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Implications of a Changing NATO
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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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This timely Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provides senior diplomatic-military leaders a clear picture of the impact to expect from the new NATO Strategic Concept. The NATO Strategic Concept will be released at the end of this year at the summit in Lisbon, Portugal. The author, Lieutenant Colonel Phillip R. Cuccia, argues that getting the new NATO Strategic Concept right is imperative, not only for the U.S. participation and goals within the Alliance but for the health of the Alliance itself. By looking at external and internal NATO threats, Lieutenant Colonel Cuccia argues that the biggest threat to NATO now is the “internal threat” caused by the absence of consensus over what the perceived “external threat” to NATO is.

This monograph focuses on recent trends within the Alliance and their implications. It provides senior military and political leaders with a discussion of these trends and the changing composition (political geography) of the NATO nations and how that could impact the nature of the Alliance.

The monograph goes beyond merely explaining the problems NATO faces. In addition to examining the problem, Lieutenant Colonel Cuccia explores four possible scenarios for the future of NATO and recommends conceptual solutions which he argues should be included in the new NATO Strategic Concept.

The outcome of the new Strategic Concept will shape the Atlantic as well as the global strategic environment well into the future. The Strategic Studies
Institute is pleased to offer this insightful monograph as a contribution to the debate on this important Atlantic security issue.

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SUMMARY

NATO officials plan to unveil the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Strategic Concept during the Alliance’s summit in Portugal at the end of 2010. This monograph focuses on the impact that the Strategic Concept will have on the Alliance. This analysis describes recent trends within NATO and their implications, and provides senior military and political leaders with a discussion of the changing composition of the NATO nations and the impact of these changes on the nature of the Alliance. The monograph describes four possible scenarios of what NATO could look like in the future so as to give senior leaders thoughts to consider while instituting NATO policy.

In terms of NATO relevance, the prevailing thought at the close of the Cold War was that NATO needed to find a suitable common threat to substitute for the former Soviet Union. That role was initially filled by the threat of destabilization with the crisis in the Balkans and then by the NATO response to September 11, 2001 (9/11) and global terrorism. NATO’s response was guided by a Strategic Concept written in 1999 which did not directly address global terrorism. The Strategic Concept was supplemented in 2006 with the Comprehensive Political Guidance which provided a framework and political direction for NATO’s continuing transformation and set priorities for all Alliance capability issues for the following 10 to 15 years.

The NATO Alliance has now reached its 60th birthday and is currently in the middle of updating and rewriting the new Strategic Concept. The Alliance, which has grown to 28 countries, is facing problems with changing demographics, an awkward relationship with Russia, a war in Afghanistan, and threats
of global jihad. Muslim immigration into Europe and population aging will have a great impact on European views of the Alliance. NATO must decide how closely it wants to work and coordinate with Russia in future endeavors. The most important issue at hand is how NATO is going to fare coming out of the war in Afghanistan. The desired NATO outcome needs to be defined clearly. It is imperative that the New Strategic Concept address NATO goals in Afghanistan and the ways and means of accomplishing those goals. Defined goals will give member nations objectives while formulating national defense plans. Getting the Strategic Concept right is the first step in maintaining the health of the Alliance.

This monograph examines four possible future scenarios for NATO: the U.S. leadership relationship with NATO continues on the same path; the U.S. leadership in NATO increases; the European Union (EU) leadership in NATO increases; and the NATO Alliance breaks apart. The scenarios present a range of short- and long-term challenges for the future. The prominent short-term challenge is consensus on the 2010 Strategic Concept. If well thought out, it will set the conditions for both short- and long-term success.

NATO must decide whether to “go global” or concentrate on the collective defense of Europe. But those options are not mutually exclusive. U.S. policymakers must ensure that NATO policy toward Russia is clear. NATO’s relationship with Russia must be based on openness, both when the two sides agree and when they disagree. The new Strategic Concept must identify NATO goals in Afghanistan and indicate how they will be attained. The biggest threat to NATO now is the “internal threat” caused by the absence of consensus over what the perceived “external threat” to NATO is.
IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING NATO

Everything has to change in order for everything to stay the same.¹

Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampeduse

“Transformation” has been a major North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) theme ever since the creation of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) at the 2002 Prague Summit.² Due to the accelerating pace of technological, political, and social changes, thinking about the future of NATO is now more important than ever. Its very relevance is at stake. ACT, the institution responsible for studying and recommending changes within NATO, has as its vision statement that it is “NATO’s leading agent for change, driving, facilitating, and advocating continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to maintain and enhance the military relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance.”³ But execution of the changes ACT recommends depends upon the political wishes and collective views of the individual sovereign governments which comprise NATO. The operative question is what changes are necessary for the transatlantic relationship to function in the 21st century?

NATO is indeed changing. In August 2009, the new Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced in his first press conference that by transforming the way NATO does business, he wants to see “NATO reach its full potential as a pillar of global security.”⁴ His statement is rife with implications. It acknowledges that NATO must continue to transform in order to reach its full potential in the area of global security. It describes NATO as a global security
organization. This means it must look outside of its geographic borders to consider a wider range of security, and that it is no longer simply a trans-Atlantic alliance. It also implies that NATO will work with other security organizations in a global effort as several pillars rely on one another to support a massive structure. How then will the United States formulate policy in the future with regards to this growing task which NATO is taking on?

The NATO Alliance celebrated its 60th birthday in April 2009 and is currently in the middle of updating and rewriting a new Strategic Concept which will be unveiled at the NATO summit in Portugal in late 2010. This reassessment is timely. History shows that an alliance of nations cannot exist without a common enemy, or at least the perception of a common threat. The alliance that defeated Napoleon in 1814 began to break up soon after the French emperor abdicated and was exiled to Elba and then quickly reassembled when Napoleon returned to Paris, reaching its high point with the battle of Waterloo. Once again, after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the alliance slowly began to break apart when Napoleon, “the threat,” was exiled to St. Helena. The alliance which the congress created, however, defined the geopolitical structure in Europe until 1848 when a wave of revolutions swept Europe and put an end to that alliance structure. That alliance failed to adapt to the changes taking place in Europe which were clearly visible beginning with the revolutions of 1830. The main structural change which took place was within the countries themselves. The “threat” was from within. The alliance faltered and became irrelevant.

In terms of NATO relevance, the prevailing thought at the close of the Cold War was that NATO needed
to find a suitable common threat to substitute for the former Soviet Union. That role was initially filled by the threat of destabilization with the crisis in the Balkans and then by the NATO response to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) and global terrorism. But will the current substitute for the former threat prevail in holding NATO together? Or is there a developing threat to the existence of NATO from within? Alternatively, could the divisions over the approach to countering global terrorism and the lackluster response to Russia’s invasion of Georgia be simply a symptom of NATO’s growing pains? Some analysis and “futuring” is in order.

NATO-sponsored thinking about its own future has been led by the ACT-sponsored Multiple Futures Project (MFP). In addition, the NATO Research and Technology Organization (RTO) leads the Joint Operations 2030 project.5 Nationally, U.S. organizations conducting research concerning the future of NATO include the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of the National Defense University, the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and the Heritage Foundation.6 Other NATO countries likewise have institutions conducting similar research on the future of NATO, of which the Danish Institute for International Studies,7 the Estonian International Centre for Defence Studies, and the Royal United Services Institute are just a few.8 These organizations and others, as well as many individuals, have produced a vast array of studies and opinions concerning what lies ahead for NATO.9

This monograph will capitalize on that body of research and present four future scenarios for con-
sideration, along with recommendations for a way ahead. First, however, the lead section will present a current snapshot of NATO by examining the current state of affairs within NATO and its partners today. The analysis will then extend into the near future to examine what is in store for the current NATO members. Then it will look at potential threats to NATO. These are divided into external and internal threats. In this regard, the analysis will take into consideration the awkward relationship NATO has had with Russia since the 9/11 attacks. It will also look at NATO in Afghanistan and the threat of the global jihadists.

In the second section, NATO futures studies will be described, and four futures, which look out to the year 2025, will be presented. Conclusions and recommendations are given in the third section.

NATO IN CONTEXT

Current State of Affairs within the NATO Alliance.

The year 2009 saw some significant changes for NATO. For the first time in the history of the Alliance, the military commander came from the Navy, with the U.S. selection of Admiral James Stavridis as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Even more significant was the selection of a French general as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). In March, France rejoined NATO’s Integrated Military Structure (IMS), ending a 43-year anomaly initiated by President Charles de Gaulle.

Today, NATO may not be performing as the well-oiled machine that most wish it would be, but it certainly is performing a lot better than it was in 2002 and 2003, which was clearly one of the most difficult
periods of its 60 years of existence. Just 2 months after NATO declared an Article 5 emergency for the first time in its history in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States turned aside offers of assistance for the invasion of Afghanistan because of the perception of lack of political will to employ force at effective levels. In addition, some European forces lacked the precision strike capabilities desired even if the political will was present to use those weapons. European partners became embarrassed as they were effectively marginalized. This embarrassment, in part, led to the 2002 Prague Summit decision to create ACT and launch the NATO Response Force (NRF) but the contentious intra-Alliance debate over the invasion of Iraq soon caused fissures between the U.S./U.K. sub-coalition and its German and French counterpart. In addition, diverging views on addressing terrorism began to appear publicly in the United States and some European NATO countries. This conformed to the traditional view of many European countries that terrorism was more a law enforcement issue than a military one. Therefore, for these countries, internal security trumps collective defense, and Article 5 has less significance. For example, after the Madrid terrorist train bombing killed 191 and wounded more than 1,400 in 2004, Spain did not want to invoke Article 5 but instead increased its interior ministry budget.

The Alliance settled on a limited role in Iraq with a small training mission. Afghanistan was its priority. The next time that the Alliance was pressed on a major decision with regard to an ongoing war was during the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. NATO did not come to a unified decision for action on the Georgia issue. Consensus by NATO remains dependent on each individual member country’s foreign policy.
NATO’s response to such events is made more complicated by the fact that its charter was written in 1949 at the beginning of the Cold War. It is also guided by a Strategic Concept written in 1999—2 years before 9/11—which did not address directly the threat of global terrorism. This Strategic Concept was supplemented in November 2006 at the Riga Summit with the endorsement of the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG). The CPG provided a framework and political direction for NATO’s continuing transformation, and set out the priorities for all Alliance capability issues for the following 10 to 15 years.

**NATO Countries Today.**

With the last round of additions in 2009 (Albania and Croatia), NATO has grown to 28 countries, and the door remains open for further expansion. NATO is ready to invite the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into the fold as soon as a mutually acceptable name for that country is agreed to within the United Nations (UN). In addition, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia aspire to become members, and at Bucharest, Romania, in April 2008, NATO welcomed the Ukraine’s and Georgia’s desire for membership. The summit declaration stated, “We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.” Four months later, Russia invaded Georgia and recognized the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia’s move effectively prevents Georgia from joining NATO with its current borders as recognized by the UN.

The 28 nations making up today’s NATO vary in their geography, history, and national concepts of such things as human rights and views of national and
collective defense. These differences drive their decisions on what organizations they join and how they contribute to those organizations. Figure 1 represents countries which are currently members of NATO, the EU, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). All of the states in Figure 1 are members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with the exception of China. While Moscow works to keep the CIS within its sphere of influence, it is important to note that all members of the CIS, including Russia, are also members of the PfP. Moscow’s influence, however, is contested. The presidents of CIS countries Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and associate member Turkmenistan opted not to attend the October 9, 2009, CIS Summit in Moldova. The Ukraine, which was one of the three charter members of the CIS, is no longer officially a member but maintains participant status. Georgia left the organization altogether in August 2009. As far back as 2006, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s office announced that “Georgia has taken a course to join NATO, and it cannot be part of two military structures simultaneously.”

If the Ukraine and Georgia do join NATO, then they will fall into the geo-political alliance structure of those states outside of the EU but within NATO: the United States, Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Croatia, Canada, and Albania. Unlike Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, they will be the only former Soviet Republics to be part of NATO but not the EU. Ukraine and Georgia then might try to join the EU following in the footsteps of other former Soviet Republics and Eastern Bloc countries which went through the same process.
Figure 1. NATO and the System of Alliances.

NATO today has grown considerably and is quite different in its composition from the original 12 charter members. The newer members have taken their place along with the older members in NATO’s current struggles. In a recent Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) study titled *New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers?*, Joel Hillison builds on the Deputy Secretary General of NATO Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero’s statement that “burden-sharing is first and foremost a political issue and has to do with political will.” Hillison points out that given current trends, “new member states will be eager to contribute to the alliance but will be constrained by political and military capability shortfalls.” This will affect burden-sharing decisions. With NATO-Russian rela-
tions deteriorating, many Alliance members have become more sensitive to Moscow’s increased military expenditures, especially after the invasion of Georgia. Hillison sees two possible outcomes. The first is that as insecurity and dissension increase, NATO members may become polarized between those seeking to work with Russia on a range of issues and those wishing to take a more firm stand. The second possibility is that the newer Alliance members may shift their focus toward territorial defense at the expense of expeditionary NATO missions.

NATO Countries in the Future: Changing Demographics.

The Alliance’s members are also changing internally. This may create challenges for the EU and NATO alike. According to the Global Trends 2025 survey, Western Europe’s Muslim population is between 15 and 18 million. France’s population was 8 percent Muslim in 2003. Most demographers predict that the Muslim population in Europe will grow to at least 10 percent by 2020. This trend will have a great impact on “Old Europe,” given that many of the Eastern EU countries have negligible Muslim populations. This change will no doubt affect the body politic within these countries in the future. Muslim integration in Europe will likely increase sensitivity to the potential domestic repercussions of policies in the Middle East which include aligning too closely with the United States on actions viewed as pro-Israel.

Some may be tempted to use statistics to argue that religion will not have an effect on the future relationship between the United States and Europe within NATO. For example, a 2008 survey demonstrated that
religion does not necessarily shape views of transatlantic ties. Turkish responses indicated that there was:

. . . little difference in the desirability of EU leadership among those who pray five times a day regularly (21%), sometimes (23%), or never (24%), nor in the desirability of U.S. leadership among those who pray five times a day regularly (6%), sometimes (9%), or never (7%). Additionally, there were small differences in the percentages of those who viewed EU membership as a good thing among those who pray five times a day regularly (41%), sometimes (41%), or never (45%) and in those who felt NATO is essential among those who pray five times a day regularly (34%), sometimes (39%), or never (40%).

But one must be careful with these statistics. The purpose of the section was to describe only Turkey’s relationship with the United States, EU, and the Alliance.

NATO is viewed negatively in the Middle East. This stems from the collective Arab public view that NATO has no separate identity from that of the Western powers which compose the Alliance. Another factor contributing to that negative image is the fact that Turkey is part of the Alliance. Although Turkey is predominantly Muslim and geographically both European and Middle Eastern, its NATO membership does not improve the Arab view of NATO. This is because Turkey is an avowed secular state (which would explain the ambivalent statistics above), and because Turkey has had its own imperial dominance in the region when it ruled the area as the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, future NATO political decisions toward a skeptical Middle East may be shaped by a proportionally increasing Muslim population within the NATO countries making the decisions. Already, according
to Jeffrey Simon of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, “Muslim immigration has contributed to European NATO’s increasing focus on internal security (rather than defense) and will likely have an impact on Europe’s political relations with the external Islamic world.”

The pace of population aging has brought the developed countries—with the exception of the United States and a few others—to a demographic “tipping point.” Almost 7 of every 10 people in these developed countries are in the traditional working years (ages 15 to 64). This is the highest level ever and, according to experts, it is likely that it will never be so high again. In most developed countries, the ratio of seniors (age 65 and older) to the working-age population will grow at the fastest rate during the next 2 decades (2010s and 2020s). This will in turn increase the financial strain on senior benefit programs. In 2010, there will be roughly one senior for every four working-age people in these developed countries, and this ratio will increase to one to three, or higher, by 2025. In Western Europe, predictions show that the United Kingdom (UK), France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries will likely maintain the highest fertility rates but will remain below two children per woman. The rest of Western Europe probably will stay below the 1.5 child per woman fertility rate—far below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. This overall change in the population of Europe will have an effect on the political makeup of the countries. As more money is diverted to care for the elderly, less money may be available for defense budgets.

The overall declining population of Europe because of the low fertility rate, will also affect the makeup of the military structures within the countries of the al-
liance. Given current trends, the U.S. working population will increase from 186 million in 2005 to 255 million in 2050. In stark contrast, European NATO members will experience a population decline and a rise in median age to 47 in 2050. The number of people at the age for military service will fall considerably, and some European allies may have to make significant changes to be able to maintain a viable military.

The political leaders of NATO countries in the future will make decisions based on the composition of their electorates which will reflect the demographic predictions outlined here. A shrinking and aging electorate in European countries could result in smaller armies and more money devoted toward senior medical programs. A growing Muslim population would more than likely influence decisions about NATO’s approach toward intervention in predominately Muslim countries. This will have an impact on the number and location of NATO out-of-area operations. It is probable that the Muslim electorate in Europe would discourage those NATO out-of-area military operations viewed as anti-Muslim. The views of the collective electorate may even cause the policymakers to cast doubt on the need for NATO as a collective security organization and thus present a threat from within to NATO’s continued existence.

**Potential Threats to NATO.**

Threats to NATO can be conceptualized as two types. The first, external, are nations or a collection thereof which threaten war or at least ill will toward the NATO nations. Another external threat is instability of a nonmember state which challenges NATO members directly (Afghanistan), or indirectly
(Kosovo), or potentially destabilizes an area of concern (Sudan). The second type, internal, comes from an event, political decision, or series of these which threatens the integrity of the Alliance. This second type is a much more serious threat. NATO out-of-area stability operations are debated within the Alliance. The question is what level of force is NATO willing to engage to conduct these operations? NATO has had its problems with caveats and the level of kinetic force it is willing to employ. It is time that the member states accept that NATO is an entity of 28 nations where decisions are based on consensus. NATO has to acknowledge that there is little political will in many member states to use kinetic force in these out-of-area operations. NATO can agree, however, that it can contribute much in the area of humanitarian assistance in these operations.

The biggest threat to NATO now is the “internal threat” of the absence of consensus over what the perceived “external threat” to NATO is. The most pressing current threat to NATO’s existence is clearly the ongoing war in Afghanistan—not the impending destruction of NATO forces on the battlefield, but the weakening of the Alliance over the political controversy associated with a way forward in Afghanistan.

Some states appear to be a threat to NATO but in reality do not rise to that status. The SCO, established in 2001, has been touted as an anti-Western alliance springing up in the middle of Eurasia to provide the member states Russia and China an opportunity for regional dominance if they convince India and Iran to join. But this is far-fetched, as the SCO has not become more than the sum of its parts—two of the largest countries in the world. The SCO is not like NATO, as it is not an alliance and it has no permanently commit-
ted military capabilities or command arrangements. It is better described as an intergovernmental mutual-security organization which conducts combined military exercises. The next exercise, entitled “Peace Mission 2010,” will be held in Southern Kazakhstan. Russia sees the SCO as a useful tool to advance its interests in Central Asia. Moscow, which remains deeply suspicious of Beijing, shares only a few goals with China in Central Asia. China has been content to let Russia and the United States provide military security in the region while it focuses on its economic program. Iran has observer status in the SCO and has sought to join it while picking up support from both Moscow and Beijing. The SCO could become more menacing, but this is not likely.

An apparently stronger argument for a potential rival to NATO in the form of a bona fide military alliance—which also involves Russia—is the CSTO. This organization, chartered in 2002, grew out of an earlier arrangement introduced in 1992 as a collective security organization for the CIS (see Figure 1). With a history of states joining and leaving the organization, it now consists of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. On February 4, 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that the CSTO would set up a rapid-reaction force based in Russia, and that it would be just as good as comparable NATO forces. However, the CSTO’s first Rapid Reaction exercise for their Collective Operational Reaction Force (CORF) got off to a discouraging start in August 2009 because of deep divisions concerning the creation, use, and development of the force. Uzbekistan refused to send any troops to the CSTO and also scaled back on an SCO military exercise. More recently, however, the Russian business
daily *Kommersant* reported that Moscow had made a potential diplomatic breakthrough in that the CSTO intends to sign an agreement with the UN within 18 months that would allow the CSTO to act beyond its borders in future joint peacekeeping and counterterrorist operations. The CSTO Secretary General even stated that this might draw the organization closer to NATO. The plan, similar to the NATO-UN agreement signed in 2008, allows cooperation across a spectrum of security issues which include counternarcotics, global terrorism, transnational crime, arms trafficking, and peace-support operations. Although Moscow wants to limit NATO expansion eastward, it has proposed CSTO-NATO cooperation, which the Alliance has been unwilling to accept. A UN-CSTO agreement might open the door for future CSTO-NATO cooperation. Moscow, as the leader of the CSTO, wants it to cooperate with others including the EU, the OSCE, and NATO. The CSTO, therefore, is not a real threat to NATO.44

Any effective counteralliance would strengthen NATO. The competing alliance would provide the visible potential threat against which NATO could rally. In a way, the emerging alliance would fill the void left by the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc. But for the near future, this is unlikely. Let us now examine some threats to NATO from internal sources.

**The development of differing views concerning security priorities among the NATO nations undoubtedly poses the greatest threat to NATO as an alliance.** Such development can be viewed as a threat from within. One of the predominant threats in this area is the divergent view on what constitutes an Article 5 “armed attack.” For clarity, Article 5 states:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.45

Given the pace of developing technology, cyber attacks have become more pervasive. The 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance acknowledged that the evolving security environment will put a premium on improvements “to protect information systems of critical importance to the Alliance against cyber attacks.”46 The next logical step is for NATO to clearly define what it views as a “cyber attack” and to integrate that view into the new Strategic Concept.

In addition, the NATO discussion concerning security priorities and potential threats needs to work toward a common understanding of what constitutes a terrorist attack meriting retaliation. The operative question should be “what has changed to warrant reform?”

The political predominance of the United States in Western Europe which symbolized the Cold War did not seem to change much during the process of European integration after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This consolidation was slow but deliberate in maturation. However, the EU lacked the ability to act
as a bloc toward the conflict in the former Yugoslavia on its own. Later the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq demonstrated that individual European nations were not like-minded as the United States had hoped. Some European states participated, some remained neutral, and some actively opposed the “Coalition of the Willing.” The rupture seemed to heal somewhat with the NATO operation in Afghanistan, but the potential for major differences between Europe and the United States persists, particularly concerning relations with Russia.

The Awkward Relationship with Russia.

Russia is currently undergoing a dramatic population implosion while its oil production growth fluctuates, and its ability to meet natural gas contracts weakens. Given these conditions, Russia may invest in its society and transform its economy from within, or it may seek outside help. Alternatively, it may continue its traditional method of deflecting attention from internal problems by emphasizing external threats. If Russia tries a combination of these two diverse approaches, it will become less predictable in its foreign relations. NATO must take this into consideration. As recently as August 3, 2009, the new Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, stated in his first press conference that next to success in Afghanistan, his second priority is NATO-Russia relations.

Following the 9/11 attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered Russian support to the U.S. fight against terrorism which further opened the door to NATO-Russian discussions. In May 2002, the Alliance formed the NATO-Russia Council which made progress in the area of joint peacekeeping but little
improvement on issues such as proliferation. The relationship was originally outlined in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and solidified at the 2002 Rome Declaration. In 2008 relations broke down following Russian attacks on Georgia and Moscow’s subsequent recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states. As recently as the 2009 Summit, NATO vocally condemned Russia for these actions.

NATO’s awkward relationship with Russia constantly shifts. The September 2009 White House decision to scrap the missile shield in the NATO nations of Poland and the Czech Republic led to greater cooperation in dealing with Iran’s aggressive nuclear program. Whether or not this will last is uncertain. The announcement demonstrated NATO’s willingness to link the United States, NATO, and Russian missile defense systems in the future. It also encouraged the Russian Federation to take advantage of U.S. missile defense cooperation proposals. The day after President Barack Obama halted the East European Missile Defense Plan, Ramussen stated “we should explore the potential for linking the U.S., NATO and Russian missile defense systems at an appropriate time.”

NATO-Russia Theater Missile Defense, as a concept, was agreed to as early as 1997 in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

It is highly questionable whether or not Russia truly wants a comprehensive partnership with NATO. The Russian political-military elite continue to view NATO, and the United States for that matter, as adversaries even though Russian leaders speak positively about a NATO-Russia partnership. In fact, the systemic Russian problem of geopolitical rivalry in Eurasia never fully subsided, and therefore its true at-
titude toward the NATO relationship is ambivalence. One recurring question is whether NATO should invite Russia to join. The question is unnecessary. In 2005, Putin praised the NATO-Russia relationship, yet stated that Russia could not join NATO because doing so would threaten Russia’s sovereignty and restrict its freedom of action. The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 stopped discussion on this issue and ended nearly 2 decades of Western attempts to recreate a transatlantic security environment with Russia as the easternmost pillar. This war came on the heels of Moscow’s decision to suspend participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to protest NATO expansion eastward, U.S. missile defense planning in Europe, and the NATO decision to hold treaty ratification hostage to the final departure of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova. Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. Georgian admission into the Alliance within its internationally recognized borders would put NATO in danger of direct conflict with Russia which does not acknowledge those borders. Since Russian policymakers tend to view security and interests in tangible terms, rather than as ideas or values, they see NATO expansion into Ukraine and Georgia as a threat on two fronts: First, it allows foreign values to mature in Russia’s declared “privileged” sphere of interests, and, second, it chips away at their physical security and control of oil and gas markets further west.

Russia believes that NATO rejects the legitimacy of its interests. Hence NATO remains, for all intents and purposes, an anti-Russian military alliance. Likewise, NATO cannot recognize Russia as an equal to NATO, and simultaneously recognize it as a state equal to other states within the Alliance. Russia’s resurgence
has been focused on countering U.S. leadership, particularly through military posturing and controlling energy supplies to its neighbors. Russia’s desire to address international security challenges outside of its sphere of influence is dubious, given its policy toward the Iranian nuclear program.\textsuperscript{66}

Russia has had a track record of entering into negotiations but confines these to the partners’ sphere of influence. Although Russia has actively participated in the NATO-Russia Council, Russia is not interested in working toward the goals and objectives of NATO. Logic would say the Alliance therefore needs to stop dealing with Russia. But NATO cannot take that course. Discussions concerning NATO membership should only begin with a petition from Russia to join. However, NATO must keep Russia at the table and continue dialogue to work in areas where NATO and Russia agree. NATO needs to approach this just as Secretary General Rasmussen put it: “Now, I’m not a dreamer. It is obvious that there will be fundamental issues on which we disagree. We have to insist, for example, that Russia fully complies with its international obligations, including respecting the territorial integrity and political freedom of its neighbors.”\textsuperscript{67} This NATO dialogue with Russia needs to be open, frank, and candid. This can be best attained by laying out the NATO policy toward Russia in the Strategic Concept.

**NATO and Afghanistan, and the Threat of the Global Jihadists.**

The most important issue at hand is how NATO is going to fare coming out of the war in Afghanistan. Much attention has been given to this issue. In 2009, the seventh Global Strategic Review of the London-
based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) argued that the U.S. leadership role in NATO is waning as indicated by the difficulty it has in persuading Alliance partners to boost the number of troops they send to fight a resurgent Taliban.68 In the collaborative study *Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century*, Daniel Hamilton convincingly makes the case that NATO needs to reach a consensus on a new long-term strategy if it is to remain relevant. In the argument for a new transatlantic compact, Hamilton states that the discussion will be moot if the allies stumble in Afghanistan or are unable to devise a common approach to Russia.69 He goes on to say that European efforts in Afghanistan are necessary not as a gesture of support for Americans, but because Europeans are directly threatened.70 In addition, he argues that increasing doubts about political resolve and military capability to sustain the effort in Afghanistan are also eroding NATO’s credibility. The effect is a scramble for bilateral security assurances from Washington which only further deteriorates NATO’s credibility and mutual defense commitments.71

George Friedman allocates the second chapter of his new book, *The Next 100 Years*, to the terrorist jihadist movement.72 He dismisses the probability that the movement will have any impact on the world stage decades from now. He posits that the U.S. invasion of the Islamic world did not seek victory in the traditional sense, but rather disruption.73 He puts it like this: “The U.S.-Islamist war is already ending and the next conflict is in sight.”74 Given his definition of the jihadists’ goal of re-creating the Caliphate, it is indeed true that the jihadist did not win, and there is little probability they will.75 Looking at the U.S.-Islamist war through the historical lens in which one would
examine the Vietnam War as a campaign of the larger Cold War strategy of containment, it becomes clear that the Islamic war is merely a transitory event. According to Friedman, U.S. defeat or stalemate in Iraq and Afghanistan is likely, and both wars will appear to be a serious defeat, but by causing disruptions in the Islamic world, the United States will have achieved its strategic goal.

Even if Friedman is correct, his projection is too far in the future to dismiss the global jihadist threat to the United States and NATO. Defeat for NATO in Afghanistan would certainly not bode well for maintaining a strong and relevant Alliance. But “defeat” should be described as not achieving the desired NATO outcome. The desired NATO outcome needs to be defined clearly. It is imperative that the New Strategic Concept address NATO goals in Afghanistan, and the ways and means of accomplishing those goals. Defined goals will give member nations objectives while formulating national defense plans. Getting the Strategic Concept right is the first step in maintaining the health of the Alliance and keeping it relevant.

Summary.

Demographics will play an important role in the future NATO selection of out-of-area operations. NATO should acknowledge the lack of political will to use kinetic force in these operations and instead seek ways for these missions to be as effective as possible in the areas of political agreement. The biggest threat to NATO is the internal threat over mission and purpose. The short-term challenges for NATO are a comprehensive Strategic Concept and a way forward for Afghanistan. NATO needs to clearly define Article 5 in the Strategic Concept.
NATO needs to lay out clearly its policy toward Russia in the Strategic Concept so that those within the Alliance, those aspiring to be in the Alliance, and those dealing with the Alliance (Russia in particular) can clearly chart a path for the future. NATO needs to also define its goals and level of ambition in Afghanistan along with the ways and means to accomplish those goals.

FUTURING NATO

This section examines several NATO future studies and then presents four possible futures out to 2025. The futures rely heavily on the near-future possibilities discussed in Part I. This section is designed to inform the reader about potential long-term consequences of decisions taken in 2010 during the development of the New Strategic Concept.

Futuring does not have the goal of predicting the future but instead of improving the future. Serious study and thinking about the future, in general, began only after World War II when computers, atomic bombs, and advances in aerospace engineering, as well as the quickening pace of events, forced strategic thinkers to reflect on the impact of these technologies and events on the future. These “futurists,” as they were called in the 1960s, recognized that the future world develops out of the present, and that the key thing to watch is not independent events in the news, such as sudden developments or 1-day occurrences, but trends like long-term ongoing shifts in population, land use, technology, and governmental systems. Herman Kahn and his colleagues at the RAND Corporation, the first “think factory,” developed a scenario technique as a way to explore future possibilities in an
organized and logical manner. His work on the horrible consequences of future thermonuclear exchanges should have won him the Nobel Peace Prize but instead provided the model for the wacky atomic scientist in the movie Dr. Strangelove.\textsuperscript{78}

**NATO’s View of the Future.**

In April 2009, ACT published the findings of its *Multiple Futures Project – Navigating towards 2030* (see Appendix). This project was the result of a March 2008 Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) proposal to the NATO Military Committee which called on the Alliance to consider “that different views of future worlds will strengthen our endeavor to develop a more rigorous and holistic appreciation for future security challenges and implications for the Alliance.”\textsuperscript{79} The study pointed out that it would be more likely that the Alliance would be threatened by instability and the weakness of other states, than by invading conventional forces.\textsuperscript{80} The study tended to focus on the military implications of the future of NATO and allocated a chapter to recommendations for dealing with military implications which it derived from the security implications.\textsuperscript{81} It was not intended to predict the future or presume political decisions that would lay out future Alliance roles and required capabilities.\textsuperscript{82}

Other NATO nations have also conducted their own surveys and studies of what NATO could and should look like in the future. At the April 9-10, 2009, Regional Stability and Security Annual International Scientific Session hosted by the Bucharest Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, Dr. Florin Diaconu, the Senior Researcher at the Romanian Diplo-
matic Institute, made a review of the MFP as well as the Long Term Requirements Study (see Appendix) and hypothesized that the “future has all the chances to be more influenced by the political will inside the Alliance than by what MFP calls globalization, or terrorism, or technology.” Indeed, this is because ACT is a subordinate command and part of the NATO military structure and was established to implement the political decisions made by the NATO political leaders.

Reflecting on the Alliance’s New Strategic concept, the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) released a report in 2009 entitled “Come Home, NATO?” Denmark is the only member of the 27 EU states not part of the EU European Defense Agency (EDA). Although EDA does not determine missions, the Danes are particularly interested in the types of missions NATO will perform. The DIIS report presents three arguments concerning the new strategic direction for the Alliance. The first argument is that “the Strategic Concept serves several functions: it codifies past decision and existing practices; it provides strategic direction; and it serves as an instrument of public diplomacy.” The second argument is that “the new Strategic Concept must balance the push and pull of two competing visions of NATO, one being ‘Come home, NATO;’ the other being ‘Globalize, stupid.’” The final argument is that “although the agenda of globalization is being questioned, NATO will continue down the path of global engagement.” The DIIS study gave a comprehensive history of the NATO Strategic Concept. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept issued in April 1999 was simply a revision of the 1991 Concept and therefore the word “new” was eliminated from the title. After the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. response
in Afghanistan, many felt that the Strategic Concept needed to be revised again, but, because of the lack of political agreement, the effort was relegated to a document, agreed to in 2006, which came to be known as the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG). The CPG was mainly a military update, but its second and third paragraphs addressed the strategic context. The second paragraph of the CPG states that “Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principle threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years.” In the Danes’ review of the MFP, they found a widely shared assessment that ACT is poorly integrated into the overall NATO organization. They maintained that:

In sum, and put crudely, NATO’s military organization is bedeviled by multiple agendas and poor coordination: [The] M[ilitary] C[ommittee] in Brussels is hostage to the national politics of capability planning; A[llied] C[ommand] O[perations] is busy running operations and impatient with the MC; and [the] ACT has so far been hanging loose, thinking about the future.

The DIIS study suggests two options: Tighten up the political guidelines that underpin the military requirements which reflect the Strategic Concept; or reshape the organization. Throughout the study, which emphasized the difference between NATO states preferring to go global and those wanting to return to the territorial defense focus, the authors place the onus on the globalist camp to move things forward. They predict that in the short run the current disagreements about the primary threats to NATO and its key tasks are too pronounced to allow for a Strategic Concept
that varies widely from the current one. However, they maintain that NATO will continue on the globalization trajectory. They also claim that it is likely that the United States, with the help of the UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands, will be able to push for fewer references to the Euro-Atlantic area in the Strategic Concept and thus promote a global reach, but substantial changes are improbable.93

The study of the new Strategic Concept performed by the Estonian International Centre for Defence Studies contends that the meaning of “collective defense” against Russia, remains “unspecified and thus politically hollow.”94 Estonia believes that the need to strike a new balance between a defensive regional alliance and a global intervention force has been made obvious by the Russian attacks in Georgia.95 The Estonian study concludes that what is really needed is a common analysis and agreement on a response to the re-emerged regional security dilemmas for NATO. This means that a further clarification of the NATO-Russia strategic relationship and the future basis of NATO’s enlargement policy is needed. That is, the question must be asked, “Does NATO continue with an openly value-based course for enlargement or consider states that fall short, but could buttress the territorial defense of NATO?”96 Not surprisingly, the same Estonian group published a policy paper titled “NATO Membership Action Plan: A Chance for Ukraine and Georgia” in preparation for the Bucharest summit of 2008 which advocated extending Membership Action Plans (MAPs) to Ukraine and Georgia.97 At Bucharest, the rest of NATO was not ready to antagonize Moscow. But the deliberate decision not to extend invitations to join NATO did not prevent Russia from going into Georgia 4 months later.
NATO Future Scenarios.

Today the most common method of future analysis is the scenario technique which is used by governments and businesses globally to understand possibilities and develop options to influence the future. These scenarios are outlines that describe distinct near or long-range futures. For the most part, they consist of knowable things—trends and circumstances in a given environment that, when projected into the future, evoke new ideas about change. Given that scenarios are neither predictions nor forecasts, they are still useful to planners, decisionmakers, and policymakers. Scenarios can either project current trends into the future or explore alternative ones, including “wild cards.”

This study utilizes some of the techniques developed by Charles W. Taylor in his seminal 1993 work, *Alternative World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations*. This monograph describes and develops four scenarios to overcome the deterministic and predictive approach of single-scenario analyses and to provide a more plausible conceptual framework. The scenarios presented encompass a transition of trends and their consequences over the last decade with respect to NATO and the plausible evolutionary changes over the next 40 years (see Figure 2). This monograph will concentrate on the 2025 focus plane. The focus plane is a selected time in the future where the development of the scenarios are evaluated against each other. The thought process for this transition of trends forms a theoretical cone which encompasses the passage of time. Inside the cone, cause and effect relationships define NATO’s existence. Although the use of the cone does not increase the accuracy of the forecast of the scenarios, the tracking inside the cone establishes
the validity of the scenarios and the logic of their development. This is called “The Cone of Plausibility.”\textsuperscript{100} Using such a diagram like Figure 2 is a mental exercise which logically graphs the range of plausible futures. The narrow portion at the bottom is defined as today. It is not a single point because there are indeed conflicting views of what “today” looks like, and it is therefore described as a plane. The cone gets wider as time moves forward, and the knowable futures become less certain and increasingly obscure.\textsuperscript{101} This NATO cone of plausibility is not intended to be a comprehensive study but a forum for further study. Analysts could use the technique to extend the analysis to a focus plane further into the future. However, looking out to 2025 is sufficient to present both short- and long-term challenges to NATO. The four scenarios are: (a) U.S. leadership relationship with NATO continues on the same path, (b) U.S. leadership in NATO increases, (c) EU leadership in NATO increases, and (d) The NATO Alliance breaks apart.

![Figure 2. The Cone of Plausibility.](image-url)
The trends that shape or “drive” the future of U.S. foreign policy and NATO countries’ foreign policy are political, economic, social, technological, and military elements of power. The most important driver in this scenario is political, since NATO is first and foremost a political alliance. The trends described by the 1999 Strategic Concept and the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance conveniently provide drivers for the four scenarios. The primary driver, however, for the scenarios is the Strategic Concept to be released in 2010. This was chosen as the primary driver since it is the one item that will most affect the political will of the Alliance. That political will can be described by the four scenarios. These scenarios only present a possibility and are not to be interpreted as an outright prediction of the future.

**Scenario A:** U.S. leadership relationship with NATO continues on the same path. Scenario A, the “Continuation Scenario,” presupposes that the relationship between the United States and the other NATO nations will remain the same relative to each other as we move from today to the year 2025. Additional countries may join NATO and, conceivably, some may even leave NATO—in the same manner that Georgia joined the CSTO in 1994 and withdrew in 1999, or more precisely when France departed from the NATO IMS in 1966 and rejoined in 2009. Other nation-states or collections thereof may form alliances to counter NATO such as those discussed in “Potential Threats to NATO,” but again the U.S. leadership within the Alliance remains the same.

**Scenario A 2025:** The U.S./EU relationship remains constant. Russian suspicions of NATO continue despite efforts by the Alliance to be open and trans-
parent. The Strategic Concept in 2010 was open, frank, and directive. The Alliance sustained cooperation in Afghanistan. The openness forced the committee penning the Strategic Concept to define terms clearly and more importantly, agreed to the definitions and approved the Strategic Concept 2010. The clear descriptions of the “attack” in Article 5, including cyber attack, and resolution on mission and purpose for out-of-area operations allowed individual NATO countries to better project military defense plans. Many NATO militaries were able to sustain a viable force despite a decline in the military cohort and smaller defense budgets.

**Scenario B:** U.S. Leadership in NATO increases. Scenario B describes an environment where U.S. commitment to NATO security goals increases with respect to the European counterparts. This scenario is plausible. According to Global Trends 2025, “divergent threat perceptions within Europe and the likelihood that defense spending will remain uncoordinated suggest the EU will not be a major military power by 2025. The national interests of the bigger powers will continue to complicate EU foreign and security policy and European support for NATO could erode.”

This scenario depends conceivably more on the U.S. willingness to take a more involved leadership role within NATO than any other competing factor. This willingness would include resourcing NATO operations.

Friedman argues that “the world does, in fact, pivot around the United States.” This is not only due to American power. He points out that for the past 500 years, Europe was the center of the international system and that the main highway to Europe was the North Atlantic. Whoever controlled that body of water controlled Europe and Europe’s access to the world,
and hence the “basic geography of global politics was locked into place.” He goes on to explain that in the early 1980s a remarkable shift occurred in that for the first time in history, transpacific trade equaled transatlantic trade and hence any country that controlled the North Atlantic and the Pacific would, if it wanted to, control the global economy. He concluded that therefore whoever controls North America is virtually assured of being the dominant global power and that “for the twenty-first century at least, that will be the United States.” Friedman’s Mahanian view of sea power in the new globalized world may be incorrect but even so, it is probable that the United States will be a major power for the foreseeable future. The question is where will the United States focus on foreign engagement: Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas, or a combination thereof?

**Scenario B 2025:** A number of socio-economic factors and security perceptions made the European nations more receptive to a strong U.S. leadership role. The Strategic Concept in 2010 did not differ much from the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance. It did not convey a purpose. As 2025 approaches, the effects of Europe’s aging population, Muslim immigration, and diminished military age cohort become more pronounced. Stronger views toward international security versus home defense become more clear and distinct. The United States, wishing to maintain the Alliance, invests more effort and money. The United States also leads the out-of-area operations. The net gain is more symbolic than practical in furthering U.S. strategic goals as those goals become increasingly divergent from those of the Europeans.

**Scenario C:** EU leadership in NATO increases. Scenario C portrays the United States as leaning to-
ward isolationism which forces the EU to assume an increased leadership role within NATO. In John McCormick’s book, *The European Superpower*, he supports the idea that American global leadership is on the decline, and that European leadership, on the other hand, is in its ascendency. McCormick rejects the traditional view that the greatest powers are those with large militaries which consciously pursue national interests. He argues that globalization and interdependence have undermined power politics and supplanted it with a more nuanced set of international relationships. In this post-modern environment, the international relationships attained by the EU has made it a superpower. This scenario depends heavily on greater EU leadership.

**Scenario C 2025:** This scenario develops as U.S. and EU interests continue to diverge, and the United States disengages from Europe. The Strategic Concept in 2010 did not clearly state a mission and purpose. U.S. and European views on the way ahead in Afghanistan began to diverge after the 2010 Lisbon Summit. Some European NATO members disengaged in Afghanistan and the United States turned to other nations and organizations for support. The Alliance continues to exist and even contributes to stabilization in areas outside of NATO countries, but the thrust is defined by Europeans. EU countries lead most operations.

**Scenario D:** The NATO Alliance breaks apart. Scenario D depicts the breakup of NATO as the U.S. national security interests diverge from the rest of the Alliance. The strength of the European commitment to the Alliance influences the pace of the dissolution of the Alliance. If the European countries also develop diverse individual notions of their main national or collective security
threats, then the breakup of the Alliance quickens.

**Scenario D 2025:** This scenario occurs because of a combination of events described in Scenarios B and C. National defense and international security priorities continue to diverge between the United States and the European NATO countries. The United States moves more toward isolationism, while the EU experiences the effects of aging population, Muslim immigration, and a diminished military age cohort. Common interests fade. The Alliance continues its efforts in Afghanistan with no clear definition of success. The countries, which feel Russia is their main threat, oust the politicians who authorized involvement in Afghanistan, then withdraw. Some begin to leave the Alliance’s military establishment just as France did in 1966. The Alliance, already weakened from the threat from within, starts to feel the pressure from Russian military training exercises along its borders. The eastern NATO members become less confident in NATO’s commitment to their territorial defense. These countries organize their own collective defense alliance focused on the potential threat of a resurgent Russia. Farsighted transatlantic diplomats tried to reassure Russia of NATO’s nonthreatening security structure but failed. Russia, seeing the opportunity to strike, claims Georgia has violated citizens’ rights in the contested areas and occupies that country. NATO continues to lose members, while common interests among the remaining members diverge. For all intents and purposes, it has failed to keep Europe at peace while it focused on the larger global terrorist threat.
Summary.

These scenarios present a range of short- and long-term challenges for the future. The prominent short-term challenge is consensus on the 2010 Strategic Concept. If well thought out, it will set the conditions for both short- and long-term success. Short-term challenges that need to be addressed are: describing a mission and purpose for NATO in the 21st century; defining the relationship with Russia; identifying goals, ways, and means in Afghanistan; and clarifying what constitutes an Article 5 attack. Long-term challenges are effects of the inevitably changing demographics in Europe and consensus on the level of ambition for out-of-area operations. The scenarios show that NATO can continue to exist with a weak 2010 Strategic Concept, but the resulting NATO may not be what any of the member countries want. A weak Strategic Concept could even lead to the failure of NATO as described in Scenario D. A well-planned Strategic Concept will contribute greatly to overcoming NATO’s short- and long-term challenges.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO Strategic Concept 2010.

The NATO 2009 Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl commissioned the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept with the assistance of a broad based group of qualified experts and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Strategic Concept is the base document which establishes and reflects transatlantic consensus. The process has already begun. It involves the Euro-Atlantic partnership Council, the Mediter-
ranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, along with other organizations worldwide. On October 16, the first of the four main seminars guiding the development of the Strategic Concept was held in Luxembourg. Dr. Madeleine Albright, who chairs the experts group, presided. In his opening speech, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero stated that “NATO has to play an active political role in trying to prevent threats from arising and in shaping the political environment in which we can operate successfully.” NATO is truly looking for input—worldwide. NATO has even opened up its website for any internet user to comment on what NATO’s New Strategic Concept should look like. It is in Discussion Forum format and can be found at www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html.

Hopefully, this monograph has provoked some thought and concerned individuals will participate in that strategic discussion.

Conclusion.

Alliances must either adapt or die. The Congress of Vienna lasted only 36 years. It did not adapt. NATO is now at a point where it may suffer the same fate if it does not adapt.

If the United States wants to make NATO truly relevant, then it is going to have to invest not only time and money, but also to allocate increased human capital and talent to ensure that the envisioned future of the Alliance is clearly established as a policy goal and is pursued in a deliberate and consistent manner.

Getting the NATO Strategic Concept right is the key to success. The United States must shape this process. As Senator Richard Lugar stated, “Our commit-
ment to NATO remains the most important vehicle for projecting stability throughout Europe and even into regions of Asia and the Middle East.”

NATO must decide whether to “go global” or concentrate on the collective defense of Europe. But those options are not mutually exclusive. U.S. policymakers must ensure that NATO policy toward Russia is clear. NATO’s relationship with Russia must be based on openness, both when the two sides agree and when they disagree. The new Strategic Concept must identify NATO goals in Afghanistan and indicate how they will be attained.

How will EU countries react? The most crucial years will be in the 2010s and 2020s when the rapid growth of seniors to working-age populations in Europe will occur. The United States may have to bear more of the Alliance’s costs. There may be a collective European political will to have a strong functioning Alliance, but the social realities may cause practical problems in the execution of joint and combined military ventures. We know these problems will exist in the future. The new Strategic Concept must deal with them.

The biggest threat to NATO now is the “internal threat” of the absence of consensus over what the perceived “external threat” to NATO is.

Recommendations.

The following recommendations are proposed:

• The United States needs to insist on a clear and actionable NATO common vision of the future in the new Strategic Concept and address mission and purpose.
• A clear and concise NATO policy towards Rus-
sia should provide a common reference point for discussions and deliberations. Discussion on possible Russian membership should only begin with a formal request to join. Dialogue between NATO and Russia concerning common goals should continue.

• NATO must develop goals and objectives in Afghanistan and a strategy, with ways and means, for attaining them.

• The Strategic Concept needs to clearly define the meaning of an Article 5 “attack” in regards to terrorist and nonstate actors.

• Given the pace of developing technology, Article 5 will need to state clearly whether a cyber attack is included in the collective NATO understanding of an “armed attack.”

• NATO should identify its ambition (frequency and intensity) in conducting out of area operations.

ENDNOTES


3. History of Allied Command Transformation, available from www.act.nato.int/content.asp?pageid=240. ACT focuses on areas such as training and education, concept development, comprehensive approach, experimentation, and research and technology and using NATO’s ongoing operations and work with the NATO Response Force (NRF) to improve the military effectiveness of the Alliance. Reflecting NATO as a whole, ACT has a worldwide presence. As well as being collocated with United States Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, VA, there is an ACT command element located in Belgium.

5. Joint Operations 2030 is a major long-term scientific study that addresses the potential for emerging technology to have an impact on joint operations and identifies shortfalls in capability predicted to occur in the 2030 time frame. More information on this study is available from [www.rta.nato.int/Detail.asp?ID=3511](http://www.rta.nato.int/Detail.asp?ID=3511) and [https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/Transforma1/JointOpera](https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/Transforma1/JointOpera).


12. The mission was named the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I).


15. Article 20, NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, Bucharest, Romania, April 3, 2008.

16. Ibid., Article 23.

17. Also included in the OSCE are the countries Andorra, Vatican City, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino.


21. Hillison, p. 36.
22. Ibid., pp 36-38.


25. Ibid.


27. Global Trends, p. 25.


29. Ibid.


31. Ibid.

32. Simon, p. 56.


34. Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Population Projections: 2005-2050, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, p. 17. Working-age is described as adults who are 18 to 64.

35. Simon, p 55.


42. Available from www.rferl.org/content/CSTO_Rapid_Reaction_Exercises_Get_Off_To_Discouraging_Start/1808735.html.


46. “Comprehensive Political Guidance.”


51. “The NATO Summit at Prague.”


58. Ibid; pp. ix, 1.

59. Ibid., p. 2.

60. Global Strategic Assessment 2009, p. 238.

61. Ibid., p. 241.


64. Blank, p. 18.

65. Ibid., p. 24.


70. Ibid., p. 15.

71. Ibid.


73. Friedman, p. 5.

74. Ibid., p. 6.

75. Ibid., p. 38.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., p. 49.


80. Ibid., p. 5.

81. Ibid., pp. 8-17.

82. Ibid., p. 1.

84. Ibid.


86. “Come Home, NATO?” p. 4.

87. Ibid., p. 10.

88. Ibid., p. 9.

89. Ibid., p. 11.

90. “Comprehensive Political Guidance.”


92. Ibid., p. 23.

93. Ibid., p. 25.


95. Ibid.

96. Ibid., Part V.


100. Taylor, pp. 2-4.

101. Ibid., p. 4. Taylor does not advocate using the “continuation” scenario or the “worst case” scenario but Edward Cornish does advocate these techniques in his book *Futuring: the Exploration of the Future*. The four scenarios presented in this monograph include two such scenarios.


103. Friedman, p. 4.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., pp. 4-5.


107. Ibid., p. 2.


APPENDIX

SUMMARY OF THE MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT AND FUTURE WORLD SCENARIOS

The question that was posed in the Multiple Futures Project (MFP) was “What are the future threats and challenges that could pose risk to the interests, values, and populations of the Alliance?”\textsuperscript{1} This report, meant to provide Alliance leaders with a broad set of ideas and information to use for future planning, presented four plausible worlds in 2030. The first, called Dark Side of Exclusivity, describes how globalization, climate change, and resource scarcity affect developing states. The second, named Deceptive Stability, presents a world where developed states attempt to deal with societal change caused by demographics shifts as their native population ages and younger immigrants fill the void. The third, called Clash of Modernities, describes a world where a strong belief in rationalism buoyed by technological innovations and ingenuity allows societies to collaborate across the globe, but the network is assailed by authoritarian regimes. The fourth and final future, named New Power Politics, paints a world picture where growing absolute wealth and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have increased the number of major powers which compete for and block global access to resources.\textsuperscript{2} With each future providing a setting for imaginative analysis, the study produced a set of risk conditions spanning the gamut from “failed states” to the “challenge of conflicting values and world views.”\textsuperscript{3} These results were linked to the six potential Sources of Threat identified in the MFP resulting in 33 Security Implications and 26 Military
Implications identified as the Threatening Actions or Events to a stable world environment. These security implications demonstrated four broad concepts:

1. The evolving nature of risks and threats to vital interests will challenge strategic unity and solidarity with the Alliance, as well as the common understanding of what constitutes an Article 5 attack.

2. Increased interaction with non-NATO nations and other international actors will create opportunities for the Alliance to extend its role in enhancing security and stability outside the traditional areas of engagement.

3. Determined adversaries, enabled by readily available technologies, will attack Alliance vulnerabilities in unexpected ways, requiring the Alliance to consider changes in the character of military operations and warfare.

4. Increased interaction and other international actors will provide the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the opportunity to positively shape and influence ideas, values and events in a globalized world.

By analyzing these security implications, the study produced military implications for NATO. These military implications pointed to seven focus areas which the study fleshed out, with recommendations for changes in concepts and doctrine as well as capability enhancements for each individual focus area. The seven focus areas include:

(1) Adapting to the demands of Hybrid Threats, (2) Operating with Others and Building Institutions, (3) Conflict Prevention, Resolution, and Consequence
Management, (4) Counter Proliferation, (5) Expeditionary and Combat Capability in Austere Environments, (6) Strategic Communications, and (7) Winning the Battle of the Narrative, and Organizational and Force Development Issues. The MFP study concluded with the finding that the unpredictability and complexity of the future security environment will strain the Alliance’s most powerful assets: strategic unity of values and goals, solidarity among Allies, burden-sharing, and commitment to its decisions. It also concluded that a comprehensive approach, developed in concert with other international organizations like the European Union and the United Nations, is essential to the security of the Alliance.

In a supporting 2006 study called *Future World Scenarios*, ACT researched the medium and long-term capability requirements for the Alliance. The Long Term Requirements Study (LTRS), released in 2008, had a target timeframe between 2015 and 2030 and a focus on 2025. The study defined four Future NATO’s. The study described the first as the “Strong Toolbox NATO” where the U.S. commitment is strong but European cohesion is weak and limited. The second, “Shared Partnership NATO,” depicts a combination of strong U.S commitment and a strong coherent Europe participating with a reduced Europe-U.S capability gap. The third, the “Fragmented Toolbox NATO,” represents a lukewarm U.S. commitment and medium European cohesion. In this future, the United States is more focused on military threats, and Europe is more concerned with humanitarian and environmental operations. In the fourth and final future, NATO is presented as the “Europe-Centric NATO” characterized by limited U.S. interest and commitment to NATO, while Europeans can operate regionally with or without U.S. support.
The four Future NATOs described were developed by a team of 20 leading experts in areas related to NATO. The Future NATOs were developed from the team’s identification of three key drivers, plausible trends which shape the scenarios:

1. Whether or not the United States would be willing in 2025 to demonstrate a strong commitment in NATO;
2. Whether or not the European Union in 2025 would be a coherent, and therefore fairly strong, actor in international politics, or a fragmented and hence weak one; and,
3. Whether or not in 2025 there would be a commonly perceived threat within NATO.

This study also looked at four distinct Future Security Environments which included an analysis of (a) Return of World Order, (b) Resurgent Middle East, (c) Pro-Active China, and (d) Globalization and Terror. When put into a matrix with the four Future NATOs as rows and the four Future Security Environments as columns, the analysts had 16 potential Future World scenarios to analyze. In the interest of feasibility, they decided to analyze the Shared Partnership Future NATO along the four different future Security Environments. The result of the analysis was an assessment of the level of technology that could be available to NATO as well as to potential opponents. This was presented in matrix form. The study was a major building block for the MFP.

The MFP was “meant to inform and support the strategic dialogue on challenges the Alliance will face and the corresponding security and military implications.”
ENDNOTES - APPENDIX


2. Ibid., pp. 1-3.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. Ibid., pp. 4-7.

5. Ibid., pp. 8-17.

6. Ibid., p. 18.


9. Ibid., p. 4-1.

10. Ibid., p 5-1.

11. Ibid., pp 5-3, 5-4.
