

STRATEGIC DEPTH: CIVILIAN SKILLS IN NATIONAL GUARD BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

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TEAMS**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Recognizing that the Department of Defense likely will be the "go to" agency for international policy for the foreseeable future, this paper examines the Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team, its structure and civilian skills embedded within its units, to suggest that its depth and flexibility across the spectrum of conflict make the National Guard Brigade Combat Team a very powerful strategic policy tool available to the Secretary of Defense and the nation.

STRATEGIC DEPTH: CIVILIAN SKILLS IN NATIONAL GUARD BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

The Problem

The once stark black-and-white divisions between war and peace have faded. America's national security apparatus, military and civilian, needs to be more adept in operating along a continuum involving military, political, and economic skills in a gray area that is likely to be persistent.¹

In the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, one of the most important lessons learned, and to a large extent relearned, is that military success alone is not sufficient. Our efforts must also address economic development, the rule of law, good or at least decent governance, public services and more. These so-called soft capabilities along with military power are indispensable to any lasting success, indeed to victory itself as Clausewitz understood it, which is achieving a political objective.²

In a whole-of-government approach to conflict resolution, the United States often finds itself limited to using the Department of Defense. Gaps in capacity of U.S. government agencies often push the Department of Defense forward as the most capable instrument in the contingency tool box, even though few national security challenges conform to defense-specific solutions.³ In fact sometimes DoD finds itself the instrument of *only* resort. When not the only instrument, it is at least the enabling hub for the rest of government.⁴

Current and projected fiscal realities indicate those gaps will continue. So for the foreseeable future the Department of Defense will be the central player in whole-of-government contingencies involving political, economic, military, intelligence, and development resources, as well as civilian resources and methodologies.⁵

This paper suggests that the Department of Defense can enhance the “military-only” solution by leveraging civilian skills embedded within Army Reserve Component formations, in particular Brigade Combat Teams of the Army National Guard. Examining national policy, relationship of civilian skills to the military environment, Reserve Component mobilization training, and in-theater civilian requirements, this paper will conclude that the Army Reserve Components can – in fact, must – leverage Soldiers’ civilian skills as force multipliers of “soft power,” in addition to accomplishing the assigned mission. Offered herein is a model to that end.

The requirement for the U.S. military to maintain security, provide aid and comfort, begin reconstruction, and stand up local government and public services will not go away. At least in the early phases of any conflict, military commanders will no more be able to rid themselves of these tasks than Eisenhower after securing North Africa in 1943.⁶

Recognizing this reality, in 2005 the Department of Defense declared that a core U.S. military mission shall be to conduct stability operations.⁷ With proficiency equivalent to combat operations, stability operations capabilities shall include: establish civil security and civil control; restore or provide essential services; repair critical infrastructure; and provide humanitarian assistance.⁸ In the event civilians are not prepared to perform those tasks, military forces will assume that responsibility.⁹

In September 2009, Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, issued Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, to amplify policy for civilian and military support of stability operations, including that Service Secretaries shall “ensure availability of units to perform stability operations...”¹⁰

The Army executes this policy through doctrine found in capstone Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, and Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*. FM 3-0 recognizes a spectrum of conflict that can range from Stable Peace to Unstable Peace to Insurgency to General War.¹¹ All major operations combine offensive, defensive and stability elements executed simultaneously at multiple echelons. Major operations are conducted not only to defeat the enemy but also to restore a stable peace. The military plays a large role in this effort even after major combat operations have ended, and restoring a stable peace may take longer and be more difficult than defeating enemy forces.¹²

Army “operational themes” describe the character of the dominant major operation and convey how the commander broadly intends to operate. Operational themes include Peacetime Military Engagement; Limited Intervention; Peace Operations; Irregular Warfare; and Major Combat Operations. FM 3-0’s “Tennessee Chart” shows how these operational themes are distributed across the spectrum of conflict, from Stable Peace to General War.¹³




Figure 1:

Stability operations link military and civilian efforts, with the Department of State leading support for interagency coordination and integration. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, models an integrated civilian-military framework across five broad technical areas, or stability sectors: security; justice and reconciliation; humanitarian and social well-being; governance and participation; and economic stabilization and infrastructure.¹⁴

Military forces have to operate with the other instruments of national power to forge unity of effort through a whole-of-government approach. This approach accounts for a wider range of considerations beyond those of the military instrument, ensuring that planning accounts for broader national policy goals and interests. For the commander and staff, this may mean planning and executing operations within an environment of political ambiguity.¹⁵

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals.¹⁶ However, as Secretary of Defense Gates has noted, “If you took all the Foreign Service officers in the world, they would barely crew one aircraft carrier.”¹⁷ In current operations in Afghanistan, civilian professionals are thinly spread in the field. In a country slightly smaller than Texas, with a population of about 33 million people,¹⁸ the U.S. is on track to triple the number of U.S. Government civilians in Afghanistan to 974 by early 2010, anticipating a need to further increase State Department civilian staffing in 2010 by another 20 to 30%, concentrating on positions in the field and at key ministries that deliver vital services to the Afghan people.¹⁹ Compared to 60,000+ military in Afghanistan, this pales in size.

Important, though, is the multiplier effect that civilian personnel have. On average, each civilian leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed Afghan staff to experts with U.S.-funded NGOs [Non-governmental organizations].²⁰ In the field, lawyers, agronomists, diplomats, development specialists, and others²¹ work from District Support Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), side by side with our military.²²

As of October 2008, 26 PRTs were scattered throughout Afghanistan. A PRT typically consists of 60-250 military personnel, a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) field officer and a Department of State political officer. Many also have a U.S. Department of Agriculture advisor. PRTs do not engage in combat operations; however, they retain robust force-protection capabilities to facilitate the work of civilian representatives. PRT projects include community and government buildings, clinics, schools, capacity building for government, radio stations, gender activities, agriculture, water/irrigation projects, energy (micro-power), and roads projects.²³

Jacob J. Lew, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, described the impact of civilian skills:

There's a high degree of leverage when we put civilians out. You don't put civilians out in groups of 50 or a hundred. They go in groups of two to 10 to 15. They're surrounded by locally employed staff, by Afghan nationals who are working in a civilian capacity, and by NGO staff who are working in a civilian capacity. There's roughly a 10-to-1 ratio so that when we deploy a thousand civilians, there's an effort of roughly 10,000 civilians that's the total force in place.²⁴

Secretary of Defense Gates also has acknowledged the importance of even a few civilians:

. . . [T]he reality is that the civilians who do end up in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and in the other activities, rule of law, agriculture and so on, have a disproportionate impact to their

numbers. And I talk to brigade commanders, and one or two civilians working with them have an enormous impact. And these are the colonels who are the brigade commanders who talk about this. So do we want more civilians? Absolutely. We will take all the civilians that we can get out there.²⁵

While the impact of even a few civilian skills is significant, civilian capacity remains problematic. Civilians are seldom able to operate in unsecure areas of operation, nor are there enough of them.

Army and Marine Corps Civil Affairs (CA) personnel to an extent counter shortcomings in civilian capacity. With civilian professional skills generally parallel to those of host-nation government functions,²⁶ these personnel are essential to successful stability operations.²⁷ Primarily in the Army Reserve,²⁸ Civil Affairs Soldiers have training and experience in public administration, public safety, public health, legal systems, labor management, public welfare, public finance, public education, civil defense, public works and utilities, public communications, public transportation, logistics, food and agricultural services, economics, property control, cultural affairs, civil information and managing dislocated persons.²⁹ They include judges, physicians, health inspectors, fire chiefs, police officers, and so forth.³⁰ Civil Affairs Commands (CACOMs) provide the Geographic Combatant Commander theater-level CA planning and programs to support stabilization, reconstruction, and development. The Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Cell categorizes by Rule of Law, Economic Stability, Infrastructure, Governance, Public Health and Welfare, and Public Education and Information.³¹

Civil Affairs, however, is a "low-density" Military Occupation Specialty (MOS), with relatively few Soldiers in relation to their high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since September 11, 2001, Army and Marine Corps Civil Affairs forces have undergone

tremendous stress because of deployments to those theaters. By 2006, for example, four years of sustained combat operations had had a telling effect on both the Army Active and Reserve Component civil affairs units. The Army's only Active duty CA unit, the recently expanded 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, had seen a heavy operating tempo. The battalion [as of 2006] consisted of six companies that were regionally oriented and focused on a combatant commander's theater of operations. The force was adequate for short duration contingency operations and had served its purpose well. But for long conflicts such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, the companies were overtaxed and too often had to be reallocated to cover shortfalls in other theaters.³²

As a result, CA units – both Active and Reserve – have deployed perhaps more frequently than any other type unit. Even by 2006, nearly every available CA Soldier had mobilized and spent a year or more in Iraq or Afghanistan.³³ That trend has not abated since then.³⁴

The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model – a cyclical process designed to generate forces for combatant commanders at sustainable rotational levels and to provide predictability for Active and Reserve units scheduled to mobilize – calls for steady state rotations of 1:3 for Active and 1:5 for Reserve Components (i.e., 9 months deployed and 27 months training in a 3 year cycle for AC, and 1 year mobilized and 5 years demobilized in a 6 year cycle for RC). In surge conditions, the planning goals for AC and RC are 1:2 and 1:4, respectively. The demand for forces directly influences the length of “BOG” [Boots on the Ground time in theater] and Dwell [non-deployed time, resetting or training at home station].³⁵ As of March 2009, Active Army Civil Affairs units

were executing faster than a 1:3 ratio and receiving dwell periods of only 20 months before the units mobilized again.³⁶

The reduced timeline for CA units to reset is having a significant impact on filling requirements in theater. Although enough force structure was in place to sustain the demands for the War on Terror (assuming units were at 100% strength), requirements for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 1 required nearly 40% (2400 Soldiers) of all Civil Affairs forces to mobilize. This large force request significantly reduced the pool of available follow-on forces, as many units faced personnel shortages and lacked qualified Soldiers early during the war. The ability to provide the same number of CA personnel was not sustainable, and subsequent rotations became increasingly difficult to fill. Since then, requests for CA forces have fluctuated from 1000 to 1400 Soldiers per rotation.³⁷

With the continued demand for CA forces, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC (A)) has filled subsequent rotation requirements from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and from U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) units that had not yet deployed, and cross-leveled teams and individuals throughout USACAPOC(A). The use of IRR and USARC Soldiers started in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/OIF 04-06 (3rd rotation) and peaked in OEF/OIF 07-09 (6th rotation), providing nearly 60% of the Civil Affairs force requirement for that rotation. As of March 2009, both IRR and USARC Soldiers continued to provide approximately 25% of the Civil Affairs force required in theater. Cross-leveling still occurs to a lesser degree and will undoubtedly continue until units are well enough to provide the entire capability (unit sets) requested.³⁸

Army National Guard Initiatives

To mitigate this chronic shortage of Civil Affairs Soldiers, the Army National Guard has considered forming non-standard Civil Affairs units from its current structure (though the proposal has been only preliminarily staffed and has not been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army).³⁹

Additionally, and for the same reason, the Army National Guard has fielded Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) to Afghanistan. ADTs are self-contained volunteer units, each composed of about 58 Army National Guard (ARNG) Soldiers with expertise in agribusiness to include forestry, wildlife and fisheries, and apiaries (bees), for example. Their mission is to train and advise Afghan universities, provincial ministries, and – probably most importantly – local farmers, with the goal of increased stability and improved opportunities for Afghanistan’s reemerging agribusiness sector.⁴⁰ Means to those ends include increased Afghan income, increased jobs throughout the vertical market/business chain (that is from the field to the dinner plate), increased productivity of both crops and animals, conservation of natural resources, and so forth.⁴¹

The ADTs ensure that improvements are sustainable with local assets and are within the capabilities of the Afghan Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) both enthusiastically support the ADT initiative⁴² and actively work with the teams through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).⁴³

The ADT concept has two major benefits: teams provide immediate agricultural expertise, and they provide Task Force Commanders with daily community engagement. Tennessee’s team, for example, went “outside the wire” 220+ times in 300 days between February and December 2009.⁴⁴

The number of ADTs has grown each year: two in 2008, five in 2009, nine in 2010.⁴⁵ Some, but not all, are co-located with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (U.S. or foreign, such as Polish, Lithuanian or Czech) and maneuver battalions.⁴⁶ However, that still leaves a shortfall in 2010 of 17 or more PRTs without Agribusiness Development Teams.

Assuming the United States will maintain a presence in Afghanistan for some years to come, we likewise may assume that PRTs, ADTs and other civilian development support will be needed for the foreseeable future. But with only 9 ADTs (in 2010) and 26 PRTs spread across a country of 33 million people nearly the size of Texas, there is a striking disparity between requirements for civilian development and reconstruction skills, and resources available to meet requirements.

A Proposed Model

Given the clear need to maximize “soft” power in Afghanistan (and likely other future theaters of operation), leaders at all levels have a duty to creatively and energetically view their missions broadly, not myopically, and bring to bear all skills resident within their units. Leveraging civilian skills found within Army Reserve Component formations can mitigate the shortfall between requirements for civilian skills and resources available. Of all Reserve Component units, an Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team’s robust size and combat capabilities give it the greatest depth and flexibility to exercise civilian-skills capacity in theater. Therefore, this model will focus on the BCT, though it could apply to any Army Reserve Component unit.

The Army National Guard has a total of 28 Brigade Combat Teams: 20 Infantry BCTs, 7 Heavy BCTs and 1 Stryker BCT.⁴⁷ Brigade Combat Teams – combat maneuver units – are the largest units in the Army National Guard personnel and

equipment-wise, ranging from about 3,400 Soldiers authorized for an Infantry Brigade Combat Team, to 3,700 for a Heavy Brigade, to 4,200 for a Stryker Brigade.⁴⁸

Importantly, each Brigade Headquarters is authorized a Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations section of a Major and Sergeant First Class.⁴⁹

To see generally what civilian skills reside within their units, National Guard leaders can use primarily the Civilian Employment Information (CEI) data base, along with others described herein. As mandated by Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 10204 (10 U.S.C. 10204), each Military Secretary must maintain adequate and current personnel records on members of its Reserve components, to include each member's civilian employment.⁵⁰ Employment-related information should be readily available to Services' mobilization planners and to the Department of Defense for all members of the Ready Reserve subject to involuntary recall to active duty under 10 U.S.C. Section 12304.⁵¹

Federal law also requires annual certification of the CEI program for all reserve armed forces. Certification requires the individual Soldier to access the data base and certify its accuracy or makes changes as needed. The Army National Guard is currently at 61.8% compliance for CEI annual certification.⁵²

The CEI data base admittedly has its limitations. It provides current civilian job occupations but does not provide credentialing. It does not show the type of degree a Soldier completed, just the level of education⁵³ (though later indicators show the data base has matured and can provide types of degree at least in some cases, perhaps in conjunction with other personnel data bases such as SIDPERS (Standard Installation/Division Personnel System) for National Guard or RLAS (Regional Level Applications Software) for Army Reserve), and it is based on the Soldier's own input. The Office of

the Secretary of Defense is considering allowing individuals to input more than one skill on the website for the purpose of calling up Soldiers to work as civilians with their civilian skill sets for nation building.⁵⁴

In practice, the data base appears functional in spite of its limitations. Colonel Jim Moore, commander of the Tennessee Army National Guard's Agribusiness Development Team, worked with Tennessee's J-1/Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, as he was putting together his ADT in early to mid-2008. From the CEI and SIDPERS, he was able to see the type of college degree (AS, BS/BA, MA/MS) and general major (agriculture, engineer, biology, etc.) of Soldiers across Tennessee, but the database did not specify what subset of agriculture or engineering the Soldier had emphasized.⁵⁵

Colonel Mike Chase's ADT from the Oklahoma Army National Guard began their Afghan tour in December 2009. Colonel Chase had used the CEI data base as a start but found it to be fairly inaccurate. It was limited by vague job description drop-down menus, did not take into account that agriculture might be a secondary source of employment, and did not indicate past work experience. For example, the data base listed one Soldier's primary occupation as Municipal Public Safety worker - Fire Fighter. He worked on average 12-15 days per month with the fire department, but he also ran over 400 head of cattle and annually put in several thousand acres of wheat, soy beans and other crops. The current formatting of the data base did not capture that kind of agricultural skill or occupation.⁵⁶

Oklahoma's Adjutant General also asked his subordinate commanders to canvass their ranks for personnel formally educated, or with practical experience, in agriculture, listing the skills being sought. The units replied with those who were

interested, and Colonel Chase conducted telephonic interviews. He found skills ranging from a First Sergeant who was a large animal veterinarian, to Soldiers that had been in Future Farmers of America in high school and had grown up on farms, to a USDA certified butcher, to a medic that turned out to be a bee keeper and a supply sergeant who was an ASE certified diesel mechanic. Colonel Chase's Pre-Deployment Site Survey (known as PDSS, where the commander visits the unit's expected location in theater, usually several months before mobilization) gave him a pretty good idea of his personnel needs, and he selected his team based on their resumes, interviews and his PDSS.⁵⁷

Though the CEI data base needs improvement and commanders must vigilantly emphasize accurate inputs, an Army National Guard commander still can use the CEI or similar data base to see generally the civilian skills and/or education that lie within the unit. The next question is the feasibility of employing civilian skills with no, or only a minimum of, additional Army training. The answer appears to be yes, albeit requiring ingenuity and work.

DA Pam 611-21, *Personnel Selection and Classification – Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, Chapter 4, Table 4-3, shows that civilian skills acquired outside the Army are valid and transferable to Army Civil Affairs functions, apparently without additional Army-specific CA training. For example, an Economist (Additional Skill Identifier 6C) requires:

Masters degree in economics, finance, international business, or business administration and/or a minimum of 5 years civilian experience in economics, banking, public finance, or foreign/domestic development or a related field,

with qualifications simply validated by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.⁵⁸

Further in example, a Public Safety Officer (Additional Skill Identifier 6H) requires:

Bachelor degree in criminology, fire science, police science, corrections management, or public administration and/or 3 years practical experience in a supervisory or management position in a government related public safety field or equivalent private industry position.

Again, qualifications are simply validated by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Ft. Bragg.⁵⁹

Additional examples include Public Education, Civil Supply, Public Transportation, Public Facilities, Public Safety, Public Communications and Agricultural Officers (Additional Skill Identifiers 6C through 6H). All list civilian educational and/or experiential requirements and then simply “validation” by the Director, Special Operations Proponency of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.⁶⁰

This model does not require the Army to award an Additional Skill Identifier, though. That would put form over substance. The point simply is that civilian skills already possessed by a Soldier are usable and transferable – now – for military purposes.

Another question is how to incorporate usable civilian skills into the Reserve Component unit’s pre- and post-mobilization training. Under today’s Train-Mobilize-Deploy model, the unit receives its Notification of Sourcing (notice that it is being

selected (“sourced”) for an overseas mission) about one year before receiving its Alert order and about two years before its Mobilization Date (the date the unit transitions from Reserve to active federal status). Upon receiving Notification of Sourcing, the commander conducts mission analysis and, in coordination with First U.S. Army (the three star command in U.S. Forces Command charged with executing post-mobilization training), develops the unit’s pre- and post-mobilization training plans.⁶¹

Army doctrine reinforces that a commander and staff must always consider the civilian components within the area of operations.⁶² To do this, the commander and staff could engage (this paper’s model strongly suggests *should engage*) the unit’s in-theater counterpart unit, as well as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Agribusiness Development Teams and any theater or combined/joint commands in the area of operations to mine as much data as possible – names, locations, lines of civilian project funding, constraints and enablers, estimates of civil systems/nodes/linkages, and any other information relevant to a full assessment of the Civil Affairs and related operating environment. From this assessment, the commander would then estimate civilian skills usable in theater.

This paper’s model then calls for the commander to review the Civilian Employment Information (or similar) data base to match the unit’s civilian skills to estimated in-theater requirements. The commander identifies those civilian skills to First Army, who in turn could coordinate with the Civil Affairs proponent agency (John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center) for a Civil Affairs mobile training team (MTT), within capabilities. In conjunction with the Civil Affairs Soldiers organic to the mobilizing

Brigade Headquarters, the mobile training team could train selected Soldiers in Civil Affairs concepts and/or skills during pre- and/or post-mobilization.

Note, though, that a mobile training team is not critical to this model but would simply complement it. The goal would be to familiarize Soldiers with Civil Affairs concepts to enable them to better use their civilian skills in theater, not to qualify Soldiers with an Additional Skill Identifier for their Military Occupational Specialty (though that would be an added benefit). For example, Agribusiness Development Teams have shown that Soldiers can effectively apply civilian-acquired skills without formal Civil Affairs training.

Prior to its Mobilization Date, Army National Guard units customarily train with their state's Pre- and Post-mobilization Training Assistance Element (PTAE). This training is usually a mix of regular two-day drill weekends, some extended three- or four-day drill weekends, and often for larger units an extended training period of two or more weeks immediately prior to Mobilization Date (this period is commonly called "contiguous training" or "contiguous mobilization," being contiguous to post-mobilization training).⁶³

Units then mobilize to active federal duty and fall under command and control of First Army for post-mobilization training, which varies in duration depending upon the size of the unit. Brigade Combat Teams are modeled for 45 to 60 days of post-mobilization training. Upon completion of all training, the First Army commander certifies the unit is ready (assuming it is), and it deploys to theater for the balance of its 12 month mobilization period.⁶⁴

Planning and executing pre- and post-mobilization training is enormously challenging, especially so for a large unit such as a Brigade Combat Team. Also, since each BCT's civilian skills sets and area of operations will differ, so will each training plan. Nevertheless, the clear and pressing need for "soft" skills dictates that the mobilizing commander, as well as First Army and U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), empower civilian skill development during pre-deployment training and that the unit use "soft" power in theater.

Upon deployment to theater, this model calls for the Brigade to execute its assigned mission, along with the "soft" mission within capabilities. The Provincial Reconstruction Team is the most logical point of contact to engage the BCT's civilian skills in theater. A fully staffed PRT would have Department of State, USAID and USDA representatives, and their expertise would guide employment of the BCT's "soft power."

PRTs are not everywhere, however, but that should not impede the creative commander. For example, Captain Ryan Babcock, member of an Army National Guard Embedded Training Team (ETT) with ranching and Forest Service experience, over 2007 to 2008 built a demonstration farm of about 7 acres with about a thousand fruit trees, corn, cotton, wheat and vegetables and two drip-irrigation greenhouses in the Shindand District of Herat Province, Afghanistan, with financing from CERP (Commander's Emergency Response Program) and USAID. He did this all without a PRT and in addition to accomplishing his ETT mission.⁶⁵ Captain Babcock also built village agriculture plots consisting of two to three varieties of fruit trees, grapes, and vegetables (wheat, watermelons, tomatoes etc.), depending on the area. A typical plot would involve about 1 acre of land, include layout and sometimes a well with a storage

tank if the area lacked one. “It is amazing to me even now that these projects cost as little as \$500 each when compared to costlier ones,” Captain Babcock said.⁶⁶ To Babcock, a dozen vineyards for \$3000 was worth more than a mile of paved road and at a fraction of the cost.⁶⁷

Babcock’s flagship project was the Shindand Agriculture Station. Using an old grape arbor and an irrigation ditch as the base, he expanded out to about 50 acres to include a fish hatchery, apiary for honey production, a honey bottling room, about 9000 fruit trees, thousands of grapes, a four season greenhouse, and living quarters to include a classroom. This project still serves as an agricultural teaching and research center, including courses in bee husbandry. Total cost was \$210,000, about that of a school. Captain Babcock even left structures suitable for a PRT if one were to be created there.⁶⁸

[T]his style of project is what is needed. We were able to get an NGO to run it, and it has taken off. The country is based on agriculture Many [U.S.] soldiers possess these skills ... and can be effectively utilized in ways that are limitless. No other area that I am aware of has such an impact for the amount of investment.⁶⁹

Captain Babcock’s chain of command became very supportive once results started to come in and the positive operational effect became apparent. Importantly, such projects do require strong chain of command support, both to establish the projects and to assure their success.⁷⁰

Conclusion

Secretary of Defense Gates has recognized that economic development, rule of law, governance, public services and other civilian capabilities are indispensable to any lasting success, indeed to victory itself, in achieving a political objective in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere.⁷¹ Yet current and projected gaps in capacity other U.S.

governmental agencies likely will require the Department of Defense to fill those gaps.⁷² Army Civil Affairs Soldiers address the civilian capacity shortfall, yet Civil Affairs operations, too, are significantly constrained by current operations tempo.

This paper proposes a model by which the Department of Defense can better meet the demand for Civil Affairs and similar capability by leveraging civilian “soft” skills within Reserve Component units, Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams in particular. In this model, the commander assesses not only the assigned mission but also civilian skills usable in theater. Through the Civilian Employment Information data base (while noting its shortcomings), the commander would see many of the civilian skills held by his or her Soldiers, incorporate Civil Affairs into pre- and post-mobilization training and then execute “soft” skills in theater within capabilities, in addition to the assigned mission. Of the Army’s Reserve Component units, National Guard Brigade Combat Teams have the greatest operational flexibility and depth of Citizen-Soldiers and thus can bring to bear the most civilian skills, along with accomplishing other assigned missions in theater.

In today’s era of persistent conflict, so often waged in the people’s environment, we must wield all national capability and capacity. Provincial Reconstruction, Civil Affairs and Agribusiness Development Teams are effective but cannot meet all demand for “soft” power in theater. The United States still has untapped “soft” resources – the civilian skills within our Reserve Component units – which we can and should leverage. Current and future operations demand nothing less.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, remarks to Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., January 26, 2008, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1211> (accessed 13 Dec 09).

² Ibid.

³ Nathan Freier, "The Defense Identity Crisis: It's a Hybrid World," *Parameters* 34, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 93.

⁴ Nathan Freier, "Nature of War II: Future Warfare in an Era of Persistent Conflict," lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 9, 2009, cited with permission of Mr. Freier.

⁵ Freier, "The Defense Identity Crisis: It's a Hybrid World," 93.

⁶ Gates, remarks to Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., January 26, 2008.

⁷ Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 28 November 2005), 2 (hereafter cited as DoDD 3000.05).

⁸ Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05, *Stability Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 16 September 2009), 2-3. (DoDI 3000.05 reissued DoDD 3000.05).

⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, October 6, 2008), 1-15 (citing DoDD 3000.05).

¹⁰ DoDI 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, Para 11.d.

¹¹ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 27, 2008), 2-1.

¹² Ibid, 2-3.

¹³ Ibid, 2-5.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, 2-5.

¹⁵ Ibid, vii.

¹⁶ DoDD 3000.05, 2.

¹⁷ U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, remarks with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., October 5, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130315.htm> (accessed 13 Dec 09).

¹⁸ USAID Home Page, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.Facts.aspx> (accessed 13 Dec 09).

¹⁹ Jacob J. Lew, Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., December 9, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/remarks/2009/133338.htm> (accessed 13 Dec 09).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Lew, Briefing on Progress Made in Civilian Hiring in Afghanistan, Washington, D.C., October 26, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/remarks/2009/123025.htm> (accessed 13 Dec 09).

²² Paul Jones, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., December 7, 2009, http://www.state.gov/s/special_rep_afghanistan_pakistan/133262.htm (accessed 13 Dec 09).

²³ USAID-Afghanistan web page, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Program.31b.aspx> (accessed 13 Dec 09).

²⁴ Lew, Briefing on Progress Made in Civilian Hiring in Afghanistan.

²⁵ Gates, remarks with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, George Washington University.

²⁶ U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, September 2006), v.

²⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, 3-20.

²⁸ Ninety four percent of the Department of Defense's CA forces are found in the U.S. Army Reserve CA ranks – four civil affairs commands, seven subordinate brigades and 28 battalions. U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC(A)) home page, <http://www.usacapoc.army.mil/facts-ca.html> (accessed 15 Dec 09).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ USACAPOC(A)) home page, <http://www.usacapoc.army.mil/facts-capoc.html> (accessed 15 Dec 09).

³¹ U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2-2 and 2-7 to 2-14.

³² William R. Florig, *Theater Civil Affairs Soldiers – A Force at Risk*, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006 (Washington, D.C.), 60, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i43/17%20JFQ43%20Florig.pdf (accessed 18 Dec 09).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Author's personal knowledge from working Reserve Component and related issues in Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 2008 to July 2009. Also, author's interview with Lieutenant Colonel Ernesto Sirvas, Civil Affairs officer and student in the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 18 Dec 09.

³⁵ Pete Geren and George W. Casey, Jr., *2009 Army Posture Statement*, 7 May 2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2009), Addendum E, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/addenda/addenda_e.html (accessed 16 Dec 09). NOTE: This and the next three End Notes are also based upon the author's review of the 2009 Strategy Research Project of Lieutenant Colonel Miguel A. Castellanos, United States Army Reserve, U.S. Army War College Class of 2009, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498021&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed 16 Dec 09).

³⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Miguel A. Castellanos, *Civil Affairs - Building the Force to Meet Its Future Challenges*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 20, 2009), 3 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498021&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed 16 Dec 09).

³⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth Medina, Office of the Chief Army Reserve Strategy and Integration Office, interview by LTC Miguel A. Castellanos, Carlisle, PA, October 16, 2008 (see also End Note next above).

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Officers at Army National Guard Readiness Center, Arlington, Virginia, author's email correspondence and review of draft documents provided author, October 20, 2009.

⁴⁰ Pete Geren and George W. Casey, Jr., *2009 Army Posture Statement*, Army National Guard (ARNG) Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) Information Paper, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/arng_agribusiness_development_team.html (accessed 16 Dec 09). "...probably most importantly..." is author's comment.

⁴¹ Colonel Jim D. Moore, commander of the Tennessee Agribusiness Development Team, email correspondence with author, December 4, 2009.

⁴² Pete Geren and George W. Casey, Jr., *2009 Army Posture Statement*, Army National Guard (ARNG) Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) Information Paper.

⁴³ Colonel Jim D. Moore, email correspondence with author, December 13, 2009.

⁴⁴ Colonel Jim D. Moore, email correspondence with author, December 14, 2009.

⁴⁵ Colonel Jim D. Moore, email correspondence with author, December 16, 2009.

⁴⁶ Colonel Jim D. Moore, email correspondence with author, December 19, 2009.

⁴⁷ Major James D. Theut, NBG-ARF-F (Force Management - Futures), email correspondence with author, December 15, 2009.

⁴⁸ Major Cory Chassé, NBG-ARF-C (Force Structure), email correspondence with author, December 16, 2009. The Infantry Brigade Combat Team (~3,400 authorized) has six organic battalions: two Infantry, one each Fires (artillery), Support, and Special Troops, and a Reconnaissance squadron (approximately battalion size). The Heavy Brigade Combat Team (~3,700 authorized) has six organic battalions as well. Instead of Infantry battalions, it has two combined arms battalions of two tank companies and two mechanized infantry companies each.

Other battalions are roughly equivalent to those in the Infantry Brigade Combat Team. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (~4200 authorized) has three Stryker battalions, Fires and Support battalions, a Reconnaissance squadron, and companies of Military Intelligence, Network Support, Anti-tank and Engineers. Other Army National Guard units denoted as Brigades include Fires (~1,100 authorized); Maneuver Enhancement (~600 in Headquarters and organic units; ~3,500 with assigned, attached and operational controlled [OPCON]); Battlefield Surveillance (~1,000 in the organic formation; ~2,500 with assigned, attached and OPCON); and Sustainment Brigades (~400 in Headquarters; other units tailored to the mission); and a variety of Combat Aviation Brigades.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ *Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 10204*. Personnel records states:

(a) The Secretary concerned shall maintain adequate and current personnel records of each member of the reserve components under the Secretary's jurisdiction showing the following with respect to the member:

- (1) Physical condition.
- (2) Dependency status.
- (3) Military qualifications.
- (4) **Civilian occupational skills.**
- (5) Availability for service.
- (6) Such other information as the Secretary concerned may prescribe.

(b) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of each military department shall maintain a record of the number of members of each class of each reserve component who, during each fiscal year, have participated satisfactorily in active duty for training and inactive duty training with pay.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=10204&url=/uscode/html/usc_ode10/usc_sec_10_00010204----000-.html (accessed 18 Dec 09) (emphasis added).

⁵¹ Information Paper, NGB-ARP, dated 25 Jun 09, provided author by email from Lieutenant Colonel Sharon D. Moore, Chief, Systems Branch, NGB-ARP-S, 20 Oct 09. See also 10 U.S.C. Section 10204, End Note next above, and DoDI 3000.05, Para 11.b. (2), End Note 8, above.

⁵² Calvin Noble, NGB-ARP, telephone conversation with author March 16, 2010. Data is current as of March 11, 2010, from Defense Manpower Data Center. CEI "certification" requires a Soldier at least annually to access the data base and update his or her status or other information, noting changes as applicable.

⁵³ Colonel Marianne Watson, Army National Guard G-1, NGB-ARP, email correspondence with author, October 16, 2009. [However, see End Note 55 for discussion of Colonel Jim

Moore's use of this, or a similar, database when recruiting his Agribusiness Development Team across Tennessee.]

⁵⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Sharon D. Moore, email correspondence with author, October 20, 2009.

⁵⁵ Colonel Jim D. Moore, December 14, 2009.

⁵⁶ Colonel Amos M. Chase, email correspondence with author, January 28, 2009.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21, *Personnel Selection and Classification – Military Occupation Classification and Structure* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, January 2007), Table 4-3, available at <https://smartbook.armyg1.pentagon.mil/DA%20PAM%2061121/Forms/AllItems.aspx?RootFolder=%2fDA%20PAM%2061121%2fChapter%2004%20Officer%20Skill%20Identifiers&FolderCTID=&View=%7b5589D469%2d2970%2d4C21%2db29F%2d1D13963BC436%7d> (accessed 15 Jan 10).

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid. (The author was unable to find any requirement defining “validation.”)

⁶¹ Based upon author's experience as Executive Officer of a Training Brigade in First Army, July 2006 to March 2008, and as Action Officer for Reserve Component Integration, Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7, The Pentagon, March 2008 to July 2009.

⁶² U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, v.

⁶³ Based upon author's experience as described in End Note 61, above. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently granted limited authority for contiguous pre-mobilization training. See Robert M. Gates, remarks to National Guard Bureau Senior Leadership Conference, National Harbor, Maryland, November 19, 2009, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1396> (accessed 18 Dec 09).

⁶⁴ A Reserve Component unit's 12 month mobilization period is based upon Secretary of Defense Gates' "Utilization of the Total Force" Memorandum, 19 Jan 07. See also Lt. Col. Roy Delaney, *The Total Force Utilization Policy: Compensation and You*, Joint Matters, http://www.ameriforce.net/PDF/rng_sept07/RNG_Sept07_006-008.pdf (accessed 18 Dec 09).

⁶⁵ Captain Ryan T. Babcock, Sr., Oregon Army National Guard, email correspondence with author, December 5 and 6, 2009. Confirmed by author's email correspondence with others with personal knowledge.

⁶⁶ Babcock, email correspondence with author, December 5, 2009.

⁶⁷ Babcock, email correspondence with author, March 17, 2009.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Colonel (Retired) James Klingaman, former Embedded Training Team commander of Captain Ryan Babcock, telephone conversation with author, February 8, 2010.

⁷¹ Gates, remarks to Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., January 26, 2008.

⁷² Freier, "The Defense Identity Crisis: It's a Hybrid World," 93.

