAR efforts was lost in the military's post-Vietnam rush to divest itself of the stigma of counterinsurgency. In many ways, the broader mission of PR is a victim of the success of its subset CSAR.

Failure to address this lack of capacity could have serious ramifications. It is clear that potential adversaries have learned the lesson not to challenge the United States in a conventional sense, making asymmetric warfare the most likely challenge facing U.S. forces for the foreseeable future. The capture and the exploitation of hostages for propaganda, intimidation, extortion, or coercive purposes are nearly universal and particularly appalling features of asymmetric warfare. As the incidence of U.S. involvement in asymmetric conflict increases, so too does the likelihood that adversaries will resort to kidnapping and exploitation of U.S., coalition, and host nation military or civilian personnel to achieve their adversary aims. In this eventuality, a strong CSAR force will be irrelevant. Without recourse to alternatives, commanders will likely be subject to the depredations of lowered
troop morale and waning public support resulting from such highly publicized and graphic displays as the beheadings of American citizens Daniel Pearl in Pakistan and Nicholas Berg in Iraq, or the public desecration of the bodies of American and coalition troops such as PFCs Thomas Tucker and Kristian Menchaca or four Blackwater security contractors in Fallujah.

BACKGROUND

During World War II, concern for POWs was not overwhelming due to the expectation that belligerents would adhere to the Geneva Conventions regarding the treatment of POWs. In the case of Nazi Germany this belief was largely well-founded, and although there were abuses, the prisoner of war camps run by the Luftwaffe appear to have been managed very professionally and humanely given the circumstances. The expectation that Japan would act responsibly regarding POWs was, however, not as well-founded. Japan's record of atrocities and war crimes beginning in the early 1930s hinted direly at the prospects for POWs under their control. By 1945, these prospects had become clear as the Japanese began murdering their POWs in the Philippines, ostensibly to cover up evidence of war crimes. These attacks triggered the celebrated raid on Cabanatuan, which resulted in the rescue of 511 American and Allied POWs.

It is widely accepted that American POWs taken during the Korean War were held in Chinese and North Korean camps in both North Korea and China. By the end of the war, over 8,000 U.S. servicemen were unaccounted for. There is little evidence that any direct action was taken on behalf of POWs during this conflict, a fact which is probably explained by the dispersion of POWs and the political sensitivity due to the involvement of the Chinese.
During the Vietnam War, actual and threatened executions of American POWs and threats of war crimes trials for captured servicemen elicited memories of the Korean War experience. Determined to avoid this, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Studies and Observations Group (SOG) created the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) in September of 1966. The MACV-SOG JPRC bore little resemblance to the doctrinal JPRC of today. "Its main function was to act as a clearinghouse for the flow of intelligence on American POWs, determine the validity of the information, and then organize rescue attempts employing either SOG forces or local troops."5

In the early days of the Vietnam War, the vast majority of isolated personnel were aircrew shot down over the jungle, so MACV-SOG JPRC activities were closely aligned with CSAR efforts. CSAR was allotted 72 hours following a shootdown or ground isolating event, after which time MACV-SOG JPRC became responsible for recovery operations.6 The aviator-heavy POW population, the requirement for close coordination with CSAR assets, and a historical association of the Air Force with prisoner of war matters resulted in an agreement that allowed Air Force officers to command JPRC, despite MACV (and SOG in particular) being Army-dominated.7

The MACV-SOG JPRC launched over 125 intelligence-initiated rescue operations during its seven years of existence, and participated in a great number of other POW-related activities.8 But although the MACV-SOG JPRC was certainly instrumental in the successful evasion and recovery of a number of isolated personnel, including the epic evasion and rescue of Lt. Col. Iceal Hambleton, USAF (callsign BAT 21),9 no living POWs were ever recovered from the hands of the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese.10
In March of 1972, the MACV-SOG JPRC was moved out from under the Studies and Observations Group and placed under the MACV J2.\textsuperscript{11} This move marked the beginning of a transition away from recovery operations. In January of 1973, MACV-SOG JPRC formally transitioned to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC),\textsuperscript{12} which was focused mainly on establishing which POWs were still alive and investigating crash sites for remains.\textsuperscript{13} JCRC’s descendant, the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), continues to search for remains even today. In all probability, it is this lineage which causes some of the confusion over the nature and scope of the PR mission.

Between the end of the Vietnam War and the 1991 Gulf War, there were comparatively few isolating incidents involving American citizens. The most notable exception is the 1979 Iranian revolution and subsequent hostage crisis involving 52 American citizens; however, their location was known since they were held at the former U.S. embassy throughout their arduous year. During the 1991 Gulf War, a number of American and coalition POWs were taken by the regime of Saddam Hussein, but the duration of that conflict was so short and the resolution so favorable that there was hardly the time or motivation to plan a response to a long-term prisoner of war situation.

Apparently recognizing the need for a more comprehensive PR capability and foreseeing greater civilian involvement in future conflicts, in 2001 the House Appropriations Committee tasked the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) to conduct an assessment in order to describe a government-wide interagency national personnel recovery architecture. In 2002, DPMO tasked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to "conduct a two-year study to define the interagency national personnel recovery
IDA submitted an interim report in July of 2003 in which, among other things, it was acknowledged that:

The term PR is much broader than Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) or the recovery of a downed pilot. Presently there is no personnel recovery doctrine and the U.S. operates largely on CSAR doctrine. However, this situation has not hampered us from conducting coalition and interagency PR during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.15

Although recognition of the lack of doctrine and the distinction between PR and CSAR is notable, the final statement appears to have been premature. Between 2003 and late 2008, 39 Americans and 495 foreigners were captured in Iraq, and of those, 22 Americans and 51 foreigners were executed by al-Qaeda, Shia, and Sunni groups.16 In response, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) stood up a JPRC in 2006. The first edition of Joint Publication (JP) 3-50 Personnel Recovery was not released until 2007, leading to the conclusion that CSAR doctrine dominated PR efforts at least up to that time. This was evident in the task organization of MNF-I JPRC, despite the similarity in mission to that of MACV-SOG JPRC.

The Middle East is not the only area in which U.S. and coalition forces and civilians are likely to face isolation, capture, and exploitation. Data compiled by the Defense Intelligence Agency indicate that kidnapping and hostage-taking are on the rise worldwide. Between 2006 and late 2008, 141 foreign hostages have been taken in Nigeria alone, versus five in 2005. In the same time period, more than 500 were taken in Somalia, versus nine in 2005.17 Motivations for the kidnappings vary from the political to the criminal. Many known terrorist groups engage in criminal activities in order to fund their terrorist activities, such as Abu Sayyaf, which earned an estimated $20 million in 2000 alone through kidnapping.18 Regardless of the reason, it is apparent that in many areas of likely interest, U.S., coalition, and host nation forces and civilians will suffer this kind of violence for the
The primary issue that makes current personnel recovery doctrine inadequate in a modern asymmetric setting is that there is virtually no guidance or procedures for locating personnel who cannot self-report their location, either via survival radio, personal locator beacon, or ground to air signal. By definition, an isolating event which results in capture will preclude such communication. Aviators and ground troops who find themselves isolated and on the run may have time to communicate their location through one of the aforementioned methods, but only if not incapacitated. Personnel deliberately targeted for kidnapping will not be able to report their location in captivity, except in the event of extraordinary chance and extreme inattention on the part of their captors.

It cannot therefore be assumed that isolated personnel will always be able to report their location, yet joint doctrine makes it clear that the PR architecture maintains responsibility for the isolated personnel and “must continue to refine the accuracy and reliability of location information . . . until the isolated person is recovered.”19 If the cooperation of the isolated personnel or their captors is not a possibility, only search methods or intelligence will divulge their location. JP 3-50 cites electronic searches (radio or beacon intercepts), visual searches, and ground force reconnaissance as viable methods for determining isolated personnel position.20 However, it must be acknowledged that electronic searches ultimately only reveal the position of a radio or beacon, not necessarily that of the individual that should accompany it. Furthermore, electronic search will be fruitless if the isolated individual is not transmitting due to incapacitation or capture. Visual searches will
likely be useless in revealing the location of isolated personnel once captured, since the captors will likely take great pains to conceal the location of captivity. Ground force reconnaissance conducting house-to-house cordon and search operations may have a statistically better chance at locating captured personnel, but the risk to the isolated personnel and to the recovery force due to long exposure time while conducting a thorough search may be unacceptably high, in all but the most permissive environments. These concerns result in a certain level of reluctance to act without incontrovertible evidence, a phenomenon which exasperated MACV-SOG JPRC and was noted by MNF-I JPRC.²¹

Without resorting to negotiation or ransom, intelligence is the only remaining practical method of establishing the location of the isolated personnel. However, the sole reference in JP 3-50 to the use of intelligence methods during the “Locate” phase of PR operations recommends only that "recovery planners … should investigate the possibilities of using HUMINT assets and other resources (IGOs, NGOs, etc.) in the area to locate isolated personnel and to determine their status …”²² Army doctrine is only slightly more descriptive, pointing out that the combination of facts and considered assumptions may be helpful in indicating possible search areas on which to focus further efforts.²³

Aside from an admonition of the importance of cross-cueing intelligence capabilities and disciplines, the Army personnel recovery manual offers nothing further on the location of isolated personnel through intelligence means.²⁴ Given that the joint CSAR doctrine that was consolidated into JP 3-50 included two 100-plus page manuals dedicated exclusively to CSAR doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (JPs 3-50.2 and 3-50.21, respectively), it is fair to question whether the proper emphasis has been given to the utility of intelligence-based methods in personnel recovery.
IDA hinted at the same question in their Final Report to DPMO regarding the proposed interagency national personnel recovery architecture issued in July 2004, stating that "requirements for intelligence support are not well defined, leading to gaps in the knowledge base of those working personnel recovery actions" and recognizing that “in the case of a long-term hostage-taking situation, continuous intelligence information is required to template the activities of hostage takers and locate sites such as prison or guerrilla camps.”

Echoing the same refrain, “the inability to develop accurate and timely intelligence on the precise locations of POW camps where Americans were being held …was the single most influential reason for the failure of the U.S. military to rescue even one single prisoner” during the Vietnam War.

MNF-I JPRC experienced identical difficulties in Iraq. The difficulty in developing timely information in Iraq was exacerbated by a PR architecture that was optimized for CSAR, and not the location of isolated personnel using intelligence-based methods. MNF-I JPRC manning and task organization resembled the notional joint PR organization outlined in JP 3-50 (Figure 1). It is plain that this task organization was derived from CSAR doctrine, as an examination of the typical joint search and rescue center organization given in JP 3-50.2 (Figure 2) will show. It is notable that the notional JPRC organization does call for intelligence personnel in each watch section, but as previously indicated, little guidance is given as to what to do with them.

The Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC) established at Multi-National Corps - Iraq (MNC-I) strongly resembled the typical joint search and rescue center organization in JP 3-50.2 in terms of task organization. It was manned primarily by Army and Air Force aviators, and did not possess dedicated intelligence personnel. The PRCC’s structure and manning gave it a decided CSAR focus, which was further cemented by its
Figure 1 – Notional Joint Personnel Recovery Center Organization
(From Joint Publication 3-50, 5 January 2007, III-4)

Figure 2 – Typical Joint Search and Rescue Center Organization
(From Joint Publication 3-50.2, 26 January 1996, VI-2 [Superseded by JP 3-50])
placement subordinate to MNC-I’s air operations division. Thus, the personnel recovery node at the first echelon that could directly task combat units had no capacity to handle long-term PR cases, which were dependent on intelligence to prosecute.²⁷

This situation created a weak link in the chain of PR communications and coordination between the MNF-I JPRC, which received and correlated the available intelligence on isolated personnel, and ground forces that could have acted on areas of interest developed by JPRC. In some ways, the MACV-SOG JPRC had it better than the MNF-I JPRC, since MACV-SOG JPRC had the authority to launch missions on the basis of their own intelligence, and initially had direct access to SOG and indigenous troops. Even with access to this capability to confirm or deny intelligence reports, MACV-SOG JPRC still suffered from the inability to develop timely intelligence; the disconnected structure that existed in MNF-I only served to increase delays in confirming or denying intelligence.

Many military members acknowledge the moral responsibility to attempt to recover isolated personnel, but fail to understand the strategic importance of doing so. A common argument is that the numbers of isolated personnel are relatively insignificant compared to the overall troop level, and that it is hard to justify the level of effort for so few. However, this impression is most likely based on a misperception that PR efforts are reserved for military members alone. Joint doctrine is clear that military personnel recovery efforts will be afforded to all U.S. military members, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and DOD contractors, as well as "other governments, agencies, organizations, and individuals" when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.²⁸ When one considers that the U.S. ambassador to a host nation may claim this authority by virtue of his position as the President's direct representative, it is not difficult to see how the field of potential isolated
personnel opens up rapidly. Military commanders should be prepared to accept responsibility for providing PR services for coalition and host nation government officials and civilians.

The consequences of failing to provide PR doctrine applicable to the full spectrum of isolated personnel situations are greater than just the purely humanitarian concerns. Although difficult to quantify or directly correlate, it is reasonable to assume that the publicized executions of American and coalition hostages had a negative effect on the morale and motivation of our troops, as well as on domestic support and outlook for the war in Iraq. In addition, conventional counterinsurgency wisdom has identified a number of principles and best practices, some of which may be undermined by a failure to address hostage-based isolated personnel cases successfully. These include security under the rule of law, isolating insurgents from their support, unity of effort, and legitimacy as the main objective.28

A legitimate government "competently manages collective security and political, economic, and social development."30 A government that does not have the capacity to respond to kidnapping of government officials and citizens will be seen as less legitimate because it cannot manage security of the people in this aspect. Since U.S. and coalition forces will likely be required to shoulder the majority of the security burden initially, a pre-existing capability to respond to kidnapping and hostage-taking is an imperative. Lack of such a capability would likely impact economic development, since the risk to potential investors in the host nation's economy would be heightened. Many of the early hostages in Iraq were civilians hoping to "cash in" on reconstruction. This kind of entrepreneurship is critical to the rapid reestablishment of infrastructure and economy, but is extremely tenuous and dependent on the perception of relative security. Social development would be impeded
if intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or Doctors Without Borders minimize their roles in reconstruction for fear of being deliberately targeted for kidnapping and extortion. Both possibilities are anathema to the current tenets of good counterinsurgency doctrine.

Some would argue that diplomatic solutions, negotiation, or even the payment of ransom are a more effective way of dealing with kidnapping and hostage situations. Indeed, negotiations and ransom have successfully resulted in the release of hostages on a number of occasions. Between 2003 and 2006, Western nations alone (including coalition members) paid an estimated $45 million to ransom their citizens in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, a strong capability to resolve kidnappings or hostage situations without ransom or settlement would isolate insurgents from this lucrative line of support. Payment of ransoms in particular creates incentive and could result in a “market” for kidnapping, with a corresponding increase in risk to security forces, contractors, and civilians. Denial of this source of funding could have a significant favorable impact on the security of U.S., coalition, and host nation forces and citizens.

Similarly, negotiations have been used to effect the release of hostages, but the very definition of the term implies that the captors have gained some advantage other than money as a result. In 2004, the threatened execution of Filipino hostage Angelo de la Cruz precipitated the early departure of Filipino forces from Iraq, despite the objections of U.S. and coalition officials. Although no ransom was paid, the resulting negotiated settlement undermined the unity of effort and cohesion of the coalition, and was an information operations coup for the insurgency.
Diplomatic efforts and civil actions have also been successful in securing the release of captives in the past, such as the release of Lieutenant Robert O. Goodman, U.S. Navy, a naval flight officer shot down over Lebanon in 1983, from Syria.\(^{34}\) However, reliance on diplomatic efforts for recovery when dealing with violent extremist organizations and criminals who may be unconcerned about their political image presents a grave danger to isolated personnel, since these organizations will very likely be unmoved by humanitarian appeals. Civil actions independent of government initiatives, such as that taken by the Reverend Jesse Jackson to free Lieutenant Goodman, similarly depend on the captors’ desire to be seen as benevolent. Additionally, these actions are sometimes undertaken for ulterior motives that may be contrary to U.S. or coalition aims. Anti-war organizations such as David Dellinger’s disingenuously-named Committee for the Support of Released Prisoners brokered early releases for a number of POWs during the Vietnam War, but used these events as a vehicle to publicize their anti-war message.\(^{35}\) The benefit provided to North Vietnam was in the form of an opportunity to demonstrate to the world their "benevolent treatment" of American POWs, but history and the testimony of POWs who returned with honor at the end of the war bears out the fallacy of that claim.

CONCLUSIONS

It is clear from the recent track record of conflicts that U.S. forces and allies cannot rely on the hope that potential adversaries will respect the Geneva Conventions with regard to the treatment of POWs. Although the conventions remain an ideal to which all lawful nations should aspire, the advent of stateless enemies makes such expectations foolish for Western nations to entertain. For the foreseeable future, the sad reality for most personnel captured by violent extremist organizations is to be executed and exploited for propaganda
value. If extremely fortunate, they may be released at some benefit to their captors and at some detriment to U.S., coalition, and host nation efforts.

The severity of treatment by contemporary adversaries must be taken in context with the likelihood of capture, which increases as terrorists have more opportunities for "soft targets." Repeated U.S. and coalition experience with insurgenacies has demonstrated that terrorism in the form of kidnapping and hostage-taking is a likely course of action for insurgents to embrace. With the identification of a greater need for civilian interaction in reconstruction and counterinsurgency efforts, and the widespread use of contractors in the combat zone, it stands to reason that the potential for terrorists to cause damage to U.S. and coalition efforts through kidnapping and exploitation of hostages is much greater.

The nature of kidnapping is such that in virtually all cases, the isolated personnel will be captive long before the PR architecture is alerted. Neither CSAR nor a CSAR-based architecture will be able to mount an effective PR effort in these situations, since none of the CSAR-based search methods outlined in joint doctrine are likely to be effective against a deliberately concealed subject who is unable to communicate. Ground forces may fare little better, and may incur an inordinate risk for only a slightly increased chance of detection. The likely result is a cold trail and stale reporting, which must be placed in the hands of intelligence professionals for resolution. However, there is virtually no PR-specific doctrine that addresses either a suggested methodology or task organization for the accomplishment of this task.

Without a strong ability to prosecute PR cases based on intelligence, military commanders may be forced to deal with the consequences of ransoms being paid, negotiated settlements being made, or the strategic communications liability of appearing to be "doing
nothing about the problem.” When taken in this context, lack of doctrine on the resolution of such cases through intelligence means represents a failure to support commanders in the field.

Given the history of CSAR and the traditional association of POW matters with the Air Force, the revelation of a shared lineage with PR does not come as a surprise. The development of CSAR as a robust capability has been a necessary step in the evolution of PR, and it is not the author's intent to suggest that CSAR is obsolete or irrelevant. CSAR fulfills a vital role which must be maintained in its current capability - but it is only a part of the full PR spectrum and must not be mistaken for the whole. Nor should readiness to conduct CSAR be confused with readiness to conduct PR operations. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that current joint PR doctrine should not be dominated by CSAR doctrine.

Joint doctrine does not caveat responsibility for the recovery of isolated personnel by manner of isolation, or status of captivity. There is no passage in JP 3-50 that diminishes military commanders’ responsibility for isolated personnel upon their capture, or after a given time period has elapsed. Yet the vague nature of applicable guidance contained therein consigns attempts to resolve such cases to ad hoc efforts for which comparatively few lessons learned have been recorded. As such, existing PR doctrine represents only a partial-spectrum response to what is undoubtedly a full-spectrum responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Joint PR doctrine must be reevaluated and rewritten to incorporate useful procedures for the prosecution of cases in which isolated personnel cannot be located through means currently outlined in JP 3-50. Most importantly, the “Locate” section of Chapter VI -
Personnel Recovery Joint Procedures and Techniques should contain much more specific procedures on how to transition from “standard” air or ground search methods and execute intelligence-based efforts. Doctrinal PR architecture should be reexamined and re-crafted to reflect the corresponding need for a greater role of intelligence at PR nodes. Overall, more emphasis should be given to the role of intelligence in personnel recovery, specifically for cases in which the location cannot be resolved through conventional methods.

Personnel recovery planners and operators need a methodology to address intelligence-based location of isolated personnel. The nature of the PR problem requires more than analysis and dissemination of intelligence reporting. The resolution of a location for isolated personnel is usually not as simple as receipt of a single, high-confidence report. It requires the fusion of multiple-source intelligence into a geospatial depiction of the area of highest probability of location, a concept which Army doctrine hints at but does not elaborate on.35 Without specific guidance from doctrine, these efforts are often ad hoc, are extremely subjective, and may not engender the confidence of the forces that are requested to act on them. A structured approach outlined in doctrine would be more likely to result in cooperation, since established and recognized procedures would be followed. Army doctrine calls for the use of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) in the “Locate” phase, but taking this approach in hostage situations presents similar problems as the questionable application of a planning process designed for conventional warfare to an insurgency, in that the social, political, and economic motivations are closely aligned.37 MDMP may still be useful, but as a planning framework which must be wrapped around an appropriate methodology.
An analogue for that methodology may be found in a seemingly unlikely place: antisubmarine warfare (ASW). At first glance, it may be hard to understand how hunting submarines has anything to do with locating isolated personnel, but the similarities are striking. Both involve the fusion of evaluated information from multiple sources, each with their own capabilities and limitations, in order to systematically prosecute areas of highest likelihood and reduce the area of uncertainty to a manageable level. In ASW, this means using information from various sensors to systematically reduce the area of uncertainty to within the search volume of a torpedo. For PR, this means using information from various intelligence disciplines to reduce uncertainty in the location of the isolated personnel to a level commensurate with risk to a search or recovery force. Taken in this context, both problems are classic search problems. Navy ASW doctrine is based on decades of experience with operations analysis and search theory. This work and experience could be leveraged in the development of an intelligence-based search methodology for use in personnel recovery. The Navy, with its long history of using information to reduce positional uncertainty, may be uniquely suited to address this shortfall in joint doctrine.38

The definition of a successful recovery should be established in joint doctrine. This recommendation may appear trivial, but the lack of a definition could cause the wrong lessons to be learned from PR efforts. For instance, should recovery of the remains of an isolated individual be considered a success, if that individual was known to be alive as a hostage for several weeks after capture? For full accounting purposes and humanitarian reasons, a remains recovery is desirable and welcomed. However, success in recovering remains may overshadow the fact that initial efforts failed to provide a location in time to permit a recovery, thus coloring the perception of what was done right.

2. George J. Veith, Code-Name Bright Light (New York, NY: Bantam Doubleday Dell, 1998), 397. Nick Rowe was in fact recovered after escaping during a raid on his prison camp.


5. George J. Veith, Code-Name Bright Light, 114.

6. Ibid., 114-115.

7. Ibid., 116-119.

8. Ibid., 397. The recovery of remains is an adjunct task of PR, since identification of remains confirms the status (missing in action vs. killed in action) of isolated personnel. If an individual is known to be deceased, recovery of remains is a mortuary affairs task. MACV-SOG JPRC conducted over 110 remains recoveries during the Vietnam War.

9. Ibid., 358-366.

10. Ibid., 397.

11. Ibid., 379.

12. Ibid., 396.

13. Ibid., 379.


15. Ibid., S-2.


17. Ibid.


20. Ibid., VI-7 to VI-12.

21. George J. Veith, Code-Name Bright Light, 233. “The feelings from U.S. commanders was, ‘Won't they kill the guys?’ This was the first line of resistance. The second was, ‘This is in the heart of bad guy country.’ The third always was, ‘How good is your intelligence?’ Many commanders were gung-ho, but many also weren't.” The author of this paper served as Deputy Director, MNF-I JPRC from January to September 2008.

22. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, VI-11. In this quote, the term HUMINT refers to human intelligence, IGO to intergovernmental organizations, and NGO to non-governmental organizations.


24. Ibid., 5-10.


30. Ibid., 49.


32. Ibid.


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