THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC GUIDANCE ON ARMY BUDGET SUBMISSIONS

BY

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# The Impact of Strategic Guidance on Army Budget Submissions

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**Abstract**

See attached

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**ABSTRACT**

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Professor Harold Lord
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The President, Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff routinely publish strategic guidance in the form of the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, National Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review. This paper analyzes the correlation between the guidance contained in these documents on the Army’s annual budget submissions. In this analysis Army management decision packages (MDEPs) are grouped according to capability to highlight the linkage between guidance and budget submissions. Lastly, the paper discusses how the Army could better utilize the Planning Programming Budgeting Process to more effectively implement change.
THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC GUIDANCE ON ARMY BUDGET SUBMISSIONS

During a recent speech the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Robert M. Gates, stated that he was disappointed military leaders working in the Pentagon were more concerned with completing annual budget submissions than fighting the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary Gates’ concern raises an important question. Does the planning, programming, budgeting and execution process (PPBEP) used by the Secretary of the Army provide an effective mechanism for ensuring guidance provided by the President, Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is reflected in resource requests? This paper seeks to answer that question by reviewing the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Military Strategy. This review will include an analysis of the policies and priorities contained within the documents and compare these to the Army’s portion of the President’s Department of Defense Budget Submission to Congress. After this analysis, impediments to change and suggestions on overcoming those obstacles will be discussed.

The Department of the Army uses PPBEP to formulate budget requests. The purpose of PPBEP is to provide a logical procedure for identifying military goals and objectives, linking requirements to stated goals and objectives, allocating resources according to priorities, justifying resource requests and finally tracking how resourcing decisions resulted in achieving goals and objectives.

The first phase of the process is planning. The Army G3/5/7 is the proponent for the planning phase of PPBEP. During the planning phase, Army planners assess current and emerging threats, roles and missions. They then utilize strategic guidance
including the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, National Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review to guide the work of Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs) who identify requirements (personnel, force structure, facilities, equipment, etc.) needed to mitigate threats and accomplish all assigned roles and missions\textsuperscript{1}. The final product of the planning phase is a document called The Army Plan (TAP). Section III of the TAP is the Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM). The APGM provides guidance to programmers concerning resource constraints and priorities to be used during the integrated programming and budgeting phase of PPBEP.

The second phase of the process is integrated programming and budgeting. The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) and the Director of the Army Budget (DAB) are proponents for this phase of the PPBEP. The DPAE is the lead for all programming issues. During programming, the staff analyzes the Army plan, OSD programming guidance and the integrated priority lists (IPLs) submitted by Combatant Commanders in order to apply resources against roles, missions, and force structure requirements. Since programming provides the bedrock upon which budget submissions are built, this process will be described in detail.

Integrating requirements to insure that the Army is properly resourced is a monumental task. To accomplish this task, the Army aggregates all requirements into a set of Management Decision Packages (MDEP). An MDEP documents capabilities and requirements for a nine year period. Specifically, an MDEP documents the two prior years, the current year, budget year, and five program years\textsuperscript{2}. This time period coincides with the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) which OSD submits to OMB.
as part of the overall budget submission. An MDEP capability may describe an institution, such as the US Army War College, a piece of equipment, or a unit. Each MDEP has a manager who is responsible for integrating and justifying requirements. It is important to note that every penny spent by the Army is covered by an MDEP. During the decade reviewed the Army used a total of 923 separate MDEPs (See Appendix.)

Just as individual capability requirements are integrated by MDEP managers, MDEPs are integrated by Program Evaluation Groups (PEG). The PEGs are proponents for one of the following six functional areas; manning, training, equipping, organizing, sustaining, and installations. During the integrated programming and budgeting phase the PEGs are responsible for working with the MDEP managers and other stakeholders to insure resource levels of assigned MDEPs are in accordance with received guidance and accurately reflected in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), FYDP and budget submission.

During preparation of the Army’s budget, it is the DAB’s responsibility to apply real world cost adjustments to the POM and ensure requirements are expressed in the correct appropriation. The Army’s budget is then submitted to the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) USD(C) who consolidates service budgets on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. Once the budget is approved by the Secretary of Defense, it is forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for inclusion into the President’s annual budget submission to Congress.

In the execution phase, warrants are issued from the Department of Treasury to the USD(C). The USD(C) then apportions funding to the individual services. Once this apportionment of funds is received by the Army, the DAB allocates funding to the major
commands and operating agencies. The DAB then monitors obligations and expenditures throughout the life of the appropriation and makes adjustments to funding levels as appropriate.

Although the complex PPEP produces a budget submission that is rational, justifiable, and executable, the question remains: Do the budgets produced accurately reflect strategic guidance? In an attempt to understand the impact of strategic guidance on the Army’s annual budget submission, this report will focus on the following documents: the National Security Strategy mandated by 50 USC 404a, the National Defense Strategy (published twice by the Secretary of Defense), the Quadrennial Defense Review mandated by Title 10 USC 118, and the National Military Strategy mandated by 10 USC 153. The following is a brief description of each of the documents listed above.

As mandated by 50 USC 404a, The National Security Strategy should be published annually. During the previous ten years, however, the President has published the National Security Strategy three times. In the National Security Strategy the President provides Congress with a broad outline of the nation’s security strategy as it outlines U.S. national interests, goals and objectives. The National Security Strategy also provides a description of how the administration intends to use all instruments of national power to achieve those stated goals and objectives.

The National Defense Strategy was initiated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and has been published twice to date. The National Defense Strategy provides the military direction on implementing the President’s National Security
Strategy. The Secretary of Defense also uses this document to provide input to QDR concerning manning, equipping, and training of the services.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is published by the Secretary of Defense every four years. The QDR is a comprehensive examination of the National Defense Strategy to include military force structure, modernization plans, and infrastructure. In accordance with 10 USC 118, the QDR also informs Congress of the resources necessary to implement our National Defense Strategy with moderate to low risk of failure. As such, the QDR is both a defense strategy and a program for the next twenty year period.

As directed by 10 USC 153, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) must publish an assessment of the strategic and military risks associated with executing the missions called for under the current National Military Strategy. This report must be published no later than the 1st of January of each odd numbered year. The Chairman fulfils this requirement by publishing the National Military Strategy (NMS). The Secretary of Defense is further directed to include the NMS along with his plan to mitigate the risks identified by the CJCS with the following fiscal year’s DoD budget submission. Thus the NMS provides the CJCS a powerful feedback mechanism within the budget programming and budget process.

A review of the documents published in the previous decade indicates a dramatic shift in emphasis from the bi-polar cold war threat posed by the Soviet Union to the uncertainty of the post cold war period. The seminal events precipitating the shift in strategic guidance were the terrorist attacks which took place on September 11th, 2001. Prior to that time, strategic guidance focused on the threat posed by a near peer
competitor. Strategic policy documents since September 11, 2001 have recognized the nation’s greatest threat as terrorism carried out by non-state actors and failing or failed nation-states. These more recent documents place an increased emphasis on developing multi-national solutions to the root causes of terrorism (such as oppressive governments and a lack of economic opportunity) and pandemic disease.

Recognizing the need for greater flexibility in a rapidly changing and uncertain global environment, strategic guidance has continually called for military transformation. The focus of proposed transformation is to mitigate the threat of asymmetric warfare typically waged by non-state organizations, failed or failing states and terrorists. Since the capabilities necessary to counter asymmetric threats vary significantly from those needed to defeat a large standing army, one would expect significant programmatic changes within the Army’s budget.

To better identify anticipated programmatic changes within the Army budget this paper groups MDEPs into the following capability categories: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); facilities; joint and coalition programs; legacy systems; operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and training; personnel and benefits; reserves; transformation; and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As will be seen, grouping MDEPs by capabilities and not the functional groupings managed by the PEGs reveals a slow evolution, not the rapid transformation called for by the strategic published during the previous decade. Further evidence of this slow evolution can be seen by the relatively minor changes to the percentage dedicated to each category between the start and end of the decade. (See table 1.)
To measure programmatic changes the percentage of total funding for all FYDP years allocated to each category is calculated. These percentages are then compared to the subsequent year’s FYDP. Any changes in the percentage allocated indicate a programmatic change. Percentage changes are calculated using the sum of all years contained in the FYDP and not individual budget years for two reasons. First, since the 9/11 attacks the size of the defense budget has increased substantially. Thus, simply tracking dollar amounts would not accurately portray a change in the relative importance placed on programs. Second, the FYDP and not individual budget years are used to calculate budget share in order to normalize the data in cases of single year anomalies. (See Appendix for a list of all MDEPs grouped by category.)

Furthermore, when comparing budget submissions only fiscal years common to the two FYDPs are considered. Thus, when comparing FY2000 with FY2001, only the delta between FY2001, FY2002, FY2003, FY2004 and FY 2005 would be calculated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FYDP</th>
<th>Facilities</th>
<th>C4ISR</th>
<th>Trans</th>
<th>Joint &amp; Coalition</th>
<th>WMD</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Reserves</th>
<th>Legacy Systems</th>
<th>OPTEMPO &amp; Training</th>
<th>Psnl &amp; Benefits</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>4.47%</td>
<td>4.91%</td>
<td>0.97%</td>
<td>2.57%</td>
<td>8.39%</td>
<td>12.39%</td>
<td>9.44%</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
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<td>5.12%</td>
<td>4.81%</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
<td>2.93%</td>
<td>9.13%</td>
<td>12.05%</td>
<td>9.83%</td>
<td>10.82%</td>
<td>34.95%</td>
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<td>5.00%</td>
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<td>2.37%</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
<td>12.31%</td>
<td>10.34%</td>
<td>10.86%</td>
<td>33.13%</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2.44%</td>
<td>8.24%</td>
<td>11.63%</td>
<td>11.09%</td>
<td>10.29%</td>
<td>31.17%</td>
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<td>2.60%</td>
<td>7.88%</td>
<td>12.60%</td>
<td>10.25%</td>
<td>10.99%</td>
<td>31.41%</td>
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<td>2.83%</td>
<td>8.27%</td>
<td>12.86%</td>
<td>8.06%</td>
<td>10.51%</td>
<td>31.42%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11.23%</td>
<td>5.17%</td>
<td>9.63%</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>7.29%</td>
<td>12.82%</td>
<td>7.22%</td>
<td>10.97%</td>
<td>31.72%</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>10.93%</td>
<td>6.18%</td>
<td>8.58%</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
<td>7.98%</td>
<td>13.68%</td>
<td>7.75%</td>
<td>9.05%</td>
<td>32.99%</td>
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<td>6.78%</td>
<td>9.64%</td>
<td>1.23%</td>
<td>1.84%</td>
<td>6.89%</td>
<td>12.55%</td>
<td>8.68%</td>
<td>9.65%</td>
<td>30.13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>11.71%</td>
<td>6.32%</td>
<td>8.47%</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td>1.79%</td>
<td>7.74%</td>
<td>11.61%</td>
<td>7.73%</td>
<td>9.54%</td>
<td>34.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>14.57%</td>
<td>6.33%</td>
<td>8.15%</td>
<td>1.07%</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
<td>7.45%</td>
<td>11.20%</td>
<td>8.92%</td>
<td>9.98%</td>
<td>30.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12.61%</td>
<td>6.23%</td>
<td>6.34%</td>
<td>1.37%</td>
<td>2.98%</td>
<td>7.39%</td>
<td>11.23%</td>
<td>8.15%</td>
<td>9.65%</td>
<td>34.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
<td>1.76%</td>
<td>1.43%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>-1.16%</td>
<td>-1.29%</td>
<td>-1.34%</td>
<td>-1.32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.
Similarly when comparing FY2001 and FY2002 only the delta between FY 2002 through 2005 would be used (See Table 2.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2000 FYDP</th>
<th>FY 2001 FYDP</th>
<th>FY 2002 FYDP</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.

The first document to be reviewed is the 1999 National Security Strategy signed by President William Clinton in December of that year. This was the last national security document published prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Written nearly 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the document begins to recognize the change from a bi-polar to multi-polar security environment.

With no clear threat from a near peer competitor on the horizon, the 1999 National Security Strategy seems to be written primarily as a justification narrative for the Fiscal Year 2001 budget submission to Congress. The President outlines three core policy objectives within the document. These objectives are: To enhance America’s security, to bolster economic prosperity, and to promote democracy and human rights abroad.3 In order to accomplish these objectives, the President outlines a course of action stressing the need to pursue multinational solutions to emerging challenges, enlarge NATO to help promote stability in Eastern Europe, and increase the emphasis on diplomatic or “soft power” solutions.
The President lists arms control and non-proliferation, forward basing of trained and ready troops, freedom of navigation on the seas, information superiority and recruitment, retention of high quality personnel, and transformation to in order to meet future challenges as key military priorities. The document outlines the affects of the START II treaty on the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. It touts how the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. Lastly, the President directs that the military end the use of all anti-personnel landmines outside of Korea by 2003 and aggressively seek to eliminate their use by 2006. Based on an analysis of these military objectives one would expect an increased emphasis on the following categories within the FY 2000 budget: WMD, facilities, C4ISR, personnel and benefits, joint and coalition programs and transformation.

A review of major programmatic changes between the FY 1999 and FY 2000 budget do not reflect these anticipated programmatic changes. Upon examination, one finds an increased emphasis on C4ISR, facilities, and reserve programs. The funding for these programs came at the expense of legacy systems, OPTEMPO & training, transformation, and WMD. Table 3 lists the total programmatic changes by category between the FY1999 and FY 2000 budget submissions. The decreased emphasis placed on WMD and joint and coalition programs as reflected in the budget FY 2000 FYDP is especially surprising since the 1999 National Security Strategy was written in the style of a cover letter to Congress justifying FY 2000 national security related budgets.
As the first strategic guidance published after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) marks what may be the most significant change in defense policy and priorities during the examined period. The QDR was also the first major defense policy document of the Bush administration. The 2001 QDR directs a shift in defense planning from the “threat based” policies of the cold war period to “capabilities based” planning.

The dominant theme of the 2001 QDR is transformation of the military. The document states the military must transform for two principal reasons; first, to maintain the United States’ military’s capabilities edge and second, to reduce defense spending to manageable levels. Within this overall construct, the QDR provides the following strategic and operational goals. The strategic goal is to transform the military in order to defend the United States; deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts and to conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.

The document also established six operational goals.⁴
1) Protect critical bases of operations

2) Assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct effective information operations

3) Project and sustain U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area denial environments.

4) Deny enemy sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike munitions against both mobile and stationary targets in all weather conditions.

5) Enhance the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure.

6) Leverage information technology and innovative concepts to develop an interoperable joint C4ISR architecture and capability that includes a tailorable joint operational picture.

In addition to these operational goals the Secretary of the Army is specifically directed to accelerate the introduction of forward-stationed Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT’s). The stated purpose of this reorganization was to strengthen deterrence and improve U.S. strategic responsiveness.

Because of the technical enablers necessary to transform a standard brigade into an IBCT and the requirement to develop interoperable C4ISR, one would expect a significant acceleration of transformation related programs and a continued increase in C4ISR. An increased importance on joint and coalition programs could also be expected. A review of the budget submission confirms that the programmatic changes between the FY2001 and FY2002 budget reflect QDR guidance (See Table 4.) The
primary bill payers for the increased emphasis on transformation and C4ISR programs are legacy systems and OPTEMPO & training. These programmatic adjustments made between the FY 01 and FY 02 FYDPs more than reversed the FY 01 downward adjustment of transformation programs at the apparent expense of near term readiness, as measured by the decreased emphasis on OPTEMPO and training and legacy systems. (See Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>% of FY 01 FYDP</th>
<th>% of FY 02 FYDP</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transformation</td>
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<td>6.48</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
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<td>5.38</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
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<td>10.98</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint &amp; Coalition</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<td>Reserves</td>
<td>12.07</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and Benefits</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO &amp; Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legacy Systems</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>10.84</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.

The National Security Strategy published by President Bush in September 2002 was a significant departure from the 1999 National Security Strategy in both form and content. While the National Security Strategy published by President Clinton was clearly written with budget justification in mind, this document is focused on identifying emerging threats and national security policies and objectives in a post 9/11 world.

On the very first page of the National Security Strategy, the President declares that the era of large scale conventional forces meeting on a field of battle to decisively settle national disagreements is over. In the absence of a likely conventional threat, the President defines the most dangerous threats to vital U.S. national interest as failed and
failing states using technology in unconventional ways in order to gain an asymmetric advantage over current U.S. forces. The most notable of his policy priorities were the expansion of democracy, expanding economic freedoms throughout the globe and guarding against the effects of pandemic diseases.

Within the document the President outlines the steps he has taken to improve security including creation of the Department of Homeland Defense and a new Unified Command (NORTHCOM). In order to continue this progress he directs the military to focus on three primary tasks. First, shift the planning focus from preparing to fight conventional wars to what we now refer to as Irregular Warfare. Second, develop capabilities in support of WMD counter proliferation efforts. This task also includes the requirement to support consequence management should a WMD incident actually occur. Lastly, DoD was directed to continue ongoing transformation initiatives with a focus on joint operations, C4ISR capabilities, financial management, and recruiting and retention.

As one might expect, such a departure from the previous National Security Strategy resulted in a high number of budgetary adjustments. In accordance with the President’s guidance a large number of legacy systems saw their budgets decreased as a percentage of the Army’s TOA. Considering the President’s emphasis on the need to recruit and retain high quality personnel, the decline in the percentage of the FYDP allocated to personnel and benefits appears to be in direct contradiction to the guidance contained in the NSS (See Table 5.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>% of FY 03 FYDP</th>
<th>% of FY 04 FYDP</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
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<td>Transformation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legacy Systems</td>
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<td>-1.88</td>
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Table 5.

The 2004 National Military Strategy published in May was an extension of the strategic national security goals outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy. The Chairman outlined three primary military objectives in the document, to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression, prevent conflict and surprise attack and to prevail against adversaries.\(^5\) In order to ensure the military is capable of gaining full spectrum dominance over potential adversaries the Chairman provides eight specific areas of focus for military transformation. These focus areas are strengthening intelligence; protecting critical bases of operation; operating from the commons: space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace; projecting and sustaining US forces in distant anti-access environments, denying enemies sanctuary; conducting network-centric operations; improving proficiency for irregular warfare; and lastly increasing the capabilities of partners – international and domestic.\(^6\) Based on the guidance provided, one would expect programmatic changes in the Army budget to emphasize C4ISR, WMD, facilities, joint and coalition programs, and transformation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>% of FY 05 FYDP</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>10.42</td>
<td>0.43</td>
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<td>Transformation</td>
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<td>10.41</td>
<td>0.31</td>
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<td>Reserves</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>-0.15</td>
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<td>Joint &amp; Coalition</td>
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<td>Facilities</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>10.73</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6

In accordance with the guidance in the NMS we see a substantial increase in transformation. The portion of the FYDP allocated to C4ISR and WMD remained largely unchanged. Finally there were substantial decreases in Joint and Coalition programs and facilities (See Table 6.) While the decreased percentage of the FYDP dedicated to Joint and Coalition programs decreased, the reduction can be attributed to a reduced emphasis on residual missions in South West Asia and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). This seems appropriate since both of those missions were maturing and required fewer resources as a percentage of TOA. The biggest priority funding mismatch appears to be a decreased emphasis on facilities. In fact, the decrease would have been much greater without a substantial increase in funding for range modernization. The increased percentage of the FYDP allocated to range modernization, and OPTEMPO and training were most likely necessitated by pre-deployment training requirements in support of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the Secretary of Defense identifies four strategic objectives; To secure the United States from direct attack, to secure strategic
access and retain global freedom of action, to strengthen alliances and partnerships and lastly, to establish favorable security conditions.

In order to mitigate risk, the Secretary of Defense introduces the concept of an active, layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests. As described, an active layered approach to defense focuses heavily on proactively preventing attacks on the U.S. and its vital national interests and deterring our enemies from taking provocative actions. These preventive measures include security cooperation, forward deterrence, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and non-proliferation initiatives.

Finally, the Secretary of Defense provides four guidelines for implementation of the National Defense Strategy. First - DoD will implement an active, layered defense; second - DoD will continuously transform to meet 21st century challenges and opportunities; third – DoD will be a capabilities based organization. We will focus on how we will be challenged not who will challenge us; Lastly, DoD must effectively manage risk.

Based on this guidance C4ISR saw the greatest year to year increase as a percentage of TOA than any other time during this period (See Table 7.) As expected, transformation also saw its percentage of TOA increase. Lastly, legacy systems also saw an increase. The legacy system funding increase can be largely attributed to additional funding for the Blackhawk helicopter. This increase is not surprising considering the extra ordinary wear and tear on these helicopters during simultaneously operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>% of FY 06 FYDP</th>
<th>% Change</th>
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<td>Joint &amp; Coalition</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
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<td>-0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and Benefits</td>
<td>31.19</td>
<td>30.33</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.

The 2006 National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) were published nearly simultaneously. Both documents represent a continuation of past policies and focus providing course corrections of the 2001 QDR and 2002 National Security Strategy respectively.

The 2006 National Security Strategy is noteworthy because of the unambiguous language used in the document. The 2006 National Security Strategy defines nine essential tasks that must be accomplished in order to secure U.S. vital national interests. These tasks include: champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and
opportunities of the 21st century; and engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.

Including an introduction and conclusion the document is divided into nine parts each focusing on an individual task. Within each section the President lists progress made in each area since 2002 and the way ahead. This format greatly simplifies the connection between the ends, ways and means of our National Security Strategy.

In the 2006 QDR, the Secretary of Defense informed the services that the document should not be viewed as a radical departure from past policies and guidance. Instead, the document should be used to validate the conclusions reached in the 2001 QDR, apply lessons learned over the past four years and test assumptions about the world.\textsuperscript{11}

Within the document itself, the Secretary of Defense continues the theme of active, layered approach to the defense introduced in the 2005 National Defense Strategy. He further defines the concept by establishing four priority areas of focus, to defeat terrorist networks; to defend the homeland in depth; to shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and to prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring WMD.

To better execute active layered defense, the services are given areas of emphasis for their transformation: Institutional reform and governance, Irregular warfare, building partnership capacity, strategic communications and intelligence.

Lastly, the QDR provided the following specific guidance concerning land forces.\textsuperscript{12} First, continue to rebalance capabilities by creating modular brigades. The end state of this effort will be 42 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and 75 support
<table>
<thead>
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<th>% of FY 07 FYDP</th>
<th>% Change</th>
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<td>Facilities</td>
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<td>11.66</td>
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<td>9.82</td>
<td>-2.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8

brigades in the active component; 28 BCTs and 78 support brigades in the National Guard; 58 support brigades in the Army Reserve. Second, transform Army units and headquarters to modular designs. Third, incorporate FCS improvements into the modular force through a spiral development effort. Last, expand the Air Force Joint Tactical Air Control program.

From this guidance one would expect an increase in funding for transformation, the Reserves, C4ISR, WMD and Joint and Coalition Programs. Surprisingly this assessment is largely inconsistent with the 2007 Army budget request (See Table 8.)

While the percentage of the FYDP apportioned to C4ISR and WMD programs increased, transformation, reserves, and joint and coalition programs all saw their share of the budget decrease. The principle bill payer for program increases was MDEP ZMOD, the modularity wedge created by program budget decision 753. For those unfamiliar with the term, a “wedge” is simply funding that is set aside in the programming years to resource a capability that has not been fully defined and programmed. Once the capability is clearly defined and the program is fully developed,
adjustments are made decrementing the wedge and funding the approved program. While it is normal to see money flow out of a “budget wedge” as future programs become more fully developed, it is interesting to note that in this case the money set aside in ZMOD seems to have flowed to other programs not directly related to army transformation such as facilities and legacy systems.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy was the final strategic guidance published during the timeframe examined in this paper. This was the last major defense policy document published by the Bush administration. The document does not represent a major shift in policy means or objectives. The Secretary of Defense’s five key objectives are to defend the homeland, win the long war, promote security, deter conflict, and win our nation’s wars. The means and capabilities discussed in the document for achieving these objectives come directly from the 2006 QDR.

The last portion of the document is a discussion of risk management. In this discussion several areas of significance are highlighted. From a budgetary perspective, the most significant are operational, force management and institutional risks. When mitigating operational risks, since the U.S. military currently has a sustainable advantage in conventional capabilities the services are directed to explore areas where we can assume risk in order to resource emerging capabilities. The greatest perceived risk from a force management perspective is the recruitment and retention of high quality military and civilian personnel. From an institutional standpoint, the greatest identified risk is an increasingly complex command structure that may lead to unwanted redundancies or capabilities gaps.
<table>
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<td>Joint &amp; Coalition</td>
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<td>Transformation</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.

Considering guidance provided in this document, one would expect only small programmatic course corrections such as a slightly increased emphasis on joint programs, transformation, and personnel and benefits. Legacy systems would be the expected bill payer for program increases. This being the case, there appears to be a direct correlation between the 2008 National Defense Strategy and the 2010 budget submission. As can be seen in Table 9, the percentage of TOA apportioned to personnel and benefits, WMD, and coalition and joint programs increased. The largest programmatic increases were to personnel and benefit programs with the greatest increase in pay and allowances for military personnel and enlisted army incentives. The downward programmatic adjustment to transformation is largely attributable to decreases across the FYDP for the armed reconnaissance helicopter, Stryker, and the asymmetric warfare group.

The previous decade was one of the most dynamic in our nation’s history. During this timeframe ample strategic guidance was published to direct desired changes. Despite this fact, programmatic changes within the budget have not been as far
reaching as one might expect. Once the obstacles to change facing strategic leaders are considered, the moderate pace of change becomes understandable. Unfortunately, if the U.S. military is to maintain its competitive advantage over our nation’s adversaries it must find a way to routinely implement change in order to mitigate rapidly emerging and evolving threats to national security.

The private sector provides a never ending source of once successful businesses and organizations that failed because they could not successfully implement change. One need to look no further than the once dominant U.S. auto industry to see the disastrous consequences of failed change initiatives in today’s uncertain global marketplace. The plight of the U.S. auto industry is a cautionary tale that the Department of Defense would do well to heed. Like U.S. auto manufacturers of twenty years ago, the Department of Defense finds itself the acknowledged leader of a capital intensive industry. Unfortunately, just as the auto industry found it’s competitive advantage quickly eroded by more efficient competitors, the nation finds itself facing adversaries who are constantly looking for innovative and cheaper (aka asymmetric) ways to nullify our military’s competitive advantage. If the United States military is to maintain its position of dominance it must become more adept at implementing change.

In his highly regarded book, *Leading Change*, John Kotter provides organizations with an eight stage process for implementing change within an organization. The stages of the process are: Establish a sense of urgency; create a guiding coalition; develop a vision and strategy; communicate the change vision; empower employees for broad-based action; generate short-term wins; consolidate gains and produce more change;
and lastly anchor new approaches in the culture. Fortunately, PPBEP has the potential to execute almost every essential element of this process. The following is an examination of Kotter’s process in relation to PPBEP with recommendations on actions that could be taken to make it more effective.

**Establish a sense of urgency.** In order to establish a sense of urgency, leadership must examine the environment and competitive realities. This will enable leadership to identify potential crises, challenges and opportunities. The National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and National Defense Strategies all analyze the global environment to identify both current and emerging threats. It is this analysis that provides a sense of urgency for behind change within the military. Thus within the PPBE process, current strategy and planning documents fulfill this function.

**Create a guiding coalition.** As envisioned, the guiding coalition leading change must function as a team. In addition to providing unity of effort, the team must also be empowered to actually affect change. While not part of PPBEP, the President does establish a guiding coalition when he appoints the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Within the Army this guiding coalition is empowered to implement change since 10 USC 3013 states that the Secretary of the Army has the authority to:

- conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions: recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and development), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel), maintaining, the construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment, and the construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.
Unfortunately, while the President and title 10 provide good terms of reference for building a guiding coalition within the executive branch and the military, it does not adequately address governmental inter-agency stakeholders. During the time period reviewed, the Army had overcome two challenges relating to this stage of the process.

The first impediment to change is the limited tenure of Army senior leadership. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army have changed numerous times during the past decade. This a direct contributing factor to the Army’s inability to successfully implement change. Since October, 1999 seven individuals have held the Secretary of the Army post and three Generals have served as the Army Chief of Staff.

A possible course of action for mitigating the effects of senior leader turnover is to appoint the Service Secretaries for set terms of four years. This would provide needed continuity and ensure that Service Secretaries are in place for two complete bi-annual budget cycles. This would allow them to ensure the resources (personnel, equipment, and facilities) have been identified and accurately reflected in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), and the President’s budget submission to Congress. Two reasons that set term limits may not have been established for the Secretary of the Army position are that serving at the pleasure of the President imparts a sense of urgency to implement policy decisions. The second reason is that under current protocol newly elected Presidents are free to appoint individuals who share their administration’s national security vision into this critical position.

Despite the authority granted the Service Secretaries by Title 10, their ability to implement change is limited by Congress. All programs contained within the Army’s budget submission must be authorized and appropriated by Congress. As the
Commander in Chief, the President and all members of the administration must work with closely with the congress in order ensure authorizations and appropriations address the most likely threats to national security and administrations highest priorities for mitigating those threats. In addition to efforts by the President, The Department of Defense must take every available opportunity to educate the members of Congress on high priority programs, the fact remains that members of congress do not always share the views of the President and DoD leadership. Since it is prohibited for the Army to directly petition Congress, leadership must continue to take every available opportunity to communicate its vision to Congress.

The third step in Kotter’s model is to develop a vision and strategy for implementing change. The United States Army War College defines strategy as a plan that addresses the ends ways and means to achieve an objective. If we are to accept this definition, of the documents reviewed, only the 1999 National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review can be considered true strategy documents. While the NSS, NDS, and NMS adequately identify America’s vital interests, threats, goals and objectives they rarely discuss the desired ways or means for achieving goals and objectives or protecting vital national interests. This failure to adequately address the President’s desired ways and necessary means for achieving strategic goals adds unnecessary ambiguity to not only the PPBE but also the larger issue of inter-agency capabilities and resource integration.

In addition to the strategic ambiguity caused by a failure to adequately adjust the ways and means for achieving national objectives, within the Army turnover of senior leadership referenced above has impacted the continuity of the Army’s vision and
strategy for change. This fact is illustrated by the changes implemented by successive Army Chiefs of Staff concerning the Future Combat System (FCS).

Although General Schoomaker shared General Shinseki’s overall vision for Army transformation, he restructured the FCS program implementing a spiral development strategy in hopes of getting new technology into the hands of war fighters at the earliest possible opportunity. He additionally changed the fielding plan and unit of employment from the modular brigade combat teams envisioned by General Shinseki to the Unit of Action. After General Schoomaker was replaced by General George W. Casey, the program was again re-evaluated. When the Secretary of Defense determined that the FCS ground vehicle did not adequately address current threats (the FCS vehicle had a flat hull and not a V-shaped hull which has been proven effective in mitigating the threat of improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan) and that Army leadership had not developed a viable alternative to the proposed designs, development of both the manned ground vehicle and non-line of sight gun systems were halted. Cancellation of these programs effectively marked the end of the originally envisioned FCS. Given the short tenure of these strategic leaders, development of a coherent long term strategic vision is a nearly insurmountable task. With these facts in mind, failure to develop the FCS as initially envisioned can hardly be viewed with surprise.

While The Army Plan certainly provides programmers and budgeters in the Pentagon with direction, it does little to communicate Army vision to portions of the organization located outside of the Pentagon. The Army Chief of Staff currently gives several key note speeches every year, such as his annual address to the AUSA conference, which mitigate this problem. In addition to these speeches, the Chief of
Staff holds periodic “4-Star” conferences to communicate his vision. The fact remains; however, beyond the walls of the Pentagon or below the ranks of General Officers the Army is not effective at communicating its strategic vision for change. Army senior leadership has several ways that this situation can be corrected. First, an unclassified version of the Army Plan could be published with a target audience of ranks between Colonel and Staff Sergeant. Second, Army leadership must continue their strategic communications efforts using the internet and social networks such as Army Knowledge Online, Facebook and Twitter which younger members of the organization are more likely to utilize than printed media. Lastly, throughout their careers both officers and non-commissioned officers attend a number of formal professional development courses. The Secretary of the Army could direct TRADOC to develop and deliver rank appropriate blocks of instruction on current transformation initiatives, and strategies for implementing those changes.

Lastly, when communicating the Army’s vision for change leaders must target external stakeholders. In addition to over 1.3 million internal stakeholders, the Army has numerous external stakeholders that must be considered when initiating change. These external stakeholders include defense contractors (57 of which have annual contracts valued at $500 million or more)\(^\text{16}\), State Governors, 435 Congressmen and Congresswomen, and 100 Senators. When contemplating change, Army Leaders must consider these powerful external stakeholders and tailor their messages appropriately.

Empower broad-based action. Empowering broad based action entails senior leaders removing obstacles and changing systems or structures that undermine the change vision. It further encourages risk taking and non-traditional ideas, activities and
actions. For the Army to be successful in this stage of the process it must overcome several significant challenges.

Since its inception the Army has been a hierarchical organization. Thus rapidly changing organizational structures has proven to be difficult. The most recent example of this difficulty is the Army’s transition to the modular brigade. Enabled by the exploitation of emerging technologies, the modular brigade force structure is the result of the Army’s transformation efforts over the past decade. As directed in the 2001 QDR, the Army’s plan was to reorganize and train 42 active duty and 28 additional National Guard modular combat brigades by the end of 2011. This effort represents the most significant restructuring of the Army since the end of the cold war. Recognizing the massive commitment of resources necessary to complete the restructuring, under Section 353 of Public Law No. 109-163, Congress directed that the Army develop a detailed comprehensive plan detailing their efforts. Unfortunately, when developing the Army’s Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) a basic planning assumption used was that no more than one third of all brigades would be deployed in support of combat operations at any one time. In reality, nearly one half of all units have been deployed at any one time in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This failure to accurately forecast operational requirements has placed the Army in a situation where they are in danger of missing projected restructuring milestones. For this reason, Congress has begun carefully monitoring their progress and may need to direct the reallocation of resources in order to ensure the establishment of required military capabilities.17
While it is too early to determine if institutional inertia will result in an unwanted reallocation of resources directed by Congress, implementation of the modular brigades does demonstrate the difficulties of organizational change.

A strong organizational culture rooted in over 200 years of proud Army history is the next factor that must be considered when attempting to empower broad-based action for change. As of Fiscal Year 2009, the United States Army is an organization of approximately 1.3 million members. Each of these soldiers and civilians has been indoctrinated to some extent in the Army culture. Since most soldiers see their chosen vocation as a calling and a duty to the nation, the Army’s culture is exceptionally strong when compared to a civilian institution. While the Army’s strong culture can be a tremendous asset as a moral compass during times of war or uncertainty, it can also be a strong impediment to change.

Kotter’s next step in for managing change is to create visible improvements in performance or “wins”. Planning is the key factor in this stage. While the Army has done this well in the past, such as establishing the 4th ID as the “Digital Division”, it has also done this poorly with disastrous consequences. The most recent example of a poorly planned high visibility short-term win was changing the soldier’s headgear to the black beret. Recognizing that the Army’s heavily armored force structure could not be rapidly deployed in response to post cold war threats; General Shinseki fielded the black beret as a symbol of the expeditionary mindset he wished to instill within the “Objective Force.” In doing so, he failed to recognize the impact this would have on three significant subcultures within the organization. While it was clearly General Shinseki’s intent to encourage emulation of the Airborne, Ranger, and Special Forces...
expeditionary mindset, his actions were perceived as assaults on the most visible manifestations of these elite units; their distinctive headgear.\textsuperscript{19}

Because he failed to identify how fielding the beret would be perceived as an assault on the history and culture of elite units, the Chief of Staff was forced to spend energy and political capital to appease angry veterans and answer the concerns of soldiers serving within the Airborne, Ranger and Special Forces Communities.

Establishing a visible symbol of Army transformation was a valid goal. Had the organizational culture of the Rangers been more carefully considered prior to announcing the uniform change, a less controversial symbol of Army transformation may have been chosen. Thus the time and energy consumed to symbolize change could have been spent on more substantial transformation efforts.

Consolidate gains and produce more change. Within the PPBEP process the most effective tool available to senior leadership are the POM and FYDP. Once programs are established or targeted for change the resources necessary for implementation are recorded in the POM and FYDP. During the budget justification process, review of the POM and FYDP effectively notify all internal stakeholders of past and future change initiatives.

The last step in Kotter’s process is to anchor change in the organization’s culture. The primary tools for anchoring new approaches in the Army’s culture are leader development, doctrine and the force development process. It is vital Army Leadership recognize the importance of TRADOC to the long term success of the Army. As the principle agent for training, concepts, material, doctrine and force development, TRADOC is a key enabler to successful Army transformation. The temptation to divert
resources from TRADOC to the operational force must be resisted if the Army is to remain relevant in the future.

Change within a massive organization such as the United States Army is extremely difficult. The past decade has been an era of historic change. Spanning from a post cold war period when the United States found itself without a near peer competitor for the first time, through the attacks of September 11th and the emergence of failed states and non-state actors as the greatest threats to U.S. national interests. A common theme of the strategic guidance published during the last 10 years is the necessity for military transformation.

The President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff routinely publish strategic guidance in an attempt to foster the changes necessary to defeat our adversaries and mitigate future threats. Although the Army has dedicated enormous resources to implementation of this guidance, organizational changes and capabilities development (as measured by programmatic changes within budget submissions) is often slower and less far reaching than required.

Fortunately, change is possible. The PPBEP process is an empirical system that seeks to apportion resources in accordance with vital U.S. national interests. As currently implemented the PPBE process performs many of the functions identified by John Kotter as necessary for successfully implementing change. During the planning process the President, Secretary of Defense and Chairman must place more emphasis on addressing ways and means in strategy documents. Leadership should also use all means available to ensure all members of the military are aware of transformation efforts. The high turnover rate of senior leadership within the services must also be
addressed to ensure irreversible momentum for change initiatives is achieved. During the integrated programming and budgeting phase all strategic leaders must work closely with Congress to ensure that required capabilities are resourced adequately. By recognizing PPBE as an agent of change and not a resourcing tool, strategic leaders’ efforts to transform the military will become both more effective and efficient.
APPENDIX

ARMY MDEP GROUPINGS (1999-2009) BY CAPABILITIES.

C4ISR
AMCE - Depot Maintenance Communications-Electronic End Items
ATCN - IEW System Management
FADI - Army Spectrum Management
FAFM - Army Knowledge Management
FL6P - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
FPDA - SHORTSTOP
FPDB - Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)
FPDD - Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT)
FPDE - Night Vision
FPDH - Target Acquisition Sensors
FPDK - Signal Warfare
FPDL - Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Ground Collection
FPDM - Advanced QUICKFIX
FPDP - Distributed Common Ground System, Army (DCGS-A)
FPDQ - Combat ID
FPED - ASE--ACFT Surveillance Equipment
FPFE - CI/HUMINT Sensors, Sources & Processors
FPFF - ISR UAV Sensors
FPFJ - Army Battle Command System Integration
FPFL - Fire Support C2 Systems
FPFP - MCS -- Maneuver Control System
FPFR - GCCS-A -- Global Command & Control System -Army
FPFS - Engineer C2 Systems
FPFV - Knowledge Visualization Sys (KVS)
FPMA - NAVSTAR GPS
FPMB - TTACS (MSE)
FPMC - Tactical Network Communications
FPMD - Automatic Distribution of Data Between Battlefield Command and Control Systems
FPMH - Defense SATCOM Systems
FPMJ - MILSATCOM
FPMK - MILSTAR
FPMM - Tactical Radios
FPSC - F XX1 Battle Command Bde & Below (FBCB2)
FPTA - Horizontal Battlefield Digitization
GP3I - NFIP/S&IA
GPCI - Army Counter-Intelligence
GPIR - Intelligence Readiness
GPIS - Intelligence Support to Operations
GPRC - Defense Intel Reserve Program
MPBO - Unit Level Biometric Programs
MPE0 - CSS SATCOM Sustainment
MR1B - SOUTHCOM C3 Upgrade
MR1F - EMC Equipment
MR1K - WWTCIP
MS1Z - CS/CSS Systems Other
MS2B - LCSS Hardware Support
MS2D - HQDA ADP
MS2Z - Army Information Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency
MS4B - High Performance Computer
MS4X - Information Assurance (IA)
MS4Z - MACOM Mission ADP Sustainment
MS5N - CID Command Information System
MS5P - MP Management Information System
MS5Z - HRC Core Automation Support
MS6B - Reserve Component Automation System
MSEC - Army Biometrics Program
MU1K - TROJAN Communications
MU1V - Pentagon Telecommunications Center
MU1W - Defense Message System-Army
MU1X - Information Management Test, Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment
MU2B - HQDA Command & Control (Enhanced)
MU2M - Small Computer Program
MU2P - MEPCOM JCC & IRR
MU2Z - Installation Info Infrastructure Mod Program (I3MP)
MUIK - Artificial Intelligence Center
MX25 - Information Systems Support To INSCOM
MX5T - Information Systems Security
MXA3 - Information Systems Support To ASC
MXCC - Information Systems Support to SWA
MXCL - Long Haul Communications
MXDA - Information Systems Support to HQDA
MXEC - Technical Support of Info Sys Engineering Missions
MXEU - Information Systems Support to Europe
MXHS - Information Systems Support to HSC
MXKA - OCONUS Communication Infrastructure
MXMD - Information Systems Support to MDW
MXMT - Information Systems Support to MTMC
MXSC - Information Systems Support to SOUTHCOM
MXSH - Strategic C-2 Facilities
MXTR - Information Systems Support to TRADOC
MXUS - Army Wide Information Systems Support MACOMS
MXWE - Information Systems Support to USARPAC
NG7S - MSCA Non Standard Communications & Equip
RH01 - Tactical Intelligence and Exploitation
RH02 - Tactical Intelligence Support
RH10 - REDTRAIN
RH12 - TROJAN
RH22 - Digital Imagery Transmission Systems
RJ50 - Medium Truck Service Life Extension Program
RK10 - Unmanned Systems Technology
RK15 - ISR Technology
RK19 - C4 Technology
SPFE - ASAS Sustain
V20H - PACIFIC AREA INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM (PARIS)
VISA - INTEL Support To Acquisitions
VLWA - Information Operations
WDAC - 1st Information Operations Command
WNET - NETCOM Network Operations and Security Centers
WSUS - MTOE Unit Equipment Support
X9IN - Intelligence Center
XMGS - Pentagon IT Infrastructure
XTIS - TDA Intelligence Support

**Facilities**
BR2A - BRAC Program Management
BR3A - BRAC 93 COSTS
BR5A - Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 95 Costs
BRAC - Base Realignment and Closure
DA3G - Leadership Initiatives
DMCS - Mobilization Construction Support
DSWF - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-5)
E301 - Revitalization of Operations & Training Facilities
E302 - Revitalization of Maintenance & Production Facilities
E303 - Revitalization of RDTE Facilities
E304 - Revitalization of Supply & Storage Facilities
E306 - Revitalization of Administrative Facilities
E308 - Revitalization of Utilities, Roads and Grounds
E314 - MCA Planning and Design
E315 - Minor Construction Program
E318 - MCA Currency Fluctuations
E325 - Homeowners Assistance Program
E32H - Army Family Housing: Operations and Maintenance, Leasing
E32L - AFH Leasing
E32R - Revitalization of Army Family Housing
E33H - Army Family Housing: O & M, Leasing US Overseas
E33R - Revitalization of Army Family Housing Us Overseas
E34H - Army Family Housing: Operations and Maintenance, Leasing Foreign
E34R - Revitalization of Army Family Housing Foreign
E35H - Army Family Housing: Operations and Maintenance, Leasing-CONUS
E35R - CONUS Revitalization of Army Family Housing
E3C7 - Revitalization of Community/QOL Facilities
E3H6 - Unaccompanied Personnel Housing
USMA - United States Military Academy
USMB - United States Military Academy Preparatory School
USMC - ACAD Modernization
VARY - Rand Arroyo Center
VAWD - CSA Incentive Awards
VEMR - Environmental Support to Ranges & Munitions
VENC - Environmental Compliance
VENN - Environmental Conservation
VENQ - Environmental Quality
VEPP - Environmental Pollution Prevention
VEQT - Environmental Quality Technology
VEUR - Europe Retrograde
VIPP - Installation Preparedness Program
VJAL - Confinement Facilities
VMUS - Army's Museum Program
VSCW - Training Range Operations
VSRM - Sustainable Range Modernization
VTBL - Battle Labs

**Joint & Coalition Programs**
JDHB - Developing Country's Combined Exercise Program
JDHC - Humanitarian Civic Assistance
JDJT - Joint/Defense Activities
JDSP - Joint DoD Support
JSTF - Joint Standing Task Force
MPTZ - CALS Test Center
MS4F - EUCOM Command CTRS
MU2E - Joint Visual Information Services
TSSO - SOUTHCOM, USARSO, JTF-B
VCAT - Civic Action Teams
VCST - Civil Support Teams
VDRG - AIR RECON LOW (ARL)
VEXA - Army Executive Agency Appns
VFMS - Technology Export Control
VFRE - Operation Enduring Freedom
VFRP - Global War on Terrorism/Guantanamo Bay Opns
VHAI - Haitian Refugee
VIAD - Homeland Integrated Air Defense System
VIRQ - Military Actions Against IRAQ
VJCS - CJCS Exercises
VKCD - Korean Combined Defense Improvement Projects
VMNF - Multinational Force
VNEA - Northeast Asia Contingency Operations
VOTS - OEF-TS
VRFM - Residual Force Missions (SWA)
VRSC - Regional Security Centers
VRSI - Standardization and Interoperability Programs
VSCC - Worldwide Contingencies
VSEU - Europe Stovepipe
VTFE - Joint Task Force - East (JTF-E)
VTPA - Panama Canal Treaty (Army)
VYUG - Ops in FYROM
W5ND - NATO FC ADA
W5NF - NATO FC FA
W5NH - NATO FC AVN
W5NM - NATO FC MED
W5NO - NATO FC Ordnance
W5NP - NATO FC MP
W5NQ - NATO FC QM
W5NT - NATO FC Transportation
W5NU - NATO FC MI
W5NY - NATO FC Chemical
WPPM - Panama Defense
XISH - NATO
XISQ - International Support, Other
XMGN - Army Support to International Military HQS
XXSW - Support to Non-DoD Agency

Legacy Systems
ALTF - Lead the Fleet
AMAE - Depot Maintenance Aircraft End Items
AMAS - Fixed Wing Life Cycle Contract Support
AMLC - Depot Maintenance Life Cycle Software Support
AMME - Depot Maintenance Missile End Items
AMSA - Sustainment Systems Technical Support (SSTS)
AMTE - Depot Maintenance Other End Items
AMTV - Army Tact Wheel Vehicle Other Maintenance
AMWE - Depot Maintenance Combat Vehicles END ITEMS
FL6Q - M9-ACE -- M9 Armored Combat Earthmover
FL6Y - Fire Support Vehicle (FSV)
FPDT - Second Generation FLIR/OWN Night
FPEA - Apache Attack Helicopter
FPEF - Kiowa Warrior
FPEG - Blackhawk
FPEH - CH-47
FPEL - Longbow Apache
FPEN - AH-1 (COBRA)
FPEP - Avionics
FPHB - Self-Propelled Howitzers
FPHC - Cannon Artillery Ammo
FPHG - Crusader
FPHH - Crusader-RSV
FPJA - Heavy Tactical Vehicle Systems
FPJB - Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) Systems
FPJC - Medium Tactical Vehicle (MTV) Systems
FPLB - Javelin
FPLC - Fire Support Missiles
FPLE - Aviation Rockets and Missiles
FPLF - Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
FPLP - Stinger
FPLR - Avenger
FPQC - Patriot (ATM)
FPSA - Abrams
FPSB - Bradley Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS)
MT5Y - Tactical CE Equipment Redistribution
QBND - US Army Bands
RA09 - M113, Selected Procurement & Modifications
RA13 - SEL PROC, WTCV
RA14 - Mortar Systems
RB03 - Towed Howitzer
RB12 - Artillery Accuracy Equipment
RD07 - OH-58 Modifications
RD12 - Aircraft Component Improvement Program
RD13 - Utility Fixed Wing Aircraft
RD15 - Aviation Ground Support Equipment
RD17 - ACFT component improvement
RF08 - Armored Engineer Vehicles
RJC0 - Maintenance & EOD Equipment
RJC5 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Equipment
RR01 - Abrams M1A1 AIM XXI Rebuild Recapitalization
RR02 - Apache AH-64A Rebuild Recapitalization
RR03 - Blackhawk UH-60A Rebuild Recapitalization
RR04 - Chinook CH-47D Rebuild Recapitalization
RR05 - Recovery Vehicle M88A1 Rebuild Recapitalization
RR07 - Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) M9 Rebuild Recapitalization
RR08 - M2 Bradley Recapitalization OMA Support
RR09 - MLRS Recapitalization OMA Support
RR10 - Patriot Rebuild Recapitalization
RR12 - HEMTT Rebuild Recapitalization
RR13 - Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE) Rebuild Recapitalization
RR15 - Firefinder Rebuild Recapitalization
RR16 - Electronic Shop Shelter Rebuild Recapitalization
RR17 - FAASV M992 Rebuild Recapitalization
RR18 - Bulldozer D7 Rebuild Recapitalization
RR21 - HMMWV Recapitalization Rebuild
RU01 - Abrams Upgrade Recapitalization
RU02 - Apache AH-64D Upgrade Recapitalization
RU03 - Blackhawk UH-60M Upgrade Recapitalization
RU04 - CH-47F Upgrade Recapitalization
RU05 - Hercules M88A2 Upgrade Recapitalization
RU06 - AVLB Upgrade Recapitalization
RU08 - Bradley Upgrade Recapitalization
RU09 - MLRS M270A1 Upgrade Recapitalization
RU10 - Patriot Upgrade Recapitalization
RU11 - Armored FOV M113A3 Upgrade Recapitalization
RU12 - HEMTT ESP Upgrade Recapitalization
RU14 - Glider (Line Haul) M915A4 Upgrade Recap
SAAA - SSTS Artillery, Ground Armament Sub-Sys, Small Arms
SAVN - SSTS Avn, Avionics, Air Armament Sub-Systems, Ai
SCCC - SSTS Command, Cntrl, Comm-EI, Computer, Mobile Power
SLTT - Other Sustainment
SMSL - SSTS Missiles
SOTH - SSTS Other Tech Support Programs
SPEA - Sustain PM Apache
SPEG - Sustain PM Blackhawk
SPEH - Sustain PM CH-47D
SPEJ - Sustain PM SOA
SPEL - Sustain Longbow Apache
SPEN - PM AH-1 (COBRA)
SPHB - Sustains Howitzer Improvement Program Systems
SPLC - Sustain PM ATACMS
SPLF - MLRS Sustainment
SPLK - TOW Sustainment
SPNC - Sustain PM Patriot
SPNF - PM PMS Sustainment
SPSA - Abrams Sustainment
SPSB - BFVS Sustainment
SPSD - Sustain PM LOSAT
XMCA - MCA Support of Equipment Modifications

OPTEMPO & Training
A2AM - Second Destination Transportation Training Ammunition
FAAC - Accessions Command Support
FAJC - JAG Corps Leader Development
FAJM - JAG Corps MOS Qualification
FAJS - Continuing Legal Education and JAG School Activities
FAME - USMEPCOM
FARC - Army Recruiting
FAWC - U.S. Army War College
HSDP - USAR Medical Regional Training Sites
MS4D - Army Model Improvement and Simulation Technology
MS4J - TRADOC Analysis Command Computer
MS5H - Army Training Requirements and Resources System

40
MS5L - USMA Automation
MSBZ - TRADOC School ADP
QNCO - NCO Academies
QPTO - Planning, Training, and Mobilization Operations
RE01 - Training Ammunition
RE06 - War and Operations Ammunition
RJM5 - Army Watercraft
RK14 - Advanced Simulation
RP04 - Regional Maintenance Training Sites
TACE - Army Civilian Education & Training
TACV - Army Civilian Intern Program
TADT - The Army Distance Learning Program
TADV - Training Development
TAEV - Training Evaluation
TAFM - Army Force Management Training
TAGP - Graduate Pilot Training
TAIG - Inspector General Training
TALP - Army Language Program
TAMA - Training Accessions
TAMC - Marshall Center
TANC - Military Training for TDA Organizations
TAOC - Officer Candidate School (OCS)
TAOR - Training Op Research/Analysis
TAPE - Professional Education
TATC - Army Training Center Operations
TATM - Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM)
TAVN - Undergraduate Flight Training
TAWE - Training for Army War fighter Experiments
TBAS - Maneuver/Close Combat Non-system (TADSS)
TBFS - Fire Support Training Simulations
TBIS - Advanced Simulation Technologies
TBMS - Intelligence Training Simulations
TBWG - Command & Control War-game Simulations (WARSIM)
TCAT - Combined Arms Tactical Trainers (CATT)
TCBC - Battle Command Training Program
TCCM - Combat Maneuver Training Center
TCIV - Civilian Training
TDLI - Defense Foreign Language Training
TDLP - Defense Language Programs
TFAO - Strategic Leadership Training
TFNC - Special Skills Training
TLAM - Louisiana Maneuvers
TLVN - Command and General Staff College
TNAC - Overseas Deployment Training
TNEX - IDT Travel
TNMG - Total Army School system (TASS)
TNTE - Training Management
TOAC - Officers Advanced Course Training
TRPC - Special Branch Scholarship
TRPD - RC Professional Development Training
TRRS - SR ROTC Scholarships
TSGT - NCO Professional Development
TSPU - Training Support to Units
TTDY - Military Training Specific Allotment
TWOC - Warrant Officer Course
TWOJ - Warrant Officer Candidate Course
TWOS - Senior Warrant Officer Training
VACE - Army Continuing Education System (ACES)
VAQN - Acquisition Corps Education
VATA - Army Tuition Assistance
VFHP - Flying Hour Program
VLDR - Leader Development & Training Ammo Management
VMSO - Army Models and Simulation
VOPR - Land Forces Readiness
VSTD - HQDA Studies Program
W054 - 54TH Signal Bde
W106 - 106TH Signal Bde
W1AD - 1st Armor Division
W1ID - 1st Infantry Division
W24D - 24th Infantry Division (Mech) Integrated DIV HQ
W25D - 25th Infantry Division
W2ID - 2d Infantry Division
W2OG - 3rd Infantry Regiment
W3ID - 3d Infantry Division
W411 - 11 Signal Brigade
W42B - 2 Signal Brigade
W45A - ATC EUROPE
W45C - 5 SIG/Support Element
W47B - 7 Signal Brigade
W4KS - 1 Signal Brigade
W4KT - NON-DCS Korea
W501 - 101 Infantry Division
W504 - 504TH Signal Brigade
W510 - 10 Infantry Division Mountain
W516 - 516TH Signal Brigade
W51C - 1 Cavalry Division
W52C - 2d Cavalry Division (91 Replace)
W53A - 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment
W54M - 4 Infantry Division
W57B - 177 Armored Brigade
W582 - 82d Airborne Division
W5CE - FC Engineer Other
W5CG - FC AG FI LG Other
W5CS - FC S&M Other
W5HQ - FORSCOM HQ
W5NC - FC TAC SIG Support-Europe
W5SJ - SWA FC JA PA MH
W5SU - SWA FC MI
W6BD - 296 Army Band Japan
W6HQ - HHC Corps Japan
W76I - 1 BDE 6 INF DIV (L)
W7AK - Echelon Above BDE-AL
W7HQ - 45 Support Group & USARPAC
W7ID - 7th Infantry Division (Light) Integrated Division HQs
W817 - 17 AVN GP Korea
W818 - 18 MED Command Korea
W819 - 19 Support Command Korea
W8FC - Theater Finance
W8HQ - EUSA HQ
W8MP - 8 MP Brigade
W8PC - 8 Personnel Command
W8ST - EUSA Support Troop
W900 - MTOE AVN MAINT CONTR
W910 - USAREUR HQ
W91F - USAREUR HQ Support
W920 - 21 SUPCOM
W92D - 60 ORD Group
W92G - 29 ASG
W930 - SETAF
W950 - 5 CORPS HQ
W951 - 3 Support Command
W956 - 18TH MP BDE
W957 - 12 AVN GP
W95A - 5TH Corps Artillery
W95E - 130 ENGR GP
W95S - 22 SIG BDE
W95Z - 205 CEWI GP
W960 - 32 AADCOM
W980 - 7 MEDCOM
W98D - 7 MEDCOM (DENTAL)
W9B0 - 1 PERSCOM
W9N0 - 7 ATC
WA00 - 500 MI BDE
WA01 - 501 MI BDE
WA13 - 513 MI BDE
WA66 - 66 MI BDE
WA70 - 470 MI BDE
WASC - 9th Army Signal Command
WCCM - Combat Maneuver Training Center (OPTEMPO)
WCJT - Joint Readiness Training Center (OPTEMPO)
WCLS - TADSS Contractor Logistics Support (CLS)
WCNT - National Training Center (OPTEMPO)
WCTC - CTC Support Activities
WEAD - Non-Divisional MTO&E Units
WGMD - Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
WMDE - MDW Engineer CO
WSFA - Special Operations Forces (Active Component)
X4SA - Army Acquisition Executive Support
XCID - Criminal Investigation Division Activities
XFMU - Army Marksmanship Unit
XLSA - Supply Activity
XMGF - Army Management Headquarters Activities In FOAS
XMGH - Major Management Headquarters Activities
XMGI - Major Management Headquarters Activities-IM
XMPE - AMHA PEO Activities
XTEQ - Tactical Equipment Maintenance
ZAMH - TDA Restructure
ZDFM - Direct-Funded Ssf Maintenance and Supply
ZKEM - Hold MDEP
ZMFM - Reimbursable GS Component Repair

Other
A2AA - Second Destination Transportation AAFES
A2AP - Second Destination Transportation APO Mail
A2CA - Second Destination Transportation Contingency ACNT
A2DD - Second Destination Transportation Dodds
A2DR - Second Destination Transportation for Directed Material Movement & Redistribution
A2WA - Second Destination Transportation War reserves AMMO Allies
A2WN - Second Destination Transportation War Reserves (NON-AMMO)
A2WR - Second Destination Transportation War Reserves (Ammunition)
AACS - Conventional Ammunition (SMCA)
AANS - Conventional Ammunition (NON-SMCA)
ADSM - DBOF Supply OPS IMM
AIEI - National Inventory Control Point (NICP) Operations
ALSA - SA-CONT LG SUPPORT-NMRIS
ASAS - Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Program Management
ASCE - USAMC End Item Procurement Operations
ASDE - Conventional Ammunition Demilitarization
ASEI - End Item Supply Depot Operations
ASFMI - Non-Army Source of Supply Asset Management
ASIE - Industrial Preparedness Operations
ASIP - Industrial Mobilization Capacity (IMC)
ASLS - Logistics Assistance / Oil Analysis Programs
ASLT - Logistics Support Programs
ASOC - OCIE Sustainment
ASPO - Transportation Operations
ASTC - Chemical Weapons Stockpile and Materiel Storage
DMRA - Mobilization Rail Access
E3RC - TRAMO
EIGP - IGPBS
EMAP - Terrain and Topographic Support
ENVR - Environmental Restoration Program
FAAA - USA Audit Agency
FACB - Office Chief of Chaplains (OCCH)
FACE - COST & Economic Analysis Center
FACS - Army Safety Center
FAFC - Purchase of Finance and Accounting Services
FAIG - Inspector General Agency
FAJA - JAG ORGS/Claims
FAOD - Center of Military History
FAPA - ODCSPER Mission Support
FAPM - HR Command (HRC)
FARD - Contract Support Agency
FASS - Secretary of the Army Field Operating Activities
FL8R - Army Diagnostics Improvement Program (ADIP)
FPSF - CMS (CMV)
FPSN - Mines and Munitions
GPSI - Personnel Security Investigations
HSUK - Medical Potency & Dated Supply Readiness
JDFM - FMS Manpower Support
MPEH - STAMIS and LOG AUTO Systems Sustainment
MPEI - SALE Sustainment
MPT0 - Logistics Network
MPT1 - Automated Identification Technology (AIT)
MPT2 - Army Food Management Info System
MPT3 - PM PERMS
MPT6 - Acquisition Info Management (AIM)
MPTB - DA Movement Management System
MPTC - Standard Army Ammunition Management System
MPTD - Standard Army Maintenance System
MPTE - Logistics Post Production Software Support
MPTF - Property Book User Supply-Enhanced
MPTG - Unit Level Log System
MPTH - Logistics Automation Systems
MPTL - Single Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE)
MPTM - Tactical Logistics Automation Integration and Sustainment
MPTV - AHRS
MR1G - Power Reliability Enhancement Program
MS10 - AMC Logistics System Operations
MS2C - Inspector General Worldwide Net
MS2E - Modern Aids to Planning Program
MS31 - Logistics Support System Sustainment
MS34 - Army Materiel Direct Log Support System
MS35 - ADP FIELD Logistic System
MS3A - Commodity Command Std System
MS3E - Standard Depot System
MS3H - Paperless Contracting
MSB2 - Transportation Information Systems
MT1G - TMDE Modernization
MU1M - Visual Information Mission Support
MU1P - Army-Wide Publishing
MU2L - Records Management
MXAM - Information Systems Support to AMC
NGFB - OSACOM Administrative Support
NGFR - Counterdrug OPTEMPO
QATC - Air Traffic Control
QDOC - Directorate of Contracting/Contracting Division
QFMC - Financial Management Activities
QLOG - Logistics Activities
QLPR - Law Enforcement
QPSM - Physical Security Matters
QSEC - Directorate of Security
RA11 - Small Arms
RH04 - TRACTOR RIG/FLIP
RJC6 - Physical Security Equipment
RJC7 - Material Handling Equipment (MHE)
RJC9 - Tactical Electric Power
RJL4 - LOG Over the Shore (LOTS)
RJL7 - Liquid Logistics (Fuel & Water) Equipment
RJL8 - Army Water Modernization
RJM1 - CSS LIFE SAVE
RJM2 - TSG RDTE
RJS2 - Combat Service Support Equipment
RJT0 - Non-Tactical Vehicle (NTV)
RJT2 - Trailers
RJT7 - Trailers and Other Tactical Vehicles
RK02 - Force Protection Technology
RK03 - Medical Technology
RK12 - Classified Technology
RN13 - Base-Level Commercial Equipment
SPAR - Readiness Spare Parts
SPDP - TENCAP Sustainment
SPGA - Sustain PM LH
SSSS - SSTS Soldier Support Systems
STAC - SSTS Tactical / Cbt Vehs, Watercraft, Rail, Bridging
TATT - Tech Fixes for Command Identified Training Problems
TRJR - Junior ROTC
TROE - ROTC Enhanced Skills Training
TROT - Senior ROTC
VABS - Soldier Media Center
VALT - Army Logistics Innovation
VAMP - Army Marketing Program
VAVE - Value Engineering
VBNK - Overseas Military Banking Program
VBSA - Boy/Girl Scout Activity Support
VCDE - CDE Implementation
VCFO - Army Chief Financial Operations & Systems
VCNA - Army Counterdrug Flying Hour Program
VCND - Counter Narcotics/Demand Reduction
VCNF - CNARC FAM MEM SUB AB
VCNT - Counter Narcotics Program Accession Drug Testing
VCNX - Counter Narcotics Pgm. Detection, Monitoring and Interdiction
VCNY - Counter Narcotics Pgm. Detection, Monitoring and Interdiction - AR
VCRF - FOREIGN Currency Fluctuation
VDTS - Defense Travel System
VFGN - US Army Parachute Team (Golden Knights)
VFHM - Aviation Contract Services
VFRA - Family Readiness Support Assistants (FRSA)
VFSE - Field Food Service Equip
VGFB - General Fund Enterprise Business System
VHUR - Domestic Disasters
VINA - Inauguration and Spirit of America
VLCA - Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
VMER - Merge YR Accounts
VMSS - HQDA MSS Program
VONE - Expenditures for Operation Noble Eagle
VPBE - Automation Support for PPB Development
VPUB - Public Affairs
VSLP - Strategic Logistics Program
VTFS - FS Holding Account
VTRS - Transportation Safety and Security
VULB - Unified Legislative Budgeting
VWR1 - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-1/CONUS)
VWR2 - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-2/EUROPE)
VWR3 - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-3/AFLOAT)
VWR4 - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4/Korea/Japan/Hawaii
VWR5 - Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-5/SWA)
VWSI - War Reserve Secondary Items
WAMC - AMC TOE Organizations
WCDE - Chemical Defense Equipment for MTO&E Units
ZNET - Special Projects
ZSFM - Reimbursable AWCF Supply Operations
ZTII - II PEG Wedge
ZZDF - National Program Office
ZZSF - SSF MACOM Wedge for ZSFM (Reimb AWCF Sup Opns)

**Personnel and Benefits**
A2MW - Second Destination Transportation MWR (Less AAFES)
A2PC - Second Destination Transportation Civilian PCS
A2UP - Second Destination Transportation Unit PCS Moves
AF2S - FDT/Second Destination Transportation Subsistence
ARFT - AR FTS AT/Above RRC
FAPC - Community & Family Support Center
HSDH - Defense Health Program
MPT7 - AAC-IAA
MPT8 - Personnel Transformation
MS5A - ARMY CIVILIAN Personnel System
MS5B - KEYSTONE Systems
MS5C - Personnel Enterprise System-Automation (PES-A)
MS5G - US MEPCOM Joint Computer Center
MS5K - TOTAL ARMY Personnel Database
MS6C - SIDPERS-USAR
MS7Z - Force Management System
MSAZ - Health Care MIS
NG95 - FECA
NGBL - Education Program
PACS - PCS Travel
PADH - Military Retiree Health Care Accrual Trust Fund-AC
PAID - Enlisted Army Incentives
PAMP - Pay and Allowances (Military Personnel)
PAOT - Military Pay - Other
PARC - BAH-RCI
PARF - AC Subsistence
QAAP - Family Readiness Initiatives and Programs
QACS - Army Community Services
QCCS - Child Development Services
QCPO - Civilian Personnel Advisory Office (CPAC)
QCYS - Child and Youth Services (CYS)
QDEC - Commissary
QDPC - Soldier Rec and Community Support
QFMD - Family Member Substance Abuse
QHFM - Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Management and Fur
QPSG - Personnel Support
QYDP - Youth Development Program
TRVP - Veterans Education Assistance Program (VEAP)
V712 - PBD712 MILITARY To Civilian conversions  
VCAP - Army Career Alumni Program  
VCPR - Army Civilian Personnel Regionalization  
VHOA - Homeowners Assistance Program, Defense  
VINJ - Civilian Injury and Illness Compensation  
VINK - Federal Employees Compensation FECA  
VIRS - Army Recruiting & Retention Initiatives  
VMBH - Military Burial Honors  
VMTS - Public Transportation Benefit Program  
VPRN - OPM NACI Fingerprinting  
VRAE - Reception Stations  
VREM - Disp of Remains/POW-MIA  
VSIK - Subsistence-In-Kind  
VTSS - Subsistence Support Programs  
VUPC - Civilian Unemployment Compensation  
VWWP - Wounded Warrior Program  
VX01 - VSIP  
VX02 - Civilian Work Force Tax  
VX03 - 15% Remittance to CSRDF  
ZC12 - Transition Costs  
ZGRO - Growth of the Army  
ZK2C - Contractor to Civilian Conversions  

**Reserves**  
AR1R - Reserve Component Equipment Modernization  
ARAM - Army Reserve Aviation Maintenance  
ARDM - USAR OTHER Maintenance  
ARDP - USAR NON-AMIM Distribution  
AREN - RC Enlisted Incentives  
ARFH - USAR Flying Hour Program  
ARFU - USAR Full Time Support  
ARIM - IMA Program  
ARIR - Army IRR Screening  
ARIT - USAR Institutional Training Support  
ARMC - Army Reserve MILCON  
ARNM - New Mission Minor Construction USAR  
ARP2 - USAR Surface OPTEMPO  
ARRR - USAR Recruiting, Retention and Family Support Program  
ARTM - USAR TDA Maintenance Support  
ARTR - Division Exercise Support  
DMDE - Mobilization Deployment Exercises  
DMMC - Mobilization Movement Control Technician  
DMNG - NG WARTRACE  
DMSP - MOBEX Support  
FAAR - Army Reserve - Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM)  
FANG - Field Activity National Guard
FAOB - USA Force Development Agency
JCES - NCESGR
MS6Z - HQ OCAR Core ADP
MU1B - USAR IMMP
MXAR - AR-PERSCOM Core ADP
NG2H - NG Medical OPRED
NG39 - NG Communications and Visual Information
NG6H - RC Medical Readiness
NG8T - NG Schools
NGAT - NG Aviation Training Site Technology
NGBA - National Guard Enhanced Separate Brigades
NGBT - NG Real Property O&M For Training Sites
NGCR - NG Pay Raise
NGFH - NG Flying Hour Program
NGHA - NG Operational Safety Health Agency
NGLE - NG LCCS/CLS
NGMC - NG Military Construction
NGMD - NG Command Information
NGMU - NG DEPOT Maintenance
NGNP - NG Indirect-OPTEMPO
NGP2 - Army National Guard Ground OPTEMPO
NGPL - NG aviation Maintenance Activities
NGPT - NG JCS Directed Exercises
NGRA - NG Continuing Education Program
NGRE - NG Recruiting and Retention
NGRL - NG BASOPS OPRED
NGRT - NG BASOPS
NGST - NG Technician Pay for State Area Commands
NGTP - ARNG Military Technicians
NGTT - NG CTC Program
PAAR - Pay and Allowances, Army Reserve
PASN - NG SOF Military Pay
PASR - SOF Military Pay USAR
PNAG - NG PAY AGRS
PNAT - NG PAY 15 Days Annual Training
PNBE - ARNG Bonus Programs
PNCD - NG Pay Career Development and Refresher and Proficiency Training
PNID - NG Pay Inactive Duty Training
PNRP - ARNG Retired Pay Accrual
PNSP - NG Pay Student MOS
PNSR - Military pay, ARNG for Special Operations Forces
PNSU - ARNG Clothing & Subsistence
PNTF - NG Pay Student IET
PRAG - RC AGR Program
PRAT - RC Pay and Allowances - Annual Training
PRDH - Military Retiree Health Care Accrual Trust Fund-RC
PRID - RC Pay Inactive Duty Training
PROI - RC Officer Incentives
PRTF - RC Pay Student Initial Entry Training
QRAR - Army Reserve RPMA CORE
QRCS - reserve component support on installations
TRAP - RC TDAP
TRCS - Reserve Component Training Support
TRIT - RC Initial Skills Training Attendance
TRNC - RC Professional Development Schools
TRNM - RC MOS Qualification Schools
TROS - RC Overseas Deployment
TRST - RC Sustainment Training
TRTD - USAR Training Division
TRUT - USAR FTS TRAINING
VBGM - National Guard Borders Mission
VBSP - Training RDS GRP (AC-RC)
VCNG - NG Counternarcotics
VRDG - DTL Training ASSC (AC-RC)
VTXI - Title XI
WRSQ - USAR Force Structure
ZTRC - QDR Reserve Component Reduction

Transformation
A2FM - Second Destination Transportation Force Modernization/Recapitalization
DA3O - Restructure & Future Force Support
DA3S - STRYKER Facility Support
DA3V - Aviation Transformation Facility Support
DFFE - Field Force Engineering
FL8D - Combat Support Medical
FL8G - Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment
FL8H - Army Logistics Tech Exploration
FLTT - Other for Modernization Fielding
FPEE - Aircrew Integrated Systems
FPER - Comanche
FPES - Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH)
FPET - Light Utility Helicopter (LUH)
FPFD - Engineer Support Equipment
FPFK - Combat Service Support Central
FPLI - Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM)
FPLK - Missiles
FPLS - Follow-On To Tow
FPLW - Indirect Fire Protection Capability
FPSS - Maneuver Ammunition System (MAS)
FPSS - Future Combat Systems (FCS)
FPST - Stryker
FTRC - Advanced Combat Technologies
HS2K - MED FORCE 2000/Medical Re-engineering Initiative
HSMR - Medical Combat Development
JATT - Joint Army Training Transformation
JDDS - Joint Deployment System Resources
MU17 - Army Enterprise Architecture (AEA)
MU1L - National Science Center
NGNG - FORCE XXI
PNRT - NET/DET Through 1997
RA02 - Air Drop Equipment
RA08 - Improved Recovery Vehicle (IRV)
RA32 - Unmanned Ground Systems
RA35 - C2 Vehicle
RB14 - 105MM Ammunition
RB21 - FA Ammunition Improvement
RD16 - Air Traffic Control
RD19 - Advanced Cargo Aircraft
RF01 - Tactical Bridging
RF02 - Countermines
RF03 - Construction Equipment
RF07 - Engineer Support Equip Misc
RJS1 - Soldier Modernization
RJT3 - Armored Security Vehicle
RJT9 - Force Projection Outload
RK01 - Research-Technology Base
RK09 - Soldier Technology
RK11 - Military Engineering Technologies
RK13 - Rotorcraft Technology
RK16 - Lethality Technology
RK17 - Ground Vehicle Technology
RK18 - JSSAP
RK20 - Logistics Technology
RK22 - Digitization S&T
RL02 - Army Test Infrastructure
RL03 - RDTE Management Activities
RL04 - Test Analysis & Evaluation
RL07 - Test and Evaluation Instrumentation
RL08 - Technical Testing of Advanced, High-Technology Weapons Developments
RL12 - Medical R&D Command RDTE Management
RN04 - Manufacturing Technology
VAWE - Advanced Warfighting Experiments
VAWG - Asymmetric Warfare Group
VOCE - ORG CLOTH/IND EQUIP
VREF - Rapid Equipping Soldier Support
VREO - Rapid Equipping Force (REF) Operations
VRML - Army Logistics Transformation
VS0A - Reference Target Development
VTRD - Combat Development Core
VWPF - ODCS G-4 Transformation Support
ZIAC - II PEG AC Modular Forces Incremental Costs
ZMOD - PBD753 Modularity Wedge
ZTAC - TT PEG AC Modular Forces Incremental Costs

**WMD**
FAOC - ARMY Nuclear & Chemical Agency
FASP - Army Space/MISSILE Defense Command
FLCE - Chemical Weapons Stockpile & Materiel Storage Program
FPDG - Cruise Missile Defense
FPFB - Air & Missile Defense Battle Management C4I (AMD BMC4I)
FPQF - Terminal High-Alt Area Defense (THAAD)
FPQG - Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
FPQS - JTAGS – Joint Tactical Ground Station
HSCB - Medical NBC Defense
RG04 - Protective Systems
RL11 - Kwajalein Atoll
VCHM - Chemical Demilitarization
VCWT - Chemical and Biological Treaties
VITI - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Implementation
VNMD - National Missile Defense
VSUR - Army Biological Surety Program
VTER - Antiterrorism
VTRE - Conventional Arms Control Treaties
VTSM - Strategic Arms Control Treaties
VWMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction Domestic Response
XCAP - Chemical ACT Pacific
Endnotes


2 Ibid., 159.


6 Ibid., 23.


8 Ibid., 10.

9 Ibid., 9.


12 Ibid., 43.


16 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting Integrity: Survey on Contractor Ethics Programs (GAO-09-646SP, September 2009), an E-supplement to GAO-09-591

