UNITED STATES SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: THE ARMY RESERVE PIECE

BY

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ABSTRACT

This paper proposes a paradigm shift for the U.S. Army Reserves. It recommends the Army Reserve assume a major role in establishing a permanent capability for Security Force Assistance (SFA). The proposed Reserve-centric SFA option will provide the United States with a reliable force to build partner nations' security forces capacities. The study frames the SFA issue first by providing a brief historical perspective of the U.S. Army's SFA experiences since the Philippine Insurrection, along with a segment detailing recent Army Reserve experiences; then, it touches upon the current environment and challenges, and covers the future environment and items to consider when developing SFA solutions. Subsequently, the study elaborates upon the proposed SFA concept and organization and highlights the Army Reserve's Force Generation model - which is essential to establishing reasonable expectations and how one would obtain Reserve SFA forces.
Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police – once the province of Special Forces – is now a key mission for the military as a whole.

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
November 2007

The current environment of persistent conflict and U.S. security interests draws attention to the pressing need of establishing permanent U.S. Security Force Assistance structure. Security Force Assistance as outlined in FM 3-07.1 "is the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority." This paper proposes a concept to utilize the Army Reserve to assist the active component in fulfilling a wide range of security cooperation activities. As outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), in the section covering the build-up of partner-states' security capacities, the military's quintessential effort in the area of Security Force Assistance (SFA) is with "host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries’ forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories."

This study frames the SFA issue first by providing a brief historical perspective of the U.S. Army's SFA experiences since the Philippine Insurrection, along with a segment detailing recent Army Reserve experiences in Iraq; then it touches upon the current environment and challenges, and covers the future environment as well as points to consider when developing SFA solutions. It continues by highlighting the proposed Reserve SFA concept and organization and briefly elaborates on the Army Reserve's Force Generation model.
The highlight of the proposed concept is a paradigm shift from the Active Army handling the majority of the Security Force Assistance effort to the U.S. Army Reserves assuming a major role in establishing a permanent capability and capacity with an institutionalized force structure for SFA. This Reserve-centric SFA concept would provide the United States with a reliable force in the future to build partner nations' security capacities.

History of U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not the first time in American military history that the armed forces have been tasked with building partner capacity – providing Security Force Assistance. Throughout the Army's history it has participated in nation-building operations and has frequently advised and trained indigenous forces; most of which have been connected with fighting counterinsurgencies.4

The first large-scale foreign counterinsurgency occurred during the Philippine Insurrection beginning in 1898. The U.S. Army became deeply involved in training and advising friendly Filipino Forces to combat the insurgency that broke out shortly after the United States acquired ownership of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. The Army was "able to structure a coherent pacification policy that balanced conciliation with repression, winning over the Filipino population"5 through Benevolent Assimilation, but "ultimately military and security measures proved to be the sine qua non of Philippine pacification... [along with] civic action."6 This was accomplished in great part by the 35,000 U.S. Volunteers (national citizen soldiers - the precursor of the U.S. Army Reserves) who were recruited during the insurrection specifically for service in the Philippines, because the "War Department wanted soldiers who would combine the best qualities of the State Volunteers (National Guard) and the Regulars."7
The U.S. Army conducted extensive training and advisory missions during World War II with Free French troops and the Maquis (French Guerillas) against the Germans, and with the Chinese Nationalists against the Japanese in China and Burma. Throughout the late 1940’s and on into the 1950’s and 1960’s U.S. Army advisors served in Military Advisory Groups around the world; most notably in Greece, Turkey, Korea, and South Vietnam.\(^8\)

By far the largest U.S. advisory effort was in Vietnam. It had a modest beginning in 1950, with the establishment of the United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Indochina, providing logistical support and issuance of military equipment to French forces fighting the Viet Minh.\(^9\) In the 1960’s with the communist insurgency steadily growing, U.S. military assistance in Vietnam expanded exponentially. The role of U.S. advisors increased dramatically to assisting the South Vietnamese military in planning combat operations, training, intelligence, psychological warfare, communications, civil affairs, logistics and medical support. In the end, Vietnam was the "U.S. military’s longest, largest, and most complex advisory effort."\(^10\) At its peak in 1970, MACV "employed over 14,000 U.S. Army field advisors, including 1,800 Special Forces advisors."\(^11\)

After Vietnam the Army was reticent about its experiences in Southeast Asia, which led to the avoidance of “advisory efforts on the scale [of Vietnam]…Consequently, hard earned lessons and in-depth analyses disappeared from mainstream U.S. military concerns.”\(^12\) As a result the "advisory role and... mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) [transitioned] almost exclusively over to Special Operation Forces (SOF).”\(^13\) Within the past few decades SOF units have successfully carried out "modest [FID]
operations... in Central and South America (especially in El Salvador); more recently in the Balkans and Philippines."\textsuperscript{14} Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the demand for Special Operation Forces to conduct direct action and counterterrorist operations has skyrocketed. Simultaneously, the demand for large-scale Security Force Assistance (advisory) missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries as part of the Overseas Contingency Operations has expanded far beyond the capacity of the SOF.

**USAR Security Force Assistance Experiences**

Since the Philippine Insurrection's use of U.S. Volunteers (the predecessor to the USAR), the Army Reserve, as an institution, has not been tasked or used in an advisory role until the Global War on Terror. The highlight of this study's proposal is a shift towards the U.S. Army Reserve's assuming a major role in establishing a permanent capability and capacity for Security Force Assistance. The proposed concept is based off of recent USAR advisory experiences in Iraq and other SFA missions.

Early during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Coalition Military Assistance Transition Team (CMATT) was formed to organize, train, and equip the Iraqi Army. In 2004 with the formation of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), CMATT rolled up under the new organization. Like CMATT, MNSTC-I was not adequately staffed and was challenged to acquire units to accomplish its mission to rebuild the Iraqi Army. At the time no active duty or National Guard combat units were available to fill this mission, which left planners without any options to support MNSTC-I. Ultimately, a solution was found by assigning the mission to the U.S. Army Reserves.\textsuperscript{15}

The solution had its origins in LTG James R. Helmly's (Chief of the Army Reserve) desire to transform the USAR Training Divisions from their Cold War mission, to one supporting the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Helmly envisioned a robust
headquarters staffed with both active duty and reserve soldiers that "would deploy to a failed, failing, or defeated nation to coordinate the planning and execution of rebuilding all or parts of that nation’s armed forces," and named the organization Foreign Army-Training Assistance Command (FA-TRAC). LTG Helmly presented his proposal to the Army G3, LTG Richard Cody, who approved the concept and tasked the Army Reserve to develop a plan in April 2004.

The United States Army Reserve Command's (USARC) plan essentially tasked Army Reserve Training Divisions to provide units, command and staff to fulfill MNSTC-I’s request for personnel. The Training Divisions were top heavy with large numbers of officers and NCO's who were instructors and Drill Sergeants from Basic Combat Training, Officer Education System, NCO Education System, and Military Occupation Specialty training units, and were a good match to fill MNSTC-I’s advisory and staff vacancies.

The Training Divisions quickly formed units into advisory teams to take advantage of the opportunity to prepare and train together, understand one another's strengths and weaknesses, and form cohesive units prior to mobilization. Unfortunately, the first Division’s advisory teams did not mobilize and deploy as units, but instead as fillers in relatively small teams or as individuals based on MNSTC-I’s requirements. At first, this was due in part to the urgency of MNSTC-I’s situation that those officers and NCOs slated for the headquarters, were needed as soon as possible. Unfortunately, this system remained in place and also plagued the follow-on Divisions.

The initial Reserve Division's hard work and advisory experience provided MNSTC-I with some much needed breathing room for transitioning from what was
clearly an *ad hoc* endeavor; allowing it to become a relatively well-structured organization and establishing an orderly process for integrating and rotating follow-on units from the other Training Divisions.\textsuperscript{18} Reserve soldiers not only served as advisors, but were also assigned to staff positions as individual fillers to supplement MNSTC-I, CMATT, and the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) headquarters.

Preparing and training Reserve soldiers for SFA missions was accomplished by the 85\textsuperscript{th} and 91\textsuperscript{st} Reserve Training Support Divisions at the mobilization stations located at Camp Atterbury and Fort Bliss, and then at Fort Hood and Fort McCoy. Ultimately the advisory training moved to Fort Riley, then on to its permanent location at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk. Major changes with regard to organizing, training and deploying advisory teams were initiated in 2006. It began with turning the training over to the Active Component, which was completed in December 2006, and the advisory (Military Transition Team - MiTT) mission itself transitioned over to the Active Component with Reserve personnel assigned as augmentees.

In retrospect, the first Army Reserve advisory efforts in Iraq were timely from the standpoint that during a critical time CMATT and MNSTC-I desperately needed to augment its capabilities across multiple areas; the Army Reserve was able to effectively meet those requirements.\textsuperscript{19} The four Training Divisions’ performance in organizing, preparing, training and mobilizing their soldiers for advisory missions during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM "is a testament to the ever-increasing professionalism of the Army’s Reserve Component soldiers and their leaders."\textsuperscript{20}

Today the Army Reserve continues to fill advisory roles in Iraq as individual fillers on MNSTC-I staff, on MiTT teams at the eleven Iraqi Army Regional Training Centers,
or providing advisors to the Iraqi military schools system. Each Regional Training Center (RTC) has two advisory teams made up of Reserve personnel, a 3 man RTC Headquarters Advisory Team and a 9 man Logistic and Maintenance Advisory Team (LMAT). The Iraqi Army's main depot at Camp Taji has approximately 75 Reserve soldiers serving on a large military schools, LMAT and RCT advisory team. In all approximately 196 Reserve soldiers serve in this advisory role.21

In addition to the Iraqi Army’s military schools advisory mission, the Army Reserve has also carried out several other SFA missions. Since early 2009, 18 Army Reserve officers and NCOs have been advising the Saudi Arabian National Guard (Army) in establishing and equipping a 35,000 man Facilities Security Force (FSF), whose mission is to secure the Kingdom’s Critical Infrastructure. The advisors are also overseeing the fielding of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) as part of the Office of the Program Manager – Facilities Security Forces (OPM-FSF).22 In 2008 the Reserve’s mobilized and deployed a company of Drill Sergeants to the Dominican Republic and one company to east Africa - Uganda, for six months to conduct security cooperation missions (SFA) and advised these partners on how to expand and conduct their initial entry training.

In Afghanistan, no formal request for forces (RFF) tasker has ever been issued to the Army Reserve calling for whole units to contribute soldiers to be advisors, as the case was in Iraq. Reserve soldiers have only participated in advisory missions in Afghanistan on an individual basis, rounding out advisory units as fillers, or as augmentees. Never the less, they continue to contribute to the Army's advisory mission.
Current Environment and Challenges

The frequency of American SFA activities since the Philippine Insurrection reveal that current demands are not extraordinary. Despite decades of experience the Army has "consistently underestimated the difficulty of fighting unconventional warfare, military occupation and pacification. The price of this hubris has been high in both the past and the present."\(^{23}\) In spite of the initial \textit{ad-hoc} nature of past experiences and cost in national treasure, U.S. military and civilian advisors eventually succeeded with their pacification, civil and military action, and economic development during each conflict.\(^{24}\)

Much to its own chagrin the Army in Afghanistan and Iraq disregarded the insight history provided, and was forced to resort back to creating \textit{ad-hoc} stability and advisory capabilities because it lacked an organization capable of integrating military and interagency efforts.\(^{25}\) The Army has a tendency to focus on post-conflict operations without moving towards establishing and institutionalizing an organization to anticipate threats before they materialize within the foreign Security Force Assistance realm.

Some of the national security challenges facing the United States are "due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize, and partner with foreign security forces."\(^{26}\) In order to confront these challenges many soldiers, defense analysts and senior government officials recommend the establishment of an institution with force structure "as a means of overcoming current bureaucratic impediments and providing a coherent focus on SFA challenges."\(^{27}\) Some proponents have put forth a variety of viable solutions that can solve the U.S. problem with regard to this challenge.

It also appears that the winds of change have picked up within the DoD with the recent issuance of instructions. The 2010 QDR outlines six key initiatives to support U.S. SFA activities in strengthening and institutionalizing SFA capabilities and
capacity. Additionally, last fall the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy issued instructions outlining policy and directing DoD to "assist other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and ... organizations in planning and executing reconstruction and stabilization efforts." This is an attempt to designate responsibility within DoD to provide operational control of both soft and hard power during Stability Operations within the U.S. government and military establishment.

Reserve Soldiers possess unique skills in addition to their military skill set. They are “Twice the Citizen”– a citizen and a soldier. A typical Reserve Soldier possesses a breadth of sensitivity acquired from working in civilian business cultures that tend to be non-hierarchical requiring tolerance and patience with others, and experience working with diverse groups outside the military – dealing with people from all walks of life within their civilian communities on a daily basis. They also have experience working within an environment and system (The Reserves) that forces one to gradually develop organizations, due to time and resources. The Reserve unit training process is drawn out over multiple battle assemblies/drills, throughout the course of a year (a considerable amount of time), and often the results are not immediately evident. These constraints imposed by their training environment, coupled with their experiences in dealing with diverse groups outside the military, conditions Reserve Soldiers to work with emerging or underdeveloped countries' military.

It is not uncommon for Reserve Soldiers to have multiple Military Occupational Skill qualifications – Combat Arms, Combat Support and Combat Service Support. Approximately 36% of AR Soldiers have more than one MOS; and it is not unusual for those who do to possess more than two MOSs. This lends itself nicely to SFA
missions, where soldiers usually work in remote and desolate locations with limited resources; where additional MOS qualifications come in handy either to train low density MOS soldiers or to perform those functions for the advisory team. This, coupled with their civilian job skill sets and experiences, are valuable assets in building partner security capacities.

**Future Environment and Developing SFA Solutions**

When developing solutions or proposals to meet the DoD guidance, one must consider the current and future character of conflict. In his 2008 article for the journal *Survival*, Colonel H. R. McMaster's observations on the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq show "self-delusion" within the U.S. military concerning the character of future conflict. He noted that our initial efforts were grounded in a vision of war "based on attrition models against mirror-imaged adversaries... [and] focused on how U.S. forces might prefer to fight and then assumed that preference was relevant to the problem of future war." In his approach to developing future forces McMaster “reveals the need for balanced joint capabilities and additional capacity in other agencies to assist in post conflict stability and counterinsurgency operations.” The balanced capabilities and capacities he refers to, in essence, are the needs to establish a permanent program for building partner capacity – Security Force Assistance and State-Building.

The Secretary of Defense highlights his vision of future conflict in the 2010 QDR as "large-scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations in a wide range of environments," and directs that we institutionalize the lessons garnered from current conflicts in our "doctrine, training, capability development, and operational planning." Correspondingly, in its 2007-2012 Strategic Plan the Department of State affirms the need for security cooperation to help partners build the capability and
capacity through security assistance programs to counter threats.\textsuperscript{34} Plainly, both OSD and State corroborate McMaster's view on the character of future conflict.

A recurring theme in noted security analyst Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich's work and testimonies to Congress (on preparing U.S. ground forces for future conflicts) is that the military is limited in the area of SFA. He notes that not having an existing "organization for training [partner state] forces, and a lack of equipment stocks from which to outfit them"\textsuperscript{35} hurt U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also emphasizes that "these capabilities must exist in advance of our engagement in stability operations, [and] not be cobbled together on the fly."\textsuperscript{36} In his 2008 \textit{Military Review} article, another security analyst, Dr. John A. Nagl stresses the important role advisors play in the current operational environment and like any previous innovation in warfare "requires [some] degree of institutional advocacy."\textsuperscript{37}

The Army has initiated a concept of creating Advise and Assist Brigades (AAB) from standard General Purpose Force (GPF) Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). Basically, a BCT undergoes advisory training, and “based on the requirements of the operational environment,” it is augmented with additional officers and other “enabling assets and capabilities to support a security force assistance mission.”\textsuperscript{38}

BCTs will undoubtedly encounter difficulties as they transition from focusing on combat tasks and quick decisive action, to the advisory and teaching role of an AAB. The mission for each is distinct, as are the required skill sets to be an advisor. BCT leaders and soldiers alike will have to adjust their frame of mind from achieving swift and immediate success, to one where results are not easy to discern in the short term and evolve over weeks, months, or even years. This transition can discourage result
oriented soldiers accustomed to achieving goals quickly and unless units check this mindset, it can become a liability.  

The Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff G 3/5/7, Strategic Planning, Concepts, and Doctrine Division (DAMO-SSP) has developed an interim SFA Model. DAMO-SSP projects that in the future, after the draw-down from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army will align AABs with each Army Service Component Command (ASCC) in each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) to provide them with SFA capabilities (see Figure 1, Advise and Assist Brigade Alignment). The BCTs will undergo Advisory training, just as several Brigades did last year, prior to being assigned to a GCC in accordance with the Guidance for Employing the Force (GEF). However, the Army acknowledges a "civilian gap" within the AAB model. The military lacks available capacity to advise and assist in the development of partner nations' ministerial governance capacity, especially in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies.

Just as future conflicts and current requirements (2010 QDR and DoD Instruction 3000.05) dictate the need to change, or re-orient, U.S. military force structure, the Army needs to heed the recommendations of experts and formalize Security Force Assistance by establishing a permanent institution and an "organization that can leverage U.S. military and civilian expertise internally as well as externally across the interagency and [with] our international partners." This commanding agency, or proponent, should have responsibility for all advisory issues — concepts, requirements, doctrine, training, personnel selection, planning, and operations.
Proposed Reserve SFA Concept and Organization

In today’s operational environment and period of persistent conflict the Army is expected to function as a full-spectrum expeditionary force. The current force structure places a lot of emphasis on the Modular Brigade Combat Team to be a "jack of all trades," fully capable of not only conducting asymmetric warfare, but also proficient in Irregular Warfare; and at conducting stabilization and advisory (Security Force Assistance) missions.

Several noted Defense analysts and counterinsurgency experts, such as Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, and Dr. John Nagl, as well as two recent Army War College
(AWC) studies, have developed and proposed concepts for institutionalizing SFA for adoption by the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS), as well as other Intergovernmental agencies. Many of these professionals proposed their own version of SFA organizational structure, and they are all very similar. Portions of their proposals are incorporated into this paper — for the most part this proposed SFA force structure is derived from the two recent Army War College studies, and Dr. Nagl’s proposed Advisor Command composition and organization form his 2008 Military Review article.

This study proposes a solution to assist the active component by highlighting the U.S. Army Reserve’s capability and capacity to assume a major role in developing a permanent structure for Security Force Assistance. The framework for this concept is modeled after the Army’s Civil Affairs (CA) structure where the active component has a CA Group and proponent responsibility, and the Army Reserve has four CA Groups and a CA/PSYOPS Training Brigade. This Reserve-centric SFA option is also based on the recent USAR advisory experiences in Iraq and other SFA missions, along with concepts put forth by aforementioned professional practitioners.

In order to ensure that the tenets of advisory are codified in the military, it is necessary to establish a proponent agency. This proposal concurs with the Wuestner study’s institutional concept designating the proponent agency the “Security Advisory and Assistance Command” (SAAC), a Joint Command and lead advocate responsible for integrating all SFA activities of the Department of Defense, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational organizations. Just as Wuestner points out, this concept agrees that capabilities already exist within DoD and DoS, by combining all or
some of the existing structure (State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), and University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies etc.). Additionally, building the new command will produce cost savings in and of itself, through reducing or eliminating redundancies and manpower bill requirements.\textsuperscript{47} The new command would also manage the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) for the interagency and joint force and handle legislative and funding issues.\textsuperscript{48} Basically, the agency would assume the role of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance and become the Department of Defense Center of Excellence responsible for managing SFA DOTMLPF and the development of SFA capabilities and concepts, including the integration of lessons learned and best practices, across DoD and other governmental departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{49}

It is logical for the proponent SFA Headquarters, SAAC, to be aligned within the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). SOCOM already has the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) as its proponent for FID and irregular warfare, with SOF units conducting all of the military aspects of the SFA mission, and has existing institutional structure. This organization would be expanded to include the civilian side of Security Force Assistance - the ministries (civil governance/management) and budgetary/finance. The Department of State’s Civilian Response Corps would provide executive expert staffers, just as they reinforce the regular DoS staff in Washington, to fill permanent SAAC headquarters civilian staff directorate positions, and assist in
managing the reconstruction and stabilization staff functions of the military elements trained and tasked to perform ministry advisory functions.50

As with the McMahon study group’s proposal, military personnel assigned to operational SFA HQ units providing oversight (command), training, and advising at all levels, would undergo SFA Advisory training. The SFA Advisor Training Brigade would develop and implement an SFA training course that aligns “all tactical combat advisor training, operational enabler and support training and strategic staff mentoring training to ensure unity of purpose in execution of SFA activities.”51 Upon completion of the training, officers and enlisted would receive an appropriate SFA Additional Skill Identifier (ASI). SAAC would manage the awarding and tracking of ASIs and SFA qualified personnel in coordination with Human Resources Command.52

Reserve officers and NCOs would augment the headquarters staff for the SFA Department of Defense Center of Excellence. These "Individual Augmentees" would be organized into a unit much like the 7th and 8th U.S. Armies’ Army Reserve HQ Augmentee Units, or the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Reserve Unit.53 These units are different in that the Reserve Staffers’ drill schedule – Inactive Duty Training (IDT), is based upon the individual’s availability and the requirements of their assigned staff directorate, with the exception of the mandatory battle assemblies/drills and Annual Training (AT).

The SAAC HQ would be manned with a fulltime active duty staff, just as in Wuestner’s proposal – with personal and special staffs, as well as civilian and military (coordinating) staff directorates. The military directorates would include (G1 through G8), Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Plans, Signal, Engineer, and
Comptroller. The civilian directorates would consist of Justice/Legal, Police/Law Enforcement, Infrastructure & Energy, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, National Finance, Economic Development, Health, Public Information, Education, Defense Assistance and Religion. Reserve staff officers and NCOs from across the nation will make-up the SAAC HQ Reserve Augmentee Unit. These soldiers will be assigned to the different staff directorates and assemble at the HQ to perform their battle assemblies - IDT, and Annual Training in week long or multiple week increments as needed or required by the Command. Each military staff directorate and special staff would have at least an eight person augmentation team of officers and NCOs; with a total number of 104 Reserve Augmentee personnel depending upon special staff needs. The augmentee soldiers would have to meet all Military Occupational Skills Qualifications (MOSQ) and SFA required certifications or criteria in order to serve on the staff. For example, the G1 staffers would need to be AG/42 series, G3 would need to be combat arms (02A) with Advisor Training and preferably with advisory experience. The same would apply to personnel serving on the civilian interagency staff directorates whose augmentee strength would be 96 and would require Civil Affairs qualification (38A series) and appropriate Advisory ASI.

As mentioned earlier JCISFA would become the Department of Defense Center of Excellence responsible for SFA proponent training under SAAC, similar to the functions of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School under USASOC. JCISFA would have an active component Advisor Training Brigade, like the current Army Advisor Training Brigade (AATB) at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, responsible for SFA training. This Brigade would be organized
with a TRADOC TDA and have “a standard staff, with a Training Support Battalion (TSB), Individual Training Battalions (ITB), an Operations Group (OG), and a University of Foreign and Cultural Studies.”

Individual Training Battalions (ITB) would train Military, Police, Intelligence, Customs/Border Police, and Logistical advisors, as well as Government Agency advisors on the required skill sets for advisors that would “include subject matter expert skills, combat and advisory skills, and advanced individual training such as language and cultural studies” oriented on specific regions based on priorities. The training battalion would also have governmental agencies assist in training “both civilian and military [advisors] in Embassy, USAID, DoS, Treasury, Justice, and other interagency components” related to SFA requirements. Just as the current AATB facilitates area briefs, or familiarization tours, to provide situational awareness for advisory teams prior to deployment, the ITB would continue with that responsibility.

Army Reserve Training Support Brigades (TSB) would partner with the SFA Training Brigade to provide surge instructor capacity and if necessary on a permanent cyclical basis during contingency operations. Reserve SFA instructors would be available during their Inactive Duty Training and Annual Training periods, to augment regular SFA training. The Training Brigade could integrate the Reserve instructors as individuals or teams, as the situation requires. Just as Army Training Centers do with Drill Sergeants for Initial Entry Training and Instructors for MOS Training at Advanced Individual Training (AIT).

SAAC would have responsibility to oversee and implement security force assistance programs and would have a deployable (expeditionary) Theater
Headquarters element. The expeditionary headquarters’ structure and identification is derived from Wuestner – Military Advisory and Assistance Command (MAAC). MAAC would have joint staff directorates to oversee and manage training, organization and operations; as well as conduct assessments, advise, and train Foreign Security Forces (FSF). The staff directorates’ would be manned by AC personnel on a fulltime basis. Similar to the SAAC headquarters, but on a smaller scale, a Reserve Augmentation Unit would be assigned with approximately 40 personnel. If the situation requires additional personnel beyond those assigned to MAAC, the SAAC Reserve Augmentation Unit could be drawn upon to bolster the deployed headquarters. MAAC would have the capability to oversee and manage the deployment of tailored and scalable SFA teams and units to perform a range of SFA activities in Theater.

The Theater Headquarters element of MAAC would work National and Regional Ministry (Government) Advisory Teams whose focus would be on stability operations. The HQ would also provide governance advisory to the host nation, as well as advising the Combatant Command on civil matters. Under hostile, or combat, operations, Ministry Teams would initially be manned by properly trained military personnel. However, as hostilities decrease, they would transition over to their civilian counterparts. National Ministry Teams (NMT) would have senior level experts who would provide broad and diverse governance functions in both civilian and military sectors at the national level. Regional Ministry Teams (RMT) would do the same at the local and provincial level. These Ministry Advisory Teams would work closely with the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with the core mission "to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to
prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife."

As with the analysts' and studies' proposals, the goal is to provide tailored SFA teams whose core competencies and level of training provide the capability to improve or sustain partner capabilities and capacities. Composition of the SFA teams would vary in size as well as mission focus; from various governmental agencies to military organizations. The military advisory teams would range from Corps and Division level down through Brigade and Battalion units. The teams would assist in professionalizing the partner/host nation forces and support the development of institutions to meet the various demands facing them, including major combat operations; irregular warfare; and SSTR operations. The advisory teams would not be limited to military or ministry functions, they would include Border Police, Anti-Terrorism/Anti-Narcotics, Logistics and other special entities with proper augmentation from the appropriate components (such as maritime and aviation), and other interagency enablers (FBI, ATF, Boarder Patrol, Customs and Boarder Patrol, etc.).

Under this proposal the composition of military advisory teams at the operational level, corps and division, closely resemble those of Wuestner and Nagl. These teams would have advisors assigned to each coordinating and special staff function/position (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, communications, information, etc.), as well as advisors for the personal staff positions (public affairs, judge advocate, surgeon, etc.). Brigade and battalion level teams would have advisors for each staff function, while the battalions would have additional advisors for each company within the battalion.
The operational force structure of this SFA concept calls for the creation of two active duty SFA Groups and five Army Reserve Groups. This mirrors the basic structure of Civil Affairs, in that the Active Component is the cornerstone for institutionalizing and maintaining the proponency of the SFA program and the ties with the active force while being augmented by the Reserve element. By having at least five Reserve Groups allows for the integration of the SFA organization to effectively work within the Army Reserve Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model (described later).

The composition of each (Active and Reserve) SFA Group would include several battalions and companies comprised of operational advisor teams whose functional area of focus would be on Ministry (Regional), Division, Brigade, Battalion, and Logistics and Military Schools. A typical SFA Group would have a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, one Regional Ministry Advisory Company, one Division/Corps Advisory Company, a Special Troops Advisory Battalion, and three Advisory Battalions. The Special Troops Advisory Battalion would have Logistical advisory teams, as well as MOS Schools’ advisory teams. The Advisory Battalions are comprised of one Brigade Advisory Team, three Maneuver Battalion Advisory Teams, and two to three Law Enforcement/Police Advisory Teams. The total manning for an Advisory Group is 830 officers, NCOs and enlisted. Figure 2 shows the proposed Group organization.
The structures of each operational and tactical level advisory unit (Ministry, Division/Corps, Brigade, Line Battalion and Police Battalion) mirror those of the Wuestner study. A Regional Ministry Advisory Team would consist of 65 officer and NCO advisors filling each department or directory. The Division/Corps Advisory Company has 47 officer and NCO advisors assigned, covering down on each staff element (personal, coordinating and special staff). The Brigade Advisory Company is manned by 23 officer and NCO advisors filling each primary staff element (personnel,
operations/intelligence, logistics and communications). A Maneuver Battalion Advisory Company is assigned 26 officer and NCO advisors to man the headquarters staff element – operations, intelligence, and fire support, with a HQ Service Company covering logistics, communications and medical, along with four line company advisory teams. The Police Battalion Advisory Company is comprised of 23 officer and NCO advisors filling the headquarters element containing operations, criminal intelligence, logistics, communications and medical sections, along with four line/station company advisory teams. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company within an Advisory Group will have 35 officers and enlisted assigned to the organization to provide supervision and coordinate support for its advisory subordinate units.

Neither study, nor any of the analysts, proposed a unit structure to provide a support or special troops advisory organization. Based on lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is necessary for the host/partner nation’s military to adopt and institutionalize proper logistic and maintenance procedures in order for their forces to sustain themselves and remain combat effective in addition to establishing force generating training centers to build the armed forces. As a result, this concept proposes the formation of a Special Troops Advisory Battalion that contains a Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, along with four Advisory Companies.

The breakout of this organization begins with a Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment of 14 personnel that includes the command section and the coordinating staff to provide the nexus of advisory support coordination. The Sustainment Brigade Advisory Company is staffed with 38 officer and NCO advisors filling the command and coordinating staff (S-1 through S-6) sections, a Surgeon/Medical Section, and Support
Operations Section. The Maintenance Battalion Advisory Company is manned by 23 officers and NCOs within the command section and coordinating staff (S-1 through S-6), and the Maintenance Support Elements – Wheeled Vehicle, Tracked Vehicle, Generator, Small Arms and Communication. The Transportation Battalion Advisory Company is comprised of 23 officer and NCO advisors assigned to the command and coordinating staff (S-1 through S-6) sections, and the Transportation Support Elements – Transportation Operations (Land, Sea, Air), BMO, Truck Master and Dispatching. The last support element is the MOS Schools Battalion Advisory Company with 28 officers and NCOs fulfilling advisory roles at the partner nation’s training centers for Combat Arms, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Officer and NCO Education. Figure 3 depicts the proposed Special Troops Advisory Battalion organization.

On the government side, the advisory team structure for the ministries would vary according to the level of governance (national, regional/provincial, and local). Each government agency would have a military advisor. Under hostile conditions it is likely that these military government advisors will be the first governmental advisors in country. They will transition to follow-on civilian advisors as hostilities decrease and the security environment permits. The civilian advisors will come from other governmental agencies and the S/CRS. In permissive environments the civilian government advisors may be the first to take the lead. Some of the typical functional areas with military advisors are: cultural, judicial, infrastructure, energy, foreign affairs, economic, health, education, agriculture, public security, finance, public information and defense. The composition of the National and Regional Ministry Advisory Teams will include Active Duty or Reserve Civil Affairs personnel with the requisite MOS and ASI, as well as
S/CRS personnel. All must have acquired additional training and education on how to advise, train, assist, lead, mentor, and educate ministries, regional and local governments.\(^{71}\)

### Figure 3. Proposed Special Troops Advisory Battalion Organization

The capabilities of the advisory teams on the military side enable them to build partner capacity, conduct combat advising, assist partner security forces in conducting security cooperation tasks (counterterrorism, counterdrug, counterinsurgency, humanitarian and civic assistance actions, etc.) and execute contingency operations.
While on the civilian side, the advisory teams are able to train and advise across the full spectrum of government – at the national and regional level.

When organizing and recruiting for advisor units, volunteers should be sought before detailing any soldier. In Reserve SFA units, just as in Reserve Basic Combat Training (Drill Sergeant) units, the officer and NCO leadership is responsible for recruiting potential candidates. The selection process for SFA assignment should be deliberate and thorough, because the environment that advisors work in is extremely demanding. Candidate assessment would include background screening, a psychological profile, medical and physical screening to insure the best qualified personnel are selected to conduct advisory missions for the United States. After all, they will be our ambassadors to partner nations’ military and government personnel.

Once approved, SFA candidates would have to complete the advisor training course and would receive an additional skill identifier. Like Reserve Drill Sergeant Candidates, Reserve SFA Candidates will be required to complete their qualifications within 24 months of joining the unit, or before the unit is mobilized (whichever comes first). Just as the SFA soldiers serving on operational advisory teams, those soldiers serving on the HQ staff will also have to meet all MOS qualifications and SFA required certifications and criteria in order to deploy.

Overall, this concept requires the Army Reserve to provide a total of 4,390 personnel to the SFA mission. This includes 4,150 officers and enlisted in five Reserve SFA Groups, and 240 officers and NCOs in the three SFA Headquarters Augmentation Units (SAAC Military Team, SAAC Civil/Ministry Team, and MAAC). The active duty
element requires a total of 3,076 personnel. This consists of two SFA Groups with a total of 1,660 soldiers assigned; SAAC HQ with 1,300 personnel and MAAC with 116.73

A way ahead for the Army is to review recent proposed SFA concepts, develop and then adopt a permanent SFA organization while still maintaining the ability to focus on improving our ability to conduct conventional, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and stability operations.

Army Reserve ARFORGEN and the Reserve SFA Concept

In the past Reserve unit readiness and mobilization has been a point of contention for the Active Component and Army planners. Much has changed since DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I (OIF I) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF); so it is essential to understand the Army Reserves' ARFORGEN process is in order to establish reasonable expectations, debunk stereotypes and recognize how one obtains Army Reserve SFA units.

Army Reserve ARFORGEN is designed to enhance unit readiness and provide predictability to Army units (Active and Reserve) by identifying sequential windows when Reserve units are available for deployment; facilitating a deliberate ramp up to deployment readiness and sustaining that readiness for the defined mission cycle. The Army Reserve packages its forces on the assumption of one year deployed for every four years stabilized at home station. Accordingly, the USAR organizes its units into ten Army Reserve Expeditionary Forces (AREFs) organized into pairs or “packages” for the ARFORGEN rotation process.74

Under this proposal, one Reserve SFA Group would be slated within each one of the five AREF Packages (as mentioned above); within one of the priority pair AREFs available for deployment one year out of every five, aligned by fiscal year. This will allow
the SFA Command to have an SFA Reserve Group available for deployment in any given year to support a rotation of forces during any given contingency.

ARFORGEN provides predictability to Army planners, to expect at least one Reserve SFA Group to be available every year for a 12 month deployment. The cycle's predictability also allows Reserve units to recover from a deployment, re-set and prepare for the next mission. Armed with this knowledge, planners can integrate Reserve SFA units into their design of future stability operations plans accordingly and thereby successfully strengthen our partner nations.

Conclusion

The current administration's Quadrennial Defense Review clearly cites the importance of building the security capacity of partner states. Within the key initiatives segment it outlines strengthening and institutionalizing security force assistance capabilities as well as the capacity for ministerial-level training within the DoD. However, as described by a senior DoD official, all the service chiefs are in agreement that they do not desire the establishment of a permanent SFA agency or element. Their reasoning is that in order to create such an organization requires the services to extract personnel and funding out of the existing force structure during this time of persistent conflict. This view is somewhat shortsighted. Future conflicts are likely to be low intensity/irregular and many foreign armies will need assistance. This prediction is echoed by DoD and DoS officials and military analysts.

As with U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA), the military should create an SFA advisory force and assign the primary responsibility to the U.S. Army Reserve. Just like CA, establish an SFA proponency under the Special Operations Command, with two active duty SFA Group and a minimum of five Army Reserve Groups. USAR soldiers are
exceptionally well suited for advisory missions; as stated earlier they possess a breadth of political sensitivity and patience in dealing with different cultures and experience working in a system that forces one to gradually develop organizations. These qualities are especially helpful in dealing with emerging or underdeveloped countries' military organizations.

As we have seen throughout history advisory teams are often exceptionally small and advisors are placed in situations where possessing multiple skills in addition to their primary branch are a tremendous asset. The best advisor will be a jack of all trades. Most Reserve soldiers have multiple Military Occupational Skill qualifications (Combat Arms, Combat Support and Combat Service Support), and civilian skill sets and experiences that lend themselves nicely to SFA missions.

Creation of an SFA organization would be fairly easy and not cost prohibitive because most of the capability already exists within the military and government. By leveraging existing structure from within the DoD and DoS we can build capacity and limit manpower costs. The recommended design approach of the SFA Command provides for the integration of reserve component soldiers with advisory skill sets to enhance the active component and interagency to meet current and future demands of U.S. national security interests. Based on the security situation and conditions, this model provides scalable capabilities and provides for rapid mobilization and deployment of "modular formations while maximizing power. It also allows the United States to offer "best practices" to [the] indigenous government and host nation leadership."

The intent of this proposal is to institutionalize a permanent SFA structure and advocates that the USAR assume a primary role in providing the bulk of the force
structure. It also outlines the development of an SFA organization solution that effectively meets the requirement to build enduring partner capacity and capability to support U.S. national security interests abroad. The U.S. Army lacks the force structure to meet current and future requirements for stabilization, training, and advising foreign militaries and the Army Reserves is a logical and economical choice for the Army to entrust it with the major portion of the SFA mission.

**Endnotes**


6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 125.

8 Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm, 4-5.


14 Ibid.


16 Ibid., 7.

17 Ibid., 51.

18 Ibid., 209.

19 Ibid., 224.

20 Ibid., 227.

21 LTC Louis Long, Executive Officer, Assistant Secretary of the Army Man Power and Reserve Affairs, telephone interview by author, March 5, 2010.

22 COL Douglas Shipman, Ops Officer OPM-FSF, email March 10, 2010.

23 Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, 237.


25 Ibid.


27 Ibid.


30 Robert A. Cipolla, USARC CIO G2/6 ESD, email data on Reserve MOS qualifications derived from Regional Level Application System report, 23 March 2010.

32 McMaster, “On War: Lessons to be Learned,” 27.
36 Ibid.
41 COL Cheryl Smart, Deputy Chief of Staff, DAMO-SSP, G3/5/7, interview by author, March 11, 2010.
44 The two recent Army War College proposals are the research paper by Scott Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm (2008), and the group paper supervised by Michael McMahon, A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts (2009).


Ibid., 27.

Augmentation Units are unique, unlike regular Reserve units their schedule is designed around the individual's availability and the needs of the staff directorate to which they are assigned. These units provide command, administrative and training oversight of the assigned soldiers and have mandatory battle assemblies where they all meet together, usually to conduct required training. Their Annual Training (AT) periods are usually conducted during major training exercises or deployments.


The number of "Augmentees" is based off of conversations with several Reserve officers who have served in these Augmentation Units. Typically, each HQ staff directorate will have six to eight Reserve officers and NCOs assigned to expand/enhance the section.


Ibid., 44.

Ibid.

During this period of persistent conflict the Active Component (AC) has been severely stretched and experienced a shortage of AC Drill Sergeants (DS) and AIT Instructors (AI) at Army Training Centers (ATC), due to current operational demands. As a result, the AC (TRADOC) turned to the USAR Training Divisions to fill its shortages of Drill Sergeants and Instructors. The USAR has implemented an ARFORGEN process for DS and AI units to provide support to the AC on a more permanent (cyclical) basis from 6 to 12 months. During times where ATCs experience a surge of new recruits – soldiers in training (SIT), Reserve training units provide DSs and AIs to assist during the Reserve soldier’s IDT or AT periods.


Total 324 Officers, 506 NCO and Enlisted in a Reserve SFA Group.


Ibid., 57.

The figures for the Active Duty personnel assigned to SAAC and MAAC HQs are from the Wuestner study, see pages 40-41.


Comment by Senior DoD official as a guest lecturer in response to an SFA question during Q&A session at the U.S. Army War College, January, 2010.