CONSIDERATIONS FOR A POST CONFLICT UNITED STATES ARMY

BY

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United States Army

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A POST CONFLICT UNITED STATES ARMY

by

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History has many examples of the United States military emerging from conflict and facing major challenges with respect to rebuilding and retooling for the next conflict. In most cases external forces and trends have influenced this often complex post conflict period. In the post Vietnam era the United States Army was fraught with problems. These problems were the direct result of its involvement in an exhausting, unpopular, protracted conflict half a world away. A familiar depiction of that era, from within its own ranks, described the Army as 'hollow'. It is a tribute to the leaders during the post Vietnam era who took these problems head on and raised our Army to a level not thought possible.

Although currently engaged on two fronts of war, the Army will emerge from these unprecedented times to once again reset and refit on the road to preparing for the nation's next conflict.

This paper examines the key challenges the United States leaders will face in the not so distant future and makes recommendations for our leaders to consider in order to prepare our Army for follow on missions.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A POST CONFLICT UNITED STATES ARMY

It is safe to say that in the not so distant future the United States military will have less of an influence and certainly less of a presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. The number of troops on the ground in Iraq will decrease to roughly 50,000 by the end of August 2010. The current administration is overwhelmingly committed to ending combat operations in Iraq and transitioning the security of that country to the Iraqi Security Forces. The focus of the American presence in Iraq beyond August 2010 will be in the role of advise and assist in further maturing a fragile governmental structure. Within the context of the ‘other war’, an increase of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, as announced by President Obama in December 2009, is in full swing. Even so, in the same address, the Obama administration emphasized a withdrawal from this region to begin in July 2011. Although dates and deployments will shift based on conditions in these two theaters, it is not too difficult to envision a smaller military commitment and a more robust civilian effort as the underpinnings of governance rightfully take center stage.

Our nation’s history has many examples of a post conflict military that was faced with rediscovering itself and retooling, retraining and refocusing itself for the next conflict. I contend, at this juncture, that it is never too early to start the debate as it relates to the challenges the United States military will face beyond the current main efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Historical Context

Let us consider the role of the United States armed forces in major conflicts since the nation’s inception. Although armed forces in other parts of the world can boast of
rich histories that span centuries and encompass vast swaths of the global landscape, the United States military stands alone as a most revered force that has served, fought, and succeeded for the greater good on a consistent basis. Often faced with hurdles and rough spots along the way, the U.S. military has been known to rebound and demonstrate a most impressive resiliency throughout its young history. Arguably, the United States continues to be the model for armed conflict and the torch bearing example of how to build, and more importantly, how to rebuild an effective military.

Perhaps the cornerstone or the guiding light of this unique military force is the fact that it represents and serves the most successful democratic nation the world has ever known. At low points, highlighted dramatically by the post Vietnam era, and at its pinnacle moments, such as victory in World War II, the force seemingly transformed and rose to not only see another day but grew to be greater than it ever was before. It is truly remarkable to understand this very unique dynamic. Not only has this force regrouped and learned lessons but it has figured out how to become better, raising the bar higher and higher each time. Notable examples from the previous century include the examination of the force in the latter part of the 1940’s through 1951 and its early involvement in the Korean conflict. Quite frankly, the force rested on its laurels and got kicked in the teeth all the way to Pusan, Korea. From the breakout at Pusan to the dramatic Inchon landing was born a most resilient force. As a result the Army proclaimed ‘no more Task Force Smiths’ after Korea and maintained this policy until its involvement in Vietnam. Of course this dynamic of rebounding to something better than it ever was is not unfamiliar to many facets of the American culture. But for the military, why and how does this happen over and over again?
Let’s not for a moment take this positive result for granted…not for one minute!
The history of American wars is that we win and we come home. The most interesting
dexample from American history of the Army regrouping, resetting and refocusing itself
can be taken from the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. The challenges were
astounding and seemingly insurmountable after four years of internal strife and conflict.
Consider Jay Winik’s description of the national situation in April 1865:

But even as the war climaxed to a close, there remained the most
significant question of all; one that had consumed Abraham Lincoln,
haunted him, kept him awake at night, and etched lines of worry deep in
his face: not simply how to subjugate the Confederacy by force of arms,
but, more importantly, how to reunite two separate, political, social, and
cultural entities that had been bitter military enemies just days before (xiv,
Introduction). 1

Consider the momentous events that were unfolding in just one week at this time;
the fall of Richmond, the surrender of the Confederacy at Appomattox, and the grass
roots effort taking shape in the south to engage in a long drawn out guerilla war against
the north. With the task of uniting a nation, restructuring much of the country’s industrial
base, refocusing a grieving nation following the death of a beloved president, and
overcoming the deep wounds inflicted by a horrific war one could hardly think about a
capable, functional military. Truly the state of the military and its future was not a
pressing concern. It can be argued that a structured formidable standing military with a
common purpose and mission was the furthest thing from most American minds. But in
time, an impressive force grew, and it would grow to be a formidable force once again.

Although tested on a limited basis in the latter part of the nineteenth century and
early into the next century, it is fascinating to consider how the United States, as a
nation, overwhelmingly in favor of isolationism until April 1917, took on a substantial role
in World War I. Many would say the United States military was the difference in
determining the positive outcome for the allies. This was a tremendous commitment from a nation that struggled with isolationism but roared onto the world stage in huge numbers, well led and with the backing of a renewed and refocused American society.

During the period between the ‘war to end all wars’ and America’s involvement in the Second World War, the Greatest Generation was born and proceeded to change the global landscape yet again with victory in an epic global struggle. Following the end of these two conflicts U. S. troops soon returned home and the military was drastically downsized. At the same time international tensions were growing, the United States military remained a rather low priority in the country not thinking about force projection on such a grand scale. Interestingly, these two great wars culminated with victory for the United States, a return home to America and a drastic, expedient downsizing.

The state of the United States military following the Vietnam conflict can hardly be compared to any other time in American history. This was a tumultuous period in American history that had a significant, and in some cases a lasting impact, on many facets of American society. A ‘new’ generation was coming of age at home; the confidence in the country’s political leaders was in serious question and the best we, as a military, could hope for in a very unpopular conflict was ‘peace with honor’. In 1973 the last U.S. combat troops departed Vietnam and returned to America. The force struggled to find itself among an indifferent American population. Following this very unpopular conflict there were no parades or homecomings for the troops. The force, especially the Army, struggled with indiscipline, cases of substance abuse and a lack of direction. At this lowest of low points in our history, however, the force proved resilient again, learned lessons and got better than ever before.
My task in this paper is twofold. First, to look at the post Vietnam period through the eyes of those who experienced it; in most cases through the eyes of the leaders that decided as young field grade officers that a career in the military was still viable and worthy of pursuit and who maintained the hope that the force would rebound yet again. Secondly, I will attempt to look to the future of the force that remains engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan today. Lastly I will conclude with some recommendations to build a foundation for the next chapter in our history.

Post Vietnam Era

The United States military and specifically the Unites States Army stumbled out of the Vietnam conflict and struggled to find itself in the decades of the seventies and eighties. It is worth noting at this point that the pains of America’s involvement in Vietnam, in so far as the United States military is concerned, fell on the shoulders of the Army more than the other services. At the height of the conflict more than half a million servicemen and women were in Vietnam but the effects in its aftermath rested more with the service that provided the majority of forces, the service that saw the conflict through the lens from the trenches and on the ground. In a reference from David Halberstam, U.S. Air Force General McPeak, following his appointment and eventual nomination as the new Air Force Chief of Staff in 1990, commented, “…the burden of combat for the Air Force had been carried by an elite officer corps”. The effects on the Army were much more widespread and permeated the entire force. McPeak, in a comparison between his service and the Army went on to say, "morale had never deteriorated within his service. They had lost men and overcome bitter frustrations, but somehow it had not gone as deep or as corrosively into the bloodstream of the Air Force as it had into the Army".
General (ret) Edward C. Meyer, reflects in his later years as an author, “It is interesting to note that the date 30 March 1973 marks the first day in thirty-two and a half years America had no troops in Vietnam”.4 This was a force that was desperate to find itself once again. Unlike previous conflicts, there were no victory parades and throngs of well wishers on the return of servicemen and women from Southeast Asia. “The war was over, no more or no less, and the collective conscience of the United States -- civilian, active duty military and veteran alike -- quietly tucked itself into a plain manila envelope and filed it into a desk drawer”.5 For the soldiers, there was “an element of personal humiliation in what had happened that greatly affected the army’s view of succeeding crises”.6 This view within the Army would continue to resonate into the future when the commitment of combat troops in other places around the world was contemplated at the highest levels. It has become very common, following Vietnam, for the media and American society to be skeptical about becoming embroiled in another so called ‘Vietnam’. We heard this comparison as we committed troops overseas, especially to the Middle East, in the 1980’s and ‘90’s. It is not a distant comparison to the conflicts we are in today in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Another corollary from the Vietnam era that translates almost directly to the present day is the task of modernizing or transforming the force. Throughout the Vietnam era the Air Force and Navy were overhauled with the latest technologies applied to airplanes and ships. The Army seemed to stagnate in Vietnam. In fact, as the majority of equipment and experienced soldiers and officers funneled into Vietnam, the readiness of the U.S. Army was lackluster at best. In retrospect, it is interesting to note that although the United States Army was invested heavily with more than two
corps sized units in Europe, the more experienced commanders and the most modern equipment were provided to the ‘unit’ in contact…in Vietnam. This is not surprising but rather a byproduct of a failed strategy during the Cold War. Meyer says, “It was not Vietnam but Europe that suffered. In many instances the equipment in Europe was the laughing-stock of NATO”.7

The readiness of the Army was but one issue. Shortages within the ranks were another challenge. In February, 1972, then LTG Meyer, as the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Army G-3), had testified to the Congress that there existed “a shortfall of 320,000 trained uniformed personnel within the Army Reserves”.8 However, this shortfall was overcome in the span of only five years with the elimination of the draft and the end of the Vietnam conflict9, a tribute to the Army’s ability to rebuild itself.

Still, the United States Army from 1973 forward, by comparison to its sister services, seemed stuck with an identity crisis. This crisis manifested itself in the training and readiness of the entire service. Where was the main effort? The focus for almost a dozen years within the ranks of the Army’s combat units was putting soldiers in Vietnam. With all eyes on Vietnam by so many and for so long the Army suddenly found itself in Europe in the seventies ill equipped, led by inexperienced ‘cold warriors’ and in most cases ill prepared for major combat operations in the Central European theater staring down a Soviet superpower.

The post Vietnam period was marked by many external forces and trends that posed challenges not only for the country but for the political leadership and the uniformed services as well. A generation of young Americans had turned its back on
the war and those who were drafted to fight it. The political landscape was rocked with the Watergate scandal that culminated with the resignation of President Nixon in 1974. The country was healing and learning to trust the executive branch of the government again. As the country tried to put behind nearly ten years of conflict, few wanted to focus on the military. At the same time a changing of the guard within the United States Army was underfoot. Following the withdrawal of all combat troops from Vietnam in 1973 the United States military, specifically the Army, would begin to reshape itself once again. This would be the foundation for the force that would lead to the demise of Communism and victory in the Gulf War.

A Hollow Army

As the country tried to put aside the legacy of Vietnam, the Army seemed to stumble into the next decade on the road to recovery. In May of 1980, General Meyer, now the Army’s Chief of Staff, was summoned by the Congress to testify on the funding levels for the services for fiscal year 1981. General Meyer, together with the other service chiefs, answered several questions pertaining to the funding necessary to conduct their mission to man, train, and equip their respective services. When asked about a deficit in the number of tanks per company (12 vice the required 17) at a specific unit at Fort Hood, General Meyer uttered,

Right now, as I have said before, we have a *hollow* Army. Our forward deployed forces are at full strength in Europe, Panama and in Korea. Our tactical forces in the United States are some 17,000 under strength. 10

The phrase ‘hollow Army’ would become the proverbial bumper sticker for the United States Army in the post Vietnam era. In a certain sense there seemed to be, finally, an acknowledgement that the Army was in dire straits. Just saying the Army was hollow was a defining point for the force; accepting that moniker and charting a course for its
rediscovery was another matter altogether. General Meyer, General Dupuy and a host of other leaders would do just that.

How to Make a Hollow Army

The ‘hollow Army’ moniker, although vocalized in 1980 by General Meyer arguably manifested itself as early as 1968 while the military was still embroiled in Vietnam. Beginning in early 1968 and carrying through the infamous Tet offensive, several significant events would play out within the framework of the war that would chart a very undesirable course for the Army in the coming years. The unpopular war continued as the Johnson administration struggled to find the right formula to turn the tide in favor of the fledgling South Vietnamese government. With General Westmoreland in command of all forces in Vietnam, American troop strength topped 500,000 and treasure to support the effort was not questioned. Tet changed everything. Seen through the eyes of those that served at this time, Tet was a major tactical victory. Another interpretation of the effect of the Tet offensive reads as follows:

U.S. leadership in Saigon saw Tet as the destruction of the VC infrastructure that had taken Hanoi decades to build, which made it a victory. Washington saw it as armed enemy troops raising hell throughout Vietnam, including the halls and offices of the American Embassy in Saigon, which made it a defeat.11

This turning point in the war triggered the changing of the guard not only in the military but the political landscape as well. In Vietnam Westmoreland was replaced by General Abrams and on the political stage came the abrupt announcement that President Johnson would not seek reelection. This latter event was indicative and in many ways perceived as an administration that had run the course of options to right this conflict. With no firm commitment for the forces in Vietnam on the political and the societal front the military would wither in Vietnam and in the United States through the early parts of
the 1970’s. In Gole’s biography of General Dupuy he describes, “The period 1969-1973 was a terrible time in the history of the U.S. Army”. This period would be marked by a massive downsizing in the Army coupled with the end of mandatory conscription. More importantly, Gole notes, “…while the U.S. Army was engaged in light infantry combat in Asia for a decade, the Red Army had modernized its mechanized and armoured forces and massive mobile fire support in Europe”.

The United States Army was desperate for an overhaul. While reducing in size from a 1.6 million soldier force down to 800,000 there was no better time than “now” to relook the entire force. Few would argue that change was required but just what needed to transform within the ranks to stand down the mighty Soviet machine was still an unknown. Redeploying the force from Southeast Asia and reducing the size of the Army was directed and hardly debatable but how could true change be brought to the force? The Army needed to change from within, it needed to rediscover itself in a most profound way.

Moving Forward

It is interesting and certainly helpful to look to history as a teacher in learning about the American military and how it has responded to the call. In the period between the attacks on Pearl Harbor (December 1941) and the United States first offensive action on the World War II battlefield in Northern Africa (August 1942) the U.S. Army underwent an extraordinary transformation. A famous Churchill quote read, “Creating mighty armies almost at the stroke of a wand” hardly describes the painstaking process of building a force capable of thwarting the Axis powers. Generals McNair, Marshall and Eisenhower knew that in 1941.
In October 1972 General Creighton Abrams became the new Army Chief of Staff (CSA). Abrams was a well respected senior leader within the service; a leader that many felt deserved better after succeeding General Westmoreland as the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAC-V). To understand Abrams’ reputation one has to go back to his unique vision and understanding of the insurgency in Vietnam. In Vietnam, Abrams was cited as the senior leader who truly grasped the essence of the Vietnam conflict. He dismissed the body counts as a true measure of success and immersed his staff and their efforts in the engagement of the population. He understood the conflict and many believe he was the first senior leader to truly understand what it would take to defeat the insurgency. It was not meant to be. Abrams wrestled with the post Tet era, a time that little is written about. Robert Shaplen said, “You know, it’s too bad. Abrams is very good. He deserves a better war.” He would serve as the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) for two short years but his impact on the force would be significant and lasting.

As the CSA, General Creighton Abrams was faced at the end of 1973 with an Army in turmoil. “He put out a plea to his senior officers on the Army staff and the faculty at the Army War College and asked for an answer to this question: Why an Army? It was clear at that point that the future role for the Army was in doubt”.

General Abrams embarked on the journey that would change the United States Army. As any good commander would do, he immediately surrounded himself with a first rate team that included General’s Dupuy and Starry among others. This was Abrams’ strength as a strategic leader. Given the latitude to be critical and up front with peers and seniors alike, Dupuy developed the plan to get the Army back on track once
again. As General Starry assumed command of TRADOC from Dupuy, the plan was executed violently and thus the Army had found itself once again.

General Dupuy was a highly regarded U.S. Army Lieutenant General when he was brought to the Army staff by General Westmoreland. Gole, in his biography of Dupuy, describes the select few that Westmoreland brought on the team.

By the late 1960’s, they had risen to the top of the Army hierarchy, where they found themselves the custodians of a broken institution that they were determined to fix.\(^1^8\)

An interesting and unique arrangement in the United States is the civilian control of the armed forces. This deliberate construct between civilian authority and the military is fascinating when examined during extraordinary times such as presidential administration changes and military conflict abroad. The Kennedy-LBJ years brought a business like way of doing things in the Department of Defense with Robert McNamara as the Secretary of Defense.\(^1^9\) In short, civilians dominated the uniformed services during this time. With Dupuy’s arrival as Westmoreland’s Assistant to the Vice Chief of Staff (AVICE) he was determined to “…restore…what he regarded as its (the Army’s) proper respect and collaboration from the civilian side”.\(^2^0\) Gole goes on to describe Dupuy “as a general who got it…He was as bright as any of the Whiz kids, the young civilian managers Robert McNamara brought to government”.\(^2^1\)

Dupuy would be the last AVICE of the Army as the position was eliminated by General Abrams thereby allowing the Deputies within the Army more power and influence. Before moving on to four star rank and first commander of the newly established U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973, Dupuy recruited some talented folks to define the problems within the Army. One such individual was Colonel Bill Tuttle, himself a future four star commander in the Army.
Tuttle was charged as the single proponent for encapsulating exactly where the Army needed to be changed. Known as STEADFAST, Tuttle published a three page document that was very critical of the Continental Army Command (CONARC). Tuttle described CONARC, the single organization that was responsible for all operational forces within the United States, as dysfunctional, overwhelmed and in desperate need of change. This was the crux of the problem. This became the genesis for the inception of the CONARC being divided into two distinct four star commands, TRADOC and Forces Command (FORSCOM). These plans continued to mature and proved significant as Westmoreland turned the reins of the Army over to Abrams.

The generals, and all thinking officers, were deeply concerned with the many problems the Army faced as it came out of Vietnam. Depuy’s reorganization plans honored General Westmoreland’s pledge to revivify the Army, but Westmoreland would leave decision and implementation to his successor, Creighton Abrams. He didn’t want to saddle Abrams with a setup he couldn’t live with.22

Thus began the reorganization of the Army; a change that would transform the entire force. As previously mentioned, between the years 1969 and 1973 it was mandated that the Army halve in size from 1.6 million to 800,000. Coupled with this guidance was the end of mandatory conscription. But not only would the size of the Army change but its training philosophy would be overhauled. Most importantly however was its approach to leadership. The concept of leadership was analyzed by not necessarily, who led, but rather how it led. This revolutionary construct would be the blueprint that charted the course through operations in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War and beyond. TRADOC would spearhead “major changes in training and education”.23 Tuttle termed it, “a whole new focus to re-professionalize the Army”.24
For a dozen or so years the Army transformed itself against the backdrop of the Cold War and the formidable Soviet Union. The blueprint would be tested and tweaked with actions in the Middle East (Desert One, 1980), Grenada (Urgent Fury, 1983) and Panama (Just Cause, 1989). Later in life, General Dupuy offered his thoughts on Army lessons learned,

I know that the lessons that I have been talking about were primarily learned in World War I, learned again in World War II and Korea, and learned again the hard way in Vietnam, in Grenada, and probably in Panama. They have not gone away. They are classic infantry problems that you, too, will face. The thing to do now is to think them out ahead of time and practice ways to avoid repeating the U.S. Army’s bloody initiation rites during almost all of its wars.25

It was somewhat of an awakening for the Army that surged through the 1980’s fed on increased spending, modern equipment, and a senior leader corps that cut its teeth in Vietnam and committed to building a better force. Most importantly the force benefited from a surge in popular support from the American people. The only element that changed with the end of the Cold War was the face of the enemy. Instead of the Soviet machine on the central plains of Europe it was the stubborn Iraqi Army in a defenseless Kuwait. A swift victory in Desert Storm in 1991 validated Dupuy’s concept from the post Vietnam era. The Army had rebounded again.

Back to the Future

The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the resiliency of the force more than ever before. The force has once again transformed and adapted in a very complex, ambiguous counter insurgent fight. A reconstructed Iraq, although fragile and reversible, is evidence of this change. Not to be forgotten are the unfortunate by products of almost seven years of conflict in Iraq and nearly eight years of conflict in Afghanistan. First, for some of our field grade officers and senior noncommissioned
officers, serving in a combat zone is all they know. I am convinced that through repeated deployments in a very short career, some of our majors and sergeants are content with ‘getting the playbook for Iraq or Afghanistan and executing yet another mission in one or the other theater’. Although an exaggeration of sorts, this is a depiction of reality and the sentiment in these long struggles.

Second, our company grade leaders and noncommissioned officers have been given a pass on some elementary tasks that are thoroughly learned in schools and practiced in a garrison environment. An example is the Army’s stringent property accountability procedures. These mundane yet necessary tasks reinforce the banner of our leaders as good stewards of government property. All too often in combat, these skills are either not learned or certainly not practiced by our junior leaders. This is not to say that negligent practices are excuses for poor accountability. Rather, the demands of combat force leaders to prioritize life saving task ahead of others.

Third, the training of our battalion and brigade commanders prior to assuming command is woefully inadequate and in need of revamping. This pre command training is outdated and needs to more accurately reflect the challenges of the force today. This is a force that will continue to deal with repeated deployments for the foreseeable future. Commanders at the battalion and brigade level need to understand this facet of command more thoroughly. This is vital, as I believe the task of mentoring our junior leaders, when in command, is a critical task now more than ever before.

In a recent letter from General Dempsey, the current TRADOC Commander offers the following on the state of Army training, “We are behind in integrating lessons
learned, developing training and updating doctrine. We are undermanned in our efforts to design the future Army.”

Recommendations

Current requirements for the force will not wane in the near future. The demands of repeated and extended deployments will continue for most of the operational force. However, the responsibility and the requirements to build and maintain a well trained and ready force for the future must be met. It is paramount to understand that our focus will have to change from how to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan to preparing for the future enemy. How we train and resource the force is critical but the lynchpin is leadership. The following remedies are not meant as a checklist rather a primer on how we focus our future leaders.

First, we, as an Army must acknowledge at the senior level that our skills have atrophied. Our junior leaders ‘know the answers to the test’ today but this will not continue forever. To combat these training deficiencies, our junior leaders need to learn what it is like to be an officer or NCO in an Army not stressed by conflict. Our basic professional military education at the Lieutenant and Captain level needs to be revamped and focused on teaching these fundamental perishable skills again. Today, our leaders are flawless when identifying the parts and pieces of an escalation of force (EOF) kit but have no idea when asked about what is required in the field sanitation kit. This is a microcosm of the problem that needs acknowledgment and must be fixed.

Second, our senior leaders need to be senior mentors in a more robust way not only to our junior leaders in the force but at the source of commissioning. The cadets across the country need more contact from our senior leaders and to be told what is
expected of them in the future. This cannot be isolated to a graduation speech. Leadership has to be a contact sport!

Not all will make the cut. This is the brutal reality of any business. The right people need to advance not based on how much time they have spent in contact but their qualities as leaders. General Dupuy said,

Just as the state of training in a line unit should be judged by troop performance, and not by the amount of time spent in training, so any commander should be judged by his results in accomplishing mission, and not by his source of commission or the number and level of Army schools he attended.\(^{27}\)

The future of the force lies in the hands of our junior leaders. These problems are theirs to wrestle and overcome. The history of our Army is filled with examples of learning and relearning lessons. General Starry draws an analogy between the strength of our force and the country.

Our country, like countries of the past, will decline in strength and could eventually fall unless we take care to prepare young leaders to acquire competence, develop the commitment, practice the candor, and have the courage to continue this nation’s efforts to fulfill its inherent goals.\(^{28}\)

I believe it is time for our senior leaders to begin the much needed debate and exchange on the future of the Army Enterprise. With sleeves rolled up the force needs to be analyzed in the context of new missions, a reduction in resources, and an upfront, honest analysis of a training base that needs to be overhauled. Veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan and their experience are important to this exchange but most crucial to this dialogue are the naysayers and the pundits that have contrary views to the norm. In the coming years the force needs to refocus and history is on its side.
Endnotes


3 Ibid., 40.


5 Ibid., 145.

6 Halberstam, 41.

7 Meyer, 147.


9 Ibid.


12 Ibid., 213

13 Ibid., 213

14 Ibid., 213

15 Paul F. Gorman, The Secret of Future Victories pg 47


17 Ibid., 146.

18 Gole, 214

19 Gole 215

20 Ibid., 215

21 Ibid., 215
22 Ibid., 228

23 Ibid., 229

24 Ibid., 229


